# Opposition Brief — Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1970
- **Citation:** 397 U.S. 924

## Text

LIBRARY
SUPREME COURT, U. S.

ay Cir am
: Soupeeme Court of the Anited States Fis

October Term, 1969

No. 1031

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL,
DAVID G. RALL and RB. E. LEE,

) Petitioners,
vs.
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.,

4

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

j

HENRY HALLADAY
2400 First National Bank Bldg.
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402
Attorney for Respondent
Dorsny, MARQUART, WINDHORST,; West & HALLADAY
JOHN M. MASON and
Davip A. RANHEIM :
2400 First National Bank Bldg.
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402

Of Counsel

eed
1970—Northwest Brief Printing Co., 322 S. Fourth St., Minneapolis 55415 338-5078

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QUESTION PRESENTED.....................0.00::006: Reseeianvarrepes SURREAL 2
OTATUMUNE OP CAI 555i isce ciesesssnccsiessscsndeiesnens eae
ARGUMENT: '
RMP OI 55 fk sicd wes Gaya vy shade A ies Svea ebasihaepn chs sap Ebjuceohangy bend gssiteere 4
I, The Court of Appeals’ Decision Concerning Recoverability

II.

III.

of Attorneys’ Fees Does Not Involve an Important Ques-
tion of Federal Law, and Even if It Does, That Question
Already Has Been Settled by Congress and by This Court

A. The Question Raised by Petitioners Is Not of Sufficient
Importance to Necessitate Review by This Court........

B. The Question Raised by Petitioners Already Has Been
Settled by Congress and by This Court..........................

1, Congress Did Not Make § 153 Aplicable to Air Car-
POEM, Roeder sbtcav add ie avhesacadrlveds (pox sibronnesthtsandpeenders opts igesesy

_ 2. This Court Has Settled the Question of Applicabil-
ity of § 153 to the Airlines in International Ass’n

The Court of Appeals’ Decision Does Not Conflict with the
Decisions of Other Courts of Appeal, Either as to the Ques-
tion of Attorneys’ Fees or That of the Basis for Federal
RE IN 55s nb cu san eb ieo rad hke las uakcacas eenvacies oolkaeck sedusbassesece

~The Court of Appeals’ Decision in No Way Conflicts with

the Decision of This Court in Central Airlines, But Rather
Is Required by That Decision.......................0....-.¢c.cccoeeeeeeeee

CONCLUSION

13

17

Bes le PER

III

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: * Page

Air Liné Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 415 F.
ee ee a FR ha ai ene ba pa eh Arua Fok SVN NS occ Paneees 19, 22

Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 203 F. >
I ROGUE Bas ee 0 aris ink caer A le * 15

Arnold v. United Air Lines, Inc., 296 F.2d 191 (7th Cir. 1961).... 18
Bates v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 171 F.Supp. 273 (D. Minn.

DF wacetias biess cad ues uel ov take hv vane cole a bw Teubado sb audeckanebeubs Caseka pekasetenieewins 18
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353
U.S. 30_ 41957) Ses adapt avas ea che Cosanecscvelin cient tivyab cevmeekablevuihi poonioca oes mobo 2
Capitol Airways, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’ n, Int'l, 341 F.2d 288 |
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 952 (1965)...........00000 18
Crusen v. United Air Lines, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 347 (D. Colo.), aff’d,
REO Ee SO CACC Katty ROWS bikes ess so¥eicis egousechsracesesdonstosroniesucssesirs 18
Dominguez v. National Airlines, Inc., 279 F.Supp. 392 (S.D.N.Y.
SE ails eR aoeecd wre can nsnicbapeens ad's cedssyohesvanchacuoyitonsbasvtaourtenaes 19
Edwards v. Capitol Airlines, Inc., 176 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
OS BBE as ee Baa aa hs sav pn fosnka pe eeneah ve acapnentntoe sesh tua 18
Farris v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Wash.
fy 7 Raia ea SB iti lead 0 Than pe aera eae oe Ad te Pen pe CDSS Re kD ERE Sa 18
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714'
Rt 1S Rae Gee We Satis cesire re eae aCe es ie pte oe cir Iw hs aR ERC Oa 5
Flight Engineers Int’l] Ass’n v. American Airlines, Inc., 303 F.2d 5
CUI INE RO ov seca weasaic he snosies sav ech tah Cene evtaa baad pe pdasean uence suauTauNiEas 18
Gordon v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 268 F.Supp. 210 (W.D. Va.
LT se Nip aaah G The DNase bchue hheg Eon praeco met hag SEL TY CBee RABE CATON ety Panen sn ae Nl 19

Hyland v. United Air Lines, Inc., 254 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1966) 19
International Ass’n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372

Base Oe AAO RD iciiccn seoxpisinccabatadsesn igehsksall snaskeneveisscahceesis events 2, 4, 11-23
International Ass’n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 295 F.

Ee re Ce aks kD ys ooh sc oss Gs ceca Sed psn dda me oN nis panne va webabens 15
International Union, UAW v. Delta Air Lines, Tue., 83 F. Supp. 63

gfe SEE cB en |g Reerreeeeremenrreey Fe ASER TE, Pavel iS ERAS ele ina Sn NCHRP RE DE 18

Kelley v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 389 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1967)... 18
Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Weston Well Works, Inc., 261 U.S. 387

Raves sect vacace dos Daoeuy tase sevens en cib oben pimate rae susbse ype ete sieass ennaeies 6
Metcalf v. National Airlines, Inc., 271 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1959)

CE ERR LE AER EERO ae Ry SPR OR eT MELD LD MRS Pe ER TR 14,15, 16, 18,19, 21
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 373 F.2d

Se ee ey sos as ante ened cdoaceute deans ndtanap i dubentoreckeNtovss eeubeuher nl ios 9
Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 349 U.S. 70

Oe Ne acai a ovathed pds covemetvade ov tevervasionk poses? be hecacus cs duLaeath oceedoaVer tesa 6

Rosen v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 400 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1968).... 17
Rudolph_v. United States, 370 U.S. 269 (1962)....... Pte detect ee aoe 6

a

ii |

ES, THAT QUESTION ALREADY HAS BEEN SETTLED BY
NGRESS AND BY THIS COURT

Petitioners concede that attorneys’ fees cannot be allowed
by a federal court absent contractual or statutory authority
for such_an award.” Indeed, petitioners have no other choice
in view of this Court’s recognition and application of that
rule, most recently in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier
Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967). Apparently petitioners
also concede that there is no contractual authority for such
an award herein, as they fail to point to any provision in the
contract between the parties authorizing such an award.®
inally, petitioners concede that there is no direct statutory
authority for an award of attorneys’ fees herein since 45
U.S.C, §$ 181-182 do not make § 153 applicable to airlines.’

Thus, petitioners are left with the sole contention that the
general provisions of the “Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.,
$151 et seq.,” looked at “as a whole,’ do more than the
language says they do, namely, authorize an award of attor-
neys’ fees herein. We submit that this question is not of
sufficient importance to necessitate review by this Court,
and, in any event, it already has been resolved by Congress

and by this Court.
%

‘Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, p. 11,

"Petitioners do call attention to that provision in the contract which continues
the operation of any provisions of the Railway Labor Act which might other-
wise be applicable. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, p. 12, n. 3. The only
provision of the Railway Labor Act authorizing attorneys’ fees, 45 U.S.C.
§ 153, is not applicable to airlines, as will be shown in this Brief. Thus, the
aforementioned contractual provision in no way authorizes an award of at-

torneys’ fees in this case.
af
7Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, p. 11.

A. The Question Raised by Petitioners Is Not of Sufficient
Importance to Necessitate Review by This Court.

Review on writ of certiorari generally is not granted
where only the interest of the litigants themselves, as op-
posed to that of the public or a larger segment of the com- .
munity, is involved, Rice v. Siowr City Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc, 349 USS. 70 (1955); accord, Rudolph r.
United States, 370 U.S. 269 (1962); Layne & Bowler Corp.
r. Weston Well Works, Inc., 261 U.S. 387 (1923). We sub-
mit that there is no overriding public interest in the question
presented. The reason, simply stated, is that air carriers and
their unions have full contractual capacity to provide for
the award of attorneys’ fees in proceedings like this one.

This proceeding involves an action to enforce awards of
a contractually created board of adjustment possessing juwr-
isdiction over minor disputes in the NWA System. The con-
tract does not contain a provision for reimbursement of at-
torneys’ fees. If provisions governing attorneys’ fees are de-
sirable, it is a negotiable matter for bargaining by the par-
ties, and by other air carriers and their unions, as yet an-
other set of rules or working conditions in a collective bar-
gaifiing context. Neither legislation nor reversal of court
decisions is necessary to effect the policy which petitioners
contend ought to be*fixed and implemented. Such a policy
can properly be tested and established only in collective bar-
gaining where it can be weighed by the parties to the negotia-
tions, sophisticated in the techniques and ramifications of
such bargaining.

Under 45 U.S.C. $184, air carriers and their unions are
required to create, by contract, system, group or regional
hoards of adjustment as follows:

It shall be the duty of every [air] carrier and of its

employees, acting through their representatives, select-
ed in accordance with the provisions of sections 181-188

7

of this title, to establish a board of adjustment of juris-
diction not exceeding the jurisdiction which may be
lawfully exercised by system, group, or regional boards
of adjustment, under the authority of section 153 of ‘this
title. (Emphasis supplied).

NWA and ALPA complied with § 184 by a contract which
established the Northwest Airlines Pilots’ System Board of
Adjustment in complete detail. They provided, with clarity,
for the manner in which the Board was to be created and op-
erated and the disputes within its jurisdiction.® They. also
‘provided for the degree of administrative finality which de-
cisions of that Board were to have,® and they provided for
the event of a deadlock in the Board.’® Yet, though the par-
ties set forth all of these provisions in detail, and clearly
could have included a provision concerning attorneys’ fees
incurred in proceedings to enforce the Board’s awards, they
did not do so. Furthermore, not only could the parties to
this proceeding have contracted for payment of attorneys’
fees, but they still can through future negotiations, The
same is true of other air carriers and their unions."*

In these circumstances, the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals very properly ruled that it was neither its prerogative
nor its responsibility to write a provision into the agree-

“STA, 11-17.

9 “Decisions of the Board in all cases properly referable to it shall be final
and bindirig upon the parties hereto.” IA. 15. Note that by the terms of
this provision alone, without reference to 45 U.S.C. § 153, awards of the
Northwest Airlines Pilots’ System Board of Adjustment can be held final
and _ binding.

10TA, 15.

11]t is for this reason that petitioners are incorrect when they argue that no
airline employees would retain the system boards in lieu of the National Air

Transport Adjustment Board, authorized by 45 U.S.C. § 185, if attorneys’ ~

fees are not allowed in cases such as the present one. Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari, p. 15. There is a plain avenue to such a provision which re-
quires neither legislative nor judicial intervention.

‘

8

t
\

ment which the parties did not. Neither is it the burden of
this Court to review a question which bears significance only
for these particular petitioners in this particular proceed-
ing,’? and not for the general public, the airlines, or the em-
ployees in the airline industry and’ their unions.
B. The Question Raised by Petitioners Already Has Been
: Settled by Congress and by This Court.

|. Congress Did Not Make § 153 Applicable to

Air Carriers.

In their attempt to create the atmosphere of an “unset-
tled” question concerning the recoverability of attorneys’
fees, petitioners’ argument seems to proceed as follows: (1)
the parties entered into a contract under § 184 which gave
their System Board jurisdiction over grievances, which jur-
isdiction did not exceed that of Railroad Boards authorized
under $153; (2) the contract complied with the provisions
of $184; (3) Railroad System Board awards are subject,
by virtue of the provisions of § 153 Second, to the same en-
forcement provisions as those applicable to the National
Railroad Adjustment Board; (4) attorneys’ fees are award-
ed to successful petitioners in federal court proceedings to
enforce National Railroad Adjustment Board awards under
§ 153 First (p); and (5) therefore, reading these proyisions
“in the context of the Railway Labor Act as a whole and in
the context of the Railway Labor Act’s history,” recovery of
attorneys’ fees is authorized herein. fi

The difficulty with this argument is that it is founded on

statutory provisions which are not applicable to Airline

12Since ALPA presumably is able to pay attorneys’ fees incurred in protecting
its members, it is unlikely that even the individual petitioners here would
have been discouraged from the commencement of litigation, or will be
prejudiced in any way, by a refusal to award attorneys’ fees.

9

System Boards, and it then sweeps to its final conclusion by
invoking the Railway Labor Act “as a whole,”.as well as its
general “history.” Of course, even after completing these
mental gymnastics, petitioners still are unable to direct the
Court to a single statutory provision authorizing an award
of attorneys’ fees, nor have we found any such provision.”
In adopting the so-called Air Carrier Amendments to the”
Railway Labor Act in 1936, Congress extended all of the
provisions of the Railway Labor Act ercept § 153 to airlines.
Congress said: :

$181. Application of sections 151, 152, and 154-163 to
carriers by air.

All of the provisions of sections 15 152, and 154-163
of this title are extended tgand shal cover every com:
mon carrier hy aif... -. jy }

$182, Same; -dutiés, positities, benefits and privileges.
The duties, requirements, penalties, benefits and priv-
ileges prescribed” and established bythe provisions of
sections 151,152 and 154-163 of this title shall apply to
said carriers by air and their employees.

—_——_-

131t is unclear exactly what legal importance petitioncrs attach to our com-
ments in a previous Brief regarding the workings of § 153 First (p). Peti-
tion for a Writ of Certiorari, p. 10, n. 2. First of all, petitioners choose io
quote out of context. In that same Brief we said as follows: “Appellant
[NWA] has assumed arguendo that Awards of the Northwest Airlines Pilots’
System Board of Adjustment are accorded the same degree of finality as
Awards of the National Railroad Adjustment Board. This assumption should
not be made. The statute, the contract and the facts require different treat-
ment of the awards of Railroad vis-a-vis Airline System Boards.” Appellant's
Brief, p. 38, Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 373 F.2d
136 (8th Cir. 1967). We then pointed out, as we have here, that § 153
does not apply to Airline System Boards. In any event, it hardly matters
what position we may have taken in the past on the degree of finality of
Airline Board awards, since this is irrelevant to the question of federal court
authority to award attorneys’ fees.

10 ©

45 U.S.C. $$ 181, 182."

For the railroad industry, Congress adopted § 158, which
deals with (1) the establishment, composition, powers and
duties, division, hearings and awards of the National Rail-
road Adjustment Board, and (2) the establishment of rail-
road system, group or regional boards by voluntary agree-
ment. For the airline industry, in place of § 153, Congress
provided in 45 U.S.C. $185 for the creation of an equivalent
National Air Transport Adjustment Board, but postponed
this until “in the judgment of the National Mediation Board,
it shall be necessary to have a permanent national board of
adjustment. . . .” By the express language of § 185, only
in the event such a permanent Airline Board is established
will its awards be enforced in accordance with § 153."°

In the meantime, and until the National Mediation Board
determines the necessity of establishing a permanent. Na-

tional Air Transport Board, § 184 simply requires that air
~

dn
f

14In addition to the obvious absence of “section 153” from these statutory

provisions, the legislative history the Air Carrier Amendments explicitly

recognizes the inapplicabitity of § 153 to airlines. In hearings on the Amend--
ments, ALPA’s ovwzt representative testified:

“As we interpret the bill, it would apply to air transportation all of the

provisions of the Railway Labor Act with the exception of section 3.

[45 U.S.C. § 153]. Section 3 is that provision of the act which estab-

lishes a National Railroad Adjustment Board. It is the only provision

in the act which is peculiarly adapted to the railroads. All of the other

provisions are such that they may be applied to any industry without

modification.”

Hearings on S. 2496 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comni. on Interstate
Commerce, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1935).

The House Report states, “This bill [S. 2496] applies all of the provisions
of the Railway Labor Act except Section 3 to common carriers -by air and
their employees.” H.R. Rep. No. 2243, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1936).

15The legislative history set forth in the Petition. for a Writ of Certiorari, pp.
16-17, nn. 12-13, refers to this yet non-existent National Air Transport Ad-
justment Board. Nowhere in this history does it suggest that Airline System
Board contracts must incorporate all,of the provisions of § 153, nor does it
suggest that if the ‘parties fail to do so, then those provisions automatically
will be incorporated for them. -

11

.

carriers and their unions create-Airline System Boards of
Adjustment with jurisdiction not exceeding that which may
be exercised by Railroad System Boards. Clearly, the par-
ties to a $184 airline contract may not confer upon an
Airline System Board jurisdiction which exceeds that of the
£153 Railroad System Board jurisdiction, and they must,

by judicial view, give awards of an Airline Board “some de-

eree of finality.” International Ass’n of Machinsts v. Cen-
tral Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682, 694 (1963). Beyond this,
¢ 184 contains absolutely no language which imports or even

-

suggests incorporation of any other part of § 153 into the

operation of, or enforcement ‘of awards by, an Airline Sys-
tem Board created pursuant to § 184.
And even if the parties herein exercised their § 184 pre-
rogative and provided in their contract that the System
Board should have jurisdiction equal to that of a § 153 Rail-

road Adjustment Board, this still would not.empower a fed-

eral court, in an action for enforcement of the Airline Board’s
award, to grant attorneys’ fees, unless the parties also spe-
cifically contracted for such fees.. To paraphrase, there is no
statutory grant of authority to a federal court to do more
than enforce an Airline System Board contract. Whether
such contracts provide for “some degree of finality” or “ulti-
mate finality” of an Airline System Board award, there
‘must be an independent contractual basis for payment of at-
torneys’ fees. Otherwise, there is nothing for a federal court
to enforce in this regard, beyond ruling-on the appropriate
degree of finality and requiring compliance. )

Although Congress did not impose the provisions of § 153
on Airline System Boards, it knows how to do so. In § 185,
Congress found no difficulty in repeatedly and specifically
referring to and incorporating the provisions of § 153 into
the operation of the yet non-existent National Air Transport
Adjustment Board. One portion of § 185 provides:

[M]embers of the National Air Transport Adjustment
Board shall be compensated, hearings shall be held, find-
ings and awards made, stated, served and enforced, and
the number and compensation ‘of :any necessary assis-
tants shall: be determined.and the compensation of such
employees shall be paid, all in the same manner and to
thé same extent as provided with reference to the Na-
tional Railroad Adjustment Board by section 153 of this
title.

-45 U.S.C. $185. (Emphasis supplied). .

Furthermore, in recent amendments to § 153 Second, Con-
gress specifically provided that ‘compliance with awards of
the Railroad System Boards permitted by that section:

. shall be enforcible by proceedings in. the United
States district courts in the same manner and subject to
the same provisions that apply to proceedings for en-
forcement of compliance with awards of the [National
Railroad] Adjustment Board. :
45 U.S.C. § 153 Second (1964), as amended, (Supp. 11, 1965-
66). No such amendment was enacted with respect to Air-
line System Boards which have cont ‘actual status creating
“arising under” on “commerce” jurisdiction only by reason
of 28 U.S.C. $$ 13381 and 1337. International Ass'n of Ma-
chinists rv. Central Airlines, Ine., 372 U.S. 682 (1963).
In the original 1936 Air Carricr Amendments to the Rail-
“way Labor Act, Congress provided that $153 would apply
to the National Air Transport Adjustment Board only if it
were to be created. In 1966, Congress made §$ 158 applicable
to Railroad System Boards created by contract. Tt did not
choose to make $153 applicable to contractual Airline Nys-
tem Boards in spite of the fact that Gongress is manifestly
aware of its power to make specific provision for such ap-
plication.
These circumstances alone are sufficient to describe as de-
_ liberate, rather than inadvertent, the failure of the 1966 Con-

gress to apply $153 to Airline Svstem Boards. This coneln-

af: ye Na She albe DELAP SNRs ttc Ra Gad te Rabe Sao

ce | 13

‘ sion is further supported by sound reason and common sense.

Air carriers and their employees are required by § 184 to
establish Airline System Boards of Adjustment by contract.
The manner’ and method by which such boards operate, as
well as the obligations or rights attendant upon such opera-
tion, is left, with the exception that they must provide some
‘degree of finality for awards, to the negotiating capabilities
of the parties. If the parties to Airline System Board con-
tracts wish to agree to-pay attorneys’ fees or other costs of
Airline System Board proceedings or award enforcement,
they may, of course, do so. They. have not done so in the con-
tract now under consideration, except by agreeing. on ex-

‘ penses incurred at the System Board level.. Congress has

neither required nor authorized more.

Thus, petitioners are patently in error when they claim
that airlines and their employees are to have “precisely the
same remedies as were provided railroads and their em-
ployees.” They are also in error when they. contend that air-
lines and their employees are to be treated “identically to
railroads and their employees.” They are finally in error
when they state that the only difference between a contrac:
tual Airline System Board and the NATAB is one of perma-

.

nency or lack thereof.’®

"2. This Court Has Settled the Question of Applicability of § 153
to the Airlines in Internafional Ass'n of Machinists v. Central
- Airlines, 372 U.S. 682 (1963).

_ Though petitioners claim to have considered the provisions
of the Railway Labor Act “as a whole,” as well as their “his-
tory,” it is clear that ultimately the statutory provision upon

~which they must rely for an award of attorneys’ fees herein

is 45 U.S.C. § 153. No amount of discussion or rhetoric can

16See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, pp. 15-16.

~

14

obfuscate this central fact. * Thus, we still are left with the
question of whether that section is applicable to the airlines.
On the basis of the above statutory analysis, it is clear that
it is not. This conclusion also is ‘supported directly by this
Court's decision in International Ass'n of Machinists vr. Cen-
tral Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682 (1963). %s
Prior to Central. Airlines, the question of applicability of
§$ 158 to the airlines was first brought sharply into focus in
Metcalf v. National Airlines, Ine 271 F.2d 817 (Sth Cir.
1959). In Wetcalf, airline employees sought to enforce, in
federal court, awards of an Airline System Board which had
been established by their contract. The airline contended
that the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce that award, and
moved to dismiss. The motion was granted, the court ruling
against jurisdiction because $$ 181-182 of the Air Carrier
Amendments specifically excluded application of $153. to
airlines and restricted its impact to railroads. In holding
that $158 did not confer jurisdiction upon federal courts to
enforce an award of an Airline Svstem Board, the court con-
sidered the exact nature of the relationship between § 153
and air carriers:
Thus, the legislative scheme is complete. All the provi-
sions of the Railway Labor Act are adopted for the air
industry except section 153; instead of giving similar
relief to 153, special provision is made for adjustment of
labor disputes by svstem or regional boards with no
legislative determination as to their finality or as to
their being the basis of federal suit jurisdiction; but
all of the provisions of Section 153 are brought into
play, including the right granted in subsection (p) to
sue on an award in the federal district court, when and
if the National Mediation Board exercised the judgment

qxanted it in Section 185,
* * *%

We conclude that the legislative design of Congress is
clearly expressed. Such design is to grant to those win-

15

ning arbitration awards the right to sue on them in fed-
eral courts only when and if the Mediation Board creates
a National Air Transport Adjustment Board whose

award is ignored er not complied with by the carrier.

Then only does Section 1538 (p) become operative in the
air industry. ;

271 F.2d at 819, 820. (Emphasis supplied).
Two years after the Metcalf case, the Fifth Cireuit was
again faced with the issue of whether a federal court has

jurisdiction to enforce an award of an Airline System Board
extabfished pursuant to contract. International Ass’n of Ma-
chihists ve Central Airlines, Inc., 295 F.2d 209 (5th Cir.
196T

ployees in the Central Airlines case sought a jurisdictional

In view of the holding in Metcalf, the petitioning em-

hase other than § 153, and argued that federal court juris-

diction could be predicated upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337. -

These sections provide for federal court jurisdiction over
matters “arising under” a federal law or “a civil action or
proceeding arising under act of Congress regulating com-
merece” (commonly referred to as “arising under” and “com-
merce” jurisdiction). Nevertheless, the Fifth Cirenit reject-
ed the petitioners’ contentions and held that there was no
federal court inrisdiction’ under any statute over suits to
enforce the award of an Airline Svstem Board.!7

When petitioners requested review of the decision of the
Fifth Cirenit in Central Airlines, this Court was presented
with and took the opportunity: to dispel the confusion sur-
rounding the applicability of § 153 to the airline industry.
International Ass'n of Machinists vr. Central Airlines, Ine.,

372 TS. 682 (1963). In reviewing the decision of the court

>

™Both this decision and the Metcalf case were later cited by a federal district
court in Missouri in holding that federal court jurisdiction to enforce the
award of an Airline System Board could not be predicated either upon § 153
or upon §§ 1331 and 1337. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc., 203 F.Supp. 458 (W.D. Mo. 1962).

er

16

below, this Court clearly held that air carriers are not cov-
ered by $153. This Court reasoned that the aim of the 19%6
Air Carrier Amendments:

_ was to extend to air carriers and their employees
the same benefits and Obligations avilable and applic:
able in the railroad industry. But there was to be a sig-
nificant variation. The 1936 amendments made applic-
able to the airlines all of the provisions of the Railway
Labor Act, ercepting $3, 45 U.S.C. $158, dealing with
the National Railroad Adjustment Board. .

232 US. at 685. (Emphasis supplied). This Court concluded,
therefore, that federal court jurisdiction over such actions
could not be predicated upon the provisions of 45 U.S.C.
$153 First (p). But it also rejected the conclusion of the
Fifth Cirenit that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction on
any other statutory basis to enforce the awards of contrac-
tnally created Airline System Roards. This Court held in
Central Airlines that although the provisions of $153 are
inapplicable to matters arising out of contracts establishing
‘Airline System Boards, the federal courts do have jurisdic-
‘tion, nonetheless, to enforce the awards, based on “arising
under”. jurisdiction (28 U.S.C, £1331) or on “commerce”
jurisdiction (28 U.S.C, £1337). 372 ULS. at 696.

The force of the Vetealf ease is in no way diminished by
this Court’s decision in Central Airlines, since this Court did
adopt the position of Metcalf that federal jurisdiction is not
conferred by $153. It went on to find jurisdiction existed
pursnant to 28 U.S.C, €£$ 1331 and 1337. ence, $155 pro-
vides no subject matter jurisdiction to the federal courts in
Airline cases, while providing the only statutory authority
for the award of attorneys’ fees in Railroad cases.

In view of the express holding of this Court in Central
Airlines, the conclusion is inescapable that the provisions of

€ 153 are not applicable to the air carriers, that that seetion

17

does not authorize enforcement of awards of contract ally
created Airline System Boards, and that-federal jurisdiction
to enforce awards of Airline Boards is on a parity with other
federally cognizable contract, actions in which there is also
io statutory basis for awarding attorneys’. fees.” Thus, re-
spondent submits that the question raised in the petition for
certiorari herein already has been settled.

,

il. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION DOES NOT CONFLICT
WITH THE DECISIONS OF OTHER COURTS OF APPEAL,
EITHER AS TO THE QUESTION OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES OR
THAT OF THE BASIS FOR FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION

‘Petitioners cite authorities which they claim support the
proposition that § 153 applies fo’ dwards of Airline System
Toards, and, therefore, that the Fighth Circuit decision re-
fusing to apply the provision. of $153 First (p) concerning
attorneys’ fees is in conflict with those decisions.’ No such
“conflict” exists, upon proper scrutiny of those authorities.

In pre-Central Airlines decisions, cited by petitioners, in-
volving Airline System Boards, the courts failed to analyze
the language of §§ 184 and 185 closely, and this resulted in

considerable confusion as to the applicability of § 153. to air

\18In a recent Fifth Circuit case, osen v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 400 F.2d
462 (5th Cir. 1968), two flight attendants had sought review of the Air-
line System Board decision denying them relief. The court noted that they
were not entitled to judicial, review, and with respect to the airline’s argu-
ment that the employees failed to state a cause of action under 45 U.S.C.
§ 153 the court commented that, “[I]t is novel since this section is not ap- .
plicable to airlines.” In doing so, the court cited the Central Airlines case
as well as 45 U.S.C. §§ 18D, 182 and 154.

19Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, pp. 18-19.

~

18

carriers.’ In none of those cases did the parties raise, nor
did the court expressly rule upon, the specific question of
whether § 153 was. applicable to Airline System Boards
established pursuant to £184. When this exact question tras
‘aised before the Fifth Cirenit in Metcalf and this Court in
Central Airlines, the confusion Was eliminated by clear rl-
ings that § 153 was not applicable to airlines. Thus, the ma-
jority of the cases cited by petitioners are of no precedential
value.

Aside from the above pre-Central Airlines authority, peti-
tioners cite three courts of appeal decisions which they claim
custain their position.”" Again, however, close examination
of these decisions reveals no such support. None of the three
cases contains any holding regarding the applicability of
¢ 153 to the airlines.” Furthermore, none of the three cases,

even “by implication,” deals with anything more than the

20Flight Engineers Int'l Ass’n v. American Airlines, Inc., 303 F.2d 5 (5th Cir.
1962); Arnold v. United Air Lines, Inc., 296 F.2d 191 (7th Cir. 1961):
Woolley v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 250 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. de-
nied, 356 U.S. 931 (1958); Sigfred v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
230 F.2d 13% (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 925 (1956); Edwards v-
Capitol Airlines, Inc., 176 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 885
(1949); Bates v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 171 F.Supp. 973 (D. Minn.
1959); Crusen v. United Air Lines, Inc., 141 F.Supp. 347 (D. Colo. ), aff'd.
939 F.2d 863 (10th Cir. 1956); Farris v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 115 F.Supp. ,
907 (W.D. Wash. 1953); International Union, UAW v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc. 83 F.Supp. 63 (N.D. Ga. 1919). ;

2! Transport Workers Union of America v. American Airlines, Inc., 415 F.2d :
746 (10th Cir. 1969); Kelley v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 389 F.2d 478
(5th Cir. 1967); Capitol - Airways, Inc. “v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int'l,
341 F.2d 288 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 952 (1965).

°

22In the Transport Workers case, the only issue facing the court was one of
election and exhaustion of administrative remedies by the union. In the
Kelley case, the issue was whether the federal district court had properly
dismissed an employee's action for damages for unlawful discharge where
the system board had found that the employee had submitted a proper
letter of resignation. In the Capitol Airways case, a minor procedural ques-
tion was involved, and the court stated that such questions are to be deter-
mined by the system heard, not by a federal district court on review.

19

finality requirement; none of them mentions attorneys’
fees. ; 7

Finally, petitioner's cite certain district court authorities
in alleged support of the proposition that there is a conflict
in the decisions regarding applicability of § 153 to airlines.”*
Two circuit courts of appeal, the Fifth Cireuit in Metcalf
and the Eighth Cireuit in the instant case, as well as this
Court in Central Airlines, have directly ruled that § 153
Goes not apply. We know of no courts of appeal which have
ruled otherwise. This ample authority disposes of the dis-
trict court decisions relied upon by petitioners. Moreover,
the district court decisions, again, involve primarily the
finality requirement (and in the Gordon case, the statute of
limitations question ), not an award of attorneys’ fees. To
the extent that those cases seem to find § 153 to be applicable
to airlines, they are simply wrong. |

Petitioners claim further “conflict” between the Eighth
Cireuit’s decision in the instant case and. the Tenth Circuit's
decision in the Transport Workers case on the matter of the »
bases for federal court jurisdiction.’ In its recent decision
in the instant case, the Eighth Circuit properly cérrected its”
initial decision, and noted that federal court jurifdiction is
based upon 28 U.S.C. $§ 1331 and 1337, not on 45 USC.
§ 153. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l vr. Northwest Airlines,
Ine, 415 F.2d 493, 498 (Sth Cir, 1969). In the Transport
Workers case, the Tenth Circuit noted that the jurisdiction
in the complaint was based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1337
snd 45 U.S.C. § 184, no mention being made of 45 U.S.C.

¢ 153 in this context. Thus, we fail to see any conflict what-

23Thorgeirssoh v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 288. F.Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y.
1968 ); Dominguez yv. National Airlines, ‘Inc., 279 F.Supp. 392 (S.D:N.Y.
1968); Gordon v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 268 F.Supp. 210 (W.D. Va.
1967); Hyland v. United Air Lines, Inc., 254 F.Supp. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1966).

24Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, pp. 26-28.

S,
.

20 | i

soever. And we certainly do not agree that the language .
quoted by petitioners “directly conflicts” with the Eighth
Cireuit’s comments concerning federal court jurisdiction.””

We submit that there is no conflict in the decisions of the
circuit courts, nor any, others, which necessitates resolution
by this Court. It is equally clear that the Kighth Circuit's
decision herein and this Court’s decision in Central Airlines

are in complete accord,

lll. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION IN NO WAY CON-
FLICTS WITH THE DECISION OF THIS COURT IN CENTRAL
AIRLINES, BUT RATHER IS REQUIRED BY THAT DECISION

As a last resort, petitioners seem to contend that this
Court should grant review because the decision of the Eighth
Circuit is in conflict with that of this Court in Central Air-
lines.2® We agree that, in order to accommodate the “statu-
tory scheme,” Congress provided, for the mandatory” estab-
lishment of Airline System Boards of Adjustment, pending
determination of the necessity for a National Air Transport
Adjustment Board which would be governed by the terms of
45 U.S.C. £185. Indeed, Congress intended no hiatus in the
field of airline industry labor relations, and that was the
basis for this Court’s holding in International Ass'n of Ma-
chinists r. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682 (1963), that
federal courts do have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. $$ 1331
and\ 1337 to enforce the awards of the mandatory Airline
System Boards.

Petitioners somehow conclude from this Court’s Central.

Airlines’ comment that Airline System Board awards prob-

25See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, pp. 26-27. The language quoted. there
appears in the prefatory remarks in the Tenth Circuit’s opinion. There was
no issue or holding as to jurisdictional bases, since the action was brought
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337.

26Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, pp. 22-26.

21

fim”

ably are to be given “some degree” of finality, that all of the
provisions of § 153, including that authorizing a federal
court to award attorneys’ fees, are applicable to this proceed-
ing. We find nothing in the Lae Airlines decision which
supports such a conclusion.**

Nor do we find anything in Central Airlines which con-
flicts with the Eighth Circuit’s comments concerning federal
jurisdiction, a still more remarkable contention made by
petitioners.?®> .As pointed out in detail earlier in our Brief,”°
it was expressly held in Metcalf that 45 U.S.C. § 153 does
not provide jurisdiction for a federal court to enforce an
award of an Airline System Board. International Ass’n of
WVachinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682 (1963),
expressly recognized that § 153 does not apply to airlines,
but -held that the general jurisdictional provisions of 28
U.S.C. §$ 1331 and 1337 do confer jurisdiction upon federal
courts to enforce awards of Airline System Boards. —

The language of this Court quoted from Central Airlines
at p. 16 of our Brief is a clear and unambiguous statement
that $153 does not apply to Airline System Boards. And
certainly this Court would not have reasoned, as it did, to
find a jurisdictional base in other statutory provisions if it
had considered that Metcalf was wrong and that § 153 did
in fact provide jurisdiction. In view of these circumstances,
we submit that petitioners misread this Court’s decision in
Central Airlines in contending that. §$ 1331 and 1337 are
not. the exclusive bases of federal court jurisdiction to en-

27Petitioners imagine a myriad of drastic problems if attorneys’ fees are not
allowed in this froceeding. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, p. 25. Here
we remind the Court that the parties can avoid all of these alleged prob-
lems simply by including a provision for payment of attorneys’ fees in their
§ 184 contract. See Part 1.A., supra, pp. 6 to 8.

28Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, p. 24.0. 20.
29See Part I.B.2, supra, pp. 13 to 17. ;

9°
aad

force Airline System Board icaians Only if the Righth
Circuit ruled otherwise herein would there be a conflict be-
tween its decision and Central Airlines. As it is, the Eighth
Circuit has brought itself into perfect accord with this Court
on the issue of the proper bases for federal court jurisdic-
tion. We submit that nothing in the decision of the Fighth
Circuit violates the teachings of Central Airlines, and that
review by this Court is unnecessary to establish this oh-

vious point.

-

30Even assuming, arguendo, that § 153 also does ‘provide jurisdiction, it does
not “logically follow,” as claimed at p. 29 of the Petition for a Writ of Cer-
tiorari, that the portion of § 153 concerning attorneys’ fees also applies.
The Eighth Circuit met this contention head on with the following language,
quoted by petitioners themselves in their statement of the case:

In any event, a finding of jurisdiction under § 153 would not solve
petitioners’ problem on the attorney fee issue. Forty-five U.S.C.A.,
§ 184, creates authority on the part of contracting parties to confer on
the System Board of Adjustment jurisdiction not exceeding that of a
§ 153 board, but it does not demand that jurisdiction be equal to that
of a §153 board. The parties by their contract creating the board
made no provision for attorneys’ fees, and we find nothing in the stat-
utes which required them to do so. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 415 F.2d 493, 498 (8th Cir. 1969).

a cS (Cun gas Ene Sy WOR eae JOR

: 23
CONCLUSION

The question presented here does not involve an important
question of gederal law, since it may be resolved by the par-
ties simply by negotiating an amendment to their contract ;
and it already has been settled by Congress and by this
Court. Furthermore, the decision of the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals in this case does not conflict with decisions
of other courts of appeal; and that decision in no way con-
flicts with that of this Court in International Ass’n of Ma-
chinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682 (1968), but
rather is required by that decision. Therefore,.we submit
that this Court should deny the petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari. ;

Respectfully submitted,

- Henry HALLADAY
2400 Figst National Bank Bldg.
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402
Attorney for Respondent
Dorsey, MARQUART, WINDHORST, WEST & HALLADAY
JOHN M. MASON and
DaAvip A. RANHEIM
2400 First National Bank Bldg.
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402

Of Counsel

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385604_1262%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
