# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Time, Inc. v. Wasserman > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385604_1508%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari - **Published:** January 1, 1970 - **Citation:** 398 U.S. 940 ## Text APR 23 1970 TONITE, DAVIS, CLERE In THE Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1969 a TIME, INC,, a3; Petitioner, ei ie JACK WASSERMAN, a Respondent. se alt PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE Heir UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE rt DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT ym Harotp R. MEpINA, Jr., i i One Chase Manhattan Plaza, au New York, N. Y. 10005 E¢bss) Attorney for Petitioner. Joun H. PICKERING, ~ Deine Dennis M. FLANNERY, 2% Witmer, CUTLER & PICKERING, bi Farragut Building, ei 900—17th Street, N. W., thy Washington, D. C. 20006 ae W. Dennis Cross, ¥ CravaATH, SWAINE & Moore, ais One Chase Manhattan Plaza, rt: New York, N. Y. 10005 x, Of Counsel. April 22, 1970 BLEED THROUGH POOR COPY INDEX PAGE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI .........----- 1 OPINION AND ORDERS BELOW ......-.--+-+++e+e05 1 JURISDICTION «00+ ee eeeeeeee reese sere eeeeeeees 2 QUESTIONS PRESENTED ......++++-seeeeereereeees 2 CoNSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS | ere ey et 2 STATEMENT «00. +e eee ec cece reece tee eeereeeeees 3 FatvOdUctiOn 2... cece cc ccccscecsecce aaweuwe 3 Ragano’s Companion Action .......--+.-++++++5 4 ee TE oabSvivcvccsesve dsc cnsvceess 5 (a) Respondent ........-.sseeeeeeeeeeeeees 5 (b) The La Stella arrest of September 22,1966 6 (c) The La Stella luncheon of September 30,1966 6 (d) Petitioner’s editorial process with respect to the publication ........--.eeeeeeeeeeees 8 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ........---++-- 11 1. Importance of the “Deliberate Omission” Issue 11 2. The Failure to Follow New York Times ...... 13 (a) Knowledge of falsity by reason of knowl- edge of omission ........+--+-++eeeeee 14 (b) The Circuit Court’s unsound journalistic judgment ........... ee ee ence eee eeeee 18 (c) The Circuit Court’s focus upon a single iso- lated fact in disregard of the entire record, in conflict with decisions of this Court and ME. 2. oC. . ease ewik sees > ode pe 3 *. wisnem ysnowy) U sty jo Burws & Suunp “> g “J2anooue wt sueyd & yo Buiddoig “iy * JOOU>1WY “AD ISOPY DY) “AunquojueD doyyyssy s_puejSuq jo younyd ay) JUIPINA “DIE[Eg YIaquuey ul mopurm ayes se YORU OS 30U PIP sprsnid “wins 38ny sweyesy Aypig SippSueAy “WIKESY UOS PO-s294-g7 S suet APPENDIX D The Public Interest Test Although some courts were initially misled by some of the language in New York Times into believing that the principle which it announced was limited in its application to statements about “public officials”, it is now quite clear that that concept as well as that of “public figure” are simply facets of and are embraced within the broader con- cept of “public interest”. It is true that New York Times dealt only with “public officials”. However, this Court quickly moved to make clear that New York Times was not to be so narrowly inter- preted. In his opinion for the Court in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U. S. 75 (1966), Justice Brennan wrote: “.. we reject any suggestion that our references in New York Times, 376 U. S. at 282, 283, n. 23, and Garrison, 379 U. S. 564, to Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564, mean that we have tied the New York Times rule to the rule of official privilege. The pub- lic interests protected by the New York Times rule are interests in discussion, not retaliation, and our reference to Barr should be taken to mean no more than that the scope of the privilege is to be deter- mined by reference to the functions it serves. See Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised Translation, 49 Cornell L. Q. 581, 590-591 (1964).” 338 U. S. at pp. 84-95 n. 10. The article by Pedrick, referred to in Justice Brennan’s opinion, stated the policy grounds for the New York Times rule as follows: “..- If a qualified ‘good faith’ privilege is needed to better assure open debate then the privilege ought D2 Appendix D to extend as stated by Judge Burch of Kansas tp ‘all matters of public concern.’ The logic is simple, In modern democratic society the public judgment makes itself felt on a great variety of subjects in a great variety of ways, official and unofficial. If deci- sion on these matters is to be adequately informed every effort ought to be made to free the channels of communication with respect to these subjects. . . , The determination of ‘matters of public concern’ should thus become the key to the application of the privilege recognized in the Times decision.” p. 592. Pedrick argued that the protection went far beyond com- ment directed at public officials: “. .. But those maters which are of public con- cern also go beyond the iniuediate province of gov- ernment. A threatened labor strike aticcting a critical industry may not provide any immediately discernible role for public opinion but who would doubt the legitimacy of the public concern and the strategic significance of the public attitude. Even such pedestrian matters as the closing hours ob- served by business establishments, the hiring, reten- tion, or dismissal of a symphony conductor or an athletic coach would seem clearly matters of proper public concern with respect to which the popular will plays a role.” p. 593 (footnotes omitted). If there were any doubt on the subject, it was set to rest in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374 (1967). Justice Brennan stated in his opinion for the Court: BLEED THROUGH POOR COPY ——— D3 Appendix D “ | We hold that the constitutional protections for speech and press preclude the application of the New York statute to redress false reports of matters of public interest in the absence of proof that the defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth. “The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs, essential as those are to healthy gov- ernment. ... We have no doubt that the subject of the Life article, the opening of a new play linked to an actual incident, is a matter of public interest. . . . Erroneous statement is no less inevitable in such a case than in the case of comment upon public affairs, and in both, if innocent or merely negligent, ‘. . . it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the “breathing space” that they “need . . . to survive”... .’ New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, at 271-272. .. .” 385 U. S. at pp. 387-88. It is true that this Court explicitly left open the question of whether the “public interest” rule in its full sweep should apply to defamation actions in addition to the privacy action involved in Hill. However, in its next decision in Butts, a defamation action, the Court again referred to the public interest test. Justice Harlan’s opinion which announced the judg- ment of the Court relied on a phrase from Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940), that freedom of discussion “ ‘must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.’” 388 U. S. at p. 147. He noted that “we have rejected, in prior cases involving D4 Appendix D materials and persons commanding justified and important public interest, the argument that a finding of falsity alone should strip protections from the publisher”. Jd. at p, 152. He concluded: ““... We note that the public interest in the circy- lation of the materials here involved, and the pub- lisher’s interest in circulating them, is not less than that involved in New York Times... .” p. 154, And, in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 731 (1968), the Court elaborated upon the constitutional safe- guards established by its decision and drew no distinction between publications dealing with public officials and those dealing with public figures and matters of public interest. Against that background the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United Medical Laboratories v. CBS, 404 F. 2d 706 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U. S. 921 (1969), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F. 2d 565 (1969), cert. denied, 395 U. S. 922 (1969) and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 415 F. 2d 892 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. granted, 38 U. S. L. W. 3309 (U. S. Feb. 24, 1970) have explicitly accepted the principle that the “public interest” rationale specifically applies to defamation actions. Thus the Court in United Medical Laboratories stated: “... If the publications here are within the field of First Amendment protection at all as against the consequences of state libel law, the area of public interest to which they relate—conditions allegedly capable of wide-spreadedly affecting public health— would seem to us to be one of such inherent public concern and stake that there could be no possible BLEED THROUGH POOR COPY D5 Appendix D question as to the applicability of the New York Times standard for any defeasance. “The crucial question here then is whether First Amendment immunity can properly be regarded as extending to disclosure and discussion of profes- sional practices and conditions in the health area involved, so that those engaged in the particular field who may claim to have been stained by such a publication will be subject, in any seeking of redress, to application of the federal standard for defeasance of the Amendment immunity, instead of to the stand- ards of state libel law for recovery. “We have no difficulty in so concluding.” 404 F. 2d at p. 711. In McLaney, the Fifth Circuit followed the lead of the Ninth Circuit: “|... [W]e agree with the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which in its recent case, United Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast- ing System, Inc., et al. (9th Cir.) D. C., 404 F. 2d 706, November 18, 1968, said: The standard of New York Times was not to be regarded as having had “its outer limits* * * marked out” so as not to be open to further definition.’ “We conclude that the constitutional privilege extends to discussions by specific individuals, not associated with any government, if those individuals are involved in matters of important public con- cern... .” 406 F. 2d at 573. Similarly, the Court in Rosenbloom stated its holding as follows: D6 Appendix D “. .. [W]e conclude that the fact that plaintif¢ was not a public figure cannot be accorded decisive importance if the recognized important guarantees of the First Amendment are to be adequately imple. mented. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, supra, the Court applied the Times rule to false reporting of ‘matters of public interest’ in connection with an action for invasion of the right to privacy by a private indj- vidual. See also Linn v. United Plant Guard Work. ers, 383 U. S. 53 (1966), and Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563 (1968). Our con- clusion finds support in similar rulings of other courts. United Medical Laboratories v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 404 F. 2d 706 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. den., 394 U. S. 921 (1969) ; Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 704 (S. D. Ga. 1969); All Diet Foods Distributors, Inc. y. Time, Inc., 290 N. Y. S. 2d 445 (Sup. Ct. 1967). See also Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F. 2d 565 (Sth Cir. 1969), cert. den., 395 U. S. 922 (1969).” The guiding principle stated by this Court in Thornhill v. Alabama, supra—freedom of discussion on all subjects— was quoted in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U. S. at pp. 89-9 (1965) (concurring opinion of Justice Douglas) ; Hill, 385 U. S. at p. 388; and Butts, 388 U. S. at p. 147. To the extent, then, that the Court has referred to the “public figure” status of a plaintiff, the term means a figure in whom the public has an interest, not necessarily a figure who is public. For example, the activities of a Russian spy ring in New York entirely unknown to the public would render the members of that ring a legitimate subject of BLEED THROUGH POOR COPY _—— D7 Appendix D inquiry since the public has an interest in those activities. Thus, in McLaney, the Court determined that the privilege applied to statements concerning a professional gambler who tried to remain anonymous because of the nature of his activities. In addition to the Supreme Court and Circuit Court decisions, lower court decisions have expressly held that public interest was the basis for application of the con- stitutional test in defamation. Cullen v. Grove Press, 276 F. Supp. 727 (S. D. N. Y. 1967); Altoona Clay Products y. Dun & Bradstreet, 286 F. Supp. 899 (W. D. Pa. 1968). Those lower court decisions have also included several in which Time, Inc. has been a party. All Diet Food Distri- butors, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 56 Misc. 2d 821, 290 N. Y. S. 2d 445 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. County 1967); Bon Air v. Time, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 704 (S. D. Ga. 1969) ; Sellers v. Tine, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 582 (E. D. Pa. 1969), aff'd, —— F. 2d — (3d Cir. 1970) ; Cerrito v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1071 (N. D. Cal. 1969). It can no longer be doubted that the constitutional privi- lege announced in New York Times applies to all applica- tions regarding matters as to which the public has a right to be informed. The crux of the matter was aptly put by Judge Lawrence in his decision in Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 704, 705 (S. D. Ga. 1969) : “Whatever solid ground plaintiff’s case origi- nally stood on has been steadily eroded by the sweep and flow of First Amendment freedoms through new and wider channels.” res. = , ess eee, Ae tee Se ~—me eer Bem ee APPENDIX E The Actual Malice Standard This Court has laid down the following constitutional standard for articles which are entitled to protection: A plaintiff may not recover unless he proves with “convincing clarity” that the article was published with “actual malice” — “that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not” 376 U. S. at 280. And it is for the courts to determine whether this standard has been met—they must examine the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they were made to see whether the proof presented to show “actual malice” has “the convincing clarity which the constitutional standard demands... .” New York Times, 376 U. S. at 285-86. These principles—enunciated in New York Times and repeated in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 74 (1964), have remained constant as this Court has extended the doc- trine of New York Times to articles involving public figures and matters of public interest. In St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727 (1968), the Court explained that in cases concerning publications dealing with public figures and matters of public interest, as well as public officials, a plain- tiff has the burden of showing that the publication is made with “actual malice” as defined in New York Times and later cases. The Court went on to explain what its cases mean with respect to the “reckless disregard” branch of its “actual malice” rule: “These cases are clear that reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evi- dence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts E2 Appendix E shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity ang demonstrates actual malice.” 390 U. S. at p. 731, And the Court went on to emphasize that nothing less would “adequately implement First Amendment policies”, stating: “Tt may be said that such a test puts a premium on ignorance, encourages the irresponsible publisher not to inquire, and permits the issue to be determined by the defendant’s testimony that he published the statement in good faith and unaware of its probable falsity. Concededly the reckless disregard standard may permit recovery in fewer situations than would a rule that publishers must satisfy the standard of the reasonable man or the prudent publisher. But New York Times and succeeding cases have em- phasized that the stake of the people in public busi- ness and the conduct of public officials is so great that neither the defense of truth nor the standard of ordinary care would protect against self-censor- ship and thus adequately implement First Amend- ment policies. Neither lies nor false communica- tions serve the ends of the First Amendment, and no one suggests their desirability or further prolif- eration. But to insure the ascertainment and pub- lication of the truth about public affairs, it is e- sential that the First Amendment protect some er- roneous publications as well as true ones. We ad- here to this view and to the line which our cases have drawn between false communications which are protected and those which are not.” Jd. at pp. 731-32. BLEED THROUGH POOR COPY E3 Appendix E The burden of proving actual malice is on the plaintiff, y. Cowles Magazines & Broadcasting, Inc., 392 F. 24417 (9th Cir. 1968), who must make an affirmative show- ing of facts from which defendant’s probable knowledge of falsity may be constitutionally sustained. Thompson Vv. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 394 F. 2d 774, 776 (D. C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 884 (1968). The mere hope of questioning the credibility of defendant’s witnesses is not sufficient to resist summary judgment. Hurley v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 967, 974 (D. Minn. 1967), aff’d on opinion below, 398 F. 2d 346 (8th Cir. 1968). Where testimony stands uncontradicted and the adverse party has no basis on which to question the credibility of the witnesses so testifying, their assertions must be accepted as true. See Orvis v. Brickman, 196 F. 24 762, 765-6 (D. C. Cir. 1952) ; Gifford v. Travelers Pro- tective Assn., 153 F. 2d 209, 211 (9th Cir. 1946); Radio City Music Hall Corp. v. United States, 135 F. 24 715, 718 (2d Cir. 1943). Further, “actual malice” may not be presumed or in- ferred from the nature of the defamatory statement, Wash- inton Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F. 2d 965 (D. C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 1011 (1967) ; Rosenbloom v. Metro- media, Inc., supra, nor from the defendant’s failure to re- tract the allegedly defamatory statement, New York Times, 376 U. S. at 286; United Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 404 F. 2d 706, 713 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U. S. 921 (1969) ; New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F. 2d 567, 577 (Sth Cir. 1966). Neither may it be inferred from the failure to seek out plaintiff to verify facts before publication, Hurley v. Northwest Publications, Inc., supra, nor from a failure to investigate, Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U .S. 81 (1967). i a a a= Mie a Mle te Eee i. a = a ol on te The Necessity for Summary Judgment This Court has emphatically noted that one of the great- est deterrents to free discussion of matters of public inter- est is fear that publication might result in a libel action entailing an expensive defense to prove truth. “[ W Jould be critics . . . may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend to make only statements which ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone.’ Speiser v. Randall, supra, 357 U. S. at 526. The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate. It is inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 279 (1964). This Court has specifically noted that fear of expense of trial is as great a threat to freedom of press as fear of large verdicts : “Fear of large verdicts in damage suits for in- nocent or mere negligent misstatement, even fear of the expense involved in their defense, must in- evitably cause publishers to ‘steer . .. wider of the unlawful zone,’ New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. at 279; see also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 526; Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 153-154; and thus ‘create the danger that the legiti- mate utterance will be penalized.’ Speiser v. Randall, supra, at 526.” Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374, 389 (1967). It is necessary that frivolous libel suits be dismissed summarily to avoid the “chilling effect” on freedom of 2F | Appendix F speech and press an expensive defense entails. Dombroy. ski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 487 (1965). Thus, the First Amendment guarantee requires that summary judgment be granted as soon as it becomes clear that a plaintiff can. not establish “actual malice’. Since Wasserman cannot show “actual malice” with the convincing clarity required, _ it is necessary that summary judgment be granted. In Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F. 2d 965, 968 (D. C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 1011 (1967), the Court held that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment, stating that summary judgment was an essential part of the rules developed to ensure the First Amendment guaranty of freedom of press: “In the First Amendment area, summary pro- cedures are even more essential. For the stake here, if harassment succeeds, is free debate. One of the purposes of the Times principle, in addition to pro- tecting persons from being cast in damages in libel suits by public officials, is to prevent persons from being discouraged in the full and free exercise of their First Amendment rights with respect to the conduct of their government. The threat of being put to the defense of a lawsuit brought by a popular public official may be as chilling to the exercise of First Amendment freedoms as fear of the outcome of the lawsuit itself, especially to advocates of un- popular causes. All persons who desire to exercise their right to criticize public officials are not as well equipped financially as the Post to defend against a trial on the merits. Unless persons, in- cluding newspapers, desiring to exercise their First ’ Amendment rights are assured freedom from the harassment of lawsuits, they will tend to become self- BLEED THROUGH POOR COPY — 3F Appendix F censors. And to this extent debate on public issues and the conduct of public officials will become less uninhibited, less robust and less wideopen, for self- censorship affecting the whole public is ‘hardly less virulent for being privately administered.’ Smith v. People of California, 361 U. S. 147, 154, 80 S. Ct. 215, 219, 4 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1959).” The Court concluded: “... The actual malice test, designed to give practical effect to this commitment, precludes an issue of fact in this case.” Jd. at 972 (footnote omitted ). Again, in Klahr v. Winterble, 4 Ariz. App. 158, 418 P. 2d 404 (Ct. App. 1966), the Arizona Court of Appeals afirmed summary judgment for the defendant finding that the plaintiff could not prove “actual malice” and stated: “We acknowledge that we are influenced in part in arriving at the conclusion that the plaintiff's affidavit is insufficient by the nature of the case. In New York Times the fact that a threat of lawsuit is in itself an inexorable censor is recognized: “*The fear of damage awards under a rule such as that invoked by the Alabama courts here may be markedly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute.’ 84 S. Ct. at 724. “If all actions of libel similar to this must go to a full jury trial in order to ascertain whether criticism by analogy, invective and satire is believed 4F Appendix F in ‘good faith’ to be ‘true’, the light of freedom of speech and press as enunciated in New York Times will be frustrated.” Jd. at 170, 418 P. 2d at 416, In Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F. 2d 565 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U. S. 922 (1969), the Court con- sidered, as in Keogh, an appeal from a denial of judgment in a libel action. It pointed out that consideration of such interlocutory appeals was an unusual practice, but that it was justified in cases of this kind because “the fail- ure to dismiss a libel suit might necessitate long and ex- pensive trial proceedings, which, if not really warranted, would themselves offend the principles enunciated in Dom- browski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 85 Sup. Ct. 1176, 14 L. Ed. 2d 22, because of the chilling effect of such litiga- tion.” 406 F. 2d at 566. The Keogh doctrine has been followed in a number of other First Amendment cases, which have granted sum- mary judgment in applying constitutional principles. New- Journal Co. v. Gallagher, 233 A. 2d 166 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1967); Hurley v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 967 (D. Minn. 1967) aff’d on opinion below 398 F. 2d 346 (8th Cir. 1968); Thompson v. Evening Star, 394 F. 2d 774 (D. C. Cir., 1968), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 884; Walker v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 394 F. 2d 800 (C. A. 8 1968) ; Ryan v. Dionne, 28 Conn. Sup. 35, 248 A. 2d 583 (1968) ; Tagawa v. Maui Pub. Co., 448 P. 2d 377 (Sup. Ct. Hawaii, 1968) cert. denied, 396 U. S. 822 (1969). That same summary judgment doctrine has specifically been followed in several recent Time Inc. cases in which the Time Inc. editorial process has been fully disclosed to the Court. E.g., Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F. 2d 565 (C. A. 5, 1969), cert. denied, 395 U. S. 922 (1969) ; Bon BLEED THROUGH POOR COPY — ae SF Appendix F Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 704 (S. D. Ga. 1969) ; Sellers v. Time, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 582 (E. D. Pa. 1969) aff'd, F. 2d (3d Cir. 1970) ; Cerrito v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1071 (N. D. Cal. 1969). Similar recognition of the necessity for summary dis- position whenever possible in First Amendment cases ap- pears in the opinion in the United Medical case. In short, this case squarely presents to this Court the constitutional right to summary disposition referred to in New York Times and Hill, applied by the Circuit Courts in Keogh, Thompson, McLaney and United Medical, and followed by numerous District Courts. If summary judg- ment be net granted, then rights of libel-suit defendants recognized in New York Times and subsequent cases, de- signed to preserve the public interest in a free and robust press, are illusory. That is the necessary constitutional corollary to the New York Times doctrine. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385604_1508%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.