# Opposition Brief — Stifel v. United States

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385605_0648%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1971
- **Citation:** 401 U.S. 994

## Text

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1970

© No, 1256

ORVILLE E. STIFEL, II, PETITIONER
> We

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

2

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. Ex. B)
is reported at 433 F.2d 481.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on October 29, 1970. A petition for rehearing was
denied on December 24, 1970. (Pet. Ex. A). The
petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on January

(1)

—_

20, 1971. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. 1264(1),

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

4 Whether the trial court erred in admitting into
evidence expert testimony of a government witness

concerning the results of identification of certain

bomb fragments by neutron activation analysis,

2. Whether it was error for the trial court to
admit-black and white photographs of the victim into
evidence,

8. Whether the trial court erred in giving a sup-
plementa! Allen instruction. |

STATEMENT

Atter i; jury, trial in the United, States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio, petitioner
was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 1716 of sending a
bomb through the mail which caused the death of one
Danie] Ronec.' On May 1, 1969 he was sentenced to
imprisonment for life. The court of appeals af-
firmed in a lengthy opinion (Pet, Ex. B., 14-36),

The evidence showed that on the afternoon of
July 8, 1968, Daniel Ronec, a graduate student at
Ohio State University, was killed in his parents’
home in Lorain, Ohio, by the explosion of a bomb
(Tr, 17-18, 26, 41-42, 44-46, 49-50),

To show motive the government established peti-
tioner’s former relationship with one Cheryl Jones,

—

We are lodging with the Clerk the tranacript of trial

(rr).

8

8 .

to whom Ronec was engaged to be pharried at the
time of his death. The record shows that petitioner
and Miss Jones dated regularly until the fall of 1966,
at which time she sought to terminate the relation-
ship (Tr. 152-154). At the time of her decision to
cease seeing petitioner, she was dating Daniel Ronec
(Tr, 155).

In November of 1966, after a series of arguments
between Miss Jones and petitioner, Miss Jones re-
ceived a typewritten letter which later proved to be a
ruse by petitioner in order to meet with her (Tr.
166-169). At was at this meeting that petitioner
learned of Miss Jones’ engagement to Ronec (Tr.
720). Later that evening, Miss Jones received a tele- .
phone call from petitioner in which he stated that he
had been on his way to Columbus with a gun to shoot
her and whoever she was with (Tr. 169, 208; 205).
Miss Jones testified that, sometime later, she received
two letters from petitioner that could be regarded as
threats (Tr. 178-179). Petitioner admitted writing
these letters (Tr. 735-738).

Sjhbortly prior to the bombing, Lawrence Meehan,

a friend of petitioner, accompanied him to Colum-
bus; petitioner asked Meehan to deliver a letter to
Ronec on Highland Street in Columbus but the letter
was never delivered (Tr. 248-251, 258). Ronec was
listed in the Ohio State University directory at two
addresses, one on Highland Street, the other in Lorain,
Ohio, the site of the bomb explosion (Tr. 172-178).

* The pertinent parts of these letters are reproduced in the
opinion of the court below (Pet. App. B. 16-17). .

a

Petitioner testified that he and Miss Jones had en-
gaged in sexual intercourse (Tr, 665-667), and that
she had told him that she thought she was pregnant
(Tr, 667). An argument followed and a period of
approximately two weeks elapsed before petitioner
found out that Miss Jones was not in fact pregnant
(Tr. 668-669), Petitioner later testified that he felt
Mise Jones had made a fool of him (Tr. 675) and
also tpld of the ruse he concocted to gain an oppor-
tunit talk with her (Tr, 675-676, 782),

The government called one Ronald Johnson, a friend
of petitioner, who established petitioner’s knowledge
of firearms and explosives and also testified to the
presence of a workshop in his father’s garage (Tr.
222-240). In addition, employees of Proctor & Gam-
ble, where petitioner worked, testified that mailing
cylinders similar in size to that described by the
postman who delivered the bomb were available in
a stock room to which petitioner had access, along
with other materials (stickers and tape) like those
used on the bomb package (Tr. 268-269, 271-278).

In order to link petitioner directly to manufacture
of the bomb, the government produced expert wit-
nesses who testified that fragments of the mailing
tube, pieces of the mailing label, and tape recovered
at the bomb site were of the same “batch” as similar
items found at petitioner’s residence and place of
employment, This determination was made by sub-
jecting these samples to microscopic examination and
neutron activation analysis (Tr, 897-399, 400-401).

Another export witness testified that portions of the
device used to detonate the bomb were identifiable as

5

a particular switch, “Switch Craft #10002” (Tr.
298-294) and that a mail order electrical supply
catalog advertising such switches for sale was found
in petitioner’s residence when it was searched pur-
suant to a search warrant (Tr. 328).° -

ARGUMENT

1. Petitioner claims that the results of the neutron
activation analysis were inadmissible because (1)
the government’s witness had failed to cleanse the
sample, and therefore the results obtained were un-
scientific, and (2) the test is too new and has not
gained general acceptance in its particular field.

The court of appeals thoroughly canvassed this
issue in its opinion (Pet. Ex. B, 23-25) and there
is no need to repeat its discussion here. As the opinion
points out, neutron activation is a sufficiently reliable
scientific method so that evidence thereof is ad-
missible. With regard to the claim that the sam-
ple was not washed clean of impurities, Mr. Scott,
the government’s expert witness, testified that de-
spite the presence of any contaminates the ba-
sic elements of the material could be ascertained
by the neutron activation analysis. He also indicated
that a washing process was not necessary since for-
eign particles on the sample in question could be
physically removed (Tr. 380-381, 427). As the court
below held, objection to the procedure followed by

»The search also uncovered eight out-of-town newspapers
containing articles dealing with the Ronec bombing (Tr. 448-

450, 456-460).

6 :
{
Scott went only to the weight to be accorded his testi-
mony,

2, Petitioner claims that the admission into evi-
dence of two black and white photographs of the
victim taken shortly after the explosion was error
because they were inflammatory, As the majority
below held (Pet, Ex, B, 85), however, despite the un-
pleasant scene depicted, the photographs had proba-
tive value that outweighed their possible prejudice.
By supporting the government's contention that
Ronec was killed as he was opening the package,
thus demonstrating the force of the explosion, the
pictures were relevant in establishing the lethal In-
tent of the sender of the bomb, In addition the ple-
tures were used by one expert as the basis of his
opinion about the nature of the explosion that caused
the victim’s death (Tr. 311-812), Accordingly, the
admission of this evidence was not an abuse of discre-
tion, Rivers w. United States, 270 F. 2d 485, 488-440
(C. A. 9), certiovari denied, 362 U,, 020; Married
v. United States, 380 F. 2d 28%; 286-287 (C. A, D.C.);
United States v. Cartano, 420 F, 2d 862, 363.366
(C. A. 1), certiorari denied, 897 U,8, 1054,

3, Petitioner contends that the giving of a tra-
ditional Allen charge to the jury was erroneous,
Alien v. United States, 164 U,8, 492, But petitioner's
failure to object to the charge when it was given
should preclude him from attacking it on appeal,
Since no one knew how the jurors weve split at the
time the judge delivered these instructions, peti-

tioner’s failure to object may have been u strategic ©

’ decision, For even if one assumes arguendo that the

7

charge had a coercive impact, this would have bene-
fited petitioner if at that time the majority was in
favor of acquittal.

In any event, the record shows that the charge was
given after the jury had deliberated approximately
eleven hours and had sent a note to the court asking
if there was a time limitation governing an undecided
jury (Tr. 286b-292b). The instructions, which were
in the standard form, are set forth at Pet. Ex. C.
Their lack of coercive impact is reflected by the fact
that it was not until after another several hours of
deliberation that the jury reached its verdict (Tr.
297b). We note that this Court has consistently de-
clined to review the recent developments in the vari-
ous circuits regarding the propriety of a supple-
mental Allen instruction, and there is no reason to
change that policy here. As we have advised the
Court in several briefs in opposition, although the
Third and Seventh Circuits have recently decided that
the Allen charge should be modified,‘ no federal court
that has considered the question has held that the
mere giving of that charge is per se reversible error.
See United States v, Bowles, 428 F, 2d 592 (C.A, 2);
United States v. King, 417 F. 2d 633 (C. A. 5), cer-
tiorari denied, 897 U.S, 923; United States v. Meyers,
410 F. 2d 698 (C. A. 2), certiorari denied, 396 U.S.
835); Fulwood v. United States 369 F. 2d 960 (C. A.
D. C.), certiorari denied, 387 U.S. 984.

Vnitod States v. Fioravanti, 412 F. 2d 407 (C. A. 8), cer-
tiorari denied sub nom, Panaccione v. United States, 896 U.S.
887; United States v. Brown, 411 F. 2d 980 (C. A. 7), certio-
rari denied, 806 U.. 1017,

“
re)

*

2 — ä — — „ „„

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385605_0648%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
