# Respondent Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari — PSG Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Respondent Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1970
- **Citation:** 397 U.S. 918

## Text

LY

, Office-Supreme Court, US.
WIBKAN Y : FILED

SUPREME COURT, U. S.

JAN 24 1970

JOHN F | DAVIS, CLERK
gn the ~

Supreme Court
of the Wnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1969

No. 996

PSG Co., a corporation, and PHILIP S, GREENBERG,
Petitioners,

Vv.

MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC.,
Respondent.

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI be

KING, MILLER, ANDERSON, NASH & YERKE
NORMAN J. WIENER ‘

1200 American Bank Building
Portland, Oregon 97205
Telephone: 226-2431

Attorneys for Respondent.

DAILY JOURNAL OF COMMERCE

INDEX” 7

} Page
Table of Cases and Authorities er Fs eS
Statement of the Case ... «eee a

Ae 2m the Triai Court «ss «>» 1
B. In the Court of Appeals. . 4

ATSGUMONT «2 6 0 6 he ee te te 8s 5
: é f r

A. , Greenberg's fpetition seeks

‘ to ob¥ain further review of
aqwéstion of fact .... 5

B.” The decisions of the two
courts below are correct . 13

C. The trial court's order
striking Greenberg's claim
for exemplary damages does
not present a ground for
ROVOSORS 68 Fe eo ce ee ED

D. The trial court correctly
denied Greenberg's motion
to amend the pleadings to.
add a new and unrelated
Cause Of AGtiON .. «6 «-« » 29

SONTAG R 8S ae OS we eS ee

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

Cases

Baumer v. Franklin County Distilling
Co. (6th Cir 1943) 135 F2d 384 cert.
Mees See OE F803 6 see kk

Berenyi v. Immigration Service
(1967) 385 US 630,17 L ed 2d
eg ea Se eS So A

Camilla Cotton Oil Co. v. Spencer
Kellogg and Sons (5th Cir 1958)
257 F2da 162 e e e * e e e e e@o @ © e

Classic Bowl, Inc., v. AMF
Pinspotters, Inc. (7th Cir 1968)
403 F2da 463 e o oe o a e e a > o e e

DeCicco v. Uniroyal, Inc.
(D. Or. 1968) 293 F Supp 1190 ...

Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., v.

Linde Air Prod. Co. (1949)

S20 We 27a; 9S bed 672

(adhered to on rehearin ’ ‘

wan Ue Oly Oe ts OO L007. ok ck kl

Houston Oil Co. v. Goodrich
(1918) 245 US 440, 62 L ea 385. ‘e *

James Wood General Trading
Establishment v. Coe (2nd Cir
eewal ae? See G51, 688 . . 3 cc.

Martin v. Cambas (1930)
oe Oe Sees eee COL. 6k swe oe x

ii

Page

Mercury Cleaning Systems v. °
Manitowoc Eng. Corp. (7th Cir
1958) 255 F2d 318 Bes ee ie kw ee a

Polar Steamship Corp. v.
Inland Overseas S. Corp.
(4th Cir/1943) 136 F2d 835
cert. denied, Sa IO FTE a6 Ses 9

Portsmouth Baseball Core. Vv.
Frick (SDNY EOO8) Sh RRO SLE So ea Oe

Putnam v. Lower (9th Cir 1956)
sie PEO OER ye el yh Sore etre a tn ee 9

Siaith v. Abel et al (1957)
ks US Ob) SAO Pa Oo sg se es 18

Suehle v. Markem Machine eee
Company (ED Pa. 1965) 38 FRD 69 .. 21

Terre Haute Brewing Co. v.
Dwyer (8th Cir 1940) 116 F2d 239... 9

Washington Sand & Gravel Co. v.
Brann & Stuart Co. (3d Cir 1947)
Eee ee eR SO gr og kg ME ee boy 9

Weaver v. Austin (1948)
184 Or 586, 200 P2da-593 ee ae ee a eee eee SL

Western Rebuilders, Inc. my

Felmley (1964) 237 or pe Gai’ oc 2

ooo Pea Ol, 319. 920 363 5°. 3 Pie pian A
Other Authority

15 USC, Section 13 (c) ee ke eae Te Paha:

Rules of the Supreme Goure of
the United States, Rule 19 .... a6

133

‘is AGIA ARG): ANU eee a a Ria LIE

I

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent ("Merrill Lynch")
deems the statement of the case by peti-
tioners ("Greenberg") to be inaccurate
‘and incomplete and the brief of Greenberg
to improperly argue the merits, tater
than to present the legal questions as
required when seeking ‘a writ of certiorari
from this court. Merrill Lynch is com-
pelled, therefore, to make the following

statement:

A. -In the Trial Court

This is an action for breach of
an alleged contract to accept ‘Greenberg's
orders to purchase or sell commodity

futures contracts, on margin, up to a

maximum of 300 "open" contracts. (R. 61,
62)1 erecnbers cleian that by reason of
Merrill Lynch's refusal to accept orders
for new transactions, he was prevented
from making profits on the transactions,
and that Merrill Lynch's conduct in termin-
ating the agreement was such as to entitle
him to recover exemplary damages. (R. 62)
Nineteen months after the action
had been filed, and 1iteig wore than a
month before the date set for trial,
Greenberg moved to amend his complaint to
assert alleged violations of the Robinson-
. Patman Act, 15 USC, See. l3{e)}. - ths.450)
At the same time, Greenberg filed numerous
and complex interrogatories directed at

such issues.. (R. 437-449)

1. At this late stage, it should be
clear that this is an action for breach
of an express contract, and not for vague
"wrongs committed" on commodity futures
transactions, as Greenberg states in his
petition. (Greenberg's Petition, p. 3)

- 2-

The trial court denied Greenberg's
eres to. amend on the ground that the new :
claim Greenberg sought to include by amend-
ment would greatly complicate the issues,
that it constituted a separate claim not
related to the issues to be tried, that
Greenberg proposed to initiate extensive
discovery on the new claim at a late stage
in the course of the proceedings, and that
the late amendment and discovery proceed-
ings would require a postponement of trial,
which in turn would require postponement
ae enor major case already scheduled
| for trial in which Greenberg was a
defendant. (Pretrial Tr. 26-28, 46-48)

At trial, the court granted
Merrill Lynch's motion to dismiss on the
ground that there had been no probative
evidences adduced of breach of any agree-
ment, and further that the evidence of
damages based on loss of future profits
was plitpiy apeculative. f.

- 3-

B. In the Court of Appeals

As Merrill Lynch reads the
decision, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial
court's ruling that Merrill Lynch had no
continuing obligation to act as broker for
Greenberg in the purchase of new commodity
contracts not already held in his margin
account, but ruled that Merrill Lynch had
an obligation to act as broker in the dis-
posal or "liquidation" of contracts pres-
ently held in Greenberg's account. However,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial.
court's ruling that the evidence that
Greenberg had suffered any, damage was
speculative and insufficient to require
submission of the case to the jury, in
that there was no evidence introduced to
show that Greenberg actually lost profits
or that liquidation of his contracts
resulted in a loss. The Court of Appeals

0 ie«

refused rehearing on a petition Sccan
solely to the question whether the damages
Greenberg had sought to recover were specu-
lative.
Il
ARGUMENT
CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT ISSUE IN THIS

CASE BECAUSE THERE ARE NO A

SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

A. Greenberg's petition seeks to
obtain further review of a question of fact.

A review of a decision of a
court of appeals on writ of certiorari
will be granted only where the petitioner
shows that there are important questions —
of law presented, involving a conflict Te
between the decision of the court of
appeals and this court, or other circuit

courts of appeal.

Rule 19, Rules of the Supreme Court
of the United States

"1. A review on writ of
certiorari is not a matter of
right, but of sound judicial

- 5 -

discretion, and will be granted
only where there are special and
important reasons therefor. The
following, while neither control-
ling nor fully measuring the
court's discretion, indicate the
Character of reasons which will
be considered:

Veee

"(b) Where a court of
appeals has rendered a decision
in conflict with the decision of
another court of appeals on the
same matter; or has decided an
important state cr territorial
question in a way in conflict
with applicable state or terri-
torial law; or has decided an
important question of federal
law which has\not been; but should
be, settled by this court; or
has decided a federal question
in a way in conflict with appli-
cable decisions of this court;
or has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judi-
cial proceedings, or so far sanc-
tioned such a departure by a lower
court, as to call for an exercise -
of this court's power of supervi-
sion."

Greenberg's petition presents
no issue within the guidelines of Rule 19
for consideration by this court. The trial
court ruled that the evidence Greenberg

- 6 -

presented in support of his claim for
damages for lost profits was speculative
and insufficient to raise a question for
the jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed
on that ground, and denied a petition for
rehearing on that issue.

This court, as a court of law
rather than a court for the correction of
errors in fact finding, will not undertake
to review concurrent findings of fact by
two courts. below in the absence of a very
obvious and exceptional showing of error.

Graver Tank & Mfg. Co.*v.

Linde Air Prod. Co. (1949)

336 US 271, 93 L ed 672

(adhered to on rehearing,
339 US 605, 94 L ed salelily

Berenyi v. Immigration- .
Service (1967) 385 US 630,
17 L ed 2nd 656, 661

For the same reason, this court
will not undertake to review concurrent.
rulings by the two courts below that ea
evidence was insufficient to present a He
jury question. ) |

+ ere, | - 7 -

Houston Oil Co. v.
ae Goodrich (1918)
245 US 440, 62°'L ed 385
Greenberg argues in his petition
that the Court of Appeals decided a ques-
tion of law in conflict with decisions of
other federal courts. In furtherance of
the argument, he cites one case from this
court and one case from each of the eleven
courts of appeal wherein it was held, under
the fact situation presented in the par-
' ticular case, that the evidence of damages
was not too speculative to prevent sub-
mission of the case to the jury. None of
the cases cited involve a claim for damages
for breach of a contract to plirchase or
sell stocks or commodities contracts.
Instead, they involve such diverse subject
matter as antitrust proceedings, claims:
for wrongful death, fraud and other tort
' claims. Further, none of the Shien Gitea

enunciate a rule of law different from that

' (—- Qo

relied upon by the two courts below in this

case, but simply hold that, under the parti-
cular facts presented, the evidence was not

too speculative.

The fallacy in the argument that
the eesiei oe in this case is in conflict
with the decisions of other federal courts
on a point of law is pointed up by the
fact that cases can be found from each
dircuit holding that, under phe evidence
presented in the particular case, there |

was insufficient evidence to require sub-

mission of. the case to the jury.” Thus,

2. See, e.g., James Wood General
Trading Establishment v. Coe (2d Cir 1961)
297 F2d 651; Washington Sand & Gravel Co.
v. Brann & Stuart Co. (3d Cir 1947) 162
F2d 826; Polar Steamship Corp. v. Inland
Overseas S. Corp. (4th Cir 1943) 136 F2d
835, cert. denied, 320 US 774; Camilla
Cotton Oil Co. v. Spencer Kellogg and
“Sons (5th Cir 1958) 257 F2d 162; Baumer v.
Franklin County Distilling Co. (6th Cir
1943) 135 F2d 384, cert. denied, 320 US
. 750; Classic Bowl, Inc. v. A M F Pinspot-
ters, Inc. (7th Cir 1968) 403 F2d 463;

_ Terre Haute -Brewing Co. v. Dwyer (8th Cir
1940) 116 F2d 239; Putnam v. Lower (9th

' Cir 1956) 236 F2d 561. For another recent

Oregon decision, see DeCicco v. Uniroyal,

Inc. (D.Or.1968) 293 F Supp 1190.

oa

it is clear that waethes the Suidencs of
damages is too speculative to require sub-
mission of the case to the jury is a ques-
tion of sufficiency of the evidence to be
determined in each individual case.

| Among the decisions from other
courts of appeal holding that evidence of
damages was too speculative is

James Wood General Trading Establishment
v. Coe (2d Cir. 1961) 297 F2d 651

which is relied on, among other authorities,
by the Court of Appeals in the instant

case.3 In the James Wood case, a customer

brought an action against stockbrokers for
alleged breach of contract to sell a

particular stock when the price went above
$58 per share. On the question of damages,

the court remarked (p. 658):

3. Greenberg had relied on the trial
court's decision in the James Wood case in
his briefs. in the Court of Appeals, but had
neglected to inform the Court of Appeals
that the case had been reversed on appeal.
The Court of Appeals pointed this matter.
out in footnote 9 of its Opinion.

- 10 -

\ ey

"However, even assuming Moretti
had forgotten the instructions as
given, and that he exercised no.-
discretion ‘whatever, it #s difficult
to find in this record any evidence
of damage. What proof can there be ~
that, if Moretti had not forgotten
the instructions, he would have sdld
the stock on July 25 or 26, 1957, at
598 1/8 or any other price? How can
such a conclusion be arrived at
other than by the merest guesswork
and speculation? The plain fact is
that, in the circumstances of this
case there is and can be no evidence
of any probative value to support
a finding that he would have sold.

-On the contrary, there is substan-

tial evidence to support an infer-
ence that he would not have sold the
B &-O at the prices prevailing in
the market on July 25 and 26, 1957.

"Damages cannot be based on
Speculation. The difficulty of
measuring and appraising the amount,
once it is clear that actual damage
has been sustained, is another
matter. Where, as here, the exis-
tence of any damage whatever would
have to be a matter of guesswork,
no recovery is allowed (citations
omitted).

"Where actual damage depends on
an exercise of discretion, and there
is no evidence from which it can
reasonably be determined how such
discretion would be exercised, no
damages are recoverable: (citations
omitted) ."

- ll -

The law of Oregon also is to the
effect that damages cannot be based on™
‘speculation.

Weaver v. Austin (1948)
464 Or 586, GOL, 200 P2d 5393

Western Rebuilders, Inc. v.

Felmley (1964) 237 Or 191,

203, 386 P2d 8143, 391 P2d' 363

In summary, a writ of certiorari
should not issue in this case, because the
question presented for consideration is
the correctness of the trial court's ruling
on a question of sufficiency of evidence,
and not a question of law. That ruling
was sr) eed on appeal and on petition for
rehearing. Chie soees has had his day: in
Baga and the Court of nopenie: which is
the court designed to review allegations
of error:as to determinations of fact, has
upheld the trial court. This court's time

should not be taken up with further argu-

ments as to the sufficiency of the Sawer «

o

he is

B. The decisions of the two.
courts below are correct.

The question presented by
Greenberg's Serielon for writ of certiorari ’
is whether there was sufficient evidence
to require submission of this case to the
Sey Apart from the question whether
the case involves \legal issues of a kind
this court should teview, it is clear that
the two lower courts\ were correct.
Greenberg asserts that in com-

\
- \

% - ?
modity futures transactions, where because

a.)

of market action the value of the conttacte
held by the broker for a Suseonce increases
over Margin requirements, the. excess may
be withdrawn by the customer; thee. had
Merrill Lynch accepted Greenberg's orders,
the value of the contracts at a given date
selacted by Greenberg would have exceeded
the required margin; and that the excess
toaek* Greenberg was "entitled to withdraw"
from his accounts edasti tuted prerits

- 13-

Greenberg lost when Merril] Lynch refused
to accept his orders.

The error in Greenberg's argument
is apparent when all the facts concerning
obligations between broker and customer are
considered. A broker's customer is entitled
to withdraw money from his account when it
becomes “overmargined" by appreciation of
the value of the contracts. He is also
required, however, to put up or pay to the

broker additional money when his account

is "undermargined." Because the market
fluctuates constantly, it is impossible to
determine wether a profit or loss Kas
ultimately been-made on the purchase of a
commodity contract until the. contract has
been disposed of and it has been determined
Wate cues Withdrawals exceeded
amounts required to maintain margin. Thus,
until the transaction has been completely

closed out by sale of the commodity con-

ea tog

tract, the question whether its purchase
~would have been profitable is necessarily
based on speculation. There cai be no
"profit" on a transaction until a final
Sale is made, and Greenberg did not claim
he would have sold the contracts in ques-
tion on the date chosen for valuation. If
Greenberg had not made a,sale or disposal
of the contract, of course, the temporary
paper profit never would have been. realized,
and if not realized by a sale woult have
disappeared immediately as the market |
began to swing against Greenbeke. The
fact is, as the court below noted. Green-
berg arbitrarily selected the one day on’
which the Geevaeie showed a paper appre-
ciation as the date to "value" the con-
tracts. (Tr. 270) Valuation on other
dates would have shown a loss.

| ‘In this connection it is important
to note that there was no evidence that

/

See &- aa

joo

ee

. Greenberg would have suffered any loss if

he had later actually replaced his orders
for the same contracts with his new broker,
sisusignentad there was no’ evidence that the con-
tracts were not available at the same orices
at a later date. _In fant. Greenberg could
have purchased the same contracts through
his new broker ne a more favorable price,
because, as mentioned above, the market
immediately turned and dropped below the
prices at which he claimed he should have
been able to purchase the contracts through
Merrill Lynch. (Ex. 180)

Damages for lost profits are
ordinarily shown by evidence of profitable
past operations.

Mercury, Cleaning Systems v.

Manitowo¢ Eng. Corp.

(7th Cir 1958) 255 F2d 318
In the instant case, Greenberg had steadily
lost money, and could not provide such evi-

dence. The new theory of damages he sought

- -16.°

to aesext in pldce of evidence of profitable
operation was without rational or factual
justification, nie the two courts below
properly held that the case should not be
submitted to a jury.

C. The trial court's order
striking Greenberg's claim for exemplary —

damages does not present a ground for
reversal. .

a
During the course of trial, the

court withdrew Greenberg's claim for exem-
plary damages from the case.
| The trial court believed that

there was no’ evidence presented or to be
presented in this case of malicious con-
duct attending the alleged breach of con-
tract which could provide a basis for an
award of exemplary damages. (Tr. 107-
113)

The court's ruling was based on
Oregon law that exemplary damages may not

be awarded for breach of contract. See,

- 17 -

-~@ “4 . t
>

AT Hs 8

Weaver, v. Austin

(1948) 184 Or 586,

200 P2d 593

Smith v. Abel et al

(2957) 211 Or: 571,

316: P2d 793

The Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's ruling on the ground
that Oregon law requires that there be an
award of actual damages before exemplary
damages can be recovered, and exemplary
damages cannot constitute the basis for a
cause of action. See,

Martin v. Cambas =.

(1930) 130 Or 257,

293 P 601

Weaver v. Austin

(1948) 184 Or 586,

200 P2d 593

As Greenberg failed to prove any
actual damages, the issue as to exemplary
damages is moot.

In his argument in this court,
Greenberg concedes that it is the law in

Oregon that exemplary damages may not be

awarded whare there are no actual damages.

we: PO

As Greenberg'S claim for exemplary damages
presents no/ground for reversal, it need
not be co sidered by this court as ground
for review on petition for writ of cer-
tiorari.

D. The trial court correctly
denied oreenberg's motion to amend the
pieadings to add a new and unrelated

cause of action.

In August, 1967, 19 months after

the case had been filed and a little more

- than a month before the date set for trial,

Greenberg moved to amend his complaint to
assert alleged violations of the Robinson-
Patman Act, 15 USC, Sec. 13{c).. (Record
450) At the same time, Greenberg filed
numerous interrogatories. (Record 437-449)

The trial court denied the motion to amend,

for, the reasons stated at pages 2-3 of this

brief. .

The Court of Appeals affirmed the

action of the trial court on the ground
that it is not an abuse of discretion to

Ae.

Y

oe
3

S \ Pe

refuse a late motion to amend, where such
motion would introduce an entirely new
and different cause of action, involving
complicated legal and factual issues, and
require extensive discovery and prepara-
tion for trial.

The allowance of a motion to amend
is Ai eoretiGuary and the trial sere clearly
did not ee its discretion in this case.

In the cases. where the trial court's denial

of a motion ks amend ak been held to be

an abuse of discretion, the proposed amend-

ment merely stated an alternative theory,
based on the same operative facts, or added
some fact necessary to state a complete

cause of action. In most of the cases, the

_ complaint had been dismissed for failure

to state a claim 6n which relief could be

granted and the plaintifé would have been

out of court if the ieee had not been

allowed. Thus, the trial court's refusal

to allow an amendment to cure an imperfectly
- 20 - | |

— - Ee ne eT

stated claim where -a genuine claim exists
may legitimately be considered an abuse of
discretion and require reversal because the

plaintiff is left without remedy. None of

ean Cite ee oe

those circumstances are present in the
instant case, as the new amendment did not

seek to cure or add to the old claim, but’

IONE SR NRT BASE ~

,constituted a new and independent claim.

See,

*Suehle v. Markem Machine ; J
Company (ED Pa. 1965) :
38 FRD 69 ‘

i See CARR

Portsmouth Baseball Corp. v.
Frick (SDNY 1958) 21 FRD 318,

Even assuming, arguendo, that the
trial court erred in refusing to allow
Greenberg to amend, the error would not

‘have been prejudicial and would not consti-

tute a ground for reversal. In the instant

SINT TS MELE TI AL OTIS ER me ho

case, Greenberg's new.claim involved an

Ventirely new set of Operative facts: and a

ee PSR Gregorio sy Sea

new theory of law. The new Claim conse-

quently could be asserted in an independent

- 21-

OS FS RR Ars RT SOAR BIEN

action, and could not. be. barred by the trial
court's refusal to allow amendment, as the
“ teial court's decision on the original
claim would have no res judicata effect.
As the new Robinson-Patman “Act claim did
not affect the merits of the original
Soneedee claim, the trial csuvets decision
on the merits of the contract claim cannot
be reversed and remanded to the trial court. .
Further, it is not necessary to reverse and
remand this case to the trial court for
determination of the Robinson-Patman claim
alone, because Greenberg has always been =
able to assert that claim by commencing
oa new action. Thus, Greenberg has not been
injured in any way by the trial court's
denial of the motion to amend. a
As a side issue, Greenberg con- z
‘tends that Merrill Lynch resisted dtsenvary

proceedings so extraordinarily that

Greenberg could have raised the new issues

Dy ee

_ of certiorari should be denied, in that:

cat

sooner. (Greenberg's petition: pages a
ee a This argument was urged at both the
trial court. level and on appeal, and'was
not found to have any. basis in fact.
| | "y III:
CONCLUSION.
ua Merrill Lynch respect fully sub-

mits that Greenberg's petition’ for writ

SER PERRIER RARER tye oem

POE aye

bi , Greenberg’ Ss. petition eo

a review of. the decisions of the two

courts below on an issue of fact, not law,
and this court, as a court of law, will not
undertake to review concurrent findings of

fact by the two courts below’.

26 Greenberg's argument with

CEL ER pa ROR EAE poy a ad oe aS ~

respect to exemplary ‘damages and denial of

oe x ee

motion to amend does not present any
ground for reversal.

Respectfully submitted,

KING, MILLER, ANDERSON, NASH & YERKE

Norman J. Wiener

: 1200 American Bank Building
Portland, Oregon 97205
Attorneys for Respondent
‘
=

TUOMALA” So Re sla DIB SARL?

---

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