# Appendix — United Aircraft Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385605_0647%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Appendix - **Published:** January 1, 1971 - **Citation:** 401 U.S. 933 ## Text up uP -. COURT, 0. . Pitan PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ro THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ron THE SECOND CIRCUIT \ 55 TABLE OF CONTENTS APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI A. Opinion ov tus Usirep Sates Cover or Arend POR THE SECOND 0 FFF 2a B. Decwion axp ben. ov run National Lanon Raxi- ron. REE RRR IER ee Ne a AD pate 194 C. Dremion ov Taian 8 FF 21a * * © \ ) UV Aincuayr Conpornation, Petitioner, v. - National Lanon RAL Aron Boanp, Respondent, 2 APPENDIX A Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals fer the Second Circuit UNITED WATER COURT OF APPEALS YOR THE AECOND CIRCUIT Nos, 167 and 168—September Term, 1970, (Argued October 14, 1970 Decided November 16, 1970.) Docket Now, 34798 and 34928 — Uneven Aincuarr Convoration, Petitioner, V. National Lanon NI A To Boarp, Respondent, Diarnior 91, Iwremnationst, Association oy Machern AnD Agnosvace Wonkens, AFL-CIO; Intervenor,. Before: Lumparp, Chief Judge, Kauruax, Circuit Judge and Crank, Associate Justice.“ Petition of the United Aireraft Corporation to review and set aside n decision and order of the National Labor Relations Board, holding that United Aircraft violated section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to furnish the unions involved with the . names and addresses of all bargaining unit employees, and directing United Aircraft to furnish the unions with —— ow * United States Supreme Court, retired, sitting by designation, 3a that information; and cross-petition of the Board for en- forcement of its order. Petition to review denied and Board's order enforced. Joszru C. Weis, Washington, D. C., for peti- tioner, Eilat Moore, Attorney (Arnold Ordman, Gen- eral Counsel, Dominick IL. Manoli, Asso- ciate General Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Pre- vost, Assistant General Counsel, and Stanley J. Brown, Attorney, on the brief), for respondent, Mozart d. Ratner, Washington, D. C. (Plato E. Pappa, on the brief), for intervenor, Lumparp, Chief Judge: We are called upon in this case to decide whether United Aircraft Corporation violated section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to furnish the unions involved with a list of the names and addresses of all employees represented by the unions in six of the Company's plants in Connecticut. United Aircraft. Corporation is engaged in the manu- facture of aircraft engines and parts, helicopters, and electronic devices, Its Pratt and Whitney’ Division op- erates plants in East Hartford, Manchester, Southington, and Middletown; and its Hamifton Standard Division op- erates two plants in Windsor Locks, Lodges 1746, 1746A, 700 and 743 are all local Lodges of the International As- wociation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL- CIO, affiliated with District 91, I. A. M., the charging party in the instant case, which coordinates their labor relations programs, All of these Lodges have for some years been $n recognized as exclusive bargaining agents in contracts covering the production and maintenance employees at the various plants of the Company, Lodge 1746 represents» units of these employees at the East Hartford and Man- chester plants, Lodge 700 represents these employees at the Middletown plant, Lodge 1746A represents these g- ployees at the Southington plant, and Lodge 743 repre- sents these employees at Windsor Locks, On July 3, 1969, the unions filed a charge with the Na- tional Labor Relations Board alleging that the Company had violated section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by its refusal to furnish the unions with the home addresses of the approximately 25,000 employees represented by the. unions in the six plants, The Company agreed that it had refused to furnish the unions with the employees’ home addresses, but contended that under the ciroumstances its refusal did not violate the Act, More specifically, the Com- pany contended that such information was neither neces- sary nor relevant to the union's proper performance of their statutory duties and, further, that in the case of Lodges 1746, 743, and 700, the union» were legally entitled to recognition as the exclusive representatives of the em- ployees involved, The Board's trial examiner found to the contrary—hold- ing, in substance, that the home addresses of the unit em- ployees were necessary and relevant to the unions’ function as bargaining agents, and that—in the case of Local Unions 1746, 743, and 700—the unions were legally en- titled to recognition as the exclusive bargaining represen- tative of the employees in the units where they claimed such status, By decision and order dated April 2, 1970, the Board adopted the findings and conclusions of the trial examiner, Accordingly, the Board ordered the Company to cease and desist from refusing to furnish the union with the home addresses of all the employees in their re- spective collective bargaining units, and promptly to fur- nish the union with those addresses, ba ce 2e United Aireraft now petitions this court to review and set aside the Board's order, and the Board cross-petitions kor enforcement, The unions have intervened on the side of the Board. For the reasons set forth below, we deny United Aireraft's petition for review and grant the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement. I, In the summer of 1960, after a stalemate in negotiations between the Company and Lodges 1746 and 748 for new contracts, most of the employees represented by those ‘Lodges went on strike, That strike was accompanied by violence, threats, and physical damage to the non-strikers, particularly, at their homes, In August 1960, the Company and the unions finally agreed on the terms of new con- tracts, and a strike settlement was reached. In the fall of 1965, the Company and the unions entered into negotiations to settle pending litigation and to enter into new three-year contracts to replace those about to ex- pire, In March 1966, the Company quéstioned-the unions’ majority status and refused to negotiate further unless the unions could demonstrate their majority status by a Board election. The unions responded with a charge of a nection 8(a)(5) violation, and the Board’s General Coun- wel filed both a complaint before the Board and a petition for an injunetion in the United States District Court in Connecticut, (m August 5, 1966, the district court granted an injunc- tion requiring the Company to recognize and bargain with the unions, As a consequence of the court's order, the Company entered into new two-year contracts with the unions, Those contracts contained a „Savings clause“ to the effect that if the Company was ultimately found not to be obligated to bargain with the unions, it could termi- nate, The district court then dissolved its order, In Oc- tober 1966, Trial Examiner Ricci held a hearing on the wel 6a General Counsel's complaint and found that by withdraw- ing recognition from unions in March 1066 and refusing to bargain, the Company had violated section 8(a)(1) and (5): he ordered the Company to bargain with the unions, On November 27, 1007, the Board Isnued a decision up- holding the trial examiner's findings, That decision Was promptly appealed by all parties to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, On Beptember 29, 1968, the unions requested the Com- pany to give them a Mist of the names and addresses of all bargaining unit employees, and on September 30, the Company denied the unions’ request, Nevertheless, on Oc- ‘tober 15, 1068, the Company sent a letter to the unions proposing that when a local union desires to write letters to all employees on matters related to contract negotia- tions; the local deliver the sealed envelopes to the Cein- pany and the Company would, by addressograph equip- ment, put the names and addresses on the envelopes and mall them, ‘The Company stated, however, that this offer was subject to the availahvity of the addressograph equip- ment and the Company first call on the equipment, Nevertheless, the next month, the ugions took advantage of the Company's offer and sent letters to all employees by this means, In November 1968, the 8 and the unions entered into negotiations for the Pratt and Whitney Division for new contracts to succeed the ones entered into in 1966, The Company again questioned the unions’ majority status ; and the unions agreed to submit sufficient dues check- off cards to constitute a majority and, if that was not enough, to have a Board-conducted election, The Com- pany rejected this offer, proposing that they continuo to ‘' negotiate and that any agreement reached contain the ‘savings clause’’ giving it the option to terminate the oon - tract in the event the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia should reverse the Board's decision and find 7a that the Company had no obligation to bargain with the unions in March 1966, The Union, however, opposed in- clusion of the ‘‘savings clause’ and asked the Company ‘‘unconditionally and unequivocally"’ to recognize the unions as the exclusive bargaining representatives of the employees involved, Finally, the Company signed three- year contracts containing clauses of unconditional exelu- nive recognition of the unions and omitting the ‘savings clause,’ Both parties agreed, however, that by their ac- tions they were not waiving any legal position previously taken, ) In March 1969, the Company and the unions began nego- tiations for new contracts for the Hamilton Standard Di- ‘vision, but this time the Company did not question the unions» majority. On May 29, 1969, while those negotiations were pro- ceeding, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cireuit denied enforéement of the Board's order of No- vember 27, 1967, and found that in March 1966 the Com- pany had a reasonably grounded good-faith doubt as to the union's majority and hence had not violated the Act. Lodges 1746 and 746, Int, Ass'n of Mach, and Aero, Work- evs v. N. L. R. B., 416 F. ad 809 (D. C. Cir, 1969). But on July 1, 1969, despite this decision, the Company signed new contracts for its Hamilton Standard Division, con- taining exelusive recognition clauses and omitting the ‘savings clause,’’ All contracts covering both the Hamil- ton Standard and- Pratt and Whitney Divisions contained provisions for dues checkoff authorizations, but no other form of union security, | - II. The Company employs large numbers of people whose homes are dispersed over a wide geographical area. Of the 17,000 employees at the East Hartford and Manches- ter plans, only a little over 6,000 live in towns closer Sa than seven miles from the plant, The rest live in some 118 different towns in Connecticut, in 27 towns in Massen- chusetts, and in various places in other states; Similarly, only 641 of the 3,000 employees in the Bouthingtoh plant and 693 of the 1,700 employees in the Middletown plant live in there towns, The rest aro seattered over a radius of more than 40 miles from the plants, The same wide dispersion can be found among the 5,000 employees at the Windsor Locks plants, ~~ | When the Company has had serious labor relations problems in the past, it has resorted to the mils to reach the employees with its point of view, Thus, the Company has sent several letters to its employees pertaining to oui - lective-barguining contracts proposals, After negotiations with Lodges 1746 and 743 broke down in 1966, it mailed a series of letters to the employees at the affected plants, explaining and seeking to justify its aetion, Finally, in November 1968, after refusing the union's request for the home addresses of its employees, the Company utilived the mails to explain its position on the refusal to the employees, The unions, too, use the mails to communicate with om- ployees, but they can only reach those of their members for whom they have up-ta-date addresses, Moreover, they have no record whatever of the addresses of the roughly 10,000 other unit employees who are not union members, The unions have found that, under these cireunstancer, the most feasible meant of vommuniestion with all en- ployees, members as well as nonmembers, is through hand- bills which are distributed to the employees a» they enter the plants at the beginning of the shifts, During 1968, the unions distributed handbills on about 45 or 60 occasions, In 1964 the president of Lodge 1746 requested the Com- pany to permit its handbill distributors (who are usually ‘Compatiy employees) inside the plant to avoid bad weather, The Company refused, but offered to permit the Union to Da - ume ite raekn for the handbills, providing no conflicting une of the racks wa» planned, This offer was explored and Lodge 743. did use the racks at one of the Windsor Locks plant for some time, But the other Lodges, after ascer- taining that the rack» would only be open at the end of the whifts and that ad@ance notice was required to avoid con- filets over the use of the racks, declined the Company's offer, The collective-bargaining contracts obligate the Com- any to make space available on its bulletin boards for the posting of union notices, but they limit the subject matter of the notices which can be posted, and prior approval by Company official in required, The unions’ necoss to employees at the plants through shop stewards and union stewards le severely limited by the strict enforcement of the Conipany’s non-solieitation rulo and its ban on solicitation of employees for union membership or dues conducted upon the premises of the Company dlubing all paid time, whether or not the em- ployee is working, Thus, the unions’ stewards have the opportunity to discuss union matters with the employees only before and after work and during lunch periods; and because the employees have thirty-minute lunch breaks which are staggered every fifteen minutes, the opportuni- tion for conversation between stewards und employees are further limited, ; e , It was in light of all these circumstances that the unions» requested the Company in September 1968 to furnish them “with the names and addresses of all members of the bar- wulning units which they respectively represented, After the Company refused to do so, the unions filed an unfair Inbor practice charge with the Board's General Counsel? und on July 3, 1969, the General Counsel filed a complaint alleging that the Company's action had violated § 8(a)(5) und (1) of the Act, On November 28, 1969, Trial Examiner Vowe found that the Company had so violated the Act, and 10a on April 2, 1970, the Board upheld the trial examiner's findings and conclusions and ordered the Company to fur- nish the unions with the addresses, III. The Company's first claim on this appeal is that it had no obligation to bargain with the unions so as to require it to give the unions the employees’ addresses, because its status as exclusive bargaining representative of the em- ployees was due to the coercion and taint of the district court's injunction and the Board's decision, both of which rested on a finding later reversed by the District of Colum- bia Court of Appeals, The trial examiner found that the Company's 1966 grant of recognition to the unions and the consequent contracts were indeed attributable to the com- ( pulsion of the court's injunction, Hence, since the unions’ initial request for addresses and the Company's refusal to provide them came in September 1968, while the coerced 1966 contracts were still in effect and before the new nego- . tiations began, the Company’s initial refusal was not an unfair labor practice, But, as the trial examiner correctly found, the unions’ request was an ongoing one and the Company's grant of recognition in the 1968 negotiation _ was not coerced, We hold therefore that the Company's continuing refusal to provide addresses after having been given proof in the 1968 negotiations of the unions’ major- ity status cannot be justified by the coercion of the prior contract, The trial examiner found that the unions in the various plants acquired majority status at least by the last day of the month during which the total number of dues checkoff cards furnished to the Company by. the particular lodge reached fifty percent of the employees, These dates were, for the various plants, October 31, 1968, November 30, 1968, and December 31, 1968, This finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record, and the Company does not dispute it. Rather, the Company claims (1) that its lla grant of recognition to the unions during the 1968 nego- tiations was direetly coerced by the Board's 1967 decision which was then in effect but which was later found by the Distrigt of Columbia Court of Appeals to be incorrect, and SF : by of the 1968 negotiations, the Company still had to. recognize them or to bargain with them concerning address lists, because that majority was obtained through the unwarranted assistance given by the district court and the Board,’ We these contentions, - The Company's argument that its 1968 grant of nition was covrced by the Board's 1967 decision has no merit, for, as the Company itself concedes, the unions had gained a majority by late 1968 and it was the Company's knowledge of that majority, a» evidenced by the dues checkoff cards in its hands, that led it to enter into the 1968 negotiations, The Company is estopped from raining its second argu- ment--that the unions’ majority was a result of the court's and the Board's unlawful assistance, The Company failed . to charge such ‘taint'’ when the unions claimed in the late _ 1968 and carly 1969 negotiations that their dues checkoff cards established their majority status; it rejected the unions’ offer to prove their majority in an election; it ao. copted in the 1968 and 1969 contracts the unconditional and unequivocal recognition of the unions as the exclusive bargaining agent; and it yielded to the unions’ demand that the ‘savings olause“ be omitted from the new con- tracts, thereby knowingly waiving its option to terminate in the event of a favorable decision in the Distriet of Co- lumbia case, All of these actions indicate that in the 1968. and 1969 negotiations the Company accepted the fact that ' The Company's argument does not apply to the Southington ‘plant where it has never questioned the particular Lodge's majority, i 1E i 12 the unions were the exclusive bargaining representatives and that their majority was not tainted, Moreover, when the Company signed a new contract with Lodge 743 at the Hamilton Standard Division on July 1, 1069, it already knew of the District of Columbia Circuit's May decision, and it nevertheless accepted the omission of the ‘savings clause’’ and the inclusion of the clause granting uncondi- tional recognition to the union as exclusive bargaining representative, If a‘‘taint’’ charge was to be made at all, it surely should have been made at least at that time, To permit an employer to save his doubts for use at his con- venience, as the Company here seeks to do, could subvert the bargaining process and the policies of the Act, Furthermore, the Company's assertion, if accepted, would render unlawful and unenforceable all the 1968 and 1969 contracts between the Company and the unions; and the Company itself has not only not disavowed or sought to terminate those contracts even after the District of Columbia decision, but has insisted that they ‘are valid and in force. Thus the Company's argument of taint seems to us to be a make-weight, which it wishes to use in this case to escape the enforcement of its obligation to furnish addresses, while, at the same time, it refuses to accept all the consequences of its claim—that is, that the contracts are unenforceable for all other purposes as well, IV, The Company's second claim is that the record evidence fails to establish the *‘necossity’’ or ‘relevance’’ of provid- ing the unions with the home addresses of employees, We reject that claim, It is, of course, well settled that the duty to bargain in good faith imposed upon the employer by section 8(a) (5) includes an obligation to provide the employees’ bargain- ing representative with information that in necessary and * the proper performance of its duties, including y jer — 13 the effective administration of the collective bargaining agreement in force, NV, L. It. .. v, Aome Industrial Co., 385 U.S, 482 (1007); V. L. M.. v, Truitt Mig, Co., 361 U.S. 149 (1956); Fafnir Bearing Co, v. V. L. A. I., 30 F.9d 716 (2d Cir, 1966), We held in Prudential Insurance Company of America v. V. I. It. ., 412 F. au 77 (ad Cir, 1969), that the names and home addrosnon of all bargaining unit employ. oon constituted, in the elreumstances of ** case, informa- tion that war necessary and relevant 0 proper per- formanee of the unions’ duties, We stated that since 1 union is under a statutory obligation to represent nonmem- hor employees, as well as mombers, the union must be able to communicate with all employees, We found that in that case the names and addronson of all bargaining unit em- ployees were vital to such communication, and honco wo required the employer to furnish the union with thone names and addresses, Bee Standard Oil Company of Cali. fornia v. V. I. It. B., 909 F.2d 639 (Oth Cir, 1968), where the Ninth Cireuit came to the same conclusion on facts very sindlar to those in the instant ease.” Bee also Excelsior Underwear, Ine, 156 N. I., R. R. 1286 ( 1966); and V. L. N. . v. Wyman-Clordon Co,, 384 U.S, 759 (1960), In thin case, the trial examiner found that address were both necessary and relevant to the unions’ perform. ance of its dution, and there in substantial evidence in the record to support his findings, "In both situations union membership included only a amall majority; in both there was no union neourity clause in the con- tragt in both the Company had practioed untl unſon activity and the union had the need to counteract it; in both the homes of the employeon were mattered over a wide area (here even more than in Standard Oil) and in both the alternative means of communica. - lun were found to be Inadequate, In Standard Oil, the court upheld the Board's conclusion that the furnishing of employee ald ee wan relevant and nous’ to the union's performance OF its responsibilities in collective bargaining and contract admin- istration, and it required that the employer furnish the requested list of addresses, ? Fa 14a A. Necessity In view of the wide dispersal of employee homes, it is clear that the unions need an effective means of communi- cation, The severity of the problem is increased by the relatively low percentage of union membership, which limits both the effectiveness of tho intraunion modes of com- munication and the reliability of the membership as a representative sample of employee sentiment on a particu- lar topic, We reject the Company's contention that the existing means of communication—handbilling, the use of company distribution racks, bulletin boards, shop stewards and union stewards, and the Company's offer to mail union /eommunications to the employees’ home addresses—are „ wdequate to fulfill union functions, 1, Handbilling, The union is able to hand leaflets to employees as they come and go from work, But as we stated in V. I. H. . v. United Aircraft Corp., 824 F.2d 128, 130 (2d Cir,), cort, denied, 376 U.S, 951 (1963), „Sidewalk and street corners are subject to the vicissitudes of climate and often foree solicitation at awkward times, as when employees are hurrying to and from work.“ Where, as here, the unions are attempting to reach over 20,000 em- ployees at ix plants, the logistical problems of handbilling are overwhelming, The union needs enough handbillers at the many plant entrances with enough flyers for that partic- ular entrance, Since the Company does not allow non-em- ployee handbillers at the inner gate locations most suitable for thin activity, the unions must use employees, who have 4% stop distribution in time to get to work, Hence, late- comers are missed, ax are all employees who work irregular hours or are absent on that date, Finally, since handbill- ing le necessarily done at shift changes when great num- hors of employees are entering and leaving the plants, it in inevitable that many people are missed, 2, Distribution Racks, The Company's offer to open up ite distribution racks to union literature was subject lo three conditions: that advance notice would bo ro- l5a quired when the racks were to be used, that they could be used only when the Company had no use for them, and that they would be locked until the end of the shift. The first two conditions clearly prevent the unions from relying on these racks in an emergency, and the latter condition, which prevents distribution until the employees are leaving the plant, renders the method impractical. The unions have found that the beginning of the shift is the best time for distribution, since employees are more likely to take a flyer; in addition, they can read the flyer at lunch break. After work, employees are more likely to be in too much of a hurry to stop for leaflets, 3. Bulletin Boards, The collective—bargaining agree- ments severely limit the subject matter of the notices that may be posted on bulletin boards and require prior approval by a Company official. Twice in a short period before the hearing in this case, the Company refused to post a notice tendered by the unions, On the first oc- casion the Company took the position that a notice con- cerning a ‘‘golf league’’ was ‘‘recreational’’ rather than ‘*social’’ and hence not permitfed by the agreement. On n second occasion, the Company refused to post notices concerning shop steward elections, a subject expressly in- cluded in the contract, assertedly because the signs were too large and because they contained small maps of the plants which allegedly created security problems, Al- though the union offered to block out the maps, the Company still refused either to post the notices or to arbitrate the dispute. Moreover, as the trial examiner noted, even if the Company had not placed these restric- tions upon the unions’ use, ‘bulletin boards by their very nature do not provide an effective means of com- municating with employees on important matters.“ The message must be short and simple because of space limita- tions and the little time available for reading to employees hurrying by; in addition, the notice must compete for attention with other notices, 16a 4. Shop Stewards and Union Stewards, The remaining in-plant method of communication is the shop stewards and the union stewards, The stewards, however, are obviously not an appropriate mean’ for placing a sub- stantial message before the entire employee complement more or loss simultaneously, Because the Company strietly enforces a ban on solicitation of employees for union membership or dues, and on carrying on union business, upon the premises of the Company during all paid time, whether or not an employee is working, stewards can reach employees only before and after work and during lunch; and since lunch breaks are staggered, this oppor- tunity is further limited, 5. The Company's Offer to Mail Communications for the Unions, Under the circumstances here, the only method which affords an effective means of reaching virtually every employee with a substantial message under con- ditions which allow thoughtful consideration is direct mail. As has been stated, however, the unions are presently un- able to use that method effectively," _ Although the Company did offer to mail union commu- nications to the employees’ home addresses, that method is plainly unsatisfactory, The Company's offer allows it to preempt the mailing equipment, This would be eru- cial in times of emergency when the unions might well want to use the mails, for this is the very time when the Company would want to do so as well and would preempt the equipment, Moreover, the offer limits the subject matter of the letters which it will mail for the unions to matters relating to contract negotiation,’’ ‘leaving the Company ax sole judge of what could be mailed, For instance, while the Company did mail out a copy of the unions’ contract proposal in November 1968, itt refused to send out a survey concerning the employees’ interest in an automobile insurance plan, The unions’ duties ax exclusive bargaining representative do not end at ‘matters * See p. 469 supra, . 17a relating to contract negotiations“; they also include other matters such as this insurance plan.‘ Thus we find that none of the alternative methods sug- gested by the Company is adequate to achieve the unions’ objective of reaching all the bargaining unit employees, Moreover, as we held iw the Prudential case, since each of the five alternative methods is inadequate by itself to achieve the desired goal, their aggregation cannot cure the defect. B. Relevance In Prudential, we held that [als the exclusive bargain- ing representative of all the agents within the unit, the Union has a statutory duty to represent fairly the in- terests of the. .. nonunion agents as well as the Union members ... [and] data without which a union cannot even communicate with employees whom it represents is, by its very nature, fundamental to the entire expanse of a union's relationship with the employees.“ 412 F.2d at 84. The Company argues that, although the unions’ avowed purpose may be relevant, the true motivation for the unions’ demand is either to solicit for union membership or to go to the homes of those who did not strike in 1960 and to continue to visit violence upon them. But ux we stated in the Prudential case, the ‘‘complaint that the Union may use this information to solicit new mem- bers within the unit is simply of no moment. As the Board has so appropriately indicated, there is no clear distinetion between informing nonmembers about the bene- fits it has obtained and hopes in the future to secure for Other such matters specifically mentioned at the hearing in- cluded advising employees as to their rights under the pension plan; how to collect. on group insurance; information on the han- dling of grievances; decisions of arbitrators, the Board, and the courts; and clarification of employee rights under the collective bargaining agreement, as well a workmen's compensation, social security, and medicare, In thom and its solicitation of their support, In any case, union solicitation in itself hardly an-evil—ospecially where, as here, the union is already the exclusive bargaining rep- resentative of the employees it in soliciting, Prudential Ina, Co, v. VN. L At. ñ., supra, 412 F.2d at 85, There in no evidence that the unions woul use the list of addresses to go to the employeos’ homes for violent purposes, Finally, in thin case as in Prudential, ‘supplying the requested list is no onerous burden; it entails no disrup- tion of the employees“ work as is ordinarily involved in allowing union organivers on the premlsen or permitting union experts to make an independent time study of the operations,“ Prudential Ina, Co, v. V. I. It. ;., supra, 412 F. ad at 85, 1 The Company's final claim is that the union 's demand for addresses violates the employees’ right to privacy, especially in view of the unjons’ violence against non- strikers in 1960, That claim, however, has little merit in the circumstances of thin case, In determining whether the disclosure of addresses to a union violates the om- ployees’ right to privacy, the crucial factor appears to be the likelihood of a clear and present danger to the em- ployees involved, The trial examiner here found little likelihood of a cloar and present danger to the nonstriking employees, and there in substantial evidence to support his finding, Although there was evidence of violence in the past, it took place ten yours ago, and there has been no evidence of harasament since that time; the threatening statements were merely personal and not attributable to the unions; and no employee testified to present foar of - violence, Petition for review denied and Board's order enforced. 19a APPENDIX B Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board (Dated April 2, 1970) _ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -— THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Case 1-CA-6492 Unirep Arncrart Corporation (Pratt & Watney AIRCRAFT and Hau Stanparp Divisions) and District 91, InrerRNaTionaL ASSOCIATION OF MacHINists & Agnospace Workers, AFL-CIO DECISIONANDORDER ~—s« On November 28, Reo, Trial Examiner Owsley Vose is- sued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in cer- (nin unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner’s Decision. There- after, Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner’s Decision and a supporting brief, The Charging Parties filed cross-exceptions and a reply to Respondent's brief. The General Counsel filed a brief in support of the Trial yxaminer’s Decision, Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Na- tional Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Exam- iner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed, The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner’s Decision, the — Da exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this ase, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions», and recommen- dations of the Trial Examiner, : ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(¢) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and orders that Respondent, United Air- craft Corporation (Pratt & Whitney Alroraft and Hamilton Standard Divisions), its officers, agents, successors, ANd un- signs, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examin- er's Recommended Order, : Dated, Washington, D. C., April 2, 1970, Faank W. MoCuisoon, Chairman Joux H. Fax xi, Member Howaap Janxina, In,, Member National Lanon Revations Boarp * (Anal.) * V APPENDIX C Decision of Trial Examiner ~ UNITED STATES OF AMBRICA unrom THE NATIONAL BABOR RELATIONS BOARD DIVIBION OF TRIAL BXAMINERS WARHINOTON, b. o. Cane 1-0A.6402 ie. Vn Aimenavr Componation (Paar & Warrwny Alncnayr und Hamiuton Sranpanp Divimonn) and Dinthior 11, INTERNATIONAL ATN OF Manni & Awnonpack Wonnns, AFI Thomas M. Harvey, of Boston, Mans., for the General Counsel, Joseph C, Wella, of Washington, D. C., : for the Respondent, ig Mozart G, Ratner, of Washington, D. O., for the Cliurging Party, TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION Statoment of the Cane OW Vows, Trial Bxaminors This case was tried at Wont Hartford, Connectiout, on J uly 22-24, 1969, pursuant 4% u charge fled by District 91, International Association Of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, on October 16, Ihen, and a complaint issued-on July 3, 1969, The com- Plaint allogod in substance that the Rosponlent had vio- lated Mootion n) (h) and (1) of the Act by refusing, in Noptomber and Octobor 1968, and thereafter, the requests Of La 1746, 1746A, 743 and 700 of International Asso- ciation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, . 22a that each Lodge be furnished with the names and home ad- dresses of all the employees in ench of their respective col- lective-bargaining units, The Respondent filed an answer admitting the refusal to furnish the requested information but denying any legal obligation to furnish such informa- tion, All parties were represented by counsel and fully participated in the trial. Since that time all parties have filed comprehensive briefs which have been fully considered, Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observa- tion of the witnesses, I make the following: Findings and Conclusions I, The Respondent’s Business The Respondent, a Delaware corporation having its prin- cipal office at East Hartford, Connecticut, is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of aircraft engines, helicop- ters, aircraft accessories and parts, electronic devices and components thereof. The Respondent operates several plants in the State of Connecticut, including plants located at East Hartford, Manchester, Middletown and Southington (Pratt & Whitney Division), and two plants at Windsor Locks (one known as the Windsor Locks plant and the other known as the Building #3 plant). Previously, the opera- tions carried on in the Building #3 plant had been per- formed in a plant at Broad Brook, Connecticut, called the Broad Brook plant. In addition, the Respondent operates plants in the States of Florida, New York and California, In connection with its operations in the State of Connecti- cut, the Respondent annually purchases and receives from outside the State of Connecticut goods and materials valued. in excess of $1,000,000, and also ships from its plants in the State of Connecticut to, points and places outside the State of Connecticut goods and materials valued at in excess of #1,000,000, Upon these facts which are admitted by the Respondent, I find that the Respondent is engaged in com- merece within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to as- vort jurisdiction herein, II. The Labor Organisations Involved Lodges 1746, 1746A, 743 and 700 of International Asao- ciation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, uve all affiliated with District 91, a District Lodge chartered by the International, All four local lodges and District Lodge 91, the Charging Party herein, are labor organiza- tions within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. The Unfair Labor Practices The Respondent's refusal of the Lodges’ request for the addresses of employees in their respective burgaining units, in violation of Section 8(n)(5) and (1) of the Act, A. The Facts 1, Background; history of bargaining relations u. The bargaining history prior to the 1960 strike Aw indicated above, the Respondent's operations are car- ried on in two main divisions, the Pratt & Whitney Division und the Hamilton Standard Division, Involved in this ease are six units of employees at various of the Respondent's plants in both divisions, The partion stipulated at the hear- ing that each of these six units discussed below constituted appropriate units for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section bb) of the Act. In the Pratt & Whitney Division, the Board certified Lodge 1746 as the collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the Kast Hartford, Conneatiout, plant fol- lowing an eloction in 1045, Certifieation of Lodge 1746 as tho exclusive representative of the employees of the Man- _ chester plant followed an election among these employees Jdu in 1957, Lodge 1746A was certified by the Board as the collective-bargaining representative of the employees at the Respondent's Southington plant in 1951, The record does not reveal the origin of the bargaining relationship between the Respondent and Lodge 700 representing the employees at the Respondent's Middletown. plant, However, the ree- ord indicates that Lodge 700 has had contracts covering the employees of the Middletown plant going back some years, as has Lodge 1746A for the employees at the Respondent's Southington plant, Lodge 1746 han mad collective-bargain- ing contracts covering the employees at the Respondent's East Hartford and Manchester plants going back, with few interruptions, almost to the dates of the original certifica- tions, In the Hamilton Standard Division, Lodge 743 was certi- fled by the Board as the exclusive bargaining representa- tive of the employees at the Respondent's Windsor Locks plant in 1941, and at the Respondent's Broad Brook plant in 1954. The employoos in these two plants also have been covered by colloctive-barguining contracts between the Ro- spondent and Lodge 743 almost continuously since their original certification, b. The strike; the actions and counter actions commenced by the Respondent and Lodges 17-46 and 748 The negotiations betwoon the Respondent and Lodges 1746 and 743 for new contracts to sucoeed thone expiring in the latter part of 1959 and the early part of 1960 cover- ing the employees of the Respondent's Must Hartford, Man- chester, Windsor Locks and Broad Brook plants beoame stalemated, and on June 8, 1960 the employees of these four plants went out on strike, Lodges 1746A and 700, repre- senting the employoos at the Respondent's Southington and Middletown plants, respectively, renched an agreement with the Respondent concerning the terms of successor contracts and the employees at these planta did nat participate in the strike, Bu The strike In which Lodges 1746 and 743 engaged oom - mencing on June 8, 1960, was attended, as the Board has found, by ‘mas plekoting and violence’? (United Aireraft Corporation, 134 NLRB 1632), A fow days after the strike hogan the Respondent commenced actions againat Lodges 1746 ancl 743 and District Lodge 91 in the Connecticut Su- perior Court, Hartford County, seeking injunctive relief und large sume in damages, The Respondent also filed un- fnir labor practioos charges against Lodges 1746 and 743. Upon the basis of these charges the Board's Regional Di- rector Initiated proceedings in the United States District Court for the District of Connectiout seeking an injunction nuninst the Lodgow under Section 10(j) of the Act. In both the State and Federal Court proceedings the parties on- fered into stipulations about the middle of June 1960 where- hy the Lodges agreed to cease thelr mass picketing and other egal activition, Ann result of those stipulations the mass picketing and Violonoe at the picket lines subsided, However, the Lodges thereafter continued to engage in violence away from the picket lines agaist non-strikers, An was stated much later in the opinion of Judge Gaffney of the Connoctiout Superior Court, Hartford County, in sustaining the action for dam. Aon brought by the Respondent against Lodges 1746 and 74% vonulting from tortious conduct during the strike (68 LRM 248s, 2404) ; Aw such they [the night riders) damaged automobiles of non-wtriking employees, They flooded the cellars of tholr houses, they burned their hedges, they threw paint hombs through their house windows, They tried to burn a barn behind a hause where many non-atrikers lived, Tay burned one of the non-atriking employee's vutomobile, Uitinately, on August), 1060, Lodges 1746 and 749 agreed on the forma of new contracts, and a strike settloment agree- wont Was renched on August 11, 1960, 9 q 1114211 ie nou 1 e 1 fi f Hie hi 1 10 te 1 | ! 1 Hi | Hel 1 11 i af He | it Ht 11 01 1 di 1 1 AH 0 e 10 211 iv l ini e 111155 Bah | HIE l i hil 2 e and (1) charge 1CA50. The i ! K 0 if i. i t i i THT 1 0 it ' HH 1 0 11 tuk . e 0 Wl 1 1 1 ih 1271 i 1 Hal lias} 0 131 a 11 Hi: 140 23 ti . 4 1271 10 (i 11771 0 j 0 1 3 i it itt 7 i 10 “4 115 l i 43543 Hit IH | 19 fi i : Teel iil i 1 00 1 10 0 % High i] Hale 0 hia i i 100% i 10 Ae HHH 115 i a * - 4 > &* . 5 4 * =. * * OQ * 8. 35 mM i 1 1 1 11147 10 2 111 if 71 At 111 i HY 143 | 1 24% 115 j 14 f i yea] 1 HU . i! fi e i 11 1 . : oe a 4 * . employees of the Middletown plant. Ana a 3-year contract, effective December 5, 1968, was thereafter signed by the Re- ee oy ae epee ae ae Southington plant. In the negotiations commencing in March 1968 between the Respondent and Ledge 743 fer successor contracts cov- ering the Windsor Locke and Building #3 plants in the Hamilton Standard division, the Respondent did not que-- tion the Lodges’ majority-status in these two units. At the bargainiig meeting on March 19, 1969, Ostro, the union uegotiator, asked whether, in view of the number of em. pleyees on checkoff the Respondent was challenging Lode 743s status as exclusive bargaining representative. The only reply of Nathaniel Morse, the Respondent's Industrial Relations Director, was have you heard any, meaning any such challenge, to which the union negotiator replied no.“ After several months of bargaining, successor con- tracts covering the employees at the Windsor Locks and “uilding +3 plants were signed on July 1. The contracts were made effective as of April 21, 1969. All of these contracts covering the employees in both the Pratt & Whitney and Hamilton Standard divisions con. tained the exclusive recognition provisions and the other provisions mentioned in connection with the discussion of the 1965 and 1966 contracts. In addition these contract: contained new provisions granting various benefits not pre- \ ously accorded the Respondent’s employees. None of the contracts contained Article XIII. the “Savings clause,’’ giv- ing the Respondent the option of terminating the contract upon 10 days notice, depending upon the outeome of the case then pending in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cireuit. It is to be noted that at the time of the actual signing of the Windsor Locks and Building +° contracts, the Court of Appeals decision upholding the Respondent’s position, had been outstanding for about a month, the Court of Appeals decision having been * on May 29, 1969. . eafannd to Cumaiah the Ledges with the addresses of its emplovecs By letter dated September 19, 1968, signed by the presi- * im 1964 and 1965 on which Ledges 1746 and 743 hed pre“ iously requested that they be furnished with the addressex —— in their respective bargaining units and, after to the forthcoming negotiations, as- sertec that lists names and addresses of all emp in the bargaining units were indispensable to the perform. that the Wen there invelved was entitled to a list of the names and addresses of all the employees in the bargaining unit. In the letter, the Ledges quoted from the Court's of the employees is essential in order to enable the bar. gaining agent adequately to perform its statutory duty fairly to represent the interests of all the employees in the. unit, nonunion employees as well as union members. In a letter to District 91 dated September 30, 1968, the Respondent declined to furnish the addresses, without ex. pressly saying so. Instead it advanced various reasons to why the Ledges were in error in requesting the addresses. The Lodges replied to this letter by letter dated October 10, 1968, in which they attempted 25... ee * Standard Oil Co. of California v. NLRB, aad a N 0 vanced by the Respondent and gave further reason~ sup- porting their request for the addresses. In its to District 91 dated October 15, 1968, the — —— te dresses to allow the Ledge to use its mailing facilities for the purpose of mailing letters to all unit employees n unters related to contract negotiations. This offer aud the Lodges’ response is discussed more fully below. m November 29, 1969, the Respondent's continuing r. fusail to furnish the addresses of unit employees. was re- ferred to in the contract negotiations with Ledge 1746. In the negotiations on the following day the Ledge explicitly stated that by entering into the contract, ‘‘the union does not intend to waive, and has not waived, any statutory rights . . . heretofore asgerted in litigation . . . such as .. . addresses of bargaining unit employees. | At the hearing in this case on July 24, 1969, Industria! Relations Director Morse testified that the Respondent’ poliey, which has been in effect for 30 years, is to refuse to release the address of any employee to any organization or any person for any purpose, without the permission of the employee. 3. The Ledges’ need to have employees’ addresses in order to communicate with unit employees Justin Ostro, the Lodges chief negotiator, was a repre- sentative of the International assigned to District 91 and the four Lodges here involved. Ostro testified that the Lodges needed the employees’ addresses so as to be able to communicate with not only members of the Lodges, but also to give information to the employees, among other things, about impending elections, both union and civil, new serv- ices afforded by the Lodges, the interpretation of contract provisions, and the rights of the employees with respect to group insurance, pensions, workmen’s compensation, social security and medicare. - Other subjects concern- investigate grievances or alleged unfair practice charges. Finally, Ostro testified that reaching aa by mail at their homes enabled the Lodges to place the ma- . terial in the employees’ hands at a time when they would lave time earefully to consider it. The Ledges experience uns heen, according to Ostro, that when the material di- -ominated inchudes business reply envelopes, a larger num her of employees participate when the materials are mailed directly to the employees’ hemes than when any other methed of distribution is ‘used. 8 and the Lodges — of communtedting aith the Deagentest’s. OEE In view 0 Go cap tp eae —„ cmployees and the wide dispersal of their homes com- munication with all of them is nessssarily 2 dilieult, under- taking. As of the end of 1968 there. were almost 17,800 em —— — Bast Hartford end Manchester plants. An exhibit prepared by the Respondent (Resp. Exh. 1) shows that only a little over 6,000 of these employees live in towns which are closer than 7 miles from the plant. The rest live in some 118 different towns in Connecticut, in °T towns in Massachusetts, and in various places in Rhode — LF i if sf F 7 iste over 500, The Windsor Locks employees lived in 105 dif- _ ferent towns in Connecticut and 65 towns in Massachusetts. ‘mly 821 of the 4,500 Windsor Locks employees lived closer than 7 miles from the plant. The rest of the employees were dispersed over an area having a radius of more thah 45 miles from the plant. b. The Respondent ' methods of communicating withemployees $= The Respondent hes traditionally weed various means of communicating with employees. In addition te the hand- book ‘You and Your Company which is given to all em. ployees at the time of their hiring, the Respondent puts out — semimonthly house organs to the employees of both divi- their way home. 8 For many years the Respondent has used bulletin board- as a means of communicating with its employees. At the ‘last Hartford plant Respondent has for a long time had -: (ally constructed glassed-in locked bulletin boards about 3 feet high and 8 feet wide erected at prominent places in the plants. These bulletin boards are divided into separate ~ections, a section for the Respondent’s general notices, and smaller seetions for eredit union notices, Aireraft Club not ices and union notices. In the Hamilton Standard divi- sion the bulletin beards are apparently smaller. The col- loctive-hargaining contracts covering the employees in both divisions in reeent years have provided that employer-ap- proved notices concerning union meetings, elections, and union social affairs could h posted on the company bulletin hoards. 5 The Respondent has traditionally used the mails to com- municate important Messages to its employees. While this means of communications has not been used with great frequency in the past, it has been used with some regularity by the Respondent when it has had serious problems in cen- 2 order to enable them to communiente with non-member. „ well as members about contract proposals and negotia- tions. This procedure, the Respondent explained, would enable it to adhere to its longstanding policy of protecting — —— — Industrial Relation- Director Morse testified in effect that the Respondent would continue to communieaté wit!) its employees by mail whenever it decided that this would be the most effective means of communicating with the em- 42a 9 I means ased by the Lodges to commumecate with employers hamdbalis, the Lodger al- passed out copies of the District 91 monthly publication, the ‘New Union News"’ to the employees as they entered the plants. The Lodges prefer the beginning of the shift for the distribution of union literature, se Gicorge Cope, a busines» represvntative ef District 91, testified, for the reason that cmployees whe arrive early have time to read before —tarting to work, ethers can read them during lunch * s i i! Wal k 1 2 i 1 The letter then went on to offer, whenever a Ledge wished to write letters to all employees in the bargaining units on matters related to contract ne- Lodges _gotiauens,’’ to permit the use of its addressograph equip- ee and, these 22 in aeeeineat det te by the Ledges the mailing — the fortheoming negotiations, as indicated in handbill- di- tributed by the Ledges. Le. u; ate if 1 Hh 1151 t 1 Hit + ed Ail Hi & | furnishes the Ledges periadically with lists of the depart. ments to which each employee is assigned. Another factor limiting the ability ef the * stewards to com- nunicate with employees is the Reapeadent's strict enforce. ment of its ne-solicitation rules and of the contract ban 0) ~oltcitation of unien dues and memberships during working _ hours. This limits-the union stewards’ opportunity te dis- £4333 2344 10 1 1 f ii ae le 21 : af a HEH 2 D 48a rather than a social activity within the seope of ‘the topies permitted by the contract. On the second occasion Lodges 1746, 1746A and 743 had specially printed notices prepared regarding shop steward elections, The Respondent refused to permit the posting of these notices with the explanation that they were too large for posting within the existing union space on the bulletin boards, The Respondent also asserted that the inélusion on the notices of very small seale maps of the plants created security problems. Even after the Lodges pointed out that the Southington and Windsor Locks maps revealed no information of a security nature and offered to block out maps on the notices for those two plants, the Respondent still refused to permit the posting of the notices at these two plants. The Re- spondent persisted in its refusal throughout all four steps of the grievance procedure and finally refused to agree to arbitration of the dispute. Even if the Respondent had not placed restrictions upon Lodges’ use of its bulletin boards, bulletin boards by their very nature do not provide an effective means of com- municating with eniployees about important matters. At the Respondent’s plants a large number of notices usually remained posted at the same time—notices posted by the Respondent, the credit union, the Aircraft Club and the Lodges. Among this galaxy of notices it was difficult for the Lodges to attract attention to their notices, as Inter- national Representative Ostro testified. Employees tend to hurry past the notices on the way out of the plant after work, as Ostro further testified, and the only time em- ployees normally glance at the bulletin boards is on their way in to work and during lunch hours, which affords em- ployees comparatively little exposure to the messages which the Lodges would like to convey. In my opinion bulletin boards fall far short of constituting an adequate medium of communications with the employees as a whole. With respect to the Lodges’ use of the mails to com- municate with employees, at best this enables the Lodges Even with respect to members, the mails are not a com- pletely satisfactory means of reaching them, sinee the enable them to reach not only nonmembers, but also more members than they are presently reaching. Finally the Respondent asserts that the Lodge can com- munieate with their constituents through their stewards. It points out that at the East Hartford plant there are about 500 stewards, including almost 100 shop stewards who are paid for handling grievances, It is true, as found above, that the 85-100 shop stewards are allowed up to 2 hours pay per week for handling grievances, The General Counsel replied that even 100 stewards for 17,000 em- ployees provides too thin coverage and he points to various other factors diseussed hereinabove, which limit the ‘ability | of the stewards to communicate with employees, including the unavailability or inaccessability of stewards in certain departments on some shifts and the Respondent's strict enforcement of non-solicitation rules and contract provi- 0a sions which effectively prohibit any discussion of union business during working hours. Considering all the factors diseussed above, I conclude that while the stewards serve as one channel of communications with employees, they are unable to reach more than a small fraction of the em- ployees in the plant. In my opinion, when measured against the effectiveness of direct mailings to the home addresses of unit employees, none of the methods currently used by the Lodges of come municating with employees, cither singly or in combination, furnish an adequate means of reaching all unit employees, both members of the Lodges and nonmembers. B. Conelusions 1. The Lodges’ status as exclusive bargaining -., representatives of the employees in their respective bargaining units Before reaching the principal question in this case— whether the Respondent violated its obligations unler See- tion 8(a)(5) of the Act in refusing to furnish the Lodges with lists of addresses of all the employees in the various bargaining units here involved—-the threshold question of the Lodges’ status as exclusive bargaining representatives so as to be entitled to request the lists of addresses must first. be disposed of, that is, with the exception of the ma- jority status of Lodge 1746A. Lodge 1746A’s status as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees at the Southington plant has not been questioned by the Respondent in this proceedjpg or before. I have found that by.the time the negotiations were con- cluded on November 30, 1968, for the new 3-year contracts between the Respondent and Lodges 1746A, 1746, and 700 covering the employees at the Respondent's plants in tho Pratt & Whitney division, East Hartford and Manchester, . Southington and Middletown, the Respondent had in its possession current dues-checkoff authorizations signed by 51 a majority of the employees in each of these plants. have further found that months before the conelusions the negotiations between’ the Respondent and Lodge 743 i April 1969 covering the employees at the Windsor Locks and Building æ& 3 plants in the Hamilton Standard Divi- sion, the Respondent had in its possession current dues- checkoff authorizations signed by a majority of the em- ployees at each of these plants. In view of my finding that the Lodges’ request for the addresses of unit em- ployees was a continuing request, the foregoing evidenee concerning the extent to which employees had signed cheek- off authorizations would normally be conclusive of the Lodges’ status as exclusive bargaining repfesentative of all the employees in all six bargaining units at all times pertinent in this case. However, the Respondent contends that the dues checkoff authorizations relied upon by the Lodges as establishing their majority status cannot be regarded as having been voluntarily executed in view of the assistance allegedly conferred upon the Lodges by the Respondent by its recog- nizing and entering into a collective-bargaining contract with the Lodges in the negotiations begun in 1965 and by: its similar action in the negotiations begun in 1968, According to the Respondent, it granted recognition in- voluntarily on both occasions, The first time, so the Respondent asserts, it accorded recognition to Lodges 1746 and 743 as a result of the entry by the District Court, at the request of the Board, of an order under Section 10(j) of the Act requiring the Respondent ‘to recognize and bargain collectively with these Lodges, (This order, as found above, was issued in aid of the pending unfair labor practice proceeding based upon the Respondent's withdrawal of recognition ‘from Lodges 1746 and 743 on March 11, 1966.) On the second oc- casion, in 1968 negotiations, the Respondent says that it acted under the compulsion of the Board's own bar- gaining order entered on November 27, 1967, which was 8 522 — entered in the proceeding based on the Respondent 's March 11, withdrawal of recognition. The Respondent urges that singe the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cireuit in its May 29, 1969, decision set aside the Board’s order of November 27, 1967, its grant of recognition to the Lodges in the 1966 and 1968 negotiations was improper, that the Lodges were unlawfully assisted by these coerced grants of recognition, and that for this reason the dues checkoff authorizations obtained by the Lodges in their 1968 membership drive cannot be regarded as having been executed voluntarily. While it is fair to state that the Respondent's grant of reognition to the Lodges in the negotiations beginning in 1966 was attributable to the compulsion of the District Court 's order, it is not reasonable, in my opinion, to at- tribute the Respondent's recognition of the Lodges in the negotiations beginning in sees be the Board’s order of November 27, 1967. The Lodges had been carrying on a membership drive all during 1968. The number of dues checkoff authoriza- tions turned over to the Respondent steadily inereased in all plants as to which the Respondent raises a question concerning majority status from approximately 20 per- cent of the employees in January 1968 to over 50 percent in December 1968, As found above, by the time the negotiations with Lodge 743 commenced in March 1969, the Respondent for several months had been checking off union dues from the wages of a majority ut the employees at both the Windsor Locks and Building #3 plants. When Lodge 743 inquired at the start of these negotiations whether the Respondent was challenging its majority status, the — replied in the negative. While the Respondent at the outset of the nogotiations with Lodges 1746 and 700 in November 1968 challenged their majority status, after the Lodges offered additional | 53a dues-checkoff authorizations to prove their majority status, and offered to submit to a Board condueted election if the the Respondent entered into comprehensive for new contracts. In my opinion it was knowledge of the Lodges’ s teailily increasing strength among the employees at all the plants here involved, as evidenced by the dues-checkoff authoriza- tions in its hands, which impelled the Respondent to enter into the negotiations beginning in 1968, rather than any compulsion flowing from the Board's order of November 27, 1967. This evidence of the Lodges’ majority status was of a kind which the Respondent was entitled to accept The new contracts ultimately entered into by Respondent and the Lodges were not mere extensions of the previous contract», Portions of there contracts were substantially rewritten and new benefits not previously aceorded the em- ployees were granted by the Respondent, The new con- tracts did not inelude the ‘savings clause“ formerly con- tained in Article XIII of the previous contracts giving the Respondent the option of terminating the contracts upon 10 days notice if the Court of Appeals set aside the Board order of Noveniber 27, 1967, although the Respondent up until the very end of the negotiations bad insisted that any new contracts should also contain the ‘savings clause. The Respondent has treated the new contracts which it had entered into with the Lodges as being in full, force The Respondent did not raise as a barrier to the negotiations the pending proceedings in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia for the District of Columbia Circuit in which it was seek- ing the reversal of the Board's order of November 27, 1969, al- % though it had reason to anticipate that the Court's devision would be fortheoming in the near future, (The cause had been argued on October 15, 1968), * v her respects, the Respondent's position is, a» 1 understand it, that the contracts are valid and enforceable. ime has the Respondent taken any steps, or at- to take any. steps to terminate the contracts as a whole, On the con „ as late as May 2, 1969, when the Respondent filed its appeal from the Regional Director's refusal to issue a complaint upon its charge, alleging refused to bargain collectively with it = 2 = 3 . tions which it assumed in entering into the 1968 contract. To summarize, the Respondent recognized and entered into the negotiations for new contracts after having re- ceived from the yees in the units involved a steadily increasing number Of dues-checkoff authorizations, By the time the agreements were reached the Respondent had in its possession dues-checkoff authorizations from a majority tions. The new contracts arrived and contained subsan- tial revisions of the old contracts and offered the employees new benefits. In the new contracts, the Respendent re- treated from its prior position that the savings clause’’ must be included, and consented to the inclusion of an un- In view of all these facts I conclude that the Board’s order of November 27, 1967, was not a factor of any sig- nifieanee in the Respondent's decision to go ahead with the 1968 negotiations und that the Respondent must be deemed to have actéd upon its own responsibility in enter- ing into these negotiations and in concluding the new con- tracts with the Lodges, This being true, the Respondent cannot be heard to say that recognition of the Lodges in 1968 and 1969 was granted under the improper n most flagrant breach of the duty to bargain collectively in good faith. 5 The Respondent is mistaken, in. my opinion, in relying upon the Court of Appeals decision of May 29, 1969, setting aside the Board's order of November 27, 1967, as justifying its challenge in this proceeding of the Lodges’ majority Oa status. The Court of Appeals held that when the Respond- ent withdrew recugnition from Lodges 1746 and 743, afte the collapse of the negotiations in Mareh 1966, it had reasonable grounds for doubting the Lodges’ majority status and had acted in good faith, and that consequently the Board had been in error in finding an illegal refusal to bargain on this occasion and in issuing a bargaining order to remedy this alleged unfair labor practice. This decision with respect to alleged March 1966 unfair labor practices, which incidentally does not constitute a holding that Lodges 1746 and 743 iu fact lacked majority status in March 1966, has no bearing on the Lodges’ majority status in October 1968 and thereafter. The Lodges’ claim of majority status at this time was based upon newly ob- tained dues-checkoff authorizations which were turned over to the Respondent during these and the preceding months, As stated above, employers are entitled to rely. upon such evidence of majority status in determining whether or not to grant recognition. The Court of Appeals decision does not in my opinion warrant the Respondent's belated challenge of the Lodges majority status. I conclude that each Lodge acquired majority status at least by the last day of the month during which the total number of dues-cheekoff authorizations furnished the Re- spondent by the Lodge reached a number in excess of 50 percent of the employees in the unit. The Respondent's records show and I find these dates to be as follows: Lodge 1746, East Hartford and Manchester units, | November 30, 1968, 4iodge 700, Middletown unit, October 31, 1968, Lodge 743, Windsor Locks unit, November 30, 1968, Lodge 743, Building #3 unit, December 31, 1968, As stated above, there is no question in this case about Lodge 1746A’s majority status in the Southington unit at any time pertinent herein. 57a Prudential Insurance Co. v. V. L. R. B., 412 F. 24 77 (C. A. 6), eert. denied November 17, 1969, — U.S. ——, and Standard Oil Co, of California v. V. L. R. B., 309 F. 2d 639 (C. A. 9), both involve the same question as is presented in this case, i. e., whether an employer is required to eomply with a union 's request for a list of the names and addresses of all the employees in a bargaining unit of which the union is the exelusive bargaining representative. Both Courts coneluded, in the cireumstances there that the obligations of employers under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act inelude the duty to furnish such address infor- mation upon request to the exclusive bargaining repre- sentatives of their employees. More recent decisions of the Board to the same effect are Southern Counties Gas Co., 174 NLRB No, 11, and General Electric Co., 176 NLRB No, 84, The validity of a Board direction to an employer to furnish employees’ names and addresses in an election context has been upheld by the Supreme Court. V. L. R. B. v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 767. See also J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., decided October 3, 1969 - (C. A. 5), 72 LRRM 2433, 2438, The Sixth Cireuit in Prudential after referring to the general obligation of employers ‘‘to provide the employees’ statutory bargaining representative with information that is necessary and relevant to the proper performance of its duties“ and citing ‘‘wage data“ as an example of a type of information which is ‘presumptively relevant to the proper performance of a bargaining agent's duties, stated with respect to the address information sought in that case, as follows (412 F. 2d at 84): > + : 4 8 f ; 3 F Prudential and Standard Oil eases, and in my opinion more closely parallel those in the Standard Oil ease, that the exelisive bargaining representative of em- a statutory duty fairly to represent all of the ees in the bergaining unit, nonunion employees a» union members, Fulfillment of the statutory duty, rt stated, requires that the bargaining representa- tive have effective means of communicating with the hene- ficiaries of its statutory obligation, including nonunion | employees, with respect to such matters as their prefer- enees and priorities in contract negotiations, their experi- ence and recommendations with respect to the operation the grievance-arbitration machinery, and their thoughts the wisdom of striking over a particular issue’’ (399 „ 2d, at 641). The Court in Standard Oil, adopting the reasoning of the Board, held that in view of the relatively low union membership in the unit, the absence of a union- security clause in the collective-bargaining agreement, the F Fe t = f | F F 4 HH E The parallel between the facts of the Standard Oil case and this ease is apparent. Thus, here’ as in the Standard Oil the Lodges had a relatively low membership in the t, having as members only a little more than 50 of the employees in each of the units, leaving a very substantial minority of nonmembers to whom the Lodges owed the duty of fair representation. In this case employees at their homes: almost an impossibility from a practical standpoint, Here, as in the Standard Oil case, the alternative means of communicating with employees open to the Lodges were not adequate, I have found Respondent's bulletin boards, the activities of its stewards or its mailings to members, either singly or in combina- The mechanics of the furnishing of the Lodges with the requested list of addresses present no serious problem. The Respondent has mechanical addressing equipment for all 60a its plants. As found above, in November 1968, the Re- spondent, in an effort to counter the Lodges’ request for addresses, voluntarily offered the use of its mailing facil- ities to the Lodges for certain limited types of mailings. Lodges 1746, 1746A and 700 accepted this offer on one occasion. In one respect, in connection with the Respond- ent’s furnishing the Lodges with information concerning newly hired employees, it would simplify matters for the Respondent to furnish addresses, since it would enable the Respondent to stop blocking out the addresses on the ‘*Put-on’’ forms. The Respondent seeks to justify its action in refusing the lists of addresses requested by the Lodges on two main grounds. I have dealt with and rejected the first conten- tion—that the various methods of communicating with em- ployees which have been utilized by the Lodges in the past together with the additional methods offered by the Re- spondent and declined by the Lodges constitute an ade- quate means of communicating with all the employees—in connection with my discussion of the facts. There remains the Respondent’s second contention that it is entitled to withhold the addresses in order to protect the employees’ right of privacy at their homes, particularly in view of the violence which occurred at the homes of nonstrikers during the 1960 strike. The Charging Party contends that} vis-a-vis the statu- tory collective bargaining representative, address informa- tion is no more entitled to be kept private than wage in- formation; that an employer is no more permitted in one case than the other to assert employees’ alleged individual interest in privacy to justify nonperformance of its statu- tory obligation to furnish data necessary to the carrying out of the bargaining agent’s statutory functions. Logic, in my opinion, supports the Charging Party’s position. In the Prudential case in the Sixth Circuit the employer’s policy with respect to furnishing employee addresses was Gla identical with Respondent's in this case. The Sixth Cir- cuit’s decision requiring the furnishing of address informa- tion answers the Respondent's ‘*privacy’’ contention in the typical situation. See also British Auto Parts, Inc. v. M. L. It. l., 405 F. 2d 1182, 1183 (C. A. 9); M. L. R. B. v. Hanes Hosiery Division, Hones ( ‘orp., 384 F. 2d 188, 191 (C. A. 4), cert, denied, 390 U.S, 950; N. L. H. EB. v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 432, 437 (S. D. N. V.), aff' d 406 F. 2d 253, 259 (C. X. 2); X. L. Il. B. v. Wyman- Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766. - The question remains whether the violence which oc- curred at the homes of nonstrikers during the 1960 strike in which members or representatives of Lodge 1746 and 743 allegedly engaged justifies a different outcome in this cuse, Assuming that this violence can be properly at- tributed to Lodges 1746 und 743, I question whether, in a reasonable balancing of the competing considerations, these acts 8 years before should be regarded as calling for the indefinite suspension of the Respondent's statutory obli- gation to furnish. information which is relevant to the bargaining agent 's performance of its statutory fuctions. There is no evidence in this case of any present threat by agents of Lodges 1746 and 743 to engage in acts of violence at the homes of nonunion employees, Though the Lodges may have misconducted themselves in the past, they have ‘a locus penitentine, and the Respondent is not thereby relieved indefinitely of its obligation to furnish relevant information, Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. 2d 862, 872-873 (C. A. 2), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576. See also NV. L. N. B. v. Duncan Foundry d Machine Works, decided January 16, 1968 (CA. 7), 67 LRRM 2516, 2517, and Howell Refining Co. v. N. L. R. B., 400°F, 2d 213, 216 (C. A. 5), in which the production of employees’ names and addresses was required under the Board’s Excelsior rule despite evidence of some contemporary violence. And see ° Excelsior Underwear ( 0. Inc., 156 NLRB 1236. 62a N.L.R.B. v. Q-T Shoe Manufacturing Co., 409 F. 2d 1247, 1250 (C. A. 3); N. L. R. B. v. Delaware Valley Armaments, Inc., decided October 23, 1969 (D.C. N. J.) Cf. Sign and Pictorial Union Local 1175 v. N.L.R.B., decided Septem- ber 23, 1969 (C.A.D.C.), 72 LRRM 2274, 2281-2282. Accordingly, I conclude that the violence allegedly en- gaged in by agents of Lodges 1746 and 743 in 1960 does not justify a different result in this case, and that the Respond- ent was obliged under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act to furnish the address information sought by the Lodges. 3. The Respondents violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act The Lodges’ requests for the lists of addresses of the employees in the various bargaining units which gave rise to the instant proceeding were made by the Lodges in letters to the Respondent dated September 19, 1968 and October 10, 1968. These requests were in effect renewed in the bargaining negotiations between Lodges 1746 and 700 and the Respondent on November 29 and 30. (As found above, earlier requests for the addresses of unit employees had been made in 1964 and 1965.) Under all the circum- stances I find that the Lodges’ requests for the addresses of unit employees were of a continuing nature. I have found that Lodge 1746 achieved majority status in the East Hartford and Manchester units by November 30, 1968, that Lodge 700 reached such status in the Middle- town unit by October 30, 1968, and that Lodge 743 acquired its majority in the Windsor Locks unit by November 30, 1968 and in the Building #3 unit by December 31, 1968. There never has been any question in this case about Lodge 1746A’s status in the Southington unit. I have further found that under the circumstances of this case the Re- spondent was obliged under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act to furnish the address information requested. It follows 63a that the Respondent's continuing refusals, after havi been given proof of each Lodge’s majority status, to furnish the requested address information violated Section 8(a)(5) and (I) of the Act. With respect to Lodges 1746, 700 and 743, the 5 occurred on the dates set forth in the preceding paragraph. Regarding Lodge 1746A, the Respondent's violation oc- curred commencing on September 30, 1968, when the Re- spondent wrote District 91 its first letter refusing to fur- nish the addresses of unit employees, Conclusions of Law 25 1. All produetion and maintenance employees of the United Aireraft Corporation, Pratt & Whitney Aireraft Division, at the East Hartford plant (including the DE Lab and the Willgoos Lab), including inspectors, crib at-- tendants, material handlers, factory clerks and working leaders, but excluding timekeepers, engineering and tech- nical employees, laboratory technicians, foremen’s clerks,. salaried office and clerical employees, medical department employees, first-aid employees, plant protection employees, executives, plant superintendents, division superintendents, general foremen, foremen, assistant foremen, group super- visors, watch engineers, and all other supervisors as_de- He iv the Mational Labor Relations Act, as amended, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collec- tive bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 2. All production and maintenance employees of the United Aircraft Clorporation, Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Division, at its Manchester, Connecticut plant (Cheney Mills Buildings 1, 2, 3, 19, the Finishing Mill, and the Weaving Mill) including inspectors, crib attendants, ma- terial handlers, factory clerks and working leaders, but excluding all timekeepers, professional employees, engi- neering and technical employees, laboratory technicians, 64a foremen 's clerks, office and clerical employees, medical de- partment employees, first-nid employees, plant production employees, executives, plant superintendents, division su- perintendents, general foremen, foremen, assistant fore- men, group supervisors, watch engineers, and all other supervisors as defined in the National: Labor Relations y Act, as amended, constitute a unit appropriate for the pur- poses of collective bargaining within the meaning of Sec- tion 9(b) of the Act, 3, At all times on and after November 30, 1968, Lodge 1746, International Association of Machinists and Aero- space Workers, AFL-CIO, has been the duly designated exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the em- ployees in the units described in paragraph 1 and 2 above. _ 4. All production and maintenance employees of the United Aircraft Corporation, Pratt & Whitney Division, at the Middletown Connecticut plant, including inspectors, crib attendants, material handlers and working leaders, but excluding all timekeepers, engineering and technical employees, professional employees, laboratory technicans, foremen's clerks, salaried office and salaried clerical em- ployees, medical employees, firdt-aid employees, plant pro- tection employees, executives, plant superintendents, di- vision superintendents, general foremen, foremen, assist- ant foremen, group supervisors, watch engineers, and all other supervisors, constitute a unft appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 5. At all times on and after October 31, 1968, Lodge 700, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, has been the duly designated exelu- sive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the unit described in paragraph 4 above. 6. All production and maintenance employees of United Aircraft Corporation, Pratt & Whitney Division, at its Southington, Connecticut, plant, including inspectors, crib } 6 650 a 58 attendants, material handlers, factory clerks and working leaders, but excluding timekeepers, engineering and tech- nical employees, apprentices, trainees, laboratory techni- cians, foremen's clerks, salaried office and clerical em- ployves, medical department employees, first-aid employees, plant protection employees, executives, plant superintend- ents, division superintendents, general foremen, foremen, assistant foremen, group supervisors, watch engineers, and all other supervisors, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act, * 7. At all times on and after September 19, 1968, Lodge 1746A, International Association of Machinists and Aero- space Workers, AFL-CIO, has been the duly designated exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the em- ployees in the unit deseribed in paragraph 6 above. 8. All production and maintenance employees of the United Aireraft Corporation, Hamilton Standard Divi- sion, at the Windsor Locks plant, including working leaders and all hourly-rated technicians in the chemical, rubber, metallurgical, vibration, and electronics labora- tories, but excluding executives, professional employees, salaried technicians in the Engineering Department, fore- men’s clerks who have access to confidential information, draftsmen, plant protection employees, medical department employees, salaried office and salaried clerical employees, outside servicemen, truckdrivers, watch engineers, group supervisors and all other supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, constitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 9. At all times on and after November 30, 1968, Lodge 743, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, has been the duly designated exelu- sive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the unit described in paragraph 8 above. 66a 10. All production and maintenance employees of United Aireraft Corporation, Hamilton Standard Division, at the Building #3 plant, Windsor Locks, including working leaders and hourly-rated technicians iy the electronics laboratory, but exeluding executives, * & ional empjoy- ees, salaried technicians in the Engineering Department, foremen 's clerks who have access to confidential informa- tion, draftenwn, plant protection employees, medical de- partment employees, salaried office and salaried factory clerical employees, timekeepers, outside servicement, truck- drivers, watch engineers, group supervisors and all other supervisory employees as defined in the National Labor Relations Act, ax amended, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the mean- ing of Section 9(b) of the Act, 11. At all times on and after December 31, 1968, Lodge 743, International Association of Machinists: and Aero- space Workers, AFL-CIO, had been the duly designated exclusive\collective-bargaining representative of the em- ployees in the unit described in paragraph 10 above. 12. By denying the requests of the Lodges for the ad- dresses of all of the employees in the respective bargaining units on and after the dates specified in paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11 above, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 8(n)(5) and (1) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The Remedy Having found that the 1 in violation of its duty under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, refused to furnish the Lodges with the home addresses of all the employees in the units represented by them, my recommended order will direct the Respondent promptly to furnish each of the Lodges with the home addresses of all the employees in their respective collective-bargaining units. My recom- „ — eee = — 8 67a mended order will further direct the Respondent to bar- gain collectively with the Lodges, upon request, concerning the manner and form in which such information shall be furnished the Lodges in the future and the intervals at which such information shall be brought up to date. Upon the 2 findings and conclusions and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(¢) of the Act, there is hereby issued the following: 5 Recom mexpep Orpen | The Respondent United Aircraft Corporation (Pratt & Whitney and Hamilton Standard Divisions), its officers, agents, successors and assigns, shall; 1, Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to furnish Lodges 1746, 1746A, 700 and 743, International Association of Machinists and Aero- space Workers, AFL-CIO, with the home addresses of all the . in their respective collective-bargaining units, 2. Take the following affirmative action which it is found will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Promptly furnish each of the Lodges, Lodges 1746, 1746A, 700 and 743, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, with the home ad- dresses of all of the employees in their respective -collec- tive-bargaining units. ö a ie (b) Upon request, bargain collectively with each of the Lodges concerning the manner and form in which the home addresses of the unit employees will be furnished the Lodges in the future and the intervals at which such in- formation shall be brought up to date. le) Post at its Kast Hartford, Manchester, Middletown, Southington, Windsor Locks and Building #3, Windsor Locks, plants copies of the attached notice marked Ap- 68a pondix.“ “ Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 1, after being duly signed by an authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be main- tained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicu- ous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted, Réasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writ- _ ing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith." Dated at Washington, D. C. A Owstuv Von Owsley Vose * Trial Examiner — —— 5 . *In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read: ‘‘Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.“ In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Rela- tions Board, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and Rec- ommended Order herein shall, as provided in Section 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its * findings, ‘conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes, In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States Court of Ap- peals, the words in the notice reading ‘*POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD!“ shall be changed to read ‘‘ POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING AN ORDER OF TilE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BO A RD. * 2 | 69a NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES Posten BY ORDER OF THE NaTIONAL Lanes Re.ations Boarp AN AGENCY oF THE Urn Srarns Government WE WILL NOT in the future ref the requests of Lodges 1746, 1746A, 700 and 743 In rnational Associa- tion of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, for the home addresses of all of the employees in their re- spective collective-bargaining units, WE WILL promptly furnish Lodge 1746, Lodge 1746A, Lodge 700 and Lodge 743, Internationa} Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, with the -home addresses of all of the employees in their respective collective-bargaining units, WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with each of the Lodges concerning the manner and form in which the home addresses of the unit employees will be fur- nished the Lodges in the future and the intervals at which such information shall be brought up to date, (Representative) (Title) THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE | DEFACED BY ANYONE This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this Notice or compliance with its provisions, may be directed to the Board’s Office, 20th Floor John F. Kennedy Federal Building, Cambridge & New Sudbury Sts., Boston, Mass. 02208 (Tel. A. C. 617, 223. 3500). ~~ --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385605_0647%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.