# Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Crockett v. Illinois > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385604_0545%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition for a Writ of Certiorari - **Published:** January 1, 1969 - **Citation:** 394 U.S. 959 ## Text ——" = == 2 2 & SUPREME COURT. U. & FEB 19 va In Tue Supreme Court of the Ruited States OctoBer TERM, 1968 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent, vs. THEOPLIS CROCKETT; JOWEL HYSMITH; AUGUSTINE NARCISSE; FRANCES HANGER; BERTHA CYRUS; ETHEL PITTS; ELAINE STRONG; RUTH HANSEN; JOAN SMITH; JO ANNE ORLOFF; RONALD F. GEE; and JERROLD P. HOLZMAN, Petitioners. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS Leo E. Hott, 166 W. Washington Street, Chicago, Illinois 60602, Attorney for Petitioners. MIDWEST LAW PRINTING GO., CHIGAGO 60601, FINANCIAL 6-2968 INDEX PAGE Opinion Below 2 The Record 2 Jurisdiction 2 Questions Presented 2 Statement . 3 Constitutional And Statutory Provisions Involved ...... 4 Reasons For Granting The Writ 4) Certiorari Should Be Granted To Review The Illinois Supreme Court’s Holding That The IIli- nois Disorderly Conduct Statute Is Compatible With The First and Fourteenth Amendments ...... Conclusion Appendix—(Opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois) List Or AutTHoritIes CITED Cases: Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965) ................ Dombrowski v. Pfister, 280 U.S. 479 (1965) ............ 10 11 Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 383 U.S. 399 (1966) ............ 8 Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 263 (1937) ............ 7 N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432, 483 (1963) 7 People v. Raby, 40 Ill. 2d 392 ..............-.-.-cecerecse-csceneeeere 5, 6 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940) . 7 United States v. Capital Traction Co., 34 App. D. C. 592, 19 Ann. Cas. 68 5, 6, 7 Zwicker v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249-250 (1967) ...... 9 Others: United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment 4 Illinois Revised Statutes, Chapter 38, Section 26-1 (a) 1 4,9 In THE Supreme Cowt of the United States October TERM, 1968 No. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent, VS. THEOPLIS CROCKETT; JOWEL HYSMITH; AUGUSTINE NARCISSE; FRANCES HANGER; BERTHA CYRUS; ETHEL PITTS; ELAINE STRONG; RUTH HANSEN; JOAN SMITH; ¢O ANNE ORLOFF; RONALD F. GEE; and JERROLD P. HOLZMAN, Petitioners. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT Petitioners pray that a writ of certiorari issue to re- view the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court entered in the above case on November 22, 1968. No petition for rehexring was filed. NA COLNE aI ema Bia 8 ta MIS, Nip 2 Mirae aie pet caine = OPINION BELOW The opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court is reported at 41 Ill. 2d 226, 242 N.E. 2d 235 and set ovt in full as an appendix to this petition. THE RECORD A certified copy of the record below has been filed in this Court. JURISDICTION The judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court was en- tered on November 22, 1968. (R. 411.) Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 US.C., Section 1257. It is respectfully requested that this Court issue the writ of Certiorari and that the cause be consolidated with The People of The State of iliinois v. Albert A. Raby, No. 863, October Term, 1968, now pending in this Court. QUESTIONS PRESENTED Whether the proscription of Section 26-1 (a) of Chap- ter 38, Illinois Revised Statutes violates the Fourteenth Amendment by reason of vagueness and overbreadth? = STATEMENT On May 18, 1967, the petitioners Theopolis Crockett, Jowel Hysmith, Augustine Narcisse, Frances Hanger, Bertha Cyrus, Ethel Pitts, Elaine Strong, Ruth Hansen, Joan Phillips, and Joan Smith, along with other mem- bers of the Independent Union of Public Aid Employees went to the County Building of Cook County, Illinois to discuss matters of public welfare. While there some or all of the petitioners sat in the hallway of the County Building while other members of their group spoke with the County Board President. (R. 255, 256.) On June 1, 1967, the petitioners, Jo Anne Orloff, Ron- ald F. Gee, and Jerrold P. Holzman along with other members of the Independent Union of Fublic Aid Em- ployees met with County Comunissioner George Dunne in his office at the County Building in Cook County, Illi- nois, to discuss public welfare matters. Commissioner Dunne terminated the meeting and the defendants re- mained seaced in his office. (A. 391, 392.) The petitioners were thereafter charged with vio- lating Chapter 38, Section 26-1 (a) of the Illinois Re- vised Statutes. (R. 24, 38, 60, 82, 104, 126, 148, 170, 192, 214, 322, 331, 353.) Prior to the trial the petitioners filed a motion to strike the complaint on the ground that the statute was unconstitutionally void for vagueness and overbreadth and violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. (R. 31-33, 45-47, 67-69, 89-91, 111-113, 133-135, 155-157, 177-179, 199-201, 221-223, 336-338, 357-359, 369-371.) This motion was denied. (R. 50, 72, 94, 116, 138, 160, 182, 204, 226, 234, 341, 362, 374.) wa On review, the Illinois Supreme Court held that Sec- tion 26-1 (a)’s proscription is not vague and overbroad by incorporating its decision in People v. Raby. (Ap- pendix, p. 13.) The Court. held by reference that the words ‘‘knowingly’’ and ‘‘unreasonable’”’? save the dis- orderly conduct statute from unconstitutionality. See Peo- ple v. Raby, 40 Ill. 2d 392, now pending in this Court, No. 863. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, Section I All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law. Illinois Revised Statutes, Chapter 38, Section 26-1 (a) (1) A person commits disorderly conduct when he know- ingly: (1) Does any act in such unreasonable manner as to alarm or disturb another and to provoke a breach of the peace; or... sinillliais REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO REVIEW THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT’S HOLDING THAT THE ILLI- NOIS DISORDERLY CONDUCT STATUTE IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS. The petitioners were convicted on general findings of guilty of disorderly conduct. (R. 48-49, 70-71, 92-93, 114- 115, 136-137, 158-159, 180-181, 202-203, 224-225, 232-233, 339-340, 360-361, 371-372.) Illinois Revised Statutes, Chap- ter 38, Section 26-1 (a) 1. The charges and finding of guilty squarely present the problems of vagueness and overbreadth, whose constitutionality under the First and Fourteenth Amendments petitioners challenged below and challenges here. Petitioners submit that the disorderly conduct is not drawn v'th the narrow specificity required to inform men of common intelligence what is sought to be prohibited by the statute. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). Here, as in Connally v. General Con- struction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926), and United States v. Capital Traction Co., 34 App. D.C. 592, 19 Ann. Cas. 68 we have convictions under a statute where there is a total absence of any definition of what shall constitute the crime. The Illinois Supreme Court incorporated by reference its opinion in People v. Raby, 40 Ill. 2d 392, now pending Certiorari in this Court, No. 863, October Term, 1968, and thereby rejected petitioners’ vagueness challenge to the disorderly conduct statute, saying: The legislature deliberately chose to frame the pro- vision in general terms, prompted by the futility of = an effort to anticipate and enumerate all of the methods of disrupting public order that fertile minds might devise. ‘‘Section 26-1 (a) is a general pro- vision intended to encompass all the usual types of ‘disorderly conduct’ and ‘disturbing the peace.’ Ac- tivity of this sort is so varied and contingent upon surrounding circumstances as to almost defy defini- tion. In addition, the task of defining disorderly conduct is further complicated by the fact that the type of conduct alone is not determinative but rather culpability is equally dependent upon the surrounding circumstances * * * These considera- tions have led the Committee to abandon any at- tempt to enumerate ‘types’ of disorderly conduct. Instead, another approach has been taken. As de- fined by the Code, the gist of the offense is not so much‘.that a certain overt type of behavior was accomplished, as it is- that the offender knowingly engaged in some activity in an unreasonable man- ner which he knew or should have known would tend to disturb, alarm or provoke others. The emphasis is on the unreasonableness of his conduct and its tendency to disturb.’’ People v. Raby, 40 Ill. 2d 392. The Court holds here, as in Raby, that the words ‘*knowingly’’ and ‘‘unreasonable’’ saved the provision from unconstitutionality, apparently on the theory that the petitioners are not in a position to complain about lack of fair notice, since they know better than anyone exactly what they did wrong. Given this construction, the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court flies in the face of this Court’s decision in Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 393, where this Court quoted with approval from United States v. Capital Traction Co., saying: “|. The dividing line between what is lawful and unla’ ful cannot be left to conjecture. The eitizen cannot be heard to answer charges based upon penal egac.r so ~~ —_(— statutes whose mandates are so uncertain that they will reasonably admit of different constructions. A criminal statute cannot rest upon an uncertain foun- dation. The crime, and the elements constituting it, must be so clearly expressed that the ordinary per- son can intelligently choose, in advance, what course it is lawful for him to pursue. Penal statutes pro- hibiting the doing of certain things and providing a punishment for their violation, should not admit of such a double meaning that the citizen may act upon one conception of its requirements and the courts upon another.’? (Emphasis supplied) One reason for the requirement of specificity as a part of the due process clause is that overly vague statutes allow courts to reach arbitrary, ad hominem, or ad hoc results. Although the void-for-vagueness doctrine had traditionally been viewed as concerned principally with the problem of fair notice to the potential criminal actor, -a somewhat more subtle consideration has long been evident in the opinions of this Court’s vagueness deci- sions. This is the concept that a vague statute funda- mentally affronts the rule of law embodied in the Due Process clause by permitting and encouraging more or less arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions. An over-vague criminal law, this Court has recognized ‘‘li- * eenses the jury to create its own standard in each ease.’’ Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 263 (1967). It is ‘‘susceptible of sweeping and improper application,”’ N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 482, 433 (1963), fur- nishing a convenient tool for ‘‘harsh and discriminatory enforcement by prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure.’? Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940). It “‘lends itself to selective enforcement against unpopular causes.’’ N.A.AC.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 482, 433. | creme Bo we erie om This potential for impermissible and abusive adminis- tration may helpfully be conceived in two intimately re- lated but distinguishable aspects. First, there is the au- thor:ty which vague laws confer upon the police for arbitrary street enforcement, arbitrary arrest, and simi- lar harassmenats. Second, there is the propensity of vague laws to enable arbitrary court enforcement, arbi- trary conviction. The first aspect was initially recog- nized by this Court in cases like Herndon and Button, in which the challenged legislation lent itself to use, and actually appeared to have been used, for the suppression of unpopular political expression, and was voided under the particularly stringent standards of statutory spe- cificity evolved by this Court for First Amendment cases. Because of its origin in these cases, and because in each case the same statutory obscurity which licenses ‘‘the jury to create by its own standards”’ also confronted the citizen with an unfairly and repressively vague line of prohibition, the concern for lawless or arbitrary court enforcement failed for a time to emerge from a complex of other concerns, including traditional fair-notice con- cerns and free-speech concerns. But in Giaccio v. Penn- sylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966), constitutional invalida- tion of laws authorizing arbitrary court enforcement came into its own. No question of protecting freedom of expression was involved; and since an issue of judicial standards for sanctions, rather than of standards for conduct demanded of the defendant was presented no problem of fair notice could be made out. This Court held the statute unconstituticnal simply because it ‘‘con- tains no standards at all, nor does it place any condi- tions of any kind upon the jury’s power to impose costs ... Certainly one of the basic purposes of the Due Proc- ess Clause has always been to protect a person against wlio having the Government impose burden upon him except in accordance with the valid laws of the land.’’ The Illinois Court also rejected the overbreadth chal- lenge to Section 26-1 (a), on the ground that petitioners’ conduct was not constitutionally protected. The Court cited Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965) for the proposition that petitioners’ conduct fell within the am- bit of the Coz dictum that no one could contrary to traffic regulation insist upon a street meeting in the middle of Times Square at the rush hour as a form of freedom of speech or assembly.’? See: People v. Raby, 40 Ill. 2d 392. While the court below does not specifically discuss petitioners’ overbreadth challenge it applied the decision in Raby to the petitioners. Here, as in Raby, the trouble is that petitioners were not convicted for violation of a valid statute which speci- fically defines the prohibited conduct. Petitioners’ con- duct if criminal in any respect violated the provisions of the Criminal Trespass to Land Statute, Chapter 38, Sec- tion 21-3 of the Illinois Revised Statutes. The holding that petitioners’ conduct violated Section 26-1 (a) sweeps unnecessarily broadly, and thereby may invade the area of protected freedoms. ef. Zwicker v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 949-250 (1967). The statute as construed also sweeps all of the remaining provisions of the Illinois Criminal Code into Section 26-1 (a). It is no answer that the stdtute might be narrowly construed in a given situation, the statute as it presently stands, has a chilling effect on free speech conduct. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 US. 479 (1965). Nor is it relevant that the acts of the peti- tioners are not constitutionally protected. It is the vice of the statutes rather than the virtue of the petitioners that becomes the ratio decedendi. dy OP Ne iain eae tp Nh RUROINI 1 Mil DEG NG GRAIL ie M90 2A _— a CONCLUSION > For the reasons set out above, petitioners ask this Court to grant review, consolidate the cause with People v. Raby, No. 863, October Term, 1968, and to reverse the Court below. Respectfully submitted, Leo E. Ho tt, 166 W. Washington Street, Chicago, Illinois 60602, Attorney for Petitioners. * 4 rire = APPENDIX Docket Nos. 41110, 41111 cons.; Agenda 21, September, 1968 The People of the Staie of Illinois, Appellee, VS. Theoplis A. Crockett et al., Appellants. Mr. Cutzr Justice Sotrispure delivered the opinion of the court: This case involves two appeals from disorderly conduct convictions in the circuit court of Cuok County arising out of certain demonstrations in the County Building. Since the legal questions in both appeals are identical we have consolidated them for review. The defendants in Docket No. 41111, Theoplis Crock- ett, Jowel F. Hysmith, Augustine C. Narcisse, Frances E. Hanger, Bertha M. Cyrus, Ethel L. Pitts, Elaine B. Strong, Joan Rae Phillips, Joan A. Smith, and Ruth A. Hansen were arrested on May 18, 1967 and charged with a viola- tion of article 26 of Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, chap. 38, par. 26—i(a),) in that they “knowingly did an act in such unreasonable manner as to alarm or disturb another and to provoke a breach of the peace; to-wit, Loit- ering in the Fifth Floor Hallway [of the County Buiiding], Sitting on the floor.” The defendants in No. 41110, JoAnne Orlof, Ronald F. Gee, and Jerrold P. Holzman, were arrested on June 1, 1967 and charged with the same offense, in that they “knowingly did an act in such unreasonable manner as to ¢ = a (Supreme Court Opinion) alarm or disturb another and to provoke a breach of the peace, to-wit: By remaining seated in the private office of Cook County Commissioner George Dunne and refusing to leave when ordered to do so.” Motions to strike the complaints and for discharge were presented on behalf of all defendants, and were denied. Thereafter defendants waived jury trial, pleaded not guil- ty and were tried on stipulation of facts, on September 13, 1967. Neither the State nor the defendants presented any evi- dence but the cases were submitted on the following stipu- lations: In No. 41111: “Mr. Karton: [Assistant State’s Attorneyj If it please the court, at this time I believe there will be a stipulation by and between the defendants in their own proper persons and by Mr. Holt, their attorney, and by the people of the State of Illinois represented by John Stamos, State’s Attorney of Cook County, that the testimony would show and will show that the facts set forth in the complaint are true and that the said facts set forth in the complaint are sufficient to sustain a finding of guilty as charged in the complaint and that the venue is Chicago, Cook County, Illinois. Mr. Hott: [defendants’ attorney] On behalf of each of the defendants we would so stipulate.” In No. 41110: “Mr. Karton: There is a stipulation between each of the defendants in his own proper person as repre- sented by counsel, Mr. Holt, and the people of the =o (Supreme Court Opinion) State of Illinois, represented by John Stamos, State’s Attorney of Cook County, that were Officer Bernard to testify, that his testimony would be the same as the facts set forth in the complaint. It is further stipu- lated that the matter took place in Chicago, Cook County, Illinois, and that the ages of the three defend- ants, Ronald Gee, Jerrold Holtzman and JoAnne Orlof are over 21. Mr. Hott: So stipulated.” Upon the stipulations all defendants were found guilty and fined $100. The defendants appeal directly to this court alleging a violation of their constitutional rights. Defendants first contend that the disorderly conduct provision of the Criminal Code under which they were convicted is unconstitutional on its face in that it is “vague and over broad.” Defendants’ argument adds nothing to that advanced in People v. Raby, Docket No. 40596, May Term, 1968, 40 Ill. 2d 392. We carefully considered these arguments in that case, and here hold the statute con- stitutional on its face and as applied to these defendants for the reasons set forth in that opinion. See also United States v. Woodward (7th cir.), 376 F. 2d 136, 141-142. Defendants next contend that the complaints did not charge the offense with the specificity required by the con- stitution. We feel that the defendants were adequately in- formed of the charges and the particular conduct which gave rise to the arrest and complaint. At no time did de- fendants request a more detailed statement of the offense, and under such circumstances defendants may not main- tain that the complaint lacks specificity upon review. City of Chicago v. Joyce, 38 Ill. 2d 368. as ae BIE th : TORR Sid id PRE Ma mice IDE VRE Toa bat SB v2 | ae —14— (Supreme Court Opinion) Defendants last contend that the evidence does not establish their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We can- not agree. As we read the stipulations, they establish prima facie that the defendants were guilty of the offenses charged. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the trial court was justified in finding defendants guilty as charged. The “idgments of the circuit court of Cook County are accordingly affirmed. Judgments affirmed. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385604_0545%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.