# Memorandum in Reply — Ford v. United States > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385602_1480%3A4 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Memorandum in Reply - **Published:** January 1, 1967 - **Citation:** 389 U.S. 898 ## Text . Offioe-Supreme -Lepri, U.0. oe FILED “JUN 13 1966 — —— —— Oo CLERK “he THE a Sapreme poe of the United States ! OcrosER TERM, 1965 | . Nos. 1309S /3;9 ¥ . LEMOIN CREE AND ‘MARIE CREE, HIS wiFE, FREE- * THOUGHT. SOCIET Y OF AMERICA, MADALYN E. er TRUSTEE, AND Le : " cy e ve ‘ JOSEPH ALLEN, , Attorneys for: es } City Solicitor of . . ROBERT L. MAINEN, Supervisor of eM City, Assessments of Baltimore City, and en and % ‘ ¢ CLAYTON A. DIETRICH, JOHN G. ARTEUR, Director of’ Chief ant City . . Assessments for Baltimore City, 548 Tower Building, See ee Baltimore, Md. 21202 & : WILLIAM L. MARBURY, Attorneys for : ; ‘ana - THE CONVENTION OF THE PROT. 7 -MATHIAS J. DeVITO — OF THE DIOCESE OF MABY- y 900 First Natl. Bank Bldg, ‘LAND, : # ° si Maat! Ma. bg al : , 250 ‘ ‘oe . * © . $ } a - ' . . 2 . ? - * be ~ i . nA INDEX. TABLE OF ConTENTS is PAGE I Ci vs cyececincesasndeapencdiigtowsscaimeremnnnias 1 | , STATEMENT OF THE RIES ssc ey oan ra Nay a - ARGUMENT: A. No Substantial . Federal Question Is Presented +5 “a x. B. No, Justiciable Case or Controversy Is Pre- : sented ae Oni Se Ee ee enn ee Te aa: 11 CONCLUSION .............. SEF ESE Nine thud item ti dedane ee ae | . - TABLE OF CITATIONS. | pal f 3 Cases | Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 - (Tada Rent 9 ley A Et Ble Oe ON eh OR 7,10. Bell’s Gap R.R. Co. v. ‘Penniylvania, 134 US. 232 | 7 aa eh re ae Sa Tee ene REN Se. Carmichael v. Soiabiaenn Coal & Coke Co., 301°U. a ee ERS eis eS ea plats Aca ROE tice AMIN ene eS City and County.6f San Seeniinte v. McGovern, 152 ; P. 980 (Cal. App., 1915) ...........%... eer oe County of Santa Clara v..Southern Pac. R. Co., 18 F. 385 (9th Cir., 1882), affirmed, 118 U.S. 394 (1886) 6 | | Doremus v. Bd. of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952) a) Elliott v. White, 23 F. 2d 997 (D.C. Cir., 1638)......... 11 ' Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 315. cae 2 & foo Be ey ee eer peer = First Unitarian Church v. Los png, 357 U. S. 545, (1958) ....... SaAROGE. See an 8 Follett v. McCormick, 321 US. 573 (1944) Se ee Garrett Biblical Institute v. Elmhurst State Bank, . 163 N.E, 5: (i, Te) ....-604.... Hite tone irre Se eee ? a Py 6 ae ii . . PAGE Geneve Finance ieee v. Archetto, 176 A. 2d 73, (R.L, 1961), dismissed, 369 U.S. 423 (1961) 0.00... ae ‘ Gibbons x, District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404 (1886) 8 _ Hyde v. State, 228 Md. 209, 179 A. 2d 421 (1962) ..+ (4 _ Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 298 P. 2d 1 (Cal., 1956), dismissed, 352 U.S. 921 (1956) ............... 6,7 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) ........ - 11 | Sisters of Holy Cross v. Town of Brookline, 198 N.E. SE UE Cg NE oss cakes accu csreces 6 Sovereign Camp, W.OW. v. Casados, 21 F. Supp. 989 (D.C: N.M., 1938), affirmed, 305 U.S. 558 Cs Ga eercaiaen gf Sh Sere oe et oe eee ee 6,8 State v. Alabama Educational Foundation, 163 So. . ee ee ee 6 Swallow v. United States, 325 F. 2d 97: (10th Ce.. 1963); cert. denied, 371 U.S. 950 ( 1963), ‘yehear- ing denied, 372 U.S. 925 (1963) ...... Weinehocr Shane 6, 7,11 ‘ Torcaso. v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 468 (1961) 0.2.00... 10 -. United States v. Dept. “of Revenue of State of Ill, . 202 F. Supp. 787 (D.C. N.D., Ill, 1962), affirmed, i, ee We COD lees kc niece taney 6,8 Williams v. Baltimore, 289 — 36 COED pioetetiniie 8,9.° ° ‘Statutes Constitution of the United States: Article ITI— Section2 ..:...:........ Ai Bete Be ne) PAE ost owe ea : 5 + Birst Amendment .).....................0000: 2, 3, 4, 5, 8,10, 11 Fourteenth Amendment ...................... vee aan jan ae Constitution of Maryland*® Declaration of Rights— Article 15 1. ee eae soe ree Article 23... Pape oN hens Oe Dia aon 2 Article 36 6. eee in Ae -_ 2 a = 2 iii 0 . PAGE Annétated Code of Maryland (1957 Ed.) _ as Amended: | ‘ 7 Article 81— : , RI 2 icccectcorcsrccs cance utter ent 9 Section 9(4) o........cclegeceee. ecient ae 2 Alaska Constitution: Article IX— 3 Section 40 ooo... Ma teaer RAY heme cites 6 Rev. Laws of Hawaii 1955 (1961 Supp.): | | Chapter 128-18 0... Pi ne Sat oh Some sok Pret 6 . Miscellaneous 6 * Kauper, The Constitutionality of Tax Exemptions ‘for Religious Activities in “The Wall Between Church and State”, 95, 110 (Oaks ed. 1963) ........ Note, Constitutionality of Tax Benefits Accorded Re- ligion, 49 Col. L. Rev. 968 (1940) 2.0.00... | Van Alstyne, Tax Exemption of Church. Property; 20 Ohio St. L. J. 461 (1959) ............ FER MCENROE | ao aN $ Supreme Court of the United States Ocroser TERM, 1965 | Nos. 1309 and 1311 , -LEMOIN CREE anp MARIE CREE, HIS WIFE, FREE- ' THOUGHT SOCIETY OF AMERICA; MADALYN-E. . MURRAY, TRuSTEE,.AND.LEDDIE MAYS, Petitioners, = * - ; : V. LOUIS L. GOLDSTEIN, cOMPTROLLER OF THE. TREASWRY OF MARYLAND; ALBERT W. WARD, DIRECTOR, STATE DEPART- MENT OF _ ASSESSMENTS AND’ TAXATION; ROBERT L. MAINEN, SUPERVISOR OF ASSESSMENTS .OF BALTIMORE ciry; JOHN G.:ARTHUR, DIRECTOR OF ASSESSMENTS FOR - -BALTIMORE City; THE MOST~REVEREND LAWRENCE ~ J. SHEHAN, ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF BALTIMORE, A CORPORATION SOLE; THE CONVENTION OF THE. PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF THE DIG, | . CESE OF MARYLAND; UNITED CHRISTIAN CITI- . « ZENS, INCORPORATED; TEMPLE EMANUEL OF BALTIMORE anp MARYLAND SYNOD OF THE LUTHERAN CHURCH IN AMERICA, Respondents. On PETITION FOR A- WRIT OF. CERTIORARI TO THE a, [ ’ Court OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND ; BRIEF - OF RESPONDENTS GOLDSTEIN, WARD, MAINEN, ARTHUR and THE CONVENTION OF THE : PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF THE DIO- CESE OF MARYLAND IN ste iaamaitainss . / QUESTION PRESENTED : . lh addition to the questions set forth by the petitioners in | their ‘respective petitions, the following question is pre- of sented by this case: x : 7 a Pp e — Whether the constitutional issues that petitioners at- tempt to ott a justiciable case or controversy under the provisions of Section 2 of Article III of i the constitution of the United States. © S STATEMENT OF THE CASE The suit below challenging Maryland’s statutory tax exemption for houses of public worship was originally brought by the petitioners Murray and’ _ Mays in Circuit: Court No. 2.of Baltimore City against the respondents the’. Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland, the State Direc- tor of Assessments and Taxation, the Supervisor of Assess- » ments of Baltimore City and the Director of Assessments for Baltimore City. Subsequently, petitioners Cree and Freethought Society of America intervened in the case as -plaintiffs, and the respondents the Roman Catholic . Archbishop of Baltimore, the Convention of the Protestant _ Episcopal Church of the Diocese of Maryland, the United > Christian Citizens, Incorporated, Temple Emanuel of Balti- more, and the. Maryland Synod. of the Lutheran Church in “America intervened as defendants. S ' The complaint, which was brought in petitioners’ capac- ity as taxpayers, alleged that the exemption [Section «9 (4) of Article 81 of the Maryland Code] is invalid because: (1) it violates Articles 15, 23 and 36 of the Declaration of Rights of. the Maryland Constitution (2) it violdtes t First Amendment to the. United States Constitution, made applicable to thestates by virtue of the Fourteenth Amend- ment, because it is a law respecting the establishment of ”% a religion and a law prohibiting the free exercise thereof - (3) it violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United . States Constitution because it deprives the petitioners — and others similarly,situated of property without due pro- cess of law.: All of the respondents except Temple Emanuel -, aa ° - '3 j | a 7 Ob answered the complaint by denying the petitioners’ claims of unconstitutionality and challenging the petitioners’ standing to bring the action. Respondent Temple Emanuel’s’ - answer also denied that the exemption was unconstitu-. tional, but did so on the explicit ground, not asserted by | the other respondents, that the Free Exercise Clause of the Figyst Amendnient prohibits -governmental taxation ios buildings used. as houses of worship. © ; ¢ _At the hearing in the circuit court, dies was yw introduced by the. parties to show the actual scope —~ of the exemption, as it is applied by the taxing.authorities, andthe amount of property affectéd thereby.’ It was shown by’ the testimony of the Director of Assessments for Baltimore City that the exemption is comprehensively , applied by the taxing authorities to all buildings used for the purpose of teaching or.contemplating the beliefs of a ' philosophical system,. regardless of: whether that philo- sophical system includes as one of its precepts a belief in the existence of a Supreme Being. It was hic shown, however, that the exemption is strictly applied only to buildings in actual use for such purposes, and, for that — reason, is not available for property held ‘by. religious; or } | philosophical organizations ~ for’ investment or other such ~ uses. Documentary evidence revealed that in Baltimore _ City the exemption excludes from real property taxation about 2.8% of the total assessable real estate in the) City, and accounts for about 13.5% of ‘all of the property ex- empted from taxation under the various exemptions pro- vided by law. At the condlusion of the case, the trial* court, in a lengthy © ' . and well-considered opinion, dismissed the complaint with prejudice, fifiding thatthe petitioners had standing to _ assert ll of their federal and‘state constitutional conten- & vA * Rap URC ans ARS UME HE See De ein bse 4 tions, but holding that the exemption is not unconstitu- — tional as claimed. With respect to the federal constitutional questions, the court concluded that the exemption is not in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because there exists. a fairly discernible re- lationship between the exemption andthe } public good, and that it does not violate the Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment because it . represents no more than a position ‘of governmental neu- trality toward religi or which the constitution does not forbid. In reaching conclusion. that the exemption is constitutional, the court found it unnecessary to consider respondent Temple Emanuel’s argument that the Free’ Ex- -ercise Clause prohibits governrfiental taxation of houses of worship. On appeal to thé Court of. Appeals of Maryland, the » petitioners apparently abandoned their.due process’ and free exercise contentions, for, in the case of petitioners . Cree.and Freethought Society of America, the only federal constitutional argument asserted was an: establishment argument,* and in the. case of petitioners Murray and Mays, the only federal constitutional contentions were an ‘estab- | lishment. argument and an equal protection argument, the — 4 ‘latter being asserted by them for the first time. : Appeals of Maryland, an argument not presented in a party’s brief | “* Despite the fact, that’ their ‘brief im the Court of pte of Maryland contained no argumerit based_on the Free Exercise Clause er the Due Process Clause, petitioners Cree and Fréethought Society’ of America criticize the court for failing to have considered those provisions of the constitution in its opinion (petition; pp. 5-6, 13-14). This criticism is unjustified.. Under the present rules of the Court of is considered to have been waived. See Hyde v. State, 228 Md. 209, 218, 179 A. 2d 421 (1962). Certainly in the light of this rule, the . reasonabl@ne@s of which is beyond question, petitioners Cree and Freethought Society ‘of Americ# must be regarded as having aban- doned their free exercise and due process contentions in the Court of Appeals by not having a icguaratee them in their brief. ‘ . 3 : § a . o > ‘ , ° . ; - o ’ [ oe) 5 cae The coms of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision tismissing the complaint, but on slightly different grounds than: those relied upon by the. trial éourt. The Court ‘of Appeals held. that the exemption does not violate‘ the’ _ Establishment Clause because, despite its religious origins,” ‘the primary purpose and effect of the exemption is now secular in nature, and that it does not violate the Equal Protection Clause (a ground not presented. to or considered _ by the trial court) because it is grafited without discrimina- * tion to all organizations having or professing a belief con- cerning religion. Like the trial court, the Court of Appeals _ found it unnecessary in reaching its conclusion to consider — _ vespondent Temple Emanuel’s free-exercise contention, Following the denial by the Court of Appeals of the motion of petitioners Cree and Freethought Society of America for ‘a reargument, the petitioners filed in this Court their present. petitions for a writ of certiorari. =” ARGUMENT, It is respectfuily submitted that this case presents no question that this Court should review on certiorari. The petitioners’ constitutional attack upon Maryland’s statu- tory tax exemption for houses.of worship involves no fed- eral question of any substance, and,. in addition, presents no*case! or controversy reviewable by this Court under the provisions of ection 2 of Article III of the constitution of | the United States. . A. Ne Substantial Federal Question Is Presented Constitutional or statutory tax exemptions for houses _. of worship and other property of religious organizations 4 exist in every state of the union and in the District of _ Columbia. Some of them date back to early colonial times ~ ' while others, such as those of Alaska and Hawaii, are of © = recent origin. See Note, Constitutionality, of Tax : » "&S ? é 6 “ r : ‘ ; Benefits Accorded Religion, 49 Col! L. Rev. 968 (1949); Van Alstyne, Tax Exemption of Church Property, 20 Ohio St. L>J..461 (1959); Kaufper, The Constitutionality of Tax Exemptions for Religious Activities in “The Wall Between Church and State”, 95;110 (Oaks ed. 1963); Alaska Const., Art. IX, sec. 4; Rev. Laws of~Hawaii 1955 (1961 Supp. ) ch. 128-18. Throughout the long history of these exemp~ tiorfs inthis country, not one has ever been set aside as invalid yinder the federal consfitution, though the question has been raised from time to time in Roth the state and _ federal courts. The state cases which have upheld such’ exemptions are: City and County -of San Francisco v. McGovern, 152 P.. 980, 989 (Cal. App., 1915); "Garrett Biblical Institute v. Elmhurst State Bank, 163 N.E. 1, 45 (Ill. 1928); State». Alabama Educational Foundation, 163 So. 527 (Ala., 1935); Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 298 P. 2d 1 (Cal., 1956), dismissed, 352 U.S. 921 (1956); Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 315 P. 2d 394, 406-409 (Cal. App., 1957); -General Finance Corp. v. Archeétto, 176 A. 2d 73, 76-79 (R.I., 1961), dismissed, 369 U.S. 423 (1962); Sisters of Holy ~ Cross v. Town of Brookline, 198 N.E. 2d 624, 633 (Mass., 1964). The federal cases are: County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 18 F. 385, 400 (9th Cir., per Associat Justice Field, 1882), affirmed, 118 U.S. 394 (1886); Sovereign Camp, W. O. W. v.:Casados, 21 F. Supp. 989 (D.C. N.M.;° 1938), affirmed, 305 U.S. 558 (1938) ); United States'v. Depart- ment of Revenue of State.of IIl., 202 F. Supp.- ‘757 (D.C. N.D., Ill., 1962), affirmed, 371 U.S. 21 (1962); Swallow v. United States, 325 F. 2d 97°(19th Cir., 1963), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 950 (1963), ‘rehearing denied, 372 U. S. 925 (1963). ) Although this Court has never in a full opinion addresged itself to the precise constitutional questions raised in the petitions, it has consistently indicated its accord with the view that no constitutional question of any importance is re) 2 . : presented in the exemption of sroperty of religious organ- izations from taxation. For example; as recently as 1962 - ‘and 1956, it dismissed for want: of a substantial federal ‘question two appeals from state courts raising the iden- tical questions presented here, Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 298 P. 2d 1 (Cal., 1956), dismissed, 352 U.S. 921 — (1956) and Generat Finance Corp. v. Archetto, 175 A. 2d . 73 (RI, 1961), dismissed, ‘369 U.S. 423 (1962); and in 1963 . it. denied certiorari in the only case directly challenging . (but without avail) the federal income tax exemption to _ religious institutions, Swallow v. United States, 325 F. 2d 97 (10th Cir., 1963), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 950 (1963), re- _ hearing denied, 372 U.S. 925 (1963). Moreover, in Abington _ School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S..203, 301 (1963), the recent case in which this Court declared unconstitutional the recitation of prayer and the reading of the Bible in the public Schools, Mr. ‘Justice Brerinan’s concurring opinion - specifically recognized the validity of. tax exemptions to ‘religious groups. uth . - The foregoing are but reiterations of this Court’s attitude throughout the years that tax exemptions for religious bodies are constitutionally inoffensive. On numerous oc- . casions in the past the Court has had the opportunity to consider such” exemptions: in cases involving collateral questions, and it always has taken for grarited their com- — ina =: See particularly Gibbons v. District of * As one of the reasons for “tities 3 such exemptions; Mr. Justice Brennan pointed out that they have been given without discrimirttation ‘to “popular as well as unpopular sects, arid in some instances ‘to those organizations which do not profess a belief in God. .The testimony of Mr. Arthur in thisecase, as described inthe lower court’s opinion © (petitioners ,] ‘Murray and } Mays’ Appendix II, p. 31a); °clearly shows _that the Baltimore City~ practice is in accord with Mr. Justice | Brennan’s statement. - The exemption in question is made available, without discrimination, to all. sects contemplating the beliefs of a YS philosophical. system, regardless of ‘ whether it involves a belief in ~ the existence of a Supreme Being. ¢ ,= Columbia, 116 U.S. 404, 408 (1886). Bell’s Gap R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 237 (1890); and First Unitarian Church v. Los Angeles, 357 ‘U.S. 545 (1958). And, it has, on at least two occasions, affirmed without opinion decisions -of lower federal courts specifically upholding tax exemp- tions for religious organizations. See Sovereign Camp, W. O. W. v. Casados, 21 F. Supp. 989 (D.C. N.M., 1938), _ affirmed, 305 U.S. 558 (1938) and United States v. Depart- ment of Internal Revenue of State of Ill., 202 F. Supp. 757 (D.C. -N.D., Ill, 1962), affirmed, 371 US. 21 (1962). These authorities seem: ‘to leave little room for doubt that no federal question of substance is presented in a consti- tutional attack upon religidus tax exemptions. The main thrust of petitioners’ attack upon the exemp- tion is based upon the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, They séy in essence that the exemption amounts to nothing more than a grant of money by the state for the support of churches, which amounts to a constitutionally prohibited establishment of religion. There ‘is nothing in this argument that has not already been re- jected many times before: It-has_never been accepted by ‘any court: Although a tax. ‘exemption may Dein the same economic | . effect as a direct grant of money, the legal framework under _which its functions is vastly different. At the heart of the ‘legal basis for tax exemptions is the well-settled consti-'. tutional principle that the state is free to select its objects of taxation, and pursuant to ,this power, ‘may altogether decline to tax certain kinds of property, so long as there is a reasonablé basis for the exemption. Carmichael v. Southen Coal and Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937); Williams v. Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36 (1933). Our tax laws, both state and federal, have been constructed on the theory’ that s gS 9 eee oe may elect not to tax certain transactions or .. classes of property for reasons of policy which would be- wholly insufficient to justify direct subsidies. Exemptions. which the state legislatures, in their, wisdom, grant to indi- viduals or organizations in order to encourage or foster the public good long have been recognized as proper, and all ' that is required to sustain them is a showing of some fairly discernible relationship between the good of the person re- ceiving the exemption and the good’ of the community. . ' Williams v. Baltimore, supra. a In .the exercise of this prerogative to exempt for the public good, the’ Maryland Legislature, like most other - state assembliés, has exempted from taxation numerous kinds and types of organizations, including (in addition to _ houses of worship), hospitals, schools; charitable institu- - tions, fraternal beneficiary associations, manufacturers, veterans’ organizations, credit unions, historical societies, the Boy Scouts, volunteer fire departments, and that is just — to name a few. (See Section 9 of Article 81 of the Maryland Code, set forth in petitioners Murray and Mays’ Appendix III.) Théfact that an exemption from taxation has been accorded to these various organizations certainly. cannot mean that the legislature has “established” them as ‘state. instrumentalities, or adopted their purposes as state aims. Their sélection for tax exempt status only represents a legislative'judgment that, for the people in the community © affected by these institutions, the encouragement of them will produce socially desirable results, which, in the long run; will be of benefit to all of the people of the state. Churches are but one of the many organizations selected by the legislature as an instrument capable of adding to the general public good, and to say as petitioners apparently contend,-that their exemption “establishes” religions is tan- tamount to saying that the other exemptions must do like- wt <” 10 wise to the other organizations thatenjoy om. This, of course, is not the case. @romotion of religion, such as requiring prayer in the pub- lic schools or establishing a belief in God as a. require- - ment to holding public office, Abington School District v. Schempp. 374 U.S. 203 (1963) and‘ Torcaso v.: Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). It does not include indirect ‘and A prohibited establishment’ must it a a State passive accommodations, such as nondis¢riminatory tax ex- — emptions, which infringe no religious oms. As Mr. - Justices Goldberg, Brennah and Harlan, ‘pointed out in the Schempp case, supra, the Figst Amendment does not for- bid the state to provide accommodations for those people in the community who, in the free exercise of their beliefs, desire to embrace religious doctrine. Indeed, the Free Exercise Clause of the’ First-Amendment may be fairly said to require the states, in their pursuit of neutrality, to provide some accommodation in this area. It is.contrary to _ the constitution for the state to impose certain forms of taxation upon the exercise of religion, Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944), and while we do not suggest ‘that the state could not ‘constitutionally_place-a-property tax on churches and houses of worship, we do think that the legislature properly could have made and has made a factual judgment ‘that true neutrality: required it to re- frain from the taxation of religious institutions. We think that the legislature could properly regard the exemption - asa practical way to accord the churches and its members private right. of the individual to ‘freely oneiine the re- ligious beliefs guaranteed him by, the First Amendment. In view of the foregoing, it seems clear that petitioners’ “ “constitutional claims fail to present any federal question of substance that this Court should review on certiorari. ha.’ 'd A ‘ll . B. No Justiciable Case or Controversy Is Presented’ “ _ It is well settled that in order. for a person to assert the . _invalidity of a statute on a First Amendment ground in this Court, he must show that he will sustain some direct injury to his own interests as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he will ‘suffer in some tndefinite way in common with people generally. For that reason, a suit 3 brought by‘a person in his capacity as a taxpayer will _. not present a justiciable case or controversy unless he shows some adverse impact on his own individual in- ‘ terests which is different than those of other taxpayers generally. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Elliott v. White, 23 F. 24.997 (D.C. Cir., 1928); Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952); Swallow v. - United States, 325 F. 2d 97, 98 (10th’ Cir., 1963), cert denied, ° 371 U.S. 950 (1963), teat denied, 372 US. 925 (1963). The present suit was brought by. vetioners in their’ capacity. as taxpayers. They have shown no adverse im- pact on their individual rights as a result of ‘the enforce- ment of the tax exemption ‘under attack, and, for/that rea- ~ son, they present no justiciable case or controversy subject to review by this Court on certiorari. : | Si : MATHIAS J. DeVITO ie gs ae Soe or 3 ‘CONCLUSION -¥or the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that both — for a-writ of ee be — Respectfully submitted, THOMAS B. FINAN, Attorneys for: - Attorney General, . LOUIS L. GOLDSTEIN, Comptroller i: ane a dy of the Treasury of Maryland, and | ROBERT C. MURPHY, 2g ALBERT. Ww. te Director, State . epartment o 8 ents” and — Deputy Attorney oan, * Taxation, ses JOSEPH ALLEN,’ Attorneys for: = =" ‘City Solicitor of ROBERT L. MAINEN, Supervisor of Baltimofe City, Assessments of Baltimore City, and _ana-—— anni Es ; . fe CLAYTON A. DIETRICH,” «JOHN. G. ARTHUR, Director of » Chief Assistant City Assessments for Baltimore City, . Solicitor, eee ‘ji ; ie « e WILEIAM L. MARBURY, Attorneys for :. ** ana _. , THE CONVENTION ‘OF THE PROT- ea Pane " “LAND. ‘ESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH ~ OF THE DIOCESE OF MARY- ’ Respondents. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385602_1480%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.