# Appendix — City of Jacksonville v. Schumann

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385603_1203%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1968
- **Citation:** 390 U.S. 981

## Text

17

APPENDIX A
STATUTES 1
FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958

SECTION 101 (24) 49 U.S.C. §1301 (24) NAVIGABLE AIR-
SPACE.

“ ‘Navigable airspace’ means airspace above the minimum
altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations issued under
this Act, and shall include airspace needed to insure safety

“in takeoff and landing of aircraft.” -

SECTION 104, 49 U.S.C. §1304, PUBLIC RIGHT OF |
TRANSIT

“There is hereby recognized and declared to exist in be-
half of any citizen of the United States a public right of
freedom of transit through the navigable airspace of the
United States.”

SECTION 307(a), 49 U.S.C. §1348(a) AIRSPACE CONTROL

“The Administrator is authorized and directed to develop
plans for and formulate policy with respect to the use of the
navigable airspace; and assign by rule, regulation, or order

the use. of the navigable airspace under such terms, con-

ditions, and limitations as he may deem necessary in order
to insure the safety of aircraft and the efficient utilization
of such airspace. He may modify or evoke such assignment

' when required in the public interest.”

REGULATIONS

14 C.F.R. 60.17 (F.A.R. 91:79) ‘MINIMUM SAFE ALTI-
TUDES

“Except when necessary for take off or landing, no per-
son shall operate an aircraft below the following altitudes:

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(a) Anywhere. An altitude which will permit, in the event
of the failure of a power unit, an emergency landing with-
out undue hazard to persons or property on the surface;

(b) Over congested areas. Over the congested areas of
cities, towns or settlements, or over an open-air assembly
of persons, an altitude of 1,000 feet above the highest ob-
stacle within a horizontal radius of 2,000 feet from the air-
craft...

(c) Over other than congested areas. An altitude of 500 .
feet above the surface, except over open water or sparsely ©
populated areas. In such event, the aircraft shall not, be
operated closer than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle,
or structure. ones

COURT RULE

FLORIDA APPELLATE RULE 4, 5c(6) PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI FROM DISTRICT COURT
TO SUPREME COURT

“Where any decision of a district court of appeal (1) af-

‘fects a class of constitutional or state officers, or (2) passes
‘upon a question certified by such district court to be of

great public interest, or (3) is in direct conflict with a de-
cision of another district court of appeal or of the Supreme
Court on the same point of law, petition may be filed with
the Supreme Court to issue a writ of certiorari ‘to review |
such decision.”

-

~ 19

APPENDIX B

INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT. OF FLORIDA

167 So. 2d 95

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, A MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF FLORIDA,

Appellant, —
| ma. +; .
GEORGE SCHUMANN, ET UX, ET AL.,
Appellees.
DECISION | +

3

CARROLL, DONALD, Acting Chief Judge,

The defendant city:in an action for “inverse condemna-
tion” has filed this interlocutory appeal from an order en-
tered by the Circuit Court for Duval County, denying its
motions to dismiss and strike addressed to the plaintiff’s
- second amended complaint.

In this appeal .the principal question before us for de-
termination is whether the said complaint_sufficiently al-
leges a cause of action against the defendant. A secondary

question is whethér certain portions of the ‘said complaint

should have been-stricken pursuant to the defendant’s said
motion to strike. .

The basic allegations of the plaintiffs’ second amended
complaint are substantially as follows: That the plaintiffs,

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_, 57 in number, are the owners of lands on which they reside,

in closé proximity to the Imeson Airport, which is owned
and operated by the defendant, a municipal corporatign.
That the city, commencing during World War II and there-
after, embarked upon a program of expanding the airport,
acquiring additional lands both by purchase and by con-
demnation, some of it lying between the. plaintiff's: proper
ties and the original airport location. That in 1962 the city
completed an extension of the Northeast-Southwest main

‘ runway, under the directives and requirements of the Fed-

eral Aviation Agency for instrument runways, in order that
the airport would become fully qualified to handle air-
planes, both military and commercial, propelled by turbo- |
jet engines. That the Northeast end of this extension of the
runway abuts a county road running through the plaintiffs’
residential area and the approach to that end bisects the
said road; so that the said area has been severed and cut
into two parts, lying on either side of the end of the ex-
tended runway. That the city provides facilities at the air-
port for the Florida Air National Guard/and maintains a
squadron of jet fighter pilots. who cufrently fly military

fighter planes “which are the fastest and most powerful

(and consequently noisiest) fighter planes in the world.”

‘That the city also provides landing and take-off ‘facilities
- for several commercial airlines, which daily operate ap-
proximately 90 flights in and out of the airport,at all hours. ©,

of the day or night, using jet transport planes, most of them .
four-engined.

The plaintiffs further allege in their said complaint: That
the said planes, both military and commercial, are operated .
every day through the air space above the plaintiffs’ prop-
erties, at altitudes usually below 500 feet, the most common
altitude being between 100 and 150 feet, with some flights

‘

21

below 100 feet. That all of the plaintiffs’ said properties are
within the area designated and defined by the Federal Avia-
tion Agency as “Area Recommended for Non-Residential

Development and The Exclusion of Places of Public As- _
sembly” in the Aircraft Noise Abatement Guide, published

by the said agency in 1960 for the use and guidance of air-.
port owners and operators who desire to provide airport
facilities for the operation of jet-propelled aircraft.

‘The plaintiffs then allege in their second amended com-

plaint that, by reason of the close proximity of the plaintiffs’ .

properties, jet aircraft operated by the said Air National
Guard and the said commercial airlines at times pass over
the said properties at altitudes below 500 feet, the greater
number of flights occuring at altitudes ranging from 100 to

~ 150 feet; that while the said aircraft pass over the said prop-

erties or in close proximately thereto, and while landing,
taking off, and warming up, and particularly while advanc-
ing the engines to near maximum power on the warm-up
pads and taxiing strips appurtenant to the runways, the

aircraft engines cause to be heard and felt “terrific and —

overwhelming vibrations, concussions and sound waves di-
re. on transmitted from said engines” against and upon
» plaintiffs’ properties; that there aré also emitted from
he said engines “exhaust fumes, fuel gasses and heavy
black-smoke which are direeted and transmitted” against
and upon the said properties, which gasses, fumes, and
smoke carry with them “dust, debris, earth, and stones”
which are propelled against and upon the said properties:
that the said vibrations and concussions cause dishes and
windows to rattle in the plaintiffs’ homes and make it im-

possible for the plaintiffs and members of their familites

» to carry on any conversation, and on occasion have caused
structural damage to the plaintiffs’ residences and have
‘caused objects to fall from tables and shelves.

ERY NIIP Ae PRE VP or

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On the subject of damages the plaintiffs allege in their
said complaint that the above conditions occur at all hours
of the day and night and at all times during the week, to
the permanent injury and damage to their properties; that
they are unable to secure an uninterrupted night’s sleep due
to the irregularity"of the said flights of jet planes; that the

‘plaintiffs have suffered great physical and mental discom-
fort, fear, and distress from the operations of the airport,

particularly since the advent of jet planes, and the value of
their properties “as residences or other use requiring the
presence of human beings or animals has been destroyed.”
The plaintiffs re-aver their allegation that all of their prop-
erties are within the area recommended by*the Federal
Aviation Agency as not suitable for residential develop-
ment. : .

In paragraph numbered V of their said complaint,. the
plaintiffs. reveal what they conceive to be the nature of
their cause of action against the defendant city, as follows:

- “As a direct and proximate result of the increased »
operation of jet planes from Defendant’s Imeson Air-

» port, which increased operation has taken place with-
in the past two years, the Defendant has deprived the
Plaintiffs of the free and unmglested use and quiet
enjoyment of their respective properties, and De-
fendant has, by so doing, exercised dominion and
control over, -appropriated, confis¢ated and con-
demried “the properties of the Plaintiffs, without just
compensation, and without due process of. law, ‘con-
trary to the Constitution and laws of the State of
Florida and of the United States of America.”

In paragraph VI of their said complaint the plaintiffs
allege that by reason of the above-described conditions and
of the depriving of the-plaintiffs of their free and unmo-

23

lested use, and quiet enjoyment of their properties, and of

the “confiscation and condemnation of their properties by.

the defendant the Federal Housing Administration and the ~

Veterans’ Administration” will not insure or guarantee any
loan to any person to buy, build, or construct any home or”
other building on the plaintiffs’ properties, and “no bank
or other prudent lending. institution will make a loan to any
person for such purposes,” and that: “By reason ‘of these
conditions, plaintiffs’ properties have been condemned and
made usel as residential property, by the defendant,
without due process of law, contrary to the ‘Constitution
and laws of the State of Florida and of the United States
of America.”

In paragraph’ VII the plaintiffs allege that, in conjunc- ;

‘tion with the defendant’s expansion of the airport and in .
pursuance to a resolution adopted by. it, the defendant had ©
filed in the Duval County Circuit Court a condemnation
action against certain of the plaintiffs, seeking to take an
. easement consisting mainly of the right to enter upon the
properties of the said plaintiffs for the purpose of cutting
trees and removing other obstructions above a certain
height over their properties for the purpose of maintaining
a clear zone for the flight of aircraft—the so-called “clear-
ance easement”—but the said plaintiffs cannot in that ac-_
tion compel the city to condemn more property or any
greater interest.

Finally, in the eighth and last paragraph: of their said
complaint, the plaintiffs allege that the operation of. the
‘said airport, as expanded by the defendant, “constitutes a
continual -trespass against the properties of the plaintiffs,
or a nuisance equivalent to the imposition of a servitude
upon the properties of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are thus
irreparably injured, and their me relief is in equity.’

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The prayer.of the plaintiffs at the conclusion of their
complaint is as follows:

“WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that an injunction
issue against the Defendant prohibiting further con-
tinuance of the trespass or nuisance, or in the alter-
native that the Defendant be required to exercise
its right of eminent domain as a means of making
restitution to the Plaintiffs, and each. of them, and
that the Defendant. pay to the Plaintiffs such at-
torney’s fee as to the Court seems reasonable.”

To the foregoing second amended complaint the-defend-

- ant city duly filed its motion to dismiss and motion to strike.

The stated ground for.its motion to dismiss is that the said
complaint fails to state a cause of action against the defend-
ant.-In its motion to strike the defendant moves to strike

- paragraphs VI and V of the said complaint‘and certain parts

of paragraph IV on the grounds that the said allegations are |

“redundant, ‘irrelevant, immaterial and séek to assert im-

proper elements of damage against this defendant.” From
the order of the Circuit Court denying the defendant’s said
motions'to dismiss and to strike,the defendant has taken the
instant interlocutory appeal.

While the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint does not .
contain the expression “inverse condemnation,” it is ap-
parent from the allegations of the complaint, and it is clear —

-- from the statements and contentions made by the plaintiffs

in their appeal brief, that they are attempting to allege in
their complaint a cause of action in inverse condemnation,
as an alternative to the remedy of injunctive relief. This
effort makes this a case of first impression in Florida, for
we know of no decision in.this state specifically recognizing
inverse condemnation based upon airport operations.

to the injunction, make an award for the taking . .

si 25

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In several jurisdictions, both state and federal, the courts

have upheld inverse condemnation as a legally-recognizable

cause of action, and it is our problem in the present appeal .

to determine whether such a cause of action should be rec-
egress: in the courts of Florida. .

Inverse cvnlionasitin has been defined as the popular
description of a cause of action against a governmental de-
fendant to recover the value of property, which hasbeen
taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though.
no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been
attempted by the-taking agency. Thornburg v. Port of Port-
land, 233 Or. 178, 376 P. 2d 100 (1962); Martin v. Port of
Seattle, 391 P. 2d 540 (Wash. 1964). To the same effect but
_using different words, the New York Supreme Court, Ap-
pellate Division, in Trippe v. Port of New York Authority,
17 A. D: 2d 472, 236 N. Y. S. 2d 312 (1962) said that inverse
condemnation is a method of compensation wherein “an
owner asserting a claim for appropriation of his property
- may pursue his right by an action in equity for an injunc-
tion and for damages; the court may then, as an alternative

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Apparently the leading case decided by the state courts
involving an action for inverse condemnation against an air-
port authority charging a taking on account of a noise nui-

‘sance, is Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Or. 178, 376 P.

2d 100, decided by the Supreme Court of Oregon in 1962. In
that case the plaintiffs owned and resided in’ a dwelling
house located about 6,000 feet beyond: the end of a certain
airport runway and directly under the glide path of aircraft
using it, and about 1,500 feet beyond the end of a second
‘Tunway, but about 1,000 feet to one side of the glide path of
aircraft using that runway. This action in inverse condem-
_nation was brought by the plaintiffs against the Port of

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Portland, which owned and operated the airport in question,
the Portland International Airport. The defendant had the |
power of eminent’ domain and had used it to surround it-

self with a substantial curtilege, but its formal acquisition

stopped short of the plaintiffs’ land. The plaintiffs con-_
tended that flights from both of the said runways resulted

in a tking of their property. Their principal complaint was

that the noise from jet aircraft made their land unusable.

The two theories of their case were: that systematic flights

directly over their land cause a substantial interference

with their-use and enjoyment of their land, which inté

_ “ference cohstitutes a nuisance, a continuing nuisance a §

when maintained by government, amounts to the taking of,
an easement, or, more precisely, presents a jury question

whether there is a taking; and,“secondly, that systematic

flights which pass close to their. land but not directly over :

it, constitute the taking of-an easement, for the same rea- /
sons. At the trial the jury. denied to the plaintiffs the-com--

pensation which they sought in their action, and the plain- |
_ tiffs appealed. re icone

Ina scholarly opinion in the Thornburg case, the Supreme
“Court of Oregon said that the specific question before ha
was “whether a noise-nuisance can amount to a taking.”
discussing decisions involving this point, the court a
said:

“Since United States v. Causby, 328 U. ‘s. 256, 66
~_S:z Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946), and particularly
since Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 82 S.

. Ct 531,.7 L. Ed. 2d 585 (1962), we know that ease-
ments can be taken by repeated low-level flights over
private land. Such easements have been found in
actions against the,federal government (Causby) and

“in actions against. municipal corporations (Griggs). —

~

- 27

When such easements are said to have been taken, ©
‘compensation must be paid to the owners of the lands

_ thus burdened. This much appears to be settled.”

After a learned discussion of the authorities on the subj-
ect of the noise ‘of jet aircraft amounting to a nuisance and

such nuisance ripening into a “taking,” the Oregon Supreme ~

’ Court in the Thornburg case reached the following judicial
conclusion: » ie ae

‘ “Ig we accept, as we must upon-established prin-

ciples of the law of servitudes, the validity of’ the

propositions that a noise can be a nuisance; that a

nuisance can give rise to an éasement; and that a

-- noise coming straight down from above one’s land

can ripen into a taking if-it is persistent enough _

and-aggravated enough, then logically the same kind

_ and degree of interference with the use and -enjoy-:

ment of one’s land can also be a taking even though
the noise vector may come from some direction other
than the perpendicular.

_”__ “Tf a landowner has a right to be free from unrea-
«. sonable interference caused by noise, as we hold that
he has, then when does the noise burden become so
unreasonable that the government must pay for the
privilege of being permitted to continue to make the
noise? Logically, the answer has to be’ given by the
trier of. fact (subject to the usual exercise of the
proper function of the court in screening the evi-
dence). See Restatement, Torts, §826, Comment d.”

The judgment appealed from was then reversed and the
cause remanded for a new trial. :

An even more-recent case in the state courts involving
an action for inverse condemnation against an airport opera-

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28

- tor on account of the operations of jet aircraft is Martin v.
Port. of Seattle, 391 P. 24.540 (Wash. 1964). As in the case
before us, the question confronting the Supreme Court of
. Washington was whether the plaintiffs therein had stated
a claim for relief against the municipal corporation as the
owner of an airport. The defendant was the Port of Seattle,
owner of the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, and the
plaintiffs were property owners who sought, through this
action, damages for the taking or damaging of their prop-
erty for public use caused by nearby low altitude flights of

_ jet aircraft landing and taking off: from the said airport,

resulting in a decline in the market value of their properties.
The northernmost edge of the litigated area was approxi-
mately nine-tenths of a mile from the end of a certain run-
way, and jet aircraft in the process of landing passed over
the central part of the area at altitudes of less than 500 feet.
The lands of some of the plaintiffs were subjected to direct
overflights of the jet aircraft, while other plaintiffs suffered ~
no overflights. The Washington Supreme Court stated that
the gravamen of the plaintiffs’ complaint was the noise and
vibration created by the jet aircraft rather than the physical
invasion. The plaintiffs claimed that, when the said aircraft
passed over or in close proximity, conversation is halted,
sleep is disrupted, fear is caused, etc., by the noise, and the
vibration in the houses makes it necessary periodically to
hammer back nails into sidings and to tighten light fixtures,
etc. The Supreme Court:of Washington agreed with the
lower court that the plaintiffs’ complaint stated a claim for
relief against the defendant, and — the —
‘appealed from.

In its discussion of the authorities in this field of law in
the Martin case, the Supreme Court of Washington had this .
to say about the nature of the cause of actian in the litiga-
tion before it:

29

“Whether the ‘cause of action’ for the recovery of

compensation is viewed as resulting from the due ~
__ process provisions of the Constitution, or as result- .

ing from an adaptation of older ideas of éminent

domain and the condemnation of private property .

for public use, is. of little significance. When the
noise and intense vibration produced by low-flying
jet aircraft deprives the owner of land of an essential

" @lement in his relationship to that land, the result
should be the same whether the airport operator
himself brings the action to ‘condemn’ the right
to so interfere with the land, or the landowner is
forced to be the moving party.”

In both of the Oregon and Washington cases which we |

have just discussed, the courts cited and relied-upon the

following two landmark decisions of the United States

Supreme Court:

In the United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 90 L. Ed.
1206 66 S..Ct. 1062 (1945), the United States Supreme Court
held that, repeated flights of aircfaft at such proximity to
the ground as to render property uninhabitable and di-
minish its value constituted a taking, notwithstanding the
fact that the aircraft in their path of glide to and from an air-
port had conformed to the thirty-to-one glide angle ap-
proved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority. The Supreme
* Court stated that it was a case of first impression and that
the problem presented was whether the respondents’ prop-
erty was taken within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment
by frequent and regular flights of army and navy aircraft
over the respondents’ land at low altitudes. The respond-
ents, Causby and his wife,.owned land near an airport
leased to the United States in North Carolina, on which land
stood their dwelling house and various out-buildings which

t , =! 30

- were mainly used for raising chickens. The Causbys filed .

this action against the United States in the U. S. Court of
Claims to recover for the alleged taking of their property
without compensation by flying airplanes across it at such
height as to interfere with its normal use. The Court of

Claims rendered judgment for the Causbys, and the United

States sought review by certiorari in the Supreme Court.

‘The evidence showed that the flights in question interfered

with the normal use of the Causbys’ property as a chicken

‘farm and interfered with the night rest of the Causby

family. About 150 of their chickens were killed by flying

- into walls from fright. Production also fell off. The result

was the destruction of the —- asa commercial chicken
farm.

In the Causby case the United States Supreme Court gave
the following as its reasoning leading to its conclusion that —
there had been a taking of the Causbys’ property within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States:

“We would not doubt that if “ United States
erected an elevated railway over respondents’ land
at the precise altitude where its planes now fly, there
would be a partial taking, éven though none of the

| supports of the structure rested on the land. The
reason is that there would be an intrusion so im-
_ mediate and direct as to subtract from the owner’s
full enjoyment of the property and to limit his ex-
ploitation of it. While the owner does not in any phy- -
sical manner occupy that stratum of airspace or make
use of it in the conventional sense, he does use it in
somewhat the same sense that space. left between
buildings for the purpose of light and air is used. The
' superadjacent airspace at this low altitude is so closé

2 31

to the land that continuous invasions of it affect the
use of the surface of the land itself. We think that the
landowner, as an incident to his ownership, has a
claim to it and that invasions of it*are in the same
category as invasions of the surface.”

A somewhat analogous situation was before the Supreme
Court in the later case of Griggs v. County of Allegheny,
369 U.S. 84, 7 L. Ed. 2d 585; 82 S. Ct. 531 (1962). Griggs had
instituted eminent domain proceedings in the Court. of
Common.Pleas of Allegheny County, State of Pennsylvania,
which held that there had been a taking by the county,
which owned and operated an airport, of an air easement
over his property, and fixed compensation therefor. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on appeal (County of Al-
~ legheny v. Griggs, 402 Pa. 411, 168 A. 2d 123 (1961),
held that, if there had been a taking, the county was not

liable, and Griggs sought review of this reversal by cer- .

tiorari in the U. S. Supreme Cott, which reversed’and held
that the interference with Griggs’ property amounted to a
taking, in the coristitutional sense, of an’air easement for
which compensation must be paid by the county, the owner

and operator of the.airport (the Greater Pittsburgh Airport).

In the Griggs case, one “approach area,” as designed by
the county,-to the northeast runway passed* over Griggs’
home, which was 3,250 feet from the end of the said runway.
The “slope gradient” of thé approach area provided a clear-
ance of 11.36 feet between the bottom of the glide angle and
Griggs’ chimney. The low-altitude over-flights caused
Griggs and the occupants of his property to become nervous
_and distraught, their sleep was disturbed, etc. .

After discussing and re-affirming its holding in the Caus-

by case, supra, the Supreme Court in the Griggs case said -

2

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32°
the following on the question as to who took the air ease-

ment in the constitutional sense:

“It is argued that though there was a ‘taking’, ©
someone other than respondent was the taker — the
airlines or the'C. A. A. acting as an authorized rep-
resentative of the United States. We think, however,
that respondent, which was the promoter, owner,
‘and lessor of the airport, was in these circumstances
the one who took the air easement in the constitution-
al sense. Respondent decided, subject to the approval

-of the C. A. A., where the airport would be built,
what runways it would need, their direction and
length, and what land and navigation easements
would be needed : ji

In the final three sentences of its opinion, however, the
Supreme Court uses language that we think touches the
very heart of the concept of inverse condemnation:

“Without the ‘approach areas,’ an airport is indeed
‘not operable. Respondent in designing it had to ac-
quire some private property. Our conclusion is that
by constitutional standards it did not acquire
enough.” ov.

Reverting now to the case before us on ‘this appeal, we .
think that the allegations in the plaintiffs’ second amended
complaint fall squarely within the rules laid down in the
above-discussed four decisions of the Supreme Court of
Oregon, Washington, and the United States, as averring a
constitutional taking of their property, requiring the pay-
ment to them of just compensation by the owner and opera-
tor of the airport. The facts alleged in the plaintiffs’ said
complaint, are, we believe, substantially the same as the
basic facts involved in the said four decisions. This being

"33

_ so, the sole remaining inquiry is whether there exists any .
_ legal reason why the_rules recognized in those decisions —

should not ‘be recognized and applied in Florida. We see no
such reason.

This is a case of first impression in this State. We know

of no Florida case specifically recognizing inverse condem- _

nation based upon airport operations, although this court

in our recent decision in Corbett v. Eastern Air Lines, —

opinton filed June 9, 1964, not yet reported, we adverted
to that type of action by way of pure obiter dictum.

The constitutional provisions applicable in Florida are

consistent with, if.they do not affirmatively require, the
recognition of the concept of inverse condemnation. In ad-
dition to the provisions of the United States Constitution
applied in the Causby and Griggs decisions, Section 4 of
the Declaration of Rights in the Constitution of Florida
provides: “All courts in this state shall be open, so that
every person for any injury done him in his lands, goods.

a

person or reputation shall have remedy, by due course of.

law, and right, and justice shall be administered without
sale, denial or delay.” Section 12 of the Declaration provides

in pertinent part: “No person shall. . -be deprived of life, ~:

liberty, or property without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken without just compensation... .”

On the subject of condemnation Section 29 of Article XVI

of the Florida Constitution provides in pertinent part: “No
private property, nor right of way shall be appropriated to
the use of any corporation or individual until full compen-
sation therefor shall be first made to the owner, or first se-
cured to him by deposit of money. . .”

The concept of inverse condemnation can be readily ac-
cepted if we acknowledge the doctrine that a continuing

PRCT i

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34

trespass or nuisance may ripen in toa constitutional taking
of property within the ken of constitutional provisions pro-
hibiting the taking of property without the payment of
just compensation. Such a doctrine has been recognized in
several decisions of the appellate courts of Florida.

For ‘instance, in State Road Department of Florida v.
Tharp, 146 Fla: 745, 1 So. 2d 868 (1941), the owner of a water
mill filed a suit to restrain the continuing of a trespass by
the State Road Department which had ‘erected a bridge

_and a fill which obstructed channels in which water flowed

after it left the millrace, resulting in raising the elevation
of the water in the millrace and in reducing the mill’s ca-

pacity, or to require the department to exercise its right of

eminent domain as.a means of making restitution to the

owner. The said owner contended that the building ‘and

maintenance of the fill amounted to a taking of his property

without due process of law. The chancellor declined to issue ’
the injunction, but granted to the department the privilege

of exercising the right of eminent domain as a means of-
making restitution to the owner. A motion to dismiss was

denied and on final hearing the chancellor granted the re-

lief prayed for; and the department appealed.

In affirming the chancellor’s decree in this Tharp case,
the Supreme Court of Florida, speaking through the late
Justice Terrell, said the following with respect to the basic

‘oman issues involved:

“If a State agency can deliberately trespass on
and destroy the property of the citizen in the manner
shown to have been done here and then be relieved
from making restitution on the plea of nonliability
of the State for suit, then the constitutional guaranty
of the right to own and dispose of property becomes

35

‘i

nothing more than the tinkling of empty words. Such -

a holding would raise administrative boards above

the law and clothe them with an air of megalomania.

that would eternally jeopardize the,property right of
the citizens. It would reverse the or Saree
in this Loomtey and*head it into a Biind.alley.

hiieatanin democracy is a distinct departure from
other democracies in that we place the emphasis on
the individual and protect him in his personal prop-
erty rights against the State and all other assailants.
.The State may condemn his*property for public use
and pay a just compensation for it, but it will not be
permitted to grab or take it by force and the doctrine
of nonsuability should not be ‘so construed. Forceful
taking is abhorrent to every democratic impulse and
alien to our political concepts.

“lg American democracy survives and lives up to
the function of its creation, it must do so by adher-
ence to the code of moral and legal conduct promul-
gated by the Constitution, one provision of which .is
the sanctity of private property. No principle has
contributed more to the material development of the
country or done more to stabilize and balance its
citizenship. To be a property owner and a taxpayer
is one of the surest incentives to a dependable citizen-
ship. It gives the citizen a stake in his government
second to no other influence. It is one of the first
duties of constitutional government to protect, and

where the sovereign has a right to condemn for -

public use, it will not be permitted to appropriate
except by orderly processes. The current of the law
on this point will not lead to any other conclusion.

“Supporting this thesis, Section 12 of the Declara-

democracy —

’

¢ 36 ° “te

tion of Rights provides that no person shall ‘be de-
prived of his property without just compensation and —
Section 29 of Article 16 of the Constitution contains
a similar specification with reference to corporations
and individuals for the preservation of property
rights.. The latter provision is mandatory that the
.compensation be made before the property is ap-
propriated.” ae

™

: -

On the authority of the just-quoted decision of the Su-

preme Court-of Florida, the above-quoted provisions of the

Florida Constitution, and the above decisions from other

- jurisdictions, we hold that in the present case the allega-

tions of the plaintiffs’. second amended complaint are suf-

ficient to state a claim for relief — either injunctive relief

or by way of inverse condemnation — so that the chancellor

correctly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the said .

- complaint. We also hold that the complaint’s allegations at-

i tacked by the defendant’s motion to strike are both relevant

“4 and material to the plaintiffs’ cause of action, so. that the

* chancellor correctly denied that motion also. Consequently,
the order appealed from herein must be and it is

Affirmed.

WIGGINTON and RAWLS, JJ., CONCUR.

37.
FINAL ORDER

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FOURTH
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR DUVAL COUNTY.
FLORIDA

GEORGE SCHUMANN, ET’AL.,
- Plaintiffs, < -
vs. :
CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, A.MUNICIPAL.
CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF FLORIDA,
. Defendant.

aM

EDWIN H. BRAIN, ET.AL.,
Plaintiffs,

4

VS.:

_ CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, A MUNICIPAL
- CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF FLORIDA,

Defendant.

- ORDER

This cayse came on to be heard upon final hearing, and
the Court having heard the witnesses and the argument of
counsel for all parties.

The District Court of Appeals for the First District has

‘held that the.complaint in this case stated a cause of actign.

for inverse condemnation. The Court ‘also stated that this
is a case of first impression in Florida, and it recognized
_ the propriety of inverse condemnation based upon airport

operations. As stated in the opinion, “Inverse condemnation.
has been defined as the popular description of a cause of

sin SSeust

38

action against a governmental defendant to. recover he.
‘ value of property which has been taken in fact by the gov-
ernmental defendant; even though no formal. exercise of
‘ the power of ae, domain has been attempted. by the
taking agency.” |

In the opinion, which i is ‘aetna’ as City of Seleenttle: etc.,

| . _ v, George Schumann, et ux, et al., 167 So. 2d 95, the case of:

Thornburg, v. Port of Portland, : 233 Or. 178, 376 P. 2d 100, is
quoted as follows:

‘ “Tf we accept,:as we must upon established princi-
ae ples of the law of servitudes, the.validity of the propo-
sitions that: a noise can be a nuisance; that a nuisance
can give rise to an easement; and that a noise coming
straight down from above. one’s land can ripen into

“a taking if it is ‘persistent enough and aggravated
enough, then logically the same kind and degree of
‘interference with the use and ‘enjoyment of one’s
land can also bea taking even though the noise vector
may come from ome direction other than the per-

: pendicular.

“Tf a landowner: has a right to ‘be free from unrea-
sonable interference caused by noise, as we hold that
he has, then when does the noise burden become so

_ + unreasonable that the government must. pay for the

* privilege of being permitted. to continue to make the

noise? Logically, the answer has to be given by the

trier of fact (subject to the usual exercise of the

proper function of the court in screening the evi-
‘dence). See Restatement, Torts, sé 826, Comment a.”

Then, ‘after mentioning three other cases, the Court said: ° -
“the sole remaining inquiry is whether there exists any

legal. reason why the rules recognized, in those decisions

oy 2m

39 |

should not be recognized and applied in Florida. We see no |

such reason.”

The Supreme Court of Florida pointed to the difficulties
arising from the widespread use of planes when, in the
case of Brooks et al. v. Patterson, Mayor, et al. 31 So. 2d 472,
they affirmed the Chancellor’s decree and said, at page 477,
“Under this.decree we must assume that the defendants
(City) will adopt rules and regulations governing the users
of the airport which, among ‘other things, will reasonably
prohibit. planes being flown over the property of plaintiffs
at a height less than will be required to prevent the vibra-
tion caused by the operation of the plane, doing damage to
the house or other property.of either of the plaintiffs, and
will also prohibit planes being flown over the property of
plaintiffs at a height less than that which will reasonably
eliminate shock and fright being reasonably experienced
by persons occupying plaintiffs’ property.” Overflights are
not necessary to cause fright, vibrations and noise as they

- can be experienced regardless of whether the wing tip of,

the plane passes a few inches over the land or misses it by
a few inches or a few yards.

In the matter of liability for smoke and oil from unburned
jet fuel, it is interesting to note that even in the earlier

cases before the United States Supreme Court, when they ©

held there must be an actual physical invasion before rail-

roads would be held liable for vibrations and neises from |

the operation of trains, they nevertheless have held such
a railroad company liable for damages caused by unneces-
sary gases and smoke. See: Richards v. Washington Terminal
Co., 233 U.S. 546, 58 L.ed. 1088. ;

From the allegations and testimony, it appears that plain-

tiffs reside on lands adjacent to or across a road from de- ©

fendant’s airport. Commercial jets regularly use the airport

Q rcrrernree:

REPL PRIETO HLS TOT ES

OS SP A EP EOLA RS

40

with approximately 100 jet flights each day, and a part of
the airport property is leased to the Florida Air National
Guard for the use: of its jet fighter planes. On December
11, 1962, the defendant placed in operational service an
extended Northeast-Southwest runway to accommodate the
larger jet planes and the fighter planes of FANG.

The evidence shows that the noise from the nearby jets
occur at, upon and from the extended runway at frequent
intervals and at all times of the day or night; that the noise
halts personal and ’phone conversation; radio and television
reception is disrupted, and the sound obliterated; sleep is
disturbed, and the noise is painful to many; the noise also
causes fear, particularly in small children; that, in addition
to the high pitched whine of the jets on landing, there is
a roar on takeoff and frequently a sharp concussion or ex-
plosion which occurs when the fighter jets’ after-burner is
used. That unburned jet fuel leaves a greasy. film on cars,
swimming pools, clothes, laundry, homes and furnishings;
that windows facing the airport must be kept closed winter °
and summer because of the frequency of the flights; and
that a kerosene odor is prevalent. That the jets cause vibra-
tions in the houses and of their contents, causing windows
and dishes to rattle, putty in window frames to loosen, pic-
tures to hang askew, shingles on the houses to loosen, and,
in some instances, structural damage to the homes in the
area. Plaintiffs also complain that when the commercial -
jets taxi and turn for takeoffs and when the Air National
_ Guard planes go through warmup procedures, dust,. small
rocks and other debris are blasted directly against their
properties. The cutting of trees by the defendant along the
road and on properties near the extended runway facilitated
the propogation of dust and debris in the area. Residences.
which abut the warmup pad or parking apron of the FANG
have especially suffered from the blasts of dust and other

%

41

debris which have sifted into the homes through doors and
windows onto floors, carpets, drapes, food, etc...

The accumulated effect of the foregoing elements, occur-
ring with such frequency has, in the opinion of a qualified
real estate appraiser, lessened the fair market value of each
of the plaintiffs’ properties, except the plaintiff Arthur H.
Ringel, and as to Mr. Ringel’s claim, the complaint will be
dismissed..(The Ringel home is not within the area herein-
after discussed.)

Some of the owners have been paid for “clearance ease-
ments” which permit the cutting of trees, shrubs and the
like, but those easements have no bearing on this case as

there was no easement for noise, vibration, etc. “Avigation |

easements”, which have been taken from some of the plain-

tiffs, are in a different categury in that they permit the

passage of planes, jets included, over the property and
necessarily included the noise, fumes and vibration from
such planes. I cannot subscribe to the theory of plaintiffs
that when the avigation easement was taken it included
only that. area within the specific limits of the easement;
nor, on the other hand, can I subscribe to the defendant’s
theory that when the easement was taken, it included every-
thing from that time forward. In the case of avigation ease-
ments, if there is any new damage from jet planes which
was not anticipated at the time of the avigation easements,
and therefore not included in such easements, then such
damage must relate from the time of the extension of the
Northeast-Southwest runway and be based on facts and
conditions not evident when the avigation easements were
obtained. If the easements have been extended as plaintiffs
claim, then plaintiffs mayshow such additional taking.
Such damage, if any, will be held ‘to be an uncompensated
expansion of the existing easement.

patel eae aman ernetnsneeneenen

rote reg oe

i no a
ee a ae -

42
EDA,
Reasonable noise must be endured as the price for living
in an industrial society and for having deliberately selected
property immediately adjacent to the airport as a homesite,

_ but fairness will require reasonable compensation for opera-

tions. that immediately, directly and unreasonably limit the
use: and enjoyment of private property.

In this instance, the noise from the jet aircraft is more
than simple “industrial noise” which must be suffered by
those who choose to live in an industrial area. The sound- .
track admitted into evidence is clear proof of the severity
of the noise, although almost everyone is familiar with ‘the
penetrating and high pitch sounds of the jet engine. There
is little, if any, relationship between the noise emitted from
a large jet aircraft and the noise suffered by those who live —
near a railroad track or a busy highway. It may not con-
stitute an actual complete appropriation of the property,
but the creation of disturbances which substantially iner- |
fere with the use and enjoyment of property achieves the
same end and ‘the noise, vibrations, concussions, etc. are
sufficient to constitute an actionable invasion of the prop-
erty.

Although plaintiffs, by their bill of complaint, allege that
planes overfly their properties, violating their immediate

_ airspace, it is clear that the gravamen of their complaint is

the noise, vibration, dust, fumes and exhaust smoke rather
than: physical invasion of their property. They’ do not seek |

- recovery for any technical trespass, but for unreasonable

interference with the use and enjoyment of their property.
In fact, there are no overflights in the case of several plain-
tiffs.

‘The defendant argues here must be a “physical inva-
sion” of property before there can be a “taking.” Even so,
just what constitutes “physical invasion”? If, on lands ad- |

jacnt to mine, there is an atomic explosion and my house
is destroyed by the concussion, has there not been a “physi-

cal invasion” of my property by the air blast? Or can it be,
as defendant seems to contend, that unless there are-over.
flights which would cause the blast to come to my property
from a vertical direction, there can be no recovery? My

house is destroyed regardless of whether the direction of -
the force is vertical, or lateral or horizontal. Surely, if the _

result is equivalent, the right of recovery should be equiv-
alent. If the explosions frequently reoccur’ over a period
of years, my property would be effectively taken without
any other physical i invasion.

When the land of an individual is diminished in value for
the public benefit, then justice requires that the public pay.

When the interference with the use of the land is of suffi- °

cient directness, severity, peculiarity and magnitude that
the owner is denied the enjoyment of his own property,
then fairness and justice requires that he be compensated.
Neither these plaintiffs, nor anyone else whose constitu-

tional rights have been denied, are required to yield to the

summum bonum—the gteatest good for the greatest number;
unless it appears that their damage is “inconsequential” or
“incidental” and not “substantial”.

Plaintiffs seek to either enjoin the troublesome flight
operations, or to compel the defendant City to condemn an
‘ easement ‘ ‘in perpetuity consisting of the right to create
noise, vibrations, concussions and sound waves, together
with the further right to direct and transmit exhaust’
fumes, gases, smoke, dust, debris, earth and stones pro-
pelled by,and/or emitted from aircraft turbo-jet engines
from the airport property of the defendant over, across,
against and upon the lands.of the plaintiffs.” (Taken fom
plaintiffs’ contention at Targument.) |

cas

.
SOP CLE PEON EEE PUM NE Oh

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ener ean enter nets sy me RRE SSR

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44 ¢

From:the evidence and the law, it clearly appears there
has been a “taking”, to some extent, of a tefhporary ease-
ment in the plaintiffs’ properties. The big question remain-
ing is just what has been taken. The Federal Aviation Agency
has recommended that no suburban residential develop-

- ment, or place of public assembly, be constructed within.

one-half mile of each side of a jet runway nor within 15,000
feet fromm the end of such runway. I recognize that there
must be some arbitrary line beyond which, for practical
as well as legal purposes, it cannot be said there has been

a “taking”. Based on the evidence in this case, one-half -

smile frora each side of the runway is a reasonable limitation,
though there may be some inconvenience beyond that point.
I do not, however,.believe that a\ distance of nearly three

_ miles from the end of the runway is reasonable, practicable, ,

or necessary, nor is there apt to be a “taking” at such dis-

-_ tance. The testimony shows rather positively that jet planes
_ can and do reach an altitude of approximately 1,600 feet

within one mile of the end of the runway. However, as none
of the present plaintiffs have property more than one-half
mile beyond the end of the runway, it is unnecessary to de-
termine the outside limit which might constitute a “taking”
beyond the end of the runway, except insofar as it may be
pertainent to determine at what point the “one-half mile

_ from.-each side of the runway” should be terminated: In

this particular litigation, a distance of 3,000 feet from: the
end of the runway, while arbitrary, is also reasonable.

In view of the evidence and the law applicable to this
case, there has been a “taking” of a temporary easement in
the properties of those plaintiffs which are within one-half
mile of each side of the Northeast-Southwest runway, in-
cluding a distance of 3,000 feet from its Northeast end, for
the purpose of permitting any: plane to make noises, emit

~~ 4

45°

gases, fumes and smoke, to cause vibration and concussion,
and to disturb or blast dust and small particles of matter
against and onto plaintiffs’ said properties, for the period
beginning December 11, 1962, when the Northeast-South-
west runway became operational, ‘until December 11, 1968,
at which time all air operations at Imerson Airport should
be concluded. °

Although I am holding that there has been a “taking”,
I-believe that in such cases as this, where there has been
no actual physical invasion of plaintiffs’ properties, it is
not so much the character of the invasion as the amount
of damage which determines whether plaintiffs should be

compensated. This must of necessity be true. It is possible:

that there would be a great amount of actual technical in-
vasion, with little or no resulting damage. In such a situa-
. tion, -the damage may very. well be held to have been in-
consequential and endurable by the property owner and
therefore would-not justify the imposition of inverse con-

*. demnation. On the other hand, the character of the invasion

itself may, when considered by itself, not be unreasonable
at all but because of the resulting damage would constitute
a severe and remarkable deterioration of the use and en-
joyment of the property. Therefore, it is my opinion that
plaintiffs are not entitled to be compensated if they have
merely suffered simple inconvenience -which results from
the normal operation of jet planes; airspace in general is a
part of the public domain and it may be used by the public
so long as no substantial darhage is done the landowner. In
every home, everywhere in this country, there is the more
or less constant noise from airplanes; in every home the
TV is disrupted when a plane flies overhead: in every home
' there is some inconvenience caused by planes —-jet and
otherwise. To the extent the inhabitants have been incon-
_venienced, their homeplace has been made that much less

lar caitll

Sie © Sah aed ie ase

EE a ERO a SIA.

Y iiatade

ot Ria Sitar ttiasberaia Rc Shane Stpate on bes
4

46

desirable, but there can be no compensation for simple in-

convenience. Therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to be com-
pensated for such! taking only if, they suffer “substantial”
damage as distinguished from “consequential” or “inci-

~ dental” damage. If they have suffered only “consequential”

or “incidental” damage, then it will be a case of dammum

~ absque injuria for which they cannot be compensated.

Having made this determination, this case must next be
instituted as an eminent domain proceeding and a constitu-
tional jury empanelled to determine what, if any, compensa-
tion. should be paid to the various property owners for the
taking. | .

It has been determined by the Second District Court of
Appeal, in the case of F lorida Power Corp. v. McNeely, 125
So. 2d 311, at page 320, that “Such condemnation hearing
cannot be condu¢ted.as an incident to the main proceedings
in equity; but; in order that the requirements of the eminent
domain statutes ‘be fulfilled, an independent action in con-
demnation is required.” Therefore, the defendant, City of
Jacksonville, will -be directed to institute condemnation
proceedings for the acquisition of such temporary easement
and to pay therefor such amounts, if any, as may be de-
termined by the jury. |

Because large airports attract business, industry and
residences, it is hoped that in building the new airport fa-
cilit?es, the City will acquire enough property and/or ease-

ments for airport purposes and that the County will ap-

propriately zone the adjacent surrounding area, so that a
new industrial complex, oriented to space and aviation in-
dustry, can be established without the necessity for further

* suits of this nature.

47

(NOTE: Although I have tried to rationalize the above
arguments in keeping with the language in the case of City
of Jacksonville v. Schumann, supra, 1 would personally favor
the reasoning and logic as expressed by the author of the
article, “Noise and the Law”, appearing in Volume 63,
Michigan Law Review 1373. However, if the Schumann de-
cision is to be changed, it must be done at appellate levels
and not in the trial court.)

It is thereupon, upon consideration,

‘ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the com-
plaint of the plaintiffs Arthur H. Ringel and Pear] Z. Ringel,
his wife, shall be and the same is hereby dismissed.

It is further is : —

‘ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the de-
fendant, City of Jacksonville, shall be and it is hereby di-.
rected to institute eminent domain proceedings within sixty
(60) days from the date of this Order to condemn a tempo-
rary easement which it has taken in fact in the properties
of those plaintiffs which are within one-half mile of each
side of the Northeast-Southwest runway, including a dis-
tance of 3,000 feet from its Northeast end, for the purpose
of permitting any plane to make noises, emit gases, fumes
and smoke, to cause vibration and concussion, and to disturb
or blast dust and small particles of matter against and onto
plaintiffs’ said properties, for the period beginning Decem-
ber 11, 1962, and ending December 11, 1968; as to those
properties in which the defendant now holds an avigation
easement, the defendant i is hereby directed to institute such
proceédings. to obtain the additional easement it has-taken
by virtue of the extended runway: during the aforesaid
period; and in each case a jury shall determine what, if .

Said Darra a at BR a aR I clin We os

48 ae ’

any, compensation shall be puns such | property owner for

such easement.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, at Jacksonville,
Duval County, Florida, this 26th day of J anuary, A. D. 1966.

/s/ Charles A. Luckie

JUDGE -—

49

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT OF: FLORIDA

199 So. 2d 727

}
,
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;
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3
:
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r

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, A MUNICIPAL ~
CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF FLORIDA,

Appellant, |
VS. 7 :
GEORGE SCHUMANN, ET UX, ET AL.,

Appellees. |

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, A MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF FLORIDA,

Appellant,
_vs. | ae
EDWIN H. BRAIN, ET UX, ET AL.,
Appellees.
| DECISION at
JOHNSON, J. :

This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of
Duval County, wherein the case George Schumann, et al -
v. City of Jacksonville, in one case and Edwin H. Brain, et
al v. City. of Jacksonville, in the other case, were consoli-

- dated for trial and on this appeal.

From an order directing the City to institute eminent —
domain proceedings in accordance with the prayer of the
complaints, the City, appellant herein, appeals. The same
order or decree was entered in each of the two cases.

PP ERT ee ree aO HNMR RARE IAI pI NTE Ie TT ¢

nee ee

ca sats &

pt

~~ i ees) re’

- The basic auéstion before us now is whether there was
sufficient evidence before the trial court” to ‘support. the al-
legations of the complaint. ~The trial court took testimony
for about three days. At the conclusion thereof, he deter-
mined, that certain plaintiffs, five in number, ‘had given
avigation easements: over ‘he surface of their respective
properties in’coritemplation of .the defendant’s extension
of one. of its runways, and therefore summary judginents
were entered against them. Others had years earlier given
certain avigation easements, also, but prior to changes made
in the operation and extension of the airport which could
not lave been reasonably expected at the time of giving
such easements. As to these properties and plaintiffs, the
trial court made special limitation as to their damages, if
any, by limiting them -to the unexpected new, a
and new easements taken. | .

This cause has been before this court previously on an.
interlocutory appeal“? from an order denying a motion to
dismiss the 4mended complaint on the primary ground that -

‘ said complaint failed to state a cause of action. This court,

speaking through Honorable, Donald K. Carroll, in said
case, gave a very comprehensive review of the basic ques-
tion involved in that cause, which is of course the same as
here. This court determined that the complaint stated a
cause of action. for inverse condemnation, but pointed out .
further that under other provisions of our constitution, that

regardless of what it was called, the damaged property
~ owner was entitled to compensation when his property was

taken or its beneficial use to such owner destroyed.

(1) City of Jacksonville, v. George Schumann, ‘a al., 167 So. 2d 95,
(Fla. App. 1st, 1964).

(2) Section 4, Declaration of Rights, Florida Constitution and Section
_ 12, Declaration of Rights, Florida Constitution. |

51
:* view of the decision by this court, supra, we are, as
pointed out earlier, confronted only with the factual situa- -
tion as it appears from the testimony and whether the trial
judge, before whom the testimony was taken, without a:
jury, rendered a proper determination based thereon.

sheer
.

Chan, bee ise Ste

We.think the trial court did a an excellent job i in decipher- .
ing all the evidence, some of which tended to be conflicting, | :
-and rendered a decision in which we cannot find fault and
with which we agree. :

Pangea EMU 4

In arriving at our conclusion, we point out that not all
plaintiffs may receive compensation. The amount of dam-
ages must be determined by a jury in another proceeding ©
in circuit court. The trial court herein only determined that |
the plaintiffs, except those against whom summary judg- -
-ment had -been rendered, each.had a valid legal cause of |
action for damages under the allegations of the complaint ~
and the. evidence in support thereof, properly leaving the
question of amount, if any, due each plaintiff to be fixed
_ by the jury in the subsequent trial of this issue.

While the issue of inverse condemnation in airport avia- oe
tion: projects “was a novel one in Florida, at the time this. i
_court.rendered its deciSion i in the former appearance of this
‘case before this court (167 So. 2d 95, supra), we think the
issue has now been settled by that decision, in which the
Supreme Court of Florida denied certiorari,and which com-
mitted Florida to the view adopted in Thornburg v. Port of
Portland, 3) Martin v. Port of Seattle,“ and the two United
States Supreme Court cases of United States v. Causby,
328 U. S..256, 66 S. Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206, and Griggs v.

"Allegheny County, 369 U. S..84, 82 S. Ct. 531, 7 L.Ed. 2d 585
w& ;

se i le ‘J
5

1} (3) Thornburg v. Port of Portland, .239 Or. 178, 376 P. 2d 100 (1962).

(4) Martin v. Port of Seattle, 391 P. 2d 540 (Wash. 1964).

OI i ita iri sent
:

52

(1962). In these cases, it is in substance held that noise can
be a, nuisance and that such nuisance can give rise to an |
easement, and that such noise may come straight down
from.above, or from some other direction. That the land
owner has a right to be free from unreasonable interference
caused by the noise, and if such noise and/or intense vibra- —
tion produced by low flying aircraft deprived such owner of

an essential element in his relationship to his land,. com- .
pensation therefor should be made by the publit authority
‘responsible therefor, and it makes no difference whether
- the public, or condemning authority is the movant or the
land owner, through a process similar to that employed in
this case by the plaintiffs. |

_ . Most of the arguments raised by appellant are similar to

those raised in and settled by this court in the first appear-

ance of this case before this court. A repetition thereof in

_ this opinion to any further extent than already made, would
- serve no good purpose.

We think the evidence supported the finding of the trial

court inview of the guidelines laid ‘down by this court in— ;

its first decision in this case when here on interlocutory
appeal. ;

Appellant’s points one, three and five, as raised in its
brief, have been answered above and adversely to the ap-
pellant. = naa

As to appellant’s point two, we think this ‘point has also
been laid to rest by the decision in Griggs v. Allegheny
County, supra, and is therefore without merit.

We think we have partly dealt with appellant’s point
five, but here reiterate that the trial court made a broad
finding as to those plaintiffs who had given “avigation ease-

+
id

53

ments.” In substance, the court’s order was to the effect

that each plaintiff's problem had to be treated in the light

of the easement given, as to its substance and time of giving’

thereof.’ He did not rule that all such would receive dam-

ages, but left the element of damages, if any, to the jury .

to be later empanelled to try such issue. We can find no
error committed by the learned. trial judge, but on the
. contrary think his decree was well thought out, well worded

’ and very comprehensive in its coverage of the facts and we

agree with his detree and therefore affirm the same.

~ The City of J salemmatitie Vv. Edwin H.. Brain, et al, being
eur case numbered I-142, was consolidated for trial and for
purpose of appeal herein, with the Schumann case, supra.

In appellant’s brief four points are raised in which error is

. contended. These points are identical to four points raised
_ in the Schumann case and which points we have treated
supra. The same reasoning applies equally to both cases

with the same ultimate decision from both: the trial court —

and this court. We see no reason for disturbing the trial

court’s finding of fact. nor his ; application of the appropriate .

law:thereto.

In both eases, the trial court ordered the defendant (ap-
pellant) to institute eminent domain procéedings within
60 days to condemn the necessary easements.

We affirm this decree i in both cases.
_ WIGGINTON, ACTING CHIEF JUDGE, and
- SPECTOR, J. CONCUR.

fy

*,

Pato Cy Eye mer, o~

EE LAE S LOE TI OFT i bi aaa een yer)y
* _
.

WEB ee va.

54

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
' FIRST DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

‘CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, A MUNICIPAL
CORE er ee UNDER THE LAWS OF FLORIDA,

Appellant, s

vs.

GEORGE SCHUMANN, ET UX, ET AL.,
en

oe

*

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, A MUNICIPAL
- CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF FLORIDA,

: Appellant,
| vs. |
EDWIN H. BRAIN, ET UX, ET AL., ‘
"Appellees. |

ORDER

Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing in the above styled
cause having been oomainenee,

| IT Is ORDERED that the Petition be and the same is.
; hereby denied.

WITNESS the Honorable John T. Wigginton, Chief
Judge, and Seal of the Court this 10th day*of July, A. D.
1967._

DISTRICT COURT OF. APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, OF FLORIDA »

. _ CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, A MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF FLORIDA,

a . e - Appellant,
, VS.
GEORGE SCHUMANN, ET UX, ET AL.,

Appéllees.

; CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, A MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF FLORIDA,

"Appellant,
VS.
EDWIN H. BRAIN, ET UX, ET AL.,
Appellees,
ORDER

Appellant’s suggestion that decision be certified as -pass-
ing upon a question of great’public interest having been -

considered,
IT IS. ORDERED that the suggestion be and the same is
hereby denied.

WITNESS the Honorable John T. Wigginton, Chief
Judge, and Seal of the Court this 10th day of July,. A. D.
1967.

oe)

ma ORO ELT TT ETI THN
° \

Bpaginee

- —

hes

RSA RMN Graig oe TAI hivir ae inet Sey
: .
.

, 56 | | ~
SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
| | | OCTOBER. 5, 1967

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, A MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF FLORIDA,

Petitioner,
. See |
GEORGE SCHUMANN, ET UX, ET AL.,
Respondents.

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, A MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF FLORIDA,

Petitioner,
EDWIN H. BRAIN, ET UX, ET AL.,
. Respondents. '

‘This cause having heretofore been submitted to the Court

‘ on Petition for Writ of Certiorari, jurisdictional briefs and
’ portions of the record deemed necessary to reflect jurisdic-

tion under Florida.Appellate Rule 4.5c(6), and it appearing
to the Court that it is without jurisdiction, it is ordered that
the Petition for Writ of Certiorari be and he same is here-

by denied.

57

' SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
‘NOVEMBER 1, 1967

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, A MUNICIPAL |
CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF FLORIDA,

| - Petitioner,
i. Ag °
GEORGE SCHUMANN, ET. UX, ET AL.,
, Respondents.

—_—

- ~ a

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, A MUNICIPAL ;
CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF FLORIDA,

Petitioner,
vs. : .
EDWIN H. BRAIN, ET UX, ET AL.,
| Respondents.

«On consideration of the Petition for Rehearing filed by
Attorneys for Petitioner,

_ [TIS ORDERED by the Court that said petition be, and
the same is hereby denied.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385603_1203%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
