# Amicus Curiae Brief — Feaster v. United States > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385604_1129%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1969 - **Citation:** 396 U.S. 962 ## Text Supreme Court of the United States, cx OCTOBER TERM, 1969 : . * No. 558 EP PAE RO ET OP OES aii ‘HOUSTON H. FEASTER, individually and as Director, | Alabama State Docks Department, and the dione, OF ALABAMA, Petitioners, ae ; versus | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and WARREN S. LANE, as Mediator, National Mediation Board, A Substantial Federal Question Is Presented Which- Shows The Necessity For Uniform Application Of Railway Labor Legislation. Pursuant To A Deter- mination By The Interstate Commerce Commission. State ports authorities generally, as have Petitioners in this case, treated their railroad employees performing 4y railroad work as being covered by various statutes relating to railway labor such as the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151, First (see Pet., App. F); the Railroad Retirement Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. 3231 (a), (g) (see Pet., App. J); the Railroad Retirement Act, 45 U.S.C. 228a(a) (see Pet., App. K); the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C. 351 (a), (b), (c); (see Pet., App. L); and the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 1(3)(a) (see Pet., App. I). This treats these employees as part of the “‘a state within a state (which) has its own customs and its own vocabulary and lives according to rules of its own making.” California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, at 565 (1957). Because divergent rule: Conversely, simple operation by a subsidiary of rail tacilities should not be the sole factor de- termining ‘‘carrier”’ status of all activities carried on by the parent organization. Cf. Brief of Solicitor General of the United States as Amicus Curiae, in Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners -: of America, 324 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. den. 376 U.S. 964. : Further, the state ports authorities are subject to reg- - ulation by the Federal Maritime ‘Commission. The juris- diction of this Commission may easily overlap and conflict with the claimed jurisdiction of the N.M.B. or the Inter- state Commerce Commission. Some determination must be made of the jurisdictional claims, for it is clear that the “jurisdiction | of the I.C.C. ceases where that of another fed- ‘eral agency begins. Alabama Great Southern Ry. Co. v. Federal Maritime Commission, 379 F.2d 100 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Swift & Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 216 (1942). The NM. B. recognizes the jurisdictional limits of the L.C.C., once determined, as the limits of its jurisdiction. Union | Stockyard and Transit Company of Chicago, Cases Nos. ae C-2073, 3 N.M.B. 149 (1953), 3 N.M.B. 156 (1953). _ The L.C.C. and.the F.M.C. have even jointly determined their respective jurisdictions in the past. Interchange of Freight at Boston Piers, 253 I.C.C. 703 (1942); Interchange of Freight at Boston Terminals, 2 U.S.M.C. 671 (1942). 7 \ | ony The consequences of diverse determinations is shown in the case of Petitioner. Thus the N.M.B. has determined Petitioner is a “carrier” and has asserted jurisdiction over Petitioner’s non-rail employees. This determination, while not com} letely endorsed by the court below, was found not to be ‘ “enor of the magna or summa quality” which could now be reviewed and the N.M.B. result was allowed to stand. United States v. Feaster, 410 F.2d 1354, at 1368- © 1372 (5th Cir. 1969) (see Pet., App. B). On the other hand, the same court has just determined in a subsequent case that the Alabama State Docks Department is not a common carrier under the Interstate Commerce Act. Central Stik- stof Verkoopkantoor, N.V. v. Alabama State Docks Depart- ment, .... F.2d .... (5th Cir., No. 24045, decided August 15, 1969). The I.C.C. has allowed state ports such as Peti- tioner to avail themselves of the rate adjustment complaint procedures of Section 3(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S. C. 3(1), see Alabama State Docks Department uv. Ala- . bama, Tennessee & Northern R. Co., 323 1.C.C. 185, while denying the same right to rail carriers, see Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co. v. Union Pacific R. Co., 287 I.C. C. 611, thus differentiating rail carriers from state maritime authorities. - Thus a substantial federal question of state-federal : relationships arises under the Railway Labor Act present- ° ing the question of federal control of a state’s employment and personnel policies. The substantial interests of the sev- eral states, which both parallel and oppose one another, re- quire a uniform code to govern the relationships of all states with all their port employees. This Court has recognized of- ten that there is a manifest need for uniformity in the appli- cation of federal labor laws, including railway labor legis- lation. International Assn. of Machinists v. Central Airlines, » Inc., 372 U.S. 682, 691-692 (1963), reh. den. 373 U.S. 947; Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Ala- bama, 353 U.S. 448, 456-457 (1957); Garner v. Teamsters, ‘ - Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, _at 490-491 (1953). This Court has this year reiterated this need for uniformity in regard to state regulation of railroads clearly subject to the Railway Labor Act. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., .... U.S. , 22 L.Ed.2d 344 (1969), reh. den. .... U.S. ..... This uniformity can be attained only by consideration and reso- lution of this question by the Interstate Commerce Com- - mission, the one tribunal whose’ determination, perhaps jointly made with other involved agencies; will settle all questions of jurisdiction and whose expertise to make the determination of ‘‘carrier’” and “employee” -status has been — recognized by the Congress and the Courts. i +45 U.S.C! 151, First, Fifth; Shields v. Utah-Idaho Cen- tral R. Co., 305 U.S..177 (1938); National Council of Railway Patrolmen’s Unions uv. Sealy, 152 F. 2d 500 (5th - Cir. — Such a determination wil] settle a substantial and deli- cate question of federal-state relationships, a considera- tion which looms as large in the interests of the Nation as | the delicate questions of international relations involved in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hon- duras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963). z A Substantial Federal Question Is Presented As To Whether Congress Intended The Railway Labor Act me To Apply To Non-Railroad Employees Of The Type | Here re ~ The correct approach to federal labor legislation is to ‘consider the legislative background of the statute and to "give it “a broad common-sense construction rather than a Narrow one, sounding in mere logomachy.” Allen v. Ocean S.S. Co. of Savannah, supra, 470.-The assertion of jurisdic” tion by the N.M.B. over the non-railroad employees of Pe- _ titioner has been based entirely upon a literal interpretation of Section 1, First of the Railway Labor Act, 45,.U.S.C. 151, First, and has been endorsed by the Court below on such a basis, see United States v. Feaster, supra, at 1368-1372. Yet this Court has consistently pointed out the dangers of a literal reading of federal labor legislation, noting that it is _ often the product of compromise between strong conflicting views and reiterating the warning of Holy Trinity Church .v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459, that “a thing maybe with- in the letter of the statute-and yet not within the statute, be- cause not within its spirit, nor within the intenfion of its ; : . 2 x > © + ¥. ; hes = Je makers.’ ”* See, National Woodwork Mfegrs. Assn. v. N.L.R.B., 386 U.S. 612, 619° (1967), reh. den. 387 U.S. 926, and cases there cited; Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., 389 U.S. 463, 468 (1968); Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, supra, 458. Such a literal approach ~ to the Railway Labor Act by the N.M.B, in its Case No. C-2202 was condemned by the Ninth Circuit-in Pan Amer- ican World Airways v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, supra, and by the Solicitor General | in his brief as amicus curiae on the petition for certiorari therein, and certiorari therein was denied by this Court. Yet this thoroughly discredited approach. to the complex questions of*national labor policy has again been success- fully (thus far) espoused, requiring that this Court grant certiorari to determine if such a literal approach is correct ° x S~] -inthiscase. ° ° * ' Turning to the legislative history of the current ‘Railway Labor Act, we find that in enacting the definition of a4 “carrier” in a form more expansive than predecessor def- initions, Congress appears to have had a “narrow focus” aimed at a specific character Df abuses and at a specific class. of ‘isolated evils’, Cf. N.L.R.B*v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local ..760, 377 U.S. 58, 63 (1964). The abuse sought to be corrected was the-use by railroads of _ subsidiary organizations which the railroads controlled to perform work that otherwise would have to be performed - by railroad employees and thus to escape application of . railway labor legislation to/ large groups of employees whose employment was, in’fact, under the control. of the railroads through their subsidiary shells. Sr, WV” 11 . So _ That this was the evil understood by Congress to be cor- rected is shown by the testimony of the sponsor and author of the Railway Labor Act, Joseph B. Eastman, the Federal Coordinator of Transportation, before the Senate, as con- tained in the Report of Hearings of the Senate Committee on — Interstate Commerce on S.3266, 73d Congress, Second Ses- — sion. In his original appearance, Mr. Eastman noted that ‘ the new “carrier” definition sought to cover such companies. as refrigeration car companies and structures and equip- ment maintenance companies which functioned as “‘an inte- gral part of the railway transportation system.” The defi- om then proposed incorporated into the term “carrier” companies who were “operating any equipment or facili-— ties or furnishing any service included within the defini- tion of the terms ‘railroad’ and ‘transportation’ as defined in the Interstate Commerce Act.” Ibid., 10-11. George M. Harrison, testifying on behalf of 21 railway labor unions, - stated their primary concern to be with broadening the Act to encompass “railroad owned and operated refrigerator car lines.” Ibid., 35. The railroads’ spokesman, M. W. Clement, objected to the scope of the definition as bringing under the Act companies which did not belong there. [bid., 56-59. Mr. Eastman then redrafted the definition of a “carrier” in the bill to read as it now reads in pertinent part. He testified that he had so drawn it to avoid “‘possible conflicts with N.R.A. Codes” which covered non-rail indus- tries and ‘“‘not to go beyond carriers and their subsidiaries engaged in transportation.” This narrowing of coverage to “railroad subsidiaries” was to avoid getting “into the outside field.”’ [bid., 145-146. Congres then passed the bill containing the definition as finally er by Mr. Eastman. < LESTER EAI T LE IE REMOTINS ALN NANTES SLAIN eh eaten ceca vr apt pct neoenanes omnes RELAIS MONT PIRES LOE "/ dacna 4. Bhd cas aokieae deer atealaae eae Thus it appears probable that Congress did not intend .that a company which was engaged primarily in another business should be treated as a “carrier’’ because it might own or control a small railroad, but rather that subsidiaries of railroad companies, performing work closely related to railroad transportation, should not escape coverage merely because of technically separate incorporation. The coverage was to flow down from a central controlling stream, not percolate upward from a minor spring. The literal approach - espoused by the N.M.B., in the case of the Authority, pre-~ sumably makes the status ‘of the eight employees of the Railroad Company contyol the status of nearly 500 employees of the Warehouses where the Railroad Company does not — and it is not able to control or manipulate the Ware- ouses or the Authority. The “tail wags the dog.” Such an absurd result does not appear intended by Congress nor does it evidence a rational approach to the complex prob- lem of the industrial relations of a maritime facility. This Court should not decline to decide the questions here presented, as did the court below, on the ground that the administrative processes have not yet been finally ex- hausted. Slavish deference to that essentially sound principle © will only result in an extensive period of uncertainty and multitudious litigation for the many state ports authorities over whom the N.M.B. now appears to be asserting juris- diction.: Such uncertainty may itself forment labor strife. It will upset delicate balances in federal state relationships which rank as high in national priority as the relationships of the Nation to.other nations. The exhaustion of the admin- istrative process will not preclude judicial review of the ul- timate question of whether the N.M.B. has acted in excess of its delegated authority. The court below found only an ab- 13 4 sence of error of sufficient magnitude to invoke its juris- diction, leaving open for later review the question of error itself. From the history of the present case, and the pend- ency of similar proceeding involving other state ports authorities, the conclusion is inescapable that this precise Question will ultimately be presented for determination. Additionally, there is no substantial interference with administrative discretion of decision making in now pro- ceeding to determine “‘carrier” status. This determination of status by the N.M.B., in the case of Petitioner, has been made and an election directed. Only the ministerial certi- fication of election results remains as part of the admin- istrative process. Thus this court may review and decide the “carrier” question at a time when it will enhance the administrative process rather than impede it. eer oe ’ * Ce ep) err ene ’ ° P acme 14 a CONCLUSION. S For the reasons shown, granting of a writ of certiorari by this honorable Court is clearly justified, and the petition for a writ of’certiorari should be granted to settle the sub- stantial federal questions involved. Respectfully submitted, *ARTHUR K. BOLTON, Attorhey General of the State of Georgia, 132 State Judicial Building, Atlanta, Georgia 30334. HAROLD N. HILL. JR.. Executive Assistant Attorney General. _ COURTNEY STANTON. ? _ Assistant Attorney General. \ | ERLE PHILLIPs. WILLIAM.W. ALEXANDER. JR.. 26 Pryor Street, N.E.. Atlanta, Georgia 30303. \ © ~ October. 1969 15 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. I, Erle Phillips, one of the attorneys -for the Georgia Ports Authority, amicus curiae herein, and a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, hereby certify that, on the .... day of October 1969, I served cop- ies of the foregoing Brief of the Georgia Ports Authority . as amicus curiae on the several parties thereto, as follows: On the United States and:on Warren S. Lane, as Medi- ator, National Mediation Board, by mailing a copy thereof in a duly addressed envelope with air mail postage prepaid to Charles S. Whitespunner, Esquire, United States Attorney for the Southern District of Alabama, at Room 311, Federal” Building, Mobile, Alabama, and by mailing a copy in.a duly addressed envelope with air mail postage prepaid to The Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C, 20530. | : “On Houston H. Feaster, individually and as Director Alabama State Docks Department, and on the State of Alabama by mailing a copy thereof in a duly addressed en- velope with air mail postage prepaid to Willis C. Darby, ~. Jr., Esquire, Post Office Box 2565, Mobile, Alabama 36601, and by mailing a copy thereof in a duly addressed en- velope with air mail postage prepaid to Hon. MacDonald Gallion, Attorney General of the State of Alabama, Mont- gomery, Alabama. = ERLE PHILLIPS} Attorney for Amicus Curiae, 26 Pryor Street, N. E., Atlanta, Georgia 30303. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385604_1129%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.