# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission v. United States

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385604_0260%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1969
- **Citation:** 393 U.S. 1017

## Text

v.

- Te sn : :

(i)
SUBJECT INDEX

ee a Perr ere 1
TO EL OCTET Tee Eee e Tee 2
Questions Presented............. rar ee repeats 2
SE IF 5 6 5 os heer ac asehanvenvereeerwees 2
gt PPPTTTTTITIT ITC CCT 2
Pemaeees Cor Gomis GO nn ce esos vcesevesvens 6
CO 56 6 vce cae eee Oe wees haves beet ve bees 19

INDEX TO APPENDICES

Appendix A - Opinion and Order of the District Court ..... App. 1
Appendix B - Opinion of the Court of Appeals ../..... App. 32

Appendix C - Affidavit of the Secretary of the Interior, dateu
January 10, 1964, in Support of Government’s Motion for

fg PTT TT TUTE eee ee ee App. 41
Appendix D - Statutes Involved................008- App. 44
Appendix E - Regulations Involved ....... ae me ete App. 51

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases:
A. T. & T. Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 232 (1936) ....... 18
Beard v. City of Alexandria, La., 341 U.S. 622 (1951) ....... 10
Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900) .............. 6,9
Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1896) ........... 9
Campbell v. Rankin, 99 U.S. 261 (1878) ............... 12
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160(1941) ............. 10
Mississippi Valley Barge Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282

EE be PEaRCE ST Uso awe Ee ENED See bee es 12

(ii)

State of Tennessee v. United States, 256 F.2d 244 (C.A. 6,

See Oe ee ee Tee eee 9
Statutes:
Act of August 25, 1916

Pe Oey OO es OP LS 6 oo os ta cnstuesens 4,7,11
Act of May 29, 1930

ee ee ee eee eee ee eee 11,14
Act of August 8, 1953

op Se eT UU LEPC CERTE CCL T Te ee 7

Act of September 15, 1960
74 Stat. 1031, D.C. Code (1967 Ed.) §§ 1-1410 to 1416 . .2,6,9

Miscellaneous:

Hearings on The 1957 Supplemental Approoriation Bill (A-t
of July 27, 1956, 70 Stat. 678) Before subcommittees of
the House Committee on Appropriations, 84th Cong., 2d
Peer r rere rere re ere eee 15

er |

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1968

No.

WASHINGTON, VIRGINIA AND MARYLAND COACH
COMPANY, INC. and D. C. TRANSIT SYSTEM, INC.,

Petitioners
Vv.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
STEWART L. UDALL, Secretary of the Interior, et al,
Respondents

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Company, Inc.
and D.C. Transit System, Inc. petition for a writ of certiorari
to review the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit which was entered on
June 12, 1968.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion and order of the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia are set forth in Appendix A,
and the opinion of the Court of Appeals reversing the order
of the District Court is set forth in Appendix B.

adler! nt Neck Ranting a

2

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under the provi-
sions of 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) and within the 90-day period
prescribed at 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c). The opinion of the Court
of Appeals was entered on June 12. 1968, and petitions for
rehearing en banc were denied on August 5, 1968.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Ip administering the national park system does the
Secretary of th~ Interior have authority to regulate activities
performed outside the parks?

2. Is the affidavit of the Secretary of the Interior, which
had not been introduced in evidence at the trial, a proper
basis for the Court of Appeals to reverse the findings of the
District Court?

3. Is there any rational basis in the evidence of record
for the involved regulations of the Secretary of the Interior?

STATUTES INVOLVED

The primary statutes involved are the Washington Metro-
politan Area Transit Regulation Compact, as approved by
Act of September 15, 1960, 74 Stat. 1031, D.C. Code (1967
Ed.) 8 1-1410 to 1416, and the acts providing for the admin-
istration of the national park system by the Secretary of the
Interior. Relevant portions of these statutes are printed in
Appendix D.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The first of the two complaints consolidated herein was
initiated by the United States in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia to enforce against the
Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co., Inc. (“W. V.
& M.”’) regulations of the Secretary of the Interior (“‘Secre-
tary”) governing commercial use of the George Washington

3

Memorial Parkway (‘“‘Parkway”’). The District Court’s juris-
tion over this action was based on the provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 1345. D.C. Transit System, Inc. (“‘Transit’’), the
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission (““Com-
mission”), and the State Corporation Commission of the
Commonwealth of Virginia intervenec as defendants.

The second complaint, brought by W. V. & M. to invali-
date the Secretary’s regulations, involves substantially the
same issues and parties, with the Secretary and the Director
of the National Park Service (“Service”) being named in
place of the United States. The District Court’s jurisdiction
over this action was based on the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2201 and 2202.

In an opinion filed April 13, 1967, and an order filed
June 9, 1967, the District Court found the Secretary’s regu-
lations invalid insofar as they arbitrarily discriminate against
W. V. & M. and Transit. The United States, the Secretary,
and the Director of the Service thereafter appealed to the
United Sta*zs Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
By decision of June 12, 1968, a three-judge panel of the
Court of Appeals (one judge dissenting) reversed the findings
of the District Court, concluding that the Secretary’s dis-
crimination in the use of the Parkway has a reasonable basis
in the record. The commissions, jointly, and the carriers,
jointly, filed separate petitions for rehearing en banc, both
of which were denied on August 5, 1968.

The Parkway is a strip of Federal land running between
Mount Vernon and the Capital Beltway in Virginia. It is, at
one and the same time, a beautiful scenic area following the
contour of the Potomac River and an interstate highway on
which commuter traffic during the daily rush hours is fre-
quently bumper to bumper (JA 124-25, 173, 189, 192; W. V.
& M. Exs. 37 and 38)./

1 All references to JA are to the Joint Appendix filed with the
re of Appeals and included in the certified record transmitted to
this Court.

From a structural standpoint, the section of the Parkway
between Key Bridge and Arlington Memorial Bridge does
not have the subsurface strength that underlies the other
sections. It is therefore subject to constant cracking from
seepage as well as the stresses of heavy traffic and has been
a maintenance problem (JA 108-09, 190-91, 221; Gov’t Exs.
15-21).

Commercial use of the Parkway is regulated by the Secre-
tary, through the Service, pursuant to the Act of August 25,
1916, 39 Stat. 535, 16 U.S.C. 8 1, 3 (App. D, p. 49).
- Regulations adopted by the Secretary on November 16,
1962 contain the following relevant provisions (36 C.F.R.
50.36, reproduced in Appendix E):

1. Taxicabs and sightseeing buses are permitted on
any portion of the Parkway.

2. Regularly scheduled commuter buses are permit-
ted on the Parkway between Mt. Vernon and Arling-
ton Memorial Bridge (the southern portion) and
between Key Bridge and Virginia Route 123 (the
northern portion). A restriction imposed on service
operated over the northern portion requires a “direct
return” upon leaving the Central Intelligence Agency
Building (“CIA”), thereby prohibiting service to
communities adjacent to the Parkway.

3. Airport buses are permitted on the Parkway
between Washington National Airport and Virginia
Route 123.

The following bus operations are being performed on the
Parkway with permits issued by the Service:

Commuter Buses

The Alexandria, Barcroft and Washington Transit Company
(“A. B. & W.”) performs daily scheduled operations over the
Parkway between Mt. Vernon and Arlington Memorial
Bridge, providing commuter service to the adjacent commu-
nities, as much as 6 miles away, of Alexandria, Belle View,
Bucknell Manor, and Orleans Village (JA 138-39, 236). A.B.

5

& W. operates a total of 820 one-way trips per day over this
southern portion of the Parkway (JA 244).

W. V. & M. performs daily scheduled operations over the
Parkway betweer. Key Bridge and Virginia Route 123 in
serving the CIA at Langley, Virginia. Upon leaving the CIA,
in violation of its permit, W. V. & M. operates over Virginia
Highway 123 to provide commuter service to nearby McLean,
Tyson’s Corner and Vienna (JA 116-17, 122). W. V. & M.
operates 52 one-way trips per day over this northern portion
of the Parkway (JA 121).

Sightseeing Buses

The Gray Line, White House Sightseeing Corporation
(“White House’), and A. B. & W. perform extensive sight-
seeing operations on the Parkway, using the southern portion
almost exclusively (JA 132-34, 144, 168-69). During the
period January 1 to October 31, 1966, for example, Gray
Line and A. B. & W., combined, operated some 1800 sight-
seeing trips thereover (JA 269, 275).

Ai port Buses

Airport Transport, Inc., performs daily non-scheduled oper-
ations over both the northern and southern portions of the
Parkway for the convenience of airline passengers using
Washington National and Dulles airports (JA 127, 130). Air-
port Transport operates 98 cne-way trips daily over just the
northern portion (JA 130-31).

The CIA itself performs a daily scheduled shuttle service
for its employees over the northern portion of the Parkway,
operating 52 one-way bus trips per day (JA 134-35, 235).

The described commuter, sightseeing, and airport opera-
tions are being performed with similar buses, generally about
20,000 pounds in weight, 96 inches in width and 35 to 40
feet in length (JA 119-20, 129, 143, 197, 233, 246, 274).

In addition to permits from the Service, the described
commercial operations required certification by the Com-

mission in accordance with the Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Regulation Compact (“Compact”), Act of
September 15, 1960, 74 Stat. 1031, D.C. Code (1967 Ed.)
$$ 1-1410 to 1416 (App. D, pp. 44-48).?_ Under Articles I
and II of the Compact the Commission has been given juris-
diction over the Metropolitan District (the District of Colum-
bia and nearby counties in Maryland and Virginia, including
all of the Parkway) for the regulation and improvement of
transit and the alleviation of traffic congestion. Section 3
of the Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 1050, D.C. Code § 1-1412,
however, specifically preserves the “normal and ordinary
police powers of the . . . Director of the National Park Serv-
ice with respect to the regulation of vehicles, control of
traffic and use of streets, highways, and other vehicular
facilities”. ;

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

In their joint briefs filed with the District Court and the
Court of Appeals, W. V. & M. and Transit have argued that
the Secretary’s regulations of November 16, 1962 exceed his
statutory authority. The District Court agreed with this
argument, quoting from Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459,
470 (1900):

the Court has no choice except to hold that the
Secretary has exceeded his authority and employed
means that are not at all appropriate to the end spec-
ified in the Act of Congress. (App. A, p. 17.)

Without any consideration whatsoever of this basic denial
of the Secretary’s statutory authority, a divided panel of the
Court of Appeals has decided in effect that the Secretary,
as the caretaker of the national parks and parkways, is
authorized to regulate activities performed after leaving the
parks and parkways. This unmeditated decision represents

2The Commission has also authorized Transit to operate on the
Parkway between the Capital Beltway and the CIA but the Service
has refused to permit such operations (JA 276-91).

Br rdenl ag iweb

7

the first judicial recognition of any such statutory authority
and, in view of its far-reaching negative implications on free-
dom of movement, particularly in interstate commerce,
raises an “important question of federal law which has not
been, but should be, settled by this court”?

A review by this Court is further warranted under Rule
19 by the Court of Appeals’ drastic departure from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, having
based its decision primarily on an affidavit not introduced
in evidence.

1. The Secretary’s Regulations Exceed
His Statutory Authority.

The regulations of November 16, 1962, have been pre-
scribed pursuant to the authority conferred on the Secretary
by the Act of August 25, 1916, 16 U.S.C. § 3 (App. D, p.
49), which provides in part:

The Secretary of the Interior shall make and pub-
lish such rules and regulations as he may deem nec-
essary or proper for the use and management of the
parks, monuments, and reservations under the juris-
diction of the National Park Service.4

The statute is thus quite clear in requiring all regulations of
the Secretary to be related to the “use and management” of
the national park system.

Such “use” is fully described in the Act of 1916 as follows
(16 U.S.C. $1, App. D, p. 49): »

There is created in the Department of the Interior
a service to be called the National Park Service. . .
The service thus established shall promote and regu-
late the use of the Federal areas known as national

FRule 19 of this Court.

4National parkways are embraced by such jurisdiction under the
Act of August 8, 1953, 67 Stat. 495, 496, 16 U.S.C. § Ic (App. D, p.
50).

parks, monuments, and reservations . . . by such
means and measures as conform to the fundamental
purpose of the said parks, monuments, and reserva-
tions, which purpose is to conserve the scenery and
the natural and historic objects and the wild life
therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the
same in such manner and by such means as will
leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future
generations. (Emphasis added)

In short, the “‘use’”’ of the parks is intended by the Congress
_ to be in conformity with the “purpose” of conserving the
scenery and natural beauty of the land for present and
future enjoyment.

It is submitted that there is no reasonable relationship or
plain consistency between the Secretary’s regulations and
this Congressional purpose. To illustrate, W. V. & M.’s com-
muter buses operate to McLean, Tyson’s Corner, and Vienna
over Virginia Highway 123 after leaving the Parkway to serve
the CIA. Can these buses possibly constitute any menace
to the Parkway’s scenery while they are conducting opera-
tions several miles away? Can these buses possibly injure
the natural beauty of the Parkway to any different degree
while they are performing the unauthorized service to these
Northern Virginia communities than while they are perform-
ing the authorized service to the CIA? The effect of
W. V. & M.’s commuter operations on the scenery and nat-
ural beauty of the Parkway is obviously the same whether
its buses terminate at the CIA or go beyond, over state
roads, to nearby communities.”

As a practical matter, it would seem that the Secretary
himself has demonstrated that W. .V. & M.’s operations over

5On page 8 of its opinion (App. B, p. 39) the panel majority sug-
gests that the 52 daily trips which W. V. & M. is now operating over
the Parkway in commuter service might well become several hundred
if sanctioned by the Secretary. This would not seem likely, as the
public demand for such service, which determines the frequency of
operations, has remained almost unchanged since July 1, 1964. (See
W. V. & M. Exhibit No. 34, JA 218.)

the Parkway have no harmful effect on the scenery and
beauty thereof. By permitting A. B. & W.’s buses to oper-
ate 820 one-way trips in daily commuter service, the Secre-
tary has recognized that commuter operations do not impair
the scenery and beauty of the southern portion of the Park-
way. In view of the similarity of the equipment used and
the much smalier frequency of service, can the Secretary, at
the same time, reasonably conclude that the 52 one-way
trips operated daily by W. V. & M. have an entirely different
effect on the northern portion of the Parkway? It would
seem not.

The Secretary’s proscription of operations performed off
the Parkway is so patently unrelated to the intended use
and purpose of the Parkway that he has clearly “exceeded
his authority and employed means that are not at all appro-
priate to the end specified in the Act of Congress.’

The unauthorized aspect of the Secretary’s regulations is
further evidenced by reference to the Act of September 15,
1960, 74 Stat. 1050, D.C. Code $ 1-1412, establishing the
regulatory jurisdiction of the Commission over the Metro-
politan District and suspending the applicability of the laws
of the United States. Congress therein specifically preserved
the “normal and ordinary police powers” of the Director of
the Service.

It would seem clear that the term “‘police powers” should
be interpreted as including the full scope of the pre-existing
authority delegated by the Congress to the Secretary to make
rules and regulations for the administration of property of
the United States, the national parks and parkways. Cam-
field v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525 (1896); State of
Tennessee v. United States, 256 F.2d 244, 258 (C.A. 6,
1958); Robbins v. United States, 284 Fed. 39, 45 (C.A. 8,
1922). However, such term surely did not confer upon the
Secretary any greater authority than that delegated to him
by the Act of 1916. It merely emphasized the Congres-

6 Boske v. Comingore, supra, 177 US. 459, 470.

10

sional intent to limit the authority of the Secretary to
activities occurring on the Parkway; for the exercise. of
police powers has been traditionally limited to matters aris-
ing within the physical borders of the jurisdiction. Beard
y. City of Alexandria, La., 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Edwards
v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).

In the final analysis, to the extent the Secretary’s regula-
tions proscribe activities which are performed entirely off
the Parkway, the Secretary has exceeded the scope of his
statutory authority as described in the Act of 1916 and as
' preserved in the Act of 1960.

The Court of Appeals completely ignored this statutory
question.

2. The Court of Appeals Improperly Based Its Reversal
of the Findings of the District Court
upon Facts Not in Evidence.

Early in this litigation, the Secretary filed an affidavit in
support of a pre-trial motion of the Government for sum-
mary judgment (App. C). The motion was denied and the
affidavit was not subsequently introduced into evidence. The
District Court therefore determined that it could not con-
sider the affidavit. (App. A, p. 13) The Government never
challenged this determination in its appeal to the Court of
Appeals.

Notwithstanding these circumstances, the Court of Appeals
has placed primary reliance on the Secretary’s affidavit in
reversing the decision of the District Court. The following
extract is taken from pages 5 and 6 of the opinion of the
Court of Appeals (App. B, pp. 36-37):

In essence the trial judge felt that the regulations
were discriminatory and invalid for two reasons: first,
because they unreasonably allow unlimited bus serv-
ice south of Memorial Bridge while limiting such
service north of the Bridge; and second, because they
allow sightseeing, airport and CIA Building buses

—~+—

11

north of Key Bridge while prohibiting general com-
muter service on this section of the Parkway.

The Secretary explained his reasons for the regu-
lations in an affidavit in support of the United States’
motion for summary judgment. He felt that the use
of the Parkway ay “ever increasing numbers of com-
muter buses with their great bulk, trucklike charac-
teristics, and odors, as is contemplated by the Wash-
ington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Company, would,
in my opinion, physically damage the scenic value
of the Parkway.”

The trial judge, however, concluded that the Sec-
retary’s regulations were not reasonably related to
his goal of preserving the scenic value of the Park-
way. For he felt that thie southern sector of the
Parkway was more scenic than the northern sector
and consequently to allow unlimited traffic on the
southern sector, while prohibiting it to the north, was
unreasonable. He felt also that, because the CIA
Building, airport and sightseeing buses were physically
identical with the WV & M buses, to bar the latter
on the northern sector of the Parkway, while per-
mitting the former, was unreascnably discriminatory.
He emphasized that he could not “‘understand how
52 suburban commuter buses operated by W. V. &
M. could be aesthetically objectionable when approx-
imately 200 airport and C.I.A. commuter buses * * *
are not aesthetically objectionable.”” 268 F.Supp. at
44

The Secretary, however, did not find that only
WV & M buses were unsightly. In his affidavit he
“reluctantly” concluded, “after weighing the interest
of the public in retaining the present natural beauty
of the Parkway and its environs® as against the com-
pelling necessity to provide CIA employees swift and

The Secretary pointed out in his affidavit that Congress
had expressed its concern “that the scenery and natural objects
found on the George Washington Memorial Parkway * * * be
conserved * * *,” citing act of May 29, 1930 (46 Stat. 482),
and act of August 25, 1916 (39 Stat. 535), as amended (16
USC. § 1).

12

immediate access to their Agency,” that direct com-
mercial transportation to the CIA Building should be
permitted on the Parkway. Similar considerations
prompted his decision with regard to the use of the
Parkway for access to Dulles International Air-
port...

The Court of Appeals’ consideration of the Secretary’s
affidavit is clearly contrary to the decision of this Court in
an analogous case. In Campbell v. Rankin, 99 U.S. 261, 264
(1878), this Court held that an affidavit in support of a
pre-trial pleading was in no judicial sense before the Court
on the trial and could only be used, if at all, when introduced
by one of the parties for some legitimate purpose.

3. The Secretary’s Regulations Constitute an
Arbitrary and Discriminatory Exercise
of His Statutory Authority

Both the District Court and the panel majority aptly put
the question respecting the reasonableness of the Secretary’s
regulations into proper perspective by reference to the fol-
lowing guideline:

The judicial function is exhausted when there is
found to be a rational basis for the conclusions
approved by the administrative body. Miss. Valley
Barge Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282, 286-287
(1934).

From this common point of departure two different con-
clusions were reached: The District Court found that “while
searching the facts and circumstances of this case to find a
rational basis for the regulations, just the contrary has
become clear to the Court” (App. A, p. 16). The panel
majority found that the “‘Secretary’s discrimination in the
use of the Parkway has a reasonable basis in the record”
(App. B, p. 39). It is respectfully submitted that the evi-
dence of record admits only the first conclusion, as expressed
by Judge Tamm in his dissent:

>

13

.. . the Secretary’s justification constitutes an army
of words escorting 2 modicum of reason. His action
is nothing more than arbitrary bureaucracy masquer-
ading as reasoned judgment. (App. B, p. 40.)

Two separate explanations have been given for the Secre-
tary’s regulations. First, it is contended that the regulations
are necessary to preserve the scenery and natural objects
found along the Parkway. Second, it is contended that the
northern and southern portions of the Parkway are treated
differently because the Parkway historically has been a
commuter highway between Mt. Vernon and Arlington
Memorial Bridge and a scenic highway between Key Bridge
and the Capital Beltway. Closely scrutinized, each of these
aesthetic and historic “reasons” is revealed to be completely
unreasonable.

Beginning with the aesthetic “reason”, the panel majority
has found the rational basis therefor existing entirely in an
affidavit of the Secretary (App. C). As noted in Argument
No. 2 herein, this affidavit was not introduced into evidence
and should not have even been considered by the panel
majority. From a practical standpoint, however, the affida-
vit provides little if any rationale for the Secretary’s regula-
tions. Most of the statements therein are merely self-serving
expressions of opinions rather than facts and are applicable
equally as well to both portions of the Parkway. No oppor-
tunity was afforded counsel to cross-examine the Secretary
on such expressions, and no independent corroborating
evidence was introduced by persons familiar with the scenic
values of the Parkway.

Moreover, most of the statements therein are misleading.
To illustrate, the Secretary states that the Parkway “abounds

_ in natural beauty and affords the people of the Washington

Metropolitan Area a panorama ofgunsurpassed scenic splen-
dor. Observation stations have been established along the
Parkway where motorists may stop in the course of their
travels and derive some benefit from the natural beauties
which surround our Nation’s Capital.”” The implication here

14

is that the Parkway is an idyllic backwoods road fairly insu-
lated from heavy automobile traffic. While it may be a
beautiful scenic area, the Parkway from Mt. Vernon to the
Capital Beltway is also a primary multi-lane highway for
Maryland, Virginia, and D. C. commuter traffic, often bumper
to bumper during rush hours. As noted by the District
Court (App. A. p. 18):
[t]he motion pictures which are in evidence amply
support a finding of which the Court could take
judicial notice anyway; that however one might view
it, the Parkway is an extremely heavily travelled
commuter highway. To the thousands of commuters
who use it and to the officials who must regulate it,
it is not a scenic parkway during weekday rush hours
and no amount of wishful thinking can make it so. . .

Under these circumstances, commuters using the Parkway
daily, whether the northern or southern portion, have abso-
lutely no opportunity to enjoy its “unsurpassed scenic
splendor’”’.

The Secretary then refers to the Act of May 29, 1930,
46 Stat. 482, 483, as representing an expression of Congres-
sional concern for the conservation of the scenery and natural
objects found on the Parkway. In authorizing the initial
purchase of Parkway land, this Act of 1930 also specifically
provided that the “acquisition of any land in the Potomac
River Valley for park purposes shall not debar or limit, or
abridge its use for such works as Congress may in the future
authorize for the improvement and the extention of naviga-
tion . . . or for flood control or irrigation or drainage, or
for the development of hydroelectric power.” From the
very beginning, then, Congress has emphasized that the
preservation of the scenic beauty of this area along the
Potomac River is compatible with its use for other public
purposes.

One such purpose, public transportation, was highlighted

in the hearings preceding the appropriation of funds for the
construction of the Parkway from Spout Run to the CIA.

+

ae

15

At such hearings, Director Dulles underscored the need of
the CIA employees commuting to work for “[p]ublic trans-
portation . . . supplied by the bus lines serving the general
area”.’ It would seem clear therefore that W. V. & M.’s use
of the northern portion of the Parkway to provide commuter
service to nearby communities in Northern Virginia was
fully contemplated and approved by the Congress.

The Secretary’s next statement apparently contains the
gravamen of his complaint, indicating that:

_ . it would be contrary to the public interest to
allow permanent commuter bus service upon the
[Parkway] for the purpose of transporting passengers
between the Virginia suburbs and the District of
Columbia. The use of this Parkway by ever-increas-
ing numbers of commuter buses with their great bulk,
trucklike characteristics, and odors, as is contem-
plated by [WV&M], would, in my opinion, physically
damage the scenic value of the Parkway.

This statement of opinion is entirely unsupported by any
evidence of record that commuter buses damage the scenery
of the Parkway. Granted that such buses are bulkier and
heavier than automobiles, are such physical characteristics —
aesthetically objectionable per se? The District Court quite
properly answered this question in the negative (App. A,
p. 12). Furthermore, the very fact that commercial buses
are allowed on other scenic lands administered by the Serv-
ice is convincing evidence that they cause no obvious physi-
cal damage to the scenery thereof (36 C.F.R. 8 5.4 and
6.3).

Although, in passing, it might have been argued that
commercial buses physically damage the surface of the
Parkway, as opposed to its scenery, the Secretary has made

7Hearings on The 1957 Supplemental Appropriation Bill (Act of
July 27, 1956, 70 Stat. 678) Before Subcommittees of the House
Committee on Appropriations, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 1, p. 255
(1956). See also pages 247, 273, and 304 thereof cited on page 7 of
the Opinion (App. B, p. 38).

16

no such argument except as to the portion of the Parkway
between Arlington Memorial and Key bridges.

Respecting the Secretary’s reference to “odors,” there is
no evidence of record that commercial buses are odoriferous
generally, that W. V. & M.’s buses are odoriferous in partic-
ular, or that W. V. & M.’s buses produce more or different
“odors” than the physically identical buses operated by
A. B. & W., Airport Transport, White House, Gray Line, and
the CIA itself. Additionally, there is no evidence of record
that W. V. & M.’s 52 buses are more odoriferous than the
thousands of automobiles permitted to use the Parkway
daily.

Finally, the Secretary’s reference to the “ever-increasing”
numbers of commuter buses is inaccurate. As shown on
W. V. & M. Exhibit No. 34 (JA 218), commuter bus opera-
tions by W. V. & M. tztween July 1, 1962 and December
31, 1963, the only period for which the Secretary had infor-
mation at the time of his affidavit, stayed at a fixed level
of approximately 10,500 miles per quarter. While this figure
grew to approximately 16,000 miles by the last quarter of
1964, no subsequent increase has occurred and none is
anticipated? |

In short, there is absolutely no evidentiary support for the
Secretary’s opinion that commuter buses physically damage
the scenic value of the Parkway. Moreover, even assuming
arguendo that commuter buses do such damage, the Secre-
tary has still acted arbitrarily in applying the “public inter-
est” factor to only the northern portion of the Parkway and
not the southern portion where A. B. & W. is daily allcwed
to operate over 800 one-way trips in “permanent conmmuter
bus service . . . between the Virginia suburbs and the District
of Columbia”. Surely, a commuter bus operated by A. B.
& W. between Mt. Vernon and Arlington Memorial Bridge

Sw. Vv. & M. Exhibit No. 49 (JA 240-43) details the fixed nature of
the mileage operated by A. B. & W. in commuter service on the south-
ern portion of the Parkway.

~r

17

does as much physical damage to the scenic value of the
Parkway as a similar bus operated by W. V. & M. between
Key Bridge and Virginia Route 123.

One other statement:in the Secretary’s affidavit warrants
passing comment. The Secretary states that “other routes
are available for transportation of passengers between the
District of Columbia and the suburbs of Northern Virginia.”
Presumably, reference here is to Virginia highways 123 and
193 which are alternate routes for the Parkway between the
CIA and, respectively, Key Bridge and the Capital Beltway.
The mere presence of an alternate route, however, does not
make it a desirable route. In connection with Highway 193,
for example, the Commission found that “the Parkway offers
the most direct and shortest route, the fastest and most
efficient service, and just as important, the safest route.
Highway 193 is a narrow two-lane road, and its intersection
with Interstate 495 raises hazards not present on the Park-
way route” (JA 285-86). Additionally, on the Secretary’s
theory, U. S. 1 would provide an appropriate alternate route
for A. B. & W.’s commuter buses operating on the southern
portion of the Parkway.

In light of the foregoing, it is submitted that the Secre-
tary’s reguiations of November 16, 1962 cannot be rational-
ized on an aesthetic basis. As noted by the District Court
in this connection (App. A, p. 16):

[t]he Court cannot understand how 52 daily subur-
ban commuter buses operated by W. V. & M. could
be aesthetically objectionable when approximately
200 airport and C.I.A. commuter buses of the same
style and size, operating over the same route, are not
aesthetically objectionable. Second, the Court can-
not understand how the governmert can, in good
faith, request injunctive relief against these 52 daily
bus trips when the Park Service allows more than
800 daily trips below Memorial Bridge by buses
with identical physical characteristics and performing
an identical service. Even without more, these facts
establish the ailegations that the regulations lack a

at pane cpmentte =

18

rational basis and that they are discriminatory, unrea-
sonable and therefore invalid.

Turning row to the historic “reason” given for the Secre-
tary’s regulations, the panel majority focused upon testimony
that the southern portion of the Parkway has been developed
as a commuter highway and the northern portion has been
developed as a scenic highway. (Testimony of Robert C.
Horne, Associate Regional Director of the Capital Region
of the Service, JA 160-61, 172-73}. The implication here
is that the Parkwav is really two separate roads used for
two entirely different purposes.

This historical rationalization is “‘so entirely at odds” with
reality “‘as to be an expression of a whim rather than an
exercise of judgment”. A. 7. & T. Co. v. United States, 292
U.S. 232, 236 (1936). A mere look at the map introduced
in evidence by W. V. & M. (JA 192) refutes the existence
of any physical separation or distinction between the north-
ern and southern ends of the Parkway. More significantly,
the use made of the so-called commuter portion is as much
scenic in nature as that made of the so-called scenic portion.
Conversely, the use made of the so-called scenic portion is
as much commuter in nature as that made of the so-called
commuter portion.

To illustrate, between January 1 and October 31, 1966,
Gray Line and A. B. & W. alone were issued over 1800 one-
day sightseeing permits for tours conducted over the “com-
muter” portion of the Parkway (JA 144-46, 170-71, 269
and 275). Furthermore, the Service issued over 1600 one-
day sightseeing permits at Mt. Vernon during just the two
months of June and November, 1965 (JA 124, 216-17).

The panel majority suggests that this sightseeing traffic
on the southern portion of the Parkway may be attributable
to an interest in historic sites rather than in scenic beauty
(Opinion, page 5, note 5, App. B, p. 36). It is respectfully
submitted that the millions of persons annually visiting Mt.
Vernon and Arlington National Cemetery are greatly
attracted, in the words of the Secretary’s affidavit describing

‘a tesa

19

the natural beauty along the Potomac River in Virginia, by
the “panorama of unsurpassed scenic splendor” (JA 14).

As for the northern or “scenic” portion of the Parkway,
the bumper to bumper rush-hour traffic shown in the motion
pictures introduced in evidence (W. V. & M. Exs. 37 and 38,
JA 219) readily substantiates that this portion is a heavily
traveled commuter highway. It is also significant that
W. V. & M., Airport Transport, and the CIA operate some
200 one-way commuter trips daily, while sightseeing buses
operate rarely, over this “scenic” portion of the Parkway
(JA 121, 130-31, 134-35).

In short, the very use being made of the Parkway negates
any historic rationalization of the Secretary’s regulations.

In concluding, the most striking example of the objectivity
and validity of the review by the District Court is found in
connection with the portion of the Parkway between Arling-
ton Memorial and Key bridges. Evidence was introduced
concerning structural deficiencies in the roadway which make
this portion unsuitable for heavy bus traffic. The District
Court concluded that such evidence “demonstrated a rational
basis” for prohibiting the operation of commuter buses
thereover (App. A, p. 19). It would seem quite clear there-
fore that to the extent a sound reason was given for any
aspect of the Secretary’s regulations the District Court read-
ily recognized such fact.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfuily submitted that
this petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Manuel J. Davis
Samuel M. Langerman

Attorneys for Petitioners

as wv

App. 1
APPENDIX A

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.

WASHINGTON, VIRGINIA &
MARYLAND COACH COMPANY,

INC.,
Defendant Civil Action No.

1172-63

and
D.C. TRANSIT SYSTEM, INC., .
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN
AREA TRANSIT COMMISSION,

and
VIRGINIA STATE CORPORATION
COMMISSION,

Intervenors-Defendant

WASHINGTON, VIRGINIA &
MARYLAND COACH COMPANY,
INC.,

Plaintiff, ;
and Civil Action No.
D.C. TRANSIT SYSTEM, iNC., side
Intervenor-Plaintiff,

V.

STEWART UDALL, Secretary of
the Interior, et al.,
Defendants.

CONSOLIDATED
OPINION

This litigation involves a complex factual background and
numerous legal issues; however, one issue stands out as para-
mount. That issue is whether the Secretary of the Interior
through his delegate, the Director of the National Park Serv-
ice, has discretionary power to limit suburban commuter
bus traffic on part of the George Washington Memorial

Sees Smet oe

_ App. 2

Parkway while not limiting such traffic on other parts of
the Parkway. This litigation involves only those parts of
the Parkway which are on the Virginia side of the Potomac
River. Included in this issue is whether the Secretary has
exercised his discretion in a reasonable and non-discrimina-
tory manner under the circumstances and whether the Sec-
retary has the authority to exact a fee from suburban com-
muter bus companies for such use of the Parkway as is per-
mitted.

Annexed hereto as Appendix A is a map showing most
of the Parkway. Included are the sections of the Parkway
which are involved in this litigation, the site of the Central
Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.), and all bridges, access roads
and intersecting roads which shali be referred to in this
opinion.

Also annexed hereto as Appendix B are detailed Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

PLEADINGS AND PARTIES

The first of these two consolidated actions was initiated
by the United States, requesting injunctive relief against the
Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Company, Inc.
(W.V. & M.), restraining it from continuing its unauthorized
operation of a suburban commuter bus service over the
Parkway between the Key Bridge and the C.I.A. site, the
newest section of the Parkway. The United States com-
plained that W.V. & M. only has limited permission to use
the Parkway—to carry passengers to and from the C.I.A.—
and therefore it is violating Park Service Regulations by
adding a wide network of commuter service to and from
areas of northern Virginia beyond the C.I.A. Building and
by routing this commuter traffic onto the Parkway. The
government contends that W.V. & M.’s use of the Parkway
is substantially more extensive under its unauthorized use
than it would be if the Parkway were used only as au-

thorized to serve the C.I.A. and direct return to Key Bridge.

The government asserted that the regulations which grant
to suburban commuter buses only limited access to the

¥

’ App. 3

Parkway above Key Bridge are reasonable and necessary to
preserve the scenic values of the Parkway.

In answer to this complaint, W. V & M. denied the valid-
ity of the regulations upon which the United States re-
quested this injunctive relief, claiming that the regulations
are discriminatory in that they permit all buses except sub-
urban commuter buses to use this portion of the Parkway
in connection with services rendered off the Parkway, and
by permitting all kinds of buses, including suburban com-
muter buses, to use the portion of the Parkway below the
Arlington Memorial Bridge in connection with services ren-
dered off the Parkway. The government’s contention that
suburban commuter buses detract from the Parkway’s
scenic values was answered by a denial that such buses have
any noticeable effect upon prevailing aesthetic standards on
the Parkway, and that even if there is such an effect it
would still be unreasonable and discriminatory to insist on
the preservation of scenic standards on the Parkway above
Key Bridge but not below the Arlington Memorial Bridge,
W. V. & M. also counterclaimed for a return of fees paid
under protest to the National Park Service of one cent per
vehicle mile. These fees, for prior use of the Parkway,
amounted to $2,284.16 at the time of trial.

The D.C. Transit System, Inc., the parent corporation of
W. V. & M., intervened as a defendant. Also intervening as
defendants were the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Commission (hereinafter referred to as the WMATC) and
the State Corporation Commission of the Commonwealth
of Virginia (hereinafter referred to as the Virginia State
Commission). Although limited, the interventions of the
two commissions was for the purpose of joining with the
bus companies in emphasizing the legislative aspects of this
litigation. The legislative element in this case concerns the
issue of whether the act of September 15, 1960, (74 Stat.
1031) authorizing The Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Regulation Compact has any effect upon the powers
and authority of the Secretary of the Interior or the Na-

- _unneeee — ' ,
Pew MERE Nae ee oy eee SA ta tsi Set an ar wen anne

App. 4

tional Park Service to regulate the kind and amount of sub-
urban commuter bus traffic on the Parkway. The interests
and contentions of the commissions and D.C. Transit are
substantially identical with those of W. V. & M.

The second suit, brought by W. V. & M., raised substan-
tially the same issues with three minor additions: first, ?
W. V. & M. sought review of Park Service Regulations to
the extent that they do not permit suburban commuter
buses to travel on the Spout Run “neck” of the Parkway
(a short deviation from the main Parkway route northwest
of Key Bridge into Arlington proper), and between Key
Bridge and Memorial Bridge (Route 50); second, W. V. & M.
requested that the Secretary and the Park Service be en-
joined from collecting fees for any use of the Parkway by
commuter buses; and, third, D.C. Transit intervening as
plaintiff sought review of Park Service Regulations to the
extent that such regulations do not permit suburban com-
muter buses to use the northernmost part of the Parkway
from the Beltway southward to the C.I.A., a stretch of
about two miles. D.C. Transit presently carries suburban
commuters from Maryland, who work at the C.I.A., across
the Potomac River via the Cabin John Bridge on the Belt-
way (Interstate Route 495). Because present regulations
preclude D.C. Transit from using the two-mile “shortcut”
on the Parkway from the Beltway to the C.I.A., a longer
and more indirect route must be taken by continuing west
on the Beltway past the entrance to the Parkway, on to
Route 193, then doubling back on Route 193 to the other
C.1.A. entrance.

The parties are slightly different in the second suit.
Rather than the United States, the Secretary of the Interior
and the Director of the National Park Service were named
as defendants. The WMATC and the Virginia State Com-
mission were named defendants in the second action al-
though the positions taken by them are almost identical
with those taken by the plaintiff bus companies. Whatever
procedural advantages may have been obtained by naming

-

App. 5

the two commissions as defendants in the second suit, the
Court will now treat both bus companies and both com-
missions as being aligned on the same side against the
United States, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Direc-
tor of the National Park Service.

BACKGROUND AND FACTUAL SUMMARY

The Parkway is owned and controlled by the Federal
Government. In Virginia it consists of an elongated na-
tional park running parallel to the bank of the Potomac
River with a multi-lane highway as its most distinctive fea-
ture. From Mount Vernon, at its southern end, it stretches
northwestward through Fairfax County, the City of Alexan-
dria, Arlington County, and again, Fairfax County, Virginia.
On its northwestern end it terminates at Interstate Route
495, the circumferential highway which forms a beltway
around the major portions of the Washington metropolitan
area.

For purposes of this litigation the Parkway has been re-
ferred to by various sections according to the sequence in
which it was constructed. First, there is the southeastern
part running from Mount Vernon through the City of Alex-
andria, past the National Airport, and terminating at the
Arlington Memorial Bridge (Route 50). This part of the
Parkway was once known as the “Mount Vernon Memorial
Highway” and was completed in 1932. The Parkway above
the Arlington Memorial Bridge was added section by section.
In 1937, a short stretch was completed between Memorial
Bridge and Key Bridge. In December 1950, the “Spout
Run” section of the Parkway was completed. This section
runs northwestward from Key Bridge but after less than
one mile it deviates southwestward, away from the Potomac
River and goes into Arlington proper.

The final stretch of the Parkway was completed in early
1960. It begins where the Spout Run portion deviates
away from the Potomac, and continues northwestward
along the Potomac Gorge, terminating at the Beltway.

App. 6

The building which houses the Central Intelligence
Agency was completed and opened in the fall of 1961. The
C.I.A. site is adjacent to the Parkway, about two miles
southeast of where the Parkway terminates at the circum-
ferential highway. The C.I.A. site is served with an access
road to and from the Parkway. The C.I.A. site is also
served on its opposite side by State Routes 123 and 193,
which join when they reach the C.I.A. site and continue
toward Washington as Route 123. Going tuward the Dis-
trict of Columbia and after passing the C.I.A. site, Route
123 goes over the Parkway at a clover-leaf intersection be-
low the C.I.A. site and continues southeastward between
the Parkway and the Potomac, connecting with Chain
Bridge into the District of Columbia.

The National Park Service views the various sections of
the Parkway differently with reference to what kind of
commercial traffic will be permitted. Taxicabs are permit-
ted to travel on any portion of the Parkway without pay-
ment of any fee. Commercial trucks are not permitted on
any part of the Parkway except in special cases and conse-
quently there is no general provision for fees as to them.

With respect to commercial buses, however, use of the
Parkway depends on two factors: what kind of service the
buses render, and what portion of the Parkway is involved.
First, as to the kind of service rendered, sightseeing buses,
and airport buses serving Dulles and National Airports, are
permitted on any portion of the Parkway which is desired
and needed for those particular services subject to obtaining
a permit and paying a fee. There are also buses owned by
the Federal Government which are used as a shuttle serv-
ice between the C.I.A. and points in downtown Washington.
These government-owned buses are permitted on the Park-
way south of the C.I.A. without payment of a fee and in
this respect are given more favored treatment than buses of
W. V. & M. which are permitted the same use of the Park-
way from Key Bridge to the C.I.A., but contingent upon
payment of a fee of one cent per vehicle mile. Park Serv-

tis en) odes Cae w is Sie oa ads Sea Atak Wea neem pl ek AOR an eet Raa Satin bs inh hh A RE SN te he wis Si aI

* x =y
a sacsetonge§ 2

_ App. 7

ice Regulations prohibit W. V. & M. (or any suburban com-
muter bus company) from going beyond the C.I.A. to serve
suburban residents in outlying northern Virginia, and, thus,
these “C.I.A. commuter buses” operated by W. V. & M. are
to be distinguished from “suburban commuter buses.” In
reality, therefore, any bus company (Such as W. V. & M.)
which operates on the Parkway to and from the C.LA.
under this special regulation, is merely operating a shuttle
service for the benefit of the C.I.A. and its employees in
competition with, and identical to, the government-owned
shuttle service.

The second distinction made by Park Service Regulations
deals only with “suburban commuter buses.” Rather than
depending on the kind of service which a bus renders, this
distinction is based on different parts of the Parkway. For
example, commuter buses which actually carry passengers
between downtown Washington and points in residential
areas of suburban Virginia (“suburban commuter buses’’)
are allowed unlimited use of the Parkway only on the
southern part between Memorial Bridge and Mount Vernon.
Such buses, regardless of what company owns them, cannot
operate above Memorial Bridge except for the limited
“C.LA. commuter service,” without violating Park Service
Regulations.

Simply stated, the regulations appear to discriminate
against suburban commuter bus companies desiring to use
the Parkway to serve the northern section of suburban Vir-
ginia. This is the basic complaint of the bus companies in
this litigation. They want the restrictive regulations de-
clared invalid, including the provisions which require the
payment of a fee for such use of the Parkway as is not
permitted or will in the future be permitted.

A few statistics will demonstrate the difference in treat-
ment accorded suburban commuter bus companies desiring
use of the Parkway above the Memorial Bridge when con-
trasted with the treatment accorded other bus companies
rendering other kinds of passenger service over the same

App. 8

portion of the Parkway. Using the nine month period from
January 1 to September 30, 1966, as en example, the evi-
dence established that W. V. & M. operates an average of
52 one-way trips per day between Key Bridge and the C.LA.
This use of the Parkway includes service to outlying subur-
ban Virginia in excess of the authority granted by Park Serv-
ice permits and Reguiaiions. Using the same period as an
example, the evidence shows that Airport Transport, Inc.
operates an average of avout 98 one-way trips per day be-
tween Dulles Airport and a terminal in downtown Washing-
ton. These airport buses use the Parkway between Key
Bridge and its intersection with Route 123 near the C.LA.
Occasionaily, Airport Transport ulso carries passengers be-
tween Duiles and National Airports, in which event the
Parkway is also used between Key Bridge and National Air-
port. On sich occasions a limousine, rather than a bus, is
generally used. The goverrm:nt-owned shuttie service be-
tween the C.I.A. and Key Bridge on the Parkway also in-
volves about 99 one-way trips per day, about 52 of which
are by bus and the rest bv limousine.

The most glaring exampic, however, of the discriminatory
effect of the regulations can be illustrated by comparing the
use of the Parkway above Key Bridge by W. V. & M. with
the use of the Parkway below Arlington Memorial Bridge
by A. B. & W. (Alexandria, Barcroft & Washington Transit
Company), also a suburban commuter bus company. A. B.
& W. is permitted to operate about 820 one-way trips per
day on the Parkway below Arlington Memorial Bridge. It
should be noted that uot all of these trips cover the entire
stretch between the Memorial Bridge and Mount Vernon.
Many, if not most, of these trips enter or leave the Parkway
between these two poiits; however, the fact remains that
about 820 suburban commuter buses per day are permitted
to travel at least some distance on the Parkway below the
Memorial Bridge while carrying passengers to and from out-
lying suburban areas off the Parkway.

For a complete comparison between Parkway use by
suburban commuter buses above Key Bridge with all other

' App. 9

use of the Parkway by ail other buses, something should be
said about sightseeing buses. Between January | and Octo-
ber 31, 1966, the National Park Service issued 1224 one day
permits (an average of abcut 4 per day) to the Gray Line
in connection with its sightseeing tours A and D conducted
over the Memorial Bridge—Mt. Vernon portion of the Park-
way. In almost the same period (January Ist to Octobder
19th) A. B. & W. was issued 610 sightseeing permits (aa
average of about 2 per day) for operations over the same
portion of the Parkway. The White House Sightseeing Cor-
portation also operates one or two daily sightseeing trips,
and perhaps as many as 5 per day during the peak tourist
periods, most of which are conducted over this southern
portion. Finally, out-of-state carriers operating over the
scuthern portion of the Parkway are granted an indetermi-
nate number of sightseeing permits at Mt. Vernon by the
National Park Service for operations over the southern por-
tions of the Parkway. The evidence adduced at trial indi-
cates that very few, if any, sightseeing buses travel on the
Parkway above Key Bridge.

Because an issue has been brought into this case of
whether certain legislation enacted in 1960 may have modi-
fied or diminished the power of the Secretary of the In-
terior to regulate suburban commuter bus traffic on the
Parkway, some facts as to this legislation should be stated.
On September 15, 1960, the Congress of the United States
gave its consent and approval (74 Stat. 1031) to a proposed
interstate agreement (“Compact”) between Virginia, Mary-
land and the istrict of Columbia. This Compact, finally
ratified by the three signatories on December 22, 1960, es-
tablished a commission, the WMATC, for the regulation of
carriers of passengers between points in the metropolitan
area of the District of Columbia. Under Article I of the
Compact, the District of Columbia and suburban counties
in Virginia and Maryland were included in a “Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit District” over which the WMATC
would have regulatory authority. In Virginia this District
includes the City of Alexandria, the Counties of Arlington

OS Oe Te IEP ee i eee ost

. App. 10

and Fairfax and that portion of Loudoun County occupied
by Dulles Airport. In Maryland this District includes Mont-
gomery and Prince Georges Counties. The District there-
fore includes all parts of the Parkway involved in this liti-
gation.

The purpose of the enabling Act and Compact was; the
unification in one agency of all authority over commuter
transit within this District which was previously vested in
the several signatories and the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. The newly created Commission, the WMATC, was
granted the power to issue certificates of public convenience
and necessity, prescribe routes, set fares, and otherwise to
govern commuter bus traffic in the metropolitan area.

Another important factor is that W. V. & M. and D. C.
Transit have been granted certificates by the WMATC to
travel on the contested portions of the Parkway to serve
suburban commuters. These certificates, however, contain
a proviso that the bus companies must meet any criteria
set by the Park Service. In other words, the WMATC, in
prescribing a route over the Parkway, does not assume to
have the power to overrule Park Service Regulations to
the contrary; instead, the WMATC specifically states that
it is for the bus company involved to comply with Park
Service Regulations with respect to Parkway use.

This practice of the WMATC in adding a proviso to its
certificates requiring the carrier to satisfy Park Service Reg-
ulations is no doubt based upon the specific language of
Section 3 of the Act of Congress which authorized the
Compact and the creation of the WMATC. Section 3 con-
tains the following proviso:

* * * Provided further, That nothing in this Act or
in the compact shall affect the normal and ordinary
police powers of the signatories and of the political
subdivisions thereof and of the Director of the Na-

tional Park Service with respect to the regulation of

vehicles, contro! of traffic and use of streets, high-
ways, and other vehicular facilities.

ere di

App. 11

With respect to the fee requirement of one cent per ve-
hicle mile for use of the Parkway by suburban commuter
buses, I find that such fees are well within the limits set by
other governmental authorities as to fees (“road taxes’’) re-
quired for use of city and state roads by commuter buses.
Arlington County and the District of Columbia require fees
of one cent per vehicle mile. These so-called “franchise
fees” are also exacted on a mileage basis by the City of
Fairfax, the City of Falls Church, and the City of Vienna,
Virginia.

Returning now to the discrimination issue, certain facts
should be stated about the government’s position. The
government argues that the presence of suburban commuter
buses on the Parkway above Key Bridge is aesthetically ob-
jectionable, per se, and therefore the regulations designed
to limit access to the Parkway by such buses have a rational
basis and are valid.

The government also points to an alternative route, via
Route 123 and Chain Bridge, which W. V. & M. buses em-
ployed before the northern leg of the Parkway was com-
pleted and which is still available, although it is slower and
a more circuitous route to and from downtown Washington.
With respect to D.C. Transit’s desire to use the two-mile
shortcut to the C.I.A. at the northwest end of the Parkway,
the government also points to the availability of the alter-
nate route via the Beltway and Route 193 which D.C. Tran-
sit is presently using.

Finally, the government contends that a rational basis
exists for the regulations which differentiate between the
old and new sections of the Parkway (below Memorial
Bridge and above Key Bridge, respectively). As to this con-
tention the government argues that the old section below
Memorial Bridge was originally a “Highway” and that only
after it was authorized and construction begun was it desig-
nated as part of the George Washington Memorial “‘Park-

way.” The government further contends that when this
section was constructed it partially took the place of a pre-

sia NETS (lin Kise askbes shhs aiio ict SHAS ah a isc cd ina a aes Mains 008 ———
. ies a niin =

App. 12

existing commuter railway; that it was designed and con-

structed with bus stops; and that unlike the newer section

above Key Bridge, it has many intersecting streets (without

clover-leaf features) which are regulated by stop lights. In

effect, the government is saying that although this old

“highway” is now under the authority of the Park Service *
and is designated as part of a Federal Parkway, it is histori-

cally and realistically proper for the Secretary and the Park

Service to consider it and govern it as a separate entity i
apart from the new section of the Parkway above Key

Bridge.

Apart from the availability of alternate routes, the govern-
ment has not established this theory from the evidence ad-
duced at trial. First, from the evidence I cannot find that
there is anything aesthetically objectionable, per se, about
having commuter buses on the Parkway above Key Bridge.
The government has offered no valid reason which even at-
tempts to justify a per se approach to this problem. In my
view, a per se approach to solving a problem is only used
when prior experiences with similar or identical problems
is so convincing that evidence need not be introduced in a
given instance to prove what has been proven many times
in previous cases. The Court has found no such prior cases
involving parkways and commuter buses and the parties
have cited none.

Second, and without taking a per se approach, I find that
the government has not proved that suburban commuter
buses have any adverse effect upon scenic aspects of the
Parkway at the time of day ..hen such buses would be 3
using it.

In this case the government’s only odiiens that sub- '
burban commuter buses are spoilers of parkway scenic 4
values is a self-serving letter to that effect from the Director
of the National Park Service to the WMATC dated Novem-
ber 2, 1962 (Government Exhibit No. 23). The statements
made in that letter are opinions rather than facts; there was
no opportunity afforded counsel to cross-examine the Di-

Sith AO CIS: ie 2 dal Nn RE

App. 13

rector of the Park Service on the contents of the letter or
the assumptions upon which it was based; and there was no
independent evidence introduced along the same lines such
as expert opinions or testimony of lay persons who were
familiar with the scenic values of the Parkway.

Early in this litigation, on January 10, 1964, affidavits
by stewart L. Udall, the Secretary of the Interior, and other
officials of the Department of the Interior were filed in sup-
port of the government’s motion for summary judgment.
That motion was denied on February 28, 1964. Since the
affidavit of the secretary was not introduced into evidence,
it cannot be considered by the Court; however, even if-it
were evidence in this case, it would give little support to
the government’s position. The pertinent parts of the affi-
davit are as follows:

* * *

In my judgment, it would be contrary to the
public interest to allow permanent commuter bus
service upon the George Washington Memorial Park-
way for the purpose of transporting passengers be-
between the Virginia suburbs and the District of Co-
lumbia. The use of this Parkway by ever-increasing
numbers of commuter buses with their great bulk,
trucklike characteristics, and odors, as is contem-
plated by the Washington, Virginia & Maryland
Coach Company, would, in my opinion, physically
damage the scenic value of the Parkway. Further,
other routes are available for transportation of pas-
sengers between the District of Columbia and the
suburbs of Northern Virginia.

In my judgment, allowing permanent commuter
bus service of the nature described above, would not
be in the public interest, and would be inconsistent

with the intendment of Congress.
* * *

In addition to the fact that this opinion was not offered
into evidence, nowhere does the Secretary attempt to
justify the application of these alleged public interest fac-

App. 14

tors to only part of the Parkway. Since the affidavit shows
no recognition of the fact that on a daily basis more than
806 suburban commuter buses are operated by A. B. & W.
on the Parkway below the Arlington Memorial Bridge, it
toses any relevance to the issues as they are now befcre the
Court. The basic problem in this case is no longer whether
the preservation of scenic values, alone, would justify ex-
clusion of commuter buses from the Parkway. The Court
agrees that, as an abstract principle, the Secretary does have
the authority to deny access by any class of commercial
vehicle to all sections of the Parkway. Such a policy has
been adopted by the Secretary with respect to trucks. They
are not allowed on any section of the Parkway except in
special cases. However, the regulations which govern sub-
urban commuter buses employ a double standard—depend-
ing upon which part of the Parkway is involved.

| find that regardless of the historical background of the
various sections of the Parkway, it is now one Parkway—not
two—and that the original congressional authorization for
its construction and maintenance had the effect of combin-
ing and unifying all preexisting parts of it, together with
such extensions of it as may be added thereafter, into one
continuous National Parkway.

To summarize the factual situation just presented, the
evidence convinces me that the Park Service Regulations
here in issue, except those as to fees and those designed to
protect a short stretch of the Parkway which has weak con-
struction and cannot withstand heavy bus traffic, discrimi-
nate against suburban commuter bus companics desiring to
use the Parkway above Key Bridge. The regulations dis-
criminate between Parkway use above Key Bridge when
contrasted with Parkway use below Memorial Bridge; and
with respect only to the Parkway above Key Bridge there
is also a double standard—one for commuter buses and the
other with respect to other buses rendering similar but not
identical services such as airport buses.

App. 15
DISCUSSION

The issues of discrimination and unreasonableness must
be analyzed within a legal framework which is fairly clear
and about which all the parties seem to agree. The bus
companies, citing Eastern Central Motor Carriers Ass’n v.
United States, 239 F.Supp. 591, 594 (D.C.D.C. 1965) main-
tain that the allegedly discriminatory regulations must be
found invalid if they are without a rational, substantial or
sound basis. Other cases are cited to the same effect.’ Re-
liance is also placed on Section 10 of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 1009, which contains a general
prohibition against administrative regulations or orders
which are either “*** arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of dis-
cretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law***.”

The WMATC and the Virginia State Commission urge a
similar standard. Citing Sproles v. Binford, 283 U.S. 374,
396 (1932), and Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220
U.S. 61 (1911), the commissions contend in their brief that
the regulations must be declared invalid if they “lack a ra-
tional basis.”

This is precisely the same test which the government
seeks to have applied in this case. “The judicial function is
exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the
conclusions approved by the administrative body.” Miss.
Valley Barge Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282, 286-287
(1934) (cited in the government’s post-trial brief).

What the issue comes down to is this: In view of the
broad discretion vested in the Secretary and the Park Serv-
ice, and in view of the limited role of the reviewing Court,
does the evidence show a rational basis for the regulations

1 Jenkins v. Macy, 237 F..Supp. 60, 62 (E.D.Mo. 1964), affirmed
357 F.2d 62; Irvin v. Hobby, 131 F. Supp. 851, 865 (N.D. Iowa 1955);
NLRB v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg., 179 F.2d 323, 326 (8th Cir. 1950);
and Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 695 (9th Cir. 1949)
cert, denied 338 U.S. 860, rehearing denied, 339 U.S. 945.

App. 16

here in issue? I conclude that the evidence does not show
a rational basis for the regulations as they now exist.

The first step in applying the “rational basis” test which
the parties seem to agree upon, is a proper understanding
of the facts; however, while searching the facts and circum-
stances of this case to find a rational basis for the regula-
tions, just the contrary has become clear to the Court.
First, the Court cannot understand how 52 daily suburban
commuter buses operated by W. V. & M. could be aesthet-
ically objectionable when approximately 200 airport and
C.I.A. commuter buses of the same style and size, operat-
ing over the same route, are not aesthetically objectionable.
Second, the Court cannot understand how the government
can, in good faith, request injunctive relief against these 52
daily bus trips when the Park Service allows more than 800
daily trips below Memorial Bridge by buses with identical
physical characteristics and performing an identical service.
Even without more, these facts establish the allegations that
the regulations lack a rational basis and that they are dis-
criminatory, unreasonable and therefore invalid.

The government, perhaps anticipating the Court’s rejec-
tion of its contention that “preservation of scenic values”
is, per se, a rational basis for the regulations, sought to es-
tablish that the Parkway is a scenic Parkway only above
Key Bridge, with an older, multiple access “Highway”
tacked onto its southern extremity. In addition to my find-
ing that this is factually not true, the evidence establishes
the contrary. In direct conflict with this contention is the
fact that literally thousands of sightseeing bus trips are »
made every year on the Parkway south of the Memorial
Bridge but that very rarely do any of them travel on any
portion of the Parkway above Memorial Bridge. The activ-
ity of these sightseeing buses is strong evidence, contrary
to the government’s contention, that the Parkway below
Memorial Bridge is a scenic attraction which equals and per-
naps surpasses the newer section above Key Bridge.

In my opinion, the Secretary and the Park Service are
“clearly wrong” and the weakness of the “‘scenic values”

eed

Bnaaa its

App. 17

argument is “so manifest that the Court has no choice ex-
cept to hold that the Secretary has exceeded his authority
and employed means that are not at all appropriate to the
end specified in the Act of Congress.””2

In addition to the foregoing, something should be said
about ceitain aspects of this case which may not be clearly
presented on the record. The Court received the impression
that there is more to this controversy tinan meets the eye.
Because of the peculiar or unusual nature of certain cases
it is often difficult to understand the “theory” upon which
the respective parties are proceeding; however, in this case
there were too many inferences to be drawn from the evi-
dence—all pointing to the same problem—for the Court not
to comment. My comments are also intended as an as-
surance to the parties that certain elements of the case did
not go unnoticed by the Court.

The “‘buried problem” involves the whole question of ade-
quate highways and mass transit facilities to handle the
large and growing volume of commuter traffic in the Dis-
trict of Columbia metropolitan area. The problem is most
acute in the Virginia suburbs because traffic to and from
the District of Columbia must squeeze onto a few bridges
across the Potomac River. This case presents a unique as-

Quoting from Boski v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 470 (1900)
(cited in the government’s post-trial brief). The Act of Congress which
is relevant here is the Act of August_25, 1916 (39 Stat. 535 as
amended, 16 U.S.C., 88 1, 3) which directs the Secretary of the Interior
and the National Park Service to

“promote and regulate the use of the Federal areas known as
- national parks * * * by such means and measures as conform
to the fundamental purpose of the said parks, monuments,
and reservations, which purpose is to conserve the scenery
and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein
and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such man-
ner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the

enjoyment of future generations.” (16 U.S.C. § 1).

This Act also authorized the Secretary of the Interior to make “such

rules and regulations as he may deem necessary or proper for the use

and management of the parks, monuments, and reservations under the
jurisdiction of the National Park Service.” (16 U.S.C. § 3).

App. 18

*

pect of this problem because the Parkway provides direct
access to Key Bridge, Theodore Roosevelt Memorial Bridge,
Arlington Memorial Bridge and the “14th Street” Bridge,
ail of which provide Virginia commuters with direct access
to the downtown area of the District of Columbia. The
motion pictures which are in evidenee amply support a
finding of which the Court could take judicial notice any-
way; that however one might view it, the Parkway is an ex-
tremely heavily travelled commuter highway. To the thou-
sands of commuters who use it and to the officials who
use it and to the officials who must regulate it, it is not a
scenic parkway during weekday rush hours and no amount
of wishful thinking can make it so without a drastic high-
way building program in suburban Virginia to ease the load
on the Parkway.

The significance of this state of affairs is that the Secre-
tary may have reasons quite apart from what he calls
“‘scenic values” for the strange and discriminatory set of
regulations which now prohibit suburban commuter buses
from the northern portion of the Parkway. I seem to de-
tect an: implied warning, directed across the Potomac
toward Virginia, and also toward the WMATC, that the
Parkway cannot be relied upon, as it has been in the past,
as a route to be used for easing the mounting pressure of
commuter traffic, including mass transit, in lieu of new
highways being opened.

I mention this latent element in this case because there
undoubtedly must be more to the government’s position
chan the “scenic values” and “old highway-new parkway”
arguments which have been relied upon. These two theories
do not have substantial evidence in the record to support
them and they do not provide a rational basis for the un-
fair and discriminatory double standard regulations which
presently apply to the suburban buses using the Parkway.
These, nevertheless, are the contentions advanced by the
government and I have no alternative but to invalidate this
regulatory pattern in the absence of a rational basis in the
evidence of record.

Fer eters A —

SNe eiesSee

App. 19

The government, on the other hand, has demonstrated a
rational basis for the fee requirement which applies to buses
using the Parkway and to the prohibition against buses
traveling on the structurally weak section of the Parkway
between Key and Memorial Bridges. The cost of mainte-
nance is a substantial and rational basis for these two as-
pects of the Parkway regulatory pattern.

As to the counterclaim by W. V. & M. in Civil Action
No. 1172-63 (the first of these two actions, wherein the
United States is plaintiff) requesting . return of $2,284.16
representing fees paid by W. V. & M. up to the time of
trial, the Court concludes, as an alternative reason for deny-
ing this particular request, that it is without jurisdiction.
This counterclaim is a demand against the United States
and even though it is under $10,000.00 it does not state
a claim under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 8 1345(a) (2), _
because it is not based on either an express contract or
a contract implied in fact. It is therefore a claim for dam-
ages against the government without the government having
given its consent to be sued. See Cobb v. Shore, 87 U.S.
App. D.C. 162, 183, F.2d 980 (1950); Alabama v. United
States, 282 U.S. 502, 506 (1931); United States v. Minne-
sota Mutual Investment Co., 271 U.S. 212, 217 (1926).

The Court concludes therefore that the Regulations of
the Park Service are valid and have a rational basis except
for those which deny W. V. & M. and D.C. Transit unlimited
commuter bus use of the Parkway below Arlington Memo-
rial Bridge, permits for such traffic above the Key Bridge
must also be granted.

The regulations may exclude all commuter buses from
the Parkway, but access or exclusion must not be discrim-
inatory. Such regulations could permit -such traffic only
during certain hours of the day or during:all hours of the
day, but whenever granted the present distinctions between
buses using the northern and southern portions of the Park-
way cannot be part of the regulatory pattern.

App. 20

This opinion, together with the detailed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law annexed hereto as Appendix B shall
constitute all of the findings of fact and conclusions ef law
in this case.

Counsel will submit an appropriate order.

John J. Stree
April 13, 1967 United States District Judge

{A map attached to the above Opinion as an appendix, is
reproduced as a foldout page herein at the end of this
volume |

App 21

APPENDIX B

FINDINGS OF FACT

(1) Title to the George Washington Memcrial Parkway
is vested in the United States. Administration of the Park-
way is a responsibility of the National Capital Region of the
National Park Service under the jurisdiction of the Secre-
tary of the Interior. The Act of August 25, 1916 (39 Stat.
535, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 3), authorized the Secretary
of the Interior to make “such rules and regulations as he
may deem necessary or proper for the use and management
of the parks, monuments, and reservations under the juris-
diction of the National Park Service.”

(2) Pursuant to Section | of the Act of August 25, 1916
(39 Stat. 535, 16 U.S.C. § 1), the National Park Service is
directed to “promote and regulate the use of the Federal
areas known as national parks *** by such means and meas-
ures as conform to the fundamental purpose of the said
parks, monuments, and reservations, which purpose is to
conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects
and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment
of the same in such manier and by such means as will leave
them unimpared for the enjoyment of future generations.”

(3) Foilowing the opening of the George Washington
Memorial Parkway from Spout Run to the C.I.A. Building
on November 3, 1959, the Department of the Interior, on
December 30, 1959 (24 Fed. Reg. 11019), adopted the fol-
lowing regulation [36 C.F.R. (1960 Rev.) 3.36(b) (2)], with
particular reference to the operation of commuter buses on
the Parkway:

Passenger carrying buses for hire or compensation
shall be permitted on the George Washington Memo-
rial Parkway upon application for, and the granting
of a permit by the Superintendent, National Capital
Parks, issued on an annual basis, effective from April
1 until the following March 31, at the rate of $3 for
each passenger-carrying seat in every vehicle so op-

Se ay oe

SS ae

FPG ALLL NAS EFAS AIELLO TS UT LEG

App. 22

erated. Such permits may be issued (i) to provide
passenger service on any portion between Mount
Vernon and the Arlington Memorial Bridge, (ii) to
provide limited direct non-stop passenger service be-
tween Key Bridge and the Central Intelligence
Agency at Langley, Virginia, and (iii) to provide
limited direct non-stop passenger service between
the interchange at Route 123 and the Central Intel-
ligence Agency Building at Langley, Virginia.
Subsequent to the publication of these regulations, the
W. V. & M. Coach Company, on February 15, 1960, peti-
tioned the Secretary for a modification thereof and a hear-
ing on the petition. Such hearing was held on February 29,
1960; however, no report containing findings of fact, con-
clusions of law, or orders was ever served on W. V. & M.

(4) On April 18, 1°60, the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission! issued a certificate of nublic convenience and ne-
cessity to W. V. & M. to provide commuter bus service to
the C.I.A. Building. This permit authorized W. V. & M. to
travel over the Parkway between Arlington Memorial Bridge
(Route 50) and the C.I.A. Building and it authorized bus
travel over the Spout Run Parkway. A restriction in the
permit stated that:

The authority granted herein is subject to compli-
ance by said carrier with any rules, regulations, or
requirements which may be by law maintained or
adopted by the Secretary of the Interior in connec-
tion with his administrative jurisdiction over matters
relating to national parks.

(5) With the opening of the C.I.A. Building in the fall
of 1961, W. V. & M. applied for a permit to “‘initiate ex-
press bus service over the George Washington Memorial Park-
way to the C.I.A. Building at Langley, Va.’’ Pursuant to
the foregoing regulation, a Park Service permit was issued

!The WMATC had not yet been created, thus, the I.C.C. still had
jurisdiction over the commuter service rendered by W. V. & M. between
Virginia and the District of Colurnbia.

App. 23

authorizing use of the Parkway, as requested, to furnish
service to and from the C.I.A. Building only. The pertinent
provisions of this permit were as follows:

Permission is granted to operate buses on the fol-
lowing portions of the George Washington Memo-

rial Parkway in accordance with existing regulations:

1. To provide limited direct non-stop passenger
service between Key Bridge and the Central In-
telligence Building at Langley, Virginia.

2. To provide limited direct non-stop passenger
service between the Interchange at Route 123
and the Central Inteiligence Buiiding at Lang-
ley, Virginia.

(6) For a short period of time in late 1961, W. V. & M.
operated a bus service, as authorized by the Park Service
permit and regulations, from downtown Washington to the
C.I.A. Building and return. At this time, W. V. & M. pro-
vided suburban commuter bus service from the northern
Virginia area to Washington by a scheduied route that pro-
ceeded down Highway 123, over the Parkway at a clover-
leaf intersection, across Chain Bridge into the District of
Columbia, and thence to downtown Washington.

(7) In the summer of 1962, it was ascertained that
W. V. & M. had ceased to use the Parkway solely for com-
muter service to the C.I.A. Building. Instead, suburban
commuters were’ picked up in Washington whose destina-
tion was beyond the C.I.A. Building, and these buses, after
stopping at the C.I.A. Building, would proceed beyond that
point into suburban Virginia to discharge passengers. On
return runs, suburban commuters would be picked up by a
bus that would stop at the C.I.A. and then proceed down
the George Washington Memorial Parkway into Washington.
Although the scheduled route via Route 123 and Chain
Bridge was still used by W. V. & M., the unauthorized in-

crease in Parkway use lessened the use of Route 123 and
Chain Bridge.

—
Oh lak Mee lanl De dl

i RINE GEIL gf BALE LOL GM e POE, TOI OI LON, LITE

EE RSP IRE MOY

ie Heal

ee

App. 24

(8) On November 16, 1962 (27 Fed. Reg. 11346). the
applicable regulation [36 C.F.R. (1966 Supp.) 3.36(b) (3)
(i)] was amended. The provision relating to commuter
buses was altered slightly to make clear that the service to
the C.I.A. was to a “terminus” at the C.I.A. Building, with
“direct return.” In other words, this amendment was de-
signed to make sure that W. V. & M. kmew it was not au-
thorized to use the Parkway for carrying passengers picked
up or to be discharged beyond the C.I.A. Building.

(9) On November 16, 1962, a revised Park Service per-
mit was issued to W. V. & M. to be effective until June 30,
1963. This permit merely modified the language of the
previous permit to reflect the changes im the applicable reg-
ulation, that is, to plainly state that the Parkway use was
limited to a “‘terminus” at the C.I.A. Building and “direct
return” to Key Bridge.

(10) On December 14, 1962, W. V. & M. petitioned the
Secretary for a modification of these regulations and for a
hearing. This petition was denied on March 14, 1963, with-
out explanation or further elucidation of the reasons for re-
stricting commuter buses on the Parkway above Key Bridge.
Meanwhile, W. V. & M. did not accept the revised permit
and has since, despite objections made by representatives
of the Department of the Interior, continuously exceeded
the terms-of the permit and the regulations by operating
buses on the George Washington Memorial Parkway which
carry suburban commuters and not limited to providing
service only to the C.I.A. Building and direct return. For
example, W. V. & M.’s Route 5-C picks up passengers as
far away as Seven Corners, Virginia. This route, instead
of proceeding east to the District of Columbia down U.S.
Highways 29 and 211 through the center of Arlington and
across Key Bridge, goes the opposite direction of those
highways and eventually proceeds down Route 123, and the
Parkway, to Key Bridge.

(11) On October 27, 1964, the WMATC issued a certifi-
cate of public convenience and necessity to W. V. & M.,

App. 25

covering the Route 5-C, which prescribed use of the Park-
way for transporting commuters to and from . be | 4

ap

° wleghe es

Distnct Of Columbia

B-wpe-ed - xan The Decor Of Tee
Department Of Highways And Traffic

Cthoe Of Plons..ng And Programming

Ve Oulies Airport

<_

c t 7 Lis aD thd
/ , 2 i say ‘- hy hae
<= Link “ty, ie: “é od

2

4
THA
1gitisd B
oe Ce
» OB §.%2 3
pe RES

; 1655 af *
35”
Pas}

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385604_0260%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.