# Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Town of Hempstead v. American Airlines, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1969
- **Citation:** 393 U.S. 1017

## Text

7 Offiee- Steer one Gourt, U.S. :
‘ ao)

OCTOBER TERM, 1968
No. 637

- ERR

TOWN OF HEM®?STEAD, PALMER D. FARRINGTON, as Presiding Supervisor of the
Town of Hempstead, RALPH G. CASO, as Supervisor of the Town of Hempstead, JOHN
H. BENOIT, EASA EASA, JAMES F. NIEHOFF, and GEORGE A. MURPHY, as

Councilmen of the Town of Hempstesd, and JOHN A. MORHOUS, as Town Attorney
of the Town of Hempstead,

: Petitioners,

—against—
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., BRANIFF AIRW.Ax%, INC., DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,
EASTERN AIR LINES, INC., NATIONAL AIRLINES, INC., NORTHWEST AIR-

LINES, INC., PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., TRANS WORLD AIR-
LINES, INC., and UNITED AIR LINES, INC.,

THE PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY,

CHARLES H. RUBY, as President of the Air Line Pilots Association, International and as
Representative of that class of persons hereinafter mentioned, AIR LINE PILOTS ASSO.
CIATION, INTERNATIONAL, an unincorporated association, on behalf of the Assccia-
tion and on behalf of that class of persons hereinafter mentioned, and HARRY F.
CLARK, THOMAS M. BARTLEY, JR., and RUSSELL G. DERICKSON, individually
and on behalf of the class of persons hereinafter mentioned, and

THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY (Intervenor),
Respondents.

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION TO THE
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

FOWLER HAMILTON SIDNEY GOLDSTFIN
Attorney for Respondents Attorney for siespondent
American Airlines, Inc., et al. The Port of New York Authority
52 Wall Street 111 Eighth Avenue
New York, New York 10005 New York, New York 10011

SAMUEL J. COHEN
Attorney for Respondents
Charles H. Ruby, et al.
605 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10016

———

RPE KYLIE

eget a

INDEX

PAGE
Opinions Below ....................-- 1
Jurisdiction 2
Constitutional, Statutory and Other Provisions ............ 2
Questions Presented 2
Statement ot the Case 3

ARGUMENT

(a) No novel legal issue is presented .

(b) No conflict exists between the decision of the
District Court in this case on the question of
preemption and the holding of any other court,
state or federal 11

(c) The unquesticned fact that aircraft noise is a
problem of national importance is not sufficient

basis for granting a writ in this case ................. 14

(d) There is no novel question of federal statutory
interpretation 15
ConcLusIon 16

APPENDIE .... la

TaspLE oF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d
2 BG | eeeaeeieeie enemas saree 9, 11, 12
American Airlines, Inc. v. City of Audubon Park, No.
5828, W.D.Ky., April 1, 1968 -

Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961) 13
Chronister v. City of Atlanta, 99 Ga. App. 447, 108
S.E.2d 731 (1959) .. 13
City of Newark v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 159 F.Supp.
750 (D.N.J. 1958) 11,13
Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942) 8
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) -...... 8

Houston v. T.C.R.R. Co. v. Mayes, 201 U.S. 321 (1906) 8
International Union of U.A.W. v. O’Brien, 339 U.S.

454 (1950) 9
Local 24, Int’l1 Bh’d of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S.

283 (1959) 9,13
Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 39

Cal. Rptr. 708, 394 P.2d 548 (1964) 11, 12
Minnesotu Rate Cases, The, 230 U.S. 352 (1913) .......... 8
Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605

(1926) 13
Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944) .. 138
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U-S. 497 (1956) -...W000..... 9

Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Illinois Brick Co., 297 U.S.
447 (1936)

PAGE
Redman v. Patterson, No. 14869/60, Sup.Ct., Nassau
Co., New York, January 4, 1961 ‘ 13

Scandinavian Airlines System, Inc. v. County of Los
Angeles, 56 Cal.2d 11, 363 P.2d 25 (1961), cert. den.,
368 U.S. 899 (1961) 13

Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955) . 13

Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) 2
6 UG. 410OP ns 3
28 U.S.C. § 1337 3
28 U.S.C. § 2101(e) 2
28 U.S.C. § 2201 3
49 U.S.C. $1301 2
49 U.S.C. § 1308 .... 10
49 U.S.C. § 1304 16
49 U.S.C. § 1548 10, 16
49 U.S.C. § 1482 11
P.L. 90-411, 82 Stat. 395 (1968) 14

Public Utilities Code of California § 21240 13

iv

Miscellaneous
PAGE
United States Supreme Court Rule (19(b) 8,12
United States Supreme Court Rule 22(3) 2
S. Rep. No. 1851, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) ................ 10
S. Rep. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) ................ 15

Office of Science and Technology, Executive Office of
the President, Jet Aircraft Noise Panel, “Alleviation
of Jet Aircraft Noise Near Airports” (March, 1966) 15

Stern & Gressman, Supreme Court Practice (3d ed.
1962) 14

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1968
No. 637

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION*

Opinions Below

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, printed in the petitioners’ Appendix
(P.Ap. la-15a),** is now reported at 398 F.2d 369. The

* The airline respondents, The Port of New York Authority and
Air Line Pilots Association, International join in this brief.

** “P Ap.” refers to the Appendix to the Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari. “R.Ap.” will refer to the Appendix hereto. When one
of the lower court opinions reprinted in the petitioners’ Appendix
is cited herein, and the opinion cited is not otherwise apparent from

yey

2

opinion of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York (Dooling, J.) (P.Ap. 16a-34a) is re-
ported at 272 F. Supp. 226.

Jurisdiction

The petitioners have invoked the authority of this Court
to review cases in the courts of appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254(1). Under 28 U.S.C. §2101(¢) and Rule 22(3) of
this Court their Petition for a Writ of Certiorari was
timely. The respondents received copies of the Petition,
by mail, on October 14, 1968.

Constitutional, Statutory and Other Provisions

In addition to the provisions ,of the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958, as amended (49 U.S.C. § 1301, et seq.), set
out in the Appendix to the Petition (P.Ap. 35a-41a), this
case also involves the constitutional provisions, and the
Town of Hempstead’s noise ordinance, which are repro-
duced, infra, in the Appendix hereto (R.Ap. la-6a).

Questions Presented

The Petition lists three questions for review (Pet. 2).
Stated summarily they are whether Article IT of the Town
of Hempstead’s Unnecessary Noise Ordinance (the “Ordi-
nance”) is invalid (1) because it operates in a field over
which the national government has preempted the power of

the context, the abbreviations “D.C.Op.” and “C.A.Op.” will be used.
The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari itself will sometimes be abbre-
viated herein as “Pet.”

3

plenary regulation; or (2) as an undue burden on inter-
state and foreign commerce; or (3) because it is in direct
conflict with valid and applicable regulation by the national
government. The District Court concluded that the Ordi-
nance is invalid on all three of these grounds (C.A.Op.,
P.Ap. 6a). However, the Court of Appeals held only that
the Ordinance is invalid because of direct conflict with
federal regulation, expressly finding it unnecessary to de-
cide the first two questions listed above (P.Ap. 6a, 15a
(n. 4)), even though it did say that “Any one of the Dis-
trict Court’s three conclusions is enough, of course, to make
the ordinance invalid” (P.Ap. 6a).

Statement of the Case

As stated in the Petition the jurisdiction of the Dis-
trict Court in this case was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1337
(giving jurisdiction in actions arising under acts of Con-
gress regulating commerce) and 28 U.S.C. $1331 (giving
jurisdiction in controversies #rising under the Constitution,
laws or treaties of the United States). In addition, it was
also based on 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (authorizing the granting
of declaratory judgments).

The Town of Hempstead (hereinafter individually called
“Hempstead”) enacted the Ordinance on November 19,
1963.* In brief, it provides, with respect to aircraft, that
it is unlawful to operate any aircraft that creates a “tran-
sient” noise within Hempstead, for a duration greater

* The Ordinance was amended on March 10, 1964, and, by stipu-
lation, it is the arnended version that is at issue in this action. Since
the record does not contain a composite rendition of the Ordinance
as amended, such a composite, based on the record, is included in
the Appendix hereto (R.Ap. la-6a).

4

than twelve seconds from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., or greater
than six seconds for the remainder of the day, which ex-
ceeds in any one octave band of sound frequency the listed
decibel limit for that octave band as set forth in a “limiting
noise spectrum” consisting of such limits for each of eight
such octave bands; and that it is unlawful for aircraft to
create “steady noise” (noise for a period of one minute at
any time) which exceeds in any one octave band the listed
limit set forth in a different limiting noise spectrum appli-
cable to the same eight octave bands.

The airjline respondents began this action on December
4, 1963 to obtain (i) a declaratory judgment that the
Ordinance is unconstitutional and (ii) an order enjoining
its enforcement. They instituted it because, as the Dis-
trict Court found, compliance with the Ordinance’s noise
requirements would force changes, including unsafe
changes, in traffic patterns and altitudes prescribed by the
Federal Aviation Agency (findings of fact Nos. 282, et seq.,
P.Ap. 3a-4a; C.A.Op., P.Ap. 15a). Separate, but compan-
ion, actions of a similar nature were thereafter begun
against, the petitioners (hereinafter collectively called the
“Town”) by The Port of New York Authority (the “Port
Authority”) and the Air Line Pilots Association, Interna-
tional (“ALPA”). The Port Authority operates John F.
Kennedy International Airport (“JFK”), the airport af-
fected by the Ordinance, and ALPA is an unincorporated
association representing pilots employed by scheduled air-
lines. On January 24, 1964 motions for an order granting a
preliminary injunction were filed in each of the three ac-
tions, and subsequently the Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Agency (the “FAA”) intervened in support of
the motions. The three separate actions were consolidated
by consent on June 2, 1964.

5

Before ruling on the motions for a preliminary injunc-
tion, 4,088 pages of testimony, by 12 witnesses, were
taken intermittently from September 21, 1964 to Septem-
ber 24, 1965 by Judge Dooling; 187 exhibits were offered
and 53 affidavits, some very lengthy and technical, were
submitted. After Proposed Findings of Fact, Proposed
Counter-Findings of Fact and plaintiffs’, defendants’ and
intervenor’s written comments thereon were received
by Judge Dooling, he made detailed and technical findings
of fact consisting of 294 paragraphs and, on August 7,
1967, entered an order granting a preliminary injunction.

The Court of Appeals pointed out the reason for the
exhaustive record:

“The Town argued initially that aircraft could fly
over the Town in compliance with both the ordinance
and with FAA regulations governing landing and
take-off patterns and procedures. There was no ques-
tion, however, but that at the time the suit was brought,
take-offs and landings at JFK regularly produced
noise exceeding the relevant limiting noise spectrum
of the ordinance.

“The District Court made crucial findings of fact
which contradict the Town’s initial argument that com-
pliance with the ordinance is possible without altera-
tions in flight patterns and procedures, and the Town
has now shifted its ground, arguing in essence that the
ordinance is not an undue burden on interstate com-
merce, because ‘the Town has unveiled a plan pursuant
to which approximately 98% of all flights [to and from
JFK] will avoid the Town while, at the same time, the
present traffic capacity will be unaffected.’ (Town’s
brief, p.22).” (P.Ap. 3a).

The Town’s initial position that the Ordinance and the FAA
regulations were compatible necessitated detailed evidence

6

as to how and why air traffic at JFK is regulated and oper-
ated as it is, how it would be affected by enforcement of
the Ordinance, and the nature of aircraft noise, including
the technical possibility of its control (see D.C.Op., P.Ap.
20a-23a, 27a-28a, 31a-32a). The respondents completed this
complex presentation and rested on June 15, 1965.

The Town’s case, consisting only of the testimony of its
expert witness (the acoustician who authored the Ordi-
nance), was put in during the period September 21-24, 1965,
after the Town had had a full summer to prepare. It was
only during this testimony, under cross-examination, that
it was first admitted by the Town’s expert that despite a
considerable amount of testing he could not point to a
single jet landing over Hempstead which had complied with
the Ordinance. Moreover, no mention was made by this
witness of any different “plan” for regulating air traffic at
JFK. While the respondents do not concede that such a
“plan” would be relevant (let alone safe), since it is not
really within the power of the Town or the District Court
to pose a different “plan” on the FAA, it is clear that the
Town had ample opportunity to prepare and submit its
ideas to the District Court and to argue their relevance.

It was only thereafter, in its Proposed Counter-Findings
of Fact (and not through any evidence), that the Town
first presented the new “plan” for regulating air traffic at
JFK in a different fashion from that prescribed by the
FAA, but allegedly permitting compliance with the Ordi-
nance. The Town has since largely rested its argument on
this “plan” (Pet. 5-6), but the very fact of its presentation
is a demonstration that the long record has been conclusive
that the air traffic patterns and altitudes required to achieve
compliance with the Ordinance would be in conflict with

7

those prescribed by the FAA and now in force (D.C.Op.,
P.Ap. 34a). The fact of such conflict was further verified
by the Town’s failure to attack on appeal (C.A.Op., P.Ap.
6a) any of the crucial findings (Nos. 281-294, quoted at
P.Ap. 3a-5a), “except that the Town still insists that its
alternate plan, submitted to the District Court, could steer
most flights away from the Town, thus assuring compliance
with the ordinance” (P.Ap. 6a). As to this argument, the
Town made no showing “that the District Court’s finding
[No. 286] to the contrary is clearly erroneous...” (C.A.
Op., P.Ap. 6a), and has never explained how air traffic thus
required to avoid flying over Hempstead could at the same
time avoid violation of FAA requirements thai dictate such
flights.* .

Thus, with such a plain basis for decision before it, the
Court of Appeals did not go beyond the conflict of the
Ordinance with applicable federal regulation (P.Ap. 6a) in
affirming the August 7, 1967 order of the District Court,
which granted the preliminary injunction restraining the
Town from enforcing the Ordinance against aircraft opera-
tions. The Town seeks review of that judgment of affirm-
ance.

*In essence, the Town’s “plan” is a contrived attempt to enable
aircraft to comply with the Ordinance either by causing flights over
Hempstead to be diverted over equally populous communities in the
Borough of Queens in the City of New York (to the west and south
of JFK), or by causing aircraft to avoid flying over Hempstead
by engaging in flight procedures which would substantially reduce
safety (D.C.Op., P.Ap. 33a; C.A.Op. n. 1, P.Ap. 3a-5a). In this
regard, the record flatly contradicts the statements at pages 5 and 6
of the Petition that the Town’s “plan” would permit compliance
with the Ordinance without affecting the capacity of JFK or the
safety factors now existing, and that the “evidence and exhibits”
show that operations at JFK can be conducted differently while
continuing to accommodate current traffic and allowing aircraft to
avoid the Town and equally populous areas. Jbid.

ARGUMENT

The respondents submit that none of the Town’s four
reasons for the granting of a writ of certiorari is sufficient.
None of them is of the character :equired by Rule 19(b).
Before briefly dealing with each of these four reasons, the
respondents wish to reemphasize that the District Court,
in a careful opinion, rested its decision on several separate,
alternate bases (see pages 2-3, swpra), each sufficient to sus-
tain the result (C.A.Op., P.Ap. 6a). All of these grounds
are discussed at length in the District Court’s opinion
(P.Ap. 23a-32a), and this brief will not dwell on them.

In discussing, below, the Town’s four points, we have
directed particular attention to the Court of Appeals’ af-
firmance on the ground of direct conflict between the Ordi-
nance and federal regulation of air commerce.

(a) No novel legal issue is presenied.

The legal question presented for review is not new. Ever
since Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824)
it has been settled that when Congress has acted consti-
tutionally all local police power regulations that directly
conflict in any way with federal action must, under the
Supremacy Clause, give way. This rule has been con-
sistently and continuously reaffirmed. E.g., Houston & T.C.
R.R. Co. v. Mayes, 201 U.S. 321, 328 (1906) ; The Minnesota
Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 399 (1913) (“There is no room
in our scheme of government for the assertion of state
power in hostility to the authorized exercise of Federal
power.”) ; Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Illinois Brick Co., 297
U.S. 447, 459 (1936); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson,

9

315 U.S. 148, 155-56 (1942) ; International Union of U.A.W.
v. O’Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 458-59 (1950) (“A state statute
so at war with federal law cannot survive.”); Pennsyl-
vania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 505-509 (1956) ; and Local 24,
Int’l Bh’d of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 296 (1959).
Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812
(2d Cir. 1956) (no petition for a writ) struck down a
minimum altitude ordinance that Judge Dooling, in this
case, hela to be the “legal equivalent” (D.C.Op., P.Ap. 23a)
of the Town’s Ordinance, and, in doing so, specifically ap-
plied the above rule in a case involving Kennedy Airport.
Indeed, in this case the Court of Appeals said that the
Hempstead Ordinance “is in effect a more comprehensive
regulation of air traffic patterns than was the Cedarhurst
ordinance”, and that Cedarhurst is a “square precedert for
holding the Hempstead ordinance invalid” because of its
conflict with federal regulation (P.Ap. 13a-14a).

Insofar as air commerce is concerned, Congress has
long since “recognized the national responsibility”, as it
was called by Mr. Justice Jackson in 1944 (see D.C.Op.,
P.Ap. 32a), and assumed for the federal government full
control of its regulation. It has placed the regulatory
powers in the FAA (see pages 10-11, 16, infra). Since
there is no suggestion that the Acts of Congress under which
air commerce is regulated are invalid, and in view of the
established principle of the supremacy of valid federal
regulation over conflicting local law, there is not only no
new issue presented here—there is no issue at all of “the
entire relationship of federal-local” governmental interests

(Pet. 4, 6) as urged by the Town as its first reason for
further review.

The Town also argues that, since differing local situa-
tions of wind, terrain, obstructions, etc. require the FAA

10

to cirect air traffic differently (“ad hoc”) from airport to
airport (which only makes it more important that there
be unified control), it should be permitted te reopen the
record on the issue of whether the Town’s late-blooming
“plan” for operating air traffic at JFK would sustain the
validity of the Ordinance. The Town asserts that the plan
“would not affect the traffic capacity at the Airport, but
would retain the safety factors now existing” (Pet. 5); it
claims: “In essence . . . that the airport is improperly
operated ...” (Pet. 5); and it apparently concludes that
the courts below were both in error in calling the plan
“irrelevant”. It is worth noting, in passing, that the Dis-
trict Court did devote attention in its opinion to the in-
adequacies of the “plan” (D.C.Op., P.Ap. 33a-34a) and,
in finding Ne. 286 .°.A.Op., P.Ap. 4a), expressly found,
without any subsequent showing of error before the Court
of Appeals (C.A.Op., P.Ap. 6a), that:

“There is no reliable evidence that a set of proce-
dures could be devised for Kennedy Airport in the
present state of aviation development which could
without substantial sacrifice of the interest in flight
safety assure either practical or complete compliance
with the Hempstead Ordinance.”

Regardless of the plan’s deficiencies, what the Town over-
looks is that Congress specificaily directed the FAA <Ad-
ministrator to develop the air traffic regulations to which
the Town now objects (see, e.g., 49 U.S.C. $1303, 1348;
P.Ap. 35a-38a) and that Congress did so, with the over-
riding interest of safety in mind, to assure unified control
over the navigable airspace and over air navigation.
Plenary authority in the matter of air traffic rules was
vested in the FAA (S. Rev. No. 1851, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.

11

13-15 (1958)). If a iocality like Hempstead believes an
airport is improperly operated, it may file a complaint with
the FAA. 49 U.S.C § 1482.

It is not for the courts to decide how air traffic at an
airport should be routed, or whether the Town’s “plan”
would impair safety or reduce traffic capacity. Those and
all other aspects of any plan to regulate air traffic or deal
with the use of the navigable airspace are extremely cor: -
plex subjects reserved for the expertise of the FAA.*
That is basically why judicial consideration of the “plan”
belatedly proposed by the Town is irrelevant (D.C.Op.,
P.Ap. 25a, 3la-34a). See also, City of Newark v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 159 F.Supp. 750, 757-58 (D.N.J. 1958), and
Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 39 Cal.
Rptr. 708, 394 P.2d 548, 554 (1964).

(b) No conflict exists between the decision of the
District Court in this case on the question of
preemption and the holding of any other court,
state or federal.

This second argument for review need be discussed only
briefly because, as the Town recognizes (Pet. 4), the Court
of Appeals did not base its decision on preemption. The
only conflict between decisions that is argued by the Town
as a basis for review is that alleged to exist on the issue
of preemption between the District Court in the present
case, and the Cedarhurst case, supra, on the one hand, and
Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 39 Cal.
Rptr. 708, 394 P.2d 548 (1964), on the other. This issue

* As to the complexity of air traffic regulation, see C.A.Op. n. 2,
P.Ap. 8a-13a; D.C.Op., P.Ap. 26a-28a, 31a.

12

is obviously not one of state law, as described by this
Court’s Rule 19(b). In any event Loma Portal did not in-
volve an ordinance at all, but rather an action by prop-
erty owners to enjoin airline operations at San Diego’s
Lindbergh Field. The California Supreme Court affirmed
a summary judgment denying such an injunction. In dicta
the court did decline to say that federal aviation legislation
was clearly intended to be exclusive in all areas relating tc
aviation, pointing out that it did not wish to preclude the
enforcement of state-created rights to damages, the imposi-
tion of state property taxes, and the entertainment of
wrongfui death actions against airlines. However, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court also said that “we could not erjoin
a pilot from flying in the landing pattern that he was or-
dered to follow by the [federal] control tower ...” (394
P.2d at 554), and specifically distinguished Cedarhurst on
the ground that it involved a local ordinance (394 P.2d at
555).

To the best of our knowledge there is only one other
case (besides Cedarhurst and the present one) which has
considered whether federal preemption of the fields of air
traffic safety and control and airspace management in-
validates local aircraft noise ordinances, and that one held
in the affirmative, agreeing with Cedarhurst and Judge
Dooling. American Airlines, Inc. et al. v. City of Audubon
Park, No. 5828, W.D.Ky., April 1, 1968 (unreported, but
appeal pending). In that case a summary judgment per-
manently enjoining the enforcement of a 750-foot minimum
altitude ordinance passed by a suburb of Louisville was
granted on the grounds, among others, of preemption and
conflict with federal regulation. Moreover, the only expres-
sions of dicta on the point of which we are aware were in

13

agreement. City of Newark v. Eastern Airlines, Irc., 159
F. Supp. 750, 755 (D.N.J. 1958) ; Redman v. Patterson, No.
14869/60, Sup.Ct., Nassau Co., New York, January 4, 1961
(unreported). See also, Northwest Airlines v. Mimnesota,
322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) {concurring opinion) ; Chronister
v. City of Atlanta, 99 Ga. App. 447, 108 S.E.2d 731, 734
(1959); Scandinavian Airlines System, Inc. v. County of
Los Angeles, 56 Cal.2d 11, 37, 363 P.2d 25 (1961), cert.
den., 368 U.S. 899 (1961); Public Utilities Code of Cali-
fornia § 21240.

The Town’s contention that there is no preemption be-
cause federal aviation iegislation does not contain “noise
criteria” (Pet. 6), which the Ordinance does, is not only
irrelevant to the issue of whether there are conflicting de-
cisions but is unsound. The argument is unsound because
local regulation of noise would require conduct inconsistent
with federal directives, as the trial court found (findings
Nos. 282, et seq., P.Ap. 3a-4a), and because the fact that
noise control, rather than airspace or air traffic regula-
tion, is the nominal objective of the Ordinance, does not
save it from invasion of the preempted fields (D.C.Op.,
P.Ap. 24a). See also, Local 24, Int’l Bh’d cf Teamsters
v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 297 (1959); Weber v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 479-81 (1955) ; Napier v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1926). Not even
complementary local regulation is permissible where the
federal interest is dominant. Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S.
297, 302 (1961). The argument is alco unsound because the
FAA “is not free to ignore, and it has not ignored, noise
abatement considerations” * (D.C.Op., P.Ap. 30a).

* Since the decision by the Court of Appeals, Title VI of the
Federal Aviation Act has been amended to require the Administra-

14

(c) The unquestioned fact that aircreft noise is a
problem of national importance is not sufficient
basis for granting a writ in this case.

The respondents do not know of any other “litigation
involving aircraft noise ordinances or minimum altitude
ordinances ...” that has “been stayed pending ultimate
decision on the Town’s Ordinance” (Pet. 7), even though
they believe they would be informed if there were any.
Respondents do agree that if the Ordinance were ulti-
mately sustained “one could almost certainly expect similar
type ordinances being enacted by communities” (Pet. 7)
across the country, and even around the same airports. It
could be expected that these would impair safety by impos-
ing a variety of requirements on aircraft, not necessarily
consistent with FAA controls. Furthermore, ordinances
or plans of neighboring towns would be likely to be mutu-
ally contradictory; like Hempstead, each would endeavor
to require aircraft to fly over the others (see D.C.Op., P.Ap.
33a). This is an additional practical argument in support
of the decisions below, even when looked at from the point
of view of airport communities themselves (see D.C.Op.,
P.Ap. 20a, 25a, 33a). However, the fact that the subject
matter generally is of importance is not sufficient reason
for reviewing a ruling which is unquestionably correct as
to the precise issue presented by the case. Srexn & Gress-
MAN, SUPREME Court Practice 255 (3d ed. 1962).

For a realistic appreciation of the background of this
case it should be understood that “the aircraft are operated

tor of the FAA to prescribe standards tor the measurement of
aircraft noise and sonic boom and, subject to certain stated con-
siderations, to prescribe such rules and regulations as he may find
necessary to provide for the control and abatement of aircraft noise
and sonic boom. P.L. 90-411, 82 Stat. 395 (1968).

15

in a thoroughly responsible manner ...” (D.C.Op., P.Ap.
22a) and that “the aircraft noise problem” is “not a con-
seqrence of the failure to take feasible precautions or to
p. ovide practical remedies” (D.C.Op., P.Ap. 20a). The
respondents and the FAA have all becn working for years,
with numerous others, to try to alleviate the noise from
aircraft. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1968). They cooperated, for example, in the 167-page
report of the Office of Science and Technology’s Jet
Aircraft Noise Panel, entitled Alleviation of Jet Aircraft
Noise Near Airports (March, 1966), which charted the
work which has since been carried on by the respondents
and others under federal leadership. This work has in-
cluded research on jet aircraft noise reduction at the source,
operational improvements to reduce noise by means ap-
proved by the FAA as consistent with safety, and suggested
limitations on land use near airports to encourage uses com-
patible with the noise (which are the three possible means to
alleviate aircraft noise).

(d) There is no novel question of federal
statutory interpretation.

The Town raises the supposed interpretative question
of “whether this federal legislation is dependent upon
local laws for measurement of its terms or is intended to
operate uniformly throughout the nation” (Pet. 8). “Meas-
urement”, in this context, can only mean the imposi-
tion by local laws of limitations on the flight of aircraft
and on their right to use the navigable airspace (whether
directly, or indirectly by noise limits). However Congress
has, among other things, declared “a public right of free-
dom of transit through the navigable airspace of the United

16

States” (49 U.S.C. § 1304), has delegated control of its use
to the FAA (49 U.S.C. 4 1348(a)), and has also delegated
control over air traffic rules and regulations to the FAA
(49 U.S.C. §1348(c)). This case does not involve any
question of statutory interpretation but rather, as found
in the District Court, the head-on conflict of a local enact-
ment with federal regulation.

CONCLUSION

The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit should
be denied.

November 12, 1968
Respectfully submitted,

Fowier Hamitton
Attorney for Respondents
American Airlines, Inc., et al.
52 Wall Street
New York, New York 10005

Lyman M. Tonvet, JR.
Georce WEISZ
JaMeEs D. WIESE

Of Counsel

17

Smyey GoLpstern
Attorney for Respondent
The Port of New York Authority
111 Eighth Avenue
New York, New York 10011

Dantet B. GoipBere

JOSEPH LESSER

IsopeL E. MutrHeap
Of Counsel

Samvuet J. CoHEN
Attorney for Respondents
Charles H. Ruby, et al.
605 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10016

la

APPENDIX
Constitutional, Statutory and Other Provisions

United States Constitution, Article VI, clause 2:

“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and
all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme

- Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”

United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8:
“The Congress shall have Power...

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes....”

Unnecessary Noise Ordinance (No. 25) of the Town of
Hempstead: Article II, as amended (see Record, pp. 4112-
15, 4470-72):

ArtTicLe IT

REGULATION OF AND LimiTaTION Upon TRANSIENT
Sounp From Arrcrart In FLIcHTs aND ANY AND
ALL OtTseEeR Devices or a MECHANICAL NATURE.

1. Definitions of words and phrases used in this ordi-
nance.

(a) “Person”:—Includes any individual, firm, as-
sociation or corporation, whether such person be

ET APN eT TOS . ee eR SRS ee ee eed va:

2a

the owner, lessee or charterer, his or its pilots or
co-pilots as to aircraft, and any individual firm,
association and corporation, its servants, agents or
employees as to any other sound producing device
or mechanism.

(b) “Noise” :—Noise is any incr2ase in the ambient
noise, measured as provided in this Article, caused
by any mechanical device including aircraft.

(c) “Ambient Noise”:—Ambient noise is the all-
encompassing noise associated with a given environ-
ment.

(d) “Bel”:—The bel is a unit of level when the
base of a logarithm is 10 and is restricted to levels
of quantities proportional to power.

(e) “Decibel” :—The decibel is one-tenth of a bel
and is a unit of level when the base of the logarithm
is the tenth root of ten, and the quantities con-
cerned are proportional to power.

(f) “Spectrum”:—A spectrum is a function of
time and is a description of its resolution into
components, each of different frequency and is
also used to signify continuous range of com-
ponents usually wide in extent within which waves
have some specified characteristics such as “audio-
frequency spectrum” and is also applied to func-
tions of variables other than time.

(g) “Sound Pressure Level” :—The sound pressure
level, in decibels, of a sound is 20 times the loga-
rithm to the base 10 of the r&tio of the pressure
of this sound to the reference pressure, which
reference pressure must be explicitly stated.

3a

(h) “Band Pressure Level”:—The band pressure
level of a sound for a specified frequency band is
the sound pressure level for the sound contained
within the restricted band. The reference pressure
must be specified.

(i) “Cycle”:—A cycle is the compiete sequence of
values of a periodic quantity that occur during a
period.

(j) “Frequency”:—The frequency of a function
periodic in time is the reciprocal of the primitive
period. The unit is the cycle per unit time and
must be specified.

(k) “Microbars”:—-A microbar is a unit of pres-
sure commonly used in acoustics and is equal to 1
dyne per square centimeter.

(1) “Sound-Level Meter”:—A sound-level meter is
an instrument including a microphone, an ampli-
fier, an output meter, and frequency weighting
networks for the measurement of noise and sound
levels in the manner provided by this Article.

(m) “Sound Analyzer”:—A sound analyzer is a
device for measuring the band-pressure level or
pressure spectrum level of a sound as a function of
frequency.

(n) “Duration”:—The duration of a_ transient
noise from a machine during the entire period
when the transient noise is first distinguished from
the ambient noise until the noise from the same
machine finally recedes into the ambient noise,
shall be the period of the beginning when the tran-
sient noise first exceeds a certain band pressure

4a

level until it no longer exceeds the same band
pressure level and providing it remains above the
same band pressure level for at least one-third of
the total duration.

(o) “Transient Noise” :—Any noise having a dura-
tion of one minute or less shall be considered a
transient noise and the limits of Table I of this
ordinance shall apply.

(p) “Steady Noise”—Any noise having a duration
in excess of one minute shall be considered a steady
noise and the limits of Table II of this ordinance
shall apply.

2. No person shall operate or cause to be operated
any mechanism or device (including but not limited
to airplanes) which shall create a noise within the
Town of Hempstead exceeding the limiting noise
spectra set forth in Tables I and II as follows:

TABLE I

Liuitine Notsr SPectruM
ror Steapy NOISE

Band Pressure Level Octave Band Center
Decibels Re 0.0002 Frequency Cycles
Microbars per Second
92 63
87 125
79 250
72 500
66 1000
60 2000
54 4000
52 8000

ha

During the daytime from 7:00 A.M. to 7:00 P.M.
the limits of Tasie I hereinbefore set forth shall ap-
ply to transient noise having a duration in excess of
twelve (12) seconds. During the night from 7:00 P.M.
to 7:00 A.M. the same limits shall apply to transient
noises having a duration in excess of six (6) seconds.

TABLE II

Limitine Noise SPECTRUM
For Steapy No!lse

Band Pressure Level Octave Band Center
Decibels Re 0.0002 Frequency Cycles
Microbars per Second
72 63
67 125
59 250
52 50u
46 | 1000
40 2000
34 4000
32 8000

3. Noise measurements end limits shall conform to
the following practices:

(a) Noise shall be measured at an altitude not
exceeding 100 feet above sea level.

(b) Measurements of noise emanating from any
mechanism or device including, but not limited
to, motor vehicies, shall be made at a distance
of at least 100 feet from the longitudinal cen-
ter line of the vehicle.

6a

(c) Machinery noise originating on private prop-
erty shall be measured at the property line of
the property on which the noise source is lo-
cated.

. If any clause, sentence, paragraph, section or part
of this article shall be adjudged by any Court of
competent jurisdiction to be invalid, such judgment
shall not affect, impair, or invalidate the remainder
of this article but shall be confined in its operation
to the clause, sentence, paragraph, section or part
thereof directly involved in the litigation in which
such judgment shall have been rendered.

. Penalties:—Any person violating any provision of |
this article shall be liable to a penalty not exceed-
One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars for each offense
and a violation of this ordinance or any part
thereof shall constitute disorderly conduct and any
person violating the same shall be a disorderly per-
son.

. This article shall become effective in accordance

with the provisions of Section 133 of the Town
Law of the State of New York.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385604_0259%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
