# Appendix — Bay Sound Transportation Co. v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1969
- **Citation:** 396 U.S. 928

## Text

, LIBRARY ae co
SUPREME COURT. U. & “AUG 25 1969

"JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK

wo _ 007"

IN THE

Supreme Cont af the Yorted States

October Term, 1909

BAY SOUND TRANSPORTATION CO., et al.,
Petitioners

| | moe, |
ween UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent

a

‘ADDENDUM TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Fifth Circuit

> | ‘Opinions of United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit and United States District Court

'(S.D. Tex.) aa

-_

aoe - JOHN A. BAILEY
— | , SUSMAN & BAILEY |
- 1721 Chamber of Commerce
Building
Houston, Texas 7 7002
Attorney for Petitioners

Alpha Low Brief Co, M&M Bldg., Houston, Texas 77002

C

Oe

4

INDEX

Opinion of United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit

| J udgment of United States Kis of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit:

Sher ae ee! gx CoE ge sat ky oh ar Lh cpt ae

: Order of United States Court of Appeals = the
Fifth Circuit Overruling Petition for Réhearing

Opinion of United States District Court for the .

Southern District of Texas ..

Se ee eel EG GO a Dh

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NO.

/ IN THR

pane Court of ra United States

October Térm, 1969

BAY SOUND TRANSPORTATION CO. et al.,
Petitioners

V.

ds

ADDENDUM To
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Fifth Circuit

Opinions of United States ‘Comme of Appeals for the

Fifth Circuit and United States District Court |
(S.D. Tex.)

oy

OPINION OF UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT :

Before GoLDBERG and Morean, Circuit Judges, and
Lies, District Judge. — .

-Moraan, Circuit Judge: These related income tax re-

fund actions were consolidated and tried*before the Dis-

- trict Court [67-2 ustc 99641] sitting without a jury. This —

— aoe the taxpayers is taken from portions of twenty-

Pd

UNITED: STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent §

2

six (26) judgments of the District Court. The three issues
presented to this Court are: . ad Z

1. Whether the taxpayers’ estimated useful lives
.of certain vessels were “reasonable” in claiming a
depreciation allowance. Section 167 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954.. a

* 2. Whether taxpayer C. W. Edwards is entitled
to deduct claimed business entertainment expenses in
the absence of any record evidence under Section
162 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

3>Whether the “principal” or “major” purpose for
the formation of multiple corporations was tax avoid-
ance. Sections 269 and 1551 of the Interfial Revenue
Code of 1954, ©

C. W. Edwards is the gas founder and still operates
to a large extent a number of partnerships and corpora-
tions engaged in the businéss of hauling crude oil and
distillate in the Louisiana and Texas coastal areas.

Edwards Transportation Company is the parent organi-
zation. It is a partnership set up in the early 1930's by
C. W. Edwards and another individual, now deceased.

In 1939, Edwards organized his first corporation, Barge

Transport .Company, for the benefit of his son, Keith
Edwards. From its inception, Barge Transport Company .
has conducted its business within the framework of the
entire Edwards organization. At the time of the trial in
the court below Edwards: was in his 70th year.

In 1955, it was decided that each newly acquired tow-
boat, pushboat, and barge should be owned and operated
by separate. corporations, Accordingly, by June, 1966,

the time of the trial below, nineteen separate business

/ \
%

\
5

organizations—one partnership and eighteen corporations
—each_owned one of-the- nineteen new vessels.

The Commissioner of InternalRevenue disallowed the

surtax exemptions of the corporate taxpayers under Sec- .

tion 269’ of the Internal Revenue ‘Code, contending ‘that

— >

1 Section 269, Internal Revenue Code of 1954:

SEC. 269. SANE aE TNS MADE- -TO EVADE OR AVOID °

INCOME TAX.

(a) In General. sictihicn

(1) any person or persons acquire, or acquired on or after October
8, 1940, directly or indirectly, control of a corporation, or

(2) any corporation acquires, or acquired on or after October 8,
1940, directly or indirectly, property of another corporation, not con-
trolled, directly or indirectly, immediately before such acquisition, by
such acquiring corporation or its stockholders, the basis of which’
property, in the hands, of the acquiring corporation, is determined
by reference to the basis in the hands of the transferor corporation;
and the principal purpose for which such acquisition was made is
evasion of avoidance of Federal income tax by securing the benefit
of a deduction, credit, or other allowance which such person or cor+
poration would not otherwise enjoy, then the Secretary or his delegate
may disallow such deduction, credit, or other allowance. For purposes
of paragraphs (1) and (2), control means the ownership of stock
possessing at least 50 percent of the total combined voting power of
all classes of stock entitled to vote or at least 50 percent. of the total
value of shares of all classes of stock of the corporation.

(b) Power of Secretary or His Delegate To Allow Deduction, etc.,

in Part.—In any case to which subsection (a) applies the Secretary

or his delegate is authorized—

(1) to allow as a deduction, credit, or allowance any part of any
amount disallowed by such subsection, if he determines that such
allowance will not result in the evasion or avoidance of Federal
income tax for which the acquisition was made; or

(2) to distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, and distrib-
ute, apportion, or allocate the deductions, credits, or allowances the
benefit of which was sought to be secured, between: or among the
corporations, or properties, or parts thereof, involved, and to allow
such deductions, credits, or allowances so distributed, apportion =y
or allocated, but to give effect to such allowance only to such exte
as he determines will not result in the evasion or avoidance of:
Federal income tax for which the thar gee was made; .or-

(3) to exercise his powers in under paragraph (1) and in
part under paragraph (2), ;

\ .

=:

4

the several corporations were formed for the “principal

purpose” of tax avoidance. Taxpayers contend that the

principal ‘purpose for creating multiple corporations was

to limit the liability of the Edwards enterprise. They al-

lege several other purposes for incorporating multiple bus-

“ inesses, and~assert-that tax considerations took a minor
role. | =

The District Court, following a non-jury trial of the
case, found that the entire enterprise should be treated
as a single business entity, rather than. as separate _cor-
porations. Although the Court did not specifically so state,
it bottomed its opinion of Section 1551 of the Code.”
It did not rely on Section 269, as was urged by the.
Commissioner.

* Section 1551, Internal Revenue Code of 1954: » }
SEC. 1551. [Prior to its amendment by the Revenue Act of 1964].
DISALLOWANCE OF SURTAX EXEMPTION AND ACCUMU-

LATED EARNINGS CREDIT. \

If any corporation transfers * * * all or part of its property (other
than money) to another corporation which was created for the pur-
pose of acquiring such property or was not actively engaged in busi-
ness at the time of such acquisition, and if. after such transfer the
transferor corporation or its stockholders, or both, are in control of
such transferee corporation during any part of the taxable year of
such transferee corporation, then such transferee corporation shall
not for such taxable year (except as may be otherwise determined
under section 269(b)) be allowed either the $25,000 exemption’ from
surtax provided ir section 11(c), or the * * * accumulated earnings
credit provided in * * * section 535(c), unless such transferee cor-
poration shall establish by the clear preponderance of the evidence
that the securing of such exemption or credit was not a major pur-
pose of such transfer. For purposes of this section, control means the
ownership. of stock possessing at least 80 percent of the total com-
bined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or at least
80 percent of the total value of shares of all classes of stock of the
corporation. In determining the ownership * * *, the ownership of
stock shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of section
544, except that constructive ownership under section 544(a)(2) shall
be determined only with respect to the individual’s spouse and minor _
children. * * * :

a
f

/ 5

In the late 1950’s and during the taxable years 1957
to 1960, the corporate taxpayers estimated the probable
useful lives of their newly built vessels for depreciation
purposes pursuant to Section 176(a) of the Code.*. The
criterion is that the estimation must be “reasonable.” The
taxpayers estimated the usefu) lives of the vessels to be
seven years. The Commissioner maintained at trial that
the barges had a useful life of twenty-five years, and the
tugboats thirty-five years. The Court below found that
the tugs had a useful life of twenty years, except that
the useful lives of four tugs was fifteen years. The Court
also found that the gbarges had a useful 4 of fifteen
years, :

Vinsdnses object vigorously that the Commi sioner and
the District Court errgd in gauging useful life on the
basis of depreciation history of those vessels which were
constructed prior to 1955. The lower court in fact fotind
that the taxpayers’ actual past experience was) to retire
few pre-1955 vessels from ‘service. \

Alternatively, taxpayers argue that the trial cout should
have applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel” because
of alleged statements by certain Internal Revenue agents

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to officials of the taxpayers shortly before 1957 that the .- -
useful lives of seven years would be a criterion acceptable ©

to the Internal Revenue Service. The Court gave little
weight to taxpayers’ proof on this point and held, in any

3 Section 167(a), Internal Revenue Code of 1954:

SEC. 167. DEPRECIATION. . \.

(a) General Rule.—There shall be allowed. as a depreciation: de-
duction a reasonable allowance for the, exhaustion, wear and tear
(including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence)

(1) or property used in the trade or business, or

(2) of property held for the production of income.

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12

4

The record fails t6 reveal that Mr. Edwards proved
even a portion of his expenses to be deductible. This fact
renders futile a court’s effort to determine that at least a ;

‘ given amount was actually spent or incurred as-an enter-
tainment expense. Mayrath v.-Commissioner [66-1 Ustc
99250], 357 F.2d 209, 214 (5 Cir., 1966). The rule in
Cohan: v. Commissioner [2 ustc 9489], 39 F.2d 540 -

3 (2 Cir., 1930), is inapposite under the circumstances ae

foe this case. pees San

‘On the multiple corporate: issue, although the District

’ Court did not specifically so hold, it is evident from read-
‘ing the lower Court’s memorandum opinion that the Court
relied on Section 1551 of the Code instead of Section
296(a), as was urged by the Commissioner in denying
the taxpayers’ separate surtax exemptions.

@

Section, 1551 is explicit in its requirement that the
transferor of property to the newly established transferee
corporate body must itself be a corporation. If the:trans-:

‘feror was not a corporation, then Section °1551—is-in-——_
applicable; The A issioner maintains that the trans- _
feror was 2 ree “Transport Company, a corporation; that
Transport Company which transferred the

rer acted vehicles to the new corporations. The
Commissioner urges that this Court hold that* such a
finding is implicit.in thé. lower Court’s memorandum
opinion, even though the: jlower Court did not make that
finding. jem

An examination. of the| entire oid has failed to reveal

any evidence that. Barge Transport Company, or any

_ other corporation, transferred the vesselssto the new cor-

porations so as to bring these various nn within
the purview of Section 1551.

>

ich Af the 18 cor-
pplies was acquired

The Commissioner contends tha
porations to which Section -1551
-in essentially the same manner. The
the vessel was made by C. W. Edwards; the vice-president
__ of the Barge Transport Company, the original corporxation,
after consulting with his son, Keith Edwards, the presi-

. dent, Jack Redding, the secretary and treasurer, of Barge

Transport Company, and others. While the vessel was
under construction, and about the time for delivery there-
of, financing of the cost would be arranged. After the

ion to cqnstruct ©

decision to construct each vessel was made, and the order _

therefor was placed with the company doing the construc-

tion- work, a new corporation was organized to receive ©

the vessel when completed. All property rights that existed _
in the vessel were acquired by, the new corporation, and -
when and as the vessel was completed and delivered the
new Corporation took title. Each corporation acquired
only one vessel: The above-summarized evidence is insuffi- .
‘cient, to support the conclusion that there was a transfer
of property from Barge oe Company to the. newly

acquired: ‘Corporations.

“The surtax’ Skemptions here in question were not -pro-
perly., disallowed under the provisions of Section 1551.
However, the Government contends that, if the Court does
not agree that the record will support no finding other .
than that tax avoidance was the principal purpose of the
__ transactions in question, the case should be remanded to
the District Court for additional findings as to the appli-
cability of Section 269. We agree that if Section 1551 is
not applicable that this Court should direct that the case
be remanded for the District Court to determine if Section
269 is applicable to these transactions and also to the

14
d

- Aransfers of the vessels CT&J and Toni Ann.*

As its title denotes, Section 269 is designed to Prevent
“acquisitions made to evade or avoid income tax.” How-
ever, the section is applicable only in certain carefully
’ circumscribed situations—it may be invoked only where
there has been an acquisition of control, the principal
purpose of which is eVdsion or avoidance of taxes.

Section 269 provides that if any person’ acquires control
of a corporation and the principal purpose of this acquisi-
tion is evasion of income taxes by ‘securing the benefit
of a deduction, credit, or other aliowance, which he would
hot otherwise enjoy, then the deduction credit or allow-
ance ma be'disallowed. The determination of the tax-
payer's. principal purpose in incorporation is a question
of fact that depends upon the intent of the taxpayer at
the time he acquires control of the corporation. See Air-
port Grove Corp. of Polk County, et al. v. United States
of America, 5 Cir., 1969 [69-1 ustc 49267] —F.2d —
[No. 25701, March 11, 1969]. The taxpayer ha’\the bur-
den of proving that control was not gcquired for the
unlawful purpose. American Pipe & Steel Cotp. v. Com-
missioner [57-1 UsTc. 19590), . 343 F.2d 125 (9 Cir.,
1957).

The District.Court did not make findings on theggues- ©
tion of taxpayers’ “principal purpose” under Section
269(a). The issue of “principal purpose” is one of fact.
For this Court to hold that the “principal purpose” of
these transactions was “evasion or avoidance of federal
income tax,” when the Court below failed to consider this

* These two vessels were transferred to Bay Sound Transportation
Company and Riverside Transportation Company from Louisiana

Transportation Company, - a partnership.
t a!)

}

15

matter, and when the facts might suggest a contrary con-
clusion under Section 269, would be wholly inappropriate.
In cases tried without a jury, Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure 52(a) directs the District Court to determine the
essential facts upon which it bases its judgment; where
the trial Court fails to do so, this Court cannot make such
findings of fact. S. S. Silberblatt, Inc. v. United States
ex rel. Lambert Corp., 353 F.2d 545, = (5 2
1965).

The findings and conclusions of the District Court are
AFFIRMED on the issues disallowing taxpayers’ claimed
depreciation and entertainment expenses.

We disagree with the disallowance of the surtax exemp-
tions under Section 1551 and REMAND the case to the
District Court to determine whethér or not the findings
of fact on the record are sufficient to disallow the exemp-
tions of the surtax under Section 269.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED and REMANDED
in part for furthe proceedings not inconsistent herewith.

ee :
CT.

16

Auited States Court of neta:

’ FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT -

October Term, 1968

| No. 25,729

D. C. Docket Nos. CA 63-H-73, 75 thru 99
& 66-H-462

BAY SOUND TRANSPORTATION CO PANY,
ET AL., Appellants,

versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appbllee.

°

Appeal from the United States District Court
‘for the Southern District. of Texas ie

Before GOLDBERG and MORGAN, Circuit Judges,
and LIEB, ced Judge. °
| ~'{/ JUDGMENT

This.causé came on.to be heard on the transcript of
the record from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, and was argued by counsel;

/

17 -

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now here
ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment
of the said District Court in this cause be, and the same
is hereby, affirmed in, part, and reversed and remanded
in part for further proceedings not inconsistent with the
opinion of this Court;

It is further ordered! that appellants be condemired to
pay one-half of the costs if this Court, and appellee be
' condemned to pay one-half of said costs.

igh April 30, 1969
Issued as Mandate: June 13, 1969 «

ORDER AMENDING JUDGMENT

It is now;hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED by this
Court that the prior judgment in the above-styled action,
dated April 30, 1969, be amended as to the assessment
of cogts as follows: Petereys =

The appellee is condemned tu pay one-half of the
costs to the extent expressly permitted by law, 28 U.S.C.A. _
§ 2412(a). (The 1966 amendment to this Statute not
being applicable in that this action was filed before
July 18, 1966, Allen v. Rachal, D.C. Tex., 1967, 283
F.Supp. 986). Appellant is condemned to pay all re-
maining costs.

18

IN THE

Yuited States Court of Appeals

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 25729

BAY SOUND TRANSPORTATION COMPANY,
ET AL., Appellants,
—

versus , %
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Texas ‘

(Filed May 30, 1969)
_ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

Before GOLDBERG and MORGAN, Circuit Judges, and ,
LIEB, District Judge. 6

PER CURIAM:

. IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing filed
in the above entitled and numbered cause be and the same
is hereby DENIED.

J

19

OPINION OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
_ (Filed August 30, 1967)
(Caption Omitted)
[9641] Bay Sound Transportation Co. v. United States
of America. Coastal Transportation Co. v. United States

of America. The Christine Towing Co. v. United States of —

America. Riverside Transportation Co. v. United States of
America. Murray Bay }ransportation Co. v. United States
of America. Dixon Bay Transportation Co. v. United States
of America. Green Bay Transportation Co. v. United States

of America. Erie Barge Co. v. United States of America.
Ev Barge Co. v. United States of America. Gulf Storage~
Company, Inc. v. United States of America. Lavaca Barge.

Co. v. United States of America. Naphtha Barge Co. v.
United States of America. Navidad Barge Co. v. United
States of America. Wolverine Barge Co. v. United States
of America. Huron Barge Co. v. United States of America.

Michigan Barge Co. v. United States of America. Superior |

Barge Co. v. United States of America. Ontario Barge Co.
v. United States of America. St. Clair Barge Co. v. United
States of America. Jack Barge Co. v. United States of
America. ©. W. Edwards & Letha C. Edwards v. United
States-of America. Keith S. Edwards & Mary Edwards v.
United States of America: John E. Redding & Violet Red-
ding v. United States of America. Everett L. Meley, Jr. &
Helen D. Meley v. United ’States of América. Maurice H.
Hoffman & Lurline M. Hoffman v. United States of Amer-
ica.. J. E. Redding, Trustee of the Shirley & Garland
Fielder Trust, & Garland W. Fielder v. United States of
America. William N. Blair & Glynn Blair v. United —
of America.

U. S. District Court, So. Disi. Tex., Houston Div.,

CA’s. 63-H-73, 63-H-75-63-H-99, 63-H-462, 8/30/67.

2

-4

o

WEBS O Seat
ae

id Vad eeeee

« OS. eeeee

‘
eeseeeevene

Everett L. & Helen D. Meley, Jr.. :
Maurice H. & Lurline M. Hoffman. .

J. E. Redding,

as .Trustee of the

“Shirley & Garland Fielder Trust &

Garland W. .Fielder-....

Total Amount in, Dispute :

¢
eeeereeeee

eeeese50e’s

Taxable
years ending

2-29-60

11-30-57/58/59

1-31-59/60 |
11-30-59

3-31-60

4-30-60

_» 7-31-59/60 -
© 2-28-59/60
12-31-58/59/60

9-30-59/60
11-30-59/60
12-31-58/59

11-30-59/60. ~
7-3 1-58/59/60

2-28-59/60
2-28-59/60
-2-28-59/60
8-31-59/60°
8-31-59/60
4-30-59/60
12-31458/59
12-31-58/59

12-31-58/59
12-31-58/59

12-31-58/59

“¥, °

7

-1231-58/59

oa

J

Amount
* $ 6,889.39"
18,759.38
19,074.09
7,444.25 °
8,441.99

ay 9,244.96
17,615.73
4,134.23
22,018.87

- 6,030.35
11,335.52
19,112.34
11,180.18

* 14,796.70
~ 3,115.89
4,422.33
4,422.33
10,442.51
10,422.51
16,328.18
88,704.60
67,134.93
602,34 .
559.99
192.76

232.25

$382,678.57

ad
mse

; The cases were tried to the Court without a jury. A |
_ number of motions: with reference to the admission of
evidence were taken with the-case. They will be discussed

- and ruled upon later in this memorandum opinion.
i é

Questions Presented Vor Decision

1. Whether plaintiffs’ should use useful lives of 35 years.

1 The plaintiffs involved in the depreciation issue are as follows:
‘ Civil
Name of Plaintiff ? Action No.
Bay Sound. Transportation Co. eee Clr ee eee CP eee 63-H-73
Coastal Transportation Co. ........3....... eke aioe oe 63-H-75 ;
Christine Towing Co. ................ aoe es oceecet ls 63-Hi76
» Riverside Transportation Co. ...............4. erecrn 63-H-77
Murray Bay Transportation Co. ...... paliewas et * 63-H-78
Dixon Bay Transportation Co. ............ Tatupakes 63-H-79 »
Green Bay Transportation Co. ....3..........00.0000e 63-H-80
BOO BE Oe vos e ic ise seeds STTC Perey terre eee 63-H-81
rE A xs. Zoib oy bg cov bv'ke cova’, Serrrereer ns
See WN Oe otha ches cease ds Ph DM Seren Eee
Lavaca Barge Co: ...... | POS BERGER Red Pe aed Eee _ 63-H-84
Naptha Barge Co. ....: PR rr eer Sry ere 63-H-85
A SR ee ees eran, Cone pena! 63-H-86
_ Wolverine Barge Co. .......... ae ae ece USA Es Da .. 63-H-87
‘ Huron Barge Co. ......... ates ed ie ie beavals wadibe ac 63-H-88
Michigan Barge Co... ....6..00000: peer shettege'es 63-H-89
Superior Barge Co. : eawowes EP eel Pla erage Cay ee AN es 63-H-90
Ontario Barge Co... .¢.6......4. wee ene nt eee eee SOSH-OR sd
St. Clair Barge, "SEBS Seam bela int nOn) 63-H-92
EN opine ep osnes La Wovneey is éirscws 63-H-93

Partners in Louisiana Transportation Co., (later called Oil Cities -

Transportation Co.):

a Me EE 8% o7o Oe 0o-a htc sense des CR Se 63-H-94
J. E. Redding ...... Sak Sa wate hhh gs , SE heehee 63-H-96
LS “=e ++) baccenenel : 63-H-97
Je Ti. FE STII oie pic Sees cece wie be apc GSdvesie con-
_Sthacted during the 1930’s is the same as the thickness of

5 The partners in Buffalo Bayou Watiaiertitiaa Co. in the years
before the Court ‘are as follow:
. Percentage of-..

Name of\ Partner Partnership Interest *
ED | cc a xdbee hes en eee noks ev aweken ae
ie a: EE Dee vick ews cnaneues ise bee enae 23
Ss 5 PT ee ee ixepentawaes med |
aN Herbert S. Fislier,\Trustee .............. : cekeces 5:
Ny Dep BRO now aa\ bc dic cpeccovectiocs st cgeccey 4

On September 30,, 1961, Ruffin sold ie 4 percent to Keith S.

| Kdwards.

ag

. those constructed during ‘the 1940’s and 1950’s. (Tr. 702,
1004, 1010, 1033, 1399, 1405). The only exception is
with respect to those barges designed for use in the- Gulf
of Mexico whith were*of heavier gauge steel. (Tr. 1464).

There is some suggestion in the evidence that the vessels . =
constructed ‘during the 1930’s were made of “copper---~

bearing ‘steel” which means that the steel contained be-
tween 2/10 percent and 5/10 percent copper (Tr. 1003;
1005); however, this fact is not established by the record.
(Tr..1003). Copper-bearing steel and “mild steel” (of *
which later vessels were constructed) ¢orrode.at approxi-
_ .mately the same. raté in salt. and fresh water. (Tr. 712;
1584-86, 1600; G. Ex. 11.) However copper-bearing steel
deteriorates more slowly than mild steel in the atmosphere. —
(Tr. 1591-92, 1599). Coatings of various sorts (particu-
larly epoxy) applied to both types of steel exposed to
the atmosphere retard. corrosion to a marked degree. (Tr.
711, 713, 1579-90, 1599). The Edwards fleet is and has
been in the process of receiving original and renewals of
epoxy coating. (Tr. 709-11, 1205, 1397, 1404-05, 1456,
1462). 7 ,

11: Although the so-called “spoon bill” design of barges
has been known and used since the late 1940's or early
1950’s, none. of the vessels in the Edwards fleet .con-
_ structed through the end of 1959 wére of such design. .
(Tr. 775, 947, 1420). However, vessels constructed and
- added to the*Edwards fleet during the early 1960’s were
of the “spoon bill” design. (Tr. 779,.917). This design
apparently enables a barge to move through the water as
mtch as one or two miles an hour faster (using the same
pushing effort) as. conventionally designed barges. (Tr.
917). However, the conventionally designed barges con- .
- structed for the Edwards fleet through the end of the

ee “ss

*
\
4

son “aay
us
: ‘

Z
om

30 7

t

1950’s are a being constructed and put: into service

"* today. (Tr, \1409, 1463-64, 1478).

12. The ‘voces’ ‘in the Edwards fleet are used basically
in four different bodies of water: (1) offshore in the

Gulf of Mexico which is deep salt water; (2) the Mis-

sissippi River around New Orleans which is déep fresh «
water; (3) the Intracoastal Waterway which is relatively
shallow, and at places brackish, salt and fresh water; and
(4) the bayous, marshes and private canals in the Louisi-
ana Gulf Coast area which are shallow and brackish and.
salt water. (E.g., Tr. 915).

13. Gretually, as the Edwards fleet expanded, Edwards

‘_ Transportation Co.. and Barge Transport Co. contracted

with numerous oil operators and producers to perform the
same services originally performed for Heiis. Their services

- entail transporting petroleum. products from field gathering.

points to refineries. The field gatherin ints are located
in vartous swamp areas in south Fk toy and the off-
shore_wells are off the Jlexas and Louisiana coast. From
the gathering points, the Vessels would proceed to points ‘of
discharge, using in [94] most instances the Intracoastal
Waterway, Houston Ship. Channel, and the Mississippi
River. As the vessels proceeded through the various bodies -
of water they were subjected to the various physical con-
ditions present, such as shallow channels, etc.

. &

Number 47139 Court Decisions—Cited 67-2 USTC
9-20-67 . Bay Sound Transportation Co. et al.v.U.S.\.
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1967 andar Federal Tax Reports

ro

ag PNET EN, ERIN ROIS II TON OTT A RTD

~ 95/2 /P asivg TeSIWIN G/st/9E 0D a8ieg ues WIN

‘ s s (dyyssauzsed &)

a OVE Ws 8 makes +e” geenend 9S 'ZPI'Sze 9s/s /t yeoqueng 9 rte | 1S /61/2t eeceee eae ‘0D e3.10g Bujj1971S
———— ‘ ; is ' “ § + © % 480 pazinboy-. 128834 128S9A JO aeN pezjuesiQ. JQUMO Jo aweN” r
aamnog 0} sv pro Edwards fleet and the various organizations
that own the vessels have always followed a_ practice of
charging to expense items such as new bottoms for barges,
-etc., even though such portions could be expected to have

_- a useful life of greater ‘than one -year. This depreciation

_ treatment—has-been done with the acquiescence of ‘per-
~ sonnel of the Internal Revenue Service. (Tr. 514, 517-20,

848-49). .

SORA AMOR IAS OE PE GEO +

.
‘2. ’
“ eee
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34

» 17. The cargo transported by the barges in the Edwards ~
fleet i in the early years was in great part crude oil. In later
‘years, more and more distillate ‘has been transported until

_ during the years before the Court about half of the cargo

was crude oil and the other half was distillate. (G. Exs.°9 -

& 10, pars. 2(s)). Distillate has a characteristic of clean-
ing the inside portions of a tank barge so as to expose
the inside to the air inside the barges; (Tr..283) on the

other hand, crude oil has a tendency to coat the interior

portions of the barge so that the metal is not exposed to

air inside the barges. (Tr. 283).

18. The Edwards fleet’s barges have never’ been manned;

crews, of course, man the various boats and-are present’
on the barges that are in the boat’s tow. During the 1930's —

and 1940’s members of the boat’s crews ‘worked, in their

spare time, scraping and repainting the exposed surfaces on
of the barges. and boats on which they worked. With the ~

passage of years,-this practice has decreased due. primarily
to the reduction (brought about in a desire to reduce

’ costs) in the number of men on the boats. The day to
day preventive‘maintenance on the Edwards fleet has thus _

. decreased. (Tr. 856),

ee A) BLE gene -

19. Edwards Transportation Co. has been cig
profitable through the years. During 1958 and 1959 Mr.

.C. W. Edwards’ 50° percent distributive portion of. Ed-
‘wards Transportation €p. produced for him respectively

$72,157 and $93,811. (G. Exs. 7 & 8 pars. 78).
Louisiana Transportation Co.,- the partnership, has ‘alsa
been extremely - lucrative for Mr. Edwards through the

_years, and- during 1958 ahd 1959 it produced, : for his
“°69 percent interest, distributive’ shares of $262,962 and -
$367,909, respectively. (G. Exs. 7 & 8, pars. 78). Sterling

he Mee #
- barge "ue, the pagtnership.which operated the Edwards _
_ fleet’s most expensive vessel (the Letha c., which “Lost. -
*-$325,000) ‘generated for Mr. Edwards’ 50 percent in-.
“terest $24,136- -and $39,323 during 1958 and 1959. (G.
-Exs. 7 & 8, pars. 78). Mr. Edwards’ personal income tax *
bracket was in EXCESS. of 90 percent during the years in-
volved. (Tr. 204). Mr. Edwards personally received 4% of :
a cent per barrel for all crudé oil or distillate transported. :

20. The following table teflects, by year, from ‘date of —
vessel . acquisition the-(1). total’ revenue earned (net of...

amounts paid out for chartered: equipment’ and vessels); .
(2) arsounts ‘ctrrently deducted by the owners.as re-
pairs and maintenance expense (even though such items
including replacing vessels’ sides, bottoms, knuckles, ste. 2
and (3) taxable income — “by vessel:

_-

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36 :
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| U.S. Tax Cases
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Number 47—146 °

| U. 8. Tax Cases
Bay Sound Transportation Co. et ol.v. U.S.

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1967 Standard Federal Tax Reports _

44

21. Vessels such as the boats and barges owned by the
Edwards interests can be kept in serviceable condition and
their useful lives can bg prolonged swage al if the _
owners spend the necessary funds to renew repair, and:

maintain the’ vessels. (Tr. 698, 771-72, ; ' 694; 1002-03, ‘

1020, 1062, 1072, 1206-07, 1402, 1406). ‘ ;

’21A. The useful life of barges or tugs’ ‘to the Edwards
interests is directly related to whether the Edwards inter-
ests find it economical to continue to use the vessels in

_ their operations. (Tr. 694, 696, 1209, 1217, 1225-26,.

1479). 3

21B. The Edwards interests have found it economical
to. utilize their vessels for their full physical life. The policy .

‘of the Edwards interests over the past thirty years has been:

tc expend money as necessary to keep their vessels in good
working condition, and accordingly to prolong the useful
life of their vessels. (Tr. 1242, 1247, 775; Pars.°3, 5, 8,
10, 20, supra).

21C: The Edwards interests, over the past thirty years,
have retired but few of their vessels from service, (Pars._
20, 3, 5; 8, 10, supra; e.g., Tr. 761, 768, 772-75, 779.)

As to. the multiple corporation issue:

, 22. Barge Transport Co., the original corporation in
the group. of corporations involved in this case, was or--

ganized and ‘has operated since 1939. The shareholders of

. this corporation at all times pertinent to this case were: /’

(1) Keith Edwards, plaintiff in Civil Action No.63-
H-95; the only ‘child of Mr. C. W. Edwards; Keith
Edwards was 40 years old when this case was tried.
ATE. 1371, 1384). :

4

’” (2) John E. Redding, plaintiff in Civil Action No.

. 63-H-96, who functions as thégeneral managér of the .

whole group of companies. (Tr. 789).

(3) Miss Pauline Lambert; Miss Lambert ceased to
be a shareholder on November 16, 1960, when the
corporation redeemed her stock; she is C. W. Edwards’
sister. (G. Exs. 9 and 10, pars. 10).

(4) Mrs. Letha C. Edwards, one of the plaintiffs in

| Civil Action No. 63-H-94, who is the wife- of Mr. C.
W. Edwards: (G. Exs. 9 and 10, pars. 10).

(5) Mrs. Evelyn Owens Edwards; Mrs: Edwards is

a sister-in‘law of C. W. Edwards. (D. Exs. 9 and 10, -

pars. 10). (G. Exs. 7 and 8 pars. 7). ae

23.. The officers of Barge Transport Co., at all times
here relevant were Keith Edwards, President, Charles: W.
. Edwards, Vice-President; and Jack Redding, Secretary
and Treasurer. The same three men formed the Board: of

Directors of the cosporation’ at alk times here pertinent.
baa Ex. 4, p. 23). !

24. The stock of Bay Sound Transportation Co., the

corporation organized August 1, 1959, at all times here -

pertinent, was. owned as follows:

| , Percentage ~° ae
Name of Of Stock :
Shareholder ~~» Owned +) Investment.
C. W. Edwards... 67.131... $ 772.00
J. E. Redding........ - Dial 60.00

Edwards’ Employees ... 27. 652 : 318.00 .

menremee tice Do pa neecieinpe Ee at ae ea Ry RELA
br
°

ARNE

LEVELS OLIN SATO LT OD

er ” 6

one : ee
- Name of . | of Stock
Shareholder. ~. | - Owned Investment —
CC. W. Edwards ....... 67.121 «© $772.00 |
3 i. §. EL Redding ....... +. ee) a 60.00 ©
: Edwards’ Employees _.. ..27.652 318.00
| J - $1,150.00

- Bay Sound Tratisportation Co. ‘and C. W. Edwards bis

options to acquire the stock owned by the employees . (and
Mr. Redding). (G. Exs. 7 & 8, Pars. Tr. 643-645, 844,
975, said P. Ex. 8L).

25. Riverside Transportation .Co., the ‘corporation or-

ganized August 1,- 1959, at “ times here pertinent, was
owned as follows: np) ar

Rivicide: “Transport and C. W. Edwards had options to

_ acquire the stock owned by the employees and Mr. Red-

ding. (G. Exs. 7 and 8, Pars. 9; Tr. 643-45, 844, 975,
1294-95; P- Ex. 8Q). . Ag

26. Christine Towing, ‘Co., the corporation eaiaee

ee July 9, 1957, at all times here pertinent, was owned as

follows:
ne
Ss Name of ; of Stock |
_ Shareholder . Owned . Investment .

Keith Edwards ...:).... 98 - -$ 980.00 «

J. A. Hendricks (an Em-
ployee of Edwards Trans-. -
portation Co. and Barge

- Transport Co.) .-.... e : 10.00
S W. ‘Edwards DORe Tora Ee: | 10.00
gic viele genes ~— $1,000.00 -

G. Exs. 7 and 8, a a0; EY. 1294. 95: P. Bx, 8A).

Pas

o 47 . ef :

}

27. Coastal -Transportation Co., the corporation organ-

ized December 20, 1955, at all times Pertinent y was Owned |

~ as follows:
| o Percentage oo ae
Name of of Stock Pee Bes
Shareholder Owned _ Investment
J. E. Gough ......... , 50 $ 500.00
C. W. Edwards ~~... 21 210.00
Keith Edwards ....... 25 ee
J.E.Redding........ -4 * 40.00

~~ , * $1,000.00

' Coastal Tratispitation Co. and CW. Edwards hadeop-
tions to acquire the stock owned by Messrs. Redding and.

Gough. (G. Exs.'7 and 8, pars. 11; Tr. — 844, 975,
_ 1294-95; P. Ex. 8R).

28. Dixon ‘Bay Transportation. Co., and Murray Bay ’
Transportation Co., the corporations organized July 13,
1959, at all times here pertinent were owned as follows:

.. Percentage .
Name of | ~. of Stock
Shareholder ~ Owned Investment
G. W. Edwards ...... 415 -$ 477.25
Keith S. Edwards ...... 41.5 477.25

J. E. Redding a 3450 7
_ Edwards’ employees ... 14 ee 18100 :

$1,150.00:

(G. a 7 and 8, Pars. 42 and 13; Tr. siding, P. Exs.
‘8M and 8P).

29, Green Bay Transportation Co., the corporation or-

—

i>]

ia Lt hi Race ie Cal See aE AD
} .

48 2
ganized March 27, 1959, at all times here pertinent, was
» owned as follows: :
2 Bisiechens
Name of | + of Stock
nad Shareholder ~ - Owned _Investment
C. W. Edwards... 73 “"$ 730.00
Keith S. Edwards ___. 10 + 100.00
J. E. Redding ....... -3 “30.00 ,
Employees of. Edwards 0 ee
zi ‘ * Transportation Co. are
y _ and/or Barge Trans-
, port Co. oe Pe [4 140.00

—

$1,000.00
(G. Exs. 7 and 8, Pars. 14; Tr. 1294-95; P. Ex. 8N).

30. Lavaca Barge Co., the corporation organized De-
-cember 29, i958, at all times here pertinent, was owned |

as follows: a
> | Percentagt
Name of of Stock. |
Shareholder _ Owned » Investment
C.W.Edwards....°.. = 98-—.* ~——s $980.00
Letha C. Edwards ___ 1 10.00
_ Keith C. Edwards __.. l * 10.00.

- $1,000.00
(G. Exs. 7 and 8 Pars. 15; Tr. 1294-95; re Ex. 8GG).

ty

31. Naptha Barge Co., the corporation organized De-
cember 31, 1958, at all times here pertinent was owned

. as follows: | ‘
$9

Name of 7 of Stock |

| Shareholder Owned Invesynent
\ Keith S. Edwards _.. . 99.8 . $ 998.00

C. W. Edwards dl 1.00

J. A. Hendricks (an

employee of Edwards

Transportation Co. :

and Barge Transpo .

ne ee Ee ee l i 1.00

| $1,000.00
(G. Exs. 7 and 8, Pars. 16; Tr. 1294-95; P. Ex. 8KK).

32. Navidad Barge Co., the corporation organized De-
cember 29, 1958, at all times here pertinent was owned °

. as follows:
wif

Percentage
Name of of Stock
Shareholder Owned Investment
C. W. Edwards ss 98 $ 980.00
Letha C. Edwards 1 10.00
Kefth Edwards ..___- 1 10.00

7 $1,000.00
(G. Exs. 7 and 8, Pars..17; Tr. 1294-95; P. Ex. $MM).

33. Wolverine Barge Co., the. corporation organized

August 16, 1956, ‘at all times here pertinent, was owned
as follows: /

fae ee Percentage
Name of of _Stock
Shareholder Owned —_£Investment
J. E. Gough ......-.. 30 =~ $ 500.00 -
Keith Edwards ....... 49 490.00

C.W. Edwards... TE) —s«0,.00

$1,000.00

Wolverine Barge Co. a C. W. Edwards had an option
to acquire Mr. Gough’s stock in Wolverine Barge Co.
(G. Exs. 7 and 8, Pars. 18; Tr. 643-45, 844, 975, 1294-
95; P. Ex. 8XX).

34. Michigan Barge Co., Erie Barge Co., Huron Henke
Co., and Superior Barge Co., which corporations were all
organized March 25, .1958, at all times here pertinent,
were owned as follows: ;

- Percentage

Name of —of Stock

Shareholder Owned ~* Investment
J. E. Gough ......... - 40 $ 400.00
H. V. Huckaby (Mr. .
‘ Gough’s employee) . 5 50.00 .
T.-H. Bryant (Mr. :

_Gough’s employee) . 5 50.00
Louisiana Transporta- 7 ~

—?[— erro 50 ~ — §00.00

$1,000.00°
(G. Exs. 7 and 8, Pars. 19, 22; Tr. 1294-95; P. Exs. 8V,
8CC, 811 8SS).

5 As is indicated in paragraph 7, supra, the partners in Siatitees
Transportation Co., Ltd., are C. Ww. Edwards, 69.131%; Jack Red-
ding, 5.217%; employees of Edwards Transportation Co. and/or
Barge Transport Co., 27.652%. Louisiana Transportation Co. had
options to acquire from Messrs. Gough, Huckaby Bryant the
interests they owned in Michigan Barge Co., Erie Barge Co., Huron
Barge Co. and Superior Barge Co. (Tr. 844, 943-45, 975).

o

te =

35. Michigan Barge Co., Erie Barge Co., Huron Barge
Co., and Superior Barge Co., respectively, had options to.
acquire the stock owned in each corporation by Messrs.
Gough, Huckaby, and Bryant; C. W. Edwards also had ;
option to acquire the stock-in the foregoing four” cor- '
porations owned by Messrs. Gough, Huckaby and Bryant.
(Tr. 643-45, 844, 975). E

36. Ontario Barge Co., the corporation organized Sep-
tember 15, 1958, at all times hére pertinent, was owned

_as follows: aie oe
Percentage |
of Stock
Owned Investment

90 -$-900.00
5 50.00
—

. $1,000.00
\(G. Exs. 7 & 8, Pars. 23; Tr. 1294-95: P. Ex. 800). ¢
37, St. Clair Barge Co., the corporation organized Sep-

tember 15, 1958, at all times here pettinent was owned
as follows:

Percentage
Name of of Stock ;
Shareholder Owned Investment
C. W. Edwards ...... 90 — §$ 900.00
J. E. Redding ........ 5 50.00
..- Employees of Edwards
Transportation Co. _. 5 50.00 °

| $1,000.00.
(G. Exs. 7 & 8, Pars. 24; Tr. 1294-95; P. Ex. 8QQ).

4 '

ee te

ae 52

38. Ev. Barge Co., the corporation organized January
11, 1956, at all times a pertinent, was owned as
follows

; ee

Percentage »
‘Name of of Stock + eee.
Shareholder Owned | Investment
C. W Edwards........ 90 $ 900.00
J. GB. Redding ..’...... 5.5 : 55.00
Employees of Edwards
Transportation Co, .. 4.5 45.00

$1,000.00
(G. Exs. 7 rs 8, Pars. 25; Tr. 1294.95; P. Ex. 8Y).

39. Jack Bares Co., the corporation organized April 30,
1956, at all times here pertinent, was owned as follows:

: Percentage
Name of of Stock |
Shareholder Owned Investment
C. W Edwards........ 90 $ 900.00
J. E. Redding . es ~ 55.00
Employees of Edwards
Transportation Co. .. 4.5 45.00

$1,000.00
(G. Exs. 7 & 8, Pars. 26; Tr.’ 1294-95; P. Ex. 8EE).

40. Gulf Storage Co.,; the corporation organized Octo-
‘ber 20, 1955, at all times here pertinent, was owned as
‘ follows:

¥

53

ae, Percentage
Name of — of Stock
Shareholder Owned : - Investment
C. W. Edwards 80 $ 880.00
J. E. Redding. .:.. |. ~ 10 _ 110.00
Employees of Edwards A
Transportation Co. . . 10 ; 110.00

é

. ‘$1,100.00
(G. Exs. 7 & 8, Pars. 27; Tr. 1294.95; P. Ex. 8AA).

41. Bay Sound Transportation Co. and Rivemide Trans-
portation Co.; the corporations described in paragraphs 26
and 27, supra, acquired the vessels C. T. & J. and Toni
Ann from the partnership Louisiana Transportation Co. at
or about the time they were organized. (G. Exs. 7 & 8,
Pars. 44, 46). The remaining eighteen. corporations (de-
scribed in pars. 28 through 42, supra) each acquired one
new vessel at or about the time they were organized. (See
Par. 10, supra).

c)

_ 42. Each of the eighteen new vessels acquired by eight-
een corporations were acquired in essentially the same
fashion. First, the decision to construct the vessel was
made by Mr. C. W. Edwards, the Vice-President of the
original corporation, Barge Transport Co. (Tr. 1369-70);
this decision was made after counseling with Jack Red-
ding, the general manager of the entire fleet, Ev Meley,

the engineer for the entire fleet, Keith Edwards, Mr. Ed-~

wards’ son, and Mr. Amiel Stimrow, the CPA who was
the internal auditor and financial manager for all of
the business. (Tr. 1369-70, 987-89,°925, 480°M1, 227).
Once the decision to construct a vessel was made, an
order for the construction of the vessel was placed. While
the vessel was under construction, and about the time for

w

Te ee ee eee

54

delivery thereof, Mr. Edwards would call upon either the “

Texas National Bank or the National Bank of Commerce
in Houston to arrange for a loan to cover the full acquisi-
tion cost. (Tr. 1338-42, 1351-59). Most of the loans paid
the entire total cost of the construction and, in many in-
stances, provided additional funds for operating’ expenses. :

' (Ibid; See Par. 10, supra.*). Repayment of all the loans -

was guaranteed by Mr. C. W. Edwards. The banks, of
course, were relying on his guarantee as well as the se-
curity offered by the value of the vessel, which was gen-
erally covered #y a chattel mortgage. (Tr. 1352-60,
1367, 1338-45). Mr. Edwards never furnished the banks
(nor did the banks request), financial data on himself or
any of the eighteen corporations. (Tr. 1344-45, 1348,
1359-60). Mr. Edwards had had a long course dealing
with these two banks and was well known and trusted as
a responsible person. (Tr. 1273, 1360).

43. After the decision to construct each of the eighteen
new vessels was made; and the order therefore was placed
with the company doing the construction work, the cor- ©
poration to receive the vessel when completed, was organ-
ized. (Tr. 1123-27). Whatever property rights that existed
in the vessels under construction, were acquired by each
of the eighteen new corporations and when. and ‘as the -
vessels were completed and delivered, the corporations
took titles.* Then, the vessels were placed into sefvice in
the Edwards fleet. a me bitte

44. Of the twenty corporations otganized between’ 1955
and 1960, 14 each owned one barge, and 6 cach. owned

* For instance, the Barge Navidad cost\$41,000 (see Par. 10, supra)
but the loan on January 12, 1959, was $48,000. (Tr. 1356).

* Most ‘of the vessels were delivered from a few days to a Aew
weeks after the owner-corporation was organized. (See Par. 10, supra).

35

one boat. (G. Exs. 7 & 8, Pars. 37, 38, 44, 46, 48, 49, 50,
52, 54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 63, 65; 67, 69, 71, .73, 75,76
and 77). None of the barge corporation had any employ-
ees. The only employees of the boat corporation other
than members of the crews, are as follow: |

ye set ¥

OLN LUNN OES OAR

3 :
Name of Name of corporation-
employee | | employer | ,
Keith Edwards ................ Christine Towing Co. F
J. A. Hendricks j
(maintenance) ............. Christine Towing Co.
Vera McNeilly one |
(bookkeeper) .. ... Green Bay Transportation

(Tr. 449-457; P. Ex. 4, pp. 24-42).

Deemer ree i

Messrs. Edwards ‘and Hendricks were also employees off
either Barge Transport Co. or Edwards Transportation Co. ~' . 7
and they drew the bulk*of their pay from these organiza- ~
tions. (P. Ex. 4, pp. 39-42). The administrative personnel i
for the organization were employed by either Edwards
Transportation Co. or. Barge Trarsport Co. (Tr. 459-75).

cy

45. The operation of Edwards Transportation Co. and
Barge Transport Co., the several partnerships that owned’
vessels (Wilkins Barge Line, Louisiana Transportation

Co., Buffalo Bayou Transportation Co., Barge Delta Joint > |
Venture, and Sterling Barge Line), and the twenty vessel-
owning corporations was essentially as follows: a ;

(a) All of.the companies utilized the same office ad- -
~ dress. (G. Exs. 7 & 8, Pars. 34).

(b) Edwards Transportation Co. and Barge Transport
Co. had’ telephone listings and were the only two com-
_ panies known (other than Wilkins Barge Line for a time)

56

to the general public; these two companies obtained all.

business for the éntire group of Edwards’ companies. oy
(G. Exs. 7 & 8, Pars. 33; Tr. 479-480, 765-67, 852).

(c) When Edwards Transportation. Co. or Barge Trans-

~ port Co. obtained a contract for the transportation’ of |
“petroleum products, Mr. Redding was given the job of

seeing that appropriate vessels were assigned to the job.
Mr. Redding, of course, knew the capacity and- capability
of each of the vessels and would assign the appropriate
number of barges and boats to the tasks. The company

., maintained a dispatching office in New Orleans and an-—
othér in Houston, and contact was made with the boat cap- -
~ “tain to advise him what barges to pick up, where he should

go,~and what he should.do. The dispatchers in New |
Orleans and Houston and Mr. Redding were all employees
of Edwards Transportation Co. and/or Barge Transport
Co. (Tr. 111-114, 93, .791, 852-54).

(d) In those circumstances where the Edwards fleet
had no vessels available to perform a contract, outsiders
were: contacted and a sub-contract was made with these
outsiders to either furnish one or two barges or a tugboat.
or a whole tow, as necessary,-for the job at hand. However,
in dispatching the vessels to the job sites, preference was
always given to vessels owned in the Edwards fleet, and.
about 90 percent of the: work that was obtained through
Edwards Transportation Co. and Barge ‘Transport Co. was
done by the Edwards fleet itself. \N€Tr. 479-80, 852-56).

(e) Of course, therg were no formal negotiations or
contracts let between Edwards Transportation .Co. and/or
Barge Transport Co. and the five’ partnerships and twenty
vessel-owning corporations. Instead, the vessels were dis-

patched to perform the work, much like taxicabs. are dis-

,2

~

’

}
| 37 .

| }

. patched, and an intercompany billing process followed. &
Those corporations and partnerships which owned barges f
ie - tion’ were informed of and aware of the potential tax ad-

vantage that could be accomplished by spreading income

_-from one business over more than. one corporation. They
_were aware that, during the late 1950's, the federal income

/

te ; -

a ae

&

= Bx. 18).

59

tam Bek Bek Bok Ue tee tye tee Wee t

organized between 1955 and 1960) pertinent to the tax
advantages to be achieved through the use of several
corporations rather than one corporation. (Tr. 439-449,
480-500, 868). As a matter’ of fact, Mr. Sumrow, the
C. P. A., made projections of income and expense ‘to
ascertain the cash flow that would be produced-for several
of the newly constructed vessels. (Tr. 439-449, 480-481,
850). In making these projection’ studies, a deduction for.
income tax was always prédicated upon the tax rate of.
30 percent: (not 52 percent) on the first $25,000 of tax-
able income for each vessel. (Tr. 444, 448, 850).

Although the officials of the Edwards organization al-

legedly had formal meetings to discuss and decide upon the ~

use of multiple corporations in their operations, no minutes
or writings of any kind were ever made to reflect what,
if anything, happened. The. only real evidence supporting
_ plaintiffs’ testimony is one letter written by Edwards’ ad-
miralty attorneys during the adminstrative processing of
this case by the Internal Revenue Service. (Tr. 255, 257-
«61, 312, 584, 897-98, 1632; G. Ex. 1 for identification G.

a ‘
ie

a -

—

60

48. Mr. Charles Edwards is the person in the organiza-
tion who made the ultimate decision of whether or not
multiple corporations would be utilized. This would be
done after considering the recommendations of the other
key personnel. (Tr. 212-214, 1369-70). Mr. Edwards
testified that he had not considered tax matters in deciding
to incorporate each vessel constructed during the period
of 1955 through 1960 and had not discussed such mat-
ters with tax counselors. (Tr. 55-57, 238, 239, 242-243).
The. federal taxation specialist employed by a national
certified public accounting firm in Houston, Texas in
fact was sought out by Mr. Edwards and from him Mr.

Edwards and other of his employees obtained counseling ~

contemporaneously with the formation of the first of the
twenty corporations as_to the tax advantage of the use of
multiple corporations. The counseling was to the effect
that (1) there was a maximum tax Saving of $5,500 per
annum to be achieved for each additional corporation that
was utilized in the Edwards operation, and (2) there was
an exemption from accumulated earnings tax of $60,000
which was allowed to each corporation. The counseling
was to the effect that if Edwards used twenty-one cor-
porations in his fleet operation instead of one corporation,
there was a maximum tax savings that could be achieved
of $110,000 per annum. (Tr. 1612-1617).

49. Mr. Charles Edwards, who is aging and infirm, in
recent years and at the trial of this case, manifested a
consistent failing of his capacity to recollect recent occur-
rences. He is able to vividly recount transactions that
occurred during the 1930’s and 1940's, but is unable to
clearly recall transactions that occurred during the 1950's.
(Tr. 75, 83, 84, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, 105-
106, 134, 137). |

\
,

Py
~~ . P whe
; « s — 4

61°
50. Mr. Keith Edwards was not at all concerned during
the 1950’s whether the next.vessel"to be constructed (or

any vessels) were placed in one of the’ existing partnerships
or in a new corporation. As a matter of fact, he did not

keep track of who owned the new vessels. He was con- .

cerned primarily with the operation of the ‘vores, (Tr.
1369-70). j

51. Mr. Jack Redding, the general. manager of ‘the

operation, was never really in.a position to dictate policies:

~ He discussed business matters and recommended caurses of
action, but Mr. Edwards himself was the decisive person.
(Tr. 867-868, 925, 1369-70).

52. Mr. Amiel Sumrow, during the time when the first

one or two (of the twenty corporations involved) were ©

organized, expresséd his‘concern to Charles Edwards and
Redding about the possible tax problems that would accrue
as a result of the use of the numerous corporations. Mr.
Sumrow read the accounting periodicals and studied tax

services, and cautioned Mr. Edwards that a business pur- -

pose was necessary. (Tr. 486, 488, 500).

53. Of all the persons in the Edwards organization, Mr.
Ev Meley, Jr., the partner in Louisiana Transportation Co.,

displayed the most concern about his possible liability to.

the public as a result of liability. During the middle 1950's,
he was in charge of handling. the damage claims against
Edwards Transportation Co. et al. In talking to lawyers in
New Orleans, he was advised of his possible exposure as
a partner for claims against the partnership. He was coun-
seled to the effect that the corporate device would limit
his liability to the investment in. the corporation, and that

__ the most conservative of all positions was to incorporate.
each vessel. Nothing was ever done to reduce Mr. Meley’s |

62

/

.. . . * /
exposure as a partner, for he remains a partner in Louisi-

ana Transportation Company (now .called Oil -Cities
Transportatiort Co.). As a matter of fact, this partnership
owns half of the stock in several of the corporations (see,

Par. 34, supra, and, of course, Mr. Meley himself owns -

_stock in other corporations, all of which would. be subject
to seizure by his creditors. (Tr. 906-907). |. -f

54. Through :the years going back to the 1930's, Mr.
Charles Edwards’-Houston admiralty attorney counselled
with him in respect to the limitation of liability that would
be afforded through the use of the corporate device. (Tr:
55, 1137-38). However, the beginning date for the
‘separate corporations began in 1955. The case of Rogers
v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506, was
decided on February 25, 1957. Mr. Eastham’s letter with
reference to spreading liability which was referred to but
not offered in evidence was dated December 7, 1961.

55. The Edwards companies have always carried insur-

ance on cargo being transported and when damage thereto .

occurred, adjustments were always made directly by the
insurance company with the cargo owner. (G. Exs. 9 &
10, Pars. 2(O)). Insurance for personal injury and
property damage was carried in some instances but
because of the cost, some of the companies carried no
such insurance. The following tabulation reflects by year
all ‘of the personal ‘injury and property damage claims
paid by all of the various companies respecting the Ed-
wards vessels for personal injury and property damage:

/ °

63 °

, Fiscal ¥ear Ending During

— 1958 ~~ 1959 1960
Edwards Transportation Co. $38,907 $12,119. $44,271
Barge Transport Co... ... 3,180 7,414 5,371
Bay Sound Transportation Co. .... et 40
Christine Towing Co. ..... J > 1519 197
Dixon Bay Transportation Co. _ fe 14
Green Bay Transportation Co... __. 364 |
Murray Bay TransportationCo. _.. ae 7027
Riverside Transportation Co. .... 294 16,433
Wilkins Barge Line ...... ~ 1,500 ages 1,573
Louisiana Transportation Co. 29,540 24,627. 16,843
Sterling Barge Line ... 286 250 25

(G. Exs. 9 & 10, Pars. 2(O); P. Ex. 4, pp, 11-14).

oe

56. Over the years all of the companies and vessels have
had claims for property damage and personal injury made
against them. Some of the claims, of course, were: valid
and some spurious. Most claims were made with respect
to operation of boats, not barges. The experience of the
Edwards Transportation Co. partnership is typical; through
30 years of operation. The following are claims (whether

or not valid) made with respect to barges:

ye se

64
?

Total Amount
Barge of Claims
NN aaa base ah 8b eae None
aerate tae are ee None
oS Se On ee ee None
SS eae fers eee ee $ 2,500
George BE. ww eee eee eee 5,200
OS Saree errr rrr er ret 10,000
Hiram King... ee None
L. G. Cobb SS Ah cue None |
Peggy Coyle ......--- ee a. 49,000 -
Sy dens she w ado 9:8 OE FE ee None
Petroleum iw... -- ee eee ... ° 88,394
Salvador as Oxon te aa EAE Se ras None
ee ee se eras None
ae Ape rere re eee Ties f None
W. J. Wyatt | wwe eee eee None

(G. Exs. 9 & 10, Pars. 2(O); P. Ex. 4, pp. 7 & 9). The
experience as to claims made (whether or not valid),

~ against the other barge-owning organizations in the Ed-
wards fleet is as follows:

dina Si Se: ile

o 65
Total Amount
of Claims—
Inception to
Company . Date of Trial
Nn Ne $2,500
Buffalo Bayou partnership (2 barges) ...__.. 2,500
Barge Transport Co. (5 barges) .......... 2,500*
Barge Delta Joint Venture. ................. None
Ci ee None
Coastal Transportation Co. ........... None
IS oY ' None
WE ES ec a esas) tea oan . eis. None
Naptha Barge Co. ....... FP FEN er el ee None ,
.Navidad Barge Co.: ............. ate . None
Wolverine Barge Co. ...-........... Ae ~ None-
Michigan BargeCo........................ ~ None’,
Ne 6h i iis os oe ,., Ome
dF & i ae ...- None
I I ore a eS ss None
St. Clair BargeCo. ...... peal ich ya 5 None ©
navets BergeCo. |. eee s Aten at None

* 1950 to date of trial in 1966.

As to the organization expense issue:

57. Incident to the formation of 14 of the 20 new cor-

porations ( between 1955 and 1960), fees were paid to

Edwards Transportation Co.’s attorneys covering fees and
costs incident to preparing and filing the various corpora-

Oe Eee RET See

tions’ articles of incorporation and holding the: first meet- +

‘ing of shareholders. These organizational costs were all |

paid to the same’ law firm in amounts as follows:

66
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. 67

58. On the first income tax return filed by the fourteen
corporations mentioned in the preceding paragraph, no
reference was made to the fact that the amounts paid were
organizational costs. Neither on nor attached to the .re-
turns were there statements to the effect that the fourteen
corporations elected to amortize the organizational costs.
(P. Exs. 8). The amounts mentioned in the preceding
' paragraph were deducted along with other amounts by
each of the fourteen corporations on their respective first
income ‘tax réturns under the classification “Legal and
Professional fees.” (Ibid.) a

As to the travel and entertainment expense issue:

59. During 1958, plaintiff Charles Edwards, at a down- —
town Houston hotel, cashed thirty-five $300 counter checks :
-drawn on his ‘personal bank. These checks were cashed

regularly about every ten days or two weeks. Of the ag-
Sregate currency received ($10,500) Mr. Edwards con-
tends that he redeposited $1,000. (Ex. K-1 to-P. Ex. '5 ).

60. During 1959, plaintiff Charles Edwards ‘(at the ©

same downtown Houston hotel) cashed forty $300 coun-
ter checks drawn on his personal bank account, one $300
counter.check in New Iberia, Louisiana, and-one $800
counter check at the downtown Houston. hotel. These
checks were. cashed regularly every week to tea days
throughout'the year. (Ex..K-2 to P.-Ex. -

61. Neither Mr. Charles Edwards nor any other person
’ maintained any records whatsoever to substantiate whether
the $9,500 in 1958 (Par. 59, supra.) or the $13,100 in
1959 (Par. 60, supra.) were expended for travel and/or
entertainment. (G. Ex. 18 (Edwards subpoena, itefff ie i a
327, 329-31)). | Cosme:

68-

. As to the government bond interest issue:

. 62. During December 1946, the’ plaintiff Keith S. Ed- |
wards purchased six: United States Savings Bonds, Series
F, at a cost of $7,400 each, or a total of $44,400; these
- bonds had maturity values of $10,000 each, or an aggre-
gate maturity value of $60,000 when is matured. (G.

Exs. 7 & 8, Pars. 80.) |

63. Plaintiff Keifi-S, Edwards during January 1947,
purchased six additional Series F United States Savings -
‘Bonds, three at a cost_of $7,400 each, and three at a cost -
of $740 each, or a total cost of $24,420. These bonds had
maturity values of respectively three at $10,000 and three
at $1,000, or a total of f $33, 000. ue Exs: 7 & 8, Pars.
81.)

_ 64. The bonds described in the second preceding para-
graph, purchased during December 1946, matured during
_ December 1958, an@the bonds mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, purchased during January 1947, matured dur-
ing January of 1959, The United States had not extended
the maturity date on the Series F Bonds described in this ,
paragraph, and the maturity: values thereof were payable
when and as the bonds matured, and would have been
paid to plaintiff Keith Edwards had he presented them for
ie ocr (G. Exs.’7 & 8, Pars. 82.)

~ 65. Some time during 1964, plaintiff Keith Edwards
presented all of the Series F Bonds and collected the ag-
gregate maturity value of $93,000. (G. Exs. 7 & 8, Pars.
82.) .

66.. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue caused the

various tax returns of all plaintiffs involved in this suit ~~

to be examined and as a result of such examination, ad-
ditional assessments were made, paid, and in due course

9

as ot wl pm ay

69
after claims for refund were filed, these suits ‘demanding
refunds were filed. Because the plaintiff Keith Edwards
has conceded that the government is correct as to this @d-
ditional assessment, no further discussion or reference to
_ ‘this part of the case need be further mentioned.

> °

case, the rulings are as follows:

(1) As to the admissibility of the letter of John’O’Far:
rell, dated July 15, 1965. The same is admitted upon
authority of ‘Brooks v. Texas General Ind. Co., 251 F.2d" -
_ 15 (C.C.A. 5th 1958). This letter was hearsay, not sworn
to and the person writing it was not subjected to cross-
examination and it was cumulative of other expert witness
offered by the Plaintiffs. The weight to be given such
testimony is, of course, up to the trier of facts. The Court.
in considering the latter ‘is, in accord with the following '
from the case of Jones v. N. V. Nederlandsch-A meri-
kaansche Stoomvaart Maatshappij, 374 F.2d 189, at 1 90,
when the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held: : is

“. .. For the opinion, of an expert even. if uncontra-
dicted is not conclusive and a jury is not required to
accept it. Such testimony | must pass through the
Screen of the jury’s judgment of credibility. Sartor .
v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U. S. 620, 627, .
64 S.Ct. 724, 88 L.Ed. 967 (1944); Rhoades, In-
corporated v. United Air Lines, Inc., 340 F.2d 481

(3 Cir. 1965); Wooley v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Company, 281 F.2d 78 (3 Cir. 1960).”.° 27 -.

70

’ Passing now to’ the “question of equitable estoppel
claimed by Plaintiff as the result of a conversation between
Plaintiff C. W. Edwards and government employees Walt
- Williams and Steven Condon. At most, this conversation
was tentative and only applied to one vessel, to wit: Letha
C.. The casé of Bornstein v. The United States [65-1
USTC 9421], 345 F.2d 558 is in point and controlling.
In that case-at page 562, the ‘tout of Claims wrote as.
follows: ’

(2) “... It is a settled piebinle of law that the
United States is not bound by the unauthorized acts
of its agents, that it-is not estopped to assert the lack
of authority as a defense, and that persons dealing

'. with an agent of the government must take notice
of the limitations of his authority. Federal Crop In-
surance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 68 S.Ct. 1;,
,92- L.Ed. 10 (1947); Utah Power & Light Co. v.
United-States, 243 U.S. 389, 37 S.Ct. 387, 61 L.Ed.
791 (1917); Byrne Organization, Inc. v. United

' States, 287 F.2d 582,.152 Ct.Cl. 578 (1961). An.
agent cloaked only with apparent authority cannot

- bind the United States for, as the court stated in

. .United\States v. Willis, 164 F.2d 453, 455 (4th Cir.
1947)— ss 3 4 +

sé

‘* * * He who deals with an + seent of the goverti-

- ment must look to his authority, which will not be

_ presumed but must be established:~-He-cannot. rely”.

upon the. scope of dealing or apparent Semone | as in
the case of a private agent’.”

All other motions not heretofore specifically ruled on
are enced denied and overruled.

!

bepisciedion Issue

* Coming now to the first question for decision—that of
the matter of the depreciation of the tugs and barges.

- ’ Teas i

71

ge

~ Plaintiffs claim that both the tugs and the barges have a

useful life of only 7 years and that at the tnd of that 7~ -

year period, they have no salvage value. Defendant as-_

serts that the tugs have a‘useful life of 35 years with a
10% salvage value and the barges have a useful ‘life of
25 years, and a 10% Salvage value at the end of. that

25 year period. A large amount of the more than 1,800 |

pages of testimony was devoted to this question of de-
preciation. The question of the: regulation of the depre-

ciation is covered in the Appendix .A attached’ to this.
Opinion. Judge ‘Connally in the recent case of Shell -Pipe -

Line Corporation v. United States, 267 F.Supp. 1014, at
1018, correctly discusses depreciation, and: in doing so

‘

not have enjoyed. The bur-
den of proof that the Commissioner was in error was upon
the Plaintiffs and they have not carried their burden. In the

case Of Hiawatha Home Builders, Inc. y. Commissioner of -

Internal Revenue [CCH Dec. 24884], 36 Tax Court of
United States Reports, at 498, the court held:

“* * * The second issue is whether the petitioner

has established ‘by the clear preponderance of the

= :

ee

74

/ evidence’ that a major purpose of the transfer men-
/ tioned and described in the first issue, supra, was not
to secure the surtax exemption or the minimum ex-
cess profits credit. The issue is one of fact, to be de-
termined upon a consideration of all the circum-
- stances relevant to the transfer. Truck Terminals,
- Inc. (CCH Dec. 24,044], 33 T. C. 876, 884; Sno-
Frost, Inc. {CCH Dec. 23,474], 31 T. C. 1058, 1062,
‘acq. 1959-4C. B. 7; Income Tax Regs., Sec. 1.1551-

1 (e). (Emphasis added.)

The interdicted purpose of securing the surtax
exemption need not be the sole or principal purpose
of the transfer of property. Rather, the benefit of
the exemption is to be disallowed if such purpose was
a major purpose. Truck Terminals, Inc., supra. Nor
_will a mere showing of a business need as actuating
“the transfer suffice to satisfy a taxpayer’s burden of
proof under section 1551. In a word, the taxpayer has
the burden of establishing a negative proposition, i.e.,
that the securing of the surtax exemption or the mini-
mum excess profits credit was not a major purpose
of the transfer.”

/

. The history and listing of the claims against the cor-
porations and partnerships and their respective vessels for
the years herein involved are significant when. compared
with the amount sought to be saved by the taxpayers. See:
Paragraphs 55 and 56 on pages 42 and 43 of this Memo-
randum Opinion. :

Plaintiffs have the heavy burden under the settled law
of proving that the organizing of the 21 corporations was
not for the purpose of securing surtax exemptions. If
one purpose was to obtain such surtax exemption, then
Plaintiffs have failed to discharge their burden. On this
question of tax avoidance I hold against the Plaintiffs and
in favor of the Government.

©

75

Amortization

Coming now to the question of whether the corporate
Plaintiffs are not entitled to amortize their organizational

expenditures. Several of the corporations’ expended funds —

for legal costs in connection with their organization.’
On the federal tax returns filed by each of the corpora-
tions they deducted the full amount of the organizational
costs as “legal and professional fees” treating them as de-
ductible under Section 162. ;

The Government takes the position that none of these
amounts are deductible as legal and professional fees, i.e.,
under Section 162 as ordinary and necessary business ex-
penses. Taxpayers now agree that Section 162 is inap-
plicable...Both parties agree that if they are deductible
at all, such expenditures are deductible only under Sec-
tion 248"' of the Internal Revenue Code. Appendix A,
Page 2, infra.

~- .
® The names of the corporations involved in this’ issue are set: out

in Footnote 3, supra. ;.

1°The amounts expended are set out in Statement, supra, Pars.
57 & 58.

11 Section 248 was enacted in the 1954 Internal Revenue Code to
.provide a benefit to yers; there was no corresponding provision
in prior internal sévenue law. Under the law prior to 1954, organiza-
tional costs wére required to be capitalized and no deduction was
ever allowed {therefor on the theory that the corporation had an
indefinite life; or if it had a definite life, it was subject to renewal
an indefinite number of times. The organizational costs.were deduct-
ible only when the corporation was terminated and its franchise

oabandoned. Malta Temple Association v. Commissioner [CCH Dec.
5133], 16 B. T. A. 409 (1929); Shellabarger Grain Products Co. v.
Commissioner [44-2 ustc J 9527], 146 F.2d 177 (C..A.7th, 1944);
Koppers Co. v. United States [60-2 ustc { 9505], 278 F.2d 946 (Ct.
Cl. 1960). }

76
\2
The Government takes the position that Section 248
requires an express election and failure to make the elec-
tion in the form and manner proscribed, precludes ap-
plicability of Section 248. (Emphasis added. ) :

» With respect to the time for the- scope of the election —
required by Section 248, Section 248(c), Appendix A,
infra, Page 3 provides in part as follows:

“The election provided by subsection (a) may ‘be
made for any taxable year beginning after Decem-
ber 31, 1953, but only if made not later than the
time prescribed by law for filing extensions thereof) .”
(Emphasis added.)

For Regulations pertinent to the time and manner of.
making an election see (Section 1.248-1(c)), Appendix
A, Page 8, infra. bt oha 2s

All of the plaintiffs admittedly failed to cémply..with
Section 248 and the foregoing regulation. They made no
reference in any way to an election to avail themselves of
Section 248. The Regulations under Section 248 are ob-
viously valid, because’ they are reasonable, consistent with
the statute, ard°clearly with the Congressional grant of
power. See, e.g., Ackerman v. United States [63-2 USTC
q 9542], 318 F.2d 402, 404 (C.A. 10th); Darby v. Wise-
man [63-2 USTC 4 12,186], 323 F.2d 792 (C.A. 10th,
1960).

the doctrine of election applies where, as here, a ‘tax-
payer is given a choice of either taking one or two courses
of action; once there has been ‘a clear exercise of the
choice as shown by some act or failure to act, the election
is binding on the taxpayer. An oversight, an error of

ct»

=
t ¢

t

77

judgment, or unawareness of tax consequences does not
lessen the binding character of the election. See Mertens,
Federal Income ‘Taxation, Sections 60.19-60.20 (1959);

Ross, v. Commissioner [48-2 USTC 4 9341], 169 F.2d

>» 483, 493 (C.A. Ist 1948); Alabama Pipe Co. v. Com-

Thorrez v. Commissioner [CCH .Dec. 23,301],*
655, 668 (1958) aff'd [60-1 USTC q 11,920], 2
945 (C.A. 6th). i 2 :

‘The corporate’ ‘Plaintiffs in the instant case made
binding elections not to claim the benefits of Section 248

. missioner [CCH Dec. 20,619], 23 T.C. 95, 98 43 :

F.2d

~

Suasiassions expenses, therefore, fall under the general
; they must be capitalized and recovered upon ulti-
sat abandonment of the corporate franchises.’*
Travel and Entertainment. Expenses

Reaching the last question to be decided on the-merits,

to wit: That of the alleged travel and entertainment ex-

_ penses claimed by Mr. Charles W. Edwards.
In the case of W. Horace Williams, Sr., and Viola Bloch

E&.:

by not complying with the statute and Regulations. Their

COP REO RN,

Williams v. United States of America, United States Court |~

of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, June 18, 1957, [57-2 USTC
q 9759] 245 F.2d 559, at 560, now Chief Judge John R.

' Brown, in a case in which a taxpayer sought a refund for
income tax for entertainment expenses, wrote:

“* * * That the.trier, whether District Court or
Tax Court, might have considerable latitude in mak-
ing estimates of amounts probably spent in the light

of accepted practice amongst law-abiding business-

12 See the preceding footnote. :

«

| oe

78

men of moral standing considering the nature and
kind of records which might reasonably be kept for
such expenditures, Cohan v. Commissioner, 2 Cit.,
[2 USTC 4 489] 39 F.2d 540, 543, certainly does not”
requife that such latitude be employed. The District
Court may not be compelled to guess, or estimate. It
may not be compelled to estimate even though such -
an estimate, if made, might have been affirmed. For,
.the basic requirement is that there be sufficient evi-
dence to satisfy the trier that at least the amount al-_
lowed in the estimate was in fact spent or incurred for
the stated “purpose. Until the trier has that assurance
from the record, relief to the: taxpayer would .be un-
guided largesse.” ;

In the late case of Herbert v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue [67-1 USTC 4 9421], 377 F.2d 65, at 69, the
court held: — ys, :

_ “& * & The general rule is that the burden of proof
is on the Commissioner to establish that the taxpayer
received income. Hawever, the. Commissioner’s de-
- termination of a deficiency satisfies such burden since »
the determination’made by the Commissioner is pre-
sumptively correct. The taxpayer then has the burden
of overcoming this presumption by a preponderance
of the evidence. American Pipe and Steel Corp. _v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue [57-1° USTC
49590], 243 F.2d 125, (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 906, 78 S.Ct. 333, 2, L.Ed,2d 261 _(1957).”

In this case, the hcuiser C. W. Edwards’ signally failed

- to discharge his burden of proof by not having any recard -

of such entertainment or tfavel expenses, -and I therefore
hold that he ‘has failed- reasonably to establish with suf-
ficient certainty to entitle him to make any recovery of
the amounts that he allegedly spent for such entertain-
ment or travel expenses. le

ee

«ec

oe

Rig Me au Je

In line with the above facts and. the applicable law, I

find that the claimed ¢ expenses of Mr. C. W. Edwards in

the amount of $22, 600. 00 are non-deductible personal ¢ ex-
penses. 3

The aici and foregoing shall constitute the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law herein.

The question of court costs is adjudicated as follows:

Two-thirds shall' be paid. by the Plaintiffs and one-third . |

.. by the:Defendant. ‘

The Clerk will notify counse].

Appendix A
pena Revenue Code of 1954:

- SEC. 11. TAX IMPOSED.

(a) Corporations in General.—A tax is hereby im-
, Posed for each taxable year on the taxable i income of every
*corporation:. The tax Shall. consist of a normal tax com-
,. puted under subsection ( b) and a surtax computed under
subsection (c).

( b) Normal Tax.—

1) Taxable years beginning before July 1, 1964.—In
the case of a taxable year beginning before July 1, 1964,
the normal. tax is equal . ‘to 30 percent of the taxable in-
come. Pa eet

way Taxable years beginnirig nha June 30, 1964. —_

In the case of ‘a taxable year beginning after June 30,
1964, the normal tax’ is — to 25 percent of the taxable.
income.

SPR MN

80

(c) Surtax.—The surtax is equal to 22 percent of
the amount by. which the taxable income (‘computed with-
out:regard to the deduction, if any, provided in section 242
for partially tax-exempt interest) exceeds $25,000.

(26 U.S.C. 1958 ed., Sec. 11.) Si >

SEC. 61. GROSS INCOME DEFINED.

(a) General Definition. —Except as otherwise provided .
in this subtitle, gross income means all income from what-
ever source derived, adn

artic ae re

(26 USC 1958 ed., Sec. 61.)

| SEC. 162. TRADE OR BUSINESS: EXPENSES,

(a) In General.—There shall be allowed as a deduction
all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or busi- ,

ness, including— : ra
: ee
; (2) traveling expenses’ (including the entire amount
- expended for-meals and lodging) while away from home
in the pursuit of a trade or business; * * *

a ee
(26 U.S.C. 1958 ed., Sec. 61.)

Pa

SEC. 167. DEPRECIATION.

(a) General Rule—There shall be allowed as a de-
preciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the ex-

a
y a

¢ bed -
: aor Dx. > sa vane eR iy

81

haustion, wear and tear ( including a- reasonable allow-..

ance for obsolescence )—
(1) of property used in the trade or business, or

(2) of property held for the production of income.

(b) Use of Certain Methods and Rates-—For taxable .

years ending after December 31, 1953, the term “reason-

.

able allowance” as used’ in subsection (a) shall include
(but shall not be limited to) an allowance computed in

accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary

or his delegate, under any of the following methods:
(1) the straight line method,

(2) the declining balance method, using a rate not ex-

ceeding twice the rate which would have been used had
the annual allowance been computed under the method
described in paragraph (1), |

(3) the sum of the years-digit method, and

(4) any other consistent method. productive of an an- .

“nual allowance which, when added to all allowances for
the period commencing with the taxpayer’s use of the
property and including the taxable year, does not,’ during

the first two-thirds of the useful life of the property, exceed

the total of such allowances which would have been used
had such allowances been computed under eo
- described in ‘paragraph (2). ~ ence ere:

Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit or
&reduce an allowance otherwise allowable under subsec-
~ tion (a).

(c) Limitations on Use of Certain Methods and Rates.
—Paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) of subsection (b) shall

a +

”
)

82

apply only in the case of, property (other than intangible
property): described in subsection (a) with a useful life
of 3 years or more— 7 :

(1) the construction, reconstruction, or erection of
which is completed after December 31, 1953, and then
_ only to that portion of the basis which is properly attribu-
table to such construction, reconstruction, or erection after
December 31, 1953, or

(2) acquired after December 31, 1953, if the original

_* use of such property commences with. the taxpayer and |
commences after such date.

es ¢ 2

(26 U.S.C. 1958 ed., Sec. 167.)

SEC. 248. ORGANIZATIONAL EXPENDITURES.

(a) Election to-Amortize.—The organizational expendi-
tures of a corporation may, at the election of the corpora- ©
tion (made in accordance with regulations prescribed by
the Secretary or his delegate), be treated as deferred ex-
. penses. In computing. taxable income, such deferred ex-

Py penses shall be allowed as a deduction ratably over such

period of not less than 60 months as may be selected by
‘the corporation (beginning with the.month in which the
corporation begins business).

(b) Organizational Expenditures Defined.—The term
“organizational expenditures” means any expenditure
— which— | |

(1) is incident to the creation of the corporation;

(2) is chargeable to capital account; and

\§3

(3) is of a character ‘which, if expended incident to
the creation of a corporation having a limited life, would
be amortizable over such life. sige se

(c) Time for and Scope of Election—The election
provided by Subsection (a) may be_made for any tax-
able year beginning after December 31, 1953, but only

if made not later. than the time prescribed by law for
filing the .return for such‘ taxable year (including ex- .

‘tensions thereof). The period so elected shall be adhered
to in computing the taxable income of the corporation
for the taxable year for which the election is made and
all subsequent taxable years. The election shall apply only

with respect to expenditures paid-or incurred on or after |

> 2

the date of enactment of this title.
(26 U.S.C. 1958 ed., Sec. 248.) &

SEC. 269. ACQUISITIONS MADE TO-EVADE OR
-AVOID INCOME TAX.

2(a) In General.—If—.. * te

(1) any person or persons’ acquire, or quired on or
after October 8, 1940, directly or indirectly, control of
a corporation, or ? \

(2) any corporation acquires, or acquired on or, after

October 8, 1940, directly or indirectly property of an-

other corporation, not controlled, directly or indirectly,
immediately before such acquisition; by such acquiring
corporation, or its stockholders, the basis -of which prop-
erty, in the hands of. the acquiring corporation, is de-
termined by reference to the basis in the hands of the
‘transferor corporation.

and the principal purpose for which such acquisition was’ °
made is evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax by

84 —

ance, which such person or corporation would not other-
wise enjoy, then the Secretary or his delegate may dis-

allow such deduction, credit,- or other allowance, For
purposes of paragraphs (1) and’ (2), control means the

ownership of stock possessing atleast 50 percent of the
total combjned voting power of all classes of stock en-
titled to vote or at least 50 percent of the total value
of shares of all classes of stock of the corporation.

(b) Power of Secretary or His Delegate to Allow De-
duction, etc., in Part—In any case to which subsection
(a) applies the Secretary or his delegate is authorized—

(1) to allow as a deduction, credit, or allowance any

part of any amount disallowed, by such subsection, if he

determines that such allowance will not result in the

evasiofi or avoidance of Federal income tax for which the

acquisition was made; or

(2) to distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income,

and distribute, apportion,. or allocate the deductions,

credits, or allowances the benefit of which was sought to

be Secured, between or among the corporations, or prop-

. , | ; | &
Securing the benefit of a déduction, credit,°or other allow-

€

erties, or parts thereof, ‘involved, and. to allow such de-..

ductions, credits, or allowances so distributed, appor-
tioned, or allocated, but to give effect.to such allowance
only to such extent as he determines will not result in the
evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax for which the
acquisition’ was made; or

(3) to exercise his powers in ‘ie undef paragraph (1)
and in hac under paragraph (2).
* *-*

(26 U.S.C. 1958 ed., Sec. 269.)

Coe,

. «85

SEC. 451.. GENERAL RULE FOR TAXABLE YEAR
OF INCLUSION. : De a:
(a) General Rule.—The amount of any item of -gross
income shall be included in the. gross income for the tax-
able year. in which received by the taxpayer, unless, unde?

the method of accounting used in computing taxable in- ~
come, such amount is to be properly accounted for as of

a.different period, |
(26 U.S.C. 1958 ed., Sec. 451.) _
“re oe

ee nes

SEC. 482. ALLOCATION OF INCOME AND DE.

DUCTIONS AMONG TAXPAYERS.

. In any case of. two or.more organizations, trades, or

businesses (whether or not incorporated, whether or not ;
organized in the United States, and whether or not affili- -
ated) owned or controlled directly, or indirectly by the”

same interests, the Secretary or his delegate may distribute,

apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or .

allowances berwa or among such organizations, trades,
or businesses, if he determines that such distribution, ap-

portfonment, or allocation is necessary in order. to prevent

evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of
such organizations, trades, or businesses.

(26 U.S.C. 1958 ed., Sec. 482.)

SEC. 544. RULES FOR DETERMINING STOCK
OWNERSHIP. % |

(a) Constructive Ownership.—For purposes of deter-
mining whether a corporation is a personal holding com-
pany, insofar as such determination is based on stock
ownership under section 542 ( a)(2), section 543 (a)(5),
or section 543(a)(6)— | moe

:
. \
a \
. . \

of

~

§
* SOREN EMRE NE Re ENA NBR cmp rr

' : “2 . ‘

“f ee “an |
86 -
(1) Stock not owned by individual, —Stock. owned, >
directly. or indirectly, by or for a. corporation, partnership,

estate, or trust shall be considered ‘as being owned pro-
portionately by its shareholders, partners, or beneficiaries. -

(2) F amily and partnership ownership. An individual
. shall be considered as owning the stock owned, directly
“Or indirectly, by or for his family or by or for his partner.
For purposes of this paragraph, the family of an individual
includes only his brothers and sisters (whether by the’.
whole or half blood), ‘ spouse, ancestors, and lineal ~~

oe cendants.

(3) Options. akg any person has an option to acquire
stock, such stock shall. be considered as owned ‘by such °
- person. For purposes of this paragraph, an option to —
acquire such ah option, and each one of a series. of such
options, shall: be. considered as an — to” — such
stock. ‘

(4) Application of family-partnership and option rules.
—Paragraphs (2) and (3) shall be applied — a

‘ (A) For purposes of the stock ownership requirement -
provided in section 542 (a)(2), if, but only if, the effect
is to make the corporation a personal holding * company;

(B) for purposes of section 543(a) (5) (relating to
personal service contracts), or of section 543(a)(6) (re-—
‘lating to the use of property by shareholders), if, but
only if, the effect is to make the amounts therein referred
to includible under such peregraptt as personal holding
company income.

(5) Constructive pwarahip: as” ‘actual “ownership. _
Stock constructively owned by a person by reason of the

oe
i Ja : - at

______1951, all or part of its property (other than money) to ——

2a To

application of paragraph (1) or (3). shall, for purposes «|

of applying paragraph (1) or (2), be treated as actually ©

ownea by such. person; but. stock constructively owned

by an individual by reason of the application of paragraph ia ,

\(2) shall not be treated as owned by him for purposes of '

_~ again applying such paragraph in order to make another :
-’ the constructive owner of such stock. | '

(6) Option rule in lieu of family and partygrship rule, |

—If ‘stock-may-be_considered as owned by an-individual * ~ |

_ under either paragraph (2) or-(3)-it-shall be considered
as owned by him under paragraph (3),

es ‘6

(26 U.S.C. 1958 ed., Sec. 544.)

SEC. 1551. DISALLOWANCE OF _SURTAX EX- |
_EMPTION. AND * ACCUMULAT&D EARNINGS ° |
CREDIT. — .

If any corporation transfers, on or after J anuary 1,

another. corporation which.was created for the purpose of
acquiring’such property or which -was not actively engaged
in business at the time of ‘such acquisition, and’ if after
such transfer the transferor corporation or its stockholders,
or both, are in control of such transferee corporation ;
- during any part of the taxable year of such transferee
corporation, then such transferee corporation shall not ;

: .-u-,,40F' such taxable year (except as may be otherwise de-

termined under section 269( b)) be-allowed either the
$25,000 exemption from surtax provided in section 11(c) ;
or the $60,000 accumulated earnings credit provided in
paragraph (2) or (3) of section. 535(c), unless: such |
transferee’ corporation shall. establish’ by the clear pre- .

.
»

88

.

- ponderance ef the evidence that the securing of such =
exemption or credit was not a major purpose of such .-

transfer. For purposes of this section, control means -the
. Ownership of stock. possessing at least 80 percent of the
total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled
‘to vote or at least 80 percent of the-total value of shares .
of all classes of stock of the corporation. In determining
" the ownership of stock for the purpose of this section, the
ownership of stock shall be determined in accordance with
the provisions of section 544, except that constructive

ownership under section 544(a)(2) shall be determined —

‘only with respect to the individual’s spouse and minor
children. The provisions of section 269(b), and the au-

thority of the Secretary under such section, shall, to the

extent not inconsistent with the provisions of this section, ;
be applicable to this section. (26 U.S.C. 1958 ed., Sec.
1551.)

Treasury “Regulations on Income Tax saa Code):

Sec. 1.167(a)-1. Depredigiton in general. —(a) Reason-.

_ able allowance. Section 167 (a) provides that a reasonable
- allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear, and obso-

lescence of property used in the trade or business or of

property held by the taxpayer for the production of in-—

come shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction. The
allowance is that amount which should be set aside for
the taxable year in accordance with a reasonably con-

: sistent plan (not necessarily at a uniform rate), so that

the aggregate of the amounts set aside, plus the salvage
value, will, at the end of the estimated useful life of. the
depreciable property, equal the cost or other basis of the
property as provided in section 167(g) and § 1. 167(g)-1.
An asset shall not be depreciated below a reasonable

/*

"89

salvage value under any method “Of computirig deprecia- .

tion. However, see Section 167(f). and § 1.167(f)-1 for

rules which permit a reduction in the-amount of salvage ©

value to be taken into account for certain personal prop-
erty acquired after October 16, 1962. See also paragraph
(c) of this section for definition of Salvage. The allowance

shall not. reflect amoynts representing a mere reduction—

in market, value. See section’ 179 and § 1.179-1 for a
further description of the term “reasonable allowance.”

(b) Useful life... For the purpose of section 167 the
estimated. useful life of 4n asset is not necessarily the
useful life inherent in the but is the period over
which the asset may reasonably be expected to be useful
to the taxpayer in his trade or business or in the produc-
tion. of his income. -This period shall be determined by
reference to his experience with similar property taking

‘into account present conditions and. probably future de-
velopments. Some of the factors to be considered in de- .

&

termining this period are (1) wear and tear and decay or
decline from natural Causes, (2) the normal progress of
the art, economic changes, inventions, and currentt@e-
velopments within the industry and the taxpayer’s trade or
business, (3) the climatic and other local conditions pe-

. Culiar to ‘the taxpayer’s trade or business, and (4): the

taxpayer's policy as to repairs, renewals, and replacements.
Salvage value is not-a factor for the purpose of determin-
ing useful life. If the taxpayer’s experience is inadequate,
the general experience in the industry may be used until
such time as the taxpayer’s own experience forms an ade-
quate basis for making the determination. The estimated
remaining useful life may be subject to. modification by

reason of conditions known to exist at the end of the
taxable year and shall be redetermined ‘when necessary

ad “
ORRIN MTT v
o

hinted in ode

eo EL TERETE LYE MEO EAS HEN

Cee Reha a

90

i

regardless of the method of computing depreciation. How-
- ever, estimated remaining useful life shall be redetermined
only when the change\in the useful life is significant and
there is ‘a clear and convincing basis for thé redetermina-
tion. For rules covering\agreements with respect to use-
ful life, see section 167(d) and § 1.167(d)-1.

(c) Salvage. (1) Salvage. value is the amount (de-°

termined at the time of acquisition) which is estimated

-will bé realizable upon .or other disposition of an asset

; when it is no longer useful in the\taxpayer’s trade or busi-

-’ ness or in the production of his spi and is to be re-
- tired from service by the taxpayer lvage value shall not —

be changed at any time after the determination made at .

the time of acquisition merely because of changes in

price levels. However, if thére is a redetermination of

useful life under the rules of paragraph (B) of this sec-

ined based upon facts
; — of useful life.

Salvage, when ‘reduced by the cost of removal, is referred

| to. as net salvage. The time at which an asset is retired

\ from service may vary according to the policy of the tax-

payer. If the taxpayer’s policy-is to dispose of assets -

which are still in good operating condition, the salvage

value may represent a relatively large proportion of the

original basis of the asset. However, if the taxpayer cus-

tomarily uses an asset until its inherent useful life has

been substantially exhausted, salvage value may represent _

no more than junk value.’ Salvage value must be taken

jnto account in, determining the depreciation deduction

either by a reduction of the amount subject to depreciation |

or by a reduction in the rate of depreciation, but in no

event shall an asset’(or' an account) be depreciated be-
low a reasonable salvage value. See, however, paragraph

~

91

(a) of §.1.167(b)-2 for the treatment of salvage under
the declining balance method, and § 1.179-1 for the treat-

ment of - salvage in computing the additional first-year °
* depreciation allowance. The taxpayer may.use either sal-

vage or net salvage in determining depreciation allowances

_ but such practice must. be consistently followed and the

treatment of the costs of removal must be consistent with

: the practice’ adopted. For specific treatment of salvage

value, see §§ 1.167(b)-1, 1.167(b)-2, and 1.167(b)-3.
When an asset is retired or disposed of, appropriate ad-
justments shall be made in the asset and depreciation re-

Serve accounts.,-~For example, the amount of the salvage”

adjusted for the.costs of removal may be credited to the
depreciation reserve. :

* *# *

(26 GFR, Sec. 1.167(a)-1.) |
Sec. 1.248-1. Election to amortize. organizational ex-

penditures.—(a) In general. (1) Section 248( a) provides
that a corporation may elect for any taxable year begin-

ning after December 31, 1953, to -treat its organizational _
expenditures, as defined in subsection ( b)<of section 248 ~
and in paragraph (b) of this section,’ as deferred expenses. -

A corporation which exercises such election must, at the
time it makes the election, select a period of not less than
60 months, beginning with the month in which it began

business, over which it will arhortize its: organizational —

expenditures. The period. selected by the corporation may

be equal to or greater, but not less, than 60 months, but
- in any event it must begin with the month in which the
- corporation began business. The organizational expendi-
_tures of the corporation: which Are treated as deferred ex-

r .
vs

io RINE BREN ak a

a PRLS RET EI ANT, WEEE USES ALON
‘ .

\
\\

. 92

”~@ ¢
*

penses under the provisions of section 248 and this section _

~ shall then be allowed as a deductiom in computing taxable

income ratably over the period selected by the taxpayer:
The period selected by the taxpayer in making its election.
may not be subsequently changed but shall ‘be adhered
to in computing taxable income for the taxable. year for
which the election is made and all subsequent taxable
years. y : °

(2) If a corporation exercises the election provided in
section 248(a), such election shall apply to all of its ex-
penditures which are: organizational expenditures. within °
the meaning of subsettion (b) of section 248 and para-

_ graph (b) of this section. The election shall apply, how-’ |

ever, only with respect to ‘expenditures incurred before

- the end of the taxable year in which the corporation be- :

gins business (without regard to whether the corporation
files its returns on the accrual or cash method of account-
ing or whether the expenditures are paid in the taxable
year in which they are incurred), if such expenditures
are paid or incurred~on or after August 16, 1954 (the

date of enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954).

(3) The deduction’ allowed under ‘section 248 must be’

| $pread over a period beginning with the ‘month in which
the. corporation begins -business. The determination of ©

the date the corporation begins business présents a ques-
tion of fact which must be determined in each case in
light of all the circumstances of the particular case. The
words “begins business,” however, do not have the same .
meaning as “in existence.” Ordinarily, a- corporation be-
gins business when it starts the business operations ‘for -
which it was organized; a corporation comes into existence
on the date of its incorporation. Mere organizational

-
radi

her

v; ’ ‘ ‘ ee ae ea ce SP ae Cee Wi Reeeire ve

“€4 P

activities, such as the obtaining of the corporate charter, —
..are.not alone sufficient to show the beginning of. business. :
If the activities. of the corporation have advanced to the -
extent necessary to establish the nature of its business 4
Operations, however, it will’ hé& deemed to shave begun’ .
business. For example; the’ (quisition of operating assets

x which. are necessary to: the Aype of business, contemplated

_ May constitute the beginnifg of business. Pade
e . . x * of ‘ .

(c). Time dnd.manner of making election.. The elec-
tion provided by. section 248 (a) and paragraph (a) of '
this section shall be made in a Statement attached to the
taxpayer's return for: the taxable year in which it begins°
business. Such taxable year must be one which begins -
after December 31, 1953. The’return and statement must ~
be filed not. later than the date prescribéd by law-for filing
the return (including any extensions. of time) for tlie tax-
able year in which the taxpayer begins business: The’ state-
ment shall set forth the description and amount of tlie ex-
penditures involved, the date such expenditures were in-'
curred, the month in which the corporation .began ‘busi-

hess, and the number of months. (not. less than 60 and be-
ginning with the month in which’ the taxpayer began busi- *
ness) over which such expenditures are to be deducted’ .
ratably. : : : _

(26, C.F.R., Sec. 1.248:1.)

“~

_ ; ‘

Sec. 1.451-2.° Constructive receipt of income. — (1)
General rule. « Income although not actually teduced to
‘a taxpayer’s: possession is constructively received by him = -
in the taxable year during which it is credited~to his ac-
count, set apart for him, or otherwise made: available_so

e

oO an

eats 8 ia cone hs

y

that he may draw upon it at any time, or so that he could

have drawn upon it during the taxable year if notice of

intention to withdraw had been given» “However, income
is not constructively received if the taxpayet’s-cot ontrol of
its receipt is subject to substantial bee acl or Testric-
tions. Thus, if a corporation credits its employee =
bonus stgck,’ but the stock is not available to such em-

Ployees until some future date, the mere crediting on the

books of: the corporation. does not constitute receipt. In
the case of-interest, dividends, or other earnings (whether

or not credited) payable in respect of any deposit or ac-

count in a bank, building and loan association, savings .

and loan association, or similar institution, the following
‘are not substantial limitations or restrictions on the tax-
- payer’s control over the receipt of such earnings:

-(1) A requirement that the deposit or account, and the
earnings thereon, must be withdrawn in multiples of even
amounts;

(2) The fact that the taxpayer would, by not: with-
drawing’ the earnings until’ a iater date, receive a-higher
rate of earnitigs than would be payable if the corning dre
withdrawn during the taxable year;

(3) A ‘requirement that the earnings may be with-
drawn only upon a Withdrawal of all or part of the de-
posit or account. However, the mere fact ‘that such in-
stitutions may pay earnings on withdrawals, total or par-
tial, made during the last three business days of any
calendar month ending a regular quarterly or semiannual

- earnings period at the applicable rate calculated to the

end of such calendar month shall not constitute construc-
tive receipt of income ‘by any depositor or account holder

Sy

™,
~~,
“

*

\

95

in any such institution who has not made a withdrawal
during such period; — ;

(4) A requirement that a notice of intention to with-
draw must be given in advance of the withdrawal. In any
case when the rate of earnings payable in respect of such
a deposit or account depends on the amount of notice of

intention to withdraw that is given, earnings at the maxi-

mum rate are constructively received during the taxable
year regardless of how long the deposit or account, was
held during the year or whether, in fact, any notice of
intention to withdraw is given during the year. How-
ever, if in the taxable year of withdrawal the depositor
or account holder receives a lower rate,of earnings because
he failed to give the required notice of intention to with-
draw, he shall be allowed an ordinary loss in such taxable
year in an amount equal to the difference between ‘the -
amount of earnings previously included in gross income
and the amount of earnings actually received. See sec-
tion 165 and the regulations thereunder.

+ * *
(26 C.F.R., Sec. 1.1451-2.)

Sec. 1.1551-1. Disallowance of surtax exemption and .
accumulated earnings credit.—

*- * * 9

(d) Nature of transfer. A transfer made by any cor-
poration of all or part of its assets, whether or not such
transfer qualifies as a reorganization under section 368
is within ‘the scope of section 1551 except that section
1551 does not apply to a transfer of money only. For
example, the transfer of cash for the purpose of expanding

meee aaa’
a

96

the business of the transferor corporation through the
formation of a new corporation is not a transfer within
the scope of Section 1551 irrespective of whether the new
corporation uses the cash to purchase from’ the transferor
corporation stock in trade or similar property.

(e) Purpose of transfer. In determining, for the pug-
pose of section 1551, whetlier the securing -of the exemp-
tion from surtax or the accumulated earnings credit con-
stituted “a major purpose” of the transfer, all circum-
stances relevant to the transfer shall be considered. For
disallowance of the surtax exemption and accumulated

earnings credit under section 1551, it is not necessary that

the obtaining of either such credit or exemption or both
have been the sole or principle purpose of the transfer of

the property. It is sufficient if it appears, in the light of

all the facts and circumstances, that the obtaining of such
exemption or credit, or both, was one of the major con-
siderations that prompted the transfer. Thus, the securing
of the surtax exemption or the accumulated earnings
credit may constitute “a major purpose” of the transfer,
notwithstanding that such transfer was effected for a valid
business purpose and qualified as a reorganization Within |
the meaning of section 368. The taxpayer’s burden of
establishing by the clear preponderance of the evidence
that the securing of either such exemption or credit or
both was not “a major purpose” of the transfer may be
met or example, by a showing that the-gbtaining of such |
exemption, or credit, or both, was not a major factor in
relationship to the other consideration or considerations
which prompted the transfer.

(26 C.F.R., Sec. 1.1551-1.)

am

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385604_1061%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
