# Petition for A Writ of Certiorari — Peek v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for A Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1966
- **Citation:** 385 U.S. 894

## Text

& BeeRire

_ UNITED ‘STATES. ‘CORT OF APPEALS —

: Secale, |

Questions Presented

Constitutional Provisions

Reasons for Granting the Writ ..

Argument :

INDEX ee

Eee

— and ‘Oelads Below

Statutory Provision ...

Statement of the Case ?

iy , ae . : :¢ 5 . :
Constantin i ‘

" Agpendieds: a 7 | _ ©

_A-Verdiet of the Unjted States District Court
- Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern. Divi- -

sion, together with the ‘Judgment on the
Verdict .

B—The opinion of the United States: Court of
Appeals for the Highth Circuit

=

| C—The judgment-of the “Unitea States Court of

: Appeals for the ‘Eighth Circuit
D—The order of the United States Court of ae

peals for the Kighth Cirenit denying Petition

for Rehearing és

E—The order of the United States Court of Ap-°

-peals for the = eave sn i mandate.....

ee a INDEX ‘(cowruxvzp) |

aor ee PAGE
eo ' AUTHORITIES CITED
| United States v Vuesae 177 F.2d 833 (Th oi cir. 1949) vee
- . (Ind.):@ . 10. ,
‘ - United Stated v. Scott, 957 F.2d 374 (7th cir. 1958) a oe
e (DL)... a cess 10 |
| Starr’v. United States, 153 U.S. 614... 1B
' ° Constitution of the United‘ States eof America: ‘ “3
, . Sixth Amendment . . weeeeteeee
Statutes: . nee oo gui , ,
18 U,8.05-Se6, 1341 she i feneroaa aa
— U.8.C., Sec. 3006A, Subsection tai, 2 : q .
“Criminal Justice Act of 1964”? .......2, 8, 15, 17, 24
"Federal Bules of Criminal Procedure: =
Bale 16 ... sev e — nee 6
a Rule 15(e):.. re eee 317,25
© ll MN isco ae °°:
MS TR stiri thee thninsriai 15 -
Rule - phones ee 6
i,
ee

-.. IN THE i

af

: SUPREME COURT OF THE

panic

LOYD CARL RAY, Petitioner,
an

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO. THE |

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS.

_ EIGHTH CIRCUIT

- >

Petitioner- prays that a Writ ‘of Certiorari. issue to -
review a final judgment. of the United States a of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

CITATIONS TO OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW

The verdict of the United States District Court, East-

ern. District of Missouri, Eastern Division, appears in.

Appendix A, together with the Judgment on the Verdict.
The opinion of the United States Court.of Appeals for
the Highth Circuit appears in Appendix B. The judgment

ul

of the said Court of Appeals appears in Appendix C. The ~~.
' order denying appellant’s Petition for Rehearing appears
in Appendix D. The order of the oe court staying |
mandate appears in Appendix mm - ' ee

aa
|

/

JURISDICTION

‘The judgment was ‘entered oh October 21, 1966, and
a ‘rehearing: denied. on November 22, 1966.

The* United States @Burt of Appeals for the Kighth
Cirenit@ordered-a stay of issuance of mandate for a pe-
riod of 30 days from and after November 28, 1966.

tv

~ °

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
‘Point of law not yet decided by this Court. (Q.. #1)
In addition, there is no rule applicable to this precise. a a
case before the court. aa i ate : NA

—

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Petitioner was ‘deprived of his rights under’ the
Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C., Bee. 3006A, Sub-
- section (e), as amended. .

2 Trial court crred i in making statements and com-
ments with reference to the case, in the presénce of the
_. Jury, which were prejudicial to the petitioner and deprived

him of a fair and impartial trial.
3. Trial court erred in ignoring petitioner’s motion
- for discovery and inspection at time of arraignment, and
his motion for funds with which to transport witnesses. ~

4. Petitioner was ‘deprived of his right to a fair and -
impartial trial due to evan hah esti articles dur.
' ing and before ial

Pas)

-

ya

———

&- Court erred in denying petitioner’s motion for Bill :

of Particulars. ie ae ais ’ i

°

ye 6. Appellate oun \ ame in giving binding force to.

recedents not applicable to this. case. . ‘

7. Petitioner was deprived of his right i, effective
assistance of counsel under: the Sixth Amendment to the
+, Constitution.

8. Petitioner was de Bent of his right to a fair trial
under Rules 17 (b) and“15(c) of the Federal Rules of

Criminal -Procedure, relating to funds for = inflgmnts to °.

secure witnesses for trial.

9. Trial court erred in admitting into evidence © ma- |

terial of a questionable and improper nature. -.

10. Trial counsel was “incompetent to try a case. of

‘this complexity, and the Court erred in appointing counsel.
who by his own words was not at all familiar with Crim- __
inal ‘Law and rierieeeed or with the Criminal Justice Act 3

of —

ae CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

a

Axunnasnine 6. TO THE Constrrurion OF THE Unrrep. Srarzs ,

RIGHTS OF ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL .
, PROSECU TIONS | :

“> all. criminal prosecutions, the scoused: shall enjoy
the right to a speedy. and public trial, by an impartial

jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have —
been committed, which district shall have been previously _

ascertained. by law, and to be informed of the nature and

_, tesses against him; to have compuléory process for ob-..:

cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-

a , poe ' ° - :
—/ : e . —3— ; : : .. shy wr , .
P > . ‘

Me ee ; ’ sale isa EMA ote
taining iia in his ood, and to have the Assistance
| of Counsel for his defense.

” STATEMENT OF THE CASE

_ Loyd Carl Ray was indicted on eleven counts of mail ’
‘fraud under: Title 18, U.S.C., “Sec. 1341. The indictment .
was returned on the 23rd day of April, 1964. | |

The indietment was based upon allegations that Loyd
,.Carl Bay, acting ynder an alias of Willard T. Morton,
“set up a scheme to defrand a number ‘of citizens of St.
Louis, Massouri during the months of October, .November
and December of 1963, by use of the mails. (See indict-
ment and Bill of Particulars.) 7

The indictment specifically alleged that the said de-
fendant, Ray, set up a scheme or artifice to defrayd and
for obtaining money by: false fraudulent pretenses, rep-
resentations and promises in that he (Ray), acting under
the name of Willard T. Morton, did personally set-up the
Willard. T..Morton Travel Agency in Room 208, 7603
_ Forsyth Blvd., in Clayton, Missouri; that he opened two
bank accounts in the” City of St. Louis, Misouri; that he
* hired two salesmen and a secretary; and placed ads in
- various--newspapers to induce prospective’ purchasers to »
buy a tour to:Hawaii for the sum of $485.00. Two such
tours were scheduled for December of 1963, one called
the Christmas Trip and the other the New Year’s Trip.

_ Prior to the scheduled departure dates of the tours, the

travel agency closed and Willard T. Morton disappeared.
None of the clients received tickets to go on the trip or
any of their money’ back. In this connection, Morton was
- alleged to have used the mails to obtain the money in ad-
vance without ever having any intention of providing the

tours. The government claimed that the defendant, Loyd

a , Se .

. Carl Ray, was the ‘same Willard y “Morton who perpe-

* trated the fraud.

Defendant, Ray testified that, prior to his arrest,. he
had never been in St. Louis, nor had he at any time used .
tlie namd of Willard T. Morton. (p. 481, Reporter’s Tran-_
script, Vol. #2.) Ray further testified that he had in fact
been in the City of Denver, Colorado, on ‘each and every —
- day during the time Morton was operating in St. Louis ~
(ie, October, November and December, 1963), and that .
he had witnesses who had seen him every day in Denver
during this period; customers at his office, rn busi-
ness associates, etc.

Loyd Carl Ray was arrested in — Colorado on
March 14, 1964, and was brought before the U.S. Com-
missioner there. Ray was keleased on $5,000.00 bond and
- a preliminary hearing was set for mid-April. The prelim:
inary hearing was postponed until May 11, 1964 at the
request of the United States Commissioner. Said hearing
was to be in Denver, Colorado, the. place of Mr. Ray’s
vesidence. ; |

Prior to the preliminary hearing, defendant Ray. ar-
ranged for some 40 witnesses (Denver residents) to ap-
pear at the hearing on his behalf and subpoenas were is-
sued on April 22, 1964.

However, on April 23, 1964 the Seitinnbit mentioned
above was retu:.ed in St. Louis, Missouri, allowing no
opportunity for Ray to clear himself at a preliminary
hearing in Colorado. This was in spite of the fact that
the United States Attorneys in both Denver and St. Louis
had been notified of the many people who could place Ray
in Denver during the time Morton was operating in St.
Louis, and reminded of the gravity of the mistake in in-

ee

dicting the wrong man. It is herein submitted to the court
that the secret and (from the defendant’s point of view)
premature indictment was returned because of, rather than
« in spite of, said notification.

On Friday, May 1, 1964, defendant Ray was notified
. bya letter, dated April 30, 1964, from the United States
‘District Court Deputy Clerk to appear the following Mon-
day, May 4, 1964, at 10:00 a.m., before the United States
District Court in’ St. Louis for arraignment.

.On May 4, 1964 Ray came before the court for ar- .

raignment (Hon. John K. Regan, U.S. Dist. Judge). A
plea of not guilty was entered to each of counts 1 to 11,
inclusive. A motion for discovery and inspection pursuant
to. Rule 16, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, was
made by Ray, speaking for himself. Said motion was ig-
nored by the court. Ray also. made a motion, speaking
. for himself, for funds with which -to transport. his wit-

nesses from Denver. to St. Louis. This motion was also }

‘ignored by. the court.

The court appointed J id M. Goodwin to poner
the defendant, presumably urider Rule 44 of the Federal
. Bules of Criminal Procedure.

7 case subsequently came on for trial on the 14th
day of September, 1964 (p. 2; Criminal Docket, U.S. Dist.
Court, No. 64Cr87(2)). On September 17, 1964, at the
hour of 11:15 p.m., ihe jury informed the court that they
‘‘could never reach a verdict,” whereupon the court de-
clared a mistrial, ordered the cause reset for trial (p. 3,
Criminal Docket, U.S. Dist. Court, No. .64Cr87(3) ). For
reasons unknown, the court would not allow defense at-

terney to poll the jury, or even talk to any of the’ queaee,

after the trial was over..

dstiiee Scion

Se

_ The cause came on aia for trial on October 25,
1965, whereupon, on October 28, 1965, the defendant, Loyd
Carl Ray, was convicted on nine of the eleven counts of |
indictment, to-wit: 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11. (p. 4,.
Criminal Docket, U.S. Dist. Court, No. 64Cr87 (3).)

On November 19, 1965 defendant appeared before
the United States District Court in ‘St. Louis for sentenc-
ing. Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, or in
the alternative, for a new trial, was denied. Loyd Carl
Ray was then sentenced: to a four-year term and a three-
year term, to run consecutively, for a total of seven years.

The cause was appealed before the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and argued on
September 12, 1966. Judgment of the trial court was af-
firmed by appellate court on October 21, 1966. :

_Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was filed on
November 10, 1966. An order denying Petition for Ke.
hearing was issued on November 22, 1966.

_ An order staying issuance of mandate pending cer-
tiorari proceedings in Supreme Court of the United States :
‘was entered ¢ on November 2, 1966..

"REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT:

This petition is submitted in the hope that I am not
laboring under a misapprehension in my belief that jas-
tice should and will prevail. The law ought not to be so _
inflexible as to send a mari to jail for seven years for a
crime he did not commit, simply because there is perhaps
no legal ‘‘loop-hole,” or more properly, reversible error.
If there ‘is error at all, a new trial should be granted if
for no reason other than that seven years is a long, long i
time. ;

=o

The appellate court states in the opinion, “The

examination of the entire . record shows .. .’’ The

point i is,, that court did not have all of the an in the

case, any more than ‘the jury had all the facts in the case.
They had substantially only the government’s side of it
since the defendant was blocked at every turn from pre-

senting his side, simply due to inexperience and lack of

money, to say nothing of a prejudiced judge.

_ If the Supreme Court will not review this case, then
_ an innocent man will go to prison and that i is a wer good
reseon for granting the writ.

ARGUMENT
Point 1— Petitioner was deprived of his rights under

‘the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C., Sec. 3006A,
Subsection (e), as amended.

The defendant for all practical purposes was deprived cs

of his rights under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18
US.C., Sec. 3006A, as amended.

Subsection (e) of the Act dunks states that ‘Sexpert

or other services necessary, to an adequate defense’’ shall

be made available to an indigent defendant. The appellate

court argues in the opinion that “It is somewhat difficult .

to grasp appellant’s reasons’ (for wanting dase ate
expert).

) The ienpoctdnee of his own fingerprint expert to the
defendant can be gleaned from the fact that there was no
fingerprint evidence at the first trial, which ended in a
hung jury. The first trial was fully one year after the
alleged fraud was perpetrated. Then another year later,
at the second trial, all of a sudden the prosecution had
— This was a full two years after Tie offense.

Se
a piel

One must also consider that said fingerprints were on

papers and checks which were handled by the defendant
at the first trial, and one fingerprint was on a book pur-

portedly given to the postal inspector by John Primm, a
man who was a salesman in the scheme (p. 194,: Reporter’s |
Transcript, Vol. #1), who was actually an accessory to
the crime, and who had every reason to. ‘‘cooperate”’ with

_the postal inspector. Mr. Primm was not charged with

anything.
The fingerprints were ‘atu prints. It is hatin

that a qualified expert would have found that the prints
were not two years old, if he were asked to determine age.

The government contended that the fingerprints were
not available at the first trial because a ‘‘new process
which had just become known,’’ with which to develop

latent prints, was not known at the time ef-the first trial. —— 7

This contention is ; contradicted by government witness
Mooney (p. 339, Reporter’s Transcript, . Vol, #2). -

. Answer, ‘‘Yes, sir. This is a process developed by the —
Swedish scientist in 1954, called ninhydrin, and this will

‘develop a print. The ast means nothing on a print.”

(emphasis added. -

Since the process had been known since. 1954, aie
was ample time for the prosecution to use it between
the time of the purported crime in December 1963, and .
the first trial in September 1964. It is taxing credulity &
little to have fingerprints at the second trial, in October —
of 1965, when none could be found in 1963 or 1964.

ri ie? government further contended that certain of
the documents upon which they had developed latent prints
were not available to them before the first trial. However,

‘most of the customers from. whom the documents were

—10—

- procured were named in the indictment as being the
people defrauded. Government witness Kelley (p. 218,
Reporter’s Transcript, Vol. #1) testified that he gave the
“ letter, Government Exhibits 144 and 145, to Mr. Schnicker
on December 20, 1963. One must conclude that the govern- —
_ ment had the papers all the time, at both trials.

There are more examples, but the above will serve

, to show that an expert of his own would have. been im- =

. portant to the defendant.

_ Point 2— Trial court erred in ‘making re and
comments with reference to the case, in the presence of the

jury, which were prejudicial to the petitioner and —
him of a fair and impartial trial. |

It is conceded that the trial judge has a sini
amount of latitude in the conduct of a trial, but it is re-
spectfully submitted that reasonable norms were exceeded
to the defendant’s prejudice. :

_ The influence of a trial jnilee wen a pate is necessar-
ily and properly of great weight. (United States v. Levi,
- 177 F.2d 833 (7th cir. 1949 (Ind.)): In this connection it

was held in the case of United States v. Scott, 257 F.2d ©

- . 374 (7th cir. 1958) (Tll)) that it was the duty of the trial

judge to maintain an atmosphere of impartiality.

On page 268, Volume #1 of the Reporter ’s Tran-
_ -s¢ript, the court made the statement that both he, the
government’s attorney, and the government’s witness Wil-

z son, all worked for the postal department. The Circuit

Court considered this harmless error. How could this be
harmless? (see Opinion.) I have been taught since grade
' school that the government was. divided into. three
’ branches, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial.
Yet the judge by his remark destroyed this fundamental

\

lh

_ concept by stating that he was aligned with the executive
| . ® brazich of the government insfead of ‘the judicial.-In addi-
. tion, the jury could conclude from the court’s remark in
the alternative that the postal department was the ——

department.

In the appellate sane ’s opinion a Cireuit-Sadge pa |
states: ‘‘The (trial): court’s comments. that he was sim-
ply trying to-see that ‘justice was done’ comes close

| \ . exceeding _ the bounds of judicial propriety when

\ taken in full context of the situation. It is doubtful the

trial judge intended it as such ....’? and ‘‘We submit the

-/ gourt’s charge cannot rectify actual and real prejudice..

“The Court: Well, I want to get it straight in

the record. Go ahead and make your objection, -
| " . Mr, Goodwin: My objection has been covered by
‘counsel for ‘the Government and by myself. I think
the Court unduly emphasizes something- which the

= -* to it.

“The Court: The Court has the duty, Mr. Good-

win, to see that justice is don, and that is what the |

: Court is attempting to do. (our emphasis) -
-“*Mr. Goodwin: If. the Court please, I meant no —

disrespect. I mearit no disrespect to Your Honor.

:. is ‘‘The Court: I am just telling you what I-am go-

ing to do, and I got it in the record so we don’t have

; any mistake about our respective positions.

7 ‘*Mr. Goodwin: My objection nails to his Honer’ -

ae comment.

“The Court: Now, Mr. Wilson, based on this .

- mathematical ‘probability, have you an opinion as to
whether. or not these prints were made by the same
finger, or thumb in this case?

“The Witness: May I put ‘it ‘this way, Your
Honor? The possibility that these two patterns could
occur coincidentally i in the hands of two different in- .
dividuals is so remote as. to be unworthy of any serious
consideration.”’ | .

a

-Counsel’s attempt to end his cross examniation on a ©
strong point was virtually destroyed. But Mr. Goodwin
perseveres and succeeds when, in a few short additional
‘questions, the witness: admits:

‘In the final analysis, this is for i jury to ds-
cide whether the prints are in fact identical or ‘not.’

ae a Se pen ah shad edit. sab teas cas oe wee ‘ bod SBT RN ed fata ate es Betas ae Mie! PRAT ithe GES Hons eerie 0B

_ Government is trying to emphasize, and gives weight alk

the evidence. Kansas City Star v. United States, 240 |

- Putnam case states:

! thinks = and express his- opinion upon the

The.error raised is not so much the examination by the
‘court but the fact the court stated he wanted to “eee that
justice was, done.’’ : ;

A federal judge hes the right to comment fairly upon -

F.2d 643, cert. denied 354 U.S. 923 ; Woodring v. United
States, 311 F.2d 417; Batsell v. United States, 217 F.2d
257. Such right is derived from the common law. Vicks-
burg Railroad v. Putnam, 118 U.S. 546 (1886); Capital
Traction Co. v..Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1898). The court in the

‘‘In the courts of the United States as it is in
those of England from which our -practice is derived
the judge in submitting a case to the jury may at his
discretion: whenever he thinks it necessary to assist

_. them in arriving at a just conclusion, and upon the
evidence call their attention to parts of it which he

facts; . | ; st

However, as we a pointed out in the. Woodring
case, this is a right which the trial court must cautiously
exercise since it can very easily result in prejudice to.a liti-
gant’s rights. This is particularly true in a criminal case
where life or liberty may be in jeopardy. The trial court’s
comments can ‘disturb the balance of fairness of a jury
trial. He should never assume the role of the prosecutor

or advocate. His position is one ‘of neutrality and he

should never cross boundaries. It is a trial judge’s duty °
to see that the evidence is clear and understood. How- |
ever, his comments should never unfairly emphasize testi-
mony nor add to or change the evidence given. The

jtidge’s zeal to do so. when the evidence is:evenly balanced’ _

can easily create prejudice. Each case merits individual —

‘consideration. It may well be the less comment or inter-
ference by the trial judge with the examination of wit-

‘nesses, the less opportunity for prejudice to basic. rights —

to, a fair trial. Woodring v. United States, supra; Boat-
right v. United States, 105 F.2d 137; Stoneking v. United
States, 232 F.2d. 385.*

~The statement by the trial judge that the expert wit-
ness worked for the same employer as the court is certain-
ly a harmless one. At best it could have been avoided, but
we fail.to see this statement constitutes error. If such a
comment would so influence a jury, then the intelligence
and Andependence of a jury no longer deserves” our confi-
dence. \

The court’s comments that he was simply trying to see
that ‘‘justice was done’’ comes close to\ exceeding the

bounds of judicial propriety when taken in full context of — .

the situation. It is doubtful the trial judge intended it

4s such, but the court’s examination could lend itself to

the appearance that the court was emphasizing, through
one of the government’s: witnesses, a contention of the
government, to-wit, that the fingerprints were made by
the same person as the defendant. It would seem from
the record that the court did not have to intervene with
his questioning—at all at this point. There was tiot the
need for clarification here, as existed in his examination
of the witness: ‘Shannon. The court did instruct at the
conclusion of the case as follows:

¢ Of ‘A Jakes To Comment On
Tes a renege hy seer To the guy. ” 6 F.R.D. 317 (1947),

wherein Chief Justice Fuller in Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614 is
quad on ony ing:

ee

_ witness admitted: ‘‘in final analysis’ this was for the jury |

. their scoumulative effect.*

“he harmless error statute, Rule $23), means that a criminal

jury, express any opinion as to the facts or comment
. directly upon the witnesses and their testimony. We feel

that the defendant was deprived of his rights under the

\.. es

‘‘Therefore if during this trial you have imagined
or gained the impression that the court had any
‘opinion in regard to this case so far as the facts are |
concerned ‘dismiss that impression from’ your mind
because the court meant to express neither by manner
nor by voice-any opinion on the facts.”

We submit the court’s charge cannot rectify actual and
real prejudice. However, the charge does make clear to
the jury the court did not intend to influence their deci- )
sion in any way.

It is significant the trial court did not, during the
presentation of the testimony or during his charge ‘to the

the recross examination by Mr. Goodwin, when the expert

to decide,’’ fairly brought the issue back into proper focus.
We find no prejudicial error in the comments made, or in

The second shied of reversal cuineliaini relies upon is

Criminal Justice Act. of 1964, §§ (e) as amended.
_ Subsection’ (e) reads:

**Services s other than counsel—Counsel for a de-
' . fendant who’is financially unable to obtain investiga-—
\tive, expert or other services necessary to an adeqnate
defense in his case may request them in an ex parte
application. Upon finding, after appropriate inquiry
in an ex parte proceeding, that the services are neces-

oa eon Seo ee a error. Bihn v. United

be \
WR eae AN oa te he iPS ati MS omg gadis enn os A ssid Niele x

sary and that the defendant ig financially unable to
obtain. them, the céurt shall authorize counsel to ob-
tain. the services on behalf of .the defendant. The
court may, in the interests of justice, and upon a find-
ing that timely procurement of necessary services

- eould not await prior authorization, ratify such ‘serv-:
ices after aed have been obtained : . .’’

‘Trial counsel was appointed to act for appellant under
the Criminal Justice Act during the\second trial in Octo-
ber 1965. The second trial commenced on October 25,
1965. At-noon on October 27; 1965, and before the govern-
ment rested, Mr. Goodwin was reappointed counsel under

the Criminal Justice Act.

soe argues he was not able to take advantage of

his rights under §§ (e) .of -the act, specifically to obtain
fingerprint experts to testify for the defense. It is some-
what difficult to grasp appellant’s reasons, but apparently .
‘he raises two: (1) Appellant: was not timely informed .
~~ fingérprint. experts were. to be used by the government
(the: government. did not use them in the first trial in

- :1964).* (2) Assuming (but not admitting) appellant’s trial —
counsel was forewarned concerning the government’ 8 fin-

sAlthough not raised as a point a error erat appellant is in-

directly challenging the trial court’s refusal to require the government

dy hy byt A Sa uire ‘them to inform

. & oe there were fingerprint aay. court Has long

' ROE Sek Sie: CG OF OHNE tS tae on for a bill of particulars

“a8 voy Yay Bee discretion of the trial court and that its ruling

% bed except for An j abuse of that discretion. Kansas

| : Cay mae Co. w United Sinton 200 F.2d 643, cert. denied 354 U.S. 923;
T v. United States, 298 F.2d 208: (1961). ’

_ .. & bill of. particulars: under Rule 7(f) is granted to particularize a

_ ° Charge involved and is cont 3 not an instrument to. require the gov-

. =. @mmment to disclose its evidence. Cooper v. United States, 9 Cir., 282

eal F.2d 527, 532; Cordova v. United States, 10 Cir. 303 F.2d 454; United

_ . States vy. Hanlin, D.C: Mo., 29 F.R.D. 397; United States v. Kelly, D.C.

Mo., 92 F.Supp. 672. ' reg

gerprint experts, he was appointed (under the Act) too
“late to effectively utilize defense experts since appellant:
was entitled to have such witnesses not only testify on
his behalf but also be present at the time the government
experts were on the stand.

iia ovate the purpose ‘of the Act cannot be
carried out if the accused is not afforded a sufficient op-
_ .portunity to take advantage of the Act’s provisions. Ap-
- pellant further mentions that he was at a distinct disad-
vantage because his defense was alibi and mistaken iden-

tity,.and most of the alibi witnesges were in Denver.*

Appellant concedes in his reply brief that they do not
at any time challenge the competency ‘of “—e Goodwin,
the trial attorney for Ray. :

Cssineet presumably argues that he could not nate
' adequate expert or investigative services, more particularly

- fingerprint experts, in time for adequate presentation of
“appellant’s defense. Theoretically, appellant says, since

_ trial counsel’ was -appointed belatedly he, thereby, was -
denied rights under §§ (e). However, a complete analysis
_. of the Criminal Justice Act, as set forth in the legislative
history as well as in the Act itself, fails to show that any
accused is given any greater substantive right under the

t

6A: t claims that he had affidavits of some 40 witnesses which

wo verify he was in Denver nt ad brings wile, sever ser
witnesses did not appear. Ap be

nental and twether bo-tawe oy Body he. produced a Conti-

‘Sach a contention sities Rules 15(c) and 17(b) of the Fed. R.
creti * ee 2% Te Senn ta _ A, 4.4 Saua

on, ons co ave en, or

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.

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odin SERRATE AA REAR ON preach s

per

Act than he previously had. See Vol. 4 U.S. Code Cong.
& Adm. News, p. 2990.’

The fundamental purpose of the Criminal Justice Act

_ is to provide legal assistance to indigent defendants in

criminal cases.* See Preamble to Criminal Justice Act of
1964, Pub. Law 99-455, 78 Stat.. 552, 18 U.S.C. 3006A;
Criminal Justice Act of 1964, Honorebie James A aad

36 F.R.D. 67.

‘An indigent represented thereunder is not seenbded
any procedural rights of discovery or ‘defenses. The Crim-
inal Justice Act is a means of implementing, what the
courts have declared to be a constitutional demand (right
of counsel) under the Sixth Amendment and its inclusion
in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353. Serious ‘‘equal protection” questions would —
arise if the Act provided indigents with — the non-

‘indigent defendant would not have.

"For a most theveushh and excellent ‘discussion, see Kutak, Criminal -
Justice Act of 1964, 44 Nebr. L. Rev. 703 (1966). See p. 737 where the
Allen Committee Report discusses §§(e). Such report states:

‘ “* * * the absence of a provision for defense services is ‘a fund-
amental deficiency of the present system,’ which reaches ‘serious
anyone ne The plan provides that counsel, whether appointed

or or retained: by a defendant who is financially unable to obtain

- . the services other than counsel necessary to an adequate defense,
may request them in an ex parte application to the court. The

ex parte natufe of the ee © insure that the defendant
not have to disclose defense prematurely. Although the

or tive history is replete with references to these services, no

ustive description of thefn has been found. The Allen Com-. |

mittee Report refers to counsel having at his disposal the ‘tools
- essential to conduct a ee ae, and later specifically men-
tions and pal kL e assistance of experts, transcripts

< proceedings an the like. an :
ane Se imp lementation, of such services is now more readily
provided. However on" ‘services were available tothe indigent be-
assage of the Act. See discussion in re. Bandy v. United

States, 8 ir., 296 F.2d 882, infra.

weThe sine qua non of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 is. partici
pote by competent counsel.” Kutak, supra, 44 Nebr. L. Rev. 703

=:

a

In King v. United States, 355 F.2d 500 (1966), the
court presented a similar idea when it expressed disap-
proval of the lower court’s order to the government to pro-
duce their file on the defendant for the use of his court-ap-
pointed counsel. The court said: -

‘‘The rights of a defendant are not to be deter-
mined on an ad honjinem basis with respect to his
counsel, whether because, as the court observed in this
case, he is believed ‘reliable’, or, as the court stated
was its practice, by distinguishing between court-ap-
pointed and counsel the defendant personally chooses.
There should be no special relationship between court-
appointed counsel and the court and no special. favors.
Quite apart from which would seem to us the obvious
inequity, the court’s practice might’ well cause defend- _
ants who otherwise would not have done so, to seek
court-appointed counsel, thereby increasing the gov-
ernment’s financial burden under the Criminal J ustice
Act.’’ (n. 2, p. 702)

Possibly appellant is arguing that he was denied the
right of ‘‘effective assistance of counsel’’ under the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution because his trial counsel
did not have timely opportunity to present the proper
defense Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45. This was the
approach taken in the case of United States v. Germany,
32 F.R.D. 421 (1963). There the court ordered that the
court-appointed counsel was entitled to reimbursement for
reasonable and necessary expenses in traveling to inter- —
view and depose an informer and view the scene of the
alleged crime. The Department of Justice would not honor
the order. The court held the defendant was ‘thereby ‘
denied his constitutional right to counsel and dismissed A
the indictment. The court wates:

ae

**This Court believes that, without more, upon a
certification of a court-appointed counsel for an in-
digent defendant to the effect that it is reasonably
necessary for him to incur expenses for traveling and
for subsistence in viewing the scene of the alleged
crime and in interviewing material witnesses, the
‘effective assistance of counsel’ mandate requires that

the money for said reasonably necessary travel and

subsistence expenses be made available'to him by the

- United States. However, this Court believes that Rule.’

15(c) of. the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
_ ‘bolsters the contention of the defendant, Ned Ger-
- many, in this case that his counsel is entitled to re-
imbursement for the expenses necessarily incurred by

him in rendering ‘the effective’ representation as re-
quired by the Sixth Amendment to the .Constitution.’’ |

Assuming appellant’s argument is intended to encom-

pass this theory, it is misplaced: Trial.counsel did not
at any time request handwriting or fingerprint experts

before, during or after the trial. Bandy v. United States,
8 Cir., 296 F.2d 882. We are only left to speculate why.
There probably was good reason.° |

We have thoroughly examined the record concerning
the cross examination of government experts. It is. taxing

credulity to say trial counsel was ‘‘caught by surprise’’

*

*Many reasons could exist for counsel’s not calling either a finger-
a or handwriting expert: (a) It may have been impossible to ob-

experts to disagree with the government’s statements as a matter
of scientific evidence or (b) at best such witnesses could say nothing.
more than what: counsel achieved in the cross examination of the

i — expert when the latter admitted. in the “final analysis -
was for the jury to decide” whether or not the prints were the

same, or (c) Mr. Goodwin being a Mor pee trial counsel (which
e t concedes) determined it would be better to break down the.
ent witnesses on cross examination than weaken his case by

in defense experts who possibly could be discredited com- ~~

the government.

‘3

by such evidence. His cross examination demonstrates a.
- thorough technical knowledge of the subject.”

However, whether counsel was forewarned or not —
makes little difference. He certainly had full knowledge of
such evidence prior to presenting his case-in-chief. Yet no
- request to hire experts was made. Appellant claims, how-

‘ever, retaining an expert at.the time of Goodwin’s re-

appointment under the Act would have been a futile .
gesture since the defense expert should have been in court
at the time of the actual testimony of the government’s
witnesses.’ Such a quixotic contention hardly merits dis-
cussion. We know of nothing under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure or the-Criminal Justice Act now or:
at any time which would provide the defendant with this -
as a matter of right. Furthermore, such prearranged .
presence could hardly be deemed indispensable to the
testimony of an expert .in the defense case-in-chief.

10Mr, Goodwin’s cross examination of Simeon Wilson included the
following questions: Q. You don’t know what type fingerprints he
has, whether he has whorls or arches or—what are the other things?
Q. You don’t even’ know what his fingerprint style is, do you sir? |
Q. What percentage of the people would you say in this courtroom
have got whorl type fingerprints? . . . Q.. And a bifurcation simply
means where two lines join, two of these ridges join? Q. And you
expect if you have the others present. in the _— you would have to
-have some bifurcations, wouldn’t you? .Q. I seem to have read or

heard some place sir, that it requires at least 13 identifications or
es of a print to have an opinion on it...

The cross examination of Mr. Mooney , the other fingerprint expert,
includes the following questions: Q. You mean to say that P know
of.no process which by the use of aminoacid could transfer f
Q. Is there to your knowledge any international agreement with ref-
_ erence to fingerprints? Q. Fingerprinting was originated where? Q.
Where was fingerprinting first used? Q. ere was this whole system
first used? Q. . you sure it wasn’t England? Q. The-first method of
identification the English used wasn’t it? Q. Did you know under that
$ystem doesn’t it require a minimum of 13 points of identification?
(our emphasis) 5 ie : ‘

u]f the lack of knowledge prevented timely motion, it remains un-
answered why appellant did not call -handwri ——- Govern-
ment handwriting experts appeared at the first trial. These assuredly
were as significant and important as the fingerprint experts. —

A eae eee

| °17(b) nor A. we interpret the Criminal Justice Act as
In Reistroffer v. United

—1§6—
This claim also fallaciously assumes appellant could

not obtain such services before the implementation of the “
Criminal Justice Act. The benefits granted under §§ (e) -

- of the Criminal Justice Act are similar to Rules 17(b) and

15(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Each
of these provisions relate to funds for indigents to secure
witnesses for trial. In Bandy v. United States, supra, at

_ 888, Judge, now Chief Judge, Vogel, said:

_ «* * * We agree with United States v. Fox,
' .D.C.S.D. N.Y., 1937, 19 F. Supp. 463, that handwriting
experts are included under Rule 17(b), Federal Rules

_ of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. Had Bandy em-
ployed a handwriting expert, his services would have
been’ paid for in accordance with the order of the
District Court.’’

If such services were deemed necessary, appellant

-eould have made a request to the court’? without being

reappointed under the Criminal Justice Act. Yet the record

is absent any request made and as such the matter must
be deemed intelligently waived. Bandy v. United States,

12Clearly no substantive rights are ted defendants A... A Rule
denied defendai t a gh eo

an ’s reque subpoena a wri expert to
testify on his behalf. On review the court stated:.

“It is well settled that Rule 17(b), Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 18 USCA, under which the motion for subpoena was
made, does not accord the indigent defendant an absolute rig hi to
rs ree ernment expense. There is and aust be
wide discretion vested in the District Court to prevent the abuses .
often ise of the < by defendants. This Court not disturb the
_" of discretion unless exceptional circumstances compel

District Judge Robert Van Pelt in United States ‘v. Pope,. 251 F.

S ‘Supp. 234, interpreted §§ (e) as follows:

“The Criminal: Justice-Act contemplates that counsel should be
afforded fullest opportunity to prepare their case; the rule in
allowing defense services is that judge need only be satisfied that
they reasonably appear to be necessary to assist counsel in their
SS = not that the defense would be defective without

cnililiais

supra (waived right to handwriting expert when no re-
- quest was made under 17(b); Mark v. United States, 8
Cir., 326 F.2d 481, cert. denied 377 U.S. 947 (right to
speedy trial waived by defegdant unless asserted'in some | ©
manner); United States v. Miller, 2 2-Cir.,, 246 F.2d 486 |
(alleged defect in indictment waived by failure to. raise |
by pre-trial motion); Ford v. United States, 5 Cir., 201
F.2d-300 (waived statutory disqualification by juror, even.
_ though not known by counsel. at trial) ; Edwards v. United
States, 8 Cir., 333 F.2d 588 (contentions not brought to
attention of tria¥ court are waived unless record disclosed —
plain error affecting substantial rights).

The courts must presume that trial counsel pursues’.
the course of action at the trial he feels best for his client, |
‘and absent plain error involving substantial rights his
client is bound by the counsél’s choice. United States v.
Handy, 130 F.Supp. 270, aff’d 224 F.2d 504, aff’d 351 U.S.
454 (1955), where the court said at page 295:

‘‘Defendant’s counsel apparently made a deliber-__

_ ate choice not to seek delay or a change of venue. _

Many reasons could be .suggested for their decision.

We will not indulge in speculation. At all events there
was 4 waiver of any right they may have had.’’

In Shibley v. United States, 237 F.2d 327, cert. denied,
352 U.S. 873, reh den 352 U.S. 919 (1956), the court said
that ‘‘One cannot speculate upon failure to call a witness
and thereafter present such testimony as newly discov-
‘ered,’’ at 332. See also: United States v. Marachowsky, —
213 F.2d 235° (1954), cert. denied 348 U.S. 826; Blodgett v.
United States, 161 F. 2d 47 (1947); Apel v. United States,
- 247 F.2d 277 (1957).

This court cannot ‘but observe appellant wears shoes
_ similar to a party seeking a new trial on newly discovered

at.

, «
a eee WR ie PY cece ARAN AIS

4 ¢ : Pd
ee We Meee oe Sara ars en ee eT ae

| evidence under Rule 33. Such evidence not only must be
material, but it must be shown that on a new trial it would

probably produce an acquittal. McCroskey v. U nited States,
339 F.2d 385, 387 (8 Cir. 1965) ;. Ferina v. United States,

- 302 F.2d 95, cert. denied 371 U.S. 819 (8 Cir. 1962);

Connelly v: United States, 271 F.2d 333, cert. denied 362

U.S. 936 (8 Cir. 1959) ; stad v. . 312 F.2d 533: “s
- Cir. 1963).

In United States v. Keller, 145 F. ay 692 (1956), the

defendant moved for a new trial on the basis that, among _

other things, the statement of a handwriting expert was
new evidence which exculpated him from his conviction
for aiding and abetting in filing a false FHA certificate.
The court held that this ¢vidence did not justify a new
trial because, in part, it was not newly discovered: ‘The

‘entire issue of the authenticity of the signatures on the
- FHA Completion Certificate was joined when Ginter de-

nied forging the document . . . Ginter’s testimony was.
taken on the first day of the‘trial, yet defendant made no
request to adjourn in order to obtain the services of a

‘handwriting expert.’’ (Emphasis ours)

Under Rule 33, assuming appellant could produce wit-
nesses contradicting government fingerprint experts, clear-

ly a new trial could not be granted. Such allowance would

bring no end of litigation. Hindsight can always produce
other witnesses ‘who could have been called to corroborate

‘evidence presented. Certainly appellant does not -have

any better standing than a movant under: Rule 33. We
do not see how appellant’s position is enhanced raising
the issue on a direct appeal for the first time, when we
necessarily cannot even know what such experts might say.

7 We’ emphasize, however, trial counsel is not to be
criticized. In an adversary proceeding the lawyer is the

master of his client’s case..He guides the course of the
trial, always with the utmost allegiance to his client’s
-eause. His skill and competence are his tools. His deci-
sion becomes’ his client’s command, his judgment must
necessarily guide his client’s destiny. When-the verdict
is in, his only reward may well be satisfaction in render-
.. ing his all for the. cause. A lawyer’s actions. under fire -
_ should: not be measured by hindsight speculation. The
' jury resolved the case unanimously against the defendant.
The examination of the entire record shows trial counsel
did everything within his best judgment to provide appel-
lant with a fair trial. We fail to see how any rights were .
denied the appellant.

Judgment affirmed.
. A true copy. | , )
Attest: ; : ba
' Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Appendix C
JUDGMENT

United States Court Of Appeals
| For The Eighth Circuit

-

No. 18,235 — SEPTEMBER 7 1966.
Loyd Carl Ray, Appellant, —
vs. |

_ United States of America.

Filed October 21; 1966, Robert C. Tucker, Clerk.

ee ee Pees Nag sated the tlaie fo Yl clit Ait lit a eh Sah tet pee 0 hy capes (mete

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri.

oOo

This Cause came on to be heard on the record from

‘the United States District Court for the sie ‘District -
- of Missouri, and wag argued by counsel.

On Consideration Whereof, it is now here ordered and.
adjudged by this Court, that the judgment and sentence of
the said District Court, in ™ cause, be, and the same is
hereby, affirmed.

And it is further Ordered by this Court that the de-
fendant in the said District Court, Loyd Carl Ray, do -sur-
render himself to the custody of the United States Marshal
for the Eastern District of Missouri, if not now in cus-
tody, in execution of the judgment and sentence imposed
upon him, within thirty days from and after the date of
filing of the mandate of this Court in the District Court.

October 21, 196
Appendix D

“United States Court Of Appeals
For The: Eighth Circuit —

~ No. 18,235 — Szrremser Tens, 1966.
‘Loyd Carl Ray, Appellant, ete atm

a
United States of America.

: Appeal from the United States District Court for the:

_ Bastern District of Missouri.

the Supreme Court.of the United States that a
. writ of certiorari and record have been filed, the stay
hereby granted shall continue until the final disposition

a x <i eee See ee Te:

se Seen nin re UR lar BI TCS ps Sane sites ian

Petition of .appelldnt for rehearing filed in this

‘ cause having been considered, it. is now here ordered by

this Court that the same be, :and it is hereby, denied.
November 22, 1966

| Appendix E - .
United States Court Of Appeals

For The Fighth Circuit
No, 18285

‘Loyd Carl Ray, Appellant,
Mypritets y af
United States of America. .

aggeel from the United States District rn for the
Kastern District of. Missouri. .

On Consideration of the motion of appellant} for a

stay.of the mandate in this cause pending a petition to

- the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of |

certiorari, it is now there ordered by this Court that the
issuance of the mandate herein be, and the same is hereby,
stayed for a period of thirty days from and after this
date; and if within said period of thirty days there is filed
with the, Clerk of this Court a certificate’ of the Clerk of

of the case by the Supreme Court.

November 28, 1966

ition for —

e+
%

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385603_0196%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
