# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Rowe v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1965
- **Citation:** 380 U.S. 961

## Text

RR

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1964

mo. 829 ,

GEORGE NEFF ROWE,
Petitioner
W.

THE UNITED STATES,

Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT CLAIMS

PENROSE LUCAS ALBRIGHT
Coumsel for the Petitioner
601 Perpetual Building
Washington, D. C. 20004

WILSON - EPES PRINTING Co. - RE 7-6002 - WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

Page
The Opinion Below................................. 1
LEER a SA OR ey BR CET OTF Oe AT 2
SI ci dcephsanigaabineebtienicasidinnsiliiniineiamnaaehaaiinton 2
I reeesinnmieidaneeeiatbbdiionins 2
jE SERENE a RS A RE 3
a usdasnnsineniindiepenintimemmenninand 4
Reasons for the Allowance of the Writ...................0........ 9
| RATS EN A ae eA 9 EEE ER PP ae 18
I iiss tacts cicinta an ath ial cl ncisdeindeannabcaaeenanineines 19
CITATIONS
Cases:
jp ee ee | Bh 7
Bland v. Connally, CCADC, 1961, 293 F.2d 852... 12
Burns Vv. Wilson, 1958, 346 U.S. 187.......................... 17
Clackum Vv. U.S., C.Cls. 1960, 296 F.2d 228.............. 9,11
Ex parte Lange, 1873, 85 U.S. [18 Wall] 163........ 9
Grant +. U.S., C.Cls. No. 30-60, decided July 12,

RRR ATR 8 ARE EG RRO Rica eo ee a ae 10
Harmon v. Brucker, 1958, 355 U.S. §79.........000...... ps WD yi
Jackson V. U.S., 1962, 297 F.2d 939, ceri. granted,

371 U.S. 900, cert. dismissed, Rule 60, 3'72 U.S.

EE Me IBA STS seo A iD NON BN a SO TS 10
Redd v. U.S., S.D.N.Y., 1908, 161 Fed. 469................ 11, 14

Statutes:

The Uniform Code of Military Justice
ee ci caannamnenneneen 4
I esas ib oleiae pines 3
ca caeceubamhoaie Sa 5
a a ctdlacaiinahoonh oe 2

The Career Compensation Act of 1949............... ea 3,8

pg GTR RR TISS Tet RAIL ORI Ow RU 3

ii INDEX (Continued)

Rules: Page
Air Force Regulation No. 39-17...... 3, 6, 16
Air Force Manual 35-4........................... 3, 6, 16

Manual! for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951...... 6, 14

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Hnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1964

No. ——

GEORGE NEFF RoweE,
Petitioner
V.

THE UNITED STATES,

Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT CLAIMS

Petitioner, George Neff Rowe, prays that a writ of cer-
tiorari issue to review the final order of the United States
Court of Claims of July 17, 1964, and the order of court
of October 16, 1964, denying petitioner’s motion for re
hearing, whereby the claim filed by the petitioner was dis-
missed in that court.

THE OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Claims dated
July 17, 1964, printed on pages 20-42 of the Appendix
to this petition, is as yet unreported and the order of
October 16, 1964, denying petitioner’s motion for rehear-
ing, not reported, is printed on page 43 of the Appen-
- dix to this petition.

2
JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Claims was
entered on July 17, 1964. Rehearing was denied Octo-
ber 16, 1964. The jurisdiction of this court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. Section 1255.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether Air Force Regulation 39-17, :nder which
the petitioner was given an undesirable discharge from
the Air Force, was applied in an unreasonable and arbi-
trary manner since it was based upon offenses for which
the petitioner had already been tried and punished under
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and thus petition-
er’s rights under the “ifth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion were abridged.

2. Whether a commander in the Air Force can circum-
vent th Uniform Code of Military Justice and award a
punitive discharge for acts punishable by the Code when
@ court-martial has not done so, and thus petitioner’s
rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
were abridged.

3. Whether the issuance of a punitive discharge to a per-
son in uhe Armed Forces who is opposed thereto violates
the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States.

4. Whether the Air Force can ignore its own regula-
tions and a statute leading to a fuli and fair hearing
prior to the discharge of one of its members for physical
disability where such disability is alleged to be “alco-
holism”’.

STATUTES INVOLVED

Article 44{a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
70A Stat. 52, 10 U.S.C. Section 844(a) provides:

3

No person may, without his consent, be tried a sec-
ond time.

Part IV, which includes Articles 16-21, of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, 70A Stat. 42-44, 10 U.S.C.
Section 816-821, in pertinent part prescribes that courts- °
martial convened under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice shall have jurisdiction to try a person subject to
such Code for offenses made punishable by such Code
and that concurrent jurisdiction exists with respect to
military commissions, provost courts and other rnilitary
tribunals in respect to offenders or offenses that may by
statute or by laws of war be tried by such military com-
missions, provost courts or other military tribunals.

10 U.S.C. Section 8811(b), 70A Stat. 544, provides:

No enlisted member of the Air Force may be dis-
charged before his term of service expires, except—

(1) as prescribed by the Secretary of the Air
Force; :

(2) by sentence of a general or special court-mar-
tial; cr

(3) as otherwise provided by law.

Section 413 of the Career Compensation Act of 1949,
37 U.S.C. (1952 edition) 283, 63 Stat. 823, provides:

The Secretary concerned shall prescribe regulations
for the administration of this title within his de
partment or agency, including regulations which
shall provide that no member of the uniformed serv-
ices shall be separated or retired for physical dis-
ability without a full and fair hearing if such mem-
ber shall demand it.

REGULATIONS INVOLVED

The pertinent Air Force regulations, Air Force Regu-
lation No. 39-17 (9 February 1954) and Air Force Man-
ual 35-4, have their pertinent provisions printed on pages

4

34-41 of the Appendix as part of the Findings of Fact
of the Opinion of the United States Court of Claims.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The petitioner served for some ten years on active duty
with the armed forces (R. 18, 19). His first period of
service was for approximately five and one half years in
the Navy which was terminated in 1948 under (subse-
quently determined) honorable conditions (R. 18). While
in the Navy, petitioner suffered a serious injury to his
head which required about fifteen days of hospitalization.
This injury was incurred in line of duty (R. 18).

About one year after being discharged from the Navy,
the petitioner enlisted in the Army and later when the
Air Force became a separate service was transferred to
the Air Feree (R. 18). In the Air Force, the petitioner
underwent a splenectomy as a consequence of an injury
suffered in line of duty. Even though a splenectomy is
considered to be thirty percent disabling under the Vet-
erans Administration Schedule for Rating Disabilities,
the petitioner was continued on active duty and he was
honorably discharged from the Air Force and re-enlisted
in 1952 (R. 18, 19, 28, 29).

In the period of June 1953-April 1954, the petitioner
was convicted by summary court-martial or punished un-
der Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
for some seven offenses involving drinking (R. 19). On
December 10, 1953, the petitioner was punished for four
of such offenses under Article 15 whereby he was re-
stricted to the base for some four weeks and given two
hours a day extra duty for each day thereof (Joint Exh.
2, p. 39). Although this is three times the maximum pvn-
ishment authorized under Article 15 of the Uniform v . le
of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 815, 70A Stat. 41, the peti-
tioner did not complain and underwent the pu’..shment.
A summary court-martial sentence for another of the of-

5

fenses was adjudged and approved on January 25, 1954,
for a forfeiture of $65 and reéctriction to the limits of
his duty station for a period which exceeded by one day
the maximum period of restriction permitted by law _
(Art. 19, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 819, 70A Stat. 43). Again,
petitioner did not complain but carried out his punish-
ment. (Joint Exh. 2, p. 36)

/ For the other offenses, in each case the petitioner was
awarded at least the maximum amount of punishment
permitted by law. (Joint Exh. 2, p. 40, 44, 45)

Despite the foregoing offenses, the record is clear that
the petitioner performed his military duties, as a cook, in
an effective maiiner. Regardless of this, petitioner’s im-
mediate commanding officer on May 6, 1954, initiated
steps leading towards petitioner’s undesirable discharge
and pursuant thereto caused the petitioner to“be given
what is described as a psychiatric examination which
found him to be suffering from alcoholism. It was the
opin:on of the medical officer giving the examination that
no mental or physical defect existed which warranted pe-
titioner’s disposition through medicai channels. By this it
was meant that it was not considered that petitioner
was suffering from a disability which might lead to his
separation or retirement therefor. The report of the medi-
cal officer, however, makes no mention of petitioner’s
thirty percent disabling splenectomy. Also, no mentién is
made of the prior head injury. (Joint Exh. 2, p. 33, 34,
R. 19, 20)

Soon after this examination the petitioner was again
in difficulty involving d:inking and charges under Article
134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice were brought
against him. On May 24, 1954, the petitioner was tried
for such offenses by a special court-martial and found
guilty as charged. The sentence was restriction to the
base for three months (even though two months restric-

6

tion is the maximum permitted by law)’ and forfeiture
of $65 per month for four months. Four members of the
court-martial reecinmended clemency (R. 20). They rec-
ommended that every available effort be made through
medica! care and other facilities available in the Air Force
to aid the airman.

After petitioner had been charged with the offenses for
which he was later tried by court-martial, but before the
court-martial itself, petitioner’s immediate commanding
officer recommended to the commander of petitioner’s duty
station that the petitioner appear before a Board of Of-
ficers convened under Air Force Regulation 39-17 to de-
termine petitioner’s fitness for retention in the service.
No mention was made of petitioner’s splenectomy or head
injury. (Joint Exh. 2, p. 28-35)

Such recommendation was approved by the commander
of petitioner’s duty station and following the court-mar-
tial, on May 28, 1954, the petitioner appeared before a
designated Board of Officers. By regulation, before peti-
tioner was to appear before such Board, he was supposed
to have a further physical examination to determine wheth-
er any mental or physical defect of sufficient import ex-
isted to warrant action, Air Force Manual 35-4 (per-
taining to disability separation or retirement). The reg-
ulations required ‘when physical or mental defects of
major import are involved, the medical officer will sub-
mit to the board a concise report in which the essential
points of the mental and physical condition of the air-
man are described, ....” However, such an examination
and report was not ordered or made. (R. 25, Joint Exh.
2, p. 1-22)

At the Board, the petitioner was represented by coun-
sel but there is no indication that such counsel was a
lawyer and no requirement that he so be. Among other

1 Manual for Courts-Martial. United States, 1951, p. 209.

7

things evidence was introduced before the Boar? of the
offenses for which the petitioner had just been court-
martialed some four days previously. (Joint Exh. 2,
p. 3)

With reference to the petitioner’s work, his immediate
commanding officer testified that his work was favorable.
In fact ne had no complaints at all concerning his work
and considered him a very good cook. To his knowledge,
petitioner had never come to work under the influence
of alcohol nor did he recall that he had ever reported late
for work because of drunkenness. In addition, he had
not received any complaints of drunkenness which oc-
erred either in the barracks or on when petitioner was
on duty. (Joint Exh. 2, p. 6)

The Board called as a witness one Technical Sergeant
Howard M. Campbell who was petitioner’s supervisor.
He testified that the petitioner was an excellent cook
and a good worker who ceuld accomplish in two hours
what it took others a half day to do. (Joint Exh. p. 11)

As a third witness, the Board called Technical Ser-
geant Herman C. Strickland, who was the food service
supervisor having the petitioner in his section. This wit-
ness in resumeing his experience with the petitioner
stated as follows:

I would like to state that I have a kind of mixed
feeling for him. I have close to 18 years service of
which the majority has been in food service career
field. Have been Food Service Supervisor since No-
vember 1942 and have had a large number of work-
ers working for me, civilians while stationed in
China, civilians while in the Philippines and civilians
working for me down here. I can truthfully say
that during the 12 years I have never had a more
willing worker or cook that seemed to take more in-
terest in his work. He is an excellent cook, good
worker, does not mind working, doesn’t shirk his

8

duties at all. Obediently carries out his order to
the letter. Does not question why. Another thing
I have noticed about him was when he got in trouble
and drew a restriction from the delinquency re-
ports received, never once did he break one of those
restrictions. It seemed to him that they were mili-
tary orders to be carried out just like the orders I
would give him during his tour of duty and he would
carry them out. Never had him to report for duty
under the influence cf whiskey, nor have him to
drink while on duty, or leave duty before being prop-
erly released. . . . I would like to go on record as
saying that I feel the Air Force, doing what it is to
retain experiencec personnel, they claim it costs
a good deal of money to train them, it seems to me
if it is at all possible to give this man some kind of
medical treatment to correct the disease, that I feel
he has just as much of a disease as if he had TB, and
reclaim him for the military :ervice, it would not only
be doing the man a big favor, but would also be a
benefit to the service. You do not get the high cali-
bre of working men ev2ry day that you have in this
man. I have men down there that I could gladly
spare two of, the service I get from them, better thar.
this one man... . (Joint Exh. 2, p. 11-12)

Despite such evidence the Board recommended that the
petitioner be given an undesirable discharge from the
service because of “habits or traits of character mani-
fested by chronic alcoholism.” This was approved by the
officer having general court-martial jurisdiction and the
petitioner was so discharged on July 1, 1954. At no time
did the petitioner give his consent or request such a dis-
charge, but to the contrary he opposed same. The Board
in question made no findings and was not authorized to
make any findings as provided by Title IV of the Career
Compensation Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 816-825, pertaining to
members of the armed services who were separated and
retired for physical disabilitv. (Joint Exh. 2, p. 1-22)

9

The petitioner exhausted his administrative remedies
before the Air Force Discharge Review Board and the
Air Force Correction Board. Because of the undesira-
ble discharge, the petitioner has been denied compensa-
tion for his otherwise compensable disability by the Vet-
erans Administration (R-21-23, 29).

Suit was brought in the Court of Claims on the theory
that the discharge was not validly issued and, accord-
ing.y, petitivurer had not been legally discharged (R. 1-6).

REASONS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE WRIT

This case raises questions of fundamental importance
concerning the rights of armed forces personnel.

It is singularly clear in this case that the Air Force
tried the petitioner under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice for a series of offenses for which he was awarded
the maximum or more than the maximum punishment the
law allowed. He was then taken before a Board of Of-
ficers, tried essentially for the same conduct, and award-
ed a punishment which the U.S. Court of Claims once
called in the case of Clackum v. U.S., 1960, 296 F.2d 228,
“one of the most severe penalties which may be imposed
by court-martial.” As a result of these proceedings
wherein the petitioner was twice placed in jeopardy and
doubly punished, he was not only stigmatized for life
but also a forfeiture of disability compensation from the
Veterans Administration for a thirty percent disability
was worked upon him. It is difficult to conceive of a
more patent disregard of the protections both as to pro-
cedure and the limits of punishment that Congress in-
tended servicemen to have.

Ex parte Lange, 1873, 85 U.S. [18 Wall] 163, estab-
lished that dual punishment for the same offense was
double jec \ardy under the Fifth Amendment and this
case challenges the application of a regulation which

10

circumvents the Uniform Code of Military Justice and
awards a further punishment, a punitive discharge, for
acts punishable by the Code when a court-martial has
not done so.

The situation in the instant case is not unlike where
a prosecuting attorney would be authorized in a case
where he concluded that the sentence was inadequate to
impose such additional penalties which he — the
accused person deserved.

The Commissioner of the Court of Claims considered
the treatment of the petitioner was justified on the basis
of the decision of the Court of Claims in Jackson v.
United States, No. 403-60, decided January 12, 1962,
297 F.2d 939, certiorari granted, 371 U.S. 900, certiorari
dismissed under Rule 60, 372 U.S. 950. In Jackson, the
Court of Claims found an undesirable discharge on the
basis of a conviction by an Oklahoma court which was
subsequently set aside on appeal to be justified.

The Court of Claims, being aware that certiorari had
been granted in Jackson,? omitted the Jackson citation
from its opinion—otherwise identical with that of the
Commissioner—and substituted therefor the case of Grant
v. United States, No. 30-60, decided July 12, 1963. The
Grant case, however, did not involve an undesirable dis-
charge. On the motion for rehearing, the Government
argued that Grant was, nevertheless, a proper basis for
the action by the Court of Claims inasmuch as Grant
stood for the proposition that an undesirable discharge
as an administrative discharge is not a punitive dis-
charge.

2? This was clear from specific comments of judges of the Court of
Claims in oral arguments. At least one judge appeared to feel that
the Department of Justice should not have settled Jackson after
certiorari had been granted.

1l

It is thus clear to all familiar with military law that
the instant case stands for the proposition that an un-
desirable discharge is not a punitive discharge. This we
challenge. Indeed, the legal and practical disabilities
attending the issuance of a bad conduct discharge by
court-martial sentence (with numerous legal safeguards
prescribed by law) and those of an undesirable discharge
(without such safeguards) are essentially identical. In
fact, it would seem that the undesirable discharge is
probably the more odious of these twin malefactors since
it frequently connotes homosexuality.*

The Court of Claims is turning back the clock fifty
years to Reid v. U. S., S.D.N.Y., 1908, 161 Fed. 469,
where the view was taken that the character of an un-
desirable discharge was not punishment. This view is
diametrically opposite to an ezrlier and more enlightened
decision by the ‘ourt of Claims, Clackum v. United
States, 246-56, Janaary 20, 1960, 296 Fed. 2d 228, where-
in it was stated:

A dishonorable discharge is, for a soldier, one of
the most severe penalties which may be imposed
by a court-martial. Elaborate provisions for re
view of court-martial sentences within the military
hierarchy, and potentially by the Court of Military
Appeals, are included in our military laws. Yet the
Air Force regulations discussed above provide that
if the evidence at hand is so unsubstantial that a con-
viction by a court-martial would be unlikely, the
executive officers of the Air Force may themselves
convict the soldier and impose the penalty. It is as
if a prosecuting attorney were authorized, in a case
where he concluded that he divn’t have enough evi-

—

3 So testified Chief Juage Quinn ‘* the Court of Military Appeals.
Committee Print, Constitutional Ri’ hts of Military Personne!, Sum-
mary—Report of Hearings by Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate,
Pursuant to S. Res. 58, 88th Congress, 1st Session, p. 2.

12

dence to obtain a conviction in Court, to himself
impose the fine or imprison:nent which he thought
the acciised person deserved.

The Government defends this remarkable arrange-
ment, and its operation in the instant case, on the
ground that it is necessary in the interest of an ef-
ficient military establishment for our national de-
fense. We see nothing in this argument. The plain-
tiff being a member of the Air Force Reserve, on ac-
tive duty, the Air Force had the undoubted right to
discharge her whenever it pleased, for any reason
or for no reason, and by so doing preserve the Air
Force from even the slightest suspicion of harboring
undesirable characters. But it is unthinkable that
it should have the raw power, without respect for
even the most elementary notions of due process of
law, to load her down with penalties. It is ate in the
day to argue tnat everything that the executives of
the armed forces do in connection with the discharge
of soldiers is beyond the reach of judiciai scrutiny.
Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579.

It is inconsistent with Bland v. Connally, C.C.A. D. C.
1961, 293 F.2d 852, wherein Judge Washington stated
on page 858:

What is at stake, therefore, is merely the Navy’s

right to punish or labei, ard not its right to secure
itself against subversives. . .

.. . We think it must be conceded that any dis-
charge characterized as less than honorable will re-
sult in serious injury.

It cortrasts with the viewpoint of the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals, which in a compartively recent report ‘
stated :

* Annual Report of the United States Court of Military Appeals
and the Judge Advocates General of the Armed Forces and the
General Counsel of the Department of the Treasury pursuant to
the Uniform Code of Military Justice for the Period January 1,
1960 to December 31, 1960, p. 12.

13

The unusual increase in the use of the admir:
trative discharge since the code became a fixture has
led to the suspicion that the services were resorting
to that means of circumventing the requirements
of the code. The validity of that suspicion was con-
firmed by Major General Reginald C. Harmon, then
Judge Advocate General of the Air Force, at the
annual meeting of the Judge Advocates Association
held at Los Angeles, California, August 26, 1958. He
there declared that the tremendous increase in un-
desirable discharges by administrative proceedings
was a result of efforts of military commanders to
avoid the requirements of the uniform code. Al-
though he acknowledged that men thereby affected
were deprived of the protections afforded by the code,
no action to curtail the practice was initiated.

It is contrary to the information of Senator Sam J.
Erwin, Jr., senior United States Senator of the State of
North Carolina who, as Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Constitutional rights of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, has been conducting a congressional study of
the constitutional rights of military personnel. The Sen-
ator, in a speech published in full in the Judge Advocate
Journal, Bulletin No. 35, June, 1963, stated as follows:

Pree Proceeding first to the administrative discharge
under other than honorable conditions, I find it in-
disputable that such a discharge can be as damag-
ing as a punitive discharge imposed by a court-mar-
tial. In fact, the Subcommittee has been told that
some would prefer a bad conduct discharge from
a special court-martial to an undesirable discharge
issued administratively.

Secondly, the effects of a discharge under other
than honorable conditions, however imposed, are not
limited to the military career of the person affected;
instead such a discharge will follow the individual
the rest of his life; it will affect his reputation, his
job opportunities, and his veterans benefits. .. .

14

oxen {f the allegations against the serviceman con-
stitute a violation of the Uniform Code for which
he could be court-martizled, especially if the service-
man requests a court-martial, in which he would
~ have the safeguards prescribed by the Uniform Code,
then the Services should not be able to accomplish
indirectly what they could not do directly. That is,
they should not be able to adjudge a man guilty and
stigmatize him with an undesirable discharge with-
out granting him the procedural protections that
Congress intended he have. Of course, I would not
dispute the Services’ power under such circum-
stances to discharge the man under honvrable con-
ditions; but that power has not been at issue.

It well may be that in the days of Reid, an undesirable
discharge had little effect on a man’s subsequent life other
than on his eligibility for Veterans Administration bene-
fits and was comparable to being “fired” from any other
job. This situation no longer prevails. Today, beyond
dispute, the punitive nature of the discharge is treated by
employees in much the same light as a conviction for a
felony and effectively bars the individual from the pur-
suit of many vocations irrespective of his talents. Yet
it is given for trivial offenses, often to minors, and the
undesirable discharge is frequently awarded where a
court-martial could not do so. Discharges of dishonora-
ble nature punish unequally and often harshly. In this
age of the job application form and background investi-
gation, the dishonorable discharge constitutes a modern
scarlet letter and a cruel and inhuman punishment for
the type of offenses generally involved. This case chal-
lenges the constitutionality of such punishment.

Under the Table of Maximum Punishments for the
Uniform Code of Military Justice,” a bad conduct dis-
charge is not permitted for trivial offenses unless there

5 Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, p. 228.

15

is a previous record of at least two previous convictions
under court-martial in the individual’s record. Here the
petitioner had only one such previous court-martial con-
viction at the time of his second court-martial. In ef-
fect, the Uniform Code of Military Justice gives 2 mem-
ber of the services three “strikes” before he is “out”.
By regulation, the Secretary has changed this rule to two
or even less “strikes”—depending upon the initiative of
the local commanding officer to process the individual for
an undesirable discharge.

This case challenges the authority of the Secretary of
the Air Force to diminish the rights which Congress has
given to servicemen under the Uniform Code of aiiditary
Justice before they can ke given a punitive discharge.

The instant case is unique in that all the evidence in-
dicates the petitioner’s military record for the period of
service whick terminated in the undesirable discharge
was good except, and only except, for those offenses for
which he was punished. Based upon such offenses, the
petitioner was considered to be suffering from alcoholism.’
Under Air Force regulations in effect at the time of peti-
tioner’s discharge, “physical disability” was defined as
any manifest or latent impairment of function due to
disease or injury regardless of the degree of impairment
(R. 28). If the petitioner was suffering from alcohol-
ism, a disease, it follows that he had a “physical disabil-
ity” as defined and, under the Air Force regulations,
should have been referred to a medical board and ulti-
mately to a physical evaluation board where he would
have been given a statutory full and fair hearing under
the criteria set forth in Title IV of the Career Com-
pensation Act of 1949. This is the case without even

* At least one doctor subsequently diagnosed petitioner’s condi-
tion as “Schizophrenic Reaction, Catatonic Type”. See report of
Dr. Y. Takahashi in record of proceedings of Air Force Board for
Correction of Military Records.

16

considering the petitioner’s splenectomy which was rata-
ble at thirty percent under the Veterans Administra-
tion Schedule for Rating Disabilities and serves to em-
phasize the cavalier treatment which petitioner has re-
ceived.

In connection with the foregoing it will be noted that
the Regulations of the Air Force in force when petitioner
was being processed for his discharge (AFM 35-4, Chap-
ter 2, Subsection 7) provided that a patient whose fit-
ness for further duties appears, for medical reasons, to
be “in doubt” will be referred to a medical board. The
regulation pursuant to which the petitioner was dis-
charged, AFR 39-17, provides that the discharge of en-
listed personnel under such regulation will be accom-
plished only after a “conclusive determination” has been
made that a mental or physical defect does not exist which
would warrant consideration under AFM 35-4, which is
a regulation dealing with separations and retirement fcr
physica] disability (R. 23, 28).

Here the petitioner was at least thirty percent disabled
under the Veterans Administration Schedule for Rating
Disabilities. Yet no reference was made to the existence
of such disability in the report submitted by the medical
officer in the case. Nor did the immediate commanding
officer in his recommendation make any mention of such
disability. What is required to be “in doubt” or for “con-
clusive determination” so as to preclude petitioner’s con-
sideration by a medical board!!?

Moreover, after it was determined to refer the peti-
tioner to a Board of Officers. under the regulations he
should have been scheduled to appear before the unit
medical officer or base surgeon to ascertain whether any
mental or physical defect of sufficient import to war-
rant action under AFM 35-4 existed. If the medical
officer did not consider such defect to exist, he was
to submit to the Board a concise report in which the

17

essential points of the mentai or physical condition of
the petitioner were described. This was not done in
petitioner’s case and apparently the requirement was
completely overlooked (R. 25).

This court in Burns v. Wilson, 1953, 346 U.S. 137, 142
held that service personnel are protected by the Consti-
tutional guarantee of due process and this case challenges
the due process of the procedures utilized to discharge

petitioner.

Petitioner was not given an undesirable discharge be-
cause his service was “desirable. Rather, he was given
such a discharge because he was considered an unde-
sirable type of person. But is this sufficient reason for
the Air Force to punish a man—particularly beyond that
authorized by the Uniform Code of Military Justice?

The decision of the Court ot Claims conflicts with Har-
mon v. Brucker, 1958, 355 U.S. 579 and is inconsistent
with the language of this Court in Bell v. United States,
1961, 366 U.S. 393, 401, wherein it is observed:

In the Armed Forces, as everywhere else, there
are good men and rascals, courageous men and cow-
ards, honest men and cheats. If a soldier’s conduct
falls below a specified level he is subject to disci-
pline, and his punishment may include the forfei-
ture of future but not accrued pay. But a soldier
who has not received such punishment from a duly
constituted court-martial is entitled to the statutory
pay and allowances of his grade and status, however
ignoble a soldier he may be.

This case challenges a procedure which punishes a
member of the Armed Services merely because in the
eyes of someone he may be an undesirable person and not
because his conduct has fallen below the specified
level.

18
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this petition for Writ of
Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfuly submitted,

PENROSE LUCAS ALBRIGHT
Counsel for the Petitioner
601 Perpetual Building
Washington, D. C. 20004

\"

19
APPENDIX
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS
No. 256-60
(Decided July 17, 1964) _

GEORGE NEFF ROWE
Vv.
THE UNITED STATES

Penrose L. Albright for plaintiff. Mason, Mason and
Albright on the briefs.

Arthur E. Fay, with whom was Assistant Attorney
General John W. Douglas, for defendant.

Before JONES, Senior Judge, WHITAKER, LARAMORE,
DURFEE and DAVIS, Judges.

OPINION

PER CURIAM: This case was referred pursuant to Rule
45 (since April 1, 1964 Rule 57) to Trial Commissioner
Mastin G. White, with directions to make findings of fact
and recommendations for conclusion of law. The Com-
missioner has done so and has written an opinion with
which we agree and which we adopt with minor modifi-
cations. This case differs from Sofranoff v. United States,
Ct. Cl. No. 9-62, decided April 17, 1964, in that the perti-
nent regulations were not followed in that case, whereas
they were followed in the present case. Plaintiff, is there-
fore, not entitled to recover, and his petition is dismissed.

20

The opinion, as modified, is as follows:

The plaintiff, who had served in the Armed Forces as
an enlisted man for more than 10 years, was given an
undesirable discharge by the Air Force on July 1, 1954.
The Air Force purported to act in accordance with Air
Force Regulation No. 39-17 (9 February 1954). At the
time of this discharge, the plaintiff was serving under
a 6-year enlistment in the Air Force, and he had com-
pleted only a little more than one-third of the 6-year
term.

The plaintiff alleges in the first amended petition that
the undesirable discharge of July 1, 1954, “was invalid
and illegal and did not effect his separation from the Air
Force * * *.” He accordingly seeks in the present ac-
tion to recover military pay and allowances for the period
commencing July 2, 1954, the day after he was dis-
charged. The plaintiff states in this connection that he
is entitled to recover pay and allowances up to the date
of judgment, but it should be noted at the ouiset that any
recovery would necessarily be limited to the unexpired
portion of the 6-year term of the enlistment from which
the plaintiff was discharged. Murray v. United States,
Ct. Ci. No. 237-57, decided June 7, 1961, p. 6 of slip
copy; Smith v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 28-60, decided
December 6, 1961, p. 9 of slip copy; Clackum v. United
States, Ct. Cl. No. 246-56, decided March 6, 1963, p. 2
of slip copy.

The plaintiff’s allegation of invalidity and illegality
respecting the undesirable discharge of July 1, 1954, is
basec primarily upon the contention that the Air Force,
under its own regulations, could not properly issue an
undesirable discharge to him without first referring his
case to a medical board for a determination as to whether
he was entitled to retirement or a discharge because of
physical disability. In addition, the plaintiff asserts in a
brief filed for the consideration of the commissioner that,

21

in view of the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, there is at least substantial doubt whether the
Air Force could validly provide by regulation for the ad-
ministrative issuance of undesirable discharges.

The second of the points mentioned in the preceding
paragraph will be discussed first.

It apparently is the plaintiff’s theory that any form
of discharge certificate issued by a military service which
is phrased in derogatory language and which diminishes
the benefits that otherwise ould be available to the dis-
charged serviceman is a punitive discharge; and since
Congress, in the Uniform Code of Military Justice en-
acted as Section 1 of the Act of May 5, 1950 (64 Stat.
107),’ expressly authorized courts-martial to adjudge dis-
honorable discharges and bad-conduct discharges as pun-
ishments against persons convicted of criminal offenses
defined in the Code, this impliedly prohibited the mili-
tary services from providing by regulation for the ad-
ministrative issuance of any sort of derogatory discharge
that would disminish’ the benefits otherwise available to
the discharged person.

It is pertinent to observe that the same statute which
enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice also pro-
vided in Section 6 (64 Stat. at p. 145) that the former
Article of War 108, as amended (41 Stat. 809), should
continue to have the same force, effect, applicability as
theretofore, although it should no longer be known as an
Article of War. The statutory provision formerly desig-
nated as Article of War 108 declared in part that no
enlisted man should be discharged before the expiration
of his term of service except by order of the President,
or by order of the Secretary of the military department

1The Uniform Code of Military Justice is now incorporated in
Title 10 of the United States Code as Chapter 47.

22

in which he was serving,’ or by sentence of a court-
martial. Substantially similar statutory language had
been in effect since the enactment of Article of War 11
by the Act of April 10, 1806 (2 Stat. 359, 361); and it
had been judicially held that svch language granted to
the executive branch of the Government authority to
determine the form and terms of discharge certificates to
be issued administratively to discharged military per-
sonnel (Davis v. Woodring, 111 F. 2d 523, 525 (D.C.
Cir., 1940)), it being sufficient if the form and terms
of a discharge certificate adequately indicated the nature
of the service performed (Patterson v. Lamb, 329 U.S.
539, 545 (1947)). Furthermore, this executive authority
had heen held to extend to the issuance administratively
of discharges without honor. Reid v. United States, 161
Fed. 469, 472 (S.D.N.Y., 1908). Congress showed a clear
intention, in Section 6 of the same statute which enacted
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, that the executive
authority respecting military discharges should continue
and should rot be affected by the enactment of the Code.

The authority of the Secretary of the Air Force, sub-
sequent to the enactment of the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice, to provide by regulation for the administra-
tive issuance of undesirable discharges was upheld by
this court in the case of Grant v. United States, No. 30-
62, decided July 12, 1963.

On the basis of the decision in the Grant case, it is nec-
essary to reject the plaintiff’s contention in the present
case that the Secretary of the Air Force could not validly
provide by regulation for the administrative issuance of
undesirable discharges.

? Article of War 108 referred to the Secretary of War, but the
powers of that office devolved upon the Secretary of the Army and
the Secretary of the Air Force by virtue of Title II of the National
Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 495, 499).

23

Of course, regulations promulgated by the Secretary
of a military department to govern the administrative
issuance of discharges that disadvantage the discharged
person with respect to future benefits must meet the
basic requirements of due process of law. Clackum v.
United States, 148 Ct. Cl. 404, 408, 410 (1960); Bland
v. Connally, 293 F. 2d 852, 858, 860 (D.C. Cir., 1961).
Furthermore, whatever regulations may be promulgated
must be followed by a military service in connection with
the issuance of such discharges. Service v. Dulles, 354
U.S. 268, 388 (1957); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535,
539-540 (1959); Murray v. United States, supra, at p. 6
of slip copy; Smith v. United States, supra, at p. 9 of
slip copy.

This brings us to a consideration of the contention
made by the planitiff in the present case that, under the
Air Force’s own regulations, it could not properly issue
an undesirable discharge to the plaintiff without first re-
ferring his case to a medical board for a determination
as to whether he was entitled to retirement or a discharge
because of physical disability.

At the time pertinent to this litigation, Air Force Reg-
ulation No. 39-17 constituted the authority within the
Air Force for the discharge of enlisted personnel because
of “unfitness.” The grounds for the issuance of such a
discharge were set out in the regulation, and these in-
cluded “evidence of habits or traits of character mani-
fested by * * * chronic alcoholism * * *,” this being the
particular ground that was involved in the plaintiff’s
case. The regulation prescribed a rather elaborate pro-
cedure, which included the convening of a board of offi-
cers to consider the case of an enlisted man whose dis-
charge for unfitness had been recommended, the holding
of a hearing by the board, and the right of the affected
person to appear before the board in person and to be
represented by counsel. The board could recommend that

24

the affected person be discharged because of unfitness and
be given an undesirable discharge, or that he be dis-
charged because of unsuitability under Air Force Regu-
lation No. 39-16 and be given a general discharge, or that
he be retained in the service. The board’s action was
subject to consideration and approval or disapproval by
the convening authority and by the commander exercis-
ing general court-martial jurisdiction.

The plaintiff apparently relies upon the portion of
Air Force Regulation no. 39-17 which declared that
a discharge under the regulation could be accomplished
only after “Conclusive determination has been made
that a mental or physical defect does not exist which
wou'l warrant consideration under AFM 35-4.” In this
connection, the plaintiff, prior to his appearance before
the board of officers set up under Air Force Regulation
No. 39-17, was given an examination by an Air Force
medical officer. The diagnosis was “Alcoholism, chronic,
moderate, manifested by excessive drinking, disorderly
behavior when under the influence of alcohol * * *.” The
medical officer concluded that there were no mental or
physical defects which warranted disposition of the plain-
tiffs case through medical channels, and recommended
that the -'-‘*tiff be separated from the service under
the provisic.us of Air Force Regulation No. 39-17 because
of alcoholism.

According to the plaintiff, the conclusion that there
were no mental or physical defects warranting disposi-
tion of his case through medical channels was erroneous.
The plaintiff refers to the fact that, as shown by his
medical records in the Armed Forces, he once sustained
a head injury which required that he be hospitalized for
about 15 days, a splenectomy was performed upon him,
and he was a chrunic alcoholic.

The plaintiff calls attention to Air Force Manual 35-4,
which was cited in Air Force Regulation No. 39-17 and

25

which covered the subject of retirement and separation
of military personnel by virtme of physical disability.
The manual provided in part that:

A patient who is unfit or whose fitness for further
general military service appears, for medical rea-
sons to be in doubt will be referred to a medical .
ware. * F*

The plaintiff argues that his case, because of the head
injury, the splenectomy, and his chronic alcoholism, came
within the scope of the quoted language, and, therefore,
that it was necessary for the Air Force to refer his case
to a medical board for consideration of the question
whether he was entitled to retirement or a discharge be-
cause of physical disability, before the Air Force could
properly decide on the issuance of an undesirable dis-
charge to him.

The head injury mentioned by the plaintiff was sus-
tained on or about June 10, 1947; while the plaintiff
was serving as an enlisted man in the Navy. He was
hospitalized for this injury until on or about June 25,
1947. Thereafter, the plaintiff continued to serve in the
Navy until February 6, 1948, when he was discharged.
A year later, he enlisted in the Army, and he served as
a soldier for more than 4 months, after which he was
transferred to the Air Force. The plaintiff served in
the Air Force for more than 5 years, which involved a re
enlistment. Each enlistment and reenlistment involved a
medical determination by the military authorities that
the plaintiff was physically qualified to perform full mili-
tary duty. Moreover, the plaintiff has not presented io
the court evidence proving that, after the period of hos-
pitalization in June 1947, the plaintiff’s physical capacity
to perform full military duty was affected by the 1947
head injury. Consequently, the mere fact that this head
injury occurred in i947 was not sufficient to raise a
doubt concerning the plaintiff’s physical fitness to per-

26

form the duties of his grade at the time in 1954 when
his case was being processed under Air Force Regulation
No. 39-17.

The splenectomy was performed on the plaintiff in
November 1950, while he was serving with the Air Force.
After the operation, the plaintiff had a 60-day period of
convalescence, and he was then assigned light duties for
a period of 3 or 4 weeks. At the end of the latter period,
the plaintiff was given regular duties to perform. He
served out his then current enlistment and was discharged
by the Air Force on February 13, 1952. The next day,
the plaintiff reenlisted in the Air Force; and he served
under that enlistment until the discharge of July 1, 1954,
that is involved in the present litigation. The reenlist-
ment in 1952 involved a medical determination by the
military authorities that the plaintiff was physically
qualified at the time, notwithstanding the splenectomy,
to perform full military duty. The plaintiff has not at-
tempted to rebut this by introducing evidence for the
purpose of proving that, after the period of convalescence
and the period of light duties previously mentioned, the
1950 splenectomy actually affected his physical capacity
to perform full military duty during the remaining years
of his military service. The plaintiff seems to regard
as conclusive the circumstance that, at the time of the
pla:ntiff’s discharge on July 1, 1954, the Veterans Ad-
ministration z:ated a splenectomy as a 30-percent dis-
ability. This is immaterial, however, .s the disability
ratings of the Veterans Administration are based upon
statutes and regulations different from those that govern
the retirement or discharge of military personnel. Holli-
day v. United States, 128 Ct. Cl. 647, 649 (1954).

We turn now to a consideration of the plaintiff’s chronic
alcoholista, which, according to the Air Force’s determi-
nation, rendered the plaintiff unfit for continuation in
the service. The plaintiff refers to the dictionary defi-

27

nition of alcoholism as “A diseased condition caused by
the excessive use of alcoholic liquors” (WEBSTER’S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 2d edition, unabridged) ;
and he contends that his chronic alcoholism was at least
sufficient to raise a doubt as to whether his unfitness for
further general military service was attributable to medi-
cal reasons, within the meaniug of the sentence pre-
viously quoted from Air Force Manual 35-4, this mak-
ing it necessary thai his case be referred to a medical
board for a determination of this question before the
Air Force could properly issue an undesirable discharge
to him under Air Force Regulation No. 39-17.

It is not necessary for the court to decide whether al-
coholism is or is not a disease, from the technical medi-
cal standpoint. It is sufficient for the purposes of the
present case that the Air Force, in its Regulation No.
39-17, dealt specifically with chronic alcoholism on the
part of enlisted personnel and prescribed a procedure
whereby such personnel would be discharged from the
service. These provisions dealing expressly with chronic
alcoholism would necessarily remove alcoholism from the
scope of the provisions of Air Force Manual 35-4 deal-
ing generally with the subject of physical disability. Bal-
timore Nat. Bank v. Tax Commission, 297 U.S: 209, 215
(1936).

For the reasons indicated above, it is my opinion that
the Air Force had the authority to promulgate its Regu-
lation No. 39-17 providing (among other things) for the
issuance of undesirable discharges to chronic alcoholics,
and that the plaintiff has failed to prove that the Air
Force did not act in accordance with this regulation when
it issued an undesirable discha:ge to the plaintiff.

It is my recommendation, therefore, that the petition
be dismissed.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The plaintiff is a citizen of the United States. He
resided at 3805 Military Road NW., Washington, D.C.,
when this action was initiated.

2. On October 3, 1942, the plaintiff entered upon a
period of active duty with the Navy, serving as an en-
listed man.

3. (a) On or about June 10, 1947, while the plaintiff
was serving on active duty with the Navy, as indicated in
finding 2, he suffered an injury to his head, for which he
was hospitalized until on or about June 25, 1947. This
injury was held to be “LOD” (in line of duty).

(b) The evidence in the record does not show that,
after the period of hospitalization mentioned in para-
graph (a) of this finding. the plaintiff’s physical capacity
to perform full military duty was affected by the head
injury referred to in paragraph (a) of this finding.

4. (a) On February 6, 1948, the plaintiff was given an
undesirable discharge by the Navy.

(b) Subsequently, the Navy Board of Review, Dis-
charges and Dismissals canceled the undesirable dis-
charge mentioned in paragraph (a) of this finding and
issued to the plaintiff a discharge under honorable con-
ditions by reason of unsuitability.

5. On February 8, 1949, the plaintiff enlisted in the
United States Army. This enlistment involved a medical
determination by the military authorities that the plain-
tiff was physically qualified to perform full military duty.
The plaintiff was transferred to the United States Air
Force on June 20, 1949.

6. (a) On November 12, 1950, while the plaintiff was
serving on active duty with the Air Force under the
enlistment referred to in finding 5, a splenectomy was

29

performed upon him. The splenectomy was held to be in-
curred in line of duty.

(b) After the splenectomy mentioned in paragraph
(a) of this finding, the plaintiff went through 2 60-day
period of convalescence, and then resumed the perfor-
mance of military duties. He was assigned light duties
for a period of 3 or 4 weeks, and then was given regular
duties.

(c) The evidence in the record does not show that, after
the period of convalescence and the period of light duties
referred to in paragraph (b) of this finding, the plain-
tiff’s physical capacity to perform full military duty
was affected by the splenectomy mentioned in paragraph
(a) of this finding.

7. On February 13, 1952, the plaintiff was discharged
under honorable conditions by the Air Force.

8. On February 14, 1952, the plaintiff reenlisted in
the Air Force for a 6-year term. The reenlistment in-
volved a medical determination by the military authori-
ties that the plaintiff was physically qualified to perform
full military duty. The plaintiff served under the en-
listment of February 14, 1952, until July 1, 1954, when
he was discharged as undesirable under circumstances
related in subsequent findings.

9. During the period June 1953-Aprii 1954, while the
plaintiff was serving in the Air Force under the enlist-
ment mentioned in finding 8, he was convicted by court-
martial or punished under Article 15 of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice for the following offenses:

(a) being disrespectful toward a commissioned officer,
failing to obey a lawful order of a commissioned officer,
and disorderly conduct in station on or about June
26, 1953;

30

(b) being drunk and disorderly in public on or about
November 16, 1953;

(ec) driving while intoxicated on or about November
22, 1953;

(d) driving while intoxicated on or about December
1, 1953;

(e) being drunk in public on or about December 3,
1953;

(f) being drunk in public on or about January 21,
1954; and

(2) being drunk in public on or about April 21, 1954.

10. On May 6, 1954, the piaintiff was given a psychia-
tric evaluation by an Air Force medical officer. The
diagnosis was “Alcoholism, chronic, moderate, manifested
by excessive drinking, disorderly behavior when under
the influence of alcohol * * *.” The medical officer rec-
ommended that the plaintiff “be separated from the miii-
tary service under the provisions of AFR 39-17 because
of alcoholism.” In this connection, it was concluded by
the medical officer that there were no mental or physical
defects which warranted disposition of the plaintiff’s
case through medical channels, which would have pro-
vided the plaintiff with a full and fair heariag by a phy-
sical evaluation board.

11. Under the date of May 20, 1954, the commanding
officer of the plaintiff’s organization, the Unit Command
Section, 3625th United States Air Force Hospital, Tyn-
dall Air Force Base, Florida, recommended that the
plaintiff appear before a board convened under Air Force
Regulation No. 39-17 to determine his fitness for reten-
tion in the service. The commanding officer’s recommen-
dation stated (among other things) that “Airman has
given evidence of chronic alcoholism and disorderly be-
havior by repeated commission of offenses * * *,” and that

31

“In view of the shove pattern of behavior and futile at-
tempts made to effect rehabilitation of this airman, I con-
clude that it [sic] is of minimal benefit to the Air Force
and his retention therein would be detrimental to the good
of the service.” ?

12. (a) On May 24, 1954, the plaintiff was tried at
the Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, before a special
court-martial for allegedly violating Article 134 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice by being drunk at a
public place on or about May 18, 1954, and being drunk
in station on or about Mv 15, 1954.

(b) At the conclusion of the trial, the plaintiff was
found guilty of the charge and specifications, and he was
sentenced to be restricted to the limits of the Tyndall
Air Force Base for 3 months and to forfeit $65 per month
for 6 months.

(c) A recommendation for clemency, signed by four
members of the special court-martial was submitted un-
der the date of May 27, 1954.

13. (a) On May 28, 1954, at the Tyndall Air Force
Base, Florida, the plaintiff appeared before a board of
officers appointed pursuant to Air Force Regulation No.
39-17 by the commanding officer of the 3625th Flying
Training Wing (Interceptor). After a hearing, the board
made the following finding:

The board finds that the respondent properly falls
within the category outlined in paragraph 3a(1),
AFR 39-17, “habits or traits of character manifested
by chronic alcoholism.”

The Board made the following recommendation: |

The Board recommends that Airman Basic George
N. Rowe be discharged because of unfitness and given
an und-sirable discharge.

32

(b) The ‘finding and recommendation of the board
were approved by an officer having general court-martial
jurisdiction on June 21, 1954.

14. Pursuant to the proceedings mentioned in find-
ings 10, 11, and 13, the Air Force issued an undesirable
discharge to the plaintiff on July 1, 1954.

15. (a) On July 9, 1954, the plaintiff requested that
the issuance of an undesirable discharge to him on July
1, 1954, be reviewed by the Air Force Discharge Review
Board, and that the character of the discharge be changed.

(b) The board concluded, however, that the evidence
submitted was insufficient to warrant a change in the
type and nature of the plaintiff’s discharge.

(c) Accordingly, the Secretary of the Air Force on or
about October 20, 1954, directed that the plaintiff’s ap-
plication be denied.

16. Subsequently, the plaintiff applied for a recon-
sideration of the review of his discharge. This request
was denied on or about January 26, 1956.

17. (a) In February 1956, the plaintiff applied to the
Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records for
a change in the nature of the discharge that was issue?
to him on July 1, 1954.

(b) The plaintiff’s application was denied without a
hearing, on the ground that the plaintiff had not sub-
mitted sufficient evidence to establish a showing of prob-
able error or injustice.

18. (a) On March 25, 1960, the plaintiff filed another
application for relief with the Air Force Board for Cor-
rection of Military Records. In this application, the plain-
tiff requested the following corrective action:

(*) That on July 1, 1954, I was not discharged
from the Air Force, but was retained on duty and

RS

was duly reenlisted on February 14, 1958, for a
further period of six years.

(2) In alternative to (1) above; That on July 1,
1954, I was placed on the temporary Gisability re-
tired list and on July 1, 1959, I was permanently
retired for physical disability together with appro-
priate findings to support such action under the
provisions cf Title IV of the Career Compensation
Act of 1949, as amended, and codified in 10 U.S.C.,
Ch. 61.

(3) In alternative to (1) cr (2) above; That on
July 1, 1954, I was discharged from the Air Force
with a discharge under honorable conditions.

(b) A hearing was held on July 5, 1961, before the
Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records on
the plaintiff’s application. The plaintiff personally ap-
peared and testified before the board, and he was repre-
sented before the board by his present legal counsel.

(c) In passing upon the plaintiff’s second applicativa,
the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records
made the following findings (among others) :

27. On the basis of applicant’s record of continu-
ing misconduct without response to rehabilitation
efforts, his commander was fully complying with
regulations in recommending that an AFR 39-17
Board consider applicant’s fitness for retention in
the service. The Board found applicant unfit by
reason of habits or traits of character manifested dy
chronic alcoholism. The commander and the Board
had full knowledge that applicant’s performance of
duty was excellent when he was on the job; however,
he was a constant disciplinary problem due to exces-
sive use of alcohol and resulting absence, ines pacity
and disorderly conduct which negated his value to
the service. There was no evidence, medical or other-
wise, that he had any mental or physical disability
that would warrant processing his case through medi-

34

cal channels. Applicant’s alcoholism has never been
considere’ . have been caused by psychiatric dis-
ease whi... would be compensable under service and
VA regulations. It is our opinion that the findings
and recommendations of the AFR 39-17 Board are
fully sustained by the evidence.

28. Careful study of the facts and circumstances
of this case leads to the conclusion that applicant’s
alcohclism resulted from intemperate and wanton
overindulgence in alcohol and was thus due to his
own intentional misconduct. Applicant has failed to
demonstrate that an error or injustice exists in his
case and his application should be denied. It is
stressed that this finding is based only upon service
following the reenlistment contracted 14 February
1952,

(d) The Air Force Board for Correction of Military
Records recommended that the plaintiff’s second applica-
tion be denied.

(e) On December 18, 1961, an Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force approved the recommendation of the Air
Force Board fox Correction of Military Records and de-
nied the plaintiff’s second application for relief.

19. At the time pertinent to this litigation, Air Force
Regulation No. 39-17 (9 February 1954) provided in
part as follows:

1. Purpose and Scope. This Regulation outlines
the conditions and procedures, and constitutes the
authority within the Air Force for the discharge of
enlisted personnel * * * serving on active duty for
unfitness. * * *

2. Policy. All commanders will maintain high per-
sonnel standards within the Air Force. Constant
atter:ticn will be given to the problem of early rec-
ognition of unfit airmen and elimination in cases
where rehabilitation has proven impossibie or im-

35

practical. An airman will not be reassigned who
has demonstrated unfitness for any of the reasons
listed in paragraph 3a, until proceduce outlined
herein has been followed, except as provided in para-
graph 5. Commanders who thus avoid proper dis-
position of substandard airmen are not accepting
their command responsibility, create serious morale
problems in the gaining unit, and add to the cost of
final elimination.

a. The discharge of enlisted personnel under this
Regulation will be accomplished only after:

(1) Conclusive determination has been made that
a mental or physical defect does not exist which
would warrant consideration under AFM 35-4.

(2) Definite determination has been made that,
for any of the causes mentioned in this Regulation,
the person cannot be rehabilitated to the extent where
he may be expected to become a satisfactory airman.
Action will not be taken under this Regulation in lieu
of disciplinary action.

* * * *

3. Procedure. The procedure to be followed in re-
porting airmen fer board action with a view to sepa-
ration for unfitness and subsequent action required
are set forth in a and b below. Care will be exer-
cised in the evaluation of an airman prior to recom-
mending that he appear before a board of officers or
be discharged for any of the reasons indicated. When
appropriate, all aspects of the character guidance
program will be employed prior to making such rec-
ommendations.

a. Commander’s Report. When an airman has
demonstrated that he is unfit for further retention
in the military service for any of the reasons indi-
cated in (1) and (2) below and his rehabilitation
is considered impracticable after repeated attempts
to accomplish same have failed (except where at-

tS, ER RE EY IE 7 : 4. Mee ee ate abe i . © ~ ree ~e

36

tempts at rehabilitation are impracticable as in con-
firmed drug addiction), his commander will report
the facts (see b below) to the next higher command
and recommend that the airman be required to ap-
pear before a board of officers convened under the
authority contained herein. The commander will
make such a report if the airman:

(1) Gives evidence of habits or traits of char-
acter manifested *; antisocial or amoral trend,
chronic alcoholism, criminalism, sexual perversion,
drug addiction, pathological lying, or other miscon-
duct. * * * [Emphasis supplied. }

* * + *

b. Composition of Report. The commander’s re-
port will include the following data:

oa * * *

(9) Report of medical officer, including statement
that there are no mental or physical defects sufficient
to warrant consideration under AFM 35-4. When
applicable, report of psychiatric examination will be
obtained. * * *

* * 4 *

4. Application for Discharge. Airmen who do not
hold a Reserve commission will be afforded the op-
portunity to request discharge in lieu of board ac-
tion.

+ * * *

5. Action When Airman Does Not Sign Applica-
tion. Except when other disyosition of the case is
considered warranted by intermediate commanders,
including reassignment of the airman to another sec-
tion or unit, the report will be forwarded to the
immediate wing or comparable level commander who
will, if he considers such action appropriate, con-
vene a board of officers to d2termine whether the
airman should be discharged ‘‘or unfitness. * * *

37

a. Medical Evaluation. An airman scheduled to
appear before the board will first appear before the
unit medical officer or base surgeon. This medical
officer will ascertain whether any mental or physical
defect or sufficient import to warrant action under
AFM 35-4, exists.

(1) When physical or mental defects of major im-
port are not involved, the medical officer will sub-
mit to the board a concise report in which the es-
sential points of the mental and physical condition of
the airman are described, to include a statement that
there are no mental or physical defects which wvuld
warrant action under AFM 35-4. Unless the respond-
ent, his counsel, or the board requests the presence
of the medical officer before the board, this report
will be received and considered by the board with-
out requiring the medical officer to appear.

* * * *

b. Board Convened by Immediate Wing or Com-
parable Level Commander. Boards of officers will
be convened under this authority by the wing or com-
parable level commander and will consist of not less
than three nor more than five officers, at least one
of whom is of field grade. One member of the board
will be a legal officer or officer possessing legal ex-
perience, if available, especially in instances where
the airman is represented by counsel. * * *

* * . 7

ce. Board Procedure.

* ® - * +.

(3) An airman appearing before a board of offi-
cers convened under this Regulation is entitled to
military counsel of his own selection if reasonably
available. The airman may retain civilian counsel at
no expense to the Government. If military counsel
of the airman’s own choosing is not available, com-
petent military counsel will be furnished by the con-
vening authority. However, if the person specifically

38

declines counes! in writing, counsel need not be fur-
nished.

d. Authorized kecommendations:

(1) The board will recommend that the person
be:

(a) Dis harged because of unfitness and given
an undesirable discharge, or

(b) Discharged because of unsuitability under
AFR 39-16, and given a general discharge, or

(c) Retained in the service.

* * * a

(3) Discharge, if fecommended, will be for unfit-
ness, except that discharge because of unsuitability
(under AFR 39-16 without referral to another board) .
may be recommended in borderline cases if military
circumstances and the character of service rendered
by the airman during his current period of service
so warrant. As examples, such circumstances would
apply where the cause of unfitness has been minor,
regarding the length of.- efficient service or where
there has been a definite effort at self-control, or
where an airman has, during his current period of
service, disti:guished himself by an act of heroism
which in itself reflected great credit on the airman
and the military service.

f. Action by Convening Authority:

(1) Board proceedings will be closely examined
by the convening authority and a determination made
on the propriety of action recommended.

(2) The convening authority will forward the
board proceedings with his recommenda:'on to the
commander exercising general court-martial juris-
diction (herein-after referred to as the “approving
authority”).

39

g. Action by Approving Authority:

(1) Board proceedings will be closely examined
and a determination made on the propriety of action
recommended. This examination will include a re-
view by the staff judge advocate for legal sufficiency.

(2) The approving authority in person will ap-
prove the action recommended by the board or di-
rect other appropriates disposition of the case. This
authority will not be delegated.

* * * *

8. Form of Discharge Certificate To Be Given.
When discharged because of unfitness, DD Form 258
AF, “Undesirable Discharge,” will be furnished.
When discharged because of unsuitability, DD Form
257AF, “General Discharge,” will be furnished.

* * * *

20. (a) At the time pertinent to this iitigation, the
foreword to Air Force Manual 35-4, covering the sub-
ject of “Physical Evaluation for Retention, Retirement
and Separation {of Military Personnel],” stated in part
as follows:

1. Purpose and Scope. This Manual prescribes
the procedure and sets forth the authority for the
retention, retirement, and separation of members of
the Air Force with physical defects or disabi ities
which render such members wifit. * * *

2. Statutory Authority. P.L. 35i, 81st Cong.,
Career Compensation Act of 1949 * * * which gen-
erally superseded previous provisions of law relat-
ing to physical disability retirement, provides re-
quirements for determining eligibility for physical
disability retirement and provisions for separation
with severance pay by reason of physical disability.
This statute is uniform in its application to all mem-
bers without regard to component or grade. The pro-
visions of the Career Compensation Act of 1949 and

40

certain other applicable laws are explained in detail
in section. II, chapter 1.

(b) Paragraph 1 of section I of chapter 1 ¢f the manu-
al cited in paragraph (a) of this finding contained the
following definitions (among others) :

i. Physical Disability—A physical or mental condi-
tion arising from one or more physical defects and
which may render a member unfit to perform the
duties of his office, rank, or grade.

n. Physically Unfit or “Unfit”—Physical inability
to perform the duties of the office, rank, or grade
held, which are required during the performance oi
full military duty, field as well as garrison, in both
peace and war.

e * 2 *

q. Incurred—Appearing herein as part of the
phrase “physical disability incurred while entitled to
receive basic pay,” refers to the coming into being,
while the member is entitled to receive basic pay, of
physical disability rendering such member unfit to
perform the duties of his office, rank, or grade.

r. Duties of Office, Rank, or Grade—The duties of
the particular office, rank, or grade, which are re-
quired in the performance of full military duty, field
as well as garrison, in both peace and war.

(c) Paragraph 7 of section II of chapter 2 of the man-
ual cited in paragraph (a) of this finding provided as
follows:

7. Refferral to Medical Board —

A patient who is unfit or whose fitness for further
general military service appears, for medical rea-—*
sons, to be in doubt will be referred to a medica!
board. The medical board consists of three or more
officers appointed by the surgeon or hospital com-

and facilities permit, establish the diagnosis, niake
recommended findings of fitness and unfitness, and
make appropriate recommendations of action on the
disposition of the patient. The board will be con-
ducted in accordance with the instructions of the
appointing authority, and principles of AFR 14-20.

21. As of July 1, 1954, paragraph 1-i of section I,
chapter 1, Air Force Manual 35-4, was revised to pro-
vide as follows:

i. Physical Disability—Ainy manifest or latent im-
pairment of function due to disease or injury regard-
less of the degree of impairment. The presence of
physical disability does not necessarily require a find-
ing of unfitness for duty. The term “physical dis-
ability” includes mental diseases other than such in-
herent defects as behavior disorders, personality dis-
orders, and primary mental deficiency.

(1) Impairment of function is hereby defined as
any lessening or weakening of the capacity of the
body or any of its parts, to perform that which is
considered by accepted medical principles to be the
normal activity in the bodily economy.

(2) Manifest impairment is defined as that which
is accompanied by signs and/or symptoms.

(3) Latent impairment is defined as that which is
not accompanied by signs and/or symptoms but which
is of such a nature that there is reasonable and moral
certainty, according to accepted medical principles,
that signs and/or symptoms will appear within a
reasonable period of time.

22. The plainiiff was not, at the time of his undesira-
ble discharge mentioned in finding 14, or in the several
months immediately preceding such discharge, referred
to a medical board, within the meaning of paragraph
7 of section II of chapter 2 of Air Force Manual 35-4
(see finding 20(c)).

23. (a} Under the Veterans Administration Schedule
for Rating Disabilities in current use at the time of the
plaintiff’s discharge on July 1, 1954, a splenectomy was
rated as a 80-percent disability under code number 7706.

(b) The plaintiff has been denied compensation for
such disability under laws administered by the Veterans
Administration.

24. The plaintiff’s entire service from February 8, 1949,
to July 1, 1954, is considered by the Veterans Ad-
ministration as one continuous period of service; and since
the plaintiff was not discharged therefrom under condi-
tions other than dishonorable, he is not entitled to bene-
fits under laws administered by the Veterans Adminis-
tration on such period of service.

CONCLUSION OF LAW

Upon the foregoing findings of fact, which are made a
part of the judgment herein, the court concludes as a
matter of law that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover,
and the petition is therefore dismissed.

5 ETE AE MR en

43
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS

)
256 GEORGE NEFF ROWE ) v. THE UNITED STATES

ORDER

These cases come before the court on motions or peti-
tions for rehearing, reconsideration, to alter, amend or set
aside judgments and orders, to amend findings of fact, for
reversal of order, for new trial, for oral presentation,
motion according to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and for other relief, under Rules 68 and 69 of the Rules
of this court and, on consideration thereof,

IT IS ORDERED this sixteenth day of October, 1964,
that said motions be and the same are denied as follows:

256 George Neff Rowe. Plaintiff’s motion.

BY THE COURT

Don N. LARAMORE
Acting Chief Judge

* a 2 *

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385602_0425%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
