# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Los Angeles Herald Examiner v. San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1968
- **Citation:** 393 U.S. 926

## Text

hn FOP AASY Y | |. See FIL ED’ US,
SUPREME Court. GE.

_ Supreme Court of th the jogs Stateg® 1368

JOHN F, Davis, CLERK

ee

“a Term, 1968
LOS ANGELES HERALD EXAMINER, a Division of -The. Hearst

Corporation, and THE SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, a Division’ a...
of The Hearst Corporation, ,

Petitioners,
. ’ US. . 4 .

SAN FRANCISCO-OAKLAND NEWSPAPER GUILD; NEWS-
PAPER AND PERIODICAL DRIVERS’ AND ‘HELPERS’ UNION
LOCAL 921; LOS ANGELES NEWSPAPER GUILD, LOCAL 69;
_ LOS ANGELES WEB PRESSMEN’S UNION NO: 48; LOS AN:
“GELES STEREOTYPERS’ UNION NO. 58; LOS -ANGELES
TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 174; INTERNATIONAL AS-
SOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, ;
DISTRICT LODGE NO. 94; GENERAL WAREHOUSEMEN’S
UNION ‘LOCAL 598; BUILDING SERVICE AND MAINTE- ; ‘

:

re

* NANCE EMPLOYEES UNION NO. 399; LOS ANGELES MAIL-
ERS’ UNION NO. 9; and LOS ANGELES PAPER HANDLERS’
UNION NO. 3, appellants in es before the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,

_ Respondents,

RALPH toad Regional. Director of Region 21 cf the National
Labor Relations Board, for and on behalf of the NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD, appellee in proceedings before the United States -
- Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, :

, Respondent. ’

+ Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

ae tet | 7 “CHARLES G. BAKALY, JR.,
. 433 South Spring Street, .

Los Angeles, Calif. 90013,
Attorney for Petitioners. ;

Of Counsel:
FLIN® & McKAY,
458 South Spring Street,
Los Angeles, Calif. 90013,

O'MELVENY & MYERS, —

RICHARD C;: WHITE, ,

CHARLES W. BENDER, | V-

PETER M. ANDERSON, .
433 South Spring Street, | . - &
Los Angeles; Calif. 90013. ak

Parker & Son, Inc., Law Printers, Los Angeles. Phone MA. 6-9171. -
S| ii .

‘SUBJECT INDEX . | og

_% | - ae ae oy _Page
Opinions Below osalianesinnblebeaen a suit dine edad “i
Jurisdiction OR Nee ee ccna : Macao: i
Question Presented oe cae | wes veplanonnentamevedineeeniy i ou
| Statute Involved — isiiccisininsiihealiasaaiis :

Statement of the GTA ER a eae 4

Reasons for Granting the Writ ..................:-000-0+ 5

Conclusion dasibiaiidaistadion A Rn Aor esl cence 16

INDEX -TO APPENDICES’
Appendix A. Order EOE TOM, 2 , isa p. 1
Order on Motions a miei nn &
~ Appendix B/ Order - Granting. Temporary Tnjunc-

tion 4

_ Supplemental Order Granting Temporary, Injunc~ -

—tion : /
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ....:,.:-10 _

: 5 _ | ; ° . SN
f
y

' TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

pats Cages Page
— Local 283, UAW v. vo U.S: 805. ....2, 5,.6, 7:

siiineciebiiadss dake tueeeraadiipeenbiien moosesaeh By: 12, 13;

Trades Council, 383 | F.2d 562:..

Retail Clerks Union v. Food" Biployics Council,
ae | FS. een ene : = 5

Miscellaneous Bee a
_-National Labor Relations Board, Fighteenth Annual
~ Report (1954), OR BEE na iicresecinemnnerenins

National Labor Relations Bold, Thirtieth ‘Annual °
~_ Report (1966), ig eniodl Clescess tate Ra SOA

Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Pro-
cedure, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess., Report on Regulatory Agencies the
" President-Elect 64. (1964) . buacisishpeacnciabniete

: Rules wie ae .

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule PP bihiidisaaeniances

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Ruie — (2) .

- Statutes fae aa

National Labor Relations Act, Sec. 8(b) (4) OG)-

(B) eccccccccce eeccccccccccgecccccccccsccccccccesces on
National Labor. Relations Act,. Sec. 10. 2 6, 11, 12,

’ National Labor Relations Act, Sec. 10(e)..7, 11, 12,

16

aa

N L. R. B. v. Nashville Building & ‘Construction i:
14

5.

14.

1

4
16 .
14

- National Labor Relations Act, Sec. 10(£) dace 5,7, 11
National Labor Relations Act, Sec. 10(h) ...-10, 11, 12°

National Labor Relations Act, Sec. 10( j) ....13, 14,

16.

‘_
out eu | Rage
National Labor Relations: Act, Sec. 10(1) . ey Se
26 vvenecenenti1O, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16°
‘United States Code, Title 28, Sec. 1254(1) aeons 2

.. United States Code, Title 29, - Sec. 158(b) (4)(i)- :
Gi) (B) -----

United States Code, Title 29, Sec. 160(h) . cvsspecgencscone EL
United States Code, Title 29, Sec. aia aero a ae
*
2

IN THE

Supreme Court of th the United States

‘Gevher Term, 1968 |
BOD: wsnccieenn ssoeee

LOS ANGELES HERALD EXAMINER, a Division of The Hearst
, .Corporation, and THE SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, a Division
As The Hearst. Corporation, ;
‘Petitioners,
‘SAN FRANCISCO-OAKLAND NEWSPAPER GUILD; NEWS-
PAPER AND PERIODICAL DRIVERS’ AND HELPERS’ UNION
LOCAL 921; LOS ANGELES NEWSPAPER GUILD,: LOCAL 69;
LOS ANGELES WEB PRESSMEN’S UNION NO. 18; LOS AN-
GELES STEREOTYPERS’ -UNION NO. 58; LOS ANGELE

TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 174; INTERNATIONAL A . .

SOEIATION OF > gy AND AEROSPACE WORKER

DISTRICT LODGE NO. 94; GENERAL WAREHOUSEMEN’S\
UNION LOCAL 598; BUILDING SERVICE AND MAINTE-

._ NANCE EMPLOYEES UNION NO. 399; LOS ANGELES MAIL-

- ERS’. UNION NO, 9; and LOS. ANGELES PAPER HANDLERS’.

UNION NO. 3, appellants i in proceedings before the United -States Court
of Ss for the Ninth =
—

ee

RALPH. E. KENNEDY. Regional Director of mein 21 of the National

Labor Relations Board, for and on behalf. of the NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD, appellee in pecceoenget before the United States
_ Comt of ne for = Ninth decniecaan :

Respondent.

ii for a Writ of aes to the United States
one of. fie! for the _— Circuit. |
Petitioners; the Los Aingeles Herald cues Divi-

sion of The Hearst Corpor ation, and the ‘San Fran-
‘CISCO Examiner, Division f The Hearst Corporation,

-

pray, that a writ of certiorari issue to review: a final

order. of the United. States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, entered in the: above-entitled case en
- May 20, 1968, denying petitioners leave .to intervene
in appeal proceedings to. review a temporary in junction
issued by the United States District Court = the

°

. A
IM ccememnnarer

sone daa ny

=

LL LEPO PILE IIE LPI ON

.
Sper CRO
or

POO Ee Ae
Northern District of California under Section 10(1) of

_the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29
— U'S.C. $160(1).

sa OPINIONS BELOW. |
The Court of Appeals’ order of May 20, 1968 dus

_ ing petitioners leave to intervene, rescinded a previous

order of April 19, 1968. which had granted leave to
intervene. Neither of these orders was accompanied
by an opinion’of the court. The orders are printed in
Appendix A hereto.

The order,~supplemental order, ‘end findings of fact
and conclusions of ‘law issued by the District Court
in connection with the temporary injunction have not
been published and are printed irr Appendix B hereto.

‘ JURISDICTION.
The order of the Court of Appeals denying the peti-

‘ tioners leave to intervene was entered on May 20, 1968.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. §1254(1).* . -

QUESTION PRESENTED.
Where a district court, in proceedings instituted by .

the National Labor Relations Board pursuant to §10

of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, issues _
a temporary. injunction against a charged party, and
the charged party appeals therefrom, may the charging ©
party be denied the right to intervene in the appeal
proceedings wherein the propriety of protecting his

‘rights and interests by injunctive relief’ will be deter-
mined ?

ae "
*In Local 283, UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 208-09 (1965),

‘the Court held that a charging denied intervention ‘ih court

of appeals proceedings to review a decision was a “party” -
to the ease within the meaning of §1254(1). ine :

3

“~

STATUTE INVOLVED.
Section 10(1) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, 29 U.S.C. §160(1), provides in relevant
fe, , “Whenever it is charged that any person has_
engaged in: an unfair. labor practice within the
meaning of paragraph (4)(A), (B), or (C) of .
section’ 158(b) of this title *: . the ‘preliminary: in- .
vestigation of such charge shall be made forthwith
and given priority over all other cases except cases"
of like character in the office where it is filed
or to which it is referred. If, after such investi-
gation, the officer or regional attorney to whom the,”
matter may be referred has reasonable cause to be-
lieve such charge’ is true and that a complaint
should issue, he shall, on behalf of the Board, pe- »
_ tition any United States district court within any
district where the unfair labor practice in question
has occurred, is alleged to have occurred, or wherein
such person resides or transacts business, for ap-
propriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudi-
cation of the Board with respect to such matter. .
Upon the filing of any such petition, the district
court shall have jurisdiction to grant such. injunc-
- tive relief or temporary restraining order as it
. deems just and proper, notwithstanding any other °
provision of law. . ... Upon filing of any such pe- ;
tition the courts shall cause notice thereof ‘to be
® served upon any person involved in ‘the charge
and such person, including the charging party, shall
be given an opportunity to appear by counsel and _
present any relevant testimony. . . .”
4

EE

—
STATEMENT OF THE CASE;

This case originated from charges filed with the
Board by petitioners herein, alleging that the respond-
ent unions had engaged in and were engaging in unfair
labor pract: ces within the meaning of §8(b) (4) (i) (ii) _
(B) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §158(b) (4) (i) (ii) (B),
which proscribes secondary boycotts by unions. After

‘ conducting a preMminary investigation, as required by

_

f

$10(1) of the Act, Respondent Ralph E. Kennedy, Re-
gional Director of the Board, concluded that there was
reasonable cause to believe that respondent unions were
engaging in unfair labor practices, as charged, and
that an unfair labor practice complaint should issue.
Thereupon, pursuant to §10(1), Kennedy filed a, petition

in the District Court, seeking a. temporary injunction

interlocutory to the final, adjudication of the matter by
the Board. A hearing on an order to show cause was
held, during which the charging parties, petitioners
herein, were allowed to participate as provided by §10
(1). After presentation of evidence, the District Court
issued an order and supplemental order, accompanied
by findings of fact and conclusions of law, granting the
temporary injunction. Respondent unions appealed to
the Court of Appeals and petitioners petitioned for

_ leave to intervene in the appeal proceedings before that

court. +. 4

By an order issued April 19, 1968, the Court of Ap-
peals granted petitioners leave to intervene. Respond-
ents thereafter filed with ‘the Court of Appeals a mo-

‘tion to reconsider the order allowing intervention, and
_ in resporise thereto the Court of Appeals issued a second

order on May 20, 1968, rescinding its prior order but

SY

as amici curiae.

No.
a
providing that petitionefs might appear and_file a brief :
Petitioners applied: to the Court of Appeals for an
order staying further proceedings in that court pending |

final determination by this Court of the within petition
for certiorari, but the Court of Appeals denied sajd ap-

, plication by an order dated July 16, 1968.

" REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.
1. The order of the Court of Appeals denying peti- -
tioners leave to intervene in the review proceedings be-
fore that court is directly in conflict with the control-
ling decision of this Court in Local 283, UAW v. Sco-
field, 382 U.S. 205 (1965). - |

In Scofield, this Court reviewed -two cases in which
courts of appeals had issued orders denying petitions
for intervention and relegating the would-be inter- —
venors to the status of amici curiae. In the’ first

_ of these cases (Scofield), the petitioner, who had been

the successful charged party in proceedings before the
Board, sought to intervene in review proceedings in-
stituted by the unsuccessful charging party pursuant to
§10(f) of the Act. In the second case (Fafnir), the
petitioner, who had been the successful charging: party
in proceedings before the Board, sought to intervene in :
review and enforcement proceedings which were insti-
tuted at the petition of the unsuccessful charged party
and the cross-petition of the Board. In each case; the
Court upheld the right of the successful party to in-
tervene.
“We hold. that both the successful charged

party (in Scofield) and the successful charging
party (in Fafnir). have a right to intervene in the

—ty—
Court of Appeals proceeding which reviews or en-
forces Labor Board orders. We think that Con-

. gress intended*to confer intervention rights upon.
the successful party to. the’ Labor ‘Board proceed-
ings in the court in which the unsuccessful party

. challenges the Board’s decision.” (382 U.S. at

08). [Emphasis added].

In Scofield and Fafnir, the Board argued, as it does
in this case, that the relevant provisions of §10 were in-
tended to protect the ‘ ‘public interest” to the exclusion
of the “private intefésts” of the charging party, and that:
the charging party was intended to be only an incidental
beneficiary of any relief obtained by the Board.* Mr.
Chief Justice Warren, for a unanimous Court, ejected.
this argument:

“In prior decisions, this Court ha observed that
the Labor Act recognizes the existence of . private
rights within the statutory scheme. . . . To em-
phasize the rhetoric of. ‘public interest’. ..is-not-

_‘to-imply-that-the public right excludes recognition

of parochial thes interests. ” (382 U.S. at 218).

i. :

“In short, we think that the statutory pattern
of the Labor Act ‘does not dichotomize ‘public’ as
opposed to ‘private’ interests. Rather, the two inter-
blend in the intricate statutory scheme.” (382 U.S..

af220).

*In the proceedings below, Respondent Kennedy invoked. this
argumeht as follows: “Section 10(1) of the Act was not in-
tended to establish a remedy for the benefit of a private party,
“and the incidental benefit which might inure to the charging
party from an injunction under the section is not a sufficient
‘basis for permitting charging parties to intervene in the special
statutory proceedings contemnlated by Section 10(1).” (An-°
swer of appellee Kennedy, before Court of Appeals to Motion by
Charging Parties for Leave to Intervene, p. 3).

ae
Here, as in Scofield and Fafnir, the attempt to deny:
petitioners’ rights of intervention by invoking the ‘“‘pub-

«lie right” dogma must fail. For, although §10(1) does

_not address itself directly to the question of whether in-
tervention is allowed in proceedings to review a tempo-
rary injunction, the intricate blending of: private and
public rights in the statutory scheme clearly. manifests a
congressional intention favoring intervention. The
- omission of Congress to provide expressly for inter-
véntion in an. appeal from a §10( 1) proceeding cannot
be read as an expression of intention to deny charging
parties in this case their due.process rights to participate
actively in litigation involving their statutory rights.
This issue was laid to rest in Scofield and Fafnir when .
the Court held that Congress’s omission to provide. ex-
pressly for intervention as of right in §10(e) atid. §10-
(f) review proceedings did not indicate an intent to bar
intervention. (382.U.S. at 209-10).

Congress recognized the irreparable injury which -
could be caused to an employer by secondary boycott
activity, and it was for this reason that §10€1) makes
it mandatory for-the Board to petition for injunctive re-
lief whenever such illegal activity is-alleged and the
regional director has “reasonable cause to believe such
charge is true.” Having thus recognized the essential
and immediate need for pretecting the interests of the
threatenéd employers in such circumstances, Congress
could not simultaneously have intended to prevent full
participation ‘in the: litigation by the employer. Indeed,
the contrary is shown by the language of eet) itself,
which provides, in relevant part:

“Upon filing of any such petition the courts
shall cause notice thereof to be served upon any

| com

person involved in the charge and sueh ‘person,
including the charging party, shall be given an op-
cosa by counsel and present any rele-
vant testimony... .” [Emphasis added].

Sined this . lahguage authorizes the charging eaiti to
appear and introduce contentious evidence (Retail Clerks.
Union v. Food Employers ‘Council, Inc., 351 F.2d 525,
528 (9th Cir; 1965)), the legislative niente clearly
; makes the charging party-more than an amicus, for an .
_ amicus. would have no absolute right to -be-heard and
—to “introduce and dispute contentious evidence. ‘Were’
a charging -party relegated to the role of an amicus
. in the appeal proceedings, he would be, denied the op-

portunity for active participation in the litigation which

Congress intended should be secured to him as a matter
‘of right.

” Relegation of a charging party to the status of amicus
in appeal proceedings would. thus be wholly incon-
sistent with the recognition of private: rights which
pervades the scheme of the Act. “This is ‘made plainly
. evident by Fafnir’s rejection of the argument that the
would-be intervenor can’ adequately protect his interests
by participating in appeal proceedings as amicus curiae.
,As stated by the Court, in language equally applicable .
here: | ~ ; -

“The rights typically secured to an intervenor
‘in a reviewing court—to participate in designating
the record, to pafticipate/jh prehearing conferences
preparatory to simplification of the issues, to file a
brief, to engage in oral argument, to petition for
rehearing in the appellate court or to this Court
for certiorari—are” not productive of delay nor do
they cause es in the appellate cotirts.

y

ay

Participation in defining the issues before the
court guarantees that. all relevant material is ©
brought to its attention, and makes the briefs on |

the merits more meaningful... .. On the other hand,
an amicus—vwith the vaio ofthe right to file
a brief—imght be unable adequately to present all

16). |
As noted by the. Court, intervention secures for the
petitioner, not only the right to participate in the

appeal proceedings, but. also’ the right to seek review.

by writ of certiorari from an adverse decision on: the
merits in the court of appeals. The need to secure

_ by intervention this right to petition for review is vi- -

tally. important .to the- successful charging; party, for

the Board might decline to petition for review from an
adverse .decision for reasons wholly unrelated ‘to~ the
-merits of the ‘controversy.

* * «The Labor Board may . .¢. adversely affect the

rights of the private parties. .. . For example, the
Board may decide a case and later re-evaluate its
position at a time when that case is before an
appellate court. The Géneral Counsel, in such a sit-
uation, cannot be expected wholeheartedly to at-

_ tempt to convince an appellate court of ‘the correct-
ness of a doctrine which the Board itself has aban-
doned.” (382 U.S. at 214-15 n. 7).

“Intervention additionally ‘ ‘serves the ‘public interest’
by guaranteeing that the Board’s interpretation of the

relevant provisions accords with the intent of Con-.

gress.” (382 U.S. at 219).

Finally, as stressed by the Court in Rafer, the
right of intervention by a successful charging party is

-. the relevant data to the court.” (382 U.S. at 215-

10

. supported by: the policies vterying intervention gen-
erally: 7
“[H]elpful, analogies may be found’ in the
Judicial Review Act of 1950, governing interven-
_tion in the Courts of Appeals ‘by private. parties
directly affected by agency order's, and in the Fed-
eral Rules’ of. Civil Procedure. ‘ — U.S. at ai |
- AT).
x “The Federal Rules of Civil Proceduré, of Course gs
/ apply only in the federal district courts. « Still, the
policies underlying intervention may be applicable
in appellate courts. Under Rule 24(a)(2) or Rule .«
w, 24(b)(2), we think the charged party would be |
entitled to intervene.” oe U.S. at 217 n.10).

This was the comment of the Court prior ‘to the
-1966.amendment of Rule 24. As now amended to ex-
_pand the right of intervention, Rule 24(a)(2)* offers -
an even more compelling analogy. in support - of peti-
tioners’ right to intervene.

. Respondents: have attempted to. distinguish Scofield
and Fafnir by arguing that intervention in appeal pro- .
ceedings to review a §10(1) injunction is prohibited by
" the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which limits the jurisdiction
of federal courts to grant injunctive selief in labor dis-
_ putes. This argument wholly fails to take account of §10
(h) of the Act, which excepts fron the Norris-La-’

*Rule 24(a)(2),-as amended, reads, in material part :

“Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone
shall\be permitted to intervene in an, action... . when the
applicant claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so
situated that the disposition of the action may as a prac-
tical:matter impair or -impede his ability:to protect that in-
terest, unless the applicant’s interest is’ adequately repre-
sented by existing parties.”

sahil iis

Guardia Act all federal ‘court proceedings authorjzed 7
under §10 of the National Labor: Relations Act, in-.

cluding not only §10(e) and §10(f) review and enforce-

ment proceedings of thé type involved in Scofield and ~

Fafnir, but also §10(1) injunction proceedings of the
t¥pe here itivolved. Section 10(h) provides :

“W hen granting appropriate temporary relief or
‘a restraining order, or making and entering a de&

‘cree enforcing, modifying, and ‘enforcing as so,

_ modified, or setting aside in whole or in part ‘an
order of the Board, as provided in this section

[10], the jurisdiction of courts sitting in equity

shall not be limited by sections 101-115 of this
title.” (29 U.S.C. §160(h)). [Emphasis added].

“Ignoring the fact that the exemption. provided i in §10-
(h) is applicable to all §10 proceedings, respondents
argue that the asserted potential. conflict between the
Norris-LaGuardia Act and intérvention-was not in-
volved in Scofield and Fafnir, where the Court sanc-
tioned intervention’ in a §10(e) enforcement proceeding.’
But, in “a. §$10¢ e) proceeding, a court of appeals de-
cree enforcing a Board cease-and-desist order is an in-
junctive decree.. A. cease-and-désist order is not self
enforcing.- When the Board, as in the Fafnir case,
issues an order and petitions the court of appeals for
enforcement, it seeks injupctive relief—just as it seeks
injunctive relief. when it petitions a district court pur-
suant to §10(1). Indeed, the only : difference is that
‘ the scope of injunctive relief in ‘a §10(e) proceeding is

permanent, while being temporary in‘a §10(1): proceed-
ing. Intervention in an appeal from a §10(1) proceed- —
ing involves far less potential conflict with the Norris-.

_ LaGuardia Act than the intervention in a §10( e) pro-

r
4
2

4

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‘

>

ceeding. which this Court unequivocally sanctioned in

Scofield and Fafuir.

Thus, Scofield and Fafmir ae be dicteeondint on

the grounds that intervention in the §10(e) proceeding

there involved did not entail te potential conflict with
the Norris-LaGuardia Act which is asserted to bar in-

~ tervention in this* case. Intervention . in; Scofield and
Fafnir did ‘not’ conflict with the Norris- LaGuardia Act
for the same reasohs ‘that intervention in this case does
-not. Section 10(h), which . expressly exempts all §10
_ proceedings «from the ‘liritations of the Norris- La--

Guardia Act, uniformly applies to a §10(1) eee:
as well as toa §10(e) review proceeding.

Respondents have also argued that. the legislative
history of §10(1) demonstrates a congressional intent ©

not to allow intervention. This view represents an, il-

logical: extension of what was a stated congressional

objective—to allow only the Board to initiate injunction

proceediags. “While it is true that Congress did not .
intend that a charging party have the right to initiate
§10(1) ‘proceedings, ° it is clearly a. non sequitur to as-

sume from this premise that once a proceedings is in-

stituted by the Board the charging party should be
denied intervention. To “deny a private’ party ‘the
power to institute a proceeding is manifestly not tanta-
mount to. denying him the right to intervene. once the |
Board in its discretion has’ begun proceedings. Under -

- §10(e), only the Board had statutory authority to’ file. :

the enforcement petition involved: in Fafnir: Had the —
Board not sought enforcement of .its order, the suc-

| cessful charging party could not have instituted en-,

forcement proceedings in the court ‘of appeals. But: once
the Board exercised its discretion to -seek enforce-

a“ . | ; —
". ment in Fafnir, the successful charging pay a had
a right to.intervene—as do petitioners in this case. ”

In‘a word, there is “nothing inconsistent in denying “ -

the right of a private party to institute” an injiinction
proceeding “and, on the other hand,/in permitting’ in-
‘tervention in a- proceeding already ‘in the court for

. decision.” (Local 283, UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S.
at 221.) Such. participation after proceedings’ have

._ begun in no way impairs the congressional policy of
according to the Board exclusive authority to initiate

an injunction proceeding. =~

oe 2. The order of the court below is in con-
flict with the order of the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in McLeod v. General. Elec. *Co.,

: 366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir., 1966). In McLeod, the Board
obtained a-§10(j) injunction in the district court. The
union had been the. charging party and ‘participated in

the district court, proceeding through examination and
cross-examination of witnesses, as well as in the making

- of .legal’ submissions. Although the union was not. con-
sidered a “party” in the district. court proceedings, it

was allowed.to intervene formally in the: appeal pro-'
ceedings before’ the Second Circuit. The contrary

. *Respondents have attempted to discount the significance. of
. McLeod v. General Electric Co., arguing that the matter was not
_ litigated and that, in any event leave to intervene was allowed only —
as a “nominal party.” But the court’s. order did not refer to the
intervenor as a “nominal’~party. And while it is not clear whether

the matter was litigated, the holding of the Second Circuit

_ clearly gave the charging party “party” status with the right to -
seek review in this Court. This right was exercised when the un-
“= joined with the Board to petition for certiorari, (385 U.S.
. 533). y . | )
_ Furthermore, it is interesting that. the Board through respond-
ent Kennedy attempts to avoid the conflict with McLeod v. Gen-
eral Electric Co., by ‘arguing that there the Board through its
regional director McLeod ¢hoose not to object to- the charging
- party intervening and appearing as a party. and filing a petition
_yfor certiorari.. One wonders. why the Board did not object in
that case (if that is the fact) and objects so strenuousfy in the

4 ORs

a of

- result was reached in the present case after the charging
parties had participated in the district cgurt proceedings.
Both the order allowing intervention by the Second
Circuit and the order denying intervention in the pres-
ent case were issued without opinion.*

3. The question presented ‘involves. an important —
issue in the administration of the. Act. The ‘number
of §10(1) injunction proceedings filed in district courts -
has risen from 44 in fiscal year 1953 to 227 in fiscal year
1965.** In addition, the resolution of the question of the
right of a charging party to intervene in the appeal of the;
~ issuance of a §10(1) injunction will undoubtedly dispose :
of the question of the right of a charging party to in- _
tervene in the appeal of the issuance of a §10(j) in- ~
junction. Ghe number of §10(j) injunction proceedings .
filed in district courts is also on the rise. There was
one such proceeding in fiseal year 1953 and 18 in
fiscal year 1965.*** The question presented is there-
fore not episodic, but is likely to arise with increasing
frequency in the courts of appeals and therefore it, is
in the public interest to resolve it now.

Moreover, the right of a charging employer to iriter-

-vene i in appeal proceedings to review a §10(1) injunc-
tion presents a particularly important federal question

*In N.L.R.B. v.. Nashville Building & Construction Trades
Council, 383 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1967), the court had before it
both a §10(1) note I proceeding and an enforcement pro-
ceeding under §10(e): Intervention by the successful charging
party in the enforcement proceeding was allowed, but the. court
did not speak to the issue af whet ‘infervention in a §10(1)
proceeding was proper. 383 F.2d at 563 n- 1.

**Eighteenth Anntal Report of the National Labor Relations
Board at 114-17 (1954) ; Thirtieth Annual Report of the National
Labor Relations Board at 214 —

***Tbid.

a tra ; «a

a
which should be seltled. by this Court. Section’ 10(1) .
provides that when a complaint alleges an illegal sec-
ondary boycott, the Board must petition for injunctive
relief if the regional director has “reasonable cause to
believe such charge is true.” This mandatory nature of
§10(1) reflects congressional recognition of the need to
accord employers immediate injunctive relief from the
irreparable injury that results from secondary boycotts:
’ - “Section 10(1)- «reflects a congressional de-
termination. that ‘the unfair labor practices enu-
‘merated therein are so disruptive of labor manage-
ment relations and threaten such danger of harm

to the .public that they should be enjoined when-
ever a, district court has been shown reasonable
cause to believe in their existence and finds that

the threatened harm or disruption can best be ©
avoided through an injunction. [citations omitted].

It is not*for the Regional Director to substitute his
own ideas of how best to-deal with alleged unfair
labor practices for those of the Congress.” (Retail
Clerks- Union v. Food Employers Council,.Inc., 351
F.2d 525, 531 (9th Cir. 1965)). ss

‘Congress’s firm purpose in enacting §10(1) was to
protect employers from the necessity of waiting for a
final Board adjudication in .cases involving such
business-crippling practices as secondary boycotts. In
the average case where ‘enforcement of the Board’s
action is resisted, nearly seventeen months, elapse from
the date of the violation to the date of the enforcement
order.* To deny the initially successful charging em-

on Administrative Practice and Procedure:
Sen nm. om the Judi , 86th Cong., 2d Sess., Report on

Regulatory Agencies to’the sident-Elect 64 (1964).

ai,
ployer the right to intervene in appeal proceedings in

order to protect his interest in continuing such injunctive _

relief would be egregiously contrary to this congression-
al purpose. - rs
Petitioners believe that thé reasoning and the holding
of Scofield and Fafnir are controlling in this case. How-
ever, whatever view is taken on this substantive issue,
the question of the application of Scofield and Fafnir
to §10 injunction proceedings should’ be resolved by
this Court. A court of appeals will have to face’ the is-.
sue of intervention by the su¢cessful charging party each
‘time review is’ sought by the unsuccessful charged party
_in a §10(1) or §10(j)- injunctive proceeding. We* re-
spectfully submit that a resolution of the charging
party’s rights is in the public interest and essential to
the ‘proper and smooth functioning’ of feder bor
relations law.

CONCLUSION.

For the foregoing reasons, it is urged that this pe-
tition for writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Cuar.es G. BAKALY, Jr.,
Attorney for Petitioners.

Of Counsel:
Fitnt & McKay,
O’Metveny & Myers,
~ Ricwarp C. WHITE,
Cuarves W. BENDER,
Peter M. ANDERSON,

Avucust, 1968

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- APPENDIX A.

United States Court of Appeals, for the Ninth Cir-
cuit. . >

San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper. Guilds» -News- co
paper and Periodical Drivers’ and. Helpers’ Union se
Local 921; Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69;
Los Angeles Web Pressmen’s Union No. 18; Los An- .
_ geles Stereotypers’ Union No. 58; Los Angeles Typo-
» graphical Union No. 174; International Association |

of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, District Lodge .
No. 94; General Warehousemen’s Union Local 598; |
Building Service and Maintenance Employees Se ;
No. 399; Los Angeles Mailers’ Union No. 9; and Los. :
Angeles Paper Handlers’ Union No. 3, Appellants, vs.
Ralph. E. Kennedy, Regional Diréctor of Region 21 of E
the National Labor Relations Board, for and on be- ,
half of the National Labor Relations Board, Appellee.
Nos. 22767-8-9. ee ; ; ; |
__ Filed: May 20, 1968. - .
Before: KOELSCH, BROWNING and DUNIWAY, -
Circuit Judges

The Regional Director and charged parties, having.
moved for reconsideration of our order allowing the
_ charging parties to intervene in:this proceeding, the lat- , |

ter. were permitted to and did file a brief in opposition &§
and the matter was then submitted. eeaoks

If IS ORDERED that the order of April 19, 1968,
so far as ‘it permitted such intervention, is rescinded
but is deemed ‘an authorization for charging parties ‘to -
appear and file a brief as amici curiae.

/s/ M. OLIVER KOELSCH _
/s/ JAMES R. BROWNING
/s/ BEN C. DUNIWAY *
United States Circuit Judges

SrapeNree Soe ry

Order. on Motions.

United States Court of Appeals, for the Ninth Cir-
cuit.

San F rancisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild; News-

- paper and Periodical Drivers’ and. Helpers’ Union Lo-

cal. 921; Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69; Los
Angeles Web .Pressmen’s Uriion No. 18; Los Angeles
Stereotypers’ Union No. 58; Los Angeles Typographi-
cal Union No. 174; International A$sociation-of Ma-
chinists and Aerospace Workers, District, Lodge No.
94; General Warehousemen’s Union Local 598; Build-

ing Service and Maintenance Employees” Union No.

399; Los Angeles Mailers’ Union No. 9; and Los An-
geles Paper Handlers’ Union No. 3, Appellants, vs.
Ralph E. Kennedy, Regional Director of Region 2 1 of
the National Labor Relations Board, for and on behalf
of the National Labor Relations Board, Appellee. Nos.

~~ 22767-89. | '

Filed: April 19, 1968.
Before: KOELSCH, BROWNING and DUNIWAY,

' Circuit Judges.

Appellants, above named, have siited from an

order of the United States District Court, granting a

temporary injunction on February 7, 1968, in an ac-
tion brought by the Regional Director of Region 21 of
the National Labor Relations Board under Section 10-

(L) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended
(29 U.S.C. §160(L)). ES Grae /

Presently they have moved for an nts suspending
the injunction pending this appeal. By stipulation: the

‘ parties agreed that the Regional Director should file a

written response to said motion by April 17 and that

v

nis

the matter would then be submitted for the court’s de-
termination withotit argument; additidnally, the par-
ties agreed upon a briefing schedule. and requested an

_early hearing of the appeal on the merits.

The charging parties in the Labor Board proceed-
ings (Case Nos. 21-CC-1043 and 21-CC-1043-2) on
April 17, filed their motion seeking leave to intervene
in this appeal and time to file their — to ap-
‘{pellants’ motion. ._ ey apes

The court, after pam, consideration, eee the fol-
lowing order: :

1. The charging’parties are granted leave to inter-
vene in this appeal as or: their motion for time,
etc. is’ denied ; :

2. Appellants’ motion for stay of the temporary in--

_ junction is denied;

3. The briefing schedule i is as follows:

Appellants shall file and serve their briefs by April an

23; appellees may have seven days after receipt of such
briefs to file their briefs, and appellants’ reply briefs
to follow within five days.thereafter. —
/s/ M. OLIVER KOELSCH
/s/ JAMES R. BROWNING
/s/ BEN C. DUNIWAY
_ * United States Circuit Judges

APPENDIX B.

Order Granting Temporary Injunction.

United. States District Court, Northern District of . >

; California:

— Ralph E. Kosieeity. Regional Director of Region 21
of the National Labor Relations Boatd, for and on be- »
. half of the N ational Labor Rélations Board, Petitioner,
vy. San’ Francisco-Oakland™ Newspaper Guild; News-
paper and Periodical Drivers’ ‘and Helpers’ Union Lo-
cal 921; 1; Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69; Los
Angeles Web Pressmen’s Union No. 18; Los: Angeles
Stereotypers’ Union No. 58; Los: Angeles Typograph-
ical Union No. 174; International Association of Ma-
chinists and Aerospace Workers, District Lodge No. 94;
General Warehqusemen’s Union Local 598; Building
Service and Maintenance Employees Union No. 399;
Los Angeles Mailers’ Union No. 9; and Los Angeles
Paper Handlers’ Union No. 3, Respondents. Civil No.
48511.

. This cause came on to his ee upon the verified nl
' tition of Ralph F. Kennedy, Regional Director of Re-
gion 21. of the National Labor Relations Board, for and |
on behalf of’ the Board, for a temporary injunction
pursuant to Section 10(1) of the National -Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. Sec. 160(1)), pend- .
ing the final disposition of the matters involved pend-
ing. before said Board, and upon the issuance of an
order to show cause why injunctive relief. should not be ~
~ ‘granted as ‘prayed in ‘said petition. The Court, upon
consideration of the pleadings, affidavits ‘and other
evidence, briefs, arguments of counsel, and the entire:
record in the case, has made and filed its Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law, finding and. concluding

that there is reasonable cause to believe that respondents

have engaged in, and are engaging in, acts and conduct

in violation of 29 U.S.C.+Sec. 158(b)(4)(i)(ii)(B),

affecting commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C.

Sec. 152(6) and (7), and that such acts and conduct
" will likely be repeated or continued unless enjoined.

~ Now, therefore, upon the entire- record, it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that,
pending the final disposition .of the matters involved
pending before the National Labor Relations’ Board, re-
spondents Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69; Los. |
Angeles Web Pressmen’s Union No. 18; Los Angeles |
Stereotypers’ Union No. 58; Los Angeles Typographi-
cal Union No. 174; International Association of Ma-

4 “chinists and Aerospace Workers, District Lodge. No. 94;

a : General Warehousemen’s Union Local 598; Building

Service and Maintenance Employees Union No. 399;

Los Angeles Mailers’ Union No. 9; and Los Angeles

. Paper Handlers’ Union No. 3, and each of them, their |

officers, representativ es, agents, - servants, employees,

attorneys, and. all members, persons and labor organi-

zations acting in concert. or participation. with them, or

any of them, be, and they hereby are, enjoined and,

restrained from:

aia iat ais rrr "

Engaging in, sanctioning, supporting, promoting, or
by picketing, handbilling,. orders, instructions, ‘requests’
or appeals, or by union disciplinary measures, or re-
fusal to refer employees, or by any like or related acts
or conduct, or by permitting any such to remain in ex-

’ istence or effect, inducing or encouraging any individ-
ual employed ‘bythe San Francisco Examiner (heréin
called Examiner), the Chronicle. Publishing Company

-

(herein called Chronicle), the San Francisco News-

, paper Printing . Company, Iné. .(herein - called Print-
ing Company), the ‘Hearst. Baltimore News American
Division, the Hearst Boston Record American-Adver- —
_tiser Division, the Hearst Capital ‘Newspapers Divi- -
sion, the Hearst San Antonio Light. Division, the:
Hearst Seattle Post-Intelligencer Division, or employed :
by any other, person engaged in commerce or an indus-
try affecting commerce, to engage in a strike or a re-
fusal. in the course of his employment ‘to use, manu-
- facture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work
on goods, articles, materials, or commodities, or to per-
form any services, or in any such or similar manner ©
threatening, coercing or restraining the Printing Com-
pany, or the said newspapers, or any of them, or any
other person, where in either case an object thereof
is: (1) to force-or require the Printing Company, or
the said newspapers, or any of them, to cease doing
business with their customers or suppliers; or (2) to
'. force or require the customers or ‘suppliers of the Print-
ing. Compariy, or the said newspapers, or any of them,
to cease doing business with the Printing Company, or
the said newspapers, or any of them. |

-- Done at San Francisco, California, this 7th day of
February, 1968, at 4:50 p.m. |

/s/ Alfonso:J. Zirpoli .

United States District Judge

ee
. Supplemental Order Granting ~~
Temporary Injunction.

United States District natn Northern District. of

California

Ralph E. ‘Kennedy, em —— of Region 21
of the National Labor Relations Board, for and on be-
half of the’ National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner,

v. San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild; News- -

_paper and Periodical Drivers’ and Helpers’. Union
Local 921; Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69;
Los Ailes Web Pressmen’ s Union No. 18;:Los An-

geles Stereotypers’ Union Now 58; Los Angeles Typo-

graphical Union No. 174 -vinternational Association of
Machinists and Aerospacé Workers, ‘District’ Lodge No.

94; General Warehousemen’s Union Local 598; Building _

Service and Maintenance Employees Union No. 399 ;

' Los. Angeles Mailers’ Union No..9; and Los’ Angeles
Paper Handlers’ Union No. 3 Respondents. Civil No.

48511.

__- This cause came on.to be heard upon the verified
petition of Ralph E. Kennedy, Regional Director of

Region 21 of the National Labor Relations Board, for

and on behalf of the Board, for a temporary injunction

pursuant to Section 10(1) of the National Labor Re-,
lations Act, as amerided (29 U.S.C. Sec. 160(1)), pend-—

ing the final disposition of the matters involved pend-

ing before said Board, and upon. the issuance of an.

‘order to show cause why ‘injunctive relief should not: be
granted as prayed in said petition. ‘The Court, upon
‘consideration of -the pleadings, affidavits and other. evi-
dence, briefs, arguments of’ counsel, and the entire rec-
ord in the ease, has made and filed its Findings of Fact

and. Conclusions of Law, finding and concluding that |

«

Ul
i ee

ee ee ~y —~§ ;

there is reasonable cause to believe that respondents
have engaged in, and are engaging in, acts and conduct
e violation -of 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(b)(4)¢i)(ii)(B),
affecting commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C.
Sec. 152(6) and (7), and that such acts and conduct.
will likely be repeated or continued unless enjoined.

Now, therefore, upon the entire record, it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that,
pending the final disposition of the matters involved
pending before the National Labor Relations Board, re-
spondents San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild and
Newspaper and Periodical Drivers’ and Helpers’.Union —
Local 921, and each of them, their officers, representa-
tives, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all
members, persons and labor organizations acting in
concert or participation with them, or any of them, be,
and they hereby are, enjoined and restrained, in fur-
therance and support.of a labor dispute between two

‘respondents parties hereto and the Herald-Examiner,
from: one .

Engaging in, sanctioning, supporting, promoting, Or
by picketing, handbilling, orders, instructions, requests
or appeals, or by union disciplinary measures, or refusal
to refer, employees, or by any like or related acts or con-
duct, or by- permitting any such to remain in existence
or effect, inducing or encouraging any individual em-
ployed by the San Francisco Examiner (herein called
Examiner), the Chronicle Publishing Company (herein
called Chronicle), the San Francisco Newspaper Print-
ing Company, Inc. (herein called Printing Company),
the Hearst Baltimore’ News American Division, the
Hearst Boston Record American-Advertiser Division,
the Hearst Capital Newspaper Division, the Hearst San

Antonio Light Division, the Hearst Seattle Post-Intel- _
_digencer Division, or employed by any other person en-
gaged in commerce or an industry affecting commerce, °
to-engage in a strike or a refusal in the course of his
employment to use,.manufacture, process, transport, or
otherwise handle or work on goods, articles, materials,
-or commodities, or to perform any services, or in any’
such or similar manner threatening, coercing or restrain-
ing the Printing Company, or the said newspapers, or
_any of them, or any other person, where in either case
an object thereof is: (1) to force or require the Printing
Company, or the said newspapers, or any of them, to.
cease doing business with their customers or Suppliers; ~
or (2) to force or require the custoniers or suppliers
of the Printing Company, or the said newspapers, or any
of them, to cease doing business with the Printing Com-
pany, or the said newspapers, or afty. of them; provided
‘that nothing in this order shall prevent San Fran-
- cisco-Oakland Newspaper’ Guild of Newspaper and
Periodical Drivers’ and Helpers’ Union Local 921 from
engaging in or lawfuly supporting any primary labor
dispute between the Examiner, Chronicle or the Print:
ing Company afd any union representing any —

of said persons.
Done at San Francisco, California, this 8th day of
February, 1968, at 9:45.a.m.

/s/ Alfonso J. Zirpoli,
United States District Judge

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law..
United States District Court, Northern District .of
California. ‘ | 7
Ralph E. Kennedy, Regional Director of Region 21
of the National Labor Relations Board, for and on be-

half of the National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner,

v. San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper. Guild; Newspaper

and Periodical Drivers’ and Helpers’ Union Local 921;

-. Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69; Los Angeles

Web Pressmen’s Union No. 18; Los Angeles Stereo- |

typers’ Union No. 58; Los Angeles Typographical Union
No. 174; International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, District Lodge No. 94; General
Warehousemen’s Union Local 598; Building Service and.
Maintenance Employees Union No. 399; Los Angeles
Mailers’ Union No. 9; and Los Angeles Paper Handlers’
Union No. 3, Respondents. Civil No. 48511.

This cause came“on to be heard upon the verified

petition of Ralph E. Kennedy, Regional Director of .

Region 21 of the National Labor Relations Board (here-

in called the Board), for a temporary injunction pur-_

suant to Section 10(1) of the National Labor Relations

Act, as amended (herein called the Act), pending the —

final disposition of the matters involved herein pending
before the Board, and upon the issuance of an order to

show cause why injunctive relief should not be granted.

. as prayed in the petition. Respondents filed answérs
to the said petition. A hearing on the issues raised by
the petition and answers was duly held on February 7,
1968. : 3

=} J.
The Court, upon consideration of the pleadings, evi-

dence, briefs, arguments of counsel; and the entire
record in the case, makes the following:

-Findings of Fact
&R Petitioner i is the Regional Director of Region 21
of the Board, an agency of the United States, and filed
this petition for and on behalf of the Board. |
_ 2, (a) On or about January 6, 1968, the San Fran-
cisco Examiner, Division of The Hearst Corporation
(herein called Examiner), and the Los Angeles Herald-.

_ Examiner, Division of The Hearst Corporation (herein

called Herald-Examiner ), - inter alias, filed with the.
Board’ a first amended charge to a charge originally

filed with the Board on or about January 5, 1968, the
- said first amended charge alleging: that respondents,

other than the San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild, .
have engaged in, and are engaging in, unfair labor
practices within the meaning of 29 U. S.C. Sec. 158(b)-
(4) (i) (ii) (B). *

(b) On or about January 10, 1962, the. Herald-Ex-
aminer and the Examiner filed with the Board a
similar charge alleging that the San Francisco-Oakland
Newspaper Guild has engaged in, and is engaging in, —

unfair labor practices within the meaning of 29 U.S.C,
- Sec. 158(b) (4) (i) (ii) (B).

3. The aforesaid charges and first amended charge
were referred to_petitioner as the Regional Director of ©
Region 21 of the Board.

4. There is, and petitioner has, reasonable chuse to
believe that: PY oil

(a) Respondents, each an unincorporated ‘association,
are organizations in which -employees participate and

* dani

which exist for the purpose, in whole or in part, of deal-

ing with employers concerning grievances, labor dis-
putes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment. or

conditions of work. Respondents maintain their prin- _

cipal offices either in Los Angeles County, California,
or in San Francisco, California. At all times material
herein, respondents, and each of them, have been en-
gaged within this judicial district in transacting busi-
‘ness and in promoting and protecting the -interests of
their employee members or employee members of con-
stituent or affiliated labor organizations.

(b) The Hearst Corporation (herein called Hearst),
a Delaware corporation with its principal office in
New York, New York, is engaged in, among other
things, the publishing of newspapers and magazines.
‘Hearst maintains seven newspaper divisions: The Balti-
more News American Division; The Boston Record
_ American-Advertiser Division; Capital Newspapers , Di-
vision; The Los Angeles Herald-Examiner Division;
The San ‘Antonio Light Division; The San Francisco
Examiner Division; and The Seattle Post- ia catad
Division.

(c) The Herald-Examiner publishes in Los hiitiihins
California, a daily and a Sunday newspaper in connec-’.

tion with which it subscribes to several interstate news
sérvices, has an annual gross volume of business in
~ excess of $1,000,000 and annually purchases goods and
materials valued in excess of $100,000 which are
shipped to it from points and _— located outside
the State of California.

(d) The Examiner publishes in San Francisco, Cali-
fornia, a daily newspaper, subscribes to several inter-
state news. services, has an annual gross volume of

f

business in excess of $1,000,000 and annually purchases

goods, services and materials valued in excess of $100,-
000 originating at points and places outside the State
of California. The’ Examiner also, jointly with The

Chronicle Publishing Company, publishes a Sunday

. newspaper.

(e) The Chronicle Publishing ‘Os (herein -

called Chronicle), a Nevada corporation with offices in
San Francisco,, California, publishes, in San Francisco,
California, a daily newspaper known as The San Fran-
cisco Chronicle. In connection with its publication of

the said newspaper, and jointly with the Examiner in_

the publication of a Sunday newspaper, Chronicle: pur-
chases and receives goods, services, materials and sup-
plies originating outside the State of California valued

at a substantial amount and subscribes to interstate |

news services.

(f).The San Francisco Newspaper Printing. —
pany, Inc. (herein called Printing Company), a Ne- ;
vada corporation with principal office and place of ©
business in San Francisco, California, is engaged in the

business ‘of. newspaper .printing in connection with
‘which it performs the mechanical, circulation, advertis-
ing, accounting, credit, and collection functions for both
the Examiner and the Chronicle. In the course and
conduct of its printing business, the ‘Printing Company

purchases and receives goods, materials ‘and supplies _

originating outside the State of California valued at a
substantial amourtt.

(g) The Herald-Examiner is, and at all times mate-
rial herein has been, operated independently of the
Examiner the Chronicle and the Printing Company; is
‘and has been operated as a separate autonomous enter-
b

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Sey eee Qe

. . -
oe _— : ;
it Nt dS SO NAB he bite SIE BGS et IO a etl IE ey ‘ v Linen

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prise and has and has had separate independent labor re- |
lations policies and practices. Neither the day-to-day

operations nor the labor relations policies of the Herald-
Examiner, the Examiner, the Chronicle or the Print-
ing Company are controlled by Hearst.

(h) At all times material herein, respondents, other
than the-San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild and
Newspaper and Periodical Drivers’ and Helpers’ Union
Local 921, have been engaged. in a labor dispute with
the Herald- Examiner, and in furtherance and support
-of such dispute some of such respondents have, since
about, December 15, 1967, picketed the plant and prem-
— ises of the Herald-Examiner.

(i) At no time material herein have respondents, or

any of them, had a labor dispute with’the Examiner, the

Chronicle, or the Printing Company, or any other Hearst
newspaper other than the dispute of some of. the re-
spondents with the Herald-Examiner.

(j) On or about January 5, 1968, in initial and
support of the aforesaid labor dispute with the Herald-
Examiner, respondents, acting jointly and in concert
and participation with each other, embarked upon a
plan, program and campaign to create a boycott and a
work stoppage at the plants and premises of the Exam-
iner, the Chronicle and the Printing Company. Pursu-
ant to the said plan, program and campaign, on or

about January 5, 1968, respondents commenced picket-’

ing the plants and .premises of the Examiner, the
Chronicle and the Printing Company, and distributing
‘handbills to employees and the public at - said plants
arid premises.

(k) In addition’ to ‘the picketing and handbilling, as

set forth in Findings of Fact 4(j), above, and also pur-

o poe Te

suant to the aforesaid plan, program and campaign, re- |

spondent San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild oral-
ly instructed, directed and appealed to its members em-
ployed by the Printing Company to engage in work
stoppages and refusals to perform services for their
employer. . m

(1) In addition to. the paeneney set forth in Findings

of Fact 4(j)-and 4(k), above, and also pursuant to the

aforesaid plan, program and campaign, respondent
Newspaper and Periodical Drivers? and Helpers’
Union Local 921 instructed its members employed by

- the Printing Company to engage in a work stoppage,

failed and refused to permit them to perform services

for their employer, and threatened the Printing Com- .
pany with continued failure or refusal to permit its .

members to resume work for the Printing Company. |

(my Asa consequence gf respondents’ acts and con-
duct set forth in Findings of Fact 4(j), 4(k), and 4(1),
above, individuals employed by the Examiner, by the
Chronicle, and by the Printing Company engaged in
work stoppages and failures to perform services for
their’ employers, and the newspaper publication’ and
printing facilities of the Examiner, the Chronicle, and
the Printing Company were completely shut down.

(n) By the acts and conduct set forth in Findings
of Fact 4(j), 4(k), 4(1), and 4(m), above, respondents
have engaged in, and have induced and encouraged it-
dividuals employed by the Examiner, the Chronicle, the

Printing Company,-and employed by other persons, to |

engage in, strikes or refusals in the ‘course of their

‘ employment to use, manufacture process. transport, or
otherwise handle or work on goods, articles, materials —

or commodities, or to perform services, and have

CN OEP EL DUNE FM?

coe
" ee eee
-

threatened, coerced or restrained the Examiner, the

Chronicle, the Printing Company, -and other "persons

engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting com-

~ merce.
(0) Objects of the acts and coniheet of respondents;

set forth in Findings of Fact 4(j), 4(k), 4(1), 4(m),
- and 4(n), above, have been, and are: (1) to force or re-
quire the .Examiner;, the Chronicle, or the Printing
Company to cease doing business with their “customers
and suppliers; or (2) to force or require the customers
and suppliers of the Examiner, of the Chronicle, or. of

the Printing Company to cease doing business with

the said persons.

5. - It may fairly be anticipated that, unless enjoined,
respondents will. continue to repeat the acts and con-
duct set forth in Findings of Fact 4(j), 4(k), 4(1),

4(m), 4(n), and 4(0), above, or similar or like acts -

and conduct in violation of 29 U.S.C. Sec. a (4)-
GB).

: Contin of Law

1. This Court has jurisdiction of the parties and of

the subject matter of these proceedings, and under 29 _

U.S.C. Sec. 160(1) is Sree to grant injunctive

relief.

2. There is, and petitioner has, reasonable cause

- to believe that#

(a) Each respondent is a labor organization within
‘the meaning of 29. U.S.C. Secs. shai 158(b), and
160(1).

(b) The ey eee the Examiner, the

,Chronicle, and the Printing Company each is -engaged

a ee

. \ in commerce within the meaning: of 29 U.S.C. Secs.
: 152(6) and 152(7). -

(c) The- Herald-Examiner, the Examiner, the
Chronicle, and the Printing Company each is engaged .

-in commerce or in an: industry affecting commerce.

(d) ‘Respondents have engaged in tinfair labor prac-:
tices within the meaning ‘of 29 U:S.C. Sec. 158(b) (4)-
(i) (ii) ( B), affecting commerce within the meaning of
29 U.S.C. Secs. 152(6) and 152(7), and a continua-
tion of these practices will impair the policies of the .
Act as set forth in 29 U.S. C. Sec. 151(b).’

3. To preserve the issues for the orderly determina-
tion as provided in the Act, it is appropriate, just and
proper that, pending the final disposition of the mat-
ters herein involved pending before the Board, re-
spondents, their officers, representatives, agents, ser-

--vants, employees, attorneys, and. all members;: persons

and labor organizations acting in concert or partici- .
pation with them, or any of them, be enjoined and re-
strained from the commission, continuation, or repeti-

tion of the acts and conduct set forth in Findings of

Fact 4(j), 4(k), 4(1), 4(m), 4(n), and 4(0), above,
acts.and conduct in furtherance and support thereof, a
like or related acts or conduct the commission of which

_in the future. is likely or may fairly be anticipated from

respondents’ acts and conduct in the past.

Done at San Francisco, California, this 7th day of
February, 1968.

/s/ Alfonso J. Zirpoli

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385604_0092%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
