# Appendix — Wax v. Pate > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385604_0679%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Appendix - **Published:** January 1, 1969 - **Citation:** 396 U.S. 830 ## Text APPENDIX A In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Cirruit © : SEPTEMBER TERM, 1968 . January Session, 1969 No. 16675 o Unitep States or America ex rel.| Appeal from the Wu A. Wax, United ‘States Dis- Petitioner-A ppellant, trict Court for the g Northern District , of Illinois, Eastern Frank J. Pate, Warden, ete. ‘ Division. Respondent-A ppellee. ) V. March 31, 1969 Before Knocu, Senior Circuit Judge, and Kitey and Famrcuitp, Circuit Judges. : Kwnocu, Senior Circuit Judge. This appeal was taken from denial of writ of habeas corpus in-the United States District Court. The Appellate Court of Illinois, 4th Judi- cial District, affirmed the conviction of Petitioner, William A. Wax, for murder in People v. Waz, 75 Ill. App. 2d 163, 220 N.E. 2d 64). The-Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, 1967, 387 U.S. 930. Petitioner asserts that he was denied his right to counsel at a critical stage of the prosecution when he «: mac ~ App. 2 was examined by a psychiatrist prior to. ‘trial while in custody of thé County Jail, without notice to his counsel and in his counsel’s absence, by a psychiatrist who later testified for the State that petitioner was sane. id * At the trial petitioner’s sanity defense was contradicted by the testimony of six lay witnesses and two psychia- trists. The testimony of one, Dr. Gurse, was based on a hypothetical question. The other, Dr. Smith, was asked a hypothetical question too, but also evaluated the testi- mony of the entire trial and his meeting with the petition- er prior to trial. ° 4 The petitioner had been examined by his own init trist, and Dr.. Smith -was asked to see him by the State’s attorney. Although Dr. Smith told the petitioner he was a doctor making an examination at the request of the State’s attorney, petitioner merely looked at Dr. Smith’ when the latter asked his name and age. He nodded his head when asked whether he had served in the armed forces. After 20 minutes. of silence, petitioner asked for his attorney When petitioner’s attorney Jarrived, Dr. Smith told him he wished to examine petitioner with his. permission only. The examination did not continue. Petitioner himself made some use of this attempted examination, when on cross-examination, counsel asked Dr. Smith whether petitioner’s behavior at that interview was not abnormal. Petitioner asserts that once this testi- mony was elicited,’ his counse) had no recourse but to_ test it on cross-examination and that he was in no way vouching for the credibility of the evidence as secured. Petitioner distinguishes between the right to the pres- ence of counsel which is denied, for example, toa grand jury witness, and the assistance of counsel. He asserts that counsel while not present at a psychiatric examina- App. 3 tion might well arrange in advance for conduct of such an examination in a proper manner under appropriate _ conditions. Petitioner points to the procedure suggested in State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 25-26, 210 A. 2d 763, 775, as an example. No objection was a to Dr. Smith’s testimony on the ground now offered: that petitioner was denied as- ‘sistance of counsel. There was no motion to strike the: ‘ testimony. Nor did petitioner’s own retained counsel raise this question in motion for new trial or arrest of judg- ment. Petitioner points out that the issue was raised on “ —— and is not raised — for the first time. “We agree with the view expressed in the District Judge’s carefully reasoned opinion that a psychiatric examination requested{ by the prosecution and conducted by a physician designated by the prosecution who- may testify at the trial on the issue of insanity does not con- stitute a ‘critical’? stage of the proceedings constitution- ally requiring notice and presence of counsel, such as was ~ involved in the line-up in U.S. v. Wade, 1966, 388 US. | 218, or the arraignment in Hamilton v. Alabama, 1961, 368 U.S. 52, 55. : It is not necessary-for counsel: to be present, but we believe it is the better practice to give notice to counsel. Absent a showing of actual prejudice which is mi ing here, we conclude that failure ; to give notice did not Teste: Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. F \ ‘ : | App. + -~S---. APPENDIX B _ MEMORANDUM: OPINION ~ of Hon. A. L. Marovitz, United States District Judge Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus | William Wax, who was.sentenced to 20-35. years on a murder conviction by the Cireuit Court of the Fifth Judicial Circuit of Illinois, Edgar’ County, on January 27, 1965, seeks his release on a writ of habeas corpus. His conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the Fourth District on September 26, 1966, in People v. Waz, 75 I. App. 2d 163, 220 N.E.2d 600. The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on January 18, 1967, and the Supreme Court. of the United States denied certiorari on May 29, 1967, at 387 U.S. 930. The i issue urged here was asserted in all of the proceed- ings below. In essence, petitioner alleges that he was de- _Arived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, in that he was examined by a-~psychiatrist prior to trial, at the state’s request, without notice to his retained counsel and in eounsel’s absence. The psychiatrist subsequently testified at trial as a prosecution witness to the effect that petitioner was sane at the time of the commission of the | offense. Petitioner alleges that the time of the examina- tion constituted a ‘‘critical stage’’ of the prosecution and that the denial of counsel at that, point constitutes a vio- lation of his right to effective Assistance of counsel. we The. right to effective assistance of counsel has been _applied at stages of.- the prosecution where the Supreme Court has consideréd denial of that: right® to vitiate the accused’s guarantee of a fair trial. In Gideon v. Wain- wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the right to counsel was ap- plied to the trial itself, and in Douglas v. California, 372 ° U.S. 353 (1953), to the appellate level. App. 5 ‘ ‘ These cases, and others,’ have construed the Sixth Amendment guarantee to apply to the ‘‘critical’’ stages of the prosecution. And most recently, in a provocative trilogy. of cases, the Supreme Court required the’ exclu- sion of identification evidence which was tainted by the exhibition of the accused to identifying witnesses prior to trial in the absence of counsel. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); And see Stovall vy. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). Those cases held, inter alia, that a post-indictment ‘line- up’’ is a.critical stage of the prosecution, and condemned the practice of exhibiting suspects singly to identifying witnesses. Wade defined a “critical”? stage as, follows: (at. 226) ‘ “It is central to that principle (right to. counsel) ‘that in addition to counsel’s presence at trial, the — accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone ~ against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s absence might.derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial,’’ . As Mr. Justice Black put it in his concurring and dissent- ing opinion ‘in Wade: (at 246) | 7 ‘‘And I agree with the Court that.'a lineup is a ‘eritical stage’ of the criminal. proceedings against an accused, because it is a stage af“Which the Govern- ment makes use of his custody to obtain crucial evi- dence against him.’’ : ’See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961) ; Escobedo v. Iinois, 378 U.S. 478 °(1964) ; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US. 436 (1966) ; Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) ; White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 .(1963.) ee App.6 Se < The narrow issue presentedaby this petition is whether a psychiatrie examination requested by the prosecution and conducted by a doctor of its designation, who testi- fies ‘adversely to the defendant at trial on the issue of in- - sanity, constitutes .a ‘‘eritical stage’’ of the prosecution requiring notice to the presence of the defendant’s attor- ney. The parties are in virtual agreement that the facts as set forth by the Appellate Court when it affirmed de- fendant’s conviction, are essentially accurate. For that reason, we did not deem it necessary to hold an eviden- tiary hearing, and are prepared to, make our ruling on the legal issues discussed in the briefs. The facts of the occurrence, as related by the Appellate Court at 75 Ill. App. 2d at 176-177, are these: ‘‘It is contended that this case must be reversed and remanded for a new trial by reason of the nature of an examination made of the defendant by Dr. Groves Smith,,a psychiatrist acting at the request of the State’s Attorney. This examination was made on September 23rd -at the: jail in Paris. It will be re- called that the first examination of Dr. Greenfield was *. on September 19th. The only evidence upon this ex- — amination was elicited from Dr.“Smith upon cross- examination. He stated that he’ called at the jail and that he saw the defendant and asked his name. ' Dr. Smith identified himself as a doctor making an examination at-the request of..the State’s Attorney. Following such introduction, it appears that the de- fendant and the doctor had no conversation, but that for about 20 minutes there was silence and presuthably, ~ mutual .observation. Dr. Smith then asked the de- fendant if he had ever been in the Army, Navy or. Marine Corps, and said that the defendant shook his head to signify no.There followed another interval > % App. 7 ) ° | of silence and then the defendant asked to have the sheriff get his attorney. Dr. Smith testified that he stated that he would be. glad to ha®e the attorney .; present, and the latter arrived shortly.. He testified that he told the attorney that he wished to examine. the defendant with his permission, but that no fur- oe ther examination was conducted after -such conversa- tion: It appeared that the defendant stood mute.’?’ As in the instant petition, Wax made no claim before the Appellate Court that his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination has been violated. The Appel- late Court nevertheless stated its belief ‘‘that the presence . or absence of the element of self-incrimination is a key factor in the resolution. of this preposition.” (75 Ill.App. 2d at 177) : 6 The*Court went on.to determine the issue within. the framework of a Fifth Amendment analysis, rather than squarely addressing itself to the Sixth Amendment. ground asserted by the petitioner. In denying relief, the Court relied on Schmerber v. California, 384 U:S. (1966). Schmerber held that the defendant’s Fifth» Amendment . privilege was in no way violated by the prosecution’s use at trial of evidence of a blood sample taken involuntarily from defendant. Hence Schmerber was not entitled to claim the privilege against self-incrimination,- which ap- plies only to ‘‘évidence of a testimonial or communicative nature,’’ apd the Supreme Court held there to be no issue of denial‘of counsel with respect to any rights which he did possess. - - = ; | e The Appellate Court regarded the instant right to counsel argument as governed by the same principles used in Schmerber. It stated: (at 179-180) ‘It appears, therefore, under the authorities that | the occasion’ when Dr. Smith and the defendant mu- Apps & tually obs served one another prior. to the arriving of defendant’s counsel, there was, in fact, no testimonial , compulsion as to inculpating matters... There being no..valid question of constitutional dimensions ‘upon the issue of self-incrimination, we believe that the issue raised as to the deprivation of the. benefit of counsel is controlled by Schmerber v. California... Here, as in Schmerber, no issue of counsel’s ability to assist in Susst of any right. which: he did possess was presented ...’’ -° 2 ial The Wade. trilogy was decided on June 12, 1967, sub- sequent by 14 days to the date the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in the instant case. In Wade, the court observed that compelling a defendant merely to exhibit his person for observation by a prosecution witness prior to trial involves no issue 0 testimonial com- pulsign which could raise an issue of self-incrimination ° in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege. However, the Court significantly went'on to explore the Sixth Amendment right t counsel argument upon which it ren- - dered ste india hold: The explanation of the rea- son that issue was significant in Wade,.and nof of conse- quence. in Schmexber, is of decisive importance to the - seope of our deliberations herein. The ‘Court asserted : —__(388 U.S. at 223-224) . ba “The fact thatthe linéyp involved no violation of Wade’s privilege against self-incrimination does not, however, dispose of his‘contention that the courtroom * identifications should have been, excluded because the lineup was conducted without notice to and in the absence of his counsel. * Our rejection of the right s to counsel claim in Schmerber, rested ‘on our conclu- . sion in that case that ‘(n)o issue of counsel’s ability to assist ‘petitioner in respect of any rights he did . - possess is ‘presented.’ 384 U.S. 766. In contrast, in- . this case it is urged that the assistance of counsel at ~ f % - tt = a ~ ¥ “App. 9 the lineupewas indispensable to protect Wade’s most ‘basie right as a criminal defendant—his. right to a fair trial at which ‘the witnesses against him might be meaningfully cross-examined.’? °-° . | _ It immediately becomes apparent that the instant. peti- . tioner is not challenging his* conviction because it ested upon some form. of ‘‘testimonial compulsion,’’ as the Ap- pellate Court seemed to believe he was and as Schmerber did, but because the lack of:notice to his counsel alleged- ly deprived counsel of the opportunity to consult with his client and perhaps with his own medical expért as well, and to,suggest to tha court proper procedures or condi- tions for conducting the examination” _ In Wade, the “Supreme Court distinguished a lineup from the. merely : preparatory steps in the gathering of the prosecution’s evidence, such as ‘‘systematized. or scientific analyzing of the accused fingerprints, blood sample, dothine. hair, and - the like.¥ (at 227). The Court’s justification was as fol- lows: (at 227-228) Aen a ‘“We think there are differences which preclude such’ * stages being characterized as critical stages at which the aceused has the right to the presence ofshis coun- sel. Knowledge.of-the techniques of science and tech- nology is sufficiently available, and the variables in + techniques few.enough, that the accused has the op- ortunity for a meaningful confrontation of the Gov-- ernment ’g case at trial through the ordinary processes of cross-examination of the Government’s expert wit- nesses and the presentation of, the evidence of his own experts. The denial of a right to-hdve his ceun- 0 ‘ o* : sy’ pant ee a i . ? Petitioner does not explicitly argite:that fe lack of notice and his counsel’s absence from the meeting>With Dr. Smith de- prived him. of th opportunity to eonduct‘meaningful” eross- examination at trial. ine {ix tas Ae ~~ oft - | 2 - ° % 5 s \ ° App.10 °! af * o sel present at such gnalyses does yot therefore vio- late the Sixth Amendment; they are not eritical_stages since there is minimal risk that his gounsel’s absence ~ at such stages might derogate from his right to a° j a, airgirial. oer 4 5s an The petitioner urges tha} unlike tlte aforementioned: preparatory evidentiary steps, ‘and, like a lineup, a psy- chiatric observation or examinatign constitutes .a ‘critical tage’’- of “the proceedings. He urges in his brief: (at nya there) eee, % ; “is de “We beHeve “the court oft. ude Seticial’ notice of thésfact that a psychiatyie ésamination bears little re- semblance to, a tést if which” blood is drawn, mixed with ch micals, after-whicli a’ reaction is noted by the technician. Psychiatric examipations do not partake of such easy evaluation. ‘Therefore, the giving of notice to counsel. to ¢nable. him to’consult with peti- tioner and with his own expert so that he may sug- - gest to the court the proper ‘procedures, would seem ’ ; to be required by concepts of fundamental fairness, . as, well as the explicit right to counsel contained in _»the Sixth Amendment.”’ : It is an ac@epted fact of which-the Court will “a “iis ‘that the results of psychiatric observations and examina- tions are often a good bit more conjectural, than the re- sults. of scientific. laboratory tests on fimgerprints, blood samples, hair and the like. The variables in tech- nique are many. And indeed, considerable ferment: has heen engendered as to the sufficiency of the present legal tests of insanitye., We would consequently agree that Wax raises an issue at least ‘‘colorable,’’ so that we should consider his Sixth” Amendment argument in the same framework as did the . Supreme Court in Wade—that is, deterrnining whether he 9 ~ af . ’ App. ll was denied effective asSistance of counsel at 'a<‘‘critical’? stage of the proceedings—rather than rejecting it on Fifth Amendment grounds as did the Appellate Court ‘herein on the basis of Schmerber.’ In fairness, it should again be noted that the Appellate Court acted prior to the decision in Wade. 7 However, we-are impelled to the conclusion that a psy- chiatric Wid bnkevod or examination, as described herein, does not constitute a ‘‘critical”’ stage of the proceédings, constitutionally requiring notice and the presence of coun- Sel, and automatically vitiating Wax’s* convictiqn. Al- «though, ‘‘the procedure followed by the State’s Attorney was possibly not the most desirable,” as the Appellate Court stated, we do not believe it was unconstitutionally — defective, unless petitioner can show some positive preju- dice. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961); Madi- son v. Tahash, 249 F.Supp. ‘800 (D. Minn. 1966). The considerations which prompted the holding in Wade ‘are not present here and indeed have not been urged by petitioner. In determining what constitutes a “critical” “stage of the proceedings, the Supreme Court is chiefly con- erned that the absence of counsel does not derogate from ~ the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The ‘‘identification”’ cases presénted a situation “‘peeuliarjy riddled with in- numerable dangers and variable factors which might seri- ously, tven crucially, derogate from a fair trial.’’ (at 228) .* ; : The chief danger described by the Court in Wade was the high ‘‘degree gf suggestion inherent in the manner in.which the prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses — @ > . . ; © ° for pretritel identification.’’ Numerous examples were - , cited of instances where the suggestive influences utilized -“* upon identification witnesses were all but certain to result in positive identifications. The Court said: (at 999) 7. App. 12 . Suggestion can be created intentionally or un- intentionally | in many subtle ways. And the dangers for the suspect are particularly grave when the wit- ness’' opportunity for observations was insubstan- tial, and thus his susceptibility to suggestion the great- est. -‘‘ Moreover, ‘(i)t is a matter of common experi- ’ ence that, once a witness has picked out the accused ‘at the line-up, he is not likely to go back on his word later on, so that in practice the issue of identity may (in the absence of other relevant evidence) for all practical purposes be determined there and then, be- _ fore the trial.’ ’’ quoting from Williams & Hammel- -* mann, Identification _— Part I, (1963), Crim. ; L. Rev. 479, 482. ; ? In view of the dangers of inilaiiled inherent in a con- frontation between the accused and the victim of witnesses to a crime, the court felt that the presence of counsel might avert prejudice and assure,a meaningful confrontation at trial through counsel’s increased awareness of the facts of the pretrial identification, and consequent ability to meaningfully cross-examine the witness. The following quotations from the Wade opinion. give significant insights into the reasons for the Court’s conclusions: ‘*. . . In any event neither witnesses nor inekp par- ticipants are apt to be alert for conditions prejudicial to the suspect. And if they were, it would likely be of scant benefit to the suspect since neither witnesses non lineup participants are likely to be schooled in the . detection of suggestive influences. Improper influ- a ‘ ences may go undetected by a suspect, guilty or not. ’ who experiences the emotional tension which we might expect in one being confronted with potential accus- ‘ers. Even when he does observe abuse, if he has a criminal record he may be reluctant to take the stand and open up the admissions of prior convictions. More- over, any protestations by the suspect of the fairness of the lineup made at trial are likely to be in vain; : App. 13 - the jury’s choice is between the accused’s unsupported version and that of the police officers present: In short, the accused inability to reconstruct at trial any unfairness that oceurred at the lineup may deprive him of .his only: opportunity meaningfully to attack ‘the credibility of witness’ courtroom identification.” (230-232) } : “Insofar as the accused’s conviction may rest on a courtroom identification, in fact the fruit of a sus. pect pretrial identification, which the accused is help- less to sithbject to effective scrutiny at trial, the ac- cused is deprived of that right of cross-examination which is an essential safeguard to his right to con- front the witnesses against hity. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400. rAnd evén though cross-examination is precious safeguard to a fair trial, it cannot be viewed as an absolute assuraneo of accuracy and reliability. ‘Thus in the present context, where so many variables and pitfalls exist, the first line of defense must be the prevention of unfairness and the lessen- ing of the hazards of eyewitness identificatiof® at the lineup itself. Thé trial which might determine the accused’s fate may well not be that in the courtroom but that at the pretrial confrontation, which the State ajigned against the accused, the witness the sole jury, and the accused unprotécted against the overreaching, intentional or unintentional, and with little or no ef- fective appeal from the judgment there rendered by the witness—‘ that’s the man.’ ’’ (235-236) In the instant situation, the dangers of suggestion relied upon in Walle are totally absent. Although techniques to ascertain the defendant’s mental status may vary de- “pending upon thet examining psychiatrist, in no examina. tion conducted under recognized medical standards should there be a danger that ‘‘the trial which might determine © _ the accused’s fate may well not be that in the courtrogm, but that at the pre-trial confrontation. . .”’ In sum, the dangers of overreaching which are inherently present in > App. 14 identification situations, are inherently lacking at pre- trial psychiatric observations or examinations. Although the better practice, as recognized by the Rules of the IIli- - nois Supreme Court and Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures is to require a court order before sub- jecting a party to a physical or mental examination, no constitutional concerns of right to counsel are as pressing in this regard as they are to lineups or other identifica- tfon situations. | a | In addition, unlike the identification cases, counsel’s right to conduct effective cross-examination should no hindered by his absence at the pre-trial examination. Wha ever risk there might be by the absence of counsel from the examination is minimal at most, and in our judg- ment, does not derogate from the accused’s right to a ~— fair trial. Indeed, petitioner does not raise the argu- ment that this counsel will be able to conduct a less effec- tive cross-examination. if absent from the — psychiatric examination. - If an insanity plea is to be raised at trial, defense coun- sel will routinely conduct his own pre-trial psychiatric examination, and present his own expert witnesses at trial. The jury will then be compelled to evaluate the relative credibility of the experts, based in part upon their testi- mony on cross-exaiination. _ Hence, the other major argument relied upon in Wade— that counsel can éonduct ‘more effective cross-examination if present at a lineup—is also lacking in the instant situa- tion. It is ¢rue that former Rule 17-1 and present Rule 215 of the Illinois Supreme Court, contain requirements of no- tice. But it is equally true that neither provides for the / y Loe Ny App. 15 , Ppresence.of counsel. Nor do the guidelines laid down in State v.. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 210 A. 2d 763 (1965), cited . by defendant, provide for the presence of counsel at a pre-trial physical or mental examination. In our judg- ment, lack of notice in these situations goes only to the de- gree of actual prejudice suffered by the defendant, rather than constituting an argument in support of petitioner’s contention that the psychiatric examination was a ‘criti- cal’ stage of this proceeding. Cf.-People v. Lang, 37 Ill. 2 7 (1967). : Defendant’s argument that he could have consulted his lawyer and his lawyer, an expert, does not amount to the kind of inherent danger recognized. in the lineup cases. We think those arguments too, might have merit only where the defendant makes a slfwing of actual prejudice, and cannot‘ be extended ‘to create an additional stage of. the “proceedings said to be “critical.” Since none of the constitutional deficiencies said to be inherent wheré a defendant lacks counsel at a lineup ap- pear to be inherent where he lacks counsel. at a- pre-trial psychiatric: examination, we conclude that the ‘critical stage’’ rationale of United States v.. Wade has no applica- tion to such an examination.* ' : 3 We need not consider the additional practical problems raised where a defendant is institutionalized in a mental hospital or if. facility, for a short period of examination. The prognosis in such situations, is often made as much on the basis: of mere observations, as was done here, as it is based on actual psychiatric examination. Would petitioner require his attorney to be present throughout the period of-confinement, or only at the times he ~ was being observed, or only at the time of actual examinations? The practical problems of an all encompassing constitutional mandate based on Wade, as applied to’ this issue; are apparent. App. 16 3 There may well be situations where the manner in which a pre-trial psychiatric or physical examination is con- ducted in the absence of counsel, may prejudice the defen- dant’s right to a fair trial. Those should be dealt with as _, they occur, and if.actual prejudice is shown, a new trial ‘ should be granted. All we are saying here is that the same dangers to a fair trial which exist in the’case of a lineup where ¢ounsel is not present, are not in the pic- ture in the case of a pre-trial examination in the absence - of counsel. "4 . Absent a showing that the procedure utilized in the in- stant case resulted in actual prejudice to petitioner which denied him due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, we must deny his petition for habeas corpus. It is manifest that no actual prejudice has been shown herein. No arguments have been made on this ground by petitioner, so that the following language of the Appel- late Court must be recognized as dispositive: (75 Ill.App. 2d at 181). ‘« .. (W)e cannot, in the exercise of judgment upon the whole course of proceedings, conclude that there was an actual deprivation of ‘defendant’s constitu- tional rights, nor any offense to canons of decency, fairness, and conscience A juéement will not be re- versed because of absence of counsel where there is no possibility of prejugice to the defendant. People v. Taylor, 32 Ill.2d 165,°204 N.E. 2d 734; Walton v. United States, 202 F. 2d 18.’. The pétition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.’’ iets ~ --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385604_0679%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.