# Appendix A — Consolidation Coal Co. v. South-East Coal Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix A
- **Published:** January 1, 1971
- **Citation:** 402 U.S. 983

## Text

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 19,622 5
SOUTH-EAST COAL COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. Appeals from
CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY, the United
Defendant-Appellant. | States District
- Court for the
No. 19,623 Eastern Dis-
SOUTH-EAST COAL COMPANY, trict of Ken-
Plaintiff-Appellee, | tucky.
Vv.
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA,

Defendant-A ppellant. /

Opinion
Decided and Filed November 18, 1970.

Before: PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, and CELEBREZZE and
BROOKS, Circuit Judges.

Brooks, Circuit Judge. These are appeals by de-
fendants-appellants, United Mine Workers of America
(UMW or Union) and Consolidation Coal Company
(Consol or Consolidation) ,1 from a jury verdict impos-
ing civil liability for alleged violation of Sections 1 and

1. In this action, unlike the situation which existed
in Ramsey v. United Mine Workers of America, 416 F.2d
655 (6th Cir. 1969), a coal company which allegedly
conspired with the Union to restrain trade was made a
codefendant.

ee ee ee ee ee ee ’

2a
Opinion.

2 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2).
Plaintiff, South-East Coal Company (South-East), con-
tended that a conspiracy to restrain trade existed be-
tween UMW, Consol and other large coal companies and
the Bituminous Coal Operators Association (BCOA)
which was designed to force South-East and other small
coal producers in Eastern Kentucky out of the bitumi-
nous coal business. After a trial lasting six weeks, the
jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, South-East Coal
Company, in the amount of $2,410,452. This amount was
tripled ($7,231,356) as required by 15 U.S.C. § 15, and
attorneys’ fees of $335,000 were allowed, bringing the
total judgment to $7,566,356. We affirm.

On numerous occasions this Court has considered
similar alleged conspiracies between the UMW and large
bituminous coal producers and for a general explanation
and description of the nature of the contended conspir-
acy in this case, the following cases are particularly
illuminating. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657 at 664 (1965); Tennessee Consolidated Coal
Company v. United Mine Workers, 416 F.2d 1192 at 1193
(6th Cir. 1969); Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 265
F. Supp. 388 at 392, 393 (E.D. Tenn. 1967) ; Pennington
v. United Mine Workers, 325 F.2d 804 at 807 (6th Cir.
1963).

While recognizing that the present case is factually
distinguishable from the cited cases? and that differing
proof was employed by the plaintiff, South-East, in at-

2. A notable difference is that, unlike in the cases
cited above, there is in the present case no contention
made that the alleged conspiracy attempted to affect or
manipulate coal prices in the T.W.A. jsic.] bituminous
coal market.

3a
Opinion.

tempting to establish the existence of this conspiracy,
this opinion would, however, be unduly lengthened t-
an elaborate discussion of plaintiff’s case and pr of.
Therefore, the specific and unique facts involved in this
case which bear on issues raised on this appeal will be
considered in conjunction with those issues. Both ap-
pellants have taken issue with certain conduct at trial
which allegedly prejudiced them jointly, and these issues
will be consolidated for consideration. Issues raised by
appellants which explore alleged errors having only
singular significance wil! be dealt with individually.

I. ALLEGED ERRORS IN INSTRUCTIONS

A. THE STANDARD OF PROOF REQUIRED TO IMPOSE LIA-
BILITY

Consol and the Union argue that the District Court
erred in its charge to the jury on the necessary degree
or standard of proof which plaintiff must meet in order
for the jury to conclude that appellants violated the
Sherman Act. The Union, relying upon Lewis v. Pen-
nington, 400 F.2d 806 (6th Cir.. 1968)3 and Ramsey v.

3. The Lewis v. Pennington case has a rather in-
volved history. This Court first affirmed the District
Court holding against UMW in Pennington v. UMW, 325
F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963). The Supreme Court
that the Union’s exemption from the antitrust laws did
not apply in this situation but reversed on other
grounds. Pennington v. UMW, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). On
retrial in Lewis v. Pennington, 257 F.Supp. 815 (1966),
the District Court found in favor of the Union reason-
ing that plaintiff failed to demonstrate by “clear proof”
any violation of the antitrust laws. This Court in Lewis
v. Pennington, 400 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1968) affirmed
the District Court. (Before Judges Edwards, Peck and
Combs, per J. Edwards). Certiorari was denied by the
Supreme Court in 393 U. S. 983 (1968).

4a
Opinion. a

United Mine Workers, 416 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1969) ,4
contends that the District Court did not adequately or
accurately instruct the jury that to impose liability on

4. In Ramsey v. UMW this Court sat en banc. This
was an appeal from the District Court ruling dismissing
the action, 265 F.Supp. 388 (1967), because plaintiffs
could not show an antitrust violation on the part of the
Union by “clear proof’, although by the ordinary stan-
dard of preponderance of the evidence the Court sug-
gested that liability might be imposed upon the Union.
A three-judge panel of this Court heard this appeal on
April 8, 1969. Rehearing en banc was granted and that
opinion appears at 416 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1969), Chief
Judge Phillips and Judges Edwards, Peck and Combs
for affirming; opinion by Judge Edwards. Judges Weick,
O’Sullivan, Celebrezze and McCree for reversing; opin-
ion by Judge O’Sullivan. Certiorari was granted by the
Supreme Court, — U.S. — (March .., 1970).

One week before the en banc hearing in Ramsey, a
panel composed of Judges Weick, Peck and Combs
(opinion by Judge Weick) in Tennessee Consolidated
Coal Company v. UMW, 416 F.2d 1192 (1969) affirmed
the jury finding of liability of the union for an antitrust
violation. (The West Kentucky Coal Company which
was joined as a defendant because it was an alleged co-
conspirator of the union was voluntarily non-suited.
Thus, here again, we had only the union beingsued.) This
Court observed regarding the District Court’s instruc-
tions that the Union was given the benefit of a more
stringent standard of proof by the fashion in which the
District Court instructed the jury on “clear proof” and,
therefore, was not prejudiced by the instructions even
if they were incorrect. The Court made the following
remark respecting Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act: “Section 6 does provide that participation, author-
ization or ratification must be shown by clear proof.
Section 6 does not state that the unlawful acts must be
shown by clear proof.” Judges Peck and Combs were
among the judges in the divided court in Ramsey, supra,
which there held that all elements of the antitrust vio-

5a
Opinion.

the Union every essential element of the violation, ex-
cept damages, must be established by “clear proof’’.5
Consol joins in and maintains that it too should get the
benefit of this more stringent standard of proof. This
Circuit is somewhat in disagreement as to the proper
degree of proof required to hold a labor union liable for
violating the Sherman Act. In the en banc hearing in

lation except damages must be shown by clear proof.
Judge Weick, author of the opinion in Tennessee Con-
solidated Coal, joined those judges in Ramsey who felt
that only the authorization, participation, or ratifica-
tion by the Union of the unlawful acts need be shown by
clear proof. Certiorari in Tennessee Consolidated Coal
was denied by the Supreme Court, 38 U.S.L.W. 3335,
3342 (March 3, 1970).

o. The District Court gave an instruction on proof
by a preponderance of the evidence, see infra p. 14.
However, in its supplemental instructions to the jury,
the Court gave the following charge on “clear proof”:

“Members of the jury, the Court has already
charged you that the issue of alleged conspiracy in
this case must be decided upon clear proof, that is,
the plaintiff must produce clear proof of the alleged
conspiracy. Clear proof means clear, unequivocal,
and convincing proof that. the defendants partici-
pated in, actually authorized the alleged conspiracy
or ratified it after having actual knowledge thereof.
I want to give you that additional instruction as a
definition for one of the terms I used in my charge.”

Thus, the District Court did charge the jury that “clear
proof” of participation, authorization or ratification of
the alleged conspiracy by the defendants was necessary
to hold them liable. While it is concluded that the “clear
proof” standard is applicable only in holding a union
ratified or authorized the acts of its officials, the Dis-
trict Court’s instruction even if erroneous gave both
defendants the benefit of a more stringent burden of
proof for finding them liable.

6a
Opinion.

Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, supra, the Court di-
vided evenly on the issue. Four judges held that to im-
pose liability on a labor union for a Sherman Act viola-
tion Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act® requires
that every element of the unlawful act except damages
be shown by “clear proof”. Four judges construed this
section of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to provide that
the “clear proof” standard applied only in proving
that the Union participated in, authorized or ratified
the unlawful acts of its officers with actual knowledge.
They concluded that after this was shown by “clear
proof” the remaining elements of the antitrust viola-
tion—formation of the antitrust conspiracy, the un-
lawful acts, causation and damages, and all the other
elements — required proof only by a preponderance of
the evidence.

Because a major coal company has been named a
defendant as a coconspirator with the UMW in this
antitrust case, a unique problem is presented with
respect to the standard of proof question. That prob-
lem is what standard of proof must be met by the plain-
tiff to hold a company liable for an antitrust violation
if it conspired with a labor union. If it is assumed that

6. Section 6 of the Act (29 U.S.C. § 106) pro-
vides:

“No officer or member of any association or
organization, and no association or organization
participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall
be held responsible or liable in any court of the
United States for the unlawful acts of individual
officers, members, or agents, except upon clear
proof of actual participation in, or actual authori-
zation of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts
after actual knowledge thereof.”

Ta
Opinion.

the correct standard of proof to be applied in holding
a labor union civilly liable for a Sherman Act violation
is “clear proof” of all essential elements, the question
then is: “Should a company which is fortuitously
joined as a coconspirator of a labor union in an anti-
trust case get the benefit of the stricter standard of
proof afforded the union?” There is no basis in either
the Sherman Act or the Norris-LaGuardia Act to indi-
cate that to impose liability on a company, named as
a coconspirator of a labor union for an antitrust vio-
lation, anything more than a preponderance of the
evidence is necessary. To hold that a company should
get the benefit of this more strict standard, simply be-
cause it was named with a labor union as a coconspir-
ator in a scheme to restrain trade, would be to grant
such a company a more advantageous position than
other companies would have, which might violate the
antitrust laws but ere not joined with a union. The
law does not provide such an a~bitrary advantage.
The standard of proof applicable to a company in at-
tempting to show it violated the antitrust laws, regard-
less of whether it is joined as a coconspirator with a
labor union, is the preponderance of the evidence.
Bigelow v. RKO Pictures, 150 F.2d 877, 883 (7th Cir.
1945) ; reversed on other grounds, 327 U.S. 251 (1946).

Having concluded that the standard of proof
needed to be met to hold a company civilly for an anti-
trust violation is preponderance of the evidence,
another legal hurdle is encountered when, as in this
case, a company is joined as a coconspirator with a
union. Again, assume that the correct standard of
proof applicable to a labor union under these circum-

8a
Opinion.

stances is “clear proof”. Hypothetically, a situation
could exist where only a union and a single company
have conspired to restrain trade. Suppose that in this
hypothetical case it could be shown by a preponderance
of the evidence that the company did conspire to vio-
late the antitrust laws, however, while a preponder-
ance of the evidence also showed the union conspired,
it could not be shown by “clear proof”. Therefore, the
union would be exonerated and, by force of the fact
that a Sherman Act violation is an actionable wrong
only when committed under an unlawful conspiracy
by two or more, the company would also escape liabil-
ity. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Company,
310 U.S. 150 (1940); Standard Oil Company of Cali-
fornia v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 975. Thus, the company by indirect
method would have received the benefit of the more
strict standard of proof. While the chances of a situa-
tion as this occurring are perhaps remote, this ex-
plains the type of problem which may result when
parties to an actionable wrong like conspiracy have
their respective ultimate liabilities gauged by different
standards of proof.

This leads to the question of whether all essential
elements of an alleged antitrust conspiracy against a
labor union must be shown by “clear proof”. The en
banc decision of this Court in Ramsey did not resolve
this controversy. Without a repetitive discussion of the
rationale behind this panel’s conclusion on this issue,
already extensively explored in Judge O’Sullivan’s
opinion in Ramsey, it is concluded that while “clear
proof” is necessary to show that the Union partici-
pated, authorized, or ratified the acts of its officers, the

9a
Opinion.

essential elements of the conspiracy necessary to re-
solve the ultimate issue of liability need be shown
only by a preponderance of the evidence. (See n. 4).
The jury charge on the standard of proof issue coi'!d
have been more clear, howeve.’, the parties were given
the benefit of a partial instruction which was more
stringent than required by this Court’s conclusion on
what is the proper standard of proof.’ Thus, the parties
were not prejudiced by the instruction even if it was
erroneous.

B. THE REASONABLENESS OF THE RESTRAINT

UMW and Consol claim they were prejudiced by
the absence of an instruction to the jury that only
undue or unreasonable restraints of trade or competi-
tion are grounds for finding a Sherman Act violation.
Usually, to find that a violation of the Sherman Act
has occurred, the restraint of trade or competition
resulting from certain acts committed by the accused
parties must be “unreasonable”. See generally, Stand-
ard Oil Company v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911);
Apex Hosiery Company v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940) ;
Lewis v. Pennington, supra. However, there are sever-
al types of restraints of trade which are per se unreas-
able. See e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries
Company, 273 U.S. 392 (1927) ; United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Company, Inc., supra; United States v.
Consolidated Laundries Corporation, 291 F.2d 563 (2nd
Cir. 1961). Other restraints, while reasonable on
their face, become unreasonable when they are accom-
panied with a specific intent to accomplish a forbidden

7. See n. 5, supra.

10a
Opinion.

restraint. United States v. Columbia Steel Company,
334 U.S. 492 (1948).

In United Mine Workers v. Pennington, supra, an
alleged conspiracy existed which had as part of its pur-
pose the identical objective that plaintiff, South-East,
contends was the object of this particular conspiracy.
That is, that the “union entered into a conspiracy with
the large operators to impose the agreed-upon wages
and royalty scales upon the smaller, non-union oper-
ators, regardless of their ability to pay and regardless
of whether or not the union represented the employees
of these companies, all for the purpose of eliminating
them from the industry, limiting production and pre-
empting the market for the large unionized operators.”
Respecting this type of conspiracy the Supreme Court
observed at 381 U.S. 665, 666:

“TA] union may make wage agrcements with
a multi-employer bargaining unit and may in pur-
suance of its own union interests seek to obtain the
same terms from other employers. No case under
the antitrust laws could be made out on evidence
limited to such union behavior (Footnote omitted).
But we think a union forfeits its exemption from
the antitrust laws when it is clearly shown that it
has agreed with one set of employers to impose a
certain wage scale on other bargaining units. One
group of employers may not conspire to eliminate
competitors from the industry and the union is
liable with the employers if it becomes a party to
the conspiracy.”

The Supreme Court then made the following analogy:

“One could hardly contend, for example, that one
group of employers could lawfully demand that the

lla
Opinion.

union impose on other employers wages that were
significantly higher than those paid by the request-
ing employers, or a system of computing wages
that, because of differences in methods of produc-
tion, would be more costly to one set of employers
than to another. The anticompetitive potential of
such a combination is obvious, but is little more
severe than what is alleged to have been the pur-
pose and effect of the conspiracy in this case to
establish wages at a level that marginal producers
could not pay so that they would be driven from the
industry.” 381 U.S. at §g8.

The conclusion which can be drawn from this lan-
guage is that when a labor union and an employer enter
into a plan or scheme of the type which results in the
union losing its exemption from liability under the _nti-
trust law, that plan or scheme is by definition an un-
reasonable restraint ‘under the antitrust laws. [But see
the interpretation given this language by Judge Peck
in Lewis v. Pennington, 400 F.2d 806, 813-814 (1968)
and by District Judge Wilson in Ramsey v. United Mine
Workers, 265 F.Supp. 388, 399 (1967) ]. Thus, if it could
be shown that in this case the Union entered into a con-
spiracy with certain large coal operators to impose
agreed upon wages and royalties upon smaller, non-
union coal producers, regardless of their ability to pay
and regardless of whether or not the Union represented
the employees of these smaller companies, all for the
avowed purpose of eliminating them from the business,
limiting production and pre-empting the market for the
larger, unionized coal producers, this conspiracy would
be a per se unreasonable restraint of trade or competi-
tion. While the District Court did not give an instruc-

12a
Opinion.

tion that only undue or unreasonable restraints of trade
or competition can be grounds for a jury to conclude
that there was an antitrust violation, in light of the
conclusion that if the alleged conspiracy in this case was
proved, it would be by definition unreasonable, no spe-
cific instruction on the reasonableness of the restraint
was necessary.

C. INSTRUCTIONS ON A LABOR UNION’S EXEMPTION
FROM THE ANTITRUST LAWS

The United Mine Workers argue that they were
prejudiced by the District Court’s failure to give its
proffered instruction on a labor union’s exemption from
the antitrust laws.8 The District Court gave the follow-
ing instructions respecting activities of a labor union
and their relationship to the antitrust laws:

8 The Union proffered the following instruction:

“3. In Section 6 of the Clayton Act, which
amended the Sherman Antitrust Act, Congress de-
clared that ‘the labor of a human being is not a
commodity or article of commerce nor shall (labor)
organizations or the members thereof be held or
construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies
in restraint of trade under the antitrust laws.’ The
entering into a wage agreement with employers,
which is a successful union activity, may have some
influence on price competition by eliminating that
part of such competition which is based on differ-
ences in labor standards. However, a labor union
to be effective must eliminate the competition from
goods produced under sub-standard labor condi-
tions. The elimination of price competition based on
differences in labor standar ls is a lawful union ob-
jective and the effect of such objective on price
competition is not violative of the antitrust laws.
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 503;
UMWA v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664.”

13a
Opinion.

“Now, the law does not make it unlawful for
them to combine for the purpose of making a union
for the purpose of protecting their rights and fcr
having a bargaining agent, so you are not to con-
sider because the union is composed of a great many
miners, all of the miners in this Eastern Kentucky
who are members of it, that of itself is not unlawful.
The courts have expressly said so.

“The law has expressly said so in what is
known as the LaGuardia Act that was passed by
the Congress. That is not unlawf

“Then under the national law and under the
national policy, the labor laws, as we have produced
under what is known as the Labor Act, and the
LaGuardia Act and these other Acts of Congress,
they were allowed to bargain collectively. They
didn’t hire one man for so much and another for so
much, but the miners and other workers in other
industries were allowed to bargain collectively and
to select a bargaining agent.”

* * *

“A union may make wage agreements with a
multi-employer bargaining unit and may, in pur-
suance of its own union’s interest, seek to obtain
the same terms from other employers; but a union
forteiis its cxemption from the anti-trust laws when
it is clearly shown that it has an agreement with
one set of employers to impose a wage scale on the
bargaining unit.”9

9. ‘The correct statement per Pennington is “a cer-
tain wage scale on other bargaining units.” Apparently,

l4a

- Opinion.

“One group of employers may not conspire to
eliminate competitors from the industry, and the
union is liable with the employers if it becomes a
party to the conspiracy.

“This is true even though the union’s part in
the scheme is an undertaking to secure the same
wages, hours, or other conditions of employment
for the remaining employees and employer in the
industry.

“It is a legitimate aim of any national labor
organization to obtain uniformity of labor stanc-
ards, and it may be a consequence of such union
activity to eliminate competition based on differ-
ence in such standards.

“This, however, does not mean that the union
and the employers in one bargaining unit are free
to bargain about wages, hours, and working condi-
tions of other bargaining units or to attempt to
settle these matters for the entire industry.

“The union has a duty to bargain unit by unit
in order to best serve its obligations to its members.

“The Union should retain the ability to respond
to each bargaining situation as the individual cir-
cumstances might warrant without being straight-
jacketed by some prior agreement with favored
employers.”

this was a misspoken phrase, as the District Judge in the
remainder of the charge more than adequately conveys
the idea that the disallowed conduct is when an em-
ployer (or a multi-employer bargaining unit) combines
with a labor unit to impose certain labor standards or
conditions on other bargaining units or employers.

15a
Opinion.

These instructions, portions of which are taken from
UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), adequately
explained to the jury what types of conduct a labor
union may engage in without fear of antitrust violation
repercussion. The instructions also advised the jury
under what circumstances otherwise lawful union ac-
tivity would result in an antitrust violation. See gen-
erally, Allen Bradley Company v. Local Union No. 8,
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 325
U.S. 797 (1945); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S.
219 (1941); Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, supra.
The Union complains that the expression “exemption”
was only used once in the instruction. It is interesting
to observe that even in UMW’s proffered instruction on
this subject (see n. 8) the expression “exemption” was
not used. While a party has the right to have his legal
ciaims of defenses stated to the jury by way of instruc-
tions, so long as the District Judge accurately states
these claims or defenses, there can be no grounds for
objection simply because the exact wording or phrasing
of the requesting party are not used.

The Union contends that the instructions in this
case were as fatal as those given in Cedar Crest Hats,
Inc. v. United Hatters, Cap and Millinery Workers Inter-
national Union, 362 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1966). That suit
involved a labor union against whom charges of anti-
trust violations and unfair labor practices were made.
On appeal the union objected to the court’s instructions
which did not even mention that certain conduct en-
gaged in by a labor union does not fall within the scope
of activities violating the antitrust laws. A comparison
of the trial court’s instruction in that case (appearing
at 362 F.2d 322, 325-326) with the instructions given in

16a
Opinion.

the instant case, supra, respecting a labor union’s con-
duct in regard to the antitrust laws clearly indicates
that the instructions in question on this appeal were
both correct and fair.

D. EQUAL HYPOTHESIS RULE

Appellants contend it was error for the District
Court not to instruct the jury that “where proven facts
give equal support to each of two inconsistent infer-
ences, in which event, neither of them being established,
judgment, as a matter of law, must go against the party
upon whom rests the necessity of sustaining one of
these inferences as against the other, before he is en-
titled to recover.” Pennsylvania Railroad Company v.
Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333, 339 (1933). It is argued
that such an instruction is a necessary component of
the law applicable to circumstantial evidence and was
properly given in Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 265
F.Supp. 388 at 432 (1967), and Tennessee Consolidated
Coal Company v. United Mine Workers (unreported Dis-
trict Court opinion) and respectively affirmed by this
Court in Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 416 F.2d 655,
665 (6th Cir. 1969), and Tennessee Consolidated Coal
Company v. United Mine Workers, 416 F.2d 1192, 1202-
1203 (6th Cir. 1969).

It appears that the “equal hypothesis rule” is
simply a negative way of phrasing the rule of law that
a plaintiff must sustain his burden of proof. Thus, if a
plaintiff does not come forth with evidence, when con-
sidered in light of opposing evidence, from which a jury
could infer the truth of an alleged proposition over its
contra-proposition, the plaintiff has not met his burden
of proof. When there are equal inferences which can

17a
Opinion.

be drawn from a particular set of facts — one inference
indicating liability, the other non-liability — it is the
judge’s obligation at the direct verdict stage of the trial
to find for the defendant. See Pennsylvania Railroad
Company v. Chamberlain, supra; Gulf Refining Com-
pany v. Mark C. Walker & Son Company, 124 F.2d 420,
426 (6th Cir. 1942). It would not be proper under these
circumstances for the trial judge to relinquish to the
jury this responsibility by simply giving them an in-
struction to the effect that if they could not draw either
an inference of liability or one of non-liability from the
facts presented, they should conclude non-liability.19

In this case the District Court’ fhstructed the jury
on the meaning of plaintiff having to sustain the burden
of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. He stated:

“Now, in order to recover, the South-East Coal
Company must sustain the burden of proof; in other
words, if no proof was offered, there would be no

10. The Ramsey case relied upon by appellants was
a non-jury case. On appeal an observation — not an
instruction — made by the District Judge in his opinion
was quoted with approval. Since the “equal inference”
rule or doctrine is used by the trial judge in deciding
the question of whether a directed verdict should be
granted a defendant because plaintiff has not satisfied
his burden of proof, it is both logical and correct that
this rule entered the trial judge’s thinking in the non-
jury trial in Ramsey. It is doubtful that the equal in-
ference instruction given in Tennessee Consolidated to
the jury was correct. However, this apparently was not
assigned as error on appeal as no mention whatsoever
is made of that instruction or the propriety of its use
in the appellate opinion in the case. See Tennessee Con-
solidated Coal Company v. United Mine Workers, 416
F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1969).

18a

Opinion.

judgment for the plaintiff. It is his responsibility
to offer proof to establish the facts that he claims.

“And the defendant has the right, as you have
seen here, to offer proof to contradict those facts
or to explain those facts or to justify its conduct,
which may have been brought out by witnesses for
the plaintiff in support of its allegations.

“But it is the responsibility of the plaintiff to
sustain this burden of proof. Now, by ‘burden of
proof,’ it doesn’t necessarily mean the greater num-
ber of witnesses. Sometimes the burden of proof in
lawsuits can be.sustained by one witness as con-
trary to fifteen on the other side, and so you are
not to confuse the idea of ‘burden of proof’ with
numbers of witnesses or numbers of depositions or
other articles of evidence that might be offered.

“But it must convince you, before this plain-
tiff may recover, it must sustain its burden of proof
by proving every essential element of the claim, by
a preponderance of the evidence.

“Should it fail in its proof, under this rule you
should find for the defendant.

“To establish the preponderance of the evi-
dence means to prove that something is more likely
so than not so; in other words, the ‘preponderance
of the evidence’ means such evidence, when con-
sidered and compared with that opposed to it, has
more convincing force and produces in your minds
belief that what is sought to be proved is more
likely to be true than not true.”

19a
Opinion.

These instructions explained what South-East had
to prove and to what degree the jury must be convinced
of the truth of South-East’s assertions. It was not error
for the District Court to refuse to give the “equal hy-
pothesis” instruction requested by appellants.

E. INSTRUCTIONS RESPECTING THE USE TO BE MADE BY
THE JURY OF CERT4"=N HEARSAY STATEMENTS

Consolidation raises as error the District Court’s
refusal to give a concluding instruction to the jury re-
garding the permissive use of certain statements which
were competent evidence as against the Union but were
hearsay as applied to Consolidation. The rejected in-
struction stated in part that:

“During the trial the Court has permitted the
introduction of evidence concerning the actions and
statements of each of the defendants with specific
admonition to the jury, however, that the members
of the jury must not consider that evidence against
the other defendants .... Inasmuch as there can
be no liability on the part of the defendants unless
a conspiracy is (proven) ... you must disregard all
of such evidence unless you first find by other and
disassociated evidence in the case sufficient .. .
proof that the conspiracy claimed by plaintiff ex-
isted. In such event you may then consider the
evidence subject to the admonition in concert with
all the other evidence in the case.”

A requested instruction similar to this was not
given in Schmeller v. United States, 143 F.2d 544, 550
(6th Cir. 1944), and it was held reversible error. This
case lends the strongest support for Consolidation’s

20a
Opinion.

position. However, since the Schmeller case was decided,
the logic and correctness of a jury charge that instructs
that certain hearsay statements as to one defendant
cannot be used by the jury in determining whether a
conspiracy exists between defendants until the jury has
first concluded that the defendants are guilty of an
unlawful conspiracy, has apparently been seriously
challenged. In addition, appellants’ reliance on Schmel-
ler is not entirely appropriate as part of the reason the
Court found error in the refusal to give the instruction
was that there were both substantive charges and a con-
spiracy charge involved. In the instant case we are
dealing only with a conspiracy charge. In Carbo v.
United States, 314 F.2d 718, 736 (9th Cir. 1963), an
instruction almost identical to that offered by Consoli-
dation in this case was held to have been properly re-
jected as not a correct statement of the law. The Court
in Carbo observed:

“The situation is rendered confusing by the fact
that the admissibility of this evidence (concededly
relevant but challenged under a technical eviden-
tiary rule of competence) depends upon a disputed
preliminary question of fact which coincides with
the ultimate jury question upon the merits. (Foot-
note omitted). The declarations are admissible
against the defendants if they are co-conspirators.
If they are co-conspirators, they are guilty. The
problem presented to us is whether the preliminary
question (upon the resolution of which only inde-
pendent evidence is available) is to be resolved by
the jury or by the judge. Appellants’ view of the
law [which, except for the standard of proof is
identical to that asserted by Consolidation] ... is

21a
Opinion.

that the preliminary question is to be resolved by
the jury upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

“Yet if by independent evidence the defendant’s
position as a co-conspirator is to be established by
the jury upon their judgment beyond a reasonable
doubt, there is no occasion ever to resort to the
declaration at all. The district court in effect will
have told the jury, ‘You may not consider this evi-
dence unless you first find the defendant guilty.’ ”

[Bracketed explanation is this Court’s].

While Carbo and many of the cases which have
dealt with this problem are criminal in nature, therefore
requiring the jury to conclude the existence of a con-
spiracy beyond a reasonable doubt, the paradox of in-
structing a jury that certain statements can be used to
establish a conspiracy only after they have already
found the conspiracy to exist is just as illogical in civil
cases, although a lesser standard of proof is required.
Thus, it is concluded that the preliminary question of
the admissibility of evidence challenged under this tech-
nical evidentiary rule (this is clearly a question of
admissibility and not of sufficiency or weight of the
evidence, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1962) ) is a matter for the judge not the jury to decide
and, therefore, the instruction was properly rejected by
the District Court. We deal here only with the propriety,
as a legal matter, of the District Court’s refusal to give
Consolidation’s proposed instruction, and the question
of whether the Court erred in admitting these state-
ments because no prima facie case was established will
be considered later, infra., see pp. 33-34.

Se et te ene Ed

Opinion.

INSTRUCTIONS RESPECTING THE PROTECTIVE WAGE
CLAUSE AND “80-CENT CLAUSE” IN THE NATIONAL
AGREEMENT

Alleged errors in the District Court’s instruction

regarding the Protective Wage Clause (PWC)11 and
the “80-cent clause”’!> presents a legal problem the reso-

11. See Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 416

F.2d 655 and Tennessee Consolidated Coal Company v.
United Mine Workers, 416 F.2d 1192 for a discussion of
the PWC and the complete text of the clause.

12. The “80-cent clause” of the National Agree-

ment provided:

“UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA
WELFARE AND RETIRMENT FUND OF 1950
(As Amended)

“Amend the first printed paragraph of subsection
A of this clause by striking out all of the second
sentence beginning with the word ‘During’ and end-
ing after the word ‘sale’ and inserting in lieu there-
of the following: ‘During the life of this agreement
there shall be paid into such Fund by each operator
signatory hereto the sum of forty cents (40 cents)
per ton of two thousand (2,000) pounds on each ton
of bituminous coal produced by such Operator for
use or for sale. On all bituminous coal procured or
acquired by any signatory Operator for use or for
sale, (i.e., all bituminous coal other than that pro-
duced by such signatory Operator) there shall, dur-
ing the life of this agreement, be paid into such
Fund by each such Operator signatory hereto or by
use or for sale. On all bituminous coal procured or
any subsidiary or affiliate of such Operator signa-
tory hereto the sum of (80 cents) [sic.] per ton of
two thousand (2,000) pounds on each ton of such
bituminous coal so procured or acquired on which
the aforesaid sum of forty cents (40 cents) per ton
had not been paid into said Fund prior to such pro-
curement or acquisition. The parties hereto mu-

23a
Opinion.

lution of which may be helped by a brief discussion of
the clauses and the role they played in the various na-
tional labor agreements in which they appeared. The
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement entered in-
to between the Bituminous Coal Operators Association
(BCOA) and the United Mine Workers in 1950 was
amended in 1958 thereby incorporating the Protective
Wage Clause. The arrangement provided by the clause
was that the '’nited Mine Workers agreed, as bargain-
ing agent for the employees covered by the contract
(members of the UMW), that while the contract was in
effect it would not enter into, or be a party to any agree-
ment covering wages or working conditions which were
not on an equal basis with those provisions contained
in this contract. In return for this commitment, the
coal producing signatories to the NationalAgreement
(BCOA members) agreed “that all bituminous coal
mined, produced, or prepared by them, or any of them,
or procured or acquired by them or any of them under

tually agree that, if at any time during the term of
this agreement a court or tribunal of competent
jurisdiction determines by final decision that the
provision appearing in the sentence just preceding,
providing for the payment by signatory operators
of eighty cents (80 cents) per ton under certain
prescribed conditions, is invalid or in violation of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, or
other federal or state law, the parties shall, at the
option of and upon demand by party of the second
part, without affecting the integrity of any other
provision of this section or any other provision of
the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement,
meet and engage in good faith negotiations to agree
upon a clause to be inserted irto this agreement in
rr ne of the provisions found invalid or
a Ng

24a
Opinion.

a sub-contract arrangement shall be or shall have been
mined or produced under terms and conditions which
are as favorable to the employees as those provided for
in this contract.”

The “80-cent clause” of 1964 amended the Welfare
and Retirement Fund provisions of the 1950 Nationai
Agreement. The Protective Wage Clause was dropped
from the Agreement in that year. Until this amendment
went into effect signatories to the National Agreement
had to pay into the Welfare Fund forty cents per ton
of coal they produced. The purvose of the amendment
was to obligate signatories who procured or acquired
bituminous coal for sale or use which was not produced
under an agreement requiring the paying of forty cents
per ton into the Welfare Fund (non-UMW produced
coal) to pay eighty cents into the Welfare Fund for each
ton of coal so procured. While the stated purpose of the
amendment was to protect work standards by equalizing
labor costs between employees of signatories and non-
signatories, the obvious effect was to discourage signa-
tories from purchasing or acting as sale agents for coal
companies which produced coal with non-UMW laborers.

The legality of the Protective Wage Clause, in
terms of the antitrust laws, was considered in the Ram-
sey and Tennessee Consolidated Coal cases. In Ramsey,
responding to the allegation that the PWC was a per se
violation of the Sherman Act, the Court (all judges con-
curred in this portion of the opinion) observed that the
clause was capable of two opposite constructions. How-
ever, the proper interpretation to be given the clause
was the one “that does not result in a violation of the
law.” Ramsey at 659. In Tennessee Consolidated Coal
the jury’s general verdict imposing liability on the Un-

SRT M NNN Tie PRE wast CEFF Tk

BRL GALE RO LANE

DDE LL LALA ILL LOS EET, SATII

25a
Opinion.

ion concluded that the PWC required the Union not to
bargain with non-signatory operators except upon the
terms and conditions of the National Agreement, 416
F.2d 1192, 1197 (6th Cir. 1969). The jury also found in
response to special interrogatories that “prior to and
apart from” the National Agreement as amended in 1958
the UMW did not conspire with signatory coal operators
to impose the terms of the National Agreement on non-
signatories. It should be noted that except for several
minor alterations in the 1950 National Agreement made
by the 1958 amendment, the addition of the Protective
Wage Clause by the amendment constituted the major
change in the National Agreement. On appeal on Ten-
nessee Coal, this Court stated that the contract, the
PWC, was ambiguous and that all circumstances sur-
rounding the contract and the practical construction
given it by the parties could be used by the jury in de-
termining the meaning of the contract. While it cannot
be said with absolute certainty upon which theory or
basis the jury chose to impose liability in the Tennes-
see Coal case, it seems that the jury felt that the PWC
was the crux of the Union’s illegal conduct.13

The legality of the “80-cent clause” in terms of the
antitrust laws has not been considered by an appellate
court. When the “80-cent clause” was incorporated into
the National Agreement, charges that it violated Sec-
tion 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act were
raised. See Lewis v. National Labor Relations Board,

13. The Tennessee Coal case was decided a week
after the Ramsey case. However, it is not clear what
effect Ramsey has on the findings of the jury in Ten-
messee Coal. Certiorari was denied in Tennessee Coal
but granted in Ramsey.

26a
Opinion.

350 F.2d 801 (D.C.Cir. 1965); United Mine Workers v.
National Labor Relations Board, 399 F.2d 977 (D.C.Cir.
1968). A final determination of this question has not
been made.

Appellants maintain that the instruction with re-
spect to these clauses failed to “adequately or accu-
rately” explain the significance of these provisions and
the proper legal interpretation that should be given
them. Specifically, they contend that the District
Court’s instructions were in contradiction in so far as
they instructed the jury that the contracts or national
agreements containing these clauses were legal, but that
they, the jury, could conclude that an antitrust violation
occurred if they found that the agreements were en-
tered into with the intention of driving certain coal
producers out of business. It is argued that this is
paradoxical and that either the agreements were legal
or illegal. South-East contends that the instructions
were accurate and more than adequate because they
admitted the legality of the clauses in the national
agreements, but based their claim of antitrust violation
on the theory of the existence of an “intentional preda-
tory conspiracy” as developed by Mr. Justice White’s
opinion in Pennington. Neither of th-3e positions is a
wholly correct interpretation of the law as stated in
Pennington. .

In Ramsey the Supreme Court’s decision in Penning-
ton was examined with particular attention or agree-
ment between an employer and a labor union might pro-
duce grounds for concluding that an antitrust violation
occurred. It was in Ramsey that it was decided that
“the language of the agrement (PWC) did not per se
constitute an illegal conspiracy.” In addition, Penning-

USVI ESRD RSE

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x

SRSA LRT TRO He ME Le SS a Bere

27a
Opinion.

ton was construed to have held that “a conspiracy be-
tween employers and labor formed with the intention
of driving competitors out of business is a violation of
the Sherman Act” and that “ ‘predatory intent’ (as used
by Mr. Justice White, 381 U.S. at 668 . . .) is merely
shorthand employed to describe this anti-competitive
conspiracy.”

Reviewing the Ramsey decision’s interpretation of
Pennington four conclusions may be drawn applicable to
the present dispute. First, the National Agreement con-
taining the Protective Wage Clause, is on its face, a
valid labor contract which seeks to implement the per-
fectly legal goals of uniformity of wages and working
conditions. Second, if this agreement was made or en-
tered into by the union in pursuance of its own self inter-
est, ther [sic.] are no grounds for concluding a violation
of the antitrust laws. Third, if however the employers
and union entered into this contract with the conscious
knowledge or intent that it would be used to drive com-
petitors out of business (more than the incidental ef-
fects caused by the adoption of a uniform wage agree-
ment which may result in certain operators not being
able to function profitably), then a violation of the
antitrust laws has occurred. Fourth, it is this either
expressly or impliedly agreed-upon use of the valid con-
tract, that is, that it will be used to drive competitors
out of business, that comprises the agreement or con-
spiracy which is illegal for purposes of the antitrust
laws. Without deciding the question of the legality of
the “8(-cent clause” suffice it to be said that these
conclusions are also applicable to that provision.

The District Court gave the following instruction
with regard to the National Agreement, the nature of

28a
Opinion.

an illegal conspiracy and what South-East was required
to show before the jury could impose liability on the
defendants:

“In order to establish a conspiracy or unlaw-
ful arrangement as claimed by the plaintiff in this
case it is not necessary that the plaintiff should
offer proof of a direct arrangement or executed
written contract that they are entering into a con-
spiracy.

“It is not necessary that the agreement, if any,
was the result of formal action on the part of the
defendants. The real question to be determined is
whether or not there was a meeting of the minds
or a common understanding and purpose in the
requirement of the execution of the labor agree-
ment with the intention of doing injury to the
plaintiff.

* sd sd * * * 5

“The thing which you will have to decide and
which I will probably refer to again, there is noth-
ing unlawful about that contract in itself; but if it
was entered into with we intention on the part of
the signatories — the two defendants here — to
injure the plaintiff, if they had that in mind, that
‘we are going to go into this contract because we
know it will put South-East out of business; they
can’t meet the conditions; we are too big, too strong,
and they cannot compete with us, cannot get miners
to work for them, and they cannot sell their coal on
the market because they do not have sufficient sales
agency, so we will deliberately enter into this and
they can’t meet it; we will thereby profit by putting

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29a
Opinion.

competitors out of busines or seriously hampering
his operation.’

“So, the issue is: Did these two signatories have
that thing of putting the South-East Coal Com-
pany out of business in mind, the time they signed
the contract?

* * a + ” ” *

“You are instructed that if you believe there
was an industry-wide collective bargaining agree-
ment, whereby employers and the union agreed on
the wage scale that exceeds the financial ability, of
some small operators, including the plaintiff, to
pay, and that the agreement was made for the
purpose of forcing some employers, including the
plaintiff, out of businesss, or injuring its business,,.
and you believe that the defendants, the Consolida-
tion Coal Company and the United Mine Workers,
deliberately entered into and participated in such
an arrangement, and that the result of such an
arrangement was the sole cause of damage, if any,
to the plaintiff, then you will find for the plaintiff.

“If you do not so believe, you will find for the
defendants.”

It was not necessary for the District Court to go
into more detail ahout the significunce of the PWC or
the “80-cent cluase.”14 The charge properly instructed

14. During closing arguments counsel for UMW
objected to certain statements made by counsel for
South-East about the National Agreement. The District
Court at that time gave further instructions to the jury
about the PWC. The colloquy was as follows:

30a
Opinion.

the jury on the relationship between the Nationa! Agree-
ment and the antitrust laws and what must be shown
in this regard to impose liability.15

The Court: “As I understand counsel’s argu-
ment, he is drawing a deduction from these cir-
cumstances. He does not argue, and the jury is
instructed, if it has been given that impression,
that it is not proper.

“There is nothing wrong per se, that is, of
itself, with the execution of this contract. I should
instruct them on that as a general instruction.

“In other words, you are not to consider that
simply because there was an agreement between
BCOA and the UMW that that of itself established
a violation of the antitrust laws.

“I got the impression that he was using those
figures to establish his claim that the results proved
the basis on which he relied.”

South-East’s Counsel: “The circumstances at
the time of making these contracts, they have got
to be used to prove an antitrust claim.”

Appellants’ Counsel: “I submit to the Court
that the same words that were used at the bench
as being objectionable were used by this counsel to
the same effect, that this jury would have to con-
sider the consequences of this type of bargaining,
eliminating from the whole industry certain people
and causing a good deal of harm.”

The Court: “The jury is instructed that the
execution of the contract itself is not per se a vio-
lation of law.”

Appellants’ Counsel: “Okay.”

15. Appellants also claim error in the instruction
because of remarks made by the District Judge which
were incorrect statements of certain dates involving
passage of the PWC and “80-cent clause.” In the suple-
mental [sic.] instructions the District Judge corrected
himself and no prejudice resulted from the error.

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31a
Opinion.

G. THE DEFENSE OF IN PARI DELICTO ASSUMPTION OF
RISK OF THE CONSPIRACY, WAIVER OF RIGHTS ARISING
FROM THE CONSPIRACY AND ESTOPPEL.

Appellant Consclidation Coal claims error in the
District Court’s instruction on its various defenses.
Particular emphasis is assigned to the alleged error in
the District Court’s instruction on the defense of in pari
delicto. With reference to this defense, the District
Court charged the jury that:

“Now, the defendants here say that, admitting
all of these things for the sake of argument, as we
put it, whatever damage came to the plaintiff, that
he was a part of it.

- eee
BOS GT ea ATi RE EI LE

i “He can’t claim anything against the coal op-
4 erators because this arrangement which they had
P with the UMWA had his approval and endorsement,
‘ that he was a member of the BCOA — Bituminous
Coal Operators Association — that drew up the
contract, and that he was a sponsor of it and, there-
fore, if he got hurt by it, if it was wrong, he was
helping in a wrong, “impari delicto’ (sic) they call
it. That is equal guilt.

Fy eR?
re EO > Lae

“A person who is of equal guilt cannot claim
that he has been wronged by other people who
assisted or collaborated with him on the same pro-
ject.

“The defendants have entered the defense of
‘in pari delicto’ — this means that the defendants
say that if an unlawful conspiracy existed, plaintiff
was equally responsible with defendants in the
formation of said conspiracy.

SECA EES WS Se

32a

Opinion.

“Under this defense, the Court charges you that
if the plaintiff was a co-initiator of the conspiracy
and equally responsible therefor, plaintiff is not
entitled to recover damages for that period of time
that the plaintiff remained a party to the con-
spiracy.

“Now, a person may be a party to such an ar-
rangement, be ‘in pari delicto,’ but he can withdraw
from that: You are not once brushed with tar that
you can’t get rid of.

“So, even though you may believe that he did
do this, that he was in this arrangement, entered
into this contract for the purpose of putting other
operators out of business, yet, if you believe that
he withdrew from and he got out of it and if you
find that the defendants were more responsible than
the plaintiff for the formation of the conspiracy,
plaintiff may recover, even though it was a party
to the conspiracy, even though South-East Coal
Company was a party to the conspiracy.

“Even though you may find that plaintiff was a
party to the conspiracy and if you find that plain-
tiff withdrew from the conspiracy and sought to
avoid the effects of the conspiracy, it may recover
damages arising in the period of the case subse-
quent to such withdrawal.”

This charge more than adequately instructed the

jury with respect to the defense of in part delicto, and
the effect South-East’s participation in the conspiracy
would have on the amount of damages recoverable if
termination of its part in the conspiracy did not occur.
The only difficulty with the instruction is that perhaps

33a
Opinion.

it should not have been given at all. Recent cases have
tended to indicate that for reasons of public policy the
defense of in pari delicto is not available to a defendant
in certain types of antitrust cases. See Perma Life Muf-
flers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134
(1968) ; Gaines v. Carrollton Tobacco Board of Trade,
Inc., 386 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1967); Sahm v. V-1 Oil
Company, 402 F.2d 69 (10th Cir. 1968). However, since
it has been concluded that the instructions given on
this defense were correct, it is not necessary to reach
the question of whether the type of antitrust conspiracy
involved in this case falls into the category of those anti-
trust conspiracies in which the defense of in pari delicto
is available.

Consolidation’s request for instructions on its de-
fenses of assumption of risk of the conspiracy, waiver
of rights arising from the conspiracy and estoppel were
properly rejected by the District Court. While these de-
fenses might be proper in certain negligence and con-
tract cases, there is no evidence that Congress intended
that these defenses could be set up by analogy as a de-
fense in an antitrust case. Furthermore, even if these
defenses were available, it appears that they would be
subsumed in the more inclusive defense of in pari de-
licto.

H. INSTRUCTIONS DEALING WITH THE ISSUE OF Bap
BUSINESS JUDGMENT.

Consolidation also claims that the District Judge
negated one of its primary contentions with certain
remarks made in the instructions. The primary con-
tention allegedly negated by the District Judge’s state-
ments was that much of the injury South-East sought

as

34a
Opinion.

recovery for did not result from the antitrust conspir-
acy but rather was caused by a “serious mistake in
judgment in building a cleaning plant costing $5 mil-
lion and at a point some one hundred twenty-five miles
from the mine .. .” The remarks made by the District
Judge concerned only in a very general fashion the
importance of a cleaning apparatus in processing bitum-
inous coal and the expensiveness of such a device [sic.]
There was copious testimony at trial on both sides of
the issue of whether the building of the cleaning plant
by South-East was or was not a mistake in business
judgment. The alleged prejudicial statements on this
matter were made at the very beginning of the charge
during a general discussion of the bituminous coal in-
dustry when the meaning of certain jargonistic words
and phrases used in the coal industry and at the trial
were explained to the jury. Towards the end of the
instructions, the judge charged the jury on appellant’s
bad business judgment theory of the cause of South-
East’s injuries. He stated:

“The defendants take the position that the
(conspiracy did not cause plaintiff’s injuries) ...
(but the injuries were) the result of either mis-
management, over expansion, economic conditions,
or a combination of these, with possibly other
circumstances, to none of which either of these
defendants had any part.

“That is the theory of the defendants here,
that by building this cleaning plant at Irvine,
that there was a significant miscalculation of iis
cost of construction, more than a million dollars
it anticipated to cost; that it was 125 miles in haul

35a
Opinion.

from the mines to that plant, which was an addi-
tional expense and contrary to good coal produc-
tion management, and that by loss of the sale of
coal through no fault of Consolidatio Coal Com-
pany, but through the failure of the plaintiff to
exercise orthodox business acumen; that that is
what caused this plaintiff to lose money, and that
through its own failures and no reason to accuse
either of these defendants to have committed
wrongful acts; the financial problems of the plain-
tiff arose from its own actions and its own failure
to exercise good business judgment in the face of
advice on the part of Consolidation Coal Company,
according to Mr. Tucker, I believe, who was the
witness — is that his name?

Appellants’ Counsel: “Cassidy.”

The Court: “The last witness who testified.
Well, anyway, one of the witnesses for the defendant
[said] that he was concerned about the building of
this tipple and this cleaning plant, and advised the
plaintiff, through its president, Mr. LaViers, and
possibly others, that importation from Canada and
other places and the use of gas and oil was going
to reduce the coal demands thirty-three and a third
per cent from locality, or more. Notwithstanding
that, this plaintiff proceeded to its development
and expansion, and that these defendants were in
no way responsible for it. But, due to these cir-
cumstances alone, if he had any loss, it was caused
by that.” ,

If there was a negation of one of appellant’s
theories by the passing remarks made by the District

36a
Opinion.

Judge at the beginning of the charge to the jury, it
obviously was more than compensated for by the ex-
planation of appellant’s position just quoted. It is con-
cluded that appellants were not prejudiced by certain
complained of statements made by the District Judge
in his instructions to the jury.

Il. ALLEGED ERRORS IN EVIDENTIARY MATTERS

A. EVM@ENCE OF EFFECTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE
ALLEGED ANTITRUST CONSPIRACY

The appellants challenge the District Court’s ruling
on certain evidence offered by South-East which con-
cerned economic conditions in the coal industry in East-
tern Kentucky. The evidence was principally statistical
and related to such things as: the reduction in the num-
ber of miners employed in the coal industry, diminution
of population in certain coal producing areas, wage
scales in the bituminous coal industry, quantitive fluc-
tuations in coal production in various years, income and
losses of certain bituminous coal producing companies.
The objection raised to this type of evidence was that it
inordinately emphasized alleged “effects and conse-
quences” of the antitrust conspiracy, thereby mislead-
ing the jury to believe that the existence of an anti-com-
petitive conspiracy or agreement could be inferred from
these conditions. It is argued that this Court’s decisions
in Lewis v. Pennington, 400 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1968),
and Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 416 F.2d 655 (6th
Cir. 1969), and the Supreme Court’s decision in Pen-
nington v. United Mine Workers, 381 U.S. 657 (1965),
specifically rejected the theory that an antitrust con-
spiracy can be proven by effects and consequences. The
argument is not clear, but it appears that objection is

37a
Opinion.

not made to the admissibility of this type of evidence,
rather that this type of evidence standing alone cannot,
as a matter of law, serve as the basis for concluding that
an antitrust conspiracy exists.

In Pennington v. United Mine Workers the Supreme
Court stated that a labor union, having concluded a
wage agreement with one set of employers, may uni-
laterally seek to impose the same terms on other em-
ployers even though it is believed that “[s]ome em-
ployers cannot effectively compete if they are required
to pay the wage scale demanded by the union.” Penning-
ton v. United Mine Workers, at 655, n.2. It was also ob-
served that “[s]uch union conduct is not alone sufficient
evidence to maintain a union-employer conspiracy
charge under the Sherman Act. There must be addi-
tional direct or indirect evidence of the conspiracy.”
Pennington v. United Mine Workers, Id. The textual ma-
terial, not the language of the footnote quoted above,
appears in Lewis v. Pennington and Ramsey v. United
Mine Workers. Appellants’ argument apparently relies
upon the language quoted above from the Supreme
Court’s Pennington decision. They construe this lan-
guage to mean that evidence of the effects and conse-
quences of an alleged conspiracy, e.g. statistics showing
marginal p:oducers are losing money and going out of
business, reduction in the number of individuals em-
ployed as coal miners, et cetera, are insufficient to prove
an antitrust conspiracy.

It cannot be said definitely that appellant’s inter-
pretation of the language in Pennington is either right
or wrong. While this Court find. :t difficult to construe
that particular language in Pennington as appellants
have, some support for appeliants’ interpretation of

38a
Opinion.

that language can be found in Mr. Justice soldberg’s
dissenting opinion in Pennington appearing in Local
Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher
Workmen of North America v. Jewel Tea Company, Inc.,
381 U.S. 676 (1965) at 714-715. Even though the lan-
guage in Pennington is not decisive, there is a logical
basis for appellants’ position. The “effects and conse-
quences” theory is basically a casual argument. That is,
a cause (the antitrust conspiracy has produced certain
results or effects (reduction in the number of people
employed in the mines, financial losses by marginal
producers, et cetera.). This type of argument has one
chief flaw: The difficulty in isolating a single factor
causally responsible for identifiable effects. Often there
are intervening and superseding causes which if shown
destroy the validity of the argument. The “effects and
consequences” theory appellants question appears to
simply reverse the usually logical progression from
cause to effect by first pointing to certain conditions
and thea concluding what caused these conditions. In
any event, the problem of isolating a particular cause
which definitely produced certain effects is still present.
The law cannot be that an antitrust conspiracy can be
proven by alleged effects and consequences of the con-
spiracy alone. If the only evidence a plaintiff could pro-
duce of an alleged antitrust conspiracy is statistics
showing that they and other producers in an industry
are losing money while some producers make money;
that overall production in the industry is down while
profits of certain companies are up; and that employ-
ment has dropped off in the industry, the defendants
should have a verdict directed for them at the close of
plaintiff's case. Plaintiff would not even have made out
a prima facie case for recovery.

39a
Opinion.

Regardless of how accurate these statements might
be, they do not apply under the facts of this case. Re-
viewing the record, it becomes obvious that contrary to
appellants’ conte:tion South-East’s case does not rest
solely on alleged effects and consequences to prove the
existence of the antitrust conspiracy. South-East pre-
sented evidence of statements made by UMW and Con-
solidation officials tending to show that there existed an
implied or expressed agreement between the Union and
Consolidation, there was evidence of past courses of
dealing and performance between itself and Consolida-
tion which were interrupted or changed as a result of
Union activity; there was evidence concerning what hap-
pened at bargaining sessions between South-East and
the Union which indicated that some agreement other
than the National Agreement (the Bituminous Coal
Wage Agreement) existed between the Union and cer-
tain producers.

While the question of the sufficiency of this evi-
dence will be dealt with later, the importance of in-
dicating that South-East introduced other evidence
from which the existence of an agreement to restrain
trade or competition could be inferred, is to show that it
did not rely solely on alleged effects and consequences
of the antitrust conspiracy to prove its claim. If the
only evidence South-East introduced was the statistical
evidence referred to earlier, then the case should never
have been submitted to the jury. However, this was not
the only proof they offered. Evidence of the type which
appellants object to-is admissible and can be considered
by the jury in drawing its conclusion on the issue of
liability if there is other evidence which supports the
claim. See generally, Local 175 of the International

40a
Opinion.

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. United States, 219
F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1955); Standard Oil Company of
California v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied 356 U.S. 975. Therefore, while appellants’ argu-
ment might be correct as far as it goes, it does not ap-
ply to the facts of this case.

B. EVIDENCE AND STATEMENTS WHICH ALLEGEDLY PER-
SONALIZED SOUTH-EAST CLAIMS THEREBY PREJUDIC-
ING APPELLANT

Consolidation maintains they were prejudiced be-
cause certain evidence admitted and statements made at
the trial tended to personalize South-East’s claim that
is, gave the impression that it was the claim of the La-
Viers’ family which controls and operates the company.
It is contended that this left the jury with the idea that
this was a David versus Goliath type controversy, with
the LaViers family representing the small South-East
Coal Company battling the combined giant forces of
Consolidation Coal Company and the United Mine Work-
ers of America. Thus, appellants argue that because of
this characterization, the jury’s sympathies had to be
with the underdog South-East Coal.

South-East Coal Company, for all intents and pur-
poses, is a family-owned and family-run coal company.
Mr. Harry LaViers, Senior, and his son, Harry LaViers,
Junior, were the controlling forces behind South-East
and made the decisions, either good or bad, for the com-
pany. The company, compared to Consolidation, is a
small producer of coal and its actions are earmarked
with the LaViers’ name. While there was some person-
alization of the company’s claim by occasional] inter-
changing of the name plaintiff with Harry LaViers,

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4la
Opinion.

Senior or Junior, this was no more excessive than might
be expected under the circumstances. In addition ap-
pellants, partially as a result of the defense of in pari
delicto, tended to contribute to any personalization
which may have taken place.

Conceding that some personalization of South-
East’s claim did occur, it is still difficult to accept ap-
pellant’s argument that this converted the dispute into
a small company versus large company controversy, or
appellant’s assumption that a jury’s sympathies always
rest with the underdog. Without some additional evi-
dence that appellants were in fact prejudiced by these
characterizations, the record does not support these as-
sertions, and it is concluded that no injury resulted.

C. ADMISSIBILITY OF CERTAIN HEARSAY STATEMENTS

During the trial, South-East introduced into evi-
dence portions of answers made by the United Mine
Workers to written interrogatories. The Union was
asked to admit to the authenticity of certain speeches,
editorials and statements made by Union officials which
were appended to the Union’s answers to the interroga-
tories, and then parts of these documents were read to
the jury. Consolidation objected to and now challenges
the admissibility of these statements on the grounds
that they were hearsay as against them. (Consol’s ob-
jection to the District Court’s refusal to give its re-
quested instruction on this matter was discussed earlier.
See, I. ALLEGED ERRORS IN INSTRUCTIONS: Sec-
tion E. Instructions Respecting the Use to be Made by
the Jury of Certain Hearsay Statements, supra, at p.
15). Consol’s principal contention is that statements of
this type are not to be admitted until “[t]here is inde-

42a
Opinion.

pendent evidence establishing, prima facie, that such
others were members of the conspiracy.” Standard Oil
Company v. Moore, supra.

The general rule is that this type of evidence is ad-
missible, however, subject to exclusion if no prima facie
case of the existence of the conspiracy is established.
The question of conditional admissibility is for the trial
judge to determine. Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d
718 (9th Cir. 1963). There is no error in conditionally
admitting the statements before a prima facie case was
established by independent evidence if subsequently such
a case is proven, because the trial judge has wide dis-
cretion over the order of proof. Pennington v. United
Mine Workers, 325 F.2d 804, 817 (6th Cir. 1963), re-
versed on other grounds, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). Flintkote
Company v. Lysfiord, 246 F.2d 368, 378 (9th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835. At the close of plaintiff’s
case there had been established by independent or dis-
associated evidence a prima facie case, thus the require-
ment for having conditionally admitted the statements
was met.

D. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Appellants contend that the jury verdict, and the
District Court’s denial of their motions for directed ver-
dict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict are in
error, as the verdict “is not supported by clear evidence,
but is contrary to undisputed facts and applicable legal
principles.” Appellants’ argument with regard to the
“clear proof” standard has already been discussed. See,
I. ALLEGED ERRORS IN INSTRUCTIONS, Section A.
The Standard of Proof Required to Impose Liability,
supra, at pp. 3-7. Furthermore, appellants’ arguments

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43a
Opinion.

on applicable legal principles have also been dealt with,
See I. ALLEGED ERRORS IN INSTRUCTIONS, pp.
3-28, and what remains is the issue of sufficiency of
the evidence.

4 In considering the sufficiency of the evidence, little
j if any advantage would be gained by an itemized review
i of plaintiff’s case. Much of the evidence introduced at
: trial was similar to that used at the trials in Tennessee
E Consolidated Coal v. United Mine Workers and the re-
F trial of the Pennington case in Lewis v. Pennington. Yet
E there was additional evidence introduced at the trial
b having particular significance to South-East’s claim
bi and which tended to emphasize that South-East’s case
i was unique from either Tennessee Consolidated Coal or
; Lewis. (A single example is the evidence of the circum-
a stances surrounding the cancellation of the sales agency
\ contract between Consolidation and South-East in which
: Consol acted as sales agent for South-East’s coal.)

yl While some of the evidence introduced was circumstan-
: tial, which in and of itself might not support the jury’s
i verdict, there was also direct evidence which, when

coupled with the circumstantial evidence, raised plain-
tiff’s case from one of mere suspicion or conjecture to
a level where reasonable minds might have concluded
liability upon the part of the appellants. After review-
ing the record, it is concluded that there was substan-
tial credible evidence to support the jury’s verdict. The
District Court’s decision on this matter was correct and
appellants’ motions for directed verdict and judgment
notwithstanding the verdict were properly denied.

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44a

Ill. ALLEGED IRREGULARITIES WITH RESPECT
TO THE JURY

A. Mr. LAVIERS’ SR. CONVERSATION WITH Two JURY-
MEN

Consolidation contends that the District Court com-
mitted reversible error in not declaring a mistrial be-
cause of a conversation Mr. LaViers, Sr., of South-East
Coal, had with two members of the jury outside of court
during the trial. The conversation took place in a coffee
shop in the hotel where some of the witnesses, jurors,
attorneys and parties in the trial were staying. Mr.
LaViers was seated by a waitress at a table which was
situated next to another table where two jurors were
eating breakfast. The District Judge, after examining
Mr. LaViers,!©® found that appellants were not preju-

16. The Court made the following examination of
Mr. LaViers in ascertaining what took place in the
coffee shop:

(Reporter’s note:) “The following occurred at
the bench in the immediate presence of counsel and
the Court, and in the absence and out of the hear-
ing of the jury:

“The Court: I want to clarify this other situa-
tion before we get into anything else. This is out of
the presence or hearing of the jurors, at the bench,
in connection with the statement made to the Court
by Mr. Schmidt, counsel for the defendant Consoli-
dation Coal Company, with reference to two of the
jurors, Mr. Hill and Mr. Osborne, who were seen in
conversation with Mr. Harry LavViers, Sr., at the
Coffee Shop of the Phoenix Hotel about 7:30 to
8:00 o’clock this morning, October 11, 1968.

“Now, then, do you want to make any further
statement? I am just asking.

Off the record.”

45a
Opinion.

diced by this unintentional contact and declined to grant
a mistrial.

Appellants maintain that the case of United States
v. Harry Barfield Company, 359 F.2d 120 (5th Cir.
1966), controls, and a mistrial should have been granted
on the basis of that authority. Reviewing the decision in
United States v. Harry Barfield Company, it appears
that several facts instrumental to that decision are
lacking in the present case. In the Barfield Company
case the prejudicial out-of-court conversation took place
in an elevator between the president of the company
and two jurors. The president of the company made an
effort to approach the jurors and then “cemented” the
contact by volunteering information that his wife and
her family dealt with the drug store owned by one of
the jurors. The Court observed:

(Reporter’s note:) “An off-the-record discus-
sion took place at the bench.

“The Court: Come here, Mr. LaViers, please.
Mr. LaViers, it has been reported to the Court that
this morning in the Coffee Shop at the Phoenix
Hotel, you, in the presence of Mr. Schmidt and Mr.
Rowntree—

“Mr. Schmidt: Mr. Rowntree was not present.

“The Court: No.

“Mr. Rowntree: As I stated, I was there earlier.

“The Court: Yes. I don’t know who else was
there. But you were seated near or standing near
or in the company — not ‘in the company,’ I don’t
want to use that term — but in contact with Mr.
Hill and Mr. Osborne, who are members of the jury.
Now, do vou recall that incident?

“Mr. LaViers, Sr.: Yes, I do, Your Honor.

“The Court: Would you mind stating just what
it was?

Opinion.

“By way of summation it is clear that the tax-
payer president approached the jurors. They did not
approach him. He sought to identify with juror
Lockhart through the fact of knowing about his
drug business. He then sought to cement the iden-
tity by giving the juror his wife’s name which led to
a conversation regarding his wife’s family. He ap-
parently also managed to find out that the juror
from the radio station had known his brother.”

“Mr. LaViers, Sr.: Yes. Mr. Rowntree had gone
down to breakfast prior to my coming down. When
I came into the Coffee Shop, I looked for him and
found that the table where he was seated only had
one chair and I was looking around for some other
table to sit at, and the head waitress came and said,
‘Well, just sit down here’ — which was right across
the aisle from Mr. Rowntree — and I sat down on
the bench and ordered my breakfast.

And Mr. Hill was sitting next to me, and he
asked me, he said, ‘Do you know Mr. Oscar Evans
who lives in Paintsville?’

And I said, ‘Well, he doesn’t live in Paintsville
now; he has gone to Florida — but I do know Mr.
Evans.’

And he said, ‘Well, I used to board at his house.’

And he said he was quite a character.

And I said, ‘Yes, f agree with that,’ and, ‘I
knew him very well.’

And then I believe that part of the breakfast,
not the main part, was served, and Mr. Hill then
asked me if I knew Mr. Nelson Howard who lived
in Paintsville; and I said yes, ‘I know Mr. Nelson
Howard; he came from Gallatin County; he was in
the automobile business there and later was in the
coal business, I know him.’ Mr. Hill said he used
to work for him. I said, ‘Weli, he was quite an
aggressive merchant when he was there, he made a

47a
Opinion.

(See the dissenting opinion by Judge Colman in the Bar-
ficld Company case, at p. 124, questioning the majority’s
characterization of these facts.)

In the present case Mr. LaViers was seated by a
waitress next to the jurors. He did not seek them out.
Furthermore, it was a juror who aproached Mr. LaViers
with a question about whether he knew certain individ-
uals. Obviously, Mr. LaViers could have simply ignored
the juror, but the law does not require that when a per-
son becomes a party in a lawsuit that he must renounce
all social amenities and rudely ignore people who ask
him questions. The juror’s questions were answered by
Mr. LaViers in a straight-forward polite fashion, with-

lot of money and decided he would go into the farm-
ing business and bought a couple of farms down in
Bourbon County, and I understand, lost what he
had of his investment in these farms.’

I guess the rest of the breakfast was served
about that time. I don’t recall that there was —
there was some gentleman came in on the other
side, and they turned to him to speak to him. I don’t
recall any further conversation.

There was nothing about this lawsuit.

“The Court: Do you want to ask him a ques-
tion?

“Mr. Schmidt: Mr. LaViers, there were other
places to sit down in the Coffee Shop besides next
to Mr. Hill and Mr. Osborne when you sat down?
Isn’t that true?

“Mr. LaViers, Sr.: Well, yes, sir, there are
other tables for four and tables for two and the
tables at the bench are for two, cad the head wait-
ress came along and tossed a menu down and just
said, ‘Sit down here,’ and I sat where she put the
menu. I didn’t seek out this seat.

“Mr. Schmidt: You saw them sitting there?

48a
Opinion.

out any attempt to ingratiate himself to the juror. There
was no discussion of the case. The facts of Barfield Com-
pany which were of principal significance in that deci-
sion are lacking here and the case is clearly distinguish-
able from the present dispute. While, of couse, these
types of contacts must be scrupulously avoided if at all
possible, the fact that in this case the contacts were
brought about by a coincidence of circumstances, there
was no intentional “seeking-out,” and no discussion of
the case occurred, the District Court’s denial of the mo-
tion for a mistrial was proper and clearly not an abuse
of discretion. United States v. VanBuskirk, 304 F.2d 871
(6th Cir. 1962).

“Mr. LaViers, Sr.: Oh, yes, I saw them sitting
there.

“Mr. Schmdit: Was it in your mind that, even
so, it wouldn’t hurt to develop some sort of a social
rapport with these gentlemen?

“Mr. LaViers, Sr.: No, Mr. Schmidt, that was
not in my mind. I am by nature a person who talks
to people in the elevator or wherever it might be,
and JI would be untruthful and unrealistic if I didn’t
say I do engage in conversations.

“The Court: How many minutes would be [sic. ]
assume, or how much time, I should say, would you
assume your conversation or what you stated to
the Court, or anything in addition to that, was con-
sumed with either of these men?

“Mr. LaViers, Sr.: Oh, tiere were snatches of
conversation, I imagine about ten or fifteen min-
utes. I was eating breakfast.

“The Court: That covered the whole period?

“Mr. LaViers, Sr.: Weil, not the whole period
of breakfast, but the period of the conversation.

“The Court: Do you want to ask him anything
further?

49a
Opinion.

B. ALLEGED ERROR IN THE DISTRICT COURT’S REFUSAL
TO DECLARE A MISTRIAL BECAUSE OF CERTAIN CON-
DUCT OF A JUROR

Appellants contend that they were denied their
constitutional right to trial by an © npartial jury because
the District Court refused to grant a mistrial upon learn-
ing of certain alleged misconduct of a juror. Two mat-
ters are alluded to as indicating that the partiality of
one juror was questionable. First, an incident occurred
during trial which allegedly was misconduct on the part
of the juror. An attorney for the Union developed the
following facts: the juror and his wife attended a social
function in Lexington, Kentucky, during the trial. It
appeared that the juror’s wife was a soroity sister and

“Mr. LaViers, Sr.: Mr. Rowntree has continu-
ously cautioned me about this.

“The Court: Well, you see the point is, I mean,
The Court accepts your statement that you didn’t
say anything about the case.

“Mr. LaViers, Sr.: We didn’t talk anything
about the case, Your Honor.

“The Court: But, you see, the difficulty is that
this more or less currying of favor with a juror —
while I realize it isn’t currying a favor deliberately
—but it has brought questions to people’s minds.
I realize some people are just naturally friendly, and
Kentuckians are just that way — I know them
pretty well — but we mustn’t do anything like this.

“Mr. LaViers, Sr.: I would be very, very happy
to avoid them.

“The Court: The Court is confident that you
didn’t do anything intentionally. That is the ruling
of the Court.

TES do you have anything you want to ask

50a
Opinion.

close friend of the wife of a lawyer who practiced in
the coal mining area of Eastern Kentucky. The juror
was also a close friend of the lawyer. These people met
at the social function, and the juror mentioned that a
third lawyer who practiced in the same coal mining re-
gion was an attorney for the Union in the trial in which
he was a juror and that this attorney was “a very able
lawyer”. Then the juror’s wife made some comment
about the present case being difficult “in following a
conspiracy or in following just what they were driving
at with all the reading and all.” It was not at all clear
whether the juror’s wife mentioned the word “con-
spiracy” or not. On these facts a motion was made to
subpoena the juror and the people involved in this inci-
dent and examine them. The District Court concluded
that “nothing (had) been shown here to justify an in-
vestigation of this juror” and overruled the motion.

Appellant cites Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S.
140 (1892), as controlling and requiring that under
these circumstances an examination of the juror should
have been granted. Under the facts in Mattox, it was
obvious that an examination of the jurors should have
taken place. In that case allegedly a court bailiff, pres-

“Mr. Rowntree: No.

“Mr. Schmidt: May I ask him a question?

“The Court: Yes, sir.

“Mr. Schmidt: Mr. LaViers, you have seen
each of those gentlemen sit at the same table every
morning?

“Mr. LaViers, Sr.: No, sir, they have not, as
far as my knowledge, sat at that same table. They
do sit in the Coffee Shop there at various places,
but I don’t recall seeing them at that particular
place, Your Honor.”

5la
Opinion.

ent when the jury was deliberating the verdict in a
murder case, stated, so that the members of the jury
could hear him, that “this is the third fellow he (the
accused has killed.” In addition, during deliberation the
jury or part of it was read a newspaper account of the
trial that included the following remarks:

“If he (the accused) is found guilty of murder
he will be a lucky man, for the evidence against him
was very strong, or at least appeared to be to an
outsider. The case was given to the jury at noon
yesterday, and it was expected that their delibera-
tions would not last an hour before they would re-
turn a verdict.

“It (the evidence) was so strong that the
friends of Mattox gave up all hope of any result but
conviction.”

Under these alleged circumstances, the court should
have ordered an examination of the jury to determine
the accuracy of the purported misconduct. However, by
no stretch of the imagination can it be argued that the
facts surrounding the present incident of alleged mis-
conduct approximates those in Mattox. While questions
of jury improprieties are matters of degree, it cannot be
said that the District Court abused its discretion in not
ordering an examination of the juror and the other par-
ticipants in the present incident without further repre-
sentation or a stronger indication that some misconduct
prejudicial to appellants’ constitutional right to an im-
partial trial did in fact occur.

The second matter that appellants point to which
they contend shows partiality upon the part of this

SRC

Se TIN

92a
Opinion.

juror is that his insurance agency underwrote a real
estate bond for the son of a former official of and pres-
ent minor stockholder in South-East Coal Company. The
juror was challenged for cause, but the District Court
overruled the challenge. The examination of the juror
showed that a $5,000 surety bond must be posted with
the Commonwealth of Kentucky before a real estate
broker can sell real estate. The juror’s insurance agency
underwrites the bond for the son of a former official
and present minor stockholder in South-East Coal. The
bond was first written several years before this litiga-
tion was commenced and simply has been renewed each
year. Until informed, the jurer did not know for a fact
if he wrote the bond for the son or the father and, obvi-
ously, knew neither personally. Upon questioning, he
stated that the fact he wrote the bond would not affect
his judgment in any way. This case is distinguishable
from Commonwealth Coatings Corporation v. Continen-
tal Casualty Company, 393 U.S. 145 (1968), cited by ap-
pellants to support their position that their challenge
for cause of this juror should have been granted. In
Commonwealth Coatings an individual acting as an
arbitrator under a private contractual agreement had
been an engineering consultant for one of the parties in
the dispute and collected over $12,000 in fees in four
years. The Supreme Court set aside an award made by
the panel of three arbitrators holding that an arbitrator
should disclose to the parties any dealings which migh’
create an impression of possible bias. Factually and
legally, the present case is different. Here a juror had
only remote indirect contact with a party in a lawsuit.
Even if the business contacts were more direct, all that
Commonwealth Coatings requires is a disclosure of

53a
Opinion.

these dealings. In the present case, the nature and ex-
tent of the juror’s business contacts were disclosed and
the District Court, upon examination of the juror, con-
cluded that he coulg impartially hear the evidence and
return a verdict free of any prejudice that might result
from his business dealings. The District “ourt’s refusal
to grant the challenge for cause of this juror was not an
abuse of discretion. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245

(1910) ; Coz v. General Electric Company, 302 F.2d 389
(6th Cir. 1962).

IV. DAMAGES
A. THE JuRY AWARD oF DAMAGES

South-East sought damages allegedly resulting
from the anti-competitive conspiracy in this case for a
three and one half year period from April 26, 1962, to
December 31, 1966. Two methods of computing these
damages were used to arrive at a dollar amount.!7 The
first method was a simple comparison between operating
profits and losses18 during the period 1952-1958, an ar-
bitrary base period, with the operating profit and losses

17. Computation of injuries by the first method
produced a damages figure of $3,082,816. The damages
figure produced by the second method was $2,896,713.
The jury awarded damages of $2,410,452 or approxi-
mately $700,000 less than the damages computed by the
first method and $500,000 less than computed by the
second method.

18. Figures reflecting operating profit and losses
rather than net income were used because these figures
do not include such things as percentage depletion al-
lowances which are treated as return of capital, interest
payments (expenses) or income, capital gains and losses
and dividend income.

54a
Opinion.

for the period South-East sought recovery. A method
similar to this was used in determining the antitrust
damages in Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 US.
251, 258 (1946), and Ford Motor Company v. Webster’s
Auto Sales, Inc., 361 F.2d 874, 885-886 (1st Cir. 1966).

The second method was more complex and was de-
signed to meet certain objections appellants had to the
first method. This method used various financial and
managerial figures for the years 1964 and 1965 for a
comparison with similar figures in 1962, 1963 and 1966.
Thus, statistics during the actual damages period (1964
and 1965). Thus, statistics during the actual damages
period (1964 and 1965) acted as a basis for computing
damages for the entire period. Supporting this theory,
South-East introduced six financial exhibits showing, in
part: the effects higher mining costs and decreased pro-
duction in 1962, 1963 and 1966 had on earning compared
to the base years 1964-1965; the effect on earnings of
two strikes in 1962-1963 and 1966 as compared with
earnings in 1964-1965; lower price realization on coal in
1964-1965 than in the remaining years of the damage
period; and the alleged effect the conspiracy had on
South-East’s price realization per ton of coal compared
with the average price realization of the industry for the
period 1962-1965. South-East maintains that by using
this approach appellant's challenge to the validity of
using figures for 1952-1958 for the comparison, because
allegedly during the damage period internal and external
economic conditions were less favorable than during
1952-1958, are effectively negated.

Appellants raise numerous issues regarding the
validity of South-East’s theories of damages. Mention

55a
Opinion.

of four of the challenges will give some idea of the gen-
eral nature of appellants’ attacks. Respecting South-
East’s first method of computing damages, appellants
contend that using the profit average of 1952-1958 for
the comparison is unfair as “internal and external eco-
nomic factors’’, i.e. less favorable mining conditions and
a general overall depression in the coal market, varied
between the years used as a basis and the actual dam-
ages period. The second method is challenged on the
grounds that use of new equipment during 1964 invali-
dates the comparison of the financial and managerial
date with the base period 1962-1963. The third objection
is that both methods claim losses for Consolidation’s re-
fusal to handle South-East’s coal and that these losses
cannot be recovered from the Union. Finally, appellants
complain that South-East’s computed losses which were
in part a result of its inability to get sufficient railroad
cars to ship its coal and, therefore, were in no way at-
tributable to the alleged conspiracy.

It appears that most of appellants’ challenges to
South-East’s claims of damages are directed at the ac-
curacy of the amount of damages and not the fact of
damages. There was a general issue raised as to the lack
of evidence showing that the proximate cause of South-
east’s damages was the conspiracy; that is, the suffici-
ency of evidence showing the fact of damages. How-
ever, reviewing the record, it is clear that there was
sufficient credible evidence from which the jury was
justified in inferring the necessary causal relation be-
tween the conspirators’ anti-competitive conduct and the
claimed damage or injury. Zenith Radio Corporation
v. Hazeliine, 395 U.S. 100, 125 (1969). The antitrust
cases are legion which reiterate the proposition that, if

56a
Opinion.

the fact of damages is proven, the actual computation
of damages may suffer from minor imperfections. See,
Story Parchment Company v. Paterson Parchment Com-
pany, 282 U.S. 555 (1931); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pic-
tures, supra; Zenith Radio Corporation v. Hazeltine,
supra; Ford Motor Company v. Webster’s Auto Sales,
Inc., supra; Atlas Building Products Company v. Dia-
mond Block & Gravel Company, 269 F.2d 950, 958 (10th
Cir. 1959); North Texas Producers Association v.
Young, 308 F.2d 235, 245 (5th Cir. 1962); Flintkote
Company v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 392 (9th Cir. 1957).

Appellant’s principal grounds for objection to the
jury verdict is that internal and external economic con-
ditions and decisions of the management resulted in
South-East’s losses, and not the conduct of the alleged
conspiracy. But the question of whether certain of
South-East’s losses were attributable to the conspiracy
or other economic factors was for the jury’s considera-
tion and determination. Cherokee Laboratories, Inc. v.
Rotary Drilling Services, Inc., 383 F.2d 97, 106 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 904; as is the question of
the credibility of the witnesses used in showing dam-
ages, Atlas Building Products Company v. Diamond
Block & Gravel Company, supra at 959. It is concluded
that there was sufficient credible evidence to support

the jury’s verdict as to the fact of damages and the

amount of damages was computed as precisely as capa-
ble under the circumstances.

B. ATTORNEYS’ FEES

Appellants object to the award of attorneys’ fees as
unreasonable. A party seeking review of an award of
attorneys’ fees in an antitrust case has the burden of

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57a
Opinion.

clearly demonstrating error in the factual basis of the
award or an abuse of discretion. See, Armco Steel Cor-
poration v. State of North Dakota, 376 F.2d 206, 213
(8th Cir. 1967) ; Twentieth Century Fox Film Corpora-
tion v. Coldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 221 (9th Cir. 1964). In
this case appellants have not shown either an error in
the factual basis of the award or an abuse of discretion.

The judgment is affirmed.

PHILLIPS, Chief Judge. (Concurring.) I do not in-
terpret the opinion in this case to conflict with the opin-
ion of Judge Edwards, in which I concurred, in Ramsey
v. United Mine Workers of America, 416 F.2d 655 (6th
Cir.), cert, granted, 38 U.S.L.W. 3379. I concur in the
opinion prepared by Judge Brooks.

59a
Memorandum.
APPENDIX B
[See Jt. App. pp. 248 et seq. ]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
RICHMOND

No. 303

SouTH-EAST COAL COMPANY
Vv.
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA
and CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY

Memorandum
Filed April 1, 1969

This action arises under the antitrust laws. After
a trial extending over some four weeks, the jury re-
turned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, South-East
Coal Company, of $2,410,452.00 in damages. Pursuant to
section 15 of Title 15, United States Code, judgment was
entered for three times this amount.

The record is before the court on the separate
motions of the defendants, United Mine Workers of
America and Consolidation Coal Company, for a directed
verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
or in the alternative, for a new trial. They set forth
numerous grounds in support of their motions, including
allegations that the evidence was insufficient to support
the verdict, that the verdict was contrary to the law and
the evidence, that the court made various errors with
regard to the admission of evidence, that the court erred
in failing to admonish the jury not to consider certain
evidence, that the court erred in permitting a witness

60a
Memorandum.

to use certain papers to refresh his recollection, that
the court erred in failing to declare a mistrial because
of an out-of-court conversation between an agent of
plaintiff and two jurors, that the court erred in failing
to declare a mistrial because of the argument of plain-
tiff’s counsel, that the court erred in failing to sustain
the challenge for cause to one of the jurors, that the
damages were grossly excessive and speculative, that the
court made numerous errors in instructing the jury, and
other allegations of error. I do not intend in this memo-
randum to examine each of the arguments of the de-
fendants individually or in detail. Nor will I attempt
an exhaustive discussion of every issue raised in the
excellent and very comprehensive briefs submitted by
the parties. Instead I will discuss the various groups of
issues in a general fashion.

This case, taken as a whole, was conducted in ac-
cordance with the guidelines set out in United Mine
Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, and
Lewis v. Pennington, 6 Cir., 400 F.2d 806, cert. denied
37 L.W. 3209.

I.

The defendants contend that there was insufficient
evidence or a lack of “clear proof” to support the verdict
of liability.

To prove a conspiracy in violation of the antitrust
laws, the plaintiff need not introduce direct evidence
The proof may rest, as it frequently does, on circum
stantial evidence. Viking Theatre Corp. v. Paramoun’
Film Distributing Corp., 3 Cir., 320 F.2d 285, 299, af
firmed 378 U.S. 123, reh. denied 379 U.S. 872, reh. denies
382 U.S. 1001; Eagles v. Harriss Sales Corp., 4 Cir., 36!

6la
Memorandum.

F.2d 927. In American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328
U.S. 781, 809-10, the United States Supreme “ourt clearly
stated: “The essential combination or conspiracy in vio-
lation of the Sherman Act may be found in a course of
dealing or other circumstances as well as in an exchange
of words.” €

Fully aware that reasonable inferences, but not
speculations, are a sufficient basis for finding antitrust
liability (Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, E.D.Tenn.,
265 F. Supp. 388, 432), this court is of the opinion that
the existence of a conspiracy, including the requisite
“predatory intent’, even under the stringent clear proof
test.

I.

The defendants contend that the plaintiff failed to
prove, by clear proof or otherwise, that it was injured
by a conspiracy on the part of the defendants, that plain-
tiff’s proof of damages was too speculative and con-
jectural to have been submitted to the jury, and that
the damages awarded were grossly excessive, not sup-
ported by the evidence, and the result of passion, pre-
judice and unaccountable caprice on the part of the jury.

At the trial, plaintiff introduced proof of damages
under two theories. First, plaintiff attempted to show
damages by comparing its operating profits from 1952
through 1958 with its operating losses in the period of
alleged damage, May 1, 1962, through December 31, 1966.
Second, plaintiff attempted to show damages by ana-
lyzing the business during the damage period.

It is well settled in actions brcught under the anti-
trust laws that, although a verdict may not be based on
mere speculation or guesswork, the jury may make a

62a
Memorandum.

reasonable estimate of the damage based on relevant
data and on probable and inferential proof. Exactitude
in the proof of damages is not required. Bigelow v. RKO
Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 264. Indeed, precision is
often impossible in an action of this nature. “The deter-
mination of damages in an antitrust suit, however,
almost invariably requires a certain amount of specula-
tion, no matter how informed.” Perma Life Mufflers v.
International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 152 (Marshall,
J., concurring). It should also be noted that elementary
concepts of justice and public policy require that a
wrongdoer must bear the risk of uncertainty which his
wrong has created. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures,
supra at 265.

Defendants complain of numerous aspects of plain-
tiff’s damage evidence as being misleading and inac-
curate. But the accuracy of plaintiff’s testimony is a
matter going to its weight, not its admissibility. Ford
Motor Co. v. Webster’s Auto Sales, 1 Cir., 361 F.2d 874,
886.

Defendants contend that plaintiff’s losses were the
result, not of a conspiracy, but of its own bad business
judgment and changes in the market and its methods of
operation. There may well have been many factors which
contributed to plaintiff’s losses. But it is not necessary
for a plaintiff in an antitrust suit to show that the con-
spiracy is the sole, or even the most substantial, cause
of damage. It is enough for a plaintiff to get to the jury
if he shows that the conspiracy is a substantial cause.
Haverhill Gazette Co. v. Union Leader Corp., 1 Cir., 333
F.2d 798, 805-06, cert. denied 379 U.S. 931, reh. denied
379 U.S. 984; Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts
Corp., supra at 143-44 (White, J., concurring).

63a
Memorandum.

On pages 3518-3520 of the Transcript, this court
adequately instructed the jury with regard to defend-
ants’ theory that any losses suffered by plaintiff were
not the result of the aileged conspiracy and hence not
to be included in any award of damages.

Ii.

The defendants make numerous contentions with
respect to alleged errors and prejudicial statements
made by the court in its instructions and with respect
to the refusal of the court to give their suggested in-
structions.

The defendant, United Mine Workers, submitted 26
numbered requested charges, and the defendant, Con-
solidation Coal Co., submitted 74 numbered requested
charges. Either of these sets of requested instructions,
if given in toto, would have contained errors and would
have been grossly one-sided, even though both con-
tained a great many correct statements of the law. A
court, in charging the jury, should not make statements
of the law in the abstract, without any relevance to the
issues to be decided, in order to avoid confusing the
jury. Moreover, a court is not obligated to use appro-
priate and applicable suggested charges if it gives a
charge embodying the same rule but in different lan-
guage. Tyree v. New York Central R.R. Co., 6 Cir., 382
F.2d 524, cert. denied 389 U.S. 1014; Westmoreland v.
Memphis Transit Co., 6 Cir., 305 F.2d 71.

The charge to the jury must be considered as a
whole. This court is of the opinion that the charge, so
considered, favored neither the plaintiff nor the defend-
ants and presented to the jury a sharp, clear issue for

64a
Memorandum.

their determination. This language from Cobb v. Union
Railway Co., 6 Cir., 318 F.2d 33, cert. denied 375 US.
945, is applicable:

“Flaws can be found in almost any charge by
separating certain paragraphs from the whole to
determine whether it gives the jury a correct under-
standing of the propositions which they are to de-
cide and the pertinent principles of law which shall
guide them in their decision.” 212 F.2d at 37.

IV.

Defendants complain that the court in its instruc-
tions erroneously characterized the Protective Wage
Clause to their prejudice and failed to give adequate
instructions with regard to the Protective Wage Clause
and the 80 Cent Clause.

By examining certain portions of a charge to a jury
out of their context in the whole charge and in the trial,
one can frequently find flaws. This is especially true in
the case of such a protracted trial as this was. Therefore,
as noted above, the charge must be considered as a whole
to determine whether the substantial rights of the
parties were prejudiced. Cobb v. Union Railroad Co.,
supra.

This court is of the opinion that the charge to the
jury, taken as a whole, fairly and accurately presented
the substance of the Protective Wage Clause. Any in-
accuracies in the instructions were inconsequential and
certainly rectified by the court’s admonition to the jury:
“You are not to accept what I may say (in commenting
upon the evidence) as necessarily true.” Transcript 3492.

65a
Memorandum.

The Protective Wage Clause is capable of two rea-
sonable constructions, and the one should be adopted
which does not result in a violation of law. Lewis v. Pen-
nington, supra; Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, supra
at 412. Consequently, the jury was instructed twice that
the contract between the United Mine Workers and the
coal operators was not in itself unlawful. Transcript
3507, 3512. Nevertheless, the execution of the contract,
including the Protective Wage Clause, was evidence in
the case which the jury could consider along with all
the other evidence.

V.

It is contended that the court failed to instruct
the jury properly on the defense of in pari delicto. The
most recent decision by the Supreme Court on this de-
fense is Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts
Corp., supra, which produced six opinions, none of
which was supported by a majority of the Court. The
instructions in the instant vase follow what appears to
be the law as reflected, however obscurely, in Perma
Life Mufflers, namely that if the plaintiff was a co-
initiator of the conspiracy and equally responsible
therefor, plaintiff is not entitled to recover for the per-
iod that it remained a party to the conspiracy. Tran-
script 3515-3516. It is doubtful that an instruction on
the defense of in pari delicto should have been given at
all. If anything, the instruction given was unduly fav-
orable to defendants.

66a
Memorandum.

VI.

It is contended that the court should have granted
a mistrial during the course of the trial because of an
improper contact between Mr. Harry LaViers, Sr., pres-
ident of South-East Coal Co., and two members of the
jury. The contact occurred one morning in the hotel
coffee shop when the head waitress seated Mr. LaViers
at a table next to one occupied by the two jurors. They
engaged in brief bits of conversation, but nothing was
said about this lawsuit and Mr. LaViers did not
intentionally attempt to curry favor with the jur-
ors. Transcript 1770.

The determination of whether irregularities or al-
leged misconduct of this nature should require a new
trial is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial
judge. United States v. Van Buskirk, 6 Cir., 304 F. 2d
871; Thomas v. Nuss, 6 Cir., 353 F. 2d 257, 259. The
court should not grant a new trial because of an ir-
regularity not attended with any intentional wrong
where it appears to the court’s satisiaction that the in-
terests of none of the litigants were prejudiced. Cali-
fornia Fruit Exchange v. Henry, W.D.Penna., 89 F.
Supp. 580, affirmed 184 F. 2d 517. This court is satis-
fied that the contact between Mr. LaViers and the two
jurors did not influence the verdict in any way.

The case of Noble v. McAllister Dairy Farms, 52
Ohio Ops. 52, cited by defendant Consolidation Coal Co.,
is factually distinguishable from the instant case. To
the extent that the statement of law from Henry, sup-
ra, set out above, conflicts with any of the broad propo-
sitions stated in Noble, I decline to follow Voble.

67a
Memorandum.

The defendants allege error in failing to sustain
their challenges of juror Arnspiger. This juror had writ-
ten a real estate bond for a stockholder and retired di-
rector of plaintiff (or for his son) but was not person-
ally acquainted with him. He stated that this fact would
not influence him.

The competency of a juror is for determination by
the trial court, which is vested with a wide discretion
in determining competency. Cox v. General Electric Co.,
6 Cir., 302 F. 2a 389, 391. In view of the circumstances
surrounding Mr. Arnspiger, it was within the court’s
judicial discretion to retain him on the jury. The dictum
in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Gas
Co., 37 L.W. 4037, decided November 18, 1968, does not
require a new trial in this case.

In sum, this court is of the opinion that the ver-
dict was supported by competent evidence and that the
trial was free from any error which would warrant a
new trial. The motions of the defendants for a directed
verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
or for a new trial, should be overruled.

An order in conformity with this Memorandum is
this day entered.
Mac SwWInForp, Judge

A True Copy Attest

Davis T. McGarvey, Clerk
U.S. District Court

By HELEN M. JENNIVE

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69a
Instructions to the Jury.

APPENDIX C

[Appendix C consists of the District Court’s In-
structions to the Jury in South-East Coal Company v.
Consolidation Coal Company and UMWA.]

Instructions to the Jury

[1824] Now, I feel it is important to give you some ex-
planation of the background of the coal industry in Ken-
tucky, and very briefly. I do not want to detain you any
longer than necessary in this charge, but I want you to
be able to feel that you can do so, to decide this case to-
day. You are not under any compuncti~n to do so. You
may come back tomorrow or as many days as you think
is appropriate.

I realize it has taken a long time to try it. There is
quite a lot of evidence, both from the witness stand and
by way of depositions and transcripts; quite a number
of exhibits that you will want to consider, but the issue
in this case is very narrow and before I conclude my
charge to you, I will draw the issue very sharply for you.
You will not have any difficulty in recognizing what it
is that you have to decide.

I believe, in the light of all the evidence and all the
inferences which may be drawn from it, that you can
arrive at a fair and just verdict.

The coal industry is a fascinating and interesting in-
dustry. As has been brought out here in the evidence, it

rh KOE

70a
Instructions to the Jury.

goes back a long way. The United Mine Workers, or the
workers, who are the men that produce the coal, who go
into the pits and actually produce the coal and the oper-
ators who have risked their capital in the industry, have
made a distinct contribution to our whole economy.

[1825] They are entitled, as the law provides, to be pro-
tected in those rights. They are entitled, both as the
plaintiff here is entitled to be protected, and the defend-
ants are entitled to be protected, and so long as they are
all observing the law and the responsibilities of their
business, then the economy will be protected itself, and
the people of the United States and of the world, because
this is a worid proposition. Much of this coal that we
dig here in Kentucky is exported and it is, after all, a
world proposition. But all of us will profit by a healthy
condition of the coal business.

Eastern Kentucky has a coal field and western Ken-
tucky has a coal field, which we are not concerned di-
rectly in this lawsuit, and those of you who have never
visited these coal fields or any coal fields, some of the
language used in this trial might be a little obscure and
you might not feel that you clearly understand just
what it is all about when they talk about tipples and
“sweetheart contracts” and “coal contracts” and produc-
tion and organization of coal companies and organiza-
tion of coal mines.

I am going to very briefly explain some of these
things to you.

A “tipple” is -he place where the coal comes out of
the ground and where it is loaded into cars to be hauled
to market. Now, you understand the old system, many

71a
Instructions to the Jury?

years ago coal was brought directly out of the ground,
placed into coal curs and hauled away by the railroad
companies. It was sold as it was, either good, bad, or in-
different, but you understand modern conditions, coal is
brought out of the ground and a great portion of it is.
loaded into trucks and it cannot be sold as it may appear
or at least a part of it cannot be sold as it comes out of
the ground, but it must be cleaned.

This is a highly competitive business. There are
other coal fields in other States and other places and
foreign markets even, and so the coal must be cleaned
afi [1826] taken care of and made more salable. So,
when we speak of a cleaning plant, sometimes the terms
are interchanged — “tipple” and “cleaning plant” are in-
terchanged — and to the lay people it may rot be clear.

But these cleaning plants are tipples where this coal
is brought and put into the cleaning plant and cleaned
and graded and then loaded into freight cars or trucks
for sale. This is a major proposition. It is not just a mat-
ter of — you may have driven through the mountains of
Kentucky and seen a little wooden tipple, and somebody
says “There is a tipple halfway up the mountain,” where
coal is being brought out and being brought down by a
conveyor system, which, in itself, is still in operation.

But, under modern methods, it is frequently re-
quired that this coal be processed and that these coal-
cleaning plants or washing plants, as they are some-
times called, are involved in the production just the
same as digging the coal or bringing it out or blasting
it out or by stripping methods or whatever it may be.

The cleaning of the coal or processing of the coal
is a part of the coal production. So, when I say “tipple”

72a
Instructions to the Jury.

as used here, I mean the last place that the coal is be-
fore it is hauled to market.

Now, you have also heard the term here“ sweet-
heart contract.” I am not sure that you clearly under-
stand. It sounds very romantic, I am sure, but in this
sense, where there was an agreement and there was an
agreement under this 1958 coal wage agreement, that
the United Mine Workers entered into this contract na-
tionwide thing, as they claim, to make everyone who
produced coal to pay what is known as a Welfare Fund.
The Welfare Fund was 40 cents that was put on every
ton of coal that was produced by the miners.

Now, that Welfare Fund went into the retirement
plan and various other social benefits to the miners
themselves, the building of the hospitals that some of
you may have some experience and knowledge of, or
taking care of these [1827] miners and their families in
illness and their general welfare to see that they were
given a better condition of living in that respect.

So that Welfare Fund or that 40 cents was an at-
tachment on each ton of coal that was produced, and
naturally as is a business arrangement, cost produc-
tion is included and involved in fixing the price of the
coal.

So that cost was added to the retail or wholesale
price of the coal from the producer to the wholesaler
or retailer. Now, that had to be, as it is contended, on a
national basis in order for these companies to compete
with each other from the various coal fields in the
United States.

The United Mine Workers is not just a Kentucky
organization, it is a national organization that was

Instructions to the Jury. -

begun back in 1890, as a combination of the miners for
their self-preservation and for the benefits which they

felt by union they could have which as individuals they
might not have.

So that national wage agreement included not only
the wages, not only the standards which were set by
the contracts that had been in effect since 1950, but in
1958 it added this Welfare Clause to it. That Welfare
Clause is the thing that you have heard referred to as
the Protective Wage Clause. They have used that term. I
sometimes think lawyers are so familiar with their case
that they may not realize what they say doesn’t al-
ways have significance to jurors.

But that Protective Wage Clause in the 1958 con-
tract was to the effect that the operaors would not

handle coal from any company that was not under
that contract.

Now, that is what it means in short, that this Pro-
tective Wage Clause — take the Consolidation Coal
Company, and use it as an example. It produced coal.
I don’t know whether it does now or not. It used to.
It used to own mines in Eastern Kentucky. I am not
sure that it does own any now. I believe it does own
some mines in Virginia. At any rate, it used to be a big
actual miner of coal in Eastern Kentucky. It sold its
own coal and it also bought coal and resold it. It bought
coal from other [1828] producers, independent pro-
ducers, such as it was. It bought coal from captive
mines. In other words, it was in the coal business, in

the coal production business and the coal handling -

business and the coal sale business. So there were other
companies such as this, and this contract provided that

T4a
Instructions to the Jury.

these companies would not handle anybody’s coal unless
it was a coal producing company that had signed one of
these national wage agreements with the United Mine
Workers.

You have heard the term used here “captive mines.”
Well, a captive mine is a mine, just to use an example,
like Inland Steel at Wheelwright. They have a big tipple
there. I think that tipple cost five or six milion [sic. ]
dollars. They have a big cleaning plant. Those things
are so enormous we think of a building costing four or
five million dollars, but we have got a great big build-
ing, and that is what this is.

As a matter of fact, I have seen that tipple there
at Wheelwright, and it has a provision that picks up a
freight car, the whole freight car and shakes it just like
that, and that is a modern method which is used in the
production of coal for sale.

So those companies, like Inland Steel, or like other
companies that use a lot of coal in the production of
stel, own their own mines, but very frequently there are
types of coal or kinds of coal that they cannot use in
their manufacturing process, or they may have for a
time being an overproduction. So they sell that coal and
they might sell that coal, as it has been testified to here,
by some of the witnesses, to companies as the defend-
ant, Consolidation Coal Company, for resale. Sometimes
the captive mine owners have to buy coal, and it just
depends on the circumstances and the particular need
which might arise at a given time. But that is what is
meant by a captive mine. That is a mine that is not in
the business primarily of producing coal for sale, but is
in the coal mining business for its own coal, and to use

75a
Instructions to the Jury.

its own coal and only sells its oversupply, or that which
it cannot for some reason or other use in its business.

[1829] Going back to this question of the sweetheart
contract that I brought up a few minutes ago, a sweet-
heart contract is a special dispensation to a coal produc-
ing company because of a circumstance which that com-
pany, says, “I cannot survive if I have to pay this 40-
cents Welfare clause provision, if I have to observe it. I
cannot pay that much additional and have that much
additional price on my coal and sell it,” or, “I cannot
meet some of these other conditions,” whatever they
might be, some of the conditions maybe as to the wages,
the cost of labor, or for some reason a company or an
individual will say, “Well, I cannot sign that contract.”

Then it is contended that the union, who is seeking
to have these contracts executed by all coal producers
for the benefit of all of the miners as a group, will say
to that person, “Well, you go ahead and sign it anyway.
We won’t insist on it.” In other words, it is showing
favoritism, for one reason or another, to a particular
group or individual group of companies or individual
coal producers.

Now, that

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385605_1009%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
