# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Hudson v. United States > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385604_0031%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari - **Published:** January 1, 1968 - **Citation:** 393 U.S. 876 ## Text — OO ee isa COURT. | Oo & nthe ico Supreme Court uf the Hnited States ¢ OcToBER TeeM,’ 1968 © —_ m7 - * Ye MARY A. LOSCHI, MARGARET CIANCI, MARY os, - PASCUCCI, JAMES A. MIRAGLIA, PHILENA McWHINNIE, SAMUEL BAPTISTA, | MARY C. OLIVER, PETITIONERS, _ o ov Vv 2 MASSACHU SETTS PORT AUTHORITY, RESPONDENT. | 2 PETITION I FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS ~— Vincent J. CELESTE © \ Attorney for Petitioners 53 State Street ‘ee Boston, Massachusetts : e . * Blanchard Press, Inc., Boston, Mass. — Law Printers PY id \ Ch lea INDEX: Son a ‘Opinion Below ..:......... ee 2% . Sapiediction “5.865.727. Selita 6 aii 4 See Questions Presented ........°......... Sol aaa ' Statement of the,Case .............. Lea er Maatirnr 3 Reasons for Granting sat Writ g...... TTR: | UN ns on > ees gas SE ae eae Appendix A Fa ree oe AORELED tite Opinion below ........ Lie iw vt gE A, Bales i Se _ Appendix B a UR Siig Be _ Final Decree ...... Pia cs RRTe ie Sac velLys eae _@ \ Appendix C a aes 9.1 Se | ox, _ Constitutional and Sietutory Provisions Involved ot eee, ies SL, BONE. BOY onsen cs wee ss yecce ee \98 USC. § 1967-(8) 0. Sao ar wipe 31 ieee i ee 31 44.C.P-R.4 11.31 ......:.. ye cel Me ve .. Ma OPE, 4 098. og os Se. 32 , dilase.. Acts, 1968; ¢. 410.270. QE SS. : : ; Ne Ee TABLE oF CITATIONS Bae cee es: | ‘ Cases ‘e eS Ly ee reg cay : Ses \ ‘Y tif i> ars Lines Pilots ‘Ass’ nV. Geiseie: 276 F. 2d 892 (nd Cir. 1960); cert. denied 366 U.S. 962 ..... er os ates 16 American Aty Transport, Inc. -v. Civil Aeronautics ee 7 . Board, 98 F. Supp. 661 (D. Ct. D.C.) ; 344 11.8.4. 2 ee JS - Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U:S. 249:.........0002.... ef: Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm’n v. Continental eA ! ee MN, MIR MOO, PEC) acs vse F% cn tye fe 14° Griggs v: Allegheny County,-369 U.S. 84... 8, HB, 10: Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S..479 ........... Fon ae coke Londoner v. City and County of Denver, 210 U. S. 373.. 16 B- "ii \ : a / ‘Loschi v. Masiuckuastis Port. Authority, 1968. iis. Adv. Sh: 437, 234°N.E- 2d 901... bet eases Sey ek 2, 3, 5 ‘ McDonald v. United States, 385 US. 451 °......... 9. Pierce v. Society of Sistérs, 268 U.S. ES adetri® United States-v. Causby, 328 U. B. 266 buctvlivecs. 29:@:30 ee "Constitutional Provision And Statutes U.S. Const., Amend. XIV ces Pr a es ey cae 3 Reare Se SE... i ee ees es eeu: Seals £B OP ee te en ec ee tt Hiden 2 Mass. Acts, 1963, c. 410 ................ coe 5; 13, 17 RS hs ee ig ee ee a ee -12 49 US.C..§ a (1) - sivres Siihi ui # duaibitath 4, 12 M eielionlionn’ 14 C.F.R. § 11.29 ..... i a ree ee 35 i 6 MORE. 4.1101 .........:... ghee Re gs Oe Pe 9 '; 15, 16 14 C.F.R. § 11.33 ........ Bet) pee LOOT Awted, ® 25, 16 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, ‘ Fae a ec a Page | | Bupreme Court at ie United States QcrosER ‘Trrm, 1968 2 age ‘ 3 No. \ Yo ees 3 eG: J t MARY A. LOSCHI, MARGARET GIANCI, MARY - PASCUCCI, JAMES A. MIRAGLIA, PHILENA: McWHINNIE, SAMUEL BAPTISTA, , MARY C. OLIVER, | PETITIONERS, . | MASSACHUSETTS. PORT AUTHORITY, RESPONDENT. ' “PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO. THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF THE . -” COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS To the Honorable, the Chief Justice of ihe United, States and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the Umited’ States: : Petitioners, comprising ( 1) the owner-occupants of resi- dential property that constituted part of the land-taken by the respondent for an airport runway extension and ‘clear > zone?’ therefor, and ( 2) the owner-occupants of residential _ __ ~ \ Sar! property that will be i in imnemidisite seiebnliy to the runway © \ as extended, petition this Court to issue a writ of certiorari - : **\to review the decree of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial’ Court in Loschi é others.v. Massachusetts Port: Authority, 1968. Mass. Adv. Sh. 437, 234 N.E. 2d 901, upholding: the -- . nw With respect to their. standing to challenge the inter-__ _vening taking: the petitioners Liosehi, Cianci and Paseucci are in a somewhat different position. They are the owners of properties specifically taken by an express order of the Authority (August of 1963), as distinguished from a ‘Causby and Griggs type taking. If the runway is extended, their property will constitute a portion of the ‘‘clear zone’’ of the runway as extended, and they will obviously no longer have any concern with the noise and a of - planes overhead. | But the validity of the express takings of their prop- . erties depends upon whether they are necessary to comply with federal safety standards, and they would. be if, and only if, the extension into. Wood can Memorial ualts is, valid. The Supreme Judicial @ourt held that the exeftion j in c. 410 permitting westward extension only to meeting fed- ‘eral safety standards was not ‘fconfined . . . to existing runways’’ but applied to ‘‘new or extended ronnent, (1968. Mass. Adv. Sh. at 443, 234 N.E. 2d at 906). And admittedly ‘these petitioners’ properties would be within the ‘‘clear we. zone’? required by federal standards if the Fenway were, éxtoniea as contemplated. : But on the issue of the validity of the Wood Idend Memorial Park taking for such. extension, the Supreme Judicial Court held that these petitioners too had no, stand- ing to be heard. The validity of the taking of these tities) proper- ties. hinges, therefore, on the validity of the intervening . takirigs and on that focal issue, the state, court held peti- . ' “tioners had no standing. If the respondent could not legally. ~~ take Wood Island Memorial Park and complete, the exten- | 2 sion westward, it would not be necessary to take petitioners’ properties to meet federal safety standards. The question, then, as to petitioners Loschi,:Cianci and — Pascucei, is whether the. due process clause of the 14th Amendment gives them the right. to: challenge the legality of the takings which, df legal, validate the taking of their — own properties. ‘If the intervening takings are — 3° ; vi akiage would necessarily fall with them. : er ee ee ee eee S a . . 2 ee Sh ITT. / A. Related to the issue of standing, there is an im- ‘portant federal question raised, relating to what constitutes | a federal safety standard, particularly, whether a. grant. agreement between the F.A.A. and an airport authority —— _ constitutes ipso facto such a standard.° This question relates only to those petitioners (Loschi, Cranci, and Pascucci) _ whose properties were subject to the express order of taking of August, 1963. The decision of the: Massachusetts Su- preme Judicial Court held in substance the taking of their . properties to have been required by federal safety stand- . ards, and that-the grant miyconmnett constituted a federal standard. 7 _ ‘The Federal Airport Act, as iianiia (49 U.S. on § 1101 et seq.) provides, in part, that approval of a project—and the extension of a runway is a‘‘‘project’’ within the mean- ing of the’ act. See §1101(3)(5)—shall be given by the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency only upon . eondition; inter alia, that the airport authority making the * application ‘‘have legal authority to engage in the airpert is development as proposed : . .”’ and ‘‘holds good title, satis- factory to the Administrator, to thé landing area of such airport or the site therefor, or gives assurance ‘satisfactory to the Administrator that ‘such title will be. — »» 49 U.S.C. § eit duce : Ee y ' " : i a ° . : mt “? . - . any extent’ whatever. " 13 When pom wanton ‘were jel Mass. Stat 1963 ra 410, in turn, prohibited the Authority. from extending west: - “ ward, -“‘except for the purpose of protecting the aerial - approaches to runways in accordance with applicable fed- eral standards, meeting runway clear zone requirements of | > the federal government . ... or meeting ater air safety ‘requirements of the federal government . . -At-the time of the taking, in August,’ 1963, no . federal standard required the extension of the runway westward to 2. As the master found and the heneiin J ndicial Court did * not question, (1) petitioners’ premises are all. more than -2,500 feet westerly of the present 7,873 foot runway and > are not within the ‘‘clear zone’’ required by any applicable regulations; (2) none of the structures on their premises’ ~ Fise to the slope requirements for an ‘approach area to the present runway; and (3) there was no obligation on the : part of the airport authority to extend the runway westerly. - In short; the end result of this federal-state-federal renvoi is that, unless the grant agreement itself constituted- a federal safety standard, no federal standard aacesaie the taking of petitioners’ properties. The. question then became whether the pain agreement itself, ie. F.A.A. approval of the. airport’s request for funds to conibeme the runway extension, constituted, ipso facto, the establishment of a federal safety standard. The Supreme Judicial Court held that itdid.. ~ 2 —_ grant oe said the court, ‘aboiien that de purpose of the Neptune Road land ac- quisition was to protect the aerial approach to Run- _ way 15-33 from the northwest’... The requirements — of the .. . agreement that the land be acquired, taken with. the project of. one the sussa de bere the bo tte, QUIRK BE ty j oe es Boy ;. ae ae. § 14 > takings. e , within the, exceptions to. the — eS ' of - 1968 c. 410.’ - 1968 Mass. Adv. Sh. me 234 N:E. 2d at 906. State. law in this instance def@rs to federal law: Tadeed - if federal law required a particular extension to facilitate interstate commerce, state law could not prevent it. See Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm’n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U: S. 714, 723-724. The Massachusetts | statute, therefore, merely recognizes the supremacy of fed-— eral law in this commercial matter.. Extension westward ‘is permitted by state law only if ‘required by applicable ' federal standards, that i is, by standards which have as their constitutional basis the interstate commerce clause. The Supreme Judicial: Court held that the grant of money upon application by: the Authority constituted, ipso facto, a federal standard, and permitted the westward extension. It held, in‘effect, that westward extension was Pequired by. federal law. i a Conversely, federal lee, title 49 of the Uz S. Code, con- — ditions the grant of money upon the legality ofthe proj-.. ect under state law. The grant is not simply a matter of an agreement between the FA.A. and the airport authority ; - it: becomes a matter in’ which these petitioners have a direct and immediate interest once it is held, as the Su- preme Judicial Court did, that. the agreement constitutes - a federal safety standard which ‘sanctions the. takings of their properties. The petitioners would have had no: -stand- : '.. ing, of. course, to. question the propriety of the grant agree-. + . ment. But once the grant agreement is held to constitute | a standard justifying: i injury to them, they: have the right. to be’heard, and in this court if necessary. "Pie event which _ ‘gave them theix right to be heard was the decision of the’ ~_ ' Massachusetts court. They cannot now go before the. F.A.A.. as interested parties to be heard on this “raling, | ot a : 9 - , . f > . . =e 4 é ry K, Re . ‘ . r 4 . e . ., . : as -! 0 . « : ‘ , 4 e 3. \ : P . , . — —— (Bo a ’. Indeed the F.A.A. did not establish it. The Massachusetts — court: did; and their decision establishes, at least as to these petitipners, a federal standard just as cera as. if it, were promulgated by the F.A. e. - . -: 5 om, d “A ? - Pa . ® / * ‘ . ‘ — “ i ; ” . « , ‘ Os - 3 ° 8 ¢ - - ° é » oo ‘A e - / . ‘ % e N . \ - . ‘ - . — A , ‘ ‘ " . . e% o . . : ‘ ° > . . - - . . a . - . : . . r ¢ - . . c ° 23 In 1962 and 1963, and in prior years, the Authority studied the possibility of extending Runway. 15-33 so that — it would be 10,000 feet long. The master found that: this ‘fextension contemplated an additional paved. -Tunway ( of”’ 2,127: feet. Exhibits indicate that this extension ( shown as [D] on the plan) is to be made “‘over tidal flats” at the northwest end of the existing: runway (from about point [A] shown on the plan to.a litte shown as [2] ) to near the present high water line of the southeasterly shore- line of Wood-Island Park. Filling‘of the tidal flats in the _ harbor area (marked [E].on the plan) will be required and some fill already(has been placed. Thus no property now or formerly belonging to these plaintiffs, and no. tak- ing of land not already owned by the Commonwealth or by. the Authority, will be: required ‘‘to extend physically . « Runway.15-33 to a length of’’ 10,000 feet. Z | The Authority has removed a bridge sh cosh: access ’ from Neptune Road to Wood: Island- Park and has con- - structed a fence which remaves the park “effectively from ’ public use.for recreational purposes.’’ Trees in the park have been cleared. Statute 1953, c. 528, provided that control of the park should be i in the Metropolitan District. Commission ‘‘until such time as the governor and council, . - upon request of the state airport management board, di- rects its transfer to said board for airport purposes.’’ See St. 1955, ce. 438. No actual or intended use of the park area for physical extension of the runway is proposed now, although use of the park will be required for a ‘‘clear zone’? * Because the actual ‘extension of Runway 15-33 ‘was not to go northwest of the high water mark at Wood Island Park, only “use of ti- ‘dal area (and some airport land east of the/ tidal ‘area) was in- volved. It was stipulated orally at the argume obstacles, presénted by 1939 harbor lines (existi to filling the flats in the tidal area (marked ib on the plan) were re- moved by St. 1966, c. 738, a8 a 2. ee 4 : (a matter discussed later in 1 this opinion) whgn the run- ~ \: way is’ extended. _ On October 31, 1961; the ‘Authority made a : request for Federal aid for its 1962-development program, including an,item for property acquisition for approach, protection, and clearing in connection with Runway 15-33. On May 31, 1963, the Authority made’an application (amended in June, 1963) ‘‘bearing upon a £1963 Grant-in-Aid Pro- gram’ ’’ contaiping. a land acquisition ‘“‘for Runway 15 Clear Zone.’’ Both the 1961 and the 1963 -proposed ac- quisitions included properties on Neptune Road then owned by the plaintiffs. A grant offer was made-by the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) to the Authority on June: 28, 1963. This was accepted on June 28, 1963. The accepted © \ grant offer thus became an agreement between the Auth- \ ority and FAA (the 1963 grant agreement). See 49 U. S.-C. ' § 1111 (1964); Federal Aviation Regs. § 151.31, The 1963 grant agreement provided that the Authority would not . . commence certain work on the property acquisition pro- . ject until. plans had been approved by FAA. The master *” found (a) that apart from the 1963 grant agreement, there - was no obligation’on the part of the Authority to extend ' Runway 15-33, but (b) that the acquisition of the plaintiffs’ properties became ‘‘a part of . ... [the 1963] grant agree-. _ ment.’? He also found that from ‘‘an aviation viewpoint, ‘the ... extension of [R]unway 15-33 was and is . . . desir- able,’’ and that ‘‘the removal of structures on... Nep- 5 A 1965 Blan in evidence, approved by the Authority and by FAA, shows the 2,127 foot extension, but it is not shown that this 1965: plan bears direct relationship to the 1963 grant agreement. It does appear, however, that “extension of [Rlunway 15-33 was divided into three’ ” and that a contract for phase’I involving a commit- seuss. et $500,068 jos bens guanied, bat apt completed bevgues of the Rae harbor lines problem now solved by enactment. of St. \1966; c -.+ 783 (fn. 4, eupra). That the general scheme of ‘extending ‘and pro- tecting the runway has FAA approval. is — eppeaneh, from . the master’s — = various exhibits. Ha Nhe a \ . oe cal Standard Order N18 (TSO-N18) which provides that “an ap- proach area” is 10,000 feet long “beginning 200 feet outward. from ice Se ais Road would provide a greater factor of safety for al concerned.’” @: Federal regulations 8 aualinn with the Federal Aid to ‘Air- ports Program require, in connection with Federal grants,’ the acquisition, control, or protection of so called ‘¢run- way clear zones’’ which are designed ‘to allow the unob- structed passage of aircraft landing or taking off from. a runway. ’? The master found that the plaintiffs’ parcels on Neptune Road are all beyond a 2,500 foot ‘‘clear zone”’ from the present paved 7,873 foot Runway 15-33. These parcels, however, will be within a ‘‘clear zone’’ of 2,500 feet for Runway 15-33, if and when it is extended north- westerly as proposed (i.e. to point [F] shown on the an- nexed plan), The master justifiably eoncluded that ‘‘the ‘structures upon the [plaintiffs’] -premises, . . . [on] Nep- tune ‘Road, do not constitute an obstruction p= aviation ‘within .'. . applicable federal standards as . . . Runway 15-. ‘33 exists presently at a length of 7,873 ' feet, but ons ae -[such] structures would constifute” an obstruction .. . to aerial navigation, within . .. applicable federal scindanie: if and when... Runway 15-38 may be extended’’ to es - 000 feet. °See 49 U.S. C. § 1101 et seq. (1964),. and 14 CFR (1967) §§ 151.7 (a), 151.9 and 151.11 (c). The regulatioris refer.to Techni- the end of each runway and extending outward,” -ending 10,200 feet from the end of the runway. For “instrument runways” like Run- - way 15-33, there are special requirements. 7 By. ‘the Federal statutes, the following principles are established. (1) Among the mt of airport development serge oe! is “ac- quisition of land . . . necessary to .. . mitigate . . . airport hazards,” see § 1101 (8). "(2) the administrator (to ‘ensure, among other things, that the aerial approaches to an airport will be adequately cleared ) “shall prescribe such . . . requirements . .. as he may deem necessary,” see § 1110: (3), The administrator shall approve a pro- cist Avdbanliglegg -enigetarentine rig i . will contribute to the 1108 08 (d). @¢ complishment of the. purposes: of the” Federal statute. See §° ® 26. 2 The master’s report (although more restricted in its 2 discussion of negotiations for the runway extension than ‘would have been helpful) and: the accompanying exhibits adequately establish that the Authority has long planned. extending Runway 15-33 to 10,000 feet and, that such an - extension in a northwesterly direction can be done without © taking by eminent domain land near Neptune Road or else- where for actual. runway construction. Chapter 410 did not : forbid extending the paved section of Runway 15-33 to the northwest over land which did not have to be taken by em- — - inent domain after the effective date of c. 410. Nothing in ce. 410 prohibited building a runway upon tidal flats of the Commonwealth .or upon Wood Island Park, held for po- tential airport use at the discretion of the Governor and : Council. See St. ‘1953, c. 528. Such an extension is plainly - within the Authority’s broad, — powers under St. 1956, c. 456. #~ Statute 1963, ¢. 410 (see fa. 1, supra, 5 and related text of go opinion), by its exceptions (see italicized language at points [A], [B], and [C]), expressly’ permitted the Au- thority to make eminent domain takings, even ‘‘westerly _ of the present property line of the. . . [alirport’’ (see point [D] of c. 410, as quoted) to meet Federal safety re- quirements and standards. No language confined the ex- ceptionsin c. 410 to existing runways. We see no justifica- tion for’ inserting in c. 410, by implication, language thus confining the exceptions. We interpret c. 410 as permitting _. the Authority to take land ‘‘westerly of the. [airport’s] present property line’’ to protect ‘‘the aerial approaches”’ _. to new or extended runways as well .as to Aina ap- proaches to existing runways. Examination of the 1963 grant se tiniad and of ‘the " papers and exhibits leading up to it, shows that the purpose of the Neptune Road land acquisitions was to’ protect ee aerial cciiiaas to aeenway 15-33 from the northwest, and on cy _ to question the filling of tid that this purpose was approved by FAA as sufficiently i im- proving aviation safety and. Op ations to justify Federal ments of the 1963 grant. agreement that ‘the land be. ac- quired, taken with te Project of éxte: } “bring the takings ordered on August 8, 1963, Within the exceptions to the prohibitions of St. 1963, c. 410. 2. ‘The trial judge sustained the® Authority’s deinurree” | on two grounds, viz. (1) that. (with respect to paragraphs _ of the bill pertinent. to this issue) the plaintiffs. have no. standing in equity to question the Authority’ ’s use of Wood Island Park; and (2) that the ii tiffs’-have no standing ~ u- lats in violation’ of the 1939 harbor line, now changed By St: 1966, c. 733. The second ‘ground of demurrer is: fo longer in issue (5 see fn. 4, supra) - because of c. 733. We thus discuss’ only, the first re of ; -demurrer.. | _ The plaintiffs sdieny no acti as giving them ihisibing'§ in this proceeding to seek,equitable relief concerning Wood Island Park, other than their ownership of land on or near ‘Neptune Road, ‘references: to the statutes concerning the park. (St. 1949, c..431; St. 1953, c. 528; St. 1955, c. 438), and statements that the Authority has cut off ances to the _ - _ park and has done, or proposes to do, construction work there. The proper public officer to protect park land by. bill in equity is the Attorney General.® See Jacobson v. ‘Parks & Recreation Commn. of Boston, 345 Mass. 641, 644. - See also Cabot v. Assessors of Boston, 335 Mass. 53, 57-58; ’Nickols v. Commissioners of Middlesex County, 341 Mass. | 13, 16-18 (in which, however; relief by mandamus was granted to enforce the trust there considered, see pp. 18-19, 8 The Attorney General is not a party to this case. Although. the _ | docket shows that a former Attorney General filed a motion on Feb-' _ Truary 10, 1966, for leave to intervene as a party defendant, ‘it sia not appesr. that the motion was. allowed. 4. Cf. Gould v. Greylock Reservation Commn., 350 Mass: _ ' 410 (mandamus). Under principles stated in the cases just . _ cited, the demurrer wa’ properly sustained on the first ground. a . *, ‘ <8 3. The Authority contends that this court should deal with certain matters not covered by the final deeree. We think that decision of these issues is not necessary to termi- _ nate the controversy. | : . (a) The Authority suggests that the lands, on+Neptune Road taken by it do not lie ‘‘westerly of the present [air- port} property line’’ within the meaning of St. 1963, c. 410 (see fn. 1, supra, and related text of this opinion).* Be- cause we have concluded that the Authority’s 1963 takings were proper under ¢. 410 in any event, we see no occasion for resolving now-any ambiguity which may exist in c. 410 and its application to the airport property lines. ‘ (b) There is also now no occasion, because we hold that the 1963 takings were valid, to determine whether the plaintiffs have standing in this proceeding to question their “validity. For like reasons, we see no occasion to decide whether the plaintiffs (wha certainly have long been vigor- | ously protesting the Authority’s proposals) are barred by laches. . , -h. 4. The ‘interlocutoty decree, sustaining the Authority’s Vincent J. Geleste for the plaintiffs. Donald R. Grant for the defendant. eo -. Appendix Saeae CoMMoN WEALTH oF MassacHugetts Suffolk, ss. far ° Superior Court a Ara) | No. 85004 Eq. Mary Loscui et al. F v. Massacuvusetts Port AUTHORITY sy _ FINAL DECLARATORY DECREE AFTER RESCRIPT This cause came on to’be further heard after the re- _ script issued by the Supreme Judicial Court for the Com- monwealth on March 11, 1968, and was argued by coun- 4 sel; and thereupon, upon consideration thereof, it is Or- DERED, Agree, and DECREED as anew 1. The properties of the petitioners Mary. Los- "4 chi, Margaret Cianci and Mary Pascucci which are de- ~ scribed or referred to in the order of taking adopted by the Massachusetts Port Authority on August 8, 1963, and recorded in the Registry of Deeds for Suffolk County on September 5, 1963, in Book 7776, Page 228, were validly taken by said Authority by the exercise of the power of eminent domain ‘‘for the purpose of protecting the aerial approaches’’ to Run- way 15-33 at General Edward Lawrence Logan Inter- national Airport ‘‘in accordance with applicable ‘fed- “- eral standards’’-within the meaning, of St. 1963, c.. 410. 2 eee | | la | a7 oo ¢ 2. The properties of the petitioners Mary Los- chi, Margaret Cianci and Mary Pascucci which are de- scribed or referred to in the order of taking adopted ‘ by the Massachusetts Port Authority on August 8, 1963, and recorded in the Registry of Deeds for Suf- ° folk County on September 5, 1963, in Book 7776, Page 228, were validly taken by said Authority by the exer- cise of the power of eminent domain ‘‘for the pur- ° pose of meeting runway clear zone requirements of . the federal government’’ with respect to Runway 15- 33 at General Edward. Lawrence Logan International Airport within the meaning of St. 1963, c. 410. By the Court, (Bzaupreav, J.) (s) Rosert Beaupreau JI8.G. Entered: March 21, 1968 ; -A True Copy : . ATTEST ae | (s) Tuomas F. Brorxey Assistant Clerk 31 _ je . Appendix C ° United States Constitution, Amendment XI V: Section 1 ‘‘... No State shall . ». deprive any citizen of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; .. .’’ 28 U.S.C. § 1257 rae ~ ‘Final judgments or decrees reer by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may ‘be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows: ; ‘‘(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of | a treaty or statute of the United States’is drawn im ques- tion or where the validity of a State statute is drawn in. question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Consti- tution, treaties or laws of the United States, or where any , title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or ° claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of, . or commission held or authority exercised under, the United Btates. 0 14 OF R. § 11.29 Notice of proposed rule making. (a) Each general notice of proposed rule making is published in the Feprrat Recister, unless all persons sub- ject to it are named and are personally served with a copy of it. (b) . Each notice, whether published i in the Fanenat. Br. GISTER or personally served, includes— , (1) A statement of the time, place, and nature of ‘the proposed rule-making proceeding; — (2) A reference to the authority under which. it is is- sued; © | (3) A description of the subjects and issues involved or the substance and terms of the proposed rule; (4) +A statement of the time within which written com- 32 3 ° oe must be submitted. and the disie caamien number of co- piés; and (5) A statement: of how and to what’ extent interested persons may participate in the proceeding, as prescribed by §§ 11.31 and 11.33. - (ce) A petition for extension of the time for com-. ments must be submitted in duplicate not later than two days before expiration of the time stated in the no- tice. The filing of the petition does pot. automatically ex- tend the time for petitioner’s comments. Such a. peti- tion is granted only if the petitioner shows a substan-. tive interest in the proposed rule and good cause for the . extension, and if the extension is consistent with the pub- — lic interest. If an extension i is granted it is published i in the ‘FEDERAL REcIsTER. ; $11.81 | Participation of interested persons in rule-making procedures. (a) Each interested person is entitled to participate in rule-making. proceedings by submitting written informa- tion, views, or arguments. In addition, he may comment on the original information, views, and arguments sub- - ‘mitted ‘by other persons, if, after receiving them, the Ad- ‘ministrator considers it desirable. (b) In any appropriate case, the Administrator also allows interested persons to participate in the sete-mee- ' img procedures described in § 11.33. § 11.33 Additional rule-making proceedings. (a) The rule-making, procedure also includes any far- ther procedural steps that best serve the purposes of a par- ticular proceeding. For example, interested persons may be allowed to make oral arguments, participate in confer- ences between the Administrator or his representative and ‘interested persons and onganizations, appear at informal be hearings presided over by a designated FAA official. at which a stenographic transcript is made, or participate in any other procedure whenever it’is desirable and appro- priate. to assure informed administrative action and ade- quate protection of private interests. _ (b) Any appropriate: combination of. the, procedurés _ described in’ paragraph (a) of this section may be used ~in addition to the basic procedure of allowing interested persons to partieipate in rule-making proceedings by: sub- mitting written information, views, or arguments. . Acts, 1963. Cuap. 410. An Acr PROHIBITING THE EXPANSION OF - THE LOGAN AIRPORT OR THE CONSTRUCTION OF HAN- GARS IN A WESTERLY DIRECTION THEREFROM. ' “Whereas, The deferred operation of this act would tend to defeat its purpose, which is forthwith to protect the public interest by preventing the exparision of the Lo- « ‘gan Airport in a westerly direction or the construction of © hangars in such direction, therefore it is. hereby dec- lared to be an emergency law, necessary for the imme- diate preservation of the public convenience. Be it enacted, etc., as follows: : The Massachusetts Port Authority, created by section two of chapter four hundred and sixty-five of the acts - of nineteen hundred and fifty-six, shall not, except- for the purpose of protecting the aerial approaches to run- ways in accordance. with: applicable federal standards, meeting runway clear zone requirements of the federal government, providing for the installation of navigational and landing’ aids required by the federal government, or meeting ‘other air safety requirements: of the federal gov- ernment, acquire by the exercise of the. power of eminent — ‘domain for airport purposes: any'land above mean high 34 | water in ‘the Kast Boston district of the city of ‘Sen | westerly of the present property line of the General Kd- ward Lawrence Logan International Airport, nor shall said Authority build, cause to be built nor allow to be built any hangar, or allow the operation of any aircraft, on land‘ owned by it and lying southwesterly of Porter street and westerly of ‘the existing airport service road | running between Porter. street, and Maverick str eet. ju May 16, 1963. , a’ --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385604_0031%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.