# Brief for the United States in Opposition — Morgan v. United States

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385604_0306%3A3

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Brief for the United States in Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1969
- **Citation:** 393 U.S. 1025

## Text

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1968

No. 739

CLAUDE B. MORGAN, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT .-

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES
IN OPPOSITION

Tried by a jury in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida, petitioner was
convicted on seven counts of mail fraud and was sen-
tenced to imprisonment for five years and fines tota’-
ling $7,000. |

The-only issue raised before the court of appeals
and in the petition for a writ of certiorari relates to
the denial of petitioner’s motion for a new trial based
on an alleged conversation during the trial between
one of the jurors in his case and a stranger. Because
the court of appeals was not clear about the district

(1)

2

court’s ground for denying the motion, the case was
first remanded for further findings. See 380 F, 2d 915
(Pet. App. 27-29). On the basis of those supplement-
ed findings and its own review of the record, the court
of apneals th¥n affirmed. 399 F. 2d 93 (Pet. App. 13-
24). No further review is warranted.

The underlying circumstances fully appear from the
two opinions of the court of appeals and from the
elaborate findings by the district court (set out in the
opinion below at Pet. App. 16-20). On the basis of
petitioner’s motion, the district court held a full hear-
ing at which counsel were free to introduce evidence
and each juror was separately examined by the court,
with counsel given the opportunity to cross-examine.
The district court observed the various witnesses, and
rejected the disputed testimony of petitioner’s princi-
pal witness—his close friend—that one of the mem-
bers of the jury had, before verdict, announced in a
conversation with an outsider that he had formed the
conclusion that petitioner was guilty. Rather, the
court found on the basis of the testimony that the
only conversation involving one of the jurors in this
case—which might in any event have taken place after
verdict (Pet. App. 19-20)—did not bear upon the is-
sue of petitioner’s guilt or innocence (Pet. App. 18).
The court of appeals noted that the record demon-
strated that “the trial judge was keenly aware of his
responsibility” and “used every possible means to fer-
ret out the truth” (Pet. App. 22). The court was
convinced that none of the trial judge’s findings on
the diametrically opposed factual contentions could be
considered “clearly erroneous” (Pet. App. 23 n. 2, 24).

wo STE RE ye Renae & OT A RO TENN Py Sopra ee epee pp one. rer

3

The court thus unanimously concluded: “Summoning
as we must our most perceptive antennae to detect
prejudicial communications with a juror, we neverthe-
less affirm the trial court’s findings that the jury was
not compromised” (Fet. App. 18).

We rely on the findings and opinions of both courts
below in urging that the petition for a-writ of cer-
tiorari should be denied.

ERWIN N. GRISWOLD,
Solicitor General.
DECEMBER 1968

W ou. S. GOVERNMENY PRINTING OFFICE; 1968 327222 352

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385604_0306%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
