# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Craig v. United States > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385604_1151%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari - **Published:** January 1, 1969 - **Citation:** 396 U.S. 987 ## Text PREME COURT.0& ~~ | | Toros I/O | Supreme Court of the United |States atiaeote ; ELIZABETH ELAINE CRAIG, et al., he \ “i : -} °,e ~ 3 6 Petitioner, US. es THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et. al., at, , Respondent. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States _____ Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. PETER J. HUGHES, © 2550 Fifth Avenue, Suite 515, San Diego, Calif. 92103, Counsel for. Petitioner. epleey usin Wa ter P. CHRISTENSEN, 2550 Fifth Avenue, “ _ Suite 515; ae San Diego, Calif. 92103, Of Counsel. eee kes: . ‘a Parker & Son, Inc., Law Printers, Los Angeles. 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Del Guercio, 241 F.2d 480 ccccssseee eee Vv. Ritz, 382 F. 2d a Rules ° Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15(c) saa inisisatiicalsepajulsiancaeia aula amineate y a a Se 7, Statutes ‘United States Code Annotated, Title 28, Sec. 1254 OD) cictiienntadtenbemedinnibnacias United. States Code Annotated, Title 46, ‘Mice 761- ates a AR nea eRe INS 2 4 United States Code Acie’: ~~ 46, See, 763 .... aa -/ _ IN THE Supreme Court of the United States rae . October Term, 1969 " a “aici | 7 i ; 4 . ELIZABETH ELAINE CRAIG, et al.,.° | | Petitioner, US. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ét. al., : Respowudent. - Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. - Petitioner prays -that a ‘Writ of Certiorari issue to review the Judgment of the United States. Court of * Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entered on — 24, 1969. . Opinions Below. “The opinion of the District Court for the Southern District of California is réported at 284 Fed. Supp. 697. ' The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reported PERE | Fe. prmenee J urisdiction. The Judgment of the Court of Appeals for, the Ninth - Circuit was made and entered -on June 24, 1969 and a copy thereof is appended to this petition in the Ap- pendix at pp. ........ OE cds The opinion of the District “Court is appended to this petition in the Appendix at.pp. Sap castes The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked un- der 28 U.S.C.A. Section 1254 (1)... \ oo —“‘i‘_OS— ae oi a,' ¥ ’ y bad Questions Presented. In a suit under the Death of the High Seas Act, . 46 U.S. C.A..Sections 761-768, which was based upon - | _ Admiralty’ law; the.amother on her behalf, and upon the behalf of her six surviving children’ sought recovery, for damages, for the death of her husband ‘in an air- plane. crash aboard the aircraft carrier U.S.S. ‘CON- STELLATION. The action was timely filed within the two years required by 46 U.S.C,A. Section 763 against several named defendants and “Does I through. X”’. When petitioner sought to serve Litton Systems, Inc., as Doe I after the running of.the statute of lim- itations the District Court refused to allow the, aménd- ‘ment: (1) to substitute Litton Systems, ‘Inc.,‘as Doe | I; or (2) _to allow the amendment adding Litton Sys- tems, Inc., to relate back to the time of filing the action, or (3) to allow Litton Systems, Inc., to be brought in ~ -as a party after the running of the statute ‘of limitations as a new party defendant.’ The “Court of Appeals af- firmed.and so the questions presented are: : ‘1. Whether the us¢ of a fictitiously named defend- ‘ant in an Admiralty action where jurisdiction is not , predicated upon diversity of citizenship is proper? 2. . Whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ‘Rule 15(c) ‘pre-empt an Admiralty Court from estab- lishing rules: of procedure to see: that justice. is* done, between the parties? | 3.. Must the Federal Rules of, Civil Procedure be narrowly construed when a _queStion is presented that is not covered nor contemplated bythe rules? - ° 1Tt is of interest to note ‘that Litton Systems, Inc. has been a party to companion litigation arising out of the accident brought by a seaman named Sevits [R. pp. 40 and 54] and is also attempt-. ‘ing to be dismissed out and not defend .or the merits. o Statutes, Federal Rules, and Regulations Involved. _ The pertinent portions of 46 U.S. C/A. Sections 761- . 768 and Rule 15(c) of the~Federal ‘Rules’ of Civil - Procedure are set forth i in the Appendix at PP-.. sckcaae to. 3 Statement.’ : This action arises from the death of a pilot. in’ ; crash of his aircraft aboard the U.S.S. CONSTELLA- TION off thé'coast of Okinawa on Augiist 19, 1963 [R. pp. 4.and 5]. The:complaint namés as defendants “the United States of America, Timken Roller. Bearing Company, Aluminum Company ‘of. ‘America, | Bethlehem. | Steel Corporation McKiernan-Terry Corporation, and ‘Does I through X [R. p. 2]. The thrust of the com- plaint is for negligence on the part of the. defendants in the manufacture of thé arresting gear: resulting” i in: a defect proximately causing the ‘crash of the aircraft . ; [R. pp. 2 and 3- 5]. A eent exe yy _ In the body of the complairit there is‘an: ‘pSlega tio in Paragraph number III [R. p- 3] as.follows toe “The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate-or otherwise, -of respondents, Does I through X, are unknown to libellant, who 3 therefore; sues said responddnts by such fictitious _names. Libellant is informed and believes and ‘there- on alleges that each ‘of the respondents, herein designated as a Doe is responsible in some man-_ ner for the events and happenings herein referred _to and caused. injuries and damages proximately thereby as hereinafter alleged.’ ** e - There is in addition to the shite 5 ilegation a charg- ing clause specifically alleging that Does I through X did carelessly, ‘and ‘negligently construct, design, engi- neer, fabricate, manufacture, equip, supply and main- wy. -4 « tain the arresting gear assembly on board the U.S.S. CONSTELLATION [R. p.. 5]. Libellant candidly al- leged that she was in doubt as to which of the re- spondents. was negligent and requested leave of Court to prove which one or ones were responsible at the time of trial [R. p. 5]. - Jurisdiction in the Federal District Court was based upon the Death on the High Seas Act, Title 46 U.S.C.A. Sections 761 to 768 [R. p. 2] and the complaint was filed on August 16, 1965 within two years of the date of death [R. p. 2]. | ) » An alias citation was issued on February 24, 1966 and Litton Systems, Inc., was served as Doe I on February 28,7 1966 [R. ‘pp. 12 and 13]. Litton Sys- tems, Inc., appeared specially and expected to’ the alias citation. The District Court ‘requested: that petitioner make a motion wnder Rule 15(c) to permit the naming of defendants by fictitious name; to permit the amend- ment to the libel by adding Litton Systems, Inc., as a "ns as of the, date of service-of the alias Summons; . _ and to permit the adding of Littofi Systems, Inc., as _ of the date of the motion, This motion was filed on November 16, 1966 [R. pp. 31 and 32] and was set for hearing on November 28, 1966. “Exceptions were filed by Litton Systems, Inc., and the District Court ° _ entered its order denying petitioner the right to amend on May 31, 1967 which order was filed on June 2 1967 [R. pp. 91 and 93}. The memorandum decision acknowledged that there was scant authority for the use of fictitiously named defendants in admiralty relying upon Phillips v. U.S., N.D. Cal. 1955, 127 Fed. Supp. 912 and then went on to hold that Rule 15(c)»of the Federal Rules of Civil ’ / an rr —5— . PF tH Procedure required a showing of netice of the institu- tion of the action within the statutory period of a de- fendant [R. pp--91-93]. Petitioner appealed to the _ United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court acknowledged that‘there was no provision in. the Fed- eral Statutes or Ft) of Civil Procedure au- -thorizing or prohibiting’ the use of fictitious parties and indicated that. at least in “diversity” cases (emphasis _added) the Court had expressed disapproval citing Tole-. free v. Ritz, 9 Cir., 382 F.2d 566, 567 and Sigurdson v. el Guercio, 9 Cir,, 241 F. 2d 480. So far.as admiral- ’ ty rules and procedure are concerned the Court alluded to the traditional liberality arid indicated that Phillips v. United States, N.D. Cal., 127 Fed. Supp. 912 permitted such a practice. Some doubt was expressed concerning the practfe in admiralty by citing California Stevedore & Ballast Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 9 Cir., 291 F. 2d 252, 253. This left the Court undecided as to whether such a practice in admiralty was or was not permissible. The Court then went on to say that Rule 15(c) is the only rule that can be used in any case, whether civil or in admiralty; and, since no provision is e for fictitiously named defendants petitioner must within a construction of the ‘provisions of Rule 15(c)\ to bring in any additional parties. Under the: facts as. viewed by the Court Litton Systems, Inc., had no notice _ of the action within the period of limitations and therefere could not be brought into the case after the expiration of the statutory period, pursuant to the rule d language contained in arabic numeral one of Rule (c). REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT. The’ decision below should be reviewed because it encroaches upon the power of an Admiralty Court to _ regulate proceedings in order to administer substantial justice between the parties. At the present time an ad- miralty. claimant is urged ‘to forum shop ‘within the Federal District Courts to find a Court that is favorable to his position. Had petitioner herein filed her action in - the Northerni District of California where the Phillips case cited supra was decided, fictitiously named defend- ants could be sued and rought into the case under the running of the statute of limitations. and Litton Sys- tems, Inc., would now be a defendant. The prior body of admiralty law as layed down by admiralty courts will be emasculated and it is necessary to have the ques- tion settled as to whether or not admiralty rules are still in addition to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “especially the body of judge made law that has existed for many years ip this area. t is admitted by the District Court and the Circuit Court that there is no provision in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that permit or exclude the use of fictitiously named defendants. They also admit that such a practice is permitted in admiralty by the Phillips case cited supra. The Circuit Court erroneously takes the po- sition that they have expressed some doubt as to this practice in the California Stevedore case cited supra. This opinion clearly holds that when fictitious named ~ defendants are dismissed in admiralty the action may be re-instated after ‘the running of the statute of limi- tations, this is contrary to the opinion in the Circuit — below. Perea hia 4 seo a It should be decided once and for all whether or not fictitiously named defendants may be sued in admiralty matters. If they cannot then a decision so stating should be handed down and this petition will provide a’ settle- ment of the question. If they cam then amendments to show the true names when ascertained should be al- lowed. Petitioner as the surviving widow of a deceased pilot | who was killed aboard a first line fighting ship of “the. U.S. Navy cannot be requited.to discover (emphasis added) the names of all the manufacturers, and succes- sors im interest thereto, of the vessel And ‘its parts, within the‘statutory period of limitations. To so hold is a complete refusal to consider the practical aspects of litigation, especially one that could be as complicated.as the present one. Under the decision of the ‘Court below the statute of limitations is changed into a statute of discovery. If a defendant is not discovered within the limitation period he cannot be sued. Petitioner’s hands were tied by the Court’s require- - ‘ment that Rule 15(&> be adhered to in making her mo- ‘tion when it is obvious that the situation presented is not within the purview of the rule nor was it ever - considered by the promulgators of the rule. The advisory committee never considered the use of a party by way of fictitious names avhen they set up the new require-- ments for Rule 15(c) in 1966. It is apparent that they - were considering technical defenses in actions against the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare in the notice requirements due to changes in the name of the Secretary. Rule 15(c) was. forced upon petitioner as the only vehicle for amendment since no provision was * made in the Rules for fictitiously named parties. Under 9 . tO pe Sat FR HY Ui SBS Bai. es Nh ECE DR Late, Ewe Soe PD Oe er A scale 55 nls ‘the construction of Rule 15(c) in order to bring in a new party it must be shown that he knew of the institution of the action against him. With the naming of a defendant fictitiously such a procedure would be ia impossible. No one could be shown to have notice of a law suit unless he was. specifically named in it: Peti- tioner should not be forced into using a rule that it is impossible to comply with. The case at bench will result in a hardship because petitioner has been deprived of the liberality of admiralty and has been forced to ac- cept an impossible position under a non-applicable rule. ~ Conclusion. Q Petitioner recognizes that this Court is reluctant to enter into questions of procedure that they are best. left . to the Circuit.Courts but it is submitted that the Fed- eral Rules of Civil Procedure and the judge made: Ad- miralty rules should be used for decisions on the merits and not on the basis of technicalities. One should not ; exclude the other. Rule 1 specifically provides that they are to be construed to secure the just, speedy, and in- expensive determination of every action. The applica- tion of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure to an admiralty proposition has created a serious question to the validity of traditional admiralty concepts. It is respectfully requested that this petition for a Writ of Certiorari be granted. - PETER J. HUGHEs, Counsel for Petitioner. \ WALTER P. CHRISTENSEN, Of Counsel. . De ect Rah { - | APPENDIX. Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals © _ for the Ninth Circuit. | In the United. States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. sates? Elizabeth Elaine Craig, Acvsiehstratrie of the Estate ” of Robert J. Craig, Appellant, v. The United States of America, Timken Roller Bearing Company, a corpo- ration; Aluminum Company of America, a corporation; Bethlehem Steel Corporation, a corporation; McKiernan- ‘Terry Corporation, a corperation; and ee I through X, Appellees. No. 22319. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. Before: HAMLEY and DUNIWAY, Circuit Judges, and BYRNE, District Judge* i HAMLEY, Circuit Judge: Elizabeth U.aine Craig, Administratrix of the Estate - ‘of Robert J. Craig, filed-this wrongful death action on August 16, 1965. She alleged that, on August 19, 1963,. Robert J. Craig was killed on the high seas off Okinawa while attempting to land his military airplane on the ‘aircraft carrier the U.S.S. CONSTELLATION. Ac- cording to the complaint, the accident was caused by. the _ negligence of the defendants resulting in defects in the arresting equipment of the vessel.- District court juris- _ , diction was based on the Death on the High Seas Act, 3 ioe US. S$ 761-768 (1964). *The Honorable William M. Byrne, Senior United’ States | District Judge for the Central District of California, — by ° designation. @ » « ee Ay - J. DN OP ae eee ee PS aT we Bai My 6 oh ks Shree ip dite ar. ake} Pan ‘eet & The defendants named in the complaint were the United States, Timken Roller Bearing Company, Alumi- num Company of America, Bethlehem, Steel Corpora- tion, McKiernan-Terry Corporation, ind “Does I through X.” Plaintiff caused service of an alias citation and a copy.of the complaint to be made \upon Litton Systems, Inc. (Litton) as “Doe I,” on February 28, 1966. Litton appeared specially, ake that the alias citation was issued prematurely and that Litton had not properly been brought before the court. -The ‘court ordered plaintiff to serve and file a motion for leave to amend the complaint to place Litton before the court) postponing argument on Litton’s exceptions until argument was had on the motion to amend. The motion was thereafter filed and served. Following argu- ment on the motion and exceptions, the court denied plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint by naming « Litton in substitution of “Doe I.” Plaintiff appeals. ° The limitations -period for. actions filed under the ., Death on the High Seas Act is two years from the date of the wrongful act. 46 U.S.C. § 763. Accordingly, the statute of limitations had run with regard to this action by. August 19, 1965. As indicated above, the alias citation and a copy of the complaint? were served upon * Litton on February 23, 1966. The district court held that the two-year statute of limitations bars plaintiff’s claim against Litton unless, applying the: principles stated in Rule 15(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the proposed amendment of the complaint, adding Litton as an additional party, re- lates back to the date of the original complaint. The district court further held that, applying those principles Ns SI lh aS” ARAL Sl a PA thts kU a a ee a —j— to the circumstances of the case, plaintiff’s said - amended complaint did not relate back. Plaintiff argues that, regardless of Rule 15(c), i ‘an action is timely with respect to a sateen defendant, it is not barred as to an actual defendant named in lieu of the fictitious defendant im an amend- ed complaint filed after the statute has run. _ There is no provision in the federal statutes or Fed- -eral Rules of Civil Procedure either authorizing or ex- pressly prohibiting the use of fictitious parties. How- ever, this court has at least twice expressed disapproval of the practice. In Tolefree.y. ‘Ritz, 9 Cir., 382 F.2d 566, 567, a civil rights action, we held that it was proper to dismiss the action as to fictitious defendants. In _ Sigurdson v. Del Guercio, 9 Cir., 241 F.2d 480, an action for a declaratory judgment and to enjoin certain action by immigration officers, this court said: “These John Doe complaints are dangerous at any time. It is inviting disaster to. allow them to be filed and to‘allow fictitious persons to remain de- fendants if the complaint is still of record. Ap-- | propriate action has been taken by the trial court . on its own motion ‘in some such cases. Although the “fact that the Rules. of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A,, contain no express prohibition upon. ‘the subject, ehere is no authority of which we are aware for the’ joining of fictitious defendants in | an action under a federal statute. These defendants" should have been: eliminated by motion of Del Guercio. . . .” (241 F.2d at 482, footnote omitted)? In diversity actions the difficulties. encountered when fic- titious parties are named have been dealt with a number of times. (This footnote is continued on the next page) \ - amended rules shall govern all, This is an action in admiralty, and one district court has expressed approval-of the practice of naming fic- titious defendants -in an admiralty suit, in view of the traditional liberality as to pleadings in admiralty. Phil- lips v. United States, N.D. Cal., 127 F.Supp. 912. On the other hand, this court has expressed doubt concern: . ing the practice even in admiralty suits. See C alifornia \ Stevedore & Ballast Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. ‘Corp., 91 F.2d 252, 253. The only purpose the naming of fictitious Abeta .. could possibly serve is to make it possible to substitute named defendants after the statute of liniitations has run. But Rule 15(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides the only way in which defendants, not accurate- fy named in a pleading before the -limitation period has run, may be accurately named afterwards. That rule, which pertains to the relation back of the pleadings, makes. no mention of the pleading of fictitious parties. It is therefore wholly immaterial, insofar as the applica- ' tion of that rule is concerned,-whether fictitious de- fendants were named prior to the oe of Bc stat- ute.” . See Sykes v. United States, 9 Cit, 290 at d-555, 556; Grigg v. Southern Pacific Co., 9 Cir., 246 F.2d 613, 620; Molnar v. N.B.C., 9 Gir., 231 F.2d 684, 687 ; Roth: v. Davis, 9 ii 231 F.2d 681, 683. - : 2While there are some kinds of civil proceedings i in which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply, the rules do apply — = “in suits in admiralty with exceptions not’ here relevant. See Rules 1 and 81(a)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as . ; , amended in 1966. ‘This action was ‘commenced on August 16, 1965, prior to the effective date of amended Rule 15 (c). The order of the Supreme Court, dated February 28, 1966, promulgating the 1966 amend-_ ments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that the _ er preceedings in actions the amended rules “. . . except pending on the effective dat z pen It may be, although this is ‘not entirely clear, that plaintiff*is also arguing that under-Rule 15(c) and apart from the naming of fictitious defendants in. the original complaint, ‘the amended complaint naming Lit- ton-for the first time relates back to the date of the original pleading. . Under Rule 15(c), an amended complaint “changing” the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back to the date of the 6riginal pleading only if all three of- . the following conditio ~~ are met: (1) the claim asserted in the amended plea ing arose out of the conduct, trans- , action, or occurrence’ set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original ‘pleading; (2) within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him, the party to be brought in by amendment has received such “notice of the institution of ‘the action” that he — will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense. on _ the merits; and (3) within the period provided by law for commerteing the action against him,. the party to be brought ig knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against . him.® to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application in a particular action then pending would not be feasible ‘or - would work injustice, in which event the former procedure ap- plies.”. The Supreme Court order is quoted in 28 U.S.C.A., Rules 59 to End, Cum.Ann. Pocket Part, page 231, followirig Rule 86. In our opinion, the application of the amended form of that rule is’ feasible and would not work an injustice in this case. Neither party here questions the applicability of Rule 15(c) as amended in 1966, and in fact, plaintiff. relies upon ‘the amended ing the action against ther Assuming Litton ass Inc. did: know of the oc- _ currence, it still had a right to rely on the two year ‘statute of limitations in 46 U.S.C.A. 763. It is one ' thing to know of an occurrence which may give rise to a lawsuit, another to know you are being sued. Libel- lant has failed to carry its burden. of showing that =. Litton Systems, . Inc. had n¢tice of the institution of the action within the period provided by law for commenc- ing the action against it. Con quently, the_motion seek- i ing to add Litton Systems, c. aS a respondent by amending the complaint must be denied. | SO ORDERED. | Jesse W. Curtis ny. ra) Chief United States District ‘ice : or, iY - ; ‘ ¢ oo a Pertinent Portions of 46 U.S.C.A. Sections 761-768. § 761. Right of Action; Where and by Whom Brought. Whenever the death of ‘a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high - seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United States, the personal rep- resentative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the district courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive benefit of the decedent’s wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative against the vessel, person, or corporation which would have been liable if death had not*ensued. Mar. 30, aoe, c. 111, § 1, 41 Stat. 537. § 762. \ See and Apportionment of Recovery, The recovery in such suit shall be a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit is brought and shall be apportioned among them by the court in proportion to the loss they may severally have suffered by reason of thé death of the person by whose representative the suit is brought. Mar. 30, 1920, c. 111, § 2, 41 Stat. 537. § 763. Limitations. Se Suit shall be begun within’ “two years from the date of such wrongful act, rieglect, or default, unless during ° _ that period there has noté been reasonable opportunity for securing jurisdiction of the vessel, person, or cor- poration sought to be charged; ‘but after the expiration of such period of two years: the right of action hereby given shall not be deemed to have lapsed until ninety days after a reasonable opportunity. to secure jurisdic-- na PEL Oe oe LUPINE Zo ay ws WIP wee > ~ one Silene tion has offered. Mar. 30, 1920, c. 111, '§ 3, 41 Stat. 537. § 764. Rights of Action Given by Laws of Foreign | ‘Countries. a Wherever a right of action is granted bythe law of any foreign State on account of death by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring upon the high seas, such | ‘right may ‘be maintained in an appropriate action in admiralty in the courts of the United States without abatement in respect to the amount for which recovery is authorized, any statute of the United States to the contrary notwithstanding. Mar. 30, 1920, c. 111, § 4, 41 Stat. 537. § 765. Death of Plaintiff Pending Action. If a person die as the result of such wrongful act, neglect, or default as is mentioned in section 761 of this title during the pendency in a court of admiralty of the United States of a suit to recover damages for per- sonal injuries in respect of such act, neglect, or default, the personal representative of the decedent may be sub- - stituted as a-party ‘and the suit may proceed as a suit under this chapter for the recovery of the_compensa- tion provided in : section 762 of this title. Mar. 30, 1920, c. iit, § 5, 41 Stat. 537. § 766. Contributory Negligence. In suits under this chapter the fact that the decedent has been guilty of cofitributory negligence shall not bar recovery, but, the court shall take into consideration the degree of negligence attributablesto the decedent ° and reduce the recovery secpancieey Mar. 30, 1920, Cc. 111, § 6, 41 Stat. 537, ‘ eG 4 wks eA = of : —15—- § 767. Exceptions From Operation of Chapter. The provisions of any State statute giving ‘or regu- ting rights of action or remedies for death shall not be\affected by this chapter. Nor shall this chapter apply . to the Great Lakes or to any waters, within the ter- ritorial limits of any State, or to any navigable waters - in the Panama Canal Zone. Mar. 30, 1920, c. 111, —. § 7, 41 Stat. 538. \ 1 = Sap ox nee ; Fd : Pertinent Portions of Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.. : Rule 15. Amended and Supplemental Pleadings. KOK OK OK OK OK OK OK (c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever. the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the’ original pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided a by law for commencing the action against him, the party | to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institiition of the action that he will not : : be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a ’ mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the ' action would have been brought against him. (ae The delivery or mailing ‘of process to the United States’ Attorney, .or.his designee, or the Attorney Gen- eralof thé United States or an agency or officer who | tris would have been a proper defendant if named, satisfies —s ., —16— the pentiiveenend: of clauses (1). and (2) hereof with : respect to the United States or any agency or officer thereof to- be brought into the action as a defendant: (d) Supplemental Pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable -notice and upon such ‘terms as are just, permit him to ‘serve a supplemental | pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences’ or events which have happened since the date of the plead- ing sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the — court deems it advisable that the adverse party plead to . the supplemental pleading, it shall so order, specifying the time therefor. As amended Jan. 21, 1963, eff. July 1, 1963; Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966. _— nt) --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385604_1151%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.