# Appendix — General Foods Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1968
- **Citation:** 391 U.S. 919

## Text

.-
APPENDIX A

_ UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
_ FOR.THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 15910

GeneRAL Foops Corporation, Petitioner,
v.
FEpeRAL TRADE Commission, Respondent.

On Petition To Review anp Set Aspe an ORDER
or THE FeperaL Trane ComMIssION

Argued J une 6, 1967 s

Before Statey, Chief Judge, Hastie, Circuit Judge, and |
Suerpan, District Judge.

Opinion of the Court*
_ (Filed November 9, 1967)
By Statey, Chief Judge.

Appellant, General Foods Corporation (hereinafter

. **G.F.’’), seeks to have reviewed and set aside a final order.
of the Federal Trade Commission. The Commission’ .
order required G.F. to divest itself of all the S.0.S. assets

acquired in violation of §.7 of the Clayton Act, 64 Stat. 1125 |

(1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914).? —

* The opinion of the Court of Appeals has been reproduced as
it appears in the certified Record in this Court.. Where typo-
graphical and other errors have been corrected in the Federal
Reporter they have been marked by inserting ‘‘[sic].’’

1 The pertinerit portion of the statute provides:

‘‘No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly
or indirectly, the whole or any: part of the stock or other
share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction
of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or
any part of the assets of another. corporation engaged also in
commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the
country, the effect of such acquisition may be ‘substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.’’ 64 Stat.
1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. §18 (1964), amending 38 Stat. 731
(1914). :

2

Appendia A

The precise determination was that G.F.’s acquisition of -
S.0.S. ‘‘will in fact substantially lessen competition in the
steel wool pad market.’’ ,

Both before and after the acquisition, which octurred
on December 31, 1957, the major source of revenue for
-§.0.S. came from tlie sale of its household steel wool pads.
These pads are produced by a shaving process in which a
specifically manufactured steel wool wire is drawn through
‘a machine containing a series of cutting knives. As the wire
is drawn against the knives, strands of steel wool with tri-
angular cross sections are shaved off and collected in
ribbons. Thereafter, these ribbons are formed into balls
or pads, the majority of which are impregnated with soap,
dried, and packaged for sale.

Steel wool pads make a ivtineiaely effective abrasive.
The three exposed cutting edges or cross sections perform
in much the same manner.as a knife abrasing by cutting or
shaving the surface to which the steel wool is applied. With
the addition of soap to the pad to facilitate its abrasive
action, steel wool makes a highly effective scouring and
cleansing agent.

_. The steel wool cutting machines are comparatively large,

complicated machines, not generally available on the open.
market, but are custom made to the manufacturer’s specifi-
cations. A German manufactured machine is available
but is not as efficient. as its American counterpart. The
machines can be used for no other function than the produc-
tion of steel wool. Wool manufactured from materials
other than steel are impractical because of the high cost of
the raw materials.

G.F. is one of the largest producers and distributors of
packaged food in the United States? All-its products are

2G.F. is divided ate five operating divisions which manufacture
and distribute its products—the operations of the five divisions
are supported by a Distribution Sales Service Division, an Institf-

38

Appendix A |

- low-priced high-turnover household consumer commodities
sold to customers through the Same grocery and super-
‘market outlets as are S.0.S. steel wool soap pads. Between
1955 and 1964, its net sales rose from $825 million to $1.3 .
billion, and its net asséts from $279 million to $436 million, |
an increase of 57.6% and 56.2% respectively. int

Because the self-service outlet is. the primary source of
distribution’ for its products, G.F. endeavors to create a
desire for a particular product in the mind of the shopper,
. thereby enabling her to make a distinction among the differ-
ent brands of a similar commodity. . It is ‘an unrelenting
_ effort, to presell.the housewife.’

Mass advertising and market promotions are essential
factors in the effort to achieve this goal. In 1957 G.F.’s
advertising and sales promotions aggregated $69 million,
and in 1958 $87 million. By 1961, G.F. ranked third among
all national advertisers, with most of its advertising expen-
ditures going into television advertising. * |

tional Food Service Division, and a Technical Center for research.
Each ‘division is headed by a general manager who reports to a
corporate vice-president and who is responsible for. executing his
own ‘‘business plan’’ following review and approval by higher .
~ levels of authority. Each division consists of regional sales dis-
tricts with each division having its own sales force. The exception
to this is the ‘‘Kool Aid’’ division, which distributes its products
through independent brokers.

_ 3 Advertising, according to .G.F., émbraces all phases of commer-
cial communication with consumers, and all of the many consumer
_ “‘deals’’ and incentives. Between 1957 and 1964, G.F. more than
- doubled its expenditures on consumer promotions, from $9 million
to $18.9 million.

Similarly, G.F. also was of the opinion that a successful mar-
keting program should include not only persuasion of the housewife
to select G.F.’s products from the shelves but also the. retailer to
place them on the shelves. Commensurate with this idea, G.F.
spent $9.8 million on trade promotions in. 1957. Six years later,
its expenditures in this area had more than tripled, rising to $31.5

million.

4

: Appendia A |
Prior to the acquisition, the steel wool industry had
been an almost perfectly balanced duopoly.*’ But in terms
of regional, as distinguished from national sales, 8.0.8.
managed to achieve a monopoly position in many areas.®
G.F., however, was not satisfied with the market position of
the company it acquired. Soon after the acquisition, appel-
lant concluded that the entire marketing and advertising
approach of S.0.S. needed rejuvenation.. This task was
entrusted to an advertising ageney then handling other G.F.
products. The new agency succeeded in enhancing the
. §.0.8. image by skillfully emphasizing different aspects of

the product than had previously been featured and by per-

*In 1957, the total'sales for the stee] wool industry amounted to
$28.6 million, The sales of the largest competitor, S.0.S., amounted
to $14.6 million, or 51%, and those of Brillo, to $13.6 million, or
47.6%. Three small producers accounted for the remaining 1.4% of
the total sales. None of these smaller companies had sales of over a
half-million dollars.

In 1957, S.0.S. had net assets of almost $6 million, while Brillo’s
assets, in 1958, amounted to $8 million.. None of the other industry
competitors possessed assets of as much as a half-million dollars.

5In April-May of 1957; S.0.S.’. sales represented 77.5% of total
sales on the Pacific coast, 75% in Chicago, 68.5% in the west-central
region, 65.7% in the south-west region, 60% in New England,
58.4% in the east-central region. Brillo scored very heavily in the
metropolitan New York area, accounting for almost 77% ‘of total
sales there. *° | ;

Traditionally, the ‘tude, has sold ts products on a delivered-
price basis on all orders exceeding a‘minimum amount with the:
manufacturer absorbing the cost of transportation. Due to the
high cost of shipping, the manufacturer confined the distribution
of its product to the region of its plant’s location. Only: 8.0.8. and
Brillo, with higher prices than the smallest companies, were in a
position to absorb the high freight.

5

a Appendiz A
suading G.F.’s management that they. should place an:
almost total reliance on television advertising.® ,

A survey of sales’ statistics for the household steel
wool industry reveals the dramatic change that G.F. was
able to effect. . During the period from 1955 to 1957 total
sales in the industry rose ‘from $24.2 million to $28,6 million,
a market expansion of over 18%. The sales of S.0.8., how-.
ever, increased by. only 14.5% from $12.7 million in 1955
to $14.6 ‘million in 1957. S.O.S. thus failed to keep pace -

. with the expanding market, its share falling from 52.8% in |
1955 to 51% in 1957. Contrasted with this decline is the —

rise of Brillo’s market share during the same period, going
from 45.7% in 1955 to 47.6% in 1957. Brillo’s sales in-

: creased by 23.4%, a rate markedly more rapid than that for

the industry as 4 whole.

The downward trend in the market position of S.OS.
continued for a period of time after the acquisition due.to
G.F.’s preoccupation with the integration of 8.0.8. into its

own organization. Brillo, during this same period, con-

tinued to grew faster than the market ; its sales increased,

for example, from $14.4 million in 1958 to $14.9 million in

® Prior to the acquisition, in the period from 1954 through 1957,
S.0.S. spent approximately $1.25 million yearly for television
advertising. After the acquisition, in the period from 1960 to 1963,
expenditures rose to a yearly average of- $2.25 million, an increase”

One reason for the increased expenditures was a decision to
advertise on more expensive evening shows. . §.0.S. had formerly
recognized that advertising on nighttime shows was preferable
but had felt that the expense ‘was prohibitive. G.F., however, as

of other G.F. products, 8.0.8. not only gained . access to choice
shows at prime time but earned G.F.’s greater discounts computed
on the basis of G.F.’s huge combined advertising purchases for all

’ its products, 3

Q

6

——s A.
1959, a gain of 3:8% as compared to a total market expan-

‘sion of 2.8%.

Beginning in 1960, with the post-acquisition period coming
to a close, the advantages derived from G.F.’s great com- _
petitive strength began to make themselves evident, and
the fortunes of S.0.S. took an upward turn. Sales began
to accelerate sharply and at a much faster pace than those

. for the total industry.’ Between 1959 and 1962, the sales of

8.0.8. rose from $15.2 million to $19.2 million, a gain of
26.5%. ‘Total industry ‘sales, however, increased by’ only -
11.5%, from $30.7 million to $34.2 million. Sales of S. 08.,
therefore, expanded at' more than twice the rate of the
household steel wool market, and the market share of S.0.S.
grew from 49.4% in 1959 to 56% in 1962.

In: the face of this. remarkable comeback by S.O.S.,

‘ Brillo’s position deteriorated rapidly. Even though in-

dustry household steel wool sales increased by 11 5%,
Brillo’s sales actually “decreased. from $14.9 million in
1959 to $14.3 million in 1962, a decline. of 4.2% in an ex-

panding market.® Confronted with steadily falling nies, 0

7 Trade and consumer promotions ‘for the sale of S.0.S. ae were
also more energetically engaged in by G.F. And owing to its in-
tegration in, G.F.’s market-centered distribution system, 8.O.S.
would naturally benefit from the system’s attendant advantages.
The integration enabled S.0:S. to induce purchases of its products

by: (1) granting customers discounts based ‘on pooled purchases
' of the products of G.F.’s various divisions ; (2) giving customers

the convenience of including orders of S. 0.8.’ products in their
orders of other G.F.’s —— and ‘(3) improving national
availability. .

8 Nowhere is the contrast between G.F.’s power in the market
and Brillo’s inability to cope with this power painted more starkly.

- than in the most important local market in the United States, New

York: Twenty per cent-of all soap pad consumption takes place
there. With its manufacturing facilities located in the area, Brillo
dominated the market prior to the merger, outselling $.0.S. at

7
Appendiz A
dangerously declining market share, and mounting adver-
tising and promotional expenses, Brillo, in December 1963,

ceased operations as an independent company and merged
with Purex Corporation, Ltd.

I

Section. 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits any merger which
may substantially lessen competition or tend toward mo-
-nopoly ‘‘in any line of commerce.”’ Prohibition of a
merger depends, not upon the form it assumes, but upon
the realities of the market in which the merged companies
operate. Federal Trade Commission v. Procter & Gamble
Co. (hereinafter ““Clorox’’) 386 U.S.. 568 (1967) ; Reynolds
‘Metals Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 309 F.2d 223 —
(C.A.D.C., 1962). The fact that different products may in
some sense be competitive with each other is not sufficient
to place them in the same market if by themselves they
constitute: distinet product lines. Unitéd States v. Alu-
minum Co. of America (Alcoa-Rome Cable), 377 U.S. 271
(1964). -Nor does the availability of substitute products

retail during August and September 1959, by almost 6 to 1 (84.9%
v. 15.1%) on a per pad basis. wo

For years 8.0.8. had attempted, without success, to penetrate -
the New York City market, - After the acquisition, however, G.F.
was able to effectively realize a substantial increase in $.0.S. ’s
share of this market. Resulting largely from advertising, by Sep- |
tember 1963, G.F. had gained control of 31.8% of the combined .
- $.0.S.-Brillo retail market, reducing Brillo’s share to 68.2%..
Faced with this vigorous competition not only in New York City ~
‘but throughout the coyntry, Brillo countered by introducing a new

® Purex is a multi-product manufacturer and distributor of house-
hold cleaning agents, having total sales of about $127 million
in 1963. '

8

Appendia A os

compel the conclusion that they belong in the same relevant |

‘ market. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,

. 853 U.S. 586 (1957), Reynolds Metals Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission, supra.

In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.. 294, 325
(1962), the Supreme Court addressed itself to the task of
clarifying some of the uncertainty surrounding the concept
of relevant market. There, the Court said:

‘“‘The outer boundaries of a product market are
determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use
‘of [sic] the cross elasticity of demand between the prod-
uet itself and substitutes for it. However, within this
broad market, well defined submarkets may exist which,
in themselves,: constitute product markets for anti-
- trust: purposes: United’ States v. E. I.-duPont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593-595. The boundaries.
‘of such a submarket may be determined by examining
such practical indicia as industry or public recognition —
‘of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the
product’s peculiar characteristics and uses, unique pro-
duction facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices,
" sensitivity to price changes and spectenioed vendors. =
(Emphasis supplied.) ° :

In the present case, the Commission followed, as far
as possible, the guidelines laid down in Brown, Shoe. It
-* found that the appropriate line of commerce or relevant —
| product market within which to test the impact of the
G.F.-S.0.8. merger was household steel wool. Appellant
challenges this finding, accusing the Commission of ‘‘un-
tenable gerrymandering”’ becanse of its failure to include
in the relevant market numerous nonsteel wool household
' aids that G.F. introduced into the record. Appellant fur-
ther argues that even if the’ market definition was tech-
nically tenable, the Commission nevertheless erred ‘in
assessing the impact of the merger by treating nonsteel
wool scouring devices as though they did not exist. |

9

%
Appendia A

_ At the outset, it is important to note that G.F. does
not quarrel with the legal principles that guided the Com-.
mission. Rather, appellant contends that the Commission |
not only did not find sufficient facts to satisfy the Brown
Shoe criteria, but that many of the facts that were found
had no basis in the reeord. On this latter point thé law is
clear: the Commission’s factual findings ‘‘if supported by
evidence,’’ are conclusive.: See 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1964);
Universal Camera Corp. v, NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487, 80 [sic]
(1951). We have long recognized that ‘‘our job is not to
retry [a] case. We have no right to substitute a different
view from that of the Commission so long as we have
determined that its findings have substantial support in the
whole record.’’ C. Howard Hunt Pen Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 197 F.2d 273, 278 (C.A.3, 1952). Suffice it
now to say that we find there is substantial evidence to
support those facts found by the Commission. We shall
: Shortly elaborate on this point, but first -we turn to appel- -
lant’s argument that there were insufficient facts for the
Commission to determine that the relevant market in this
case was household steel wool. '

It is urged that Brown Shoe enumerates seven factors
to be considered when evaluating the relevant product
market, and that the Commission erred by ignoring the
significance of the-inapplicability to this case of two of
the seven Brown criteria. It is true that the Commission.
did not make a special finding as to the existence of
specialized vendors and distinct customers, but we do not
think that this, in itself, indicates that the relevant market
was erroneously delineated. Our reading of Brown Shoe
discloses no requirement that each of the seven criteria
must be present in every merger case. In fact, there is at
least one case where a well-defined submarket-was held to
exist where only three of the Brown criteria were present.
Reynolds Metals Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 309
F.2d 223 (C.A.D.C., 1962). ae ,

Ldhaieaaaaaae

10
eiaietie A

We now return to G.F.’s contention that the Consmis-
sion erroneously found many of the crucial facts in this
case. As mentioned earlier, we think. this. argument is
without merit. The Commission found that there was: a
definite industry recognition of the household steel wool
submarket as a separate economic entity. This finding is °
supported by testimony of several household steel wool
producers stating that they only looked to other steel wool
producers in setting prices and in reaching marketing de-

cisions with respect to their products. As far as these . .

producers were concerned, their ‘only serious competition
was with those companies in the industry who manufac-
tured household steel wool. Little or ho attention was

paid to producers of materials other than steel wool. In- :

deed, G.F. itself recognized that, competition offered by
nonsteel wool. products is at best ‘‘indirect.’’

Prior to acquiring S. OS, G.F. made a detailed study
of the soap pad: business and its competition. In part this: |
study stated:

“* * * Brillo, the only significant direct competition,
has been in the field for years without retarding 8.0.S.
“We are unaware of any new inventions or products ~
‘which would jeopardize the §.0.S. market. 8.08.,
through Tuffy, is setting up its own indirect eompeti-
tion.”°. Other indirect competition includes abrasive
sponges and bronze or stainless steel scouring pads.
S.0.S. has an opportunity to introduce such items as
new products under its own label.’”’ (Emphasis sup-:
plied.) ! |

te: light of the Sevegelng report, it is difficult to under-
stand how appellant can seriously expect us to believe that

10“"uffy’? is appellant’s own plastic product, inh according to —
a study prepared for appellant in 1962 it is by far the largest
selling of all the nonsteel wool cleaning devices that appellant seeks
to include in the relevant market.

11

Appendia A

nonsteel wool devices, including Tuffy, are directly com-
‘petitive with household steel wool products. Our incredu-
lity is heightened by the fact that the majority of products
which appellant now contends to be close substitutes were ‘
in existence and on the market at the time of G:F.’s” pre-
- acquisition study. As stated by the Commission: —

tidied 1 8 [appellant] and the other steel wool soap -
pad manufacturers regard themselves as a separate
market, then it is this market in which the impact
of [appellant’s] acquisition must be judged. It can- -
not be said that the existence and conduct of other
manufacturers outside the market must be considered
where the soap pad manufacturers themselves do not |
_take these substitute product manufacfurers into ac-
count. in their own pricing and marketing ‘decisions.’ ©
.General Food Corp., — F.T.C. — (Dkt. 8600, 1966).

The Commission further found that steel wool pads have.
peculiar characteristics and uses. ‘Testimony and ex-
hibits relating -to.the physical composition, operational
characteristics, and stated uses for household steel wool
substantiate this finding. Nonsteel wool products assume
variant forms bearing little resemblance to steel wool and*
their compositions range from plastic, to copper, to abra-
sive-surface sponges. But appellant argues that these
products are functionally similar to the steel wool’soap pad.
An attempt is made to support this argument by pointing to.
‘advertising claims made by some of ‘the allegedly direct
competitors. The attempt is unsuccessful. Advertising
puffs will not be considered by this court as evidence of
that which could not be proved below. . We prefer to place
reliance on testimony given by both the former general
manager of appellant’s Kool-Aid Division and the. pre-
acquisition president of 8.0.S.: These gentlemen stated
that, to the best of their knowledge, there was no available’
device that would perform as well as the steel-wool soap pad
for the purposes advertised on the S.0.S. box,

12

Append. A

Appellant’ s argument respecting the alleged similarity
between household steel wool and. the synthetic devices is
further attenuated by G.F.’s aforementioned pre-acquisi-
‘tion report. This report noted :

““S.0.S. in the kitchen is used primarily for. scour-—
ing pots, pans, stoves, etc., while Tuffy is used much
as a dishrag is used.”’

‘Surely, appellant does not expect us to find that*‘Tuffy,”’
one of the largest selling synthetic products, has the
same characteristics and uses'as the steel wool soap pad
- when its own officials admitted that it was not manufac-
tured or used for scouring pots and pans, but primarily as
a dishwashing aid. These admijssions, together with related
facts found by the Commission, support the conclusion that
household steel wool has peculiar characteristics and uses.

~ Adhering to the Brown Shoe. guidelines, the -Commis-
. sion next compared the retail sales price of steel wool soap
pads with the prices of allegedly competing products. After
carefully computing and contrasting the prices of all the
products in ‘both categories, the Commission concluded that
household steel wool products are sold at distinct prices.
Appellant strongly objects to this conclusion on the ground
that many of the nonsteel wool devices (13 of which gener-
ally sell for 29 cents and one of which usually sells for 27
cents) are comparable to those of Brillo and S.0.S. soap
pads (approximately 28 cents per package). At first glance ©
this argument appears to have merit. But further analysis
persuades us that the Commission’s focus on the selling
price of individual steel wool soap pads was the only practi-
cable way in which to approach the problem. The Com-
mission found that prices of steel wool soap pads range
between 1.4 cents to 2.8 cents per pad, while nonsteel wool |
~ products are sold between 6 cents and 29 cents per item.
Appellant, however, urges that the proper test is one of
comparing the life expectancy of a 28 cent package of steel
wool soap pads with the longevity of a similarly priced

‘13
Appendia Yi

_ package of a nonsteel wool product. We agree with the
Commission’s view that the very necessity of resorting to
such estimates in order to compare prices tends, by itself, to
demonstrate the distinctiveness of the prices of the house-
hold steel wool products. aa

_Almost no evidence was introduced on behalf of the Com-
mission concerning consumer sensitivity to price changes.
There is, however, sufficient evidence to support the finding
that the prices of household steel wool products display no
sensitivity to prices of nonsteel products. Without excep-—
tion, the smaller steel wool manufacturers testified that
they disregarded the pricing structure of the nonsteel wool
devices. These manufacturers stated that they looked only
to prices established by S.0.8. and Brillo when making
pricing decisions. The former general manager of G.F.’s -
8.0.8. operation stated that he and other high level execu-
tives paid little attention to the sales volume and pricing
structure of the -nonsteel wool products. And, not sur-
prisingly, ‘the present general manager, when questioned
‘ Closely, evidenced a general lack of knowledge of the prices
of many of these allegedly competing products.

_ Finally, the Commission found that the equipment used
for the production of steel wool is distinct from, and lacks
any similarity to, the facilities required to manufacture the
other cleaning devices .that appellant contends should be
included in the relevant market. It seems to us that this
finding is self-evident: and unimpeachable. -Steel wool pro- .
ducing machinery is not available on the open market, but
must be custom made to specification. It cannot practically
be used to manufacture other products. To argue that —
8.0.8. did not utilize ‘wnique production facilities would be
to ignore the obvious. | 7

To summarize, we think that there is substantial evi-
dence in the record to support the Commission ’s finding that
the relevant product market is household steel wool. It has
been shown that household steel wool products constitute

14

Appendix A

an economically significant market and that this market is.
sufficiently inclusive to be meaningful in terms of trade
realities. See Crown Zellerback Corp. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 296 F.2d 800, 811 (C.A.9, 1961); cert. denied,
370 U.S. 937 (1962). Some. of the more significant trade
- realities in this case include the existence of unique steel
wool producing machinery, industry recognition of the
household steel wool submarket as a separate economic
entity, the peculiar characteristics and uses of household
steel wool, a distinct pricing structure, and the. lack of
sensitivity to prices of nonsfeel products.

The Commission’s delineation of the relevant market
rested upon a carefully reasoned review of the applicable
legal precedents and a thorough ‘analysis of the relevant
- facts. Much of the evidence supporting the Commission’s
determination consists of studies and: analysis made by
G.F.’s own management in evaluating the possibility of
profitably presiap: hd 8.0.8. ‘Testimony of G.F.’s officials
as to how they actually: operated the S.O.S. division and
whom they regarded as their real competition lends added
weight to the finding that household steel wool is the rele-
vant product market for purposes of this case.

We therefore reject . appellant’ - contention that non-
steel wool cleaning devices constitute part of the relevant
market and hold that there is substantial evidence in the.
record to support the Commission’s finding that household
steel wool constitutes a relevant market within the meaning
' of Section 7.

II.

-"The essential issue remains whether the Commission had
substantial evidence to support its finding that the acquisi-
‘tion of S.0.S. by G.F. would have. a substantial anti-

~ ‘eompetitive effect in the household steel wool market. In
‘evaluating the record before us, we are mindful that the
facts must show more than a ‘‘mere possibility’? of an

15

~~

Appendix A

anticompetitive effect. United States v. H. I. duPont de .

Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 598: (1957). However, the
language of §.7 clearly indicates that the Commission need

not show that competition has been, or is being restrained,

but only that ‘‘* * * the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a

_ Monopoly.’’ (Emphasis supplied.) As summarized by the
_ Supreme Court in Clorox:’ :

‘‘Section 7 of the Clayton Act was intended to arrest —

the anticompetitive effects of market power in their
incipiency.. The core question is whether a merger
may substantially lessen competition, and necessarily

requires a prediction of the merger’s impact on compe- .

tition present. and future. * * * The section can deal
only’with probabilities, not with certainties, * * * And
there is certainly no requirement that the anticompeti-
tive power manifest itself in anticompetitive action be-

fore §7 can be called into play. If the enforcement

of § 7 turned on the existence of actual anticompetitive
practices, the congressional policy of thwarting such
practices in their -incipiency would be frustrated.’’
386 U.S. at 577. | _ .

On the basis of our review of the record, the Commission "s

opinion, and the recent holding in Cloroz, supra, we will

affirm the Commission’s order.

In general ‘business parlance, the instant acquisition
would be classified as a conglomerate merger. A merger is
considered conglomerate when the relationship of the merg-
ing companies before the merger was not one of buyer and
seller (a vertical merger) or direct competitor (horizontal
merger). The fact that a given merger is of a conglomerate

nature has no effect per se on the antitrust consequences of .

the union: ‘‘All mergers are within the reach of § 7, and all
must be tested by the same standard, whether ‘they are

classified as horizontal, vertical, conglomerate or other.’?

LO EP oe OO

~/

16
Appendia A

Clorox at 577. Indeed, one of the main purposes of the 1950
amendment of § 7 was to make clear that the section was not
applicable only to horizontal mergers, -but ‘‘to all types of
mergers and acquisitions, vertical and conglomerate as well
as horizontal, which have the specified effects of substan-
tially lessening competition * * * or tending to create a
monopoly.’’ H. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. II
(1949). .

However, while a merger is not free of antitrust con-
sequences because it is conglomerate, few such mergers have
been contested by the government. Challenges to the kind
of acquisition involved in this case lie in a ‘‘comparatively
new field of economic adjudication,’’ Clorox at 582 (Justice
’ Harlan concurring), a field troubling to both courts and the
Commission. -

The problem in analyzing conglomerate mergers is that
the effect of such a merger on the relevant market isnot so
readily apparent as is the case with vertical and horizontal
mergers. In part, this problem arises froth the fact that the
~ term ‘‘conglomerate merger”’ encompasses such a variety
of combinations. As suggested by then-professor bison .
the class of mergers included i in this term

60 © © ranges from the © pure conglomerate, in: which
there are no discernible economic relationships between |
the businesses of the acquiring and the acquired firm, ©
through a variety of what may be-called mixed con-
glomerates, involving horizontal or vertical economic

. Yelationships * * *. Mixed conglomerates include ac-
quisition of a firm producing the same product as the
acquirer but selling it in a different. geographic market,

. and acquisition of a company manufacturing a different
product which is nevertheless related to a product or
products of the acquiring firm because it can be pro-
duced withmuch the same facilities, sold ‘through the
same distribution channels, or made a part of the same
research and development efforts.’”’ Turner, Con-

17

Appendia A.

glomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton ‘Act,
78 Harv. L. Rev. 1313, 1315 (1965). ,

While antitrust consequences might-attach to a ‘pure’?

conglomerate merger, it is more likely that “‘mixed’? con-

glomerates with their attendant horizontal or vertical rela-

tionships will. come under attack as involving proscribed
alterations in the structure of a given relevant market.
The instanf case is an example of a mixed conglomerate

merger in that the acquired product line, 8.0.8. soap pads,”

‘‘fits’? quite closely into -the overall marketing program

utilized by G.F. The Commission labeled this merger a

‘‘product extension merger”’ which is to say a ‘* * * *

merger that may enable significant integration in the pro-.
‘duction, distribution or marketing activities of the merging

firfas. ’’ We quite agree with this characterization of the
instant merger because, as found by the Commission, the
acquired product line was easily integrated into the market-

_ Ing program employed by G.F. for its packaged food prod-. .

ucts: common to the marketing of all these. products are
high-consumer-oriented advertising budgets? the same dis-
tributional outlets, primarily grocery stores and super-
markets; and the same ultimate consumer group, the
-housewife.

Agreeing as ‘we do with this characterization of the

merger, it is still necessary to determine whether the Com-
mission had substantial evidence to support its prediction
‘that the merger would probably substantially lessen@eom-
petition. This determination is necessary because ye do
not read Clorox as proscribing, per se, all mergers labeled
““product extension mergers.”’ |

As summarized by the Commission, the conclusion that

G.F.’s acquisition of S.0.S. would in fact: substantially
lessen competition in the steel wool soap pad market was
based on its

‘“«* * * finding that respondent’s acquisition of 8.0.8.

has raised to virtually insurmountable heights entry

np earn

18

Appéndia A.

eshien which were already high, that the presence of
General Foods in the market has changed the steel
wool pad market which prior to the merger consisted of
two substantially equal-sized companies and several
. smaller firms to one in which S.O.S. is now dominant,
_and finally that the substitution of General Foods for
S.0.S. will depress rather than enhance the competitive
vitality of the market and v@}l paralyze any incentive
to€ompete which might otherwise have existed. The
fact that these high entry barriers to potential entrants
* and the impairment of the competitive vitality of the
market arises in part because of the impact which
General Foods’ advertising, promotional and distribu- -
tional resources had on potential and actual compéti-
tors in this market did not make its aequisition any less

. anticompetitive.’’

Although G.F. asserts that its acquisition of 8.0.S. did
not raise entry barriers, the Commission could reasonably °
conclude the contrary on the basis of the record before it.
The Commission found that before the merger, the steel
soap pad market was highly concentrated, and although the
products of the competitors were functionally identical,
consumer preference for the 8.0.8. and Brillo products had
been generated through extensive advertising and a long

history of industry dominance. ‘Thus the smaller companies

producing less well-known brands and potential producers
of new brands could not make significant market penetra-
tions without engaging in heavy expenditures for adver-
tising and promotions. | , After the merger of S.O.S. and
G.F., the existing competitors and such potential competi-
7 as existed faced an even more- formidable opponent. —
. was able to advertise and promote S.O.S. less expen-
pon han the pre-merger S.0.S. Company, especially be-
cause of the television discounts available to G.F. More-
over, after the merger, S.0.S. could and did induce potential
customers to purchase its soap pads by’ offering them. dis-

19
Appendix A 4
counts based on pooled purchases from various divisions of
G.F. The Commission also reasonably concluded that G.F.
was in a.position vis-a-vis the retailers that made it highly
likely that G.F. would be able to obtain advantages“in the

display or marketing of S.0.S: which were not available to
the pre-merger company, nor then ‘available to S 0.8”

competitors. These factors are adequate to support the »

Commission’s finding that factual and psychological bar-
riers to entry were substantially heightened by this merger.

The Commission also found that. the merger had an
adverse impact on the structure of the soap pad industry.
_ Comparing the situation with that presented in Cloroz, the ~
Commission found—that the impact of G.F.’s acquisition
of 8.0.8. was. of greater competitive significance than
Procter & Gamble’s acquisition of Clorox since G.F.’s
entrance into the soap pad market had a more pronounced
effect on the competitive structure of the industry. In
Clorox, Procter & Gamble acquired the overwhelmingly
dominant company in the liquid bleach industry, the only
’ nationwide seller ‘that accounted for almost half of the
national sales and whose nearest competitor accounted for
only 15% of the market. Highly significant in Clorox was
- the fact that the Commission found that Procter & Gamble
was the most likely prospective entrant and exerted an
influence on the market as a potential gompetitor.

The Commission found that while the merger in Clorox
rendered the dominant company in an industry even more
powerful, G.F.’s acquisition of S.0.S. ‘‘eliminated the
competitive balance betweén S.O.S. and Brillo,’’ the two -
‘dominant members. of the industry, and left S.0.S. with
‘decisive competitive advantages over Brillo.’’ This dis-
proportionate strength. would contribute to and increase
_ concentration in the industry. Thougl»not well articulated,
there is merit to the Commission’s finding. - While itis not |

the aim of astitrust policy to merely preserve ‘‘competitive |

balance’’ per se, it assuredly is the aim of such policy to

20

?

Appendix A 4

+

preserve whatever competition exists in a given industry,
even if such. competition be of an oligopolistic nature.

G.F. also challenges~the Commission’s findings as in-
consistent with the woat actuation tistDry of the merger,
asserting that the effect of the merger-was really to re-
- witalize the then-stagnant competition between S.O.S. and
Brillo.. As pointed out by appellant, post-acquisition evi-
dence shows that S.O.S. lost ground to Brillo during the
initial period following the merger. Subsequently, through
an aggressive, imaginative campaign directed especially
against Brillo’s dominant position in the lucrative New
York market, S.0.S. regained its position and, at the time

the record closed below, had increased substantially its

shareof the market over its pre-merger proportion. The
problem .here’is that the post-acquisition evidence is in-,
conclusive and susceptible of diverse inferences,: including
inferences supporting the Commission’s position. Indeed,
the post-acquisition history indicates that Brillo has merged
with the Purex Corporation, Ltd. While the Commission
did not attempt to evaluate the effect that this merger
would have in the steel soap pad market, it did note that
the likelihood that a given merger will trigger other
mergers and give impetus to further concentration is a
relevant. factor in assessing the anticompetitive effect of
that merger. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S.
294, 343-44 (1962).

G.F. has also argued that one of the central aspects
of the Clorox case, the elimination of the acquiring firm as
a potentiat competitor, is entirely missing in this case, "and

that the record does not support the finding that the |

market structure of the steel wool soap pad industry was
\drastically altered through any loss of potential competi-
tion. It is true that G.F. was not a potential competitor
lurking on the fringe of the soap pad market and exerting
an effect-on the actions of the actual competitors. How-
lever, we do not read Clorcx as holding that ‘‘product ex-

‘of

wane
. - Appendix A
‘> tension’’ mergers must involve the elimination of this type

of potential competition to run afoul “ this type [sic] of
the Clayton Act.

Moreover, the Commission could reasonably conclude
that the potential competition was adversely affected by
G.F.’s entrance into the market through the acquisition of
8.0.8. because the entry of such a large, well-financed,
aggressive competitor would necessarily hamper whatever
effect potential competition had in tthe pre-merger market.
This result follows because the threat of entrance into a
given market by potential competitors is reduced to the
extent that entry barriers are raised. Thus.the Commis-
sion’s finding that’ potential competition was reduced by
the instant merger is based on its finding that the substitu-
tion of G.F. for the smaller 8.0.8. Company increased: the
difficulty of entering the market, and the reduction of
potential competition was a predictable consequence.

The Commission could reasonably conclude that the entry

of G.F. would have a depressing effect on the quality —

_ of competition in the market. Asin Clorox, the degree of
market power enjoyed by G.F.., including the power to take
retaliatory action against any aggressive competition by
smaller competitors, made it unlikely [sic]. that the market
would be come an even more rigid oligopoly. It is no answer
to/contend that the market was oligopolistic before the.
entrance of G.F. because the Commission could reasonably

. conclude that under G.F.’s eventual dominance, the market -
would become even. less competitive. Moreover, the im-
mediate post-acquisition flurry of competition between .
Brillo and S.0.S.—which apparently led to 8.0.8.’ even- _
tual emergence with a greater market share, and the merger
of Brillo. with Purex—certainly does not compel the con- we

. Clusion that the market will become competitive.

Thus, we conclude that the Commission was justified
in finding that G.F.’s acquisition of the S.OS. Company
would substantially ‘teeeen competition in the steel wool

+ ONENESS EY NONETING

22

Appendia A .-

soap pad market, and in adopting. the order entered by the
hearing examiner requiring G.F.. to- divest itself of the
- §.0.S. assets found to have been acquired in violation of
§ 7. United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366
U.S. 316, 328-31 (1961). . s

The order of the Commission. will ™ stiiad and en-
forced. 15 U. 8. C. 8 21(c) (1964).

A True Copy:

7

2 Teste:

oo _ |
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
_for the Third Circuit.

"f 23
Appendix A .
UNITED STATES COURT OF. APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
oS.
~ No. 15,910 P
‘GENERAL Foops Corporation, Petitioner,
v. |

FEDERAL TRADE Commission, Respondent.

Present: Statey, Chief Judge, Hastir, Circuit Judge, and
SHERIDAN, District Judge.

Final Decree Affirming and Enforcing Order of the
*“; ° . Federal Trade Commission a

Petitioner, General Foods Corporation, having filed in
. this Court on May 12, 1966, a petition to review and set
aside an order issued against it on March 11, 1966, by
the Federal Trade Commission, respondent herein ; and
respondent having thereafter certified and filed in this
Court a list of all documents, transcripts of testimony,
exhibits and other material comprising the record in the
proceeding upon which the order was based; and the matter
having been heard by this Court on briefs and oral argu-

ment on June 6, 1967; and this Court having rendered _

its decision and issued its opinion on November 9, 1967,
affirming and enforcing-the Commission’s order in its ‘en-
tirety: ;

Now, THererorg, Ir Is Heresy ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
Decreep that the prayer of the aforesaid petition to set
aside the order of the Federal Trade Commission be, and
it hereby is, denied; |

Ir Is FurrHer Orperzp, ApsupcEp ANnp Decreep that the
order of the Federal Trade Commission be, and it hereby
is, affirmed, and that petitioner be, and it hereby is, com-

24 |

” Appendia A

manded forthwith to obey said order and * comply there- ;
with.

By the Ceurt.

Wim H. Haste
‘United States Circuit Judge

Entered: December 21, 1967

189a
| Opinion and Order

UNITED STATES oF AMERICA .-
BEFORE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION |

CoMMISSIONERS:

Paul Rand Dixon, Chairman —
. Philip Elman
Everette MacIntyre.
John R. Reilly .
Mary Gardiner Jones

In the Matter of

GENERAL Foops CorporaTION, - Docket No. 8600.
a corporation. ;

Final Order

_- This matter having been heard by the Commission on -
an appeal by respondent from the initial decision of the
hearing examiner, and upon briefs and argument in support -
thereof and in opposition thereto; and
The Commission having .rendered its decision determin-
ing that the appeal should be denied, that the initial deci-
sion, as supplemented and modified-to conform to the views .
— expressed in the accompanying opinion, should be adopted
as the decision of the Commission, and that the order issued
. by the hearing examiner should be adopted as the order. of
the Commission: |

IT Is ORDERED that the initial decision, as modified and
supplemented by the accompanying opinion be, and it hereby
is, adopted as the decision of the Commission. .

CD

190a

Opinion and Order
IT Is FURTHER ORDERED that the order issued by the
hearing examiner be, and it hereby is, adopted. as the
order of the Commission. |

IT Is vunrnie ORDERED that the respondent herein shall,
within sixty (60) days after service upon it of this order,
_ file with the Commission a report in writing setting forth —
in detail the manner and form in which it has complied with
this order.

_ By the Commission, without the concurrence of Com-.
missioner MacIntyre. Commissioner Elman. dissented and
has filed a dissenting aauen

SEAL |
. /s/ .JosEPpH W. SHEA
Joseph W.:Shea -
Secretary

IssuED: March 11, 1966
ATTACHED ARE:

( 1) Opinion of the ‘Commission by
Commissioner Jones .

(2) Dissenting’ opinion be Commissioner Elman

_ CoMMISSIONERS:

-19la
‘Opinion and Order

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE

_ FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

. f3) >
Paul Rand Dixon, Chairman
- Philip Elman |
Everette MacIntyre

John R. Reilly |

Mary Gardiner Jones

‘In the Matter of .
GENERAL Foops CorPoraTION, Docket No. 8600
' acorporation. - |

i

Opinion of the Commission

- By Jones, Commissioner :

.On September 30, -1963, complaint wa against .

respondent General Foods Corporation (General Foods)

_ charging it with-violation of Section’7 of the Clayton Act.
_. by reason of its acquisition on December 31, 1957, of the -
assets of The S.O.S. Company, Inc. (S.0.S.). The com-

plaint alleged that the effect of the acquisition “has been,
or may be, substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in the manufacture, distribution and sale

of household steel wool * * * throughout the United

States * * *.” |
On December 18, 1964, the hearing examiner filed his
initial decision. The hearing examiner concluded that Gen-

PANTIE LA

an a ee

*%

Opinion and Order

eral Foods’ acquisition of S.O.S. had the tendency substan-

tially to lessen competition and¢consequently violated Sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act. Respondent has appealed and
urges, first, that the examiner erred in defining the relevant
product market as-consisting solely of household steel wool
products and excluding from this definition some 40 other

© cleaning’ devices; second, respondent contends that this

product extension merger was totally dissimilar in type and
effect on’ competition to Procter & Gamble’s acquisition of
The Clorox Company, held illegal by this Commission in
1963 (The Procter & Gamble Co., Docket 6901), and in-
deéd that respondent’s acquisition of S.O.S., rather than .
diminishing competition, has brought much-needed ‘com-
petition in an industry which has been characterized by
peaceful competitive co-existence. Accordingly, respondent |
contends that the complaint against it should be dismissed.

_ We will consider these arguments seriatim.

a |
The Relevant Product Market!

The examiner found that the appropriate line of com-
merce or product market for measuring the effect of the
acquisition is household steel wool. This product market -
consists primarily of soap-impregnated steel wool pads, but
also includes plain household steel wool pads with or without
separate pieces of soap. Respondent, condemning this mar- .
ket as “artificial,” contends that, in addition to steel wool
pads, approximately 40 other kitchen cleaning devices, com-
posed of such materials as plastic, cellulose and metals other
than steel, should be included in the market: “Pwo of ‘these _

"The hearing examiner found, and both parties agree, that the
relevant geographic market is the entire United Stehes.

- * 308a\

i

Opinion and, Order
devices are inipregnated with soap and the remainder are
not.” oe Ces wee
A. The Criteria for Determining the Appropriate
Product Market ae : |
The standards to be applied in delineating a line of com-
. merce do not depend upon the form of the merger but on |
the realities of the market in which the merged companies
operate.* | : £
2The examiner classified the devices which are. claimed by the
respondent to be part ‘of the relevant market as follows:,‘‘(a) 14 are

steel wool pads which counsel in support of the complaint agree.are
properly includable in the ‘line of commerce,’ whether soap-impreg-

nated or not. (b) 13 items are plastic mesh balls or pads, ‘some of ~-

which have a sponge inside the ball or mesh, but none of which are
- soap-impregnated. Respondent’s product ‘Tuffy’ is in this group.
(c) 14 items are basically plasti¢ or cellulose sponges with an abrasive
_ surface‘joined to one side of the sponge. Minnesota Mining and Man-
ufacturing Company’s ‘Rescue’ is in this’ group and is sodp-impreg-
nated. (d) 7 items are pads of metal mesh made of metal other than
steel wool, but none of which are soap-impregnated. (e) 2 items.are
fiber dish cloths. coated with an abrasive substance, neither of which
is soap-impregnated” (I.D., par. 15).

° to date involving “‘conglomerate”-mergers have used the _
same tests for defining the relevant-market and measuring the effects
" of such mergers as those applied to teststhe effects of horizontal and
veritical mergers; see Consolidated Foods Corp. (Dkt. 7000, 1962) ;
rev. 329 FE. 2d 623 (7th Cir. 1964); rev. 380 U. S. 592 (1965); -
Reynolds Metals Co. v. F.:T. C.,; 309.F. 2d 223 (D. C. Cir. 1962)*; ..
Union Carbide Corp., 59 F. T. C. 614, 642-3, 658 (Dkt. 6826,

_- 1961); and the Procter & Gamble Co. (Clorox) (Dkt. 6901, 1963).

Legal commentators and economists who have discussed “conglom- —
erate” mergers have similarly not. suggested the application of any
different tests to define the relevant product market in such mergers.
See for example, Turner, “Conglomerate Mergers and, Section 7 of
the Clayton Act,” 78 Harvard Law Review 1313 (1965) ; Clark,
“Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act,” 36 Notre
Dame Lawyer.255 (1961); Edwards, “Conglomerate Bigness as a
Source of: Power”, Business Concentration and Price Policy 331
(1955) ; Stocking, “Conglomerate Bigness—Comment,” Business Con-
centration and Price Policy 352 (1955) ; Blair, “The Conglomerate’
_ Merger in Economics and Law,” 46 Georgetéwn Law Journal 672
(1958):; Adelman, “Antitrust Problems: The Anti-Merger Act .1950-
60,” Atherican Economic Association at 236; Day, “Conglomerate
Mergers and ‘The Curse of Bigness,’” 42 N. Carolina Law Review
511 (1964) ; Comment, “Conglomerate Mergers Under Section 7 of
the Clayton Act,” 72 Yale Law Journal 1265, 1270 (1963). "

ee ee ee eC ee ee ee oe om
. FY

7 | | 1942 om ds
- Opinion and Order

The relevant market is the “area of effective competi-
tion” within which the respondent operates, Standard Oil
Company of California v. United States, 337 U. S. 293,
300, n. 5 (1949). “[T]he problem of defining a. market
turns on discovering patterns of trade which are followed
in practice.” United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co.,
110 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D.-Mass., 1953) ; aff'd por curiam,
347 U. S. 521 (1954). The boundaries of the market

“must be drawn with sufficient breadth to.* * * recognize
competition: where, in fact, competition exists.” Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 326 (1962).
The product line must be “sufficiently inclusive to be-mean-
-ingful in terms of trade realities”. Crown Zellerbuch v.
F. T. C., 296 F. 2d 800, 811 (9th Cir. 1961). United States
v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 357 (1963). °

The fact that different products may in some sense be
competitive with each other is not sufficient to place them in
the same market if by themselves they constitute distinct
product lines. In United States v. Aluminum‘Co. of Amer-
ica (Alcoa-Rome Cable), 377 U.S. 271, 275 (1964), insu-
lated aluminum conductor was consideréd a separate market
although the Court conceded that there was sufficient com-
petition between this product and its copper counterpart to
justify grouping these two products in a single product
market.. In Union Carbide Corp., 59 F. T. C. 614, 655
(Dkt. 6826, 1961), the Commission noted that ‘there is
and will continue to be competition between polyethylene
film and other flexible packaging materials” but nonethe-
’ less place them in separate lines of commerce. Competing
products have also been placed in separate product markets
in a number of other cases, including United States v. Lever
Bros. Co., 216 F. Supp. 887, 891 (S. D. N. Y. 1963) (where
low sudsing detergents and high sudsing detergents were —
placed in separate markets despite the “direct competition”
between them), and United States v. Aluminum Co..of —
America, et al., 233 F. Supp. 718 (E. D. Mo. 1964) (where

Fo ; ‘ aney Ty nl

a ~ 195° -
Opinion and_Order

a market was found for aluminum curtain wall despite the
competition between it and other types ‘of building mate-
rials). See also United States v. Philadelphia. National

Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 356 (1963) ; United States v. Bethle-

hem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 593 (1958); Crown-

Zellerbach Corp. v. F. T.'C., 296 F. 2d 800, 814, 815
(1961) ; Reynolds Metals Co. v.. F.T. C., 309 F. 2d 223,
229 (D. C. Cir. 1962) and United States v. Pennzoil Co.,
1966 Trade Cases Par: 71,659 (W. D. Pa. 1966).

Similarly, the fact that “substitute” products are avail- .

able does not compel the conclusion that they be placed in
the relevant market. In United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U. S. 586 (1957) the market was re-

stricted to “automotive fabrics and finishes” even though.

the same or similar products were utilized. in other indus-
tries. In Union Carbide Corporation, supra, the Commis-

sion acknowledged that there were “adequate substitutes”

for polyethylene film as a flexible packaging material but
nevertheless excluded such substitutes from the relevant

market. See also Consolidated Foods Corp., supra (where

dehydrated onion and garlic were held to comprise.a sepa-
rate market, even though a broader market could presum-
ably have been considered including fresh onion and garlic,
as respondent therein contended) ; Reynolds Metals Co. v.
F. T. C., 309 F. 2d 223 (D. C. Cir. 1962) (where the
market was narrowly defined to be decorative aluminum foil
sold to the florist trade, as distinct from aluminum decora-
tive foil, aluminum household foil and perhaps even wrap-
ping paper); and Clorox, supra, (where household dried
bleach was shown to be available-as a substitute product for
-certain purposes’ but -was nevertheless excluded from the

- market, which was confined to household liquid bleach).

The applicable legal test for. defining a product market
for the purposes of determining the effect upon competition
of a merger or acquisition was most recently reaffirmed in
the Brown Shoe opinion, supra at pagé 325:

SG AE aD OM

— :196a
Opinion and Order

“The outer boundaries of a product market are .

determined by the reasonable interchangeability of
use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the
- product itself and substitutes for it. However, with-
in this broad market, well-defined submarkets may

exist, which, in themselves, constitute product mar- _

kets for antitrust purposes.. United States v. E. I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U. S. 586, 593-595.
The boundaries of such a submarket may be deter-

‘ mined by examining such practical indicia as indus-
try or public recognition of the submarket.as a
separate economic entity, the product’s peculiar
characteristics and uses, unique production facili-
ties, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity
to price changes, and specialized -vendors. . Because
'§ 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits any merger which
may substantially lessen competition ‘in any line of
commerce’ (emphasis supplied), it is necessary to
examine the effects of a merger in each such eco-
nomically significant submarket to determine if there

_- is a reasonable probability that the merger will sub-

. ‘stantially lessen competition. If such a probability
‘is found to exist; the merger is proscribed.’”*

*The criteria enumerated in Brown Shoe did not spring full-
blown from the Supreme Court but had been developed in the pre-
ceding cases decided under Section 7 subsequent to its amendment
in 1950. For example, (1) industry and public recognition of the
market was regarded as a significant factor in defining the market
in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S. D.
N. Y. 1958) and A. G. Spalding & Bros., Inc., 56 F. T. C. 1125,
1160 (Dkt. 6478, 1960), aff'd. 301 F. 2d 585 (3rd Cir. 1962); (2)
the. “peculiar characteristics and uses” of automotive fabrics and
finishes was the sole basis, for the finding of the market in United
States v. E. I.-du Pont de Nemours & Co. (General Motors), 353
U. S. 586, 593-95 (1957); (3) the distinct prices of two product
. lines was one of the factors cited by the Commission in the Spalding

and Union Carbide cases in placing such products in separate mar-
kets; (4) price sensitivity was one of.the tests applied in American
Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co:, 259 F. 2d 524,
530 (2nd Cir. 1958) and; Union Carbide, 59 F. T. C. 614 (Dkt.
6825, 1961). : ;

reer ayer meaer neem: vr me

197a |
Opinion and Order

While conceding the validity of the tests enumerated in _.
the Brown Shoe case, respondent nevertheless argues that
.the relevant market must be defined to include all products
which could in any sense be regarded as -competitive. In
support of this view respondent relies heavily on the, Su-
preme Court decision in United States v. C ontinental Can,
378 U. S. 441 (1964), decided three weeks’ after Alcoa-
Rome Cable, supra. In Alcoa, the merger challenged was
between two aluminum conductor producers-and defendant
argued that its acquisition did not have the prohibited im-
pact on competition because of the existence of substitute
products (i.e., insulated copper conductors ) which therefore
required a broader market definition comprising all competi-
tive products. The Court rejected this argument, finding
. that whatever the broader market might be, a meaningful

product also existed consisting of aluminum conductors
alone. re

In Continental Can, the Court was confronted with just
_ the reverse of the situation in Alcoa. In. Continental Can,
the acquiring company, Continental, produced metal con-
tainers and the acquired company produced glass containers. _
Thus, the issue before the Court was whether a broader
market encompassing both products was meaningful ; the
Court was not concerned with the question as to whether a
more limited product market also existed. The Court held |
that metal and glass containers were in the same product
market for the purposes of considering the effects of the
_acquisition, even though the Court ‘considered the products
of the two companies to be in “separate industries” and to
comprise. distinct “product markets”. The market defined
by the Court in Continental Can was that delimited by the
“outer boundaries” referred to in the Brown Shoe opinion ;
but the Court took pains to ‘point out that its finding with
respect to this broader market did not preclude: the finding

198a

Opinion and Order ,
of narrower submarkets within. the more comprehensive
market: |

‘ %* * That there may be a broader product market
made up of metal, glass and other competing con-
tainers does not necessarily negative the existence of
submarkets of cans, glass, plastic or cans and glass
together, for ‘within this broad market, well-defined
submarkets may exist which, in themselves, consti-
tute product markets for antitrust purposes.’ Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S., at 325” (378

‘U.S. 457-58).

In short, the test of the relevant market.is whether a
given line of products constitutes an economically signifi- —
- cant market and whether that market is “sufficiently inclu-

I39-

sive to be meaningful in terms of trade realities”: Crown
Zellerbach Co. v. F. T. C., 296 F. 2d supra at 811. In de-
fining the market it is immaterial that there may be other
broader or narrower markets in which the companies are
alsooperating® Uae -

5Respondent argues that “whatever the technical definition of the
product market no rational evaluation of present or future competitive
conditions can be made without taking non-steel scouring devices into
account” (Respondent’s Brief on Appeal, ‘page 26). It is clear, how-
ever, under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, that once the appropriate
product market for determining the effect. of the merger has been
defined, the only consideration which is relevant is whether or not
there is a reasonable probability that competition in that market may
be substantially lessened. “If such a probability is found to exist the
merger is proscribed.” Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S.
294, 325 (1962). Consequently, we reject respondent’s contention
that whatever the definition of the market may be we must neverthe-
less still consider the broader cleaning device market in our assess-
ment of the competitive impact of respondent’s merger.

199a
Opinion and Order | a

B. Application of the Brown Shoe Criteria To. Define
the Relevant Product Market . .*,

Although seven separate criteria are suggested i in Brown

“Shoe for use in defining the market, the opinion did not

indicate that all of them must necessarily be considered in
each case. We find the following factors are particularly
significant in this case:

1. Industry or public recognition of the submarket as a
separate economic entity®

The producers of household steel iad recognized that —
the product, which they frequently referred to as a “soap
pad”’, constituted a distinct market and looked -only to the
steel wool products manufactured by each other in setting
prices and making marketing decisions. Thus respondent,
in its pre-acquisition report, considered only the steel wool
products of S.O.S. and Brillo'in making its determination
that S.O.S. had “60 per cent of the national dollar volume” *
(CX 5(b)). :

Furthermore, in separate studies prepared for respond-
ent by Market Facts, Inc., in 1959 (RX 12), by National
Family Opinion, Inc. in 1962 (RX 14) and by Foote, Cone .
and Belding in 1963 (RX 15), the market was again re-
ferred to as the “soap pad market,’ which included steel
wool products and excluded other cleaning devices. Other .
non-steel wool cleaning devices were considered in the 1963
Foote, Cone and Belding report, but they were consistently -
referred to as constituting a different market separate and
distinct from steel wool pads. Even for the purpose of this
litigation counsel for respondent was unable to produce
any study of a market including both steel wool and non-
steel woo] devices.

*Respondent misstates this test’ as “ ‘industry and ‘public recog-
nition’ of the presence or absence of competition between the products
under consideration” (Respondent’s Brief on Appeal, page 17).

200a

@

Opinion and Order

_ It is clear that the only competition which respondent
seriously considered in the advertising, packaging and pro-
_ duction of its product was that offered by Brillo household
soap-impregnated steel wool pads. Thus,.in its pre-acquisi-

tion study of S.O.S., respondent made a distinction between |

the “direct competition” between S.O.S. and Brillo and the

“indirect competition” between S.O.S. and such articles as _ |

“abrasive sponges and bronze or stainless steel scouring
pads” (CX 7, p. 10). After its acquisition of S.O.S., re-
spondent continued its preoccupation with the sales of 3. O. S.
as compared with those of Brillo and did not concern itself

* with the market roles.of the cleaning devices which it now
claims are part of the market. Thus after the acquisition

respondent revamped the advertising and packaging of

S.O.S. pads in an attempt to demonstrate or convey the im- -

pression that the S.O.S. pad rusted less and “actually car-
ried more soap than the average Brillo pad” (Tr. 1079).
_ A change in the color of the soap pad from red to blue was
prompted by studies which “had indicated that the reddish
soap used by both Brillo and S.O.S. reminded the housewife
-of rust (Respondent’s Brief on Appeal, page 11). More-
over, when respondent launched an onslaught on the New
York market in 1959, the only other product which it took
-into consideration was the Brillo soap pad (RX’s 12, 17,
42; Tr. 1089).

~ One of the products now claimed by respondent’s. coun-
sel to be directly “competitive” and to have been artificially
excluded from the relevant product market is respondent’s
‘ own plastic device, “Tuffy.” This must come as a surprise
to respondent’s own officials, who, as shown by the record,
had apparently never considered “Tuffy” to be directly com-

petitive with the S.O.S. soap pads. Ina report prepared for .
the board of directors prior to the acquisition it was stated |

that “Tuffy and S.O.S. are complementary rather than com-
petitive.” (CX 5(b)). In General Foods’ acquisition study
of S.O.S., Tuffy was stated to be of the “indirect com-

20la
Opinion and Order

petition” with S.O.S. At the hearing, a former general man-

ager and the present general manager of the’ Kool-Aid Di- .

vision of General Foods which now includes S.O.S. pads,
testified that Tuffy did not comnpete. with “S.O. s (Tr.
626, 761-762). ;

Respondent’s own.general manager up to the time of this
. litigation had been totally unaware of even the existence of ct

many of the cleaning devices now alleged by “Fespondent
to be part of the relevant product market. and directly com-

petitive with steel. wool pads (Tr. 791-795, 816-817).

Finally, it should be noted that the other. steel wool pad

manufacturers regard themselves as constituting a separate .
‘ and distinct industry. Thus, the president of Durawool
’ Company testifying at the hearing drew a careful distinc-

g “

tion between what he characterized as’ “the new products”

(meaning non-steel wool products ) and those “in the in-

dustry” (consisting of steel wool producers) (Tr. 875).
The president of Demcorp testified that the non-steel wool
devices did not offer his product any. “direct competition”
and that he did not “take the prices of the other products

into consideration when he set his price” (Tr. 974). The
‘president of Alloy Metal Wool Products declared that his

only competitors were Brillo, S.O.S., Durawool and Amer-
ican Steel Wool Company, and that he had not considered
the non-steel wool devices to be ae items” (Tr.
897- 898).

* It is, obvious that if respondent and the pn steel .
' wool soap pad manufacturers regard themselves as a sepa-

rate market, then it is this market in which the impact of
respondent’s acquisition must be judged. It cannot be said
that the existence and conduct of other manufacturers
outside this market must be considered where the soap pad
manufacturers themselves do not take these substitute prod-

uct manufacturers into account in their own pricing and’
" marketing decisions.

—

202a
| Opinion and Order

2. The product’s peculiar characteristics and uses

The steel wool pad is composed of triangular-shaped
steel strands with three cutting edges. When-used, a
number of the edges are pressed down, and the pad cleans
the surface in a manner similar to a knife or a razor blade.
The soap with which a soap pad is impregnated lubricates,
inhibits scratching, facilitates polishing, and removes grease

and grime (Tr. 432, 629, 893, 939, 978-979). The steel _

wool pad is a soft and pliable product which is able to reach
crevices and corners (Tr. 844).

The primary use of steel wool pads is the scouring of
pots and pans; the general manager of respondent’s Kool-
Aid Division estimated on the pad usage basis that this use
constitutes “at least 80 percent of the total volume” (Tr.
759). Other uses, described as peripheral, are. cleaning
white-wall tires, floors, walls, stoves, aluminum doors and _
windows and barbecue grills.

Physically, the non-steel wool cleaning devices which
respondent’s counsel argues should ‘be included in the rele-
vant market are unquestionably distinct. They are composed
of a variety of substances such as plastic, copper and abra-
sive surface sporiges, none of which closely resembles steel
wool. Furthermore, only two of the non-steel wool devices,
unlike the overwhelming number of “steel wool pads’ pro-
duced, contain soap. -

The examiner found that steel “es wade ‘made a par-
ticularly effective abrasive” (I. D. par. 18) and that none of
the other. devices “are able to perform the wide range of
household cleaning jobs as well as household steel wool”
(I. D. par. 20). Respondent’s counsel accuse the examiner
of “substituting his own personal judgment for that of the
market place with respect to the quality of the different
scouring devices involved” and further disparages:the ex-

203a.
Opinion and Order

‘aminer’s finding by declaring that his " personal quality

judgment is without evidentiary support” (Racponfeat's
Brief on Appeal, page 19):

We find, however, ‘that the examiner’s finding, which
coincides with the conclusions of S.O.S.’ and respondent’s

' own’officials who testified at the hearing, is amply supported
. by, the record, and we note that the only evidence which re-

spondent offered to contradict this evidence consisted of ad-.

vertising claims made for some of the purportedly com-

petitive products. A former general manager of the re-
spondent’s Kool-Aid Division testified flatly that “For the
uses that.S.0.S. was advertised for and pictured on the box,
it was better than other products” (Tr. 624). He further

testifid that respondent had tested- a number of other

cleaning devices and: found that none of them could “per

form as well as the S.O.S. steel wool sap pad * * * for the
purposes that we advertise on the box” (Tr. 626). . The
president of S:0.S. prior to the acquisition testified that
his company had-“found there was nothing in [its] opinion
that was as good as steel wool abrasive” (Tr. 429-30) and

that in his opinion “soap pads are the best cleanser I know .

of” (Tr. 431). Moreover,.respondent’s own plastic de-
vice, “Tuffy”, which, according to a study2prepared for
respondent in 1962 (RX 14( m)), is by far the largest of

- all of the non-steel wool cleaning devices which respondent

seeks to include in the relevant market, was not devised .
or used for scouring pots and pans, according to respond-
ent’s own officials who testified at the hearing (Tr. 626,
761) as well as respondent’s pre-acquisition report, in which —
it had stated: :

“S.O.S. in the kitchen is used primarily for scouring _

pots, pans, stoves, etc., while Tuffy is used much as
a dish rag is used” (CX 5(b)). |

204a e
_ Opinion and Order

Also, at least four eile ‘blastic devices, “Dobie,”
“Handy Mandy,”-“Polly Puff,” and “Reddy”, which re-
spondent’s counsel claim should be included in the market,

e do.not even claim in their advertiséments that their - prod- ..

ucts can be used for scouring pots and pans. (See re-
spondent’ s proposed findings, pp. 148, 152, 155 and 156.)

Accordingly, we find that household steel wool has
unique physical characteristics; that many of the allegedly
competitive devices are riot even claimed to perform all of
the household chores performed by steel wool, including
its principal task, scouring pots and pans; and that those as.
to which such claims are made are substantially inferior in
. the performance of such tasks.

3. Distinct prices -

The unit sales prices of steel wool soap pads and the
other cleaning devices claimed by respondents to be part of
the same market differ markedly from each. other. (See
_ Appendix B, Table IV.) Steel wool soap pads sell at a .
range of 1.4 cents to 2.8 cents (the latter representing the -
price at which S.O.S. and Brillo pads normally: sell’), while
the prices per item of the non-steel wool devices range from
6 cents to 29 cents. Respondent emphasizes the fact that
the prices ‘per package of certain of the non-steel wool
‘devices (13 of which sell for 29 cents and one of which sells
for 27.cents) are comparable to those of Brillo and S.O.S.
_ pads (28 cents per package). However, the number of units

per package varies so widely as to rénder the package price
meaningless in any comparison of prices between steel wool
and non-steel wool devices. For example, one “Scotch Brite”
pad separately packaged sells for 29 cents, while the al-
legedly comparable “package” of Brillo or S.0.S. soap pads

TBrillo also has a special purpose Brillo Whitewall Tire oad
which sells for 7.3 cents.

° 205a_
- Opinion and ‘Order

' which sells for 28 cents per-package contains ten pads.
Similar: examples could be multiplied. Moreover, in con-
sidering respondent’s argument it should be noted that in
the case of many of the scouring devices which respondent
claims should be included in the relevant market (8 of which

sell for less than 20 cents) even the package prices bear no-

relationship of any kind to the prices of the dominant steel
wool brands. .

It is clear that while the- prices of steel wool. iil are
substantially identical, they bear little or no relationship to
the prices of non-steel wool cleaning devices. The only way
_in which prices could be compared would be to make esti-

mates of the useful life of the 29-cent single pad, for ex-_
ample, as compared with the 10 S.O.S. pads selling for 28:
cents. Surely, the need to make such a computation in order: |
to compare prices almost by itself demonstrates - the ‘dis-
tinctiveness of the steel wool products as compared with the °
other cleaning devices which respondent urges be included j in

the relevant market.

4. Sensitivity to pone a

Although ines is no direct evidence as to consumer

sensitivity to price changes, the record does make it clear
that respondent and the other steel wool manufacturers paid
little or no attention to the prices of the non-steel wool de-
vices. The former manager of respondent’s Kool-Aid Divi-
sion testified that respondent “didn’t pay much attention to
the pricing structure of these small products” in setting its
prices (Tr. 626). The present general manager of this
division was almost totally ignorant of the‘ prices of the
non-steel wool devices (Tr.. 790-795), thus clearly. indicat-
ing that the prices of such goods were of slight concern to
. respondent. The smaller steel wool manufacturers who ap-
peared at the hearing also testified unanimously that the
only prices: which -they took into consideration were the

3%

206a
Opinion and Order a

prices @f other steel wool products and that they did not
consider the prices of the non-steel wool devices in setting

their prices (Tr. 841, 973-938 [sic] and 897-898).

5. Unique production facilities.

The facilities required for the production of steel wool
are distinct from those required for the other cleaning, de-
vices cited by respondent. The production of steel wool
feguires large, complicated cutting machines and other ac-
cessory equipment is required such as “take-offs” and “ball-
ing machines” (Tr. 828), for the automatic shaping, soap-

impregnation and drying of the product. The machines are ~

not generally available on the open market, but are custom-
made to the manufacturer’s specification (I. D..17). The
machines used in the production of steel wool can be used

for no other function than the production of steel wool
(I. D. 17). :

&
Cc. Conclusion

In conclusion we find of particulars significance the
facts-that: (1) household steel wool is recognized by the
industry as a separate and distinct market and that in mak-
ing marketing decisions and in setting their: prices the
manufacturers of this product do not take into account the
plastic and other types of cleaning devices referred to by

~ respondent; (2): the substitute products advanced by re-

spondent are significantly inferior in performance of the

_ household cleaning chores performed by household steel wool

. and therefore they can at best offer. only indirect competition
~ to the household steel wool manufacturers; (3) there is a
’ substantial difference between the price of steel wool and

that of the plastic and other. type cleaning devices; (4) and

. the machines used for the production of steel wool are dis-

tinct from those used -for the production of the ategedly

207a
Cpa and Order

competitive cleaning devices. Accordingly, we are of the
opinion that it would be economically unrealistic to include
said other products in the relevant market. Since the house-

hold steel wool industry-is economically significant and suffi-
ciently inclusive to be meaningful in terms of trade realities
it seems clear that the hearing examiner was correct in —
determining that this is the appropriate market for adjudg-
ing the effects of the merger.

We note that the same conclusion was reached by the
Commission in Brillo Mfg. Co., Inc» (Dkt. 6557, 1963) in
which we considered the precise issue now before us. As we
stated in that case: '

“# * * Steel wool is generally recognized as an essen-
tially unique product, i.e., possessing peculiar charac- -
- teristics and uses. It can be used either wet or dry —
on either a wet or dry surface. It will both clean
-- and polish soiled and oxidized surfaces. It is fine and
flexible so that it can be used on rough and irregular
surfaces * * *

“* * * [N]o competing product is capable of the ©
variety of applications possible with steel wool. Any
householder who has ever utilized steel wool to clean
cooking utensils, white-wall tires, golf clubs, rusty -
tools, lineoleum or tile floors, and to remove peeling |
paint or rust recognizes that this is a ey ver-

satile product * * *

‘“ * * Moreover, both the industry members and the
public recognize steel, wool as-an essentially unique”
product -sold and’ distributed in its own separate
markets. There is little or no cross-elasticity of de-

. mand between steel wool and other products. The-.

+ machinery upon which it is produced cannot be uti-.
lized to produce products other than metal wool. * * *..

es | “ge Sag : 208a |
Opinion and Order.

“* * * The single most peculiar ‘characteristic and —
use’ of steel wool and steel wool products is that no
other product will perform all of the multiple func-
tions of steel wool in either the household or in the
industrial market. The housewife can buy steel wool
for dozens of household uses rather than buying:
separate products for each use. The same fact applies
equally in the industrial field. Although other prod-
ucts may compete with steel wool for some uses,
‘such demand exists at the outer boundaries of the
steel wool market .and need not be considered in
evaluating the competitive impact of this merger be-
tween two steel wool. producers.”

i
The Competitive Effects of the Merger

The acquisition of S.O.S. by General Foods demon-
strates the same.anticompetitive effects-as the acquisition
by Procter & Gamble of The Clorox Chemical Conipany,
which the Commission recently held to be violative of Sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act. The Practer & Gamble Company
(Dkt. 6901, 1963) ‘(herein called the Clorox case). There
is a substantial identity both in the structure of the house-
hold steel wool market involved in this case and the struc-
ture of the liquid bleach market involved in the Clorox casé
and in the significant operative facts respecting the impact
of those mergers in their respective markets. A detailed
comparative analysis of the relevant facts in the two cases
is attached hereto as Appendix A.® While we will not detail

_ 8The facts recited in Appendix A, together with those referred to
‘in this opinion and those found by the hearing examiner to the extent
-latter are not inconsistent constitute our Findings of Fact in
this case.

209a
Opinion and Order

in our opinion all of the factual similarities which are set

forth in Appendix A, a few of the major conclusions re-.

specting the competitive significance of these facts will
serve to illustrate the basic identity of the two acquisitions
and the reasons why our. factual and legal analysis and
conclusions in the Clorox case are applicable with even
greater force to demonstrate the anticompetitive and illegal
nature of General Foods’ acquisition of S.O.S:

A brief-summary of the operative facts respecting re-
spondent’s acquisition of S.O.S. is necessary before analyz-
ing the competitive impact of this acquisition in the relevant
household steel wool market. ‘a

A. The Household Steel Wool Market

S.O.S. at the time of its acquisition by General Foods:

in December 1957 was basically a single-product company
_ engaged principally in the production of household steel
wool pads (App. A, pars. 1, 3). Its sales of this product

amounted to $14.6 million in 1957, representing: 51% of :

the household steel wool market (App. A, par. 6). It also
manufactured industrial steel wool which both parties agree
is not included in this market definition as well as one plastic
scouring device (App. A, par. 3). Its principal competitor,
Brillo Manufacturing Company, Inc., also. primarily a
single-product company, accounted for 47.6% of the house-
hold steel wool market and the remaining 1.4% of the mar-
ket was accounted for by three small companies with net
assets valued at less than $500,000 each (App. A, pars.

5-7). Household steel wool products on the market are vir-

tually indistinguishable from each other (App. A, par. 16).
. They are low-price, high-turnover household constimer com-
modities sold to consumers through grocery and supermar-
ket outlets (App. A; par. 17). | , .

So ak tr ae pm

210a
Opinion and Order

Advertising is an essential factor in the marketing of
steel wool pads, both as a means of building brand loyalty
and of securing adequate shelf space (App. A, pars. 18-20).
S.O:S. and Brillo had advertising budgets in 1957 of $2.2
and $1.8 million respectively, expended primarily for day-
time TV and magazines (App. A,-par. 19). Their three
_ small competitors lacked the financial resources for adver-
tising to any appreciable extent and accordingly were forced
to market their products principally under private labels and
through discount houses (App. A, pars. 20, 24).

Respondent General Foods Corporation is the largest
producer of packaged food in the United States, with net
sales of $1 billion (App. A, pars. 25, 27). General Foods
also produces some nonfood items such as bluing (App. A,
par. 26). All of its products are low-price, high-turnover
household consumer commodities sold to consumers through
the same grocery and supermarket outlets as are S.O.S. steel.
wool soap pads (App. A, par. 25). Mass advertising and
promotions are essential factors in the marketing of General
Foods’ product lines (App. A, par.’28). General Foods had

an advertising budget of $105 million and expended a sub- —

stantial portion of this on nighttime TV. Its budget for.
consumer and trade promotions, which neither S.O.S. nor
Brillo engaged in, amounted in 1957 to $19 million, exceed-
ing S.O.S.’ total sales in that year (App. A, par. 28).

_ After its acquisition by General Foods, S.O.S. was
organized first as a separate division of General Foods and
later, in 1960, was merged with General Foods Kool-Aid
Division, the products of which were, like S.O.S. pads,
also sold through food brokers (App. A, par. 33(g)). In
1962, General Foods incorporated the distribution of its -
Kool-Aid Division’ products into its overall distribution-
sales service warehousing: and distributive system, thus
effecting estimated economies in transportation, ware-

21la
Opinion and Order

housing and sales costs of $647,000, of which $388,000
. was attributed to savings effected respecting ‘the products
of the Kool-Aid Division (App. A, par. 33(f)). This
incorporation of S.O.S. directly into General Foods’ over-
all distributional organization . provided an incentive for
General Foods’ customers to include S.O.S. products in their
orders of other General Foods products. Furthermore,
S.O.S. could and did induce purthases by offering discounts

based on combined purchases of the products of various.

divisions of General Foods. Presumably, General Foods
warehousing and distributive system also improved S.O.S.’
national availability (App. A, par. 33(f)). General Foods
improved the appearance of the S.O.S. pad as well as its
advertising. The costs of advertising S.O.S. products were
substantially reduced by reason of the discounts which were
available as a result of the overall General Foods advertis-
ing budget, estimated to amount to a net saving of 23%
or a net increase in TV time of 28% in the case of network
TV advertising, a 15% decrease in the cost of spot-TV ad-

vertising, a 5.5% decrease in radio advertising and a range .

of 5-15% discount in magazine advertising. General Foods
also engaged in substantial consumer and trade promotions
respecting’ S.O.S. pads which S.O.S. dad not itself engaged
in prior to the acquisition (App. A, pars 33(a)-(d), (i)).

. After the acquisition, S.O.S.’ share of the market in-
creased from 51% in 1957 to 56% in 1962. The market
share of Brillo, its nearest competitor, declined during this

_ same period from 47.6% to 41.8%. The combined share of |
_ the three remaining companies increased slightly by 0.8%.

On an absolute basis, S:0.S.’ sales of soap pads grew from
$14.6 million in 1957 to $19.1 million in 1962, an increase of

31% while Brillo’s sales rose from $13.6 ‘million to $14.3 .
- million for the same period, or an increase of only 5% (App. -

A, par. 34). In December 1963 Brillo merged with Purex

bs]

212a
Opinion and Order

. ”

° .
.
a

Corporation Limited, a manufacturer of household cleansing .
products, with total sales for its fiscal -year ended. June 30,
1963 of $127 million (App. A, par. 37). a!

B. Competitive Impact of Respondent’s Acquisition

General Foods’ acquisition of S.O.S. and consequent
entry into the household steel wool market is a product ex-
tension merger identical in all respects to the extension of
Procter & Gamble’s product line to liquid bleach, a product
which it liad. not theretofore produced or sold. As we-noted
in our Clorox decision, product extension mergers | involve
functionally closely related products by which we stated we

“meant to * * * suggest the kind of merger that may enable
significant integration in the production, distribution or
marketing activities of the merging firms” (Clorox, p. 15).
Integration at the marketing level.we defined as encom-
passing integration of advertisirig and sales promotion ac-
tivities and as resulting where the products of the merging
firms were “sold to the same customers or are actually com-
plementary” (Clorox, p. 15). In Clorox we pointed out that
Procter was engaged in the sale of a broad range of low-
cost, high-turnover household consumer goods sold to the
consumer in grocery and department store outlets primarily

- through mass advertising and sales promotions. The liquid es

bleach market was held by us to be “virtually indistinguish-
able” from the markets previously utilized by Procter for its

*The record contains no market data after 1963. Accordingly, the
discussion in this opinion of the competitive impact of General Foods’
acquisition of S.O.S. concerns the steel wool soap pad market as it
existed prior to this merger between Brillo and Purex. While the
record does not permit a definitive appraisal as to the impact of this
merger on the household steel wool market, it should be observed that
one of the anticompetitive factors considered by the Courts in deter- _
mining the validity of-mergers is their likelihood of triggering other
‘mergers in the same market thus pyramiding their own impact on the
11965). See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, en
)

213a
Opinion and Order

product lines insofar as “the problems and techniques of

__.._marketing the product to the ultimate consumer are con-
_ cerned” (Clorox, p. 17). We pointed out that liquid bleach

was functionally identical to Procter’s product line “even

if we look beyond household cleansing agents to the food,

paper and toilet products which round out the Procter line”
(Clorox, p. 17).

The functional relationship between S.O.S.’ steel wool
soap pads and General Foods’ product line is identical as
respects the problems arid techniques of marketing involved

‘in both groups of products. Household steel wool, like

liquid bleach, is marketed by the same techniques (prin-
cipally advertising and promotions) and through the same
distributional outlets (principally supermarkets) as General
Foods’ other products and is purchased by the housewife at ‘
the same time and along with the other products sold by
General Foods. Thus we hold that General Foods’ acquisi-
tion of S.O.S. involves functionally related products and
constitutes a product extension merger cognizable under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act (See App. A, pars. 17, 18, 25,
28, 33).

The next question to be determined is whether this mer-
ger had the requisite. anticompetitive effects to render it
illegal under Section 7. |

We find that General Foéds’ acquisition of S.O.S. had’

_ the same anticompetitive effects as those which we found to

exist in Procter’s acquisition of Clorox and on which we

- based our conclusion that that acquisition had the effect of

substantially lessening competition in the household liquid
bleach industry. Here, as there, the market of the acquired
company was highly concentrated and oligopolistic (App. A,
par. 6). Indeed, the steel wool soap pad industry appears
éven more. concentrated, since it does not have the large

_ number of small fringe companies which characterized the
liquid bleach industry.

Oe eee ee
.

214a
Opinion and Order

In Clorox, the acquired company was the dominant
factor in the industry, the only national seller in an industry
consisting primarily of ‘regional sellers and able to com-
mand a premium price for its product. Its nearest competi-
tor of significance was Purex with 15% of the market,
which confronted Clorox directly in only:50% of the na-
tional market, In the steel wool soap pad industry, the ac-
quired company, S.O.S., prior to its acquisition was also.
a dominant industry factor able to command a premium
price, but, unlike Clorox, S.O.S. shared its dominant market
position with Brillo (App. A, par. 6). Thus, the impact
of General Foods’ acquisition of S.O.S. was of greater
anticompetitive significance. than Procter’s acquisition of
Clorox, since whatever competition existed between Brillo
and S.O.S. was far more distorted by the entry of General
Foods into that market than was the competitive structure
of the liquid bleach market by Procter’s entry into that mar-
ket. General Foods’ entry into the household steel wool
market eliminated the competitive balance between S.O.S.
and Brillo and weighted it irrevocably in favor of S.O.S.

‘Thus, whereas in Clorox the acquisition of Clorox oper-

- ated primarily quantitatively to render even more dominant

the single dominant industry member, in the instant case
the acquisition of S.O.S. by General Foods operated quali-
tatively as well to eliminate the market balance which had
prevailed between the two dominant members of the indus-
try and created a situation in which S.O.S. as a result of
its acquisition by General Foods acquired decisive competi-.
tive advantages over Brillo.-As we noted in our Clorox
decision, it is the disproportionate strength of the companies,
in a market which is of major significance in judging its

competitive viability or lack thereof (Clorox, pp. 23-27).

Not only did General Foods’ acquisition of S.O.S. con-
tribute to and increase concentration in the steel wool indus-
try, but it also operated to render almost insurmountable

Ee

215a
O pinion and Order

the barriers to entry surrounding this. market. In this case,’

as in Clorox, the barriers to entry were high prior to the
acquisition.” In each case, the product of the.acquired com-

.pany was functionally identical to that produced by smaller

companies but was differentiated through extensive adver-
tising and a long history of dominance in the field to-such -
an extent that the smallegscompanies in the industry pro-
ducing less well-known brands and potential producers of —

_ new brands could not penetrate the market to any significant

degree, absent huge investments in advertising and promo-
tions (App. A, pars. 16-23). The entry of General Foods
into the household steel wool market substantially height-

-enéd the factual and psychological barriers to entry to that .
markét, just as the entry of Procter in the liquid bleach

market raised the barriers surrounding that market (App.
A, par. 33). As we held in Clorox, such substantial height-
ening of the barriers to entry constitutes an important
element in the finding that a merger is in violation of Sec- -
tion 7 (Clorox, p. 50). |

General Foods, like Procter; is a powerful company,

_ Strongly entrenched in the marketing of low-cost consumer

products to grocery stores with huge financial resources
and advertising budget (App. A, pars. 25-28). Its presence
in the soap pad market where the existing competitors were
relatively small, like Procter’s presence in. the liquid bleach
market, operated as a formidable barrier to new market

entrants who, in order to gain a significant foothold in the

market, would have to withstand the powerful competitive -
weapons available to General Foods which would imme-

*°The high barriers to entry into the household steel wool market
prior to the acquisition were attested to by General Foods ‘in its pre-
acquisition study, in which it concluded that “the fact that S.O.S. and

Brillo have well-established product franchises is undoubtedly a re-

straining: factor which does not invite widespread competition even™
(CX 7, p. 23).

’ though profit margins are very attractive”

216a
Opinion and Order

diately confront them upon their first entry (App. A, -par.
33). ‘Furthermore, General Foods’ merger had exactly the
saine consequence which wé noted in our Clorox decision
is an.important anticompetitive result of mergers of this
type, namely, that of motivating the remaining firms in the
markét to seek protection by affiliating by merger with com-
panies larger than themselves (Clorox, p. 55). This was
what we predicted would happen in f lorox and what actually
did occur after General Foods’ acquisition when Brillo
merged with Purex (App. A, par. 38). - |

General Foods’ entry into the household steel wool mar-
ket conferred on S.O.S. a series of advantages which its
competitors could not match (App. A, par. 33). As we
noted in our Clorox decision, “the merger of a relatively
small, single-product firm with a very large multi-product
firm enables substantial costgsavings and other advantages
in advertising and sales promotion, especially in television
advertising.” All of the discount rate and other cost-saving
advantages ‘in television," radio and magazine advertising

' 411Respondent seeks to belittle the impact of the television discounts
available to S.O.S. after the acquisition by contending that as a matter
of fact Brillo was more efficient in its television, advertising and that
its television advertising costs were lower than those of S.0.S. (Re-
spondent’s Brief on Appeal, pp. 49-51). We reject this argument on
its facts.and on its logic. Respondent’s calculations of relative costs
and efficiency are based on Neilsen’s estimates of actual viewers after .
the program has been contracted, paid for and shown. Thus, if the
program attracted more viewers than originally estimated respondent
would equate the resulting lower per viewer poor ion greater
efficiency.: What respondent is in fact equating with efficiency is the
popularity of a program not originally anticipated and ‘therefore not
paid for. We do not believe that this is a proper basis for determining
costs and efficiency of advertising. If the figures relied upon by
respondent show anything, they demonstrate that for the programs
selected by respondent for its cost/efficiency calculation, S.0.S. spent
far more on advertising after the merger than Brillo and its com-
mercials reached many more viewers than Brillo’s. S.O.S. was able
to reach 700,120 viewers by spending $1,999,300 on the programs
enumerated, whereas Brillo was. able to reach only 336,459 persons

_as the result of its expenditure of $934,385 on the programs listed
on which its commercials appeared (CX 170).

217a

Opinion and Order

and in promotions as well as in marketing and distribution ©
which accrued to Clorox as a result of its acquisition by .

Procter were demonstrated in this case to have accrued in
large part to S.O.S. after its acquisition by General Foods

(App. A, pars, 33(a)-(d)).
| Due to the functional identity of the various household

steel wool products (like the identity of the various liquid
bleaches in their market), and the high degree of product
differentiation, or preference by the consumers ‘for the
established, well-known brands, extensive advertising is
crucial (App. A, pars, 16-22). Without widespread ad-

vertising a potential competitor cannot enter the market
and an existing competitor will disappear (App. A, par. -

18). Thus, just'as Procter’s ability to advertise and pro-
mote less expensively gave it a substantial competitive ad-
vantage over Clorox’s competitors and inhibited the entry
of new competitors so the ability of General F oods to secure
lower advertising and promotion costs gave’ it a substantial
‘advantage over S.O.S.’ competitors and raised the barriers
to entry into the market (App. A, par. 33).

After its acquisition by General Foods, S.O.S. could —

and.did induce potential customers to purchase its steel

wool pads by offering them discounts based on pooled pur-
chases from various divisions of General Foods and by ©

enabling customers to coordinate their steel wool soap pad
orders with their orders of other General Foods’ products.

~These were marketing advantages which accrued to 5.0.5.

solely as a result of the merger and which were not en joyed
by its single-product competitors (App. A, par. 33(f)).”

12Respondent in its brief denied that its incorporation of S.O.S.
into its Kool-Aid Division, with the resulting consolidation of the
warehousing and distribution facilities of the two companies, achieved
any cost savings or increased efficiency (Respondent’s Reply Brief,
pp. 8-10). Complaint counsel, on the other hand; argued the reverse
(Complaint Counsel’s Brief, pp. 44-45).‘ To the extent the point

FST RNR? AACE

-* 2184 |

5
Opinion and Order
oa.

Again,-as was also true with Procter, General Foods’ posi- .
tign as a well-established producer of “must” items made it
- likely that it would be able to ) obtain from retailers various
advantages in the display or marketing of its products which
were not available to S.O.S. prior to the merger or to any
of its competitors, all of whom were small ‘Singlerproduct
firms (App. A, par, 33(h)).

To the extent that unlawful exercise of its marketing
power by Procter was taken into account in assessing the
competitive impact of its acquisition of.Clorox, so must
' this same fac r also be considered in appraising the com-
petitive signiffcance of General Foods’ acquisition of S.O.S.. '
(Clorox,,pp. 48-49). In this connection we find the same
potential anticompetitive possibilities to be present in the
General Foods’ acquisition. The significance of this factor -
- did not depend in the Clorox case on the few instances in *
the record where Procter had in fact exercised its power un- ~ .
fairly in the past, but rather-on the fact that it possessed’ ji
such market power to compete urifairly (Clorox, pp. 48-49).
. There is no doubt that the degree of market power enjoyed
by General Foods is substantially identical, to Procter’ sand -
that its possession of this.power must be regarded as en-
genidering the same poteritially anticompetitive effects. i in the
steel wool pad market as we found Procter’s power poten-
tially engendered in the liquid bleach market.

The.so-called acceleration of competition which respond-
ent alleges followed upon General Foods’ acquisition of
S.O.S. appears to’us to have been somewhat ephemeral
and in any event is not of such a quality as in our opinion
‘changes or mitigates the deep underlying structural changes

is relevant we find that cost savings did result’ (App. A, pars. 33(f).
and (g))., We note, however, in this connection that whatever cost
savings were achieved were not reflected in any reduction in the list
price of S.O.S. pads and in fact after the merger one price increase
was announced ( App. A, par.: 36). .

219a
Opinion and Order
.

which General Foods’ acquisition accomplished in this mar--
ket and which, in our judgment, constitute the same type
of competitive destruction which we foresaw in the liquid
bleach market after Procter’s entry.and which led us to
» conclude that that merger was illegal. In our appraisal of
respondent’s claims respecting the competitive. “awakening”
which allegedly “followed its acquisition of S.O.S., we find
particularly significant the facts that during the six-year
period which followed the acquisition the only price change
made by.S.O.S. and Brillo was a price increase, that by .
1962 General Foods (S.O.S.) had increased. its market
differential over that of Brillo to 14.2%, in contrast with
the modest lead of only 3% which it had had in 1957, and:
that there were no new entries into the market during the
period in question (App. A, par. 34)...

The record indicates that another. .major multiproduct
company—Colgate-Palmolive Company—was engaged in
the sale of household steel wool in Canada (Tr. 947-948), .
and thus ‘could be regarded as a potential competitor of
S.0.S. Presumably there were other companies engaged
in the sale of low-cost, high-turnover commodities in super-
markets, which could also be considered to have been poten-
tial entrants.. Therefore, the entry of General Feods into
the market did not’ eliminate all potential competition.
Nevertheless, its entry did have the effect of substantially
lessening potential competition, since it raised to virtually
insurmountable heights the barriers ‘to entry which had al-
ready existed to some extent; thus, the acquisition severely
limited the role which potential competition could otherwise
have played as a critical check on the ability of S.O.S. to
stifle competition in the steel wool industry. ( See Clorox,
pp. 61-62. )

‘In sum, wé conclude that the same discrepancies i in ‘size ©
between the acquired and acquiring company, the same

220a
Opinion and Order

threat posed by the acquisition to transform a basically
single-product small firm industry into an industry in which, —
the incentive will be to merge and ape the oe: com-
pany, the same probability that the. acquisitisn would
dampen or even eliminate whatever modest competition ac-
tually or potentially may have existed in the pre-acquisition
market—all of these factors relied on in our Clorox decision
apply with even greater force, and ‘on the same legal and
factual reasoning, to the steel wool soap pad industry.

As we emphasized in Clorox, advantages of scale can
be an important factor heightening the barriers to’-entry
and impairing competitive conditions in an industry. (See
Clorox opinion at pp. 28-29; 31, 33; 46-47, 54, and 64-65).

Whether, a merger has or has not conferred benefits on

either the customers of the acquired company or on. the
acquired company itself is not the primary inquiry which
Congress and the Courts have commanded us to.make in
determining whether a merger violates the law or not. That —
_a merger. may “on some 4ultimate reckoning of social or
economic debits and credits * * * be deemed beneficial” is
a “value choice” from which we have been foreclosed from’
considering. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,
374 U,.S. 321, 371 (1963). The central inquiry is whether
the merger will probably substantially lessen competition.”

_ As we pointed « out in our Clorox opinion :

FE g., 95 Cong. Rec. 11486. For discussion of the Congressional -
objectives i in.enacting the Clayton Act and of the case law see Com- .
ment, “ ‘Substantially to Lessen.Competition . . .’: Current Problems
of Horizontal Mergers,” 68 Yale L. J. 1627, 1660 (1959); Blake
and Jones, “In Defense of Antitrust,” 65 Col. ) BY) 377, 382 (1965)
and Bok, “Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law
and Economics,” 74 Harv. L. R. 226, 235-37, 318-21 (1911) ; some
of the leading cases in which mergers were invalidated. despite claimed
efficiencies, e.g., United States v. First National Bank and Trust Co.,
376 U. S. 665 ( 1964) ; United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376
_U. S. 651 (1964) ; United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374
U.,S. 321, 370- 1 (1963) ; United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
168 F. Supp. 576, 615-18 (S. D. N. Y. 1958). ;

”

22la ot
Opinion and Order

“In stressing as we have, the importance of advan- :
tages of scale as a factor heightening the barriers

_ to new entry into the liquid bleach industry, and so oe

- impairing competitive conditions in that industry, |
we reject, as specious in law and unfounded in fact,
the argument that the Commission ought not, for
the sake of ‘protecting the ‘inefficient’ small firms in
the industry, proscribe a merger so productive of
% ‘efficiencies.’ The- short answer to this argument is
that, in a proceeding under Section 7, economic ef.
ficiency or any other ‘social benefit resulting from a
merger is pertinent in-only so far as it may tend to
promote or retard the vigor of competition. * * *
- Congress did not mean the adjudicators of Section
7 cases to attempt to weigh the ultimate social and
economic merits and demerits of a merger, but only *
to determine its effect on competition and monopoly”
(Op., p. 64). ie

In the instant case we have concluded. that General ..
Foods’ acquisition of S.O.S. will in fact substantially lessen
competition in the steel wool pad market. We have based
this conclusion on our finding that respondent’s acqttisition
of S.0.S. has raised to virtually insurmountable heights
entry barriers which were already high, that the presence
of General Foods in the market has changed the steel wool
pad market -which prior to the merger consisted of two
substantially , equal-sized companies and several smaller
firms to one/in which S.O.S. is now dominant, and finally |
that the substitution of General Foods for S.O.S. will de-
press rather than enhance the compétitive vitality of the
market and will paralyze any incentive to compete -which
might otherwise have existed. The fact that these- high
entry barriers to potential entrants and the impairment of
the competitive vitality of the market arises in part because

222a
Opinion and Order

of the impact which General Foods’ advertising, promo-
tional and distributional resources had on potential and
‘actual competitors in this market did not make its acquisi-

.tion any less anticompetitive. Evaluation of competitive im- -

pact must take account of business reality and of the re-
- action of businessmen to a state of facts. The state of facts
in the instant case is the effect on competition which General
Foods’ presence in this market will have. We have con-
cluded that its presence in the market will be to lessen
competition substantially. Because it chose to achieve this
market position by merger it runs afoul of Section 7.

ll
Relief
_ The.order entered by the heafing examiner requires
respondent to divest itself of the-S.O.S. assets which were

found to have been acquired in violation of Section 7. As
we held in Clorox, this is the appropriate relief in a case

involving a product extension merger of the type herein.

considered.. We pointed out in Clorox that:

“It is settled * * * that divestiture is normally

the appropriate remedy in a Section 7 proceeding.

~ United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours, 366
U. S. 316. This case would be a particularly inap-

propriate one in which to make an exception. The —

anti-competitive effects of this acquisition are non
enjoinable. They inhere in the very presence of
Procter, standing in the, place of Clorox in the liquid
bleach industry [here the very presence of General
Foods standing in the place of S.O.S. in the house+
hold steel wool industry], and can be corrected only
by restoration of the market structure, so far as
possible, as it existed at the time of acquisition”
(Clorox Opinion, p. 70).

4

: 223a
Opinion and Order

In conclusion, therefore, the initial decision, as supple-.
mented and modified to conform to this opinion and to
Appendix A attached hereto, and the order entered by the
examiner, are adopted as the decision and order of the Com-
mission. . :

The Commission’s decision of this case is without the
concurrence of Commissioner MacIntyre. a

‘Commissioner Elman dissented and has filed a dis-
seriting opinion.

| March 11, 1966

o

224a

Opinion and Order

Appendix A

. Comparison of Operative Facts
in the General Foods and
Procter & Gamble Cases |

«

Facts in the General Foods Corpora-
tion Case, Docket No. 8600

- A, Tue S.O.S. Company, Inc.
AND THE HOUSEHOLD STEEL

Woot Inpustry Prior To-

THE ACQUISITION

1. On December 31, 1957 General
Foods Corporation (herein called
GF) acquired The S.O.S. Company,

_ Inc. (herein called S.O.S.) which .

was the nation’s leading manufac-
turer of household steel wool’ (App.
B., Table I). As of July 31, 1957
S.O.S. had net assets of almost $6
million and a net worth of $4,400,-
000, which was almost three times
its total liabilities (CX 5(h)). Its

net sales in 1956 amounted to $14,- ©

468,000, and its profits before taxes
* in that year ($3,214,000) amounted
to a 22.2% return on net sales and
over 72% of net worth as of July

31, 1957 (CX 5(h) ; CX 5(i)).

2. In GF’s pre-acquisition report of
S.O.S. it was stated that its sales of
household steel wool would grow as
the number of uses multiplied, the
items within each were category ex-
panded and the population increased,
with an improving standard of living
(CX 7, pp. 21, 22). The real growth
of S.O.S. had been accomplished

within the 10 years preceding the _

Facts in the Procter & Gamble Com-
pany (Clorox) case, Docket No. 6901
(November 26, 1963)

A. THE Ciorox CHEMICAL Com-
PANY AND THE HousEHOLD
Liguip BLeAcH ° INDUSTRY
PrioR TO THE ACQUISITION

1. On September 30, 1957 Procter

& Gamble Company (herein called
P&G) acquired the Clorox Chem-
ical Company (herein called Clor-
ox) which was the nation’s leading .
manufacturer of household liquid
bleach. Clorox had annual sales of
slightly under. $40,000,000 (Clorox .
Opinion, pp. 1, 5).?

”

2. P&G prepared a report prior to
its acquisition of Clorox in which it
predicted the ascendency of liquid
bleach over powdered bleach (Clor-
ox Opinion, p. 13).

1The citations are to +hé pages of the
Commission Opinion on which the
operative facts relied on where recited.

225a
Opinion and Order

acquisition (CX 7, p. 21). Sales
of S.O.S. soap pads increased from
$3.9 million in 1948 to $14.6 million
in 1957 (CX 5(g), CX 118(b)).
According to the pre-acquisition

study prepared by General Foods, ©

this growth was due to the fact that
the soap-pad products were “very

_efficient as a cleaner -of aluminum .

‘and, as the use of aluminum has
multiplied, sales of pads have in-
creased. This growth has been
abetted by the increased distribution
of modern kitchen ranges and the
need to clean burner plates, ovens

and broiling pans” (CX 7, p. 21).

3. In addition to household steel
wool, S.O.S. also produced small
quantities of plastic scouring de-
vices and industrial steel wool. In
1956 S.O.S.’ sales of. the former

totaled $1.4 piition (CX. 5(g)),
and its sales df industrial steel wool

amounted to $229,000 (Brillo Mfg.:

Co., D. 6557, 1963).

4, Price to the entry of GF into the

~household steel wool industry, the

industry had been basically a small-
firm industry. Its.total sales were
less than $29 million annually (App.
B, Table I).

5. S.O.S.’ principal. eomeulints in
the household steel wool soap pad
- business was Brillo Manufacturing
Company, Inc. (herein called Brillo)
with total sales in 1958 of 21.7
million dollars (CX 161). Like
S.0.S. Brillo engaged almost ex-
clusively in the manufacture of steel
wo@ products, but also produced a
relatively small amount of industrial
steel wool and a plastic Ne,
device (Brillo Mfg. Co., D. 6557,
1963 ; RX 4(b) (2)).

3. Clorox was engaged almost ex-
clusively in the manufacture of
household liquid bleach (Clorox

» Opinion, p. 6).

4. Prior to the advent of P&G,
household liquid bleach was basically
a small-firm saeco = lorox. Opin-
ion, p. 55).

5. Clorox’s principal competitor in —
the liquid bleach field was the Purex

. Corporation, with total sales in 1957

of approximately $50 million. Un-
like Clorox, Purex manufactures, in
addition, to liquid bleach, a number
of other products, including deter-
gents, an abrasive cleanser and a
toilet soap (Clorox Opinion, p. 6).

26a
Opinion and Order

6. ring the year 1957, S.O.S.,
nh ole of household steel wool
in the amount of $14,600,000, was
the leader in the industry, with 51%
of the national sales of household
steel wool products. Brillo was a

close second with sales of $13,-—

629,000, or 47.6% of the market.
Thus, the two together accounted

for 98.6% of the market. Three .

smaller producers, Durawool In-
corporated, American Steel Wool
Manufacturing Company, Inc. and
Alloy Metal Products oH

shared the remaining portion of the
market, amounting to 1.4% (App.
B, Table I): So insignificant were
the market positions of the smaller
.companies' that S.O.S. and Brillo
could, and did, ignore them in their
competitive activities (CX 7, pp.
21-25; CX 124). Durawool began
producing household steel wool in
or about 1952 or 1953 (Tr. 825-
826). Ameérican first entered the
business in 1898 (Tr. 921). Alloy
began producing steel wool soap

_ pads in late 1956 (Tr. 889-891).

Alloy was dissolved in 1963 and its

plant and equipment sold to Dem-.
corp which subsequently entered the .

steel wool industry (Tr. 890, 901).
Two other small producers of
household steel wool had been elim-
inated from the market. ac-

quisition by S.O.S, and Brillo re-

spectively in 1954 and 1955. (CX 7,
Bey CX 53; CX 118(b); Tr.

7. S.O.S. and Brillo had net assets
of $6,000,000 and $8,000,000 re-
spectively, while the -net assets of
each of the smaller manufacturers
were valued at less than $500,000
Answer Par. 2(d); CX 158(a);
CX 156(b); CX ‘144; Tr. 871,
966).

rporation, -

6. In 1957, Clorox (with sales
slightly under $40 million and
48.8% of the market) and Purex
(with 15.7%) between them ac-.
counted for almost 65% of the na-
tion’s household bleach sales; four
other manufacturers accounted for
15%; and the remaining 20% of
the market was divided among ap-
proximately 223 small producers
plus a “large number of extremely

small” producers (Clorox Opinion,
pp. 5, 6). :

.

7. Only eight of the liquid bleach
manufacturers had assets in excess
of $1 million. Very few had assets
of more than $75,000 (Clorox

Opinion, p. 6).

227a
Opinion and Order 4

8. ° Both Brillo and S.O.S. had na-

‘ tional” distribution and sold their’
state in the coun- |

products in eve
try (CX 7, p. 24; CX 124). S.O.S.
. had two plants in Chicago (CX 7, p:

26) and Brillo had two plants, one

located in Ohio and the other in.

Brooklyn, New York (RX 27, p. 6).
Each of the three smaller soap pad
companies had only regional distri-
bution. Durawool and American
were limited to the northeastern area
of the United States (Tr. 834-835,
923, 957), and Alloy, which indeed
made no sales at all until 1958 (App.
B, Table I) was limited vy to
Detroit, Michigan (Tr. 910). —

. 9. While S.0.S. had 51% of the
national market in terms of total
dollar sales of household steel wool
in 1957 (App. B; Table I), it had
almost 55% of the combined S.O.S.-
Brillo sales in the nation of soap-
impregnated steel wool pads in terms
of retail sales (App. B, Table II).

Its share of combined S.O.S.-Brillo .
sales in terms of packages sold was .

proportionately higher in certain re-
gions of the country, namely: 60%
of New England, 75% in Chicago,
68% in the West Central Region,
66% in the Southwest Region and
“4 - the Pacific Region (CX 7,
P- .

10. Except for metropolitan New
York, S.O.S.’ share of the combined
sales of Brillo and S.O.S. soap-im-
pregnated steel wool soap pads in

terms of packages sold was at least -

47.8% in each region. The only area
in which Brillo had a greater dom-
inance than S.O.S. was in metropoli-
_tan New York, where Brillo had
76.7% and S.O.S. had 23.3% of
sales in terms of es sold in
April-May 1957 (CX 7, p. 84).

8. Clorox, which had 13 plants dis-
tributed throughout the country, was
the only producer selling on a na-
tional ‘scale. Purex had as many
plants as Clorox, but did not dis-
tribute its bleach in the northeast
or middle-Atlantic states and sold
in less than 50% of the national
market. Most of the other liquid
bleach manufacturers had only a
single plant and were limited to a
ee market (Clorox Opinion,
p. 7).

9. While Clorox had 48.8% of the
national market, it had 56% of the
market in New England, 64% of the
market in the metropolitan New
York area, and 72% of the market
in the middle-Atlantic states (Clorox
Opinion, p. 7). -

. one

10. Even in areas where the prin-
cipal competitors of Clorox were
active, Clorox’s total share of the
liquid bleach market was high. Ex-
cept in metropolitan Chicago and
the west-Central states, Clorox ac-

counted for at least 39% of the 73

sales (Clorox Opinion, p. 7).

228a
Opinion and Order

11. Between the founding of S.O.S. 11. Neither the liquid bleach prod-
-in 1919 and the mid-1930’s its soap —_uct nor its process is the subject of
pads were protected by patent. At a patent or trade secret (Clorox
‘ter the expiration of ‘this patent, no Opinion, p. 6).

patent on the steel wool soap pad .
product or process has been in effect

(CX 7, p. 21). While S.O.S. claims

to have a “rust arrester” (CX 68)

and Brillo advertises that its prod-

uct contains a “rust resistor” (CX
167(k)), there is’ no indication in’

the record that either is the result

of a secret process.

‘12. The American-made machines 12. The manufacturing process is
used for the manufacture of house-. relatively simple (Clorox Opinion,

hold steel wool are custom-made to. p.8). . \
the manufacturer’s eS \ \
(Tr. 847, 888-890, 908-909). \
German-manufactured machine is» \
‘available but cannot produce steel 4
wool as efficiently as. American-
made machines (Tr. 847-848).
Technical know-how is vital and
constitiites a barrier to entry by po-
tential competitors (CX 7, pp. 11,- .
- 23,75). oo ers

13. S.O.S.’ costs of producing its 13. The-equipment, raw materials
products and.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385603_1381%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
