# Brief in Opposition — Gibbons v. City of Chicago

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Brief in Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1966
- **Citation:** 385 U.S. 829

## Text

/

| otfiee Supreme Court, U.S.
1'-. FELED.
. = JU 16_ 1966
. ae de ° JOHN F. DAVss eck
| Sapreme Court of the United States
OcToBER Term, 1966, ~,
_ No. 260. .

MILDRED GIBBONS, NAPOLEON C. ZBYSZEWSKEI,

AILEEN BIEL, IDA JACOBSON, GEORGE PAPAN-

_ ' TONATOS, LEON PERMAN, HYMAN M. STEIN,
ALLEN KLEIN, KUNIO SHIMIZO, er at.,

Petitioners,

CITY OF CHICAGO, A Muwrerpan ConyGnarsom,
Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION. _

. a

RayMonp F: Smmon, :
- Corporation Counsel of the City’ of Chicago,
511 City Hall, Chicago, Illinois 60602,

| | Attorney for Respondent.
-. Sypney R. Dresrn, —
Auten Hartman, = 3

Assistant Corporation Counsel, ta ‘

- Of Counsel. - P ee.

oF)

THE GUNTHORP-WARRER PRINTING COMPANY, CnIcAG0 aAGERID 56

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Rash 6ae
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Opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois. Se eas bare sack - oO
Statutes°and Ordinances Involved........... ivagius .- 1
Questions Presented........... See teen caeeees ye
Statement. of the Case..........2...45. Miser ceivis a
Reasons For Denying the Writ: >
| A. . Factual determinations involving conflicts in
' testitnony and other evidence are not property
before this Court . (Rita takemiensetenas 8
B. The Illinois Mitie Court’s determination | :
upholding the validity and constitutionality of
the ordinance regulating self-service, coin-
operated laundries is well supported in law
Or Oe. baerankveeeteven eee O20. ene 9
‘ “Conclusion... . MiiNeeree nee CLARA Seen ise
BPDOMGIE Boo oe ve veneeccceghavccgecweccovsncecess i
PEE Ba os. ak ce hens a A Rue weeeuas ili
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ii

| - AvTuorities. .
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. 8. 27, 30.............-. . 19
Carlson v.. Curtiss, 234 U. S. 103, 106...-........:.,.
City of Chicago v. Miller, 27 il. 2d 211, 220, 188 N. B.
2d 694, cert. denied, ~Burglaries are less likely in self-service, coin-
operated laundries-which are locked and dark because to a
thinking burglar, it could be logically assumed that the
- operator would take home with him the proceeds of the day

(Rec. 26, pp. 473-74). The Illinois Supreme Court held =

that the choice of deterrence, of one type of crime at the
expense ‘of an increase in another involved a typical legis-
lative judgment, 34 Ill. 2d 102, 108.

Reasons for Denying. the Writ.

A. Factual determinations involving confliets in testimony ‘

and other evidence are not properly before this Court.

The main thrust of petitioners’ argument,, under their
' «*Reasons for Granting the Writ,’’ is their dissatisfaction
with the resolution of factual issues by the Master in Chan-
cery and the Illinois Supreme Court. They devote eight of
the eleven pages of their argument to analysis and reargu-
ment of the facts. (Petitioners’ Brief, pp. 8-16.)

This Court has many times held that the place to resolve
conflicts in testimony and an interpretation. thereof is in-
_ the State Court, not in the United States Supreme Court.
In Milkwagon Drivers Union v.. Meadowmoor Dairies,
- Inc., 312 U. 8. 287,:the Court addressed itself to similar
-circuinstances, stating 312 U. 8. at 294):

‘It is not for us to make an ae evaluation
‘of the testimony before the master. We have not only

his findings but his findings authenticated by the state —
‘of Illinois speaking through her supreme court. We.

can. reject such a determination only if we can say
that it is so without warrant as to be a palpable eva-
' sion of the constitutional guaranty here invoked. The
_ place to resolve conflicts in the testimony and in its
interpretation was in the Illinois courts and not here.

- To substitute opr judgment for that of the state court ;

’ is to ee the mee of our Anthority.’ i

~.,
’

. 8

See also, Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois,
340 U. S. 534, 538; Merchants’ Nat’l Bank v. Richmond, :

256 U. S. 635, 638; Carlson v. Curtiss, 234 U. S. 103,106. -
An examination of the testimony in the record, as\hereto-
fore set forth in the preceding ‘‘Statement of the Case,’’
demonstrates that the findings of fact as posited by the,
Illinois Sipreme Court are well supported nd substantial

oe evidence.

A8 this Court has indicated, therefore, a review of fac-
tual’issues. is not a proper basis for granting a writ of .
certiorari and respondent - —- — that the
— be denied.

’
= s

- B. The Illinois prone Court’s determination upholding ~

the validity and constitutionality of the ordinance regu-
- lating self-service, coin-operated laundries is well sup-
ported i in law and i in fact.

_. The .authority to regulate ‘nities: has lion delegated. '

directly, as well as impliedly, by the Illinois Legislature to. ~~
municipalities, as demonstrated by the collation of statu-
tory grants of power relating to this subject: setoforth in
Appendix A hereof (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 24, pars. 1-2-1,

. N\

11-1-1, 11-5-2, 11-8-2, 11-16-1, 11- 20-5, 11-30-4, 11-42-8, 11- © °

60-1) (App.. i-ii). Having proceeded from legislative
authority, the rule obtains that there is a presumption
favoring the validity of the ordinance. City of Recatur v.
Chasteen, 19 Ill. 2d'204, 210, 166 N.E» 2d 29. ‘

~ The question of whether there is, any connection between
the ordinance provisions under attack and the police power
exercised thereby, and the question of whether the ordi-
_nanée is a reasonable exercise of that police power, is pri-
marily a matter for legislative determinatio& which will
' not be disturbed by the courts unless there is a palpably

arbitrary exercise: of said power. Schuringa v. City of

10

Chicago,’30 Ill. 2d 504, 509,198 N.E. 2d 526. The ordinance
provisions need not be scientific, logical or consistent, but
need only have a reasonable basis’ when considered with
* reference to the ‘purpose of the Legislature. City of Chi-
cago v.: Miller, 27 Ill. 2d 211,220, 188 N.E. 2d 694, cert. |
denied, 375 U. S. 11. The judicial function in this resp@ct
is exhausted with the discovery that*the relation between:
the means and the end:is not ‘wholly vain and fanciful or
an illusory pretérise. Willams v. Mayor and City Council
of Baltimore, 289 U, S. 36, 49, ~

This Court has recently announced that it has retarsiea
_ to the original constitutional proposition that courts will ‘
not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the .
judgment of legislative bodies which are elected to ‘pass
laws. In Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, this Court, —
quoting from Olsen v. N ebraska, 313 U. S. 236, 246; Sproles
v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 388; and Lincoln Federal Labor
Union, A.F. L. v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U: S.
525, . 536, reaffirmed the principles enunciated «in a
cases, stating (372 U. S- at 730-31) :

‘© We are not concerned : . . with the wisdoni, add
or appropriateness of the legislation.’ Legislative
bodies. have broad scope to experiment with, economic
problems, and this Court does not sit to ‘subject the
State to an intolerable supervision hostile to the basic
principles of our Government and wholly beyond the
protection. whith the general clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to secure.’ It is now settled
_ that States ‘have power to legislate against what are
_ , found to be injuridus practices in their internal com-
mercial and business affairs, so long as theit laws do
not. run afoul of some specific. federal constitutional .
prohibition, or of some valid federal law.’ ”’

Petitioners nevertheless ask this Court to. et as a super-
legislature, to weigh the wisdom of legislation which, in ‘the

Skrupa ease, this Court said it would emphatically refuse —

"'

‘amount of competition enc ntered in that particular neigh-

borhood Rec. 26, pp.-154, 228, 236,, 282, 283, 292, 298,

311, 372, 394, 428), the age of the store and the type and ©

maintenance of equipment (Rec. 26, pp. 236, 282, 394), as
well as: the business practices of the individual entrepre-
neur. (Rec. 26, p. 236). One such operator was frank to
admit that he wished to sell his stores-because they do not

yield sufficient returns on the investment, including stores .
__ which show a considerable profit, and that the ordinance’
provisions under attack had no bearing on this decision

which he had made several months prior to passage of the
ordinance (Rec. 26, p. 241). A representative of one of
the largest laundry equipment suppliers in the industry ©
testified that the new ordinance would have no effect upon

his business and that his customers eould still make a_

reasonable profit on their businesses (Rec. 26, p. 291)..
The record thus demonstrates that the issue of how the.

" ordinance provisions will affect this industry is enigmatic,
to say the least. Notwithstanding the probability of some

adverse effect, the fact. alone that the ordinance may—op-—

— erate to impose burdens or yr restrictions on property which

would not have existed without the enactment of this pro-
vision is not determinative of the question of its validity.
Goldblatt w. Town of. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590; Kaukas v.
City of Chicago, 27 Ill. 2d 197, 203, 188 .N. E. 2d 700, cert.

' dented, 375 U.S. 8. - |
a Petitioners a sert that no ‘regulation is needed: due- to——

al injurids, quoting, out of con-
text, a so-called concession to that effect by.the Supreme
Court of ‘ling is (Pétitioners’ Brief, p. 10). Both the
record and the Supreme ‘Court opinion are in contradic-

tion_of that conclusion. The record shows that ‘a variety

of-risks to p patrons, other occupants of the building, and

to property, exist with respect to the operation of machjn-
ery and other equipment in self-service, coin-operated laun-—

13

dries, including shorting of initia wiring and blowing of

'.. ‘fuses (Rec. 26, p. 141), fires taking place i in and ‘about said:

machinery (Rec. 26, pp, 194, 201, 203, 206, 247, 248, 249,
270, 295, 323, 333, 337, “367, 370, 379, 381, 401, 414, 576),
clogging of machinery (Rec. 26; pp. 216-17), breaking of »
machine parts accessible to the public (Rec. 26, pp. 249-50,
369), burning out of* electrical motors and other glectrical
_ equipment (Ree. 26, pp. 369-70), overflowing of*water from
machines onto the ‘theta (Rec. 26, pp. 180, 190, 217, 224, .
269, 270, 271, 307, 323, 249, 364, 383, 389, 430, 530, 592), -
and ene of ventilating equipment (Rec. 26, p. ~
519).

One of senpieaiiiik*s witnesses, ‘Charlee L. Pierce, Bat-,
_talion Chief of the Fire Prevention Bureau of the Chicago .
‘Fire Department, stated, in this regard (Rec. 26, p. 507):

‘‘The point we. are concerned about is that it is ‘good
fire prevention thinking to have somebody who will
recognize a hazard once it starts.and to eliminate it
if possible, then callin somebody to rectify it.
“Tf there is nobody in attendance and the motor is
- malfunctioning, there is nobody to notify an authority
_ that the motor is malfunctioning, that it is sparking, |
'. arcing, or overheated, and so on, until such time as:
it either burns itself out or causes a fire, then the
_ proper authorities are notified, namely, the owner of
the premises. You would not need any particular
special knowledge to recognize when the ‘motor was
—— malfunctioning; just be observing’ to see whether a
motor is sparking or arcing, and if you: have the God-.
- given sense of smell you could smell a motor burning
and you could smell the overheating of it ‘arid so on.’

‘The Illinois Supreme Court opinion bears fully upon this
point, as follows (34 Ill. 2d 102; 106-08):

‘ Sypyney R. Dresin, -— ay eee ‘:
Auten Harrmay, :* ee
Assistant Corporation Couns&,
Of Counsel.

sd

i 0-1 Dn ately aligns
*.

APPENDIX A.

‘Provisions of the Illinois Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1965, ch. 24), insofar as they relate ‘to the issues of this
case, are as follows: | a

1-2-1. Ordinances and rules to execute powers—Limita-
' tions on punishments, ae :

§-1-2-1. ‘The corporate authorities of each municipality ~
may pass all ordinances and make all rules and regulations
proper or necessary, to carry into effect the powers granted
to municipdlities, with such fines or penalties as may be
deemed proper. 3 :

11-1-1.. Police ordinances, — ‘tain ie aeeeter _—— emmy ane + -

-11- 16.1 Board: of health. meaty

ii
§ 11-16-1. The corporate authorities of each dcichpality

may provide for and maintain a board of health, consisting
of more men one person, and to preeene its powers and

- duties, .

'11-20-5. Promotion of health,

_ §11-20-5. The corporate authorities of each municipality .
may do all acts and make all regulations which may be ,
necessary or expedient for the premotion of health or the.
suppression of diseases, including the regulation of plumb-
ing and the fixtures, materials, design and installation meth- ©

ods of plumbing systems subject to the — ‘of the — —
‘-Tilinois Plumbing Code Law... .

11-30-4. Construction of buildings and fire escapes. ,

§ 11-30-4. The corporate authorities of each municipality
may prescribe the strength and manner of constructing all
buildings, structures and their. accessories scar of the con-
struction of fire escapes, thereon.

11-42-8. ee a eae use: trailers
Cabins—Tents—Laundries—Bathing béaches..

-§ 11-42-8. The corporate authorities of each municipality
may locate and regulate the use and construction of .
laundries. ee ;

11-60-1. Issuance and revocation of licenses.

§1-60:1. .The corporate authorities-of each municipality .
may fix the amount, terms, and manner of issuing and ‘re-

voking licenses.

> ili

APPENDIX B.

Sections 145-24. 1 through 145-24.6 of the Municipal Code
of Chicago, adopted on July 28,4961, are as follows: )

ee
__Be e It Ordained by the Caty Council of the City of Chicago: ,
Section. 1. Chapter 145 of the Municipal Code of Chi-
cago entitled ‘‘Laundries and Laundry “Vehicles” is
amended by inserting the following new sections i in their
- proper numerical sequence :

Self-Service Coin-Operated Laultitey Establishments ;

| 145-24.1. Compliance.) Laundry establishments :
‘commonly known as-self-service ‘coin-operated ‘shall

comply with section 81-7, the general applicable -pro- . —

visions of chapter 99, and ‘the provisions of the ee
Zoning Ordinance.

145-242. Attendant. ) There shall be pour in.
every ‘self-service coin-operated establishment of this
type.an attendant between the hours .of 6: :00 P .-M. and

11:30 P.M.

” 145-24.3. Certificate of fitnese:) . person shall
- act as an attendant in any such laundry establishment, _
unless he shall be the holder ofa certificate of fitness ©
issued by the division marshal in charge of the bureau
of fire prevention and the’commissioner of health. Be-
fore the issuance of any such certificate, the division
marshal in charge of the bureau of fire prevention
- and the commissioner of health shall ‘examine the
applicant as to his qualifications to fill such position.
_ To receive a certificate of fithess the applicant must:

(a) be a citizen: of the United States ;

(b) be of. legal age; temperate habits and good
moral character ;

Se

(c) be able to speak a understand the English
language; = . \
(d) produce evidence of his employinésit or occu-
pation and residence for the previous 2 years;

(e) be familiar with the operation of the machines
-in the establishment ; and |

(f) be familiar with risks incident to .the-opera; |
tion of the machines. and capable of nee,
'__ the necessary precautions,

The annual fee for the “issuance ‘or renewal of any
such certificate shall be twelve dollars and shall bé paid
to the city collector.

Where a self-service coin-operated dry cleaning
establishment and a self-service coin-operated Jaundry.
establishment are operated on the same premises only :

-one attendant, who is the holder of a certificate of fit- _
- ness issued pursuant to section 121-13.3 of this code, .
‘Shall be required. ~- ° :

145-24.4. Plans.) ° Any pains establishing a laun-
dry of the coin-operated self-service type shall be re-
quired to submit to the commissioner ef buildings ‘for
fai appsciiel a complete set of plans and specifications |
-of the. building in which such establishment is to be
located and also a complete diagram of the floor plan :
of each room to be occupied by such establishment, -
showing the arrangement or setting of -all machinery
and equipment to be installed therein. Each.such plan
shalt be éxplicit and complete.

145-24.5. Hours of operation. ) No jativemaiatea |
self-service laundry now or. hereafter established shall
be operated between the hours of 11:30 P.M. and 6:30 —
°° |

145-24.6. Fees.) The anual license fee for each

self-service coin-operated laundry establishment is

hereby fixed as follows: $150.00 for each establishment

- having fifteen or less self-service °coin-operated ma-

chines and $5.00 for each machine in excess of Sfteen
machines maintained upon the premises. ©

oe

Vv
iin 2. The last paragraph i in Section 145-4 is here-
by repealed.

- SEcTION 2 This ordinance shall’ become effective Sep- .
tember 1, 1961;-provided, however, that persons’ licensed
prior to’ that date shall not be required to pay any further
fee for the year 1961 and persons licensed subsequent to ¢
‘effective date hereof ‘shall pay one-third of the fees pre-
scribed herein for the balance of the year 1961, —

Amendments to Section 145- 24.3 and 145-24.4, adopted
April 17, 1964, areasfollows: = - ;

Bel t Ordained by the City Council of the City of Didddige: :

Section 1. Section 145-24.3 of the Municipal Code of
Chicago is: amended by striking out subparagraphs (a), -
{b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) and a? in lieu hess
the following:

(a) be of legal age, temperate habits and good moral
character ;
(b) be able to speak and understand the English
'* Janguage; -
ve (c) produce, evidence of his employment | or. occupation
and residence for the previous 2 years; _ |
(d) be familiar. with the operations of the machines
in the establishment; and YY

(e) be familiar with r ish incident to the operation
‘of the machines ari — of oe saa neces-
sary precautions. | a ,

- Also by striking, out the sentence following said group of
subparagraphs and substituting therefor the following:

_ Upon compliance with the above and payment to the
““City Collector of an annual’ fee of $12.00 for the is-
suance or renewal of any such certificate, such certifi-
_cate shall be issued to the applicant. |

4

vi

ictiiain 2. Section 145-24. 4 of said Code i is amended to ‘
read as follows:

| ‘Any person establishing a laundry of the raat
wet _ self-service type shall be required. to submit to the —
es commissioner of buildings for his approval a complete
set of plans and specifications and a complete diagram
. of the floor plan of each room to be occupied by such
ee ' establishment, showing the arrangement or setting of.
ae | | machinery and-equipment to be installed therein.

___Each such plan shall. be explicit and complete.

x Section 3. This ordinance ‘shall become effective upon - iB;
its passage and due publication. ;

ee

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385602_1556%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
