# Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Stanbridge v. New York

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1970
- **Citation:** 398 U.S. 911

## Text

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1969

£832. ee

WILLIAM STAN BRIDGE,
Petitioner,

—_—Vv—

STATE OF NEW YORK,

LS SS See
—— LL NE Ye

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

euutlliemenmemmnen
—~ emacs

THEODORE ROSENBERG, EsqQ.,
FRANK A. Lopnz, Esq,
Attorneys for Defendant-
Petitioner,

133 Schermerhorn Street,
Brooklyn, New York 11201
Tele: 212-857-0589

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PAGE

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CASES CITED

Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 wo... 1, 2, 3, 4
Escobedo V. Tilinoia, 378 U.S. 478 ........cccccccossccoscccssssccseeee 7
Harrington vy. California, 395 U.S. 250 wees: 4, 6
PT. Demmd, SIG OB. BOD vvecevesececvevsvvesveevecsonvesseneee 6
* “KB ALBEE EL BRS IIL IE RS I ESE IS TP MER

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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ll

People v. Stanbridge, 21 N.Y.2d 706; Petition for Cer.
tiorari No. 208 Misc., Oct. Term, 1968 .......0.0..........

Stanbridge v. New York, 395 U.S. 709 cocccccccccsccscssssssses..,

United States ex rel. Johnson v. Yeager, 399 F.2d 508,
510, 511 (38rd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct.
TO scinssstininiisntemnitnehimneaianilennebiianisioaseinnnltse dssbomicaee 4

STATUTES CITED

United States Code, Title 28:

SE: STUD - cibitaerceminaiintindaaienaiinbinticebencedennncs

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‘y-

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1969

WILLIAM STANBRIDGE,
Petitioner,

—_—_vVv—

STATE OF NEW York.

a i

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
(OURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Io the Honorable, the Chief Justice and the Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:

William Stanbridge, petitioner herein, respectfully prays
that a writ of certiorari be issue to review the judgment
of the New York Court of Appeals which re-aftirmed a
judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassan County, convicting
ihe petitioner of the crimes of Manslaughter in the First.
legree and Robbery in the First Degree.

Opinions Below

The opinion aftirming petitioner's conviction is officially
nported (People vy. Stanbridge, 21 N.Y.2d 706). The opin-
im of the Court below reaffirming the conviction after
wtitioner’s application for a writ of certiorari had been
anted by this Court (Stanbridge v. New York, 395 U.S.
(9) and remanded to the Court below for further con-
ideration in light of Bruton y. United States, 391 U.S.
13 is as yet unreported but is set forth in Petitioner's

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Jurisdiction

The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals
affirming petitioner's judgment of conviction was ente
on January 8, 1970. The jurisdiction of the Court

invoked pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C., Section 1257 |

Constitutional Provisions Involved

The constitutional provisions involved in this case |
the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteeuth Amendments to the Uni
States Constitution.

Questions Presented

1. Whether, under the peculiar circumstances of |
instant case the reaflirmance of petitioner’s convictions
the Court below amounts to a disregard by that Tribu
of this Court’s decision which had_ to all intents a
purposes held that petitioner Stanbridge’s case came with
the purview of Bruton vy. United States, 391 Us. t:
and therefore entitled him to a new trial?

~. Whether, this Court should render a conclusive ¢
termination as to the constitutional propriety of Sta
bridge’s confession at this time in light of the opini
below which in part has for its premise that this Cou
has ostensibly passed upon the validity of petitioner's co
fessions and found them to have been voluntarily obtain
since such determination is fundamentally inconsistent wit
the overwhelming weight of authority of this Court wit
respect to the constitutional admissibility of an accused
incriminating statements?

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3
Statement
als re. The petitioner, William Stanbridge was jointly tried
tere! Hin the New York Supreme Court, Nassau County with
urt is # Robert Moll and John Closter for the crimes of Murder

57(2), Bin the First Degree and Robbery in the First Degree.

Petitioner was convicted of the crimes of Manslaughter
in the First Degree and Robbery in the First Degree. Pe-
titioner Was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of from
3% to 70 years. The judgments had been affirmed by
virtue Oi a 5 to 2 majority by the Court below (21 N.Y.2d
706) (Petitioner’s Appendix B).

Se are
Snited

During the October, 1967 Term of this Court, pe-
titioner filed for a writ of certiorari. This application was
subsequently re-numbered No, 208 Misc. October Term,
1968.

f the
ns by
bunal
; and
vithin

123,

By letter dated October 15, 1968, the respondent was
requested by this Court for a further response in the
light of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123.

The resppndent filed his response as requested and

vA (ef ietitioner an Answer thereto.

STali-

inion The respondent contended then as he did in the Court
“out B telow that inasmuch as there were purportedly cross-im-

cOn-
lined
with
with
sed's

plicating confessions made by the respective defendants in
this case, the Bruton rule was inapplicable. In a word,
yetitioner contended then and now, that since neither of
his co-defendants had testified at trial before the jury
thereby foreclosing him from any cross-examination what-
wever coupled with the inescapable fact that the evidence
to convict petitioner consists of his constitutionally tainted
confessions which demonstrates that the State’s evidence
igainst Stanbridge is indeed slim in the extreme he is
entitled to the benefit of the Bruton rule. Moreover, while
the co-defendants made confessions in which they incrim-

PRP HES LEONE LEE PET EL IE IE EN LOTR SHE ME _—

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4

inated Stanbridge, Stanbridge’s statements (State's Ex.
hibits 23 and 27 in Evidence) were basically exculpatory
and therefore, in drastic variance with the statements of
his co-defendants. Cf. United States ex rel. Johnson y.
Yeager, 399 F.2d 508-510-11 (8rd Cir, 1968) cert. denied,
89 S. Ct. 620

Shortly after the decision of this Court in Harringtoy
Vv. California, 395 U.S. 250, petitioner transmitted tel-
egram to this Court contending that the harmless error
criterion as outlined in that case would not conclude Stan.
bridge from the benetit of the Bruton rule in view of the
paucity of evidence adduced against Stanbridge coupled
with the fact that there was a sharp variance betwee,
Stanbridge’s exculpatory statements and Moll's incrimina-
tory statements. (Petitioner’s Exhibit C—his brief jy
the Court below reproduced here and styled Appendix ¢
infra).

After carefully considering this case for more than
two years, the respective briefs of counsel specifically ad-
dressed to the Bruton issue, petitioner's lengthy telegram
following the Harrington decision, this Court unanimously
granted the petition, vacated the judgment of the Cour
below and remanded petitioner to that Court for further
consideration in light of Bruton y. United States, supra.
(Stanbridge v. New York, 395 U.S. 709).

In light of the foregoing impressive chronology it seemed
apparent to petitioner that this Courts’ determination re
cating the judgment below predicated upon the Bruton
rule* simply meant he came within the purview of the
rule and was entitled to a new trial.

* Although petitioner Moll had petitioned this Court at the
same time as Stanbridge the Court did not grant Moll’s petition
where the evidence to convict was much more convincing than
against Stanbridge.

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Ex. Accordingly, petitioner moved in the Court below for

tory Ban order granting a new trial. This, notwithstanding
‘of B the awareness of the existing New York Court of Appeals

IY. Bf decision in People v. McNeil, 24 N.Y.2d 550 (1969) which
ied, Bisa 4 to 3 holding to the effect that a Bruton violation

ould be construed harmless error per se in the case of
ross-implicating confessions. Parenthetically, we reiterate
that this is not a bona fide cross-implicating confession
situation. Cf. United States er rel Johnson vy. Yeager,
supra. Instead, the Court below accepted the suggested
approach expressed by the respondent and set the case down
for reargument.,

ton
tel-
‘Tor
‘an-

led
eel The decision reaffirming the conviction based upon
ha- B People v. McNeil, supra, then followed. This Court. re-

nanded petitioner’s case to the Court below despite MeN cil,
which had been decided two months previous to the grant
fcertiorari. Obviously, finding nothing in McNeil to with-
hold the benefit of Bruton from petitioner.

The Cour} below is seemingly incapable of seeing bevond
its decision in People vy. McNeil, 24 N.Y.2d 550, which holds
vithout qualification that where there are cross-implicating
wnfessions per se, a Bruton violation can dissipate as
lamless error. See, New York Code Crim. Pro. See. 542.
This is conclusively demonstrated by the concurring memo-
randum of Chief Judge Fuld and Associate Judge Burke
in the Court below:

“Although we still subscribe to the view set forth
in the dissenting opinion in People vy. MeNeil (24
N.Y.2d 550)—which would require a reversal here—
we are constrained by the majority's decision in
that case to vote for affirmance. (See, also, con-
curring opinion in People v. Galloway, 24 N.Y.2d
935, 936).” (Petitioner’s Appendix A infra).

”~

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Pe Es | PREIS ESET NINE NIN BEI OT BS OPER EEC LEN

6

We had unsuccessfully urged to have the Court below
apply the more realistic criteria enunciated by this Cour
in Harrington y. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969) ( Nee,
Appellant's Brief in the Court below, Point 1, at pp. 2-5),

During the oral argument below the members of tly.
Court almost uniformly took issue with the respondent's
manifestly absurd argument that years after conviction
Stanbridge was afforded an opportunity to cross-examine
Moll and Closter at a “Huntley’* styled hearing where
the sole issue was one of voluntariness and therefore, the
Bruton violation at trial could be overlooked.

As one learned member of the majority below so cog:
ently pointed out during oral argument—had Moll ani
Closter somehow managed to blurt out testimony, clearly
inadmissible at this post-trial hearing, that their state.
ments incriminating Stanbridge were untrue in what
manner would this benefit Stanbridge with a jury which
hax long since rendered their verdict convicting the peti-
tioner?

Even Judge Bergan writing for the majority below
seems to recognize, as indeed he must, this vast distinction
but he nevertheless and seemingly rather inconsistently
relies upon this post-trial proceeding as a major factor
to withhold from Stanbridge the benefit of a rule to which
he is clearly entitled.*

* People Vv. Huntley, 15 N.Y. 2d 72, sets forth the procedure
to be followed in New York to determine the voluntariness of
confessions. Cf. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368. Although Judge
Bergan alludes to this procedure he eschewed comment upon the
irrefutable fact that the confessions of Moll and Closter were
received wunredacted of prejudicial references to Stanbridge
(Petitioner’s brief in the Court below Point IV; Appendix C..

* We are annexing herewith petitioner’s brief in its entirety
in the Court below relative to this Court’s remand styled
“Appendix-C” infra.

TAIL PIC P ER a ~

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It is quite remarkable how the quantum and character
{ the evidence against Stanbridge has improved in the
iew of the respondent and seemingly Judge Bergan since
jis Court's unexpected promulgation in Bruton. In argu-
ug before the very same Court below in People vy. McQueen,
is N.Y.2d 337, in favor of a prospective application of
teobedo ¥. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, respondent alluding to
etitioner’s case correctly stated that the only real evidence
gainst Stanbridge is his confession. Therefore, if Escobedo
vs applied to cases then on appeal such as petitioner’s
is would invalidate his confession and he probably could
wt be successfully retried. Since Bruton the evidence has
wmehow elevated to a “devastating” mountain of circum-
santial evidence.*

Il

A major factor relied upon by Judge Bergan below is
the fact that this Court did not reopen the issue of Stan-
widge’s confession. He, therefore, unilaterally concludes
‘um this that as a matter of law it must be held to be a
‘ee and voluntary confession properly received as evidence
against Stanbridge. This finding, of course, is contrary to
the venerable teaching of this Court to the effect that this
‘ourt will only decide questions sufficient to a determina-
‘jon of a cause of action and meticulously avoids the pass-
ing upon of Constitutional questions unnecessarily. Having
‘und a clear Bruton violation it was understandably un-
wessary to pass upon the validity of Stanbridge’s con-
ssion. However, in view of Judge Bergan’s opinion joined
« the majority of the Court below as to the admissibility

*The majority opinion below relies for the result reached
son that Court’s McNeil decision which is inconsistent with
this Court’s Harrington criterion. A post-trial proceeding which
tently cannot cure the prejudice of a Bruton violation; and
inally, a confession already held unconstitutionally obtained by
two members of the Court below and which under a long line of
ases emanating from this Court is clearly constitutionally tainted.

VEO TPL ON RS EERE STR. MT Oe

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8

of Stanbridge’s confession it would seem to be the logical
approach and fair to both sides to have a determination ax
to the admissibility of petitioner’s statements at this time.
A ruling at this time may well save the petitioner and
the State the extraordinary expense of a protracted re-tria|
which would practically have for its entire evidentiary coy.
tent Stanbridge’s statements having already been held COn-
stitutionally defective by Chief Judge Fuld and Associate
Judge Burke (21 N.Y.2d 706). (See, also, Petitioner's
Petition for Certiorari, No. 208 Mise., Oct. Term. 196s.
pp. 6 through 30 inclusive, concerning the propriety of
Stanbridge’s statements. )

CONCLUSION
The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,

THEODORE ROSENBERG, Esvy.,
FRANK A. Lopez, Esgq.,
Attorneys for Defendant-
Petitioner,

133 Schermerhorn Street,
Brooklyn, New York 11201
Tele: 212-857-0589

Qe
APPENDIX

TUUMNITINAAR

TAA AAAI TE

PEP TEST i le MN a Na a

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APPENDIX A

Opinion of Court of Appeals of the State of New York

STATE OF NEW YORK
COURT OF APPEALS

67

THE Peopie &c.,
Respondent-Appellant,

va.
Roserni Mou,

Appellant,

and
WILLIAM STANBRIDGE and JOHN CLosTER,
Appellants-Respondents.

a

BERGAN, oJ:

In the murder of a policeman following close upon the
wbbery of a store, William Stanbridge, a participant in
wth crimes, has been convicted of manslaughter in the
int degree, a substantially lesser charge than the murder
ist degree on which he was tried. He was also convicted
robbery, larceny and assault charges arising from the
tore robbery. ;

Stanbridge confessed his participation in the crimes.
le had two accomplices, Robert Moll and John Closter,
tho also confessed. There was a joint trial in which the
mfessions of each defendant were received, each only
wainst the one confessing, with adequate limiting instrue-
ions to the jury as to the others. This court in 1967
firmed all three convictions with a dissenting opinion by
fudge Burke in which Chief Judge Fuld joined ( People
Moll, 21 N.Y.2d 706).

4
~~

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2a
Appendiz A

On June 19, 1969 the Supreme Court of the Cnited
States on petition of Stanbridge vacated the judgment of
conviction as to iim and remanded the case to this court
“for further consideration in light of Bruton vy. United
States, 391 U.S. 128” (Stanbridge v. New York, 395 Ux.
709).

The decision in Bruton turned entirely on the absence
of confrontation of witnesses required by the Constitution
in a criminal trial. This absence was noted when a w.
defendant’s confession implicated the complainant and was
received in evidence at a joint trial.

In such a situation, the human nature of juries being
what it is, the Supreme Court felt the protection of judicial
instruction to the jury not to consider that A’s confession
said about B was an inadequate safeguard.

So the rule of Delli Paoli v. United States (352 Us
232), resting on the supposed protection of careful judicial
instruction, was overruled. The essence of Bruton as laid
down by Justice Brennan is this: “Here the introduction
of Evans’ confession posed a substantial threat to peti
tioner’s right to confront the witnesses against him, ani
this is a hazard we cannot ignore. Despite the concededly
clear instructions to the jury to disregard Evans’ inadmis
sible hearsay evidence inculpating petitioner, in the context
of a joint trial we cannot accept limiting instructions as
an adequate substitute for petitioner's constitutional right
to cross-examination” (391 U.S., p. 187).

Further consideration of the present case with the
Bruton doctrine in mind requires this court to see both
the extent to which there was an absence of confrontation
against Stanbridge when the whole record is looked at:
and if the rule of Bruton had been violated, whether the
other evidence in the case was so strong as to subordinate
the effect on Stanbridge of confessions of co-defendants to
a minor role so as to say the error was harmless within
Harrington v. California (395 U.S. 250 [1969]).

fe
th

~~”

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3a

Appendiz A

Justice Brennan, dissenting in Harrington, felt that
“the deterrent effect of” Bruton and some other cases “will
ie significantly undermined” by Harrington (395 U.S., p.
45). A State court must, however, take the two cases
the way they have been laid down and follow them both
in good faith and as far as possible.

On confrontation with the confessing co-defendants,
there was full adversary opportunity for Stanbridge’s
lawyer to examine these defendants as to the statements
made by them involving Stanbridge. All three defendants
wstified at the Huntley hearing; none testified at the trial.
Counsel for Stanbridge cross-examined Closter, one of the
defendants; he had opportunity to cross-examine Moll
mt did not do it.

The complete absence of confrontation found in Bruton,
therefore, did not exist here; and although there is a dif-
ference between the cross-examination afforded at a trial,
absent here because defendants did not testify, and that
afforded at the Huntley hearing where they did testify, the
wailability of a means to test truth seems significantly to
distinguish this case from Bruton where there was no such
wailability of cross-examination or confrontation.

This court, considering the effect of Bruton, has noted
the difference in effect where co-defendants testify at the
trial and are subject to crossexamination (People Vv.
Anthony, 24 N.Y.2d 696). It has applied the same rule
where opportunity to cross-examine was afforded at a
Huntley hearing (People v. Galloway, 24 N.Y.2d 935).

On somewhat different grounds, the court also has not
applied the Bruton rule where there are multiple confes-
sions of co-defendants and the complaining defendant has
himself confessed, apparently because this is a safety check
om the reliability of the confession or, in any event, mini-
mizes the prejudicial effect of receiving implicating con-
fesions of other defendants. “[I]n a case such as this,
the logic of Bruton is inapplicable” (People y. McNeil, 24

7”

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4a
Appendiz A

N.Y.2d 550, 552 [Scileppi, J.]).. This was in part based
on the rationale in United States ex rel. Catanzaro \.
Mancusi, 404 F.2d 296).

This reasoning suggests somewhat the broader view of
Harrington which affords ground on which the record jy
this case should be distinguished from Bruton. If Stay.
bridge’s confession be taken into account the evidenc
against him is, indeed, as overwhelming as that considered
in Harrington.

The issue on the validity of that confession is poy
closed and as a matter of law it must be held a free ani
voluntary confession properly received against Stanbridge.
This, as to Stanbridge, was the main problem debated iy
this court, as the dissenting opinion demonstrates (”
N.Y.2d 706, 709-711).

The Supreme Court did not reopen this issue in remit.
ting to consider the effect of Bruton which is quite a
different question, and so the confession of Stanbridge
added to the circumstantial case against him gives strong
enough support to the judgment to come within Harrington.
Indeed the identity of an unusual car owned by Stanbridge
observed at the scene of the crime by a youthful and alent
witness led to the apprehension of all defendants.

Upon reconsideration the judgment should be aftirmed.

Upon reargument by defendant Stanbridge: Original de.
cision of this Court, dated December 29, 1967, affirming
the judgment, adhered to. Opinion by Bergan, J. All
concur, Fuld, Ch, J. and Burke, J., in the following memo-
randum: Although we still subscribe to the view set forth
in the dissenting opinion in People v. McNeil (24 N.Y.
550)—which would require a reversal here—we are con:
strained by the majority’s decision in that case to vote
for affirmance. (See, also, concurring opinion in Peoplr
v. Galloway, 24 N.Y.2d 935, 936).

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APPENDIX B

Dissenting Opinion by Burke, J.

i

” No. 97 67

THE PHOPLE Ke.,
Respondent-Appellant,

vs.

ROBERT MOLL,
Appellant,

and

WILLIAM STANBRIDGE and JOHN CLOSTER,
Appellants-Respondents.

nl

buRKE, J.: (Dissenting) :

We are unable to agree to aftirmance of these defen-
dants’ convictions. This is the sort of case where feelings
run high—any case involving the vicious killing of a police
ificer is bound to produce such feelings. But it is just
ihis sort of case that demands scrupulous care on the part
of the authorities to prevent the sort of claims that are now
made here by these defendants. In the instant case, un-
fortunately, no such care was taken. Here, rather, the
record reveals a lack of concern on the part of a number
of those charged with responsibility for the administration
of criminal justice who had any contact with this case with
preventing possible reversible error. As a result, we have
lefore us three convictions for most serious crimes that,
under all circumstances here presented, hint strongly of
unfairness. This, where it seems clear conviction of these
defendants would likely have been obtained even if the
utmost moderation had governed the conduct of the au-
thorities.

~~”

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6a

Appendix B

¢

To begin with, three assistant district attorneys sat
throughout the night at the Sixth Precinct Station houy
of the Nassau County Police in Roslyn while teams of
police officers incessantly questioned the defendant Stay.
bridge, an eighteen year old youth, in an effort to obtain
a confession. It was clear at the time that Stanbridg
could likely be connected with the killing, yet apparently
none of the assistant district attorneys made any cffort to
sit in on the interrogation of this defendant until the
police were satisfied that they had obtained all that they
could from him. This was not until 8 A.M., when one of
the assistant district attorneys took over and began (ues.
tioning the suspect further. (Stanbridge had been picked
up about midnight.) Defendant Closter was picked up
at 3 A.M. and the same procedure was followed with him.
Presumably, Moll also received this treatment, but he doe
not urge on this appeal that his confession was a product
of coercion (only that it was taken after his request for
counsel had been denied).

On Arraignment the following day (16 hours after
Stanbridge’s arrest) the magistrate was advised of the
suspects’ complaints concerning police brutality, yet he
refused their request for a court ordered medical examina-
tion, commenting simply that this would be taken care of
by the jail authorities. He also refused their request that
they at least be allowed to exhibit in court their claimed
injuries. The same request were made some thirty minutes
later to another judge, with the added allegation that the
jail doctor on examining defendants purposely ignored
their injuries, and he also refused the requests. Subse
quently the police officers involved and the jail officials all
swore that no one had laid a hand on the suspects and
no injuries were observed, but independent verification of
the testimony of these witnesses, whose sympathy toward
and identification with the cause of the prosecution in a
case such as this must be obvious, was made forever in:

~

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ja

Appendiz B

wssible. (The arraigning magistrate and his court ste
nographer later testified that they noticed no injuries on
the parts of the suspects’ bodies that were visible to them,
wut it is ingenuous to suppose that the police Officers, if
in fact they did beat these defendants, would have beaten
them in such a way that the marks of such abuse would
le obvious On arraignment. At the Huntley hearing coun-
vl representing the defendants testified as to observing
signs of injuries.)

The trial court's later reading of People vy. Huntley
(15 N.Y. 2d 72) as mandating that he sit on the Huntley
was uncalled for. As we pointed out in People y. Horton
(7 N.Y. 2d 355, at 362), the trial court has discretion
is to whether or not to disqualify himself. This, we be-
lieve, is the only fair reading that can be given Huntley,
and, here discretion would seem to have called for dis-
qualification.

Finally, we do not believe the court on the Huntley
hearing was free to reject defendant Moll’s uncontradicted
testimony as to the denial of counsel before his confession
was obtained. The People had available numerous wit-
nesses Who would have been able to rebut this testimony,
if in fact Moll’s claim was false. The failure of Moll to
testify on his trial and raise this point cannot rea sonably
be held to impeach his later claim. If he had done so he
would have been open to unrestricted cross-examination as
to his part in the crime.

On these grounds we would reverse and order new trials
for all defendants.

* * * * *
ggoguae affirmed. No opinion. All concur except

Rurke, J., who dissents and votes to reverse and order
new eats in an opinion in which Fuld, Ch. J., coneurs.

~~”

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8a

Order of Court of Appeals of the State of New York

STATE oF NEW York,

In Court of Appeals

At a Court of Appeals for the State of
New York, held at Court of -\ppeals
Hall in the City of Albany on th
Fourteenth day of February \.))
1968.

Present, HON. STANLEY H. FULp,
Chief Judge, Presiding.

ee

Mo. No. 105

THE PEOPLE &c.,
Respondent,

vs.

ROBERT MOLL, WILLIAM STANBRIDGE
and JOHN CLOSTER,

A ppellants.

Sa

A motion for reargument and to amend the remittitu
in the above cause having heretofore been made upon the
part of the appellant Stanbridge herein, papers having
been submitted thereon and due deliberation having been
thereupon had, it is

ORDERED, insofar as reargument is sought, that the said
motion be and the same hereby is denied, and it is

ORDERED, insofar as amendment of the remittitur is
sought, that the said motion be and the same hereby is
granted, the return of the remittitur requested and, when

COPY BOUND CLOSE

9a

Order of Court of Appeals of the State of New York

returned, it will be amended by adding thereto the fol-
lowing :

Upon the appeal herein of appellant William
Stanbridge there were presented and necessarily
passed upon questions under the Constitution of the
United States, viz.: Whether appellant's right to
due process of law under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment has been adversely atfected and whether ap-
pellant’s conviction was based in part on unlawful
search and seizure in violation of his rights under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
Court of Appeals held that there was no violation
of appellant’s constitutional rights under either of
these amendments.

ANp the County Court of Nassau County hereby is re-
quested to direct its Clerk to return said remittitur to this
Court for amendment accordingly.

A copy

8/ GEARON KIMBALL
Deputy Clerk

10a
APPENDIX C

COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF N5W YORK

>

THD PEOPLE OF THE STATE oF New York

Respondent,
—against—

WILLIAM STANBRIDGE,
Defendant-A ppellant.

>

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S BRIEF UPON REMAND T0
THIS COURT FROM THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES

Statement

The defendant-appellant, William Stanbridge, was jointly
indicted and tried in the Supreme Court, Nassau County,
before Judge and jury, together with Robert Moll and John
Closter for Murder and Robbtry in the First Degree in con.
nection with a robbery at a supermarket on March 23, 1961.

EFreesPtdcteree ff & & Se ee eS eee

Appellant was convicted of Manslaughter and Robbery
in the First Degree. The judgments were affirmed by this
Court by virtue of a 5 to 2 majority (21 N. Y. 2d 706).

On June 16, 1969, the Supreme Court granted appel-
lant’s petition for a writ of certiorari and the judgment of
this Court was vacated and the case was remanded for
further consideration in light of Bruton y. United States,
391 U.S. 123 (Appendix A).

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lla
Appendiz C

Appellant thereafter motioned this Court to conform its
remittitur to the mandate of the Supreme Court to the
extent of either remanding appellant to the Supreme Court,
Nassau County, for a new trial or in the alternative, dis-
missal of the indictment.

The Court thereafter set this case down for reargument.

POINT I

The Decision of the United States Supreme Court on
June 16, 1969, granting appellant’s Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari after that Court had directed specific argument as
to the applicability of Bruton y. United States, 391 U.S. 123,
the vacatur of the judgment of this Court and the remand
of appellant’s case to this Court for further consideration in
the light of Bruton v. United States, supra, notwithstanding
the earlier decision of that Court in Harrington vy. California,
395 U.S. 250 (1969), decided two weeks prior to the grant of
appellant’s petition for a Writ of Certiorari and nearly two
full months after the decision of this Court in People v.
MeNeil, 24 N.Y.2d 550 (decided April 23, 1969), a decision
which the Supreme Court undoubtedly considered in deciding
appellant’s petition amounts to a definitive adjudication from
the highest Court in our land that appellant is indeed en-
itled to a new trial in light of Bruton v. United States, supra.

Appellant’s convictions of Manslaughter and Robbery
in the First Degree were affirmed by this Court by virtue
ofa 5 to 2 majority (21 N.Y. 24 706). He then petitioned
the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari
during the October Term, 1967. The petition was pending
for approximately one year when on October 15, 1968, the
respondent was directed by that Court for a “further re-
ponse in the light of Bruton vy. United States, 391 U. 8.
123” which had then been recently decided by that Court.

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12a
Appendiz C

The appellant filed an Answer to the respondent's Argy.
ment which must be well known to this Court at this point,
viz., that appellant could not hope to benefit from the
Bruton rule inasmuch as there were cross-implicating ¢on.
fessions in this case and, therefore, Stanbridge had not been
sufficiently prejudiced by co-defendant Moll’s incriminating
confession as to warrant the invocation of the Bruton rule.
Cf. United States ex rel. Catanzaro vy. Mancusi, 404 F24
296 (a case relied upon by the majority in People vy. Me-
Neil, supra).*

We submit that the respondent’s argument was care.
fully considered and rejected by the Supreme Court since
appellant’s conviction is hanging by the bare thread of a
confession already held invalid by Chief Judge Fuld and
Associate Judge Burke (21 N.Y. 2d 706).** A confession
which we submit patently cannot withstand the scutiny of
a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Cf. People vy. Cerrulo,
18 N.Y. 2d 839, where a federal writ of habeas corpus was
granted after a hearing ordered by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit. United States ex rel
Cerullo vy. Follette, 393 F.2d 879 (1968). Such being the
case and applying the criteria outlined by the Supreme
Court in Harrington v. California, supra, as opposed to the

* Appellant reproduces his brief as to the applicability of
Bruton rule in the Supreme Court as “Appendix B” for the pur-
pose of demonstrating that the Supreme Court has indeed ruled
precisely as to the applicability of the Bruton rule.

** Appellant also contends infra under Point II of this brief
that inasmuch as there was a drastic variance between his state-
ments and that of his co-defendant Moll his case is more analo-
gous to that of United States ex rel. ohnson v. Yeager, 399 F.2d
508-510-11 (3rd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 620, than to
the Catanzaro v. Mancusi case, supra. A case, unlike appellant's,
where the evidence was overwhelming.

COPY BOUND CLOSE IN

13a

Appendir C

blanket holding of People vy. McNeil, supra, this would pre-
clude the invocation of the harmless error doctrine in this
case of Chapman v. California (386 U.S. 18).

The decision of Harrington y. California, supra, out-
lining the ertremely rare instances where the harmless
error doctrine would apply in case of cross-implicating con-
fessions is obviously a much tricter rule than the seeming
blanket holding a majority of this Court in People v.
McNeil, supra, to the effect that per se where there are
cross-implicating confessions the harmless error rule could
be invoked to save a conviction from reversal.

To this extent McNeil should be overruled since the
Harrington case constitutes a supervening and inconsistent
decision of the United States Supreme Court. Cf. People
v. Perez, 299 N.Y. 784, 300 N.Y. 208; Cohen and Karger,
Powers of the New York Court of Appeals, Sec. 786, et seq.

To demonstrate that the Supreme Court considered ap-
pellant’s case in relation to the Harrington rule and held
that the Bruton rule nevertheless applied to his case with
full force and effect we annex to this brief as “Appellant’s
Appendix C” a telegram which the writer had transmitted
to that Court following the Harrington decision.

The United States Supreme Court had before it appel-
lant’s case for more than two long years with a complete
trial record, extensive briefs and additional “Bruton” styled
briefs, To say now that the remand to this Court for fur-
ther consideration in the light of Bruton y. United States,
supra, is anything but for the purpose of according this
Court an opportunity to render a decision in conformity
with the true intent of the Supreme Court in this case, riz.,
that appellant be aecorded a new trial under the teachings
of the Bruton rule would be manifestly illogical.

lia
Appendiz C
POINT II

With respect to appellant’s conviction of manslaughter
his statements were totally exculpatory. His co-defendant,
Moll, however, not only incriminated himself but Stanbridge
as well in his statements. As to his manslaughter conviction
appellant is on all fours with the Bruton rule.

Appellant’s statements (People’s Exhibits 23 and 97
in Evidence) were total disclaimers of any criminal par-
ticipation in the homicide of Patrolman Coote (see Appel-
lant’s Main Brief, Point V, page 37 et seq.).

On the other hand, co-defendant Moll’s statements not
only incriminated himself but he placed Stanbridge in such
close proximity to the area of the actual shooting that it
tended to connect Stanbridge to the actual homicide (R.
5260-62; People’s Exhibit 37 in Evidence). Indeed, it was
deemed sufficient to merit the affirmance of his conviction
of Manslaughter by this Court.

Appellant Stanbridge, therefore should be considered
to be “on all fours’’ by this Court with the Bruton rule
since Moll did not testify at trial and thereby foreclosed
any inquiry * in regard to the truth of his statements im-
plicating Stanbridge in the actual homicide by placing him
in his statements in close proximity to the area of the shoot-
ing while Stanbridge had denied any complicity in the

*The respondent has argued before the Supreme Court and
in his affidavit before this Court that whatever Bruton prejudice
Stanbridge suffered at trial was somehow cured by the “Post-
Trial” Huntley hearing. If the respondent somehow finds solace
in the seemingly “better than nothing” argument we cannot fore-
close him. However, we are sure this Court will understand if
we eschew answering this meritless argument.

pes
—_—

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15a
Appendix C

homicide of Patrolman Coote. It therefore follows that
his conviction of Manslaughter should be reversed since he
had been denied the right of confrontation and cross-exami-
nation vouchsafed by the Bruton rule. Cf. People v.
Anthony, 24 N.Y. 2d 696 (reversing Anthony’s co-defendant,
Reginald Stephen Batten). Accord—United States ex rel.
Johnson v. Yeager, 399 F.2d 508, 510-511 (3rd Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 620.

POINT Ill

Appellant’s conviction of robbery in the First Degree
should be reversed in the light of Bruton v. United States,
supra, since the harmless error rule cannot be applied here
inssmuch as appellant’s conviction is not predicated upon
overwhelming evidence. Instead, the entire evidentiary con-
tent of the People’s case consists of appellant’s suspect con-
fessions.

In arguing before this Court in People vy. McQueen, 18
N.Y. 2d 337 for a prospective application of Escobedo vy.
Minois, 378 U.S. 478, the respondent had occasion to allude
to appellant’s case in his brief. He stated there, and quite
correctly so, that if Escobedo were applied to cases then
on appeal, appellant’s conviction, in which an appeal was
then pending in this Court would result in reversal of his
conviction and a dismissal of the indictment since apart
from his confessions there was no other probative evidence
which the People possessed with which to prosecute Stan-
bridge.

In successfully arguing last July for the reargument of
appellant’s appeal in this Court, notwithstanding the chron-
ological set-of-events illustrated herein culminating in the
grant of appellant’s petition for a writ of certiorari and
remand in the light of the Bruton case, he stated such re-

”~

SE IN CENTER

léa
Appendia C

argument would not be a “sham and is not frivolous” (Res,
Affd. p. 3). He also asserted that Stanbridge’s convictions
do not stand exclusively “upon his confessions alone but a
mountain of circumstantial evidence sufficient to remove
any doubt in the Court’s mind about the fairness of the
trial” (Res. Affd., p. 5). The respondent’s “mountain” jg
in reality a Chimera. At best, respondent’s “mountain”
can be characterized a “molehill”. Of course, there is no
other evidence apart from Stanbridge’s probably constitn.
tionally defective confessions which explains why arring.
ton’s conviction was affirmed and Stanbridge’s case was re.
manded following Harrington and citing a case where the
defendant’s conviction (Bruton) had bbenreversed by that
august tribual.

The victims of the robbery, Frank Gagliardi and Ray-

mond Tichelaar, respectively testified that they were cer.
tainly incapable of rendering any identification of the
robbers (R. 458).

The ultimate disposition of Stanbridge’s case, which
would be consistent with the intent of the Supreme Court's
remand, would be the same result as in the case cited by
that Court in remanding appellant’s case to this Court
(Bruton v. United States, supra).

In applying the criterion of Harrington it is apparent

that the harmless error rule has no standing in the case of
appellant Stanbridge.

~~

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lia
Appendix C
POINT IV

The appellant’s right to confrontation was violated by
virtue of testimony adduced by the People. A joint trial
severely prejudiced appellant’s substantial rights.

William Brittain, 2 life-time friend of co-defendant Moll
and a friend of appellant Stanbridge, testified for the
People that following the crime, he had spoken with Moll.
He noticed that Moll’s hand was injured. He testified that
Moll had told him that he injured his hand when he shot
acop with a defective shotgun and that Red, William Stan-
bridge, was with him (R. 926). Brittain had made a
statement to the District Atiorney shortly after Moll on
the date of Moll’s arrest. At one point the trial prosecutor
was permitted to refresh the witness’ recollection by read-
ing from this statement in which Brittain had stated that
Moll admitted shooting Patrolman Coote in cenjunction
with a robbery in which appellant Stanbridge participated
(R. 931).

Upon cross-examination by counsel for Moll this witness
testified that three weeks prior to the trial of this indict-
ment, counsel for Moll and an associate, Mr. Griffin, along
with Walter Moll, the brother of Robert Moll, had inter-
viewed him. Britain testified that he had agreed with a
statement made by Mr. Griffin at this interview to the effect
that “Red” (Stanbridge) had shot the police officer with
a pistol and Walter Moll’s statement that Stanbridge had
shot Patrolman Coote with a shotgun (R. 968). Counsel
for appellant immediately moved for the declaration of a
mistrial on the basis of this prejudicial testimony adduced
at this joint trial. The motion was denied and an excep-
tion duly noted (R. 969).

Ido Ruiz, who had preceded Brittain as a prosecution
Witness earlier testified that Moll had come to his home

PME S GOI OLD Oe

”~

SE IN CENTER

léa
Appendia C

argument would not be a “sham and is not frivolous” (Res,
Affd. p. 3). He also asserted that Stanbridge’s convictions
do not stand exclusively “upon his confessions alone but a
mountain of circumstantial evidence sufficient to remove
any doubt in the Court’s mind about the fairness of the
trial” (Res. Affd., p. 5). The respondent’s “mountain” jg
in reality a Chimera. At best, respondent’s “mountain”
can be characterized a “molehill”. Of course, there ig no
other evidence apart from Stanbridge’s probably constity.
tionally defective confessions which explains why Harring.
ton’s conviction was affirmed and Stanbridge’s case was re.
manded following Harrington and citing a case where the
defendant’s conviction (Bruton) had bbenreversed by that
august tribual.

The victims of the robbery, Frank Gagliardi and Ray-

mond Tichelaar, respectively testified that they were cer-
tainly incapable of rendering any identification of the
robbers (R. 458).

The ultimate disposition of Stanbridge’s case, which
would be consistent with the intent of the Supreme Court's
remand, would be the same result as in the case cited by
that Court in remanding appellant’s case to this Court
(Bruton v. United States, supra).

in applying the criterion of Harrington it is apparent
that the harmless error rule has no standing in the case of
appellant Stanbridge.

Fy oat=-.*an~-lea'hi" «aealin.° 1a

lia
Appendir C
POINT IV

‘

The appellant’s right to confrontation was violated by
virtue of testimony adduced by the People. A joint trial
severely prejudiced appellant’s substantial rights.

William Brittain, a life-time friend of co-defendant Moll
and a friend of appellant Stanbridge, testified for the
People that following the crime, he had spoken with Moll.
He noticed that Moll’s hand was injured. He testified that
Moll had told him that he injured his hand when he shot
acop with a defective shotgun and that Red, William Stan-
bridge, was with him (R. 926). Brittain had made a
statement to the District Atiorney shortly after Moll on
the date of Moll’s arrest. At one point the trial prosecutor
was permitted to refresh the witness’ recollection by read-
ing from this statement in which Brittain had stated that
Moll admitted shooting Patrolman Coote in conjunction
with a robbery in which appellant Stanbridge participated
(R. 931).

Upon cross-examination by counsel for Moll this witness
testified that three weeks prior to the trial of this indict-
ment, counsel for Moll and an associate, Mr. Griffin, along
with Walter Moll, the brother of Robert Moll, had inter-

| viewed him. Britain testified that he had agreed with a
statement made by Mr. Griffin at this interview to the effect
that “Red” (Stanbridge) had shot the police officer with
a pistol and Walter Moll’s statement that Stanbridge had
shot Patrolman Coote with a shotgun (R. 968). Counsel
for appellant immediately moved for the declaration of a
mistrial on the basis of this prejudicial testimony adduced
at this joint trial. The motion was denied and an excep-
tion duly noted (R. 969).

Ido Ruiz, who had preceded Brittain as a prosecution
witness earlier testified that Moll had come to his home

_— — ee

18a
Appendia C

with his brother Walter and William Brittain the night of
the shooting and robbery (R. 822-24).

He was permitted to testify over vigorous objection and
motions for a mistrial that Robert Moll had told himthat
he had “pulled” a robbery with appellant Stanbridge and
John Closter in a supermarket and had shot a cop in effect.
ing an escape (R. 822).

The following then ensued:

“A. He told me that they were running and the off.
cer said ‘Stop’, and as they made a turn or some.
thing like that, the officer couldn’t see the shotgun
because he was holding it in front of him and the
officer was in back.

Mr. Direnzo: Move that that be stricken, if your
Honor pleases.

The Court: That is all part of the conversation.

The Witness: Yes.

Q. Go ahead. A. And he said that he turned
around and he asked one of the other tico guys if he
should, and somebody said ‘yeah’, one of the other
two guys.

Mr. Direnzo: Object to it, if your Honor pleases.

The Court: Just tell us what the conversation
was. Go ahead.

Mr. Dienzo: Move that this be stricken, if your
Honor pleases.

Mr. Direnzo: Respectfully except” (R. 823-24).

The tria! prosecutor, seemingly unsatisfied in “merely”
adducing thix patently prejudicial testimony as against
Stanbridge, questioned Ruiz further as follows and again
over the i peated objections of counsel for appellant:

CAnDY aRMeInMmn Crnert

19a
Appendia C

“Q. Mr. Ruiz, did the defendant Robert Moll say
anything to you, what weapons they had with them?

Mr. Direnzo: Objected to, if your Honor pleases—
The Court: Overruled—excuse me” (R. 828).

Thus, through the testimony of these two prosecution
witnesses the People succeeded in adducing hearsay—highly
prejudicial testimony against Stanbridge which he could
not combat by cross-examining Moll because Moll did not
testify at trial* and which could not have been adduced
had Stanbridge been separately tried.

This testimony is independent of and indeed in dractic
contradiction of much of Stanbridge’s exculpatory state-
ments. It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that Stanbridge’s
substantial rights were irretrievably prejudiced by the mis-
we of such constitutionally inadmissible evidence. Apart
from the fact that the Bruton rule requires reversal of his
convictions occasioned by the elicitation of such patently
hearsay, highly inflammatory testimony in addition this
Court is in the unique position of retrospectively recogniz-
ing the prejudice suffered by Stanbridge because he was
jointly tried with Moll unseen at the beginning. People vy.
Boone, 22 N.Y. 2d 476; People vy. Jackson, 22 N.Y. 2d
H6; People v. Cefaro, 23 N.Y. 2d 283; People v. Baker,
%3.N.Y. 2d 307; People v. Anthony, 24 N.Y. 2d 696. The
elicitation of this highly prejudicial testimony could have
easily been excluded. Indeed, counsel for appellant had
tried to head it off by requesting a side bar conference
just prior to the elicitation of this testimony. When it was
adduced he immediately moved for a mistrial.

*Perhaps it is this illegal evidence which is the “mountain”
of evidence the respondent was alluding to in his affidavit referred
to above.

22a
APPENDIX C-I
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1968.
STANBRIDGE v. NEW YORK.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT oF
APPEALS OF NEW YORK.

No. 208, Mise. Decided June 16, 1969.
PER CURIAM.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and
the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The
judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for further
consideration in light of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.s.
123.

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Ba
APPENDIX C-II

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1968
No. 208 Mise.
oo

WILLIAM STANBRIDGE,
Petitioner,
—against—

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW York

rr

PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF TO THE RESPONDENT’S
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETI-
TIONER’S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To: The Honorable, Tie Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.

This is the petitioner's reply to the respondent’s supple-
mental brief submitted in response to a letter dated October
15, 1968, from the Office of the Clerk calling upon the re-
spondent for a further response in the light of Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 128.

POINT I

The petitioner’s case squarely falls within the definitive
specifics of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123.

At page 2 of his supplemental brief the respondent
endeavors to distinguish the Bruton holding from the case
at bar upon the premise that: (1) Unlike Stanbridge,

NPI ES OME RT PRT EIGER COLE TEST TEE Ie RE:
@

SE INCENTER

2ia
Appendiz C-II

Bruton did not confess; and (1) Evans (the confessing eo
defendant) did not take the stand at trial to give Bruto
aun opportunity to cross-examine.

The respondent admits, as indeed he must, that none 9
the defendants testified at the trial which resulted in Stay.
bridge’s conviction.

It was only after the rights of Stanbridge had been
irretrievably endamagaed and his conviction obtained did
the defendant testify at a post trial proceeding (Jacksony.
Denno, 378 U.S. 363; People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y. 24 72),
The issu at such hearing was exclusively devoted to that
of the voluntariness of the respective confessions. In all
candor, it is quite difficult for the writer to follow the
reasoning of the respondent therein. It seems that he is
endeavoring to argue that this Post-Trial proceeding, held
after conviction, whereat the defendants testified concern
ing the voluntariness of their respective confessions eso
terically cured the prejudice of having Moll’s and Closter's
respective statements, incriminating Stanbridge received as
evidence at trial for jury consideration. If we are correct
in our interpretation of respondent’s argument, then it ix
apparent that the respondent has miscontrued the basic
precept of the Bruton rule. Prejudice results to the accused
in a joint trial when before the jury a non-testifying co
defendant's statement is read to the jury incriminating
the accused. This results from the fact that the accused
is bereft of any effective means of challenging the truth
of such hearsay accusations indelibly imprinted upon the
minds of the jurors. The jury in the case at bar having
rendered their verdict based on such tainted evidence, the
error cannot be cured. A new trial is therefore required.
If an error of such Constitutional magnitude could ever be
cured in the convenient manner suggested by the respondent
herein there would have been no necessity whatsoever for

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25a
Appendiz C-II

ihe reversal in the Bruton case. The post-trial proceeding
in this case could not cure the damage which Stanbridge
affered before the jury as it could not in the Bruton case.
Accordingly, the petition for writ of Certiorari should be
ganted in accordance with the due process of law.

POINT LA

The co-defendant, Moll’s confession in this case was
inriminatory of Stanbridge while Stanbridge’s statement
vas exculpatory with respect to the actual homicide of
Oficer Coote. Therefore, to all intents and purposes Stan-
bridge is in the position of a non-confessor convicted upon
the hearsay incriminatory confession of a co-defendant.

The respondent ventures forth with the anticipated
argument that inasmuch ax both Moll and Stanbridge both
made confessions the petitioner herein suffered no prejudice
(Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18).* This argument
must alxo fall when confronted by a juxtaposition of the
respective statements.

The petitioner's statement (fols. 5155-5214; Peo’s. Ex.
3 in Ev.) is an unequivocal denial of any intent to murder
m Stanbridge’s part. On the other hand, Moll’s statement
clearly demonstrates his intent to “kill.” Furthermore,
Moll and only Moll, incriminates Stanbridge in the actual
homicide (fols. 5248, 5260, 5280; Peo's. Ex. 37 in Eyv.).

*It is quite germane to the issue at bar that the harmless error
doctrine (Chapman V. California, 386 U.S. 18), has been held by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
Johnson Vv. Yeager, (decided August 23, 1968 and reported Sep-
tember 11, 1968, 3 Crim. L. 2481), to be unable to save convic-
tiong based upon cross-implicating confessions.

PRIN LL RGAE I OER LT OC a OO CO omengeR: 50

«

SE IN CENTER

26a

Appendia C-II

This argument of the respondent herein could not fing
juridicial solace even in New York State. See, People y.
Cassidy, 30 A.D. 2d 795 (A.D. 1st Dept. 1968) ; People y.
Shelly Jean Jackson and Wayne Bruton, 22 N.Y. 24 .......
dec’d, New York Court of Appeals, July 2, 1968, New
York Law Journal, 11-6-68, p. 1.

The respondent further alludes in his brief to the Sey.
erance concept (Res. Br., p. 4) (Federal Rules of Crim.
Pro. Rule 14). It is noteworthy that Moll’s incriminating
statements could not have been redacted by the People, tw
exclude all prejudicial references to Stanbridge. People y.
Boone, 23 N.Y. 2d 476; People vy. Shelly Jean Jackson and
Wayne Bruton, supra.

It is also our submission that this Court is in the
unique position of retrospectively determining the impair.
ment of petitioner Stanbridge’s Constitutional Rights “un-
seen at the beginning” by virtue of the unredactability
of Moll’s statements incriminating Stanbridge and the
joint trial of the defendants. Cf. People v. Krugman,
44 Cisce. 2d 48 to 49; People vy. Cole, 27 A.D. 2d 7H
People v. La Belle, 18 N.Y. 2d 405; People vy. Burrell,
21 N.Y. 2d 265; People v. Cassidy, 30 A.D. 2d 795; Bruton
v. United States, 391 U.S. 123. 130; People v. Shelly Jean
Jackson and Wayne Bruton, supra.

In the Cassidy case supra, the defendant had been
jointly tried with four others in New York. In reversing
the ensuing convictions of all of the defendants, the Ap
pellate Division for the First Judicial Department unan-
imously held there, consonant with the concept of Bruton:

“The admission into evidence, at the joint trial,
or oral and in some cases written extrajudicial state
ments of each of several defendants tending to in

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27a

Appendix C-IT

criminate co-defendants violated the rights of said
co-lefendants and requires a new trial. In the cir-
cumstances of this case, the instructions limiting the
: consideration by the jury of the incriminating state-
ments could not reasonably operate to dispel the
prejudice to co-defendants resulting from the receipt
of such evidence which was hearsay to them. (See,
Bruton vy. United States, 391 U.S. 123; Roberts v.
Russell, ........ if So ; People v. Burrelle, 21 N.Y.
: 2d 265).” 30 A.D. 2d 795.

Accord—See, People y. Boone, 23 N.Y. 2d 476 (N.Y.
| & Court of Appeals, July, 1968). The instant case is man-
ifestly “on all fours’’ with the Bruton rule. Accordingly,
the petitioner’s application fur a writ of Certiorari should
' It be granted.

. POINT Il

: There is ample justification under traditional standards
. ¥ for this Court to render constitutionally invalid Stanbridge’s
| § confession.

Under the undisputed facts of Stanbridge’s case there
, § is a legion of authority to support a finding that Stan-
bridge’s confessions were nothing more than a product of
testimonial compulsion (See, Vet.’s Pet. for Certiorari).

: Indeed two Judges of the Court below which included

. § the Chief Judge, were constrained to find that Stanbridge’s

. § confession to be Constitutionally infirm (See, Petitioner’s
Ex.-A to his Petition for Certiorari).

The State may be mislead to believe that this Con-
stitutionally defective instrument could be utilized at a

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28a
Appendix C-II

new trial if this Court were to remand this case solely
in the light of Bruton v. United States, supra.

It is respectfully submitted that the State should Ie
promptly disabused of any such concept. The confession
obtained from Stanbridge was undoubtedly procured in q
manner inimical to every basic concept and tenet of fair
play and decency. It is ripe, indeed overripe, for judicial
burial.

CREO AAR AY EY RE A ITER RIE RE ETE 8 a mn mapas aa earmark, a

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29a
APPENDIX C-III

TELEGRAM

To: THE HONORABLE CHIEF Justice EARL WARREN AND
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME CoURT oF THD
UNITED STATES:

Re: Stanbridge v. New York
No. 208 Misc., Ooctober Term,
1968.

HONORABLE SIRS:

The Court, last week, by virtue of a 5 to 3 majority and
applying the harmless error doctrine of Chapman vy. Cali-
fornia, 386 U.S. 18, affirmed the conviction of the petitioner
in Harrington v. California.
In response to aletter received from the Clerk of the
Court, dated October 15, 1968, an additional brief in the
light of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 was filed
with this Court by the respondent and petitioner, William
Stanbridge in this case.
After perusing the Harrington opinion I would, in my
estimation, be remiss in my duty to my client if I did not
point out certain calient facts which we submit favorably
distinguishes Stanbridge’s case from that of Harrington.
‘In the first instance, Stanbridge’s conviction is predi-
cated entirely upon a confession which two Judges of the
New York Court of Appeals have held to be constitutionally
defective. This evidence constitutes the entire evidentiary
content of the State’s case as against Stanbridge (see,
Court’s Charge to the Jury; Appellant’s Brief in the Court
helow, Points 1, 5 and the Conclusion).
In People y. McQueen, 18 N.Y. 2d 337, the respondent,
the same respondent as in the instant case, in arguing be-
fore the New York Court of Appeals in that case for a total

ERE LENG IOS, LY SIE INE OE IES LN OPI I LR TE LR BR Be

@

E INCENTER

30a

Appendia C-III

prospective application of the rule enunciated by this Court
in Escobedo vy. Illinois and alluding to Stanbridge’s appeal
then pending before that Court stated in his brief that if
that Court were to hold otherwise in the McQueen case the
conviction in Stanbridge’s case would have been reversed
and the indictment dismissed because this evidence was the
only evidence the State had with which to try Stanbridge.
Thus, unlike Harrington, Stanbridge’s conviction js
patently predicated on the most meager of evidence.
Also, unlike Harrington, neither of petitioner's ¢o.
defendants—Moll or Closter—testified at trial thereby pre.
cluding any cross-examination whatsoever. Moreover, Moll's
and Closter’s statements incriminating Stanbridge were not
redacted. Furthermore, even a cursory reading of Stan-
bridge’s statement is a full denial of any guilt in the actual
homicide while on the other hand, Moll fully incriminates -
himself and also directly incriminates Stanbridge.
We submit that inasmuch as Stanbridge’s statement is BR
totally exculpatory in character and Moll’s statement is in-
criminating of himself and Stanbridge as well coupled
with the fact that Moll did not testify at trial brings our
case more on all fours with Bruton v United States than

—

Most respectfully,

THEODORE ROSENBERG

(The foregoing text was
sent as a telegram to the
Supreme Court of the
United States. )

PL OME LEON 2 REET Le NNN DEES ELLIE IETS OEE LIE SAN AITO SEM EI RSIS ES PRT Y

ae ten

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385604_1454%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.