# Brief for the United States in Opposition — District of Columbia ex rel. Capital Lighting & Supply Inc. v. Merando Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Brief for the United States in Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1965
- **Citation:** 381 U.S. 936

## Text

INDEX

Opinion below_...-.----------------------------------
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Questions presented__......---------------------------
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CITATIONS
Cases:
United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479_---------------
United States v. Ladson, 294 F. 2d 535, certiorari
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Statutes and rules:
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F.R. Crim. P.:

773-720—65

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Gu the Supreme Gourt of the Ginited States

Octosper TERM, 1964

No. 1061
Wii1mM GrosH AND Mario Garcia KOoHLy,
PETITIONERS
v.
Untrep States oF AMERICA

-

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App.
B 4a-7a) is reported at 342 F. 2d 141.

~—
JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on February 26, 1965. On March 26, 1965, Mr.
Justice Harlan extended the time for filing a petition
for a writ of certiorari to and including April 12,
1965. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed *
on April 12, 1965. The jurisdiction of this Court is
invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

1. Whether, in a prosecution for conspiring to coun-
terfeit the currency of the Castro gcvernment in
(1)

2

Cuba and for possessing plates to make such currency,
the Comt properly charged the jury that no other
group claiming to be the government of Cuba had
the authority to print currency of the Castro govern-
ment.

2. Whether the trial court improperly excluded
evidence.

3. Whether the court erred in not instructing upon
the defense of entrapment.

4. Whether plain error was committed in admitting
into evidence statements of a defendant made prior to
his preliminary hearing.

5. Whether petitioners were denied the effective
assistance of counsel.

STATUTES INVOLVED

18 U.S.C. 11 provides:
§11. Foreign government defined.

The term “foreign government’’, as used in
this title, includes any government, faction, or
body. of insurgents within a country with which
the United States is at peace, irrespective of
recognition by the United States.

18 U.S.C. 481 provides in pertinent part:

§ 481. Plates or stones for counterfeiting for-
eign obligations or securities.

Whoever, within the United States except by
lawful authority, controls, holds, or possesses
any plate, stone, or other thing, or any part
thereof, from which has been printed or may
be printed any counterfeit note, bond, obliga-
tion, or other security, in whole or in part, of
any foreign government, bank, or corporation,

3

or uses such plate, stone, or other thing, or
knowingly permits or suffers the same to be
used in counterfeiting such foreign obligations,
or any part thereof * * * [s]hall be fined not
more than $5,000 or impriso..ad not more - than
five vears, or both.

STATEMENT !

Petitioners Kohly and Grosh, together with Cecily
Morrow and Robert Morrow,’ were indicted in the
Southern District of New York in a two count indict-
ment charging conspiracy to print counterfeit 50 peso
Republic of Cuba notes and posession witaout lawful
authority of plates to print counterfeit 50 peso Re-
public of. Cuba notes in violation of 18 U.S.C. 481
(1 BR. 2-4). Petitioners were convicted after a jury
trial (Tr. 854). Each was sentenced to imprison-
ment for a period of one year on each count, the
sentences to run concurrently (Tr. 887).

The statement of facts in the petition does not
differentiate the evidence presented by the govern-
ment from the evidence for the defensc. We sum-
marize the evidence at the trial as follows:

(1) The Government’s Case:

In the spring of 1960, petitioner Kohly, a Cuban
exile, told Robert Morrow that he wanted to reproduce
Cuban pesos which could be distributed by the under-
ground in Cuba. Morrow prepared plates from
which 10 peso notes were manufactured until Au-
gust, 1961, when Castro changed the Cuban currency

The Morrows pleaded nolo contendere in a case transferred

to the District of Maryland pursuant to Rule 20, F.R. Crim. P.
(Tr. 135, 713-714).

4

(2 BR. 48-51). Morrow also supplied Kohly with
some radio equipment for the Caban underground
(Tr. 195-198, 218-219)" ate

In May, 1963, Kobly arranged for Morrow to pre-
pare plates for a 50 peso Cuban note and subsequently
furnished him with $110 to buy materials (2 R. 35-36,
44-45). In July, 1963, Morrow advised Kohly that
he needed a professional printer if the notes were to
pase the strutiny of the Cutan government (2 R.
45-26).

On July 2, 1963; Harris Martin, a Secret Service
undercover agent, was introduced to petitioners by
attorney J. Walter Scholz as a New York printer
who might counterfeit Cuban pesos from plates.
Kohly wanted Murtin to invest $10,000 to finance
the plates and other supplies. He said he was con-
nected with the underground Cuban movement and
that he was anxious to use these pesos to buy boats
and weapons to support the underground movement.
Martin stated an interest in printing only if he could
make a profit: Kohly offered him a profit, saying
the pesos would be sold to Cuban refu,ees in Florida
before any would be dropped by air over Cuba.
Martin said that this was a risky illegal enterprise.
Kehly said that was the reason the return was high
aud that Martin need not worry because Kohly had
discussed his plan with the O.1.A. and the F.B.I. who,
Kohly said, were closing their eyes to the scheme.
'* Morrow, who had designed and developed a unit of elec-
tronic equipment for the C.I.A. in February, 1962 (Tr. 199-
201), denied that he told Kohly that he werked for the C.1.4.

(2 R. 54). Earlier in 1958 2nd 1959 Morrow had done some
secret work for the Navy Department (Tr. 213).

5

Kohly said that the protection he enjoyed from these
agencies would cover Martin (Tr. 24-30, 35, 103-
107). Petitioners agreed to arrange a meeting with
the plate maker after Martin said he would not make
any investment unless he saw the plates or talked to
the plate-maker (Tr. 33-34).

On July 30, Kohly informed Martin that he no
longer needed his financial assistance. He agreed to
pay Martin $7,000 to print 40 million pesos, suggest-
ing that Martin could receive more money if he would
accept payment in Cuban pesos that —— would sell
for him in Florida (2 R. 10-12).°

On September 19, 1963, puthebitinee: eaediit and
Martin discussed plans for the production of the
pesos. Morrow sug ested that Martin obtain the
paper through normal channels ‘‘as there would be
nothing wrong with that”? (2 R. 14-15, 38-39).

After Morrow turned the finished plates over to
Grosh and to Kohly’s son (2 R. 36-37), Kohly ar-
ranged to deliver the plates to Martin. They met on
September 30, 1963, but Kohly claimed that he had
left the plate-maker before the plates had been com-
pleted (2 R. 17-18). On October 1, 1963, they met
again. When Martin ascertained that Kohly had
the plates, he signalled other agents and Kohly was
arrested. That night petitioner Grosh telephoned
Morrow and told him to “get rid of the stuff’”’ (2 R.
53, 55).

On November 21, 1963, Kohly appeared as a grand
jury witness at his own request after being advised
by his attorney. He acknowledged that he did not
have either official or unofficial approval from any-

body in the United States Government for what he
did. He denied telling Martin that the F.B.I. and
that he told Martin that Morrow elaimed to have
discussed it with some government people who con-
sidered it a good idea because it would help over-
throw Castro. Kohly testified that he did not have
the consent of the Castro government to make the
plates and produce the bill because “[w]e_ considered
ourselves to be the government of Cuba” (Tr. 270-
273)... :
(2) The Defense:

_ Petitioners testified on their own behalf and por-
tions of Kohly’s grand jury testimony were read.
Kohly testified that he had united 96 organizations
whese stated aim was the liberation of Cuba from
Castro (Tr. 349-350). The grand jury testimony
showed that in 1960, after arrangements had been
made through Vice President Nixon, Kohly discussed
with a C.I.A. agent methods by which Castro could
be overthrown (Tr. 399-400); that in 1961 he turned
over to the United States Government a 10 peso note,
a plan for the unification of the Cuban exile forces
and a proposed budget for Cuba; that on August 16,
1961, the note and the papers were returned to him
(Tr. 382-385); and that Kohly thought he had the
right to print Cuban money as the head of the Cuban
government in exile (Tr. 396-397, 413-414). Kohly
testifieu that Mo: row would not make plates for him
until Morrow obtained full clearance from the Secret
Service and the C.LA. and that Morrow informed
him in August, 1963, that he had secured such clear-

=

7

ance €Tr. 389-390, 436-438, 553-557). Kohly also
said that Martin told him that he had printed securi-
ties for foreign governments and the United States
(Tr. 452-455). Petitioner Grosh testified that he
was in effect a chauffeur for Kohly and had no
knowledge of his activities (Tr. 593 ff.).

ARGUMENT

1. As the currency of a recognized foreign govern-
ment, at peace with the United States, the currency
of the Castro Cuban government is protected by the
counterfeiting statutes. See United States v. Arjona,
120 U.S. 479. Thus, even if petitioners’ claim to rep-
resent a government of Cuba in exile is accepted, they
would not have had the right to print the currency of
the Castro government. Nor are petitioners aided by
18 U.S.C. 11, upon which they rely. That section de-
fines foreign government as “any government, faction,
or body of insurgents within a country with which the
United States is at peace, irrespective of recognition
by the United States.’’ On petitioners’ logic, their
government in exile could at most print its own cur-
rency; it could not lawfully counterfeit the currency

| of a different recognized government. The trial judge

therefore properly charged the jury (Pet. 9, footnote
3) that the “recognition by our goverument of the
government of the Republic of Cuba, headed by
Castro, * * * precludes any finding by our courts,
and that would include the jurors, that any indi-
vidual, group or person claiming to represent the
government of the people of Cuba was a foreign
government which had the sovereign right to print

and issue money on behalf of the Republic of Cuba,
headed by Castro.” *

2. The trial judge did not erroneously exclude evi-
dence showing approval of portions of Kohly’s plan
by United States officials. The judge initially denied
petitioners’ proffers of evidence on the ground the
offer did not show any authorization for the plates in
’ question (2 R. 62-66; Tr. 355-361). This ruling was
modified shortly thereafter tc permit Kohly to explain
his grand jury testimony, introduced by the govern-
ment, in which Kehly admitted that he had no ap-
preval frem the Od.A. or F.B.L...(2 R. 68-69; Tr.
365-367). and this evidence came in (Tr. 399-400).
Kohly testified that Morrow told him he had govern-

* Petitioners urge (Pet. 11-15) that they had “Inwful av-
thority” to print the currency of the Castro government. In-
sofar as this is a contention that, as an alkged government im
exile, they had authority to counterfeit the Castro government's
currency, we have shown in the text that #f is erroneous. As
to petitioners’ argument that they had “lawful authority” flow-
ing from the government of the United States to print Castro
currency, petitioner Kohly himself, in his grand jury testimony,
stated flatly that he “never” had “the blessings of the United
States Government * * * for the work I’ve been doing,” that he
did not have “official or unofficial approval” and he further denied
telling Martin that the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. had approved
his undertaking. (Tr. 270-273.) In any event, petitioners do
not suggest that they requested an instruction on this theory of
defense. er

Moreover, the evidence that the Secret Service does on
occasion grant authority for foreign currency to be printed
in the United States did not destroy the government’s case, as
petitioners imply. The purport of the testimony ot Carmse
(Tr. 290-292) is that such authority is granted when a domes-
tic company cofitracts with a foreign government to produce
its currency. Petitioners did not claim such authority.

9

ment clearance and that Martin said he had done
printing for the United States and foreign govern-
ments. As to testimony concerning recognition of
Kohly’s group by Guatemala and steps to obtain rec-
ognition by other nations, this would at most have
tended to show that petitioners considered themselves
as constituting a government in exile, which, as we
have shown, did not bear on petitioners’ guilt in imi-
tating the currency of the recognized government of
Cuba.* ; |

_ 8. Under Kohly’s own evidence there was no en-
trapment and therefore no error in not instructing
in that issue. His testimony showed that before
Martin (the undercover agent) came into the case,
Kohly himself had asked Morrow to prepare the
plates. Kohly’s statement that Martin asked to meet
him in New York does not show inducement by a
government agent to commit a crime, nor was Mor-
row'’s past employment by the C.I.A. in 1962 relevant
to alleged entrapment by Martin in 1963. The state-
ment by Martin that he was interested in a profit can
hardly be said to have caused the commission of the
crime. Finally, the issue whether an entrapment
instruction should have been given was not urged
in the court of appeals and thus clearly does not war-
rant review here.

* Petitioners also claim that the court guve no proper instruc-
tion on c™'minal intent. The court properly charged that a con-
Spiracy cou..t required that a defendant act with a deliberate
purpose to violate the law (2 R. 124-125) and that the sub-
stantive count required that a defendant act “deliberately” (2
R. 127). There was no exception to this instruction.

“ 10

4. Petitioners, who neither objected at trial or on
appeal, have no basis to complain here about the
admission into evidence of post-arrest statements
made by Kohly to Secret Service agents and to an
assistant United States attorney (2 R. 30-34). In
both instances, Kohly was advised that he could re-
main silent and haf « right to consult an attorney;
the assistant United States attorney offered him a
telephone to call an attorney. The substance of
Kohly’s post-arrest statements was in most respects
similar to the grand jury testimony that he gave
seven weeks later on advice of his attorney. The
failure of trial counsel to object may thus reasonably
be considered to have been defense strategy framed in
light of the generally exculpatory character of the
statements. In any event, it is not clear that the pro-
visions of Rule 5(a) were violated since petitioners’
failure to object to the sdmission of the post-arrest
statements deprived the trial court of an opportunity
to ascertain, prior to the admission of the statements,
whether Kohiy’s post-arrest detention was, in fact, il-
legal. In these circumstances, there was clearly no
plain error which this Court should consider in the
absence of objections below. See United States v.
Ladson, 294 F'. 2d 535 (C.A. 2), certiorari denied, 369
U.S. 824.

5. In the court of appeals, petitioners claimed that
they were deprived oi a fair and impartial proceed-
ing by Judge Weinfeld’s conduct of the trial. The
court reviewed this contention and found it to be
lacking in merit. In this Court, petitioners have
changed the issue, claiming that the action of the

il

trial judge coupled with the conduct of defense coun-
sel deprived them of the effective assistance of counsel.
We submit that an examination of the record shows
this assertion to be wholly unfounded. Petitioners ex-
tract instances where defense counsel was overly con-
tentious and where Judge Weinfeld acted reasonably
to control the proceedings. Counsel, however, is not
constitutionally ineffective simply because the court
rules against him or because he is overzealous. Peti-
tioners have failed even to separate the remarks made
outside of the presence of the jury (c.g., see Tr. 20,
286, 327-329, 358, 860-862) from those made in its
presence. The jury was, moreover, clearly instructed
not to draw any inferences from the court’s rulings
(2 R. 113-114).
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.

ARCHIBALD Cox,
Solicitor General.

Frep M. Vinson, JYr.,
Acting Assistant Attorney General.

BEATRICE ROSENBERG,
Srpney M. GLAZER,
Attorneys.
May 1965.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFF:CE: 1968

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385602_0573%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.
