# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers v. Fafnir Bearing Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1965
- **Citation:** 380 U.S. 950

## Text

Ottice- Supreme Court, U.S.
4 FILED
PND hake Oh Sn! oo
nor mt wore
i
; ae !
IN THE JOHN F. DAVIS. CLe?K f

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1964

non B25

EBER BROS. WINE & LIQUOR CORPORATION,
Petitioner,

v.

THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS

-——
=

Justin N. FetpMAn
Attorney for Petitioner
777 Third Avenue
i ew York, New York 10017

Of Counsel:

HERBERT PRASHKER
Rosert B. SHarro

and

Pouettri Frempin PRASHKER
FELDMAN & GARTNER

of New York City

TAPLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
IN ete here en 2 Moanash copianesanies 1
ST RAT a EEN LOE ROOT TOT SEIT TT 2
Coermmpnces: TPO IN anna e cick ctenecansentereeenes 2
CoNSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED ................0.0000:0.065. 2
I are face rts ps dineaias Antetiieamneeans 3
Reasons For GRANTING THE WRIT ........................5:6600000 11

The Importance of the Question 0... 11

The Rationale of the Decision Below: The Presi-
dent’s Qualified Right Unilaterally to Demand
Personal PreeemGatiem .........:....6...6...0.06.....0...... aie 15

Delivery of Bills to the President’s Office at the
Seat of the Goxernment Constitutes Adequate
RII oot. aratss os~ arp oeceeremmlnaa Hersatsasee 18

The Constitutional Scheme Envisioned by the
Decision Below is Uncertain and Unworkable 23

The ‘‘Ground’’ of Congressional ‘‘Acquiescence’’ 28

RN Foie oe RA nee Le ea eaa hiatade ice 29

Se SRR LEE

I!

PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Edwards v. United States, 286 U. S. 482 (1932) .... 13, 14

La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U. S.
423 (1899) a AERP AERA CRANE SEL Seen Be Tatts tees 13

Missouri P. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U. S. 276 (1919) 1
The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U. S. 655 (1929) .........13, 27-28

Wright v. United States, 302 U. S. 583 (1938) ..... ..18,15

21-23, 27-28
Constitutions and Statutes:
United States Constitution:
(NT EGAROCD, ale Beara tier Slepenare ar erat perriee rare 6, 19
I co esans cexteaigosersd wersessnseeessnnenaconenneesd passim
I rad ccanesvtcsipraenscpainonicaninssstcssoniny aanies 2, 25
pe ae ere Lib Sea Raps Sen ROR SP Pr 18
at. 5h, 3 ....... dace Ngiaceernicecavccsounancren 19
Massachusetts Constitution (1780) 000.000. 12
New York Constitution (52h Mpeiinaderd Sia ete aeagcaee 12
0 To Sadao ccaphan passesscesaca rgsseeoeorannn 2
dea 5 cos aa cli casa ivesnencaeednoaanswnsern 3
et ak aseresnrayysesnias ivvasieesakioo essed 3
Books and Articles: ees

Baker, The Fundamental Law of American Constitu-
tions (1916) ............ FS Syren slag NE at Aa Bd tc IRM te ae 12

Beard, ‘‘ Veto Power, ’* Cyclopedia of American Gov-
ee Bellanca a civewrs ye vanachanslascinbsins 12

Ii!

Black, Handbook of American Constitutional Law
RO NS nsec hadi csencpnessaacuamsmenbeceeentrons
Bryce, The American Commonwealth (3d ed. 1907)

Dougherty, Constitutional History of the State f
Be es BIE hein ese tes

Elliott, Debates in the Several State Conventions on
the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (1836)

Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention (Rev.
Bg RRR UDR aie Rs ina atled vita o acne oro
Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution (1913)
Fisher, The Evolution of the Constitution of the
United States (2d ed. 1910) .................c cece:
Frothingham, A Brief History of the Constitution
and Government of Massachusetts (1916)

Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York
SERRE NaS oe pede = NC Oe ary I CNC DOE MO

Norton, The Constitution of the United States (1940)

Pierce, Notes, in The Formation of the Union (House
Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., Ist Sess.) (1927) ........

Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
I I MII oss Featesases insane trirmcretintcens ie

.) Se we | ene Coenen ee ee
Warren, The Making of the Constitution (1928) ....

Zinn. The Veto Power of the President, 12 F. R. D.
207 (1951)

PAGE

19
12

12

12

12

14

av

Miscellaneous:
PAGE
The Federalist, Nos. 69, 73 (Hamilton) 0... 12
105 Congressional Record (1959) .........._..4, 6, 7, 14. 26
Journai of the House of Representatives (Aug. 31,
Reet SL ene ABR a et in Oe DOE TOT 6, 9, 10, 26, 27
H. Rep. No. 118 (86th Cong., Ist Sess.) (1959) ......... §
S. Rep. No. 758 (86th Cong., Ist Sess.) (1959)... .. 5)
S. 994 (86th Cong., Ist Sess.) (1959)... ale
S. 2539 (86th Cong., Ist Sess.) (1959) 0
H.R. 6596 (86th Cong., Ist Sess.) (1959) ete
H.R. 2717 (86th Cong., Ist Sess.} (1959) ..0............passim
H. J. Res. 510 (86th Cong., 1st Sess.) (1959) one eee 11
Memorandum of Attorney General Brownell (July 5,
NS ein ata saree ty wmlouneenaneniies reaches 7-8, 14, 22

1943) ........
Memorandum of President Roosevelt (Nov. 10, 1943) 26
N. Y. Sunday Times (Oct. 25, 1964) .....0.0000 | 6d

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1964

is eet

St a

Eser Bros. Wine & Liquor CoRPORATION,
Petitioner,
v.

Tue Unitep States,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS

To the Honorable Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the United
States, and to the Honorable Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court of the United States:

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of eertiorarl
issue to review the judgment of the United States Court
of Claims entered in the above-entitled case on October
16, 1964.

Opinion Below

The opinion of the Court of Claims (Appendix B, infra,
p. 3a) is reported in 337 F. 2d 624.

st

Jurisdicti

The judgment of the Court of Claims (see Appendix
B, infra) was entered on October 16, 1964. The jurisdic-
tion of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. §1255(1).

Question Presented

Whether a bill, passed by both houses of Congress, and
physically delivered by Congress, in accordance with estab-
lished practice, to the Office of the President at the Seat of
the Government,’ was, by such delivery, ** presented”’ to the
President within the meaning of Article I, Section 7, Clause
2 of the Constitution, and so became law when not returned
by the President to the Congress within ten days of such
delivery (Sundays excepted), Congress not having previ-
ously adjourned, when the President had been abroad at
the time of the delivery of the bill to his Office and there-
after returned the bill to Congress with a message of dis-
approval within ten days of his arrival in the United States.

Constitutional Provision Involved

‘‘Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and ‘he Senate, shall, before it be-
comes a Law, be presented to the President of the
United States; If he approves ke shall sign it, but if
not he shall return it, with his Objections to that
House in which it shall have originated, who shall

1. U.S. Const. art I, §8, cl. 17.

a

3 ,

enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and
proceed to reconsider it. If atter such Reconsideration
two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill,
it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the
other House. by which it shall likewise be reconsidered,
and if approved by two-thirds of that House, it shall
become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of
both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays,
and the Names of the Persons voting for and against
the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House
respectively. If any Bul shall not be returned by the
President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after
it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be
a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the
Congress by their Adjournmeni prevent its Return, in
which Case it shall not be a Law.’’ U.S. Const. art.
I, 7, el. 2 (italies supplied).

The text of the bill in question, H.R. 2717, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1959), is set forth in Appendix A, infra. ,

Statement

(This suit was brought by petitioner in the Court of
Claims under 28 U. S. C. $1346 and §1491° for the refund
of income taxes overpaid by petitioner. The respondent
asserted the Statute of Limitations as its only defense.
(See Answer, Record, pp. 24-25.) That defense had been
expressly barred by the terms of H.R. 2717, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1959) (see Appendix A, infra), passed by both
Houses of Congress and delivered to the Office of the
President at the White House on August 31, 1959. From

2. Additional statutory bases for the claim are set forth in the
Petition below, Paragraph 12 (Record, p. 4).

4

August 26 to September 7, 1959 the President was out of
the country. On September 14, he returned H.R. 2717 to
the House of Representatives with a message of disap-
proval. Congress adjourning at 6:22 a.m. on September
15, the bill was not reconsidered.®

Upon these facts the court below found that, if H.R.
2717 was ‘‘presented’’ to the President on August 21, 1959
and consequently became law upon the expiration of ten
days (Sundays excepted), ‘‘ plaintiff is entitled to a refund
for the overpayment of income taxes in a total amount of
$150,634.18”’ plus interest (Finding of Fact 4). The court
concluded, however, that H.R. 2717 was not ‘*presented”’,
within the meaning of Article I, Section 7, Clause 2 of the
Constitution® until September 7, 1959, the date of the
President’s arrival in the United States, and that his re-
turn of the bill to the House of Representatives on Septem-
ber 14, 1959 with his disapproval accordingly constituted
an effective veto thereof. The court thereupon dismissed
plaintiff’s suit as barred by the Statute of Limitations.

The sole issue in the case was whether H.R. 2717 was
‘‘preserted’’ to the President within the meaning of Sec-
tion 7 wher it was delivered to his Office on August 31, 1959.

1. The Passage of H.R. 2717. ‘‘A Bill for the Relief of
Eber Brothers Wine and Liquor Corporation’’, H.R. 2717,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), waiving the Statute of Limita-

3. 105 Cong. Rec. 19688, 19749 (Sept. 14, 19595.

4. The parties have so stipulated. Record, p. 29. The Findings
of Fact by the Court of Claims are set forth in Appendix B, infra,
p. 3a at pp. 21-42, and are cited herein as “Finding fe

5. Hereinafter referred to as “Section 7”.

4)

tions as to petitioner’s claim for the refund of an over-
payment of income taxes for its fiscal years 1947 and 1948,
was introduced in the House of Representatives on January
15, 1959 (Finding 2). The pill was duly referred to the
cognizant House Committee, which, having considered a
Ty asury Department report opposing passage of an iden-
tical bill previously introduced (see Record, pp. 16-17),
unanimously recommended passage (H. Rep. No. 118, 86th
Cong., Ist Sess. (4959)). The House passed the bill on
March 17, 1959 (Finding 2). The cognizant Senate Com-
mittee likewise unanimously recommended passage (S.
Rep. No. 758, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted at
Record, p. 13), and the Senate passed the bill on August
97, 1959 (Finding 2). The pill was duly enrolled, signed
by the presiding officer of the Senate and by the Speaker of
the House and sent to the Committee on House Administra-
tion for presentation to the President (ibid.).

2. Delivery of H.R. 2717 to the Office of the President.
On August 31, 1959, H.R. 9717, with twelve other bills,
was physically delivered to the White House by a clerk
of the Committee on House Administration (Finding 6).
All thirteen bills were accepted by Mr. Tom Jones, a legis-
lative clerk on the White House staff, who signed receipts
therefor in the customary form:

WHITE HOUSE

Washington, D. C.

Recervep from the Committee on House Administra-
tion of the House of Representatives the following
enrolied House Bills:

* * *

6

(See Findings 5, 6). The procedure thus followed for the
delivery and receipt of enrolled bills by Congress to the
President—by an agent of the Congress to a legislative
clerk of the White House, rather than personal delivery
to the President himself—has obtained ‘‘at least since
1931, and for some period of time prior thereto, the dura
tion of which is uncertain’? (Finding 5). Accordingly,
upon the reiurn to the House of Representatives of the
White House receipt for H.R. 2717, a notation was made in
the House Journal for August 31, 1959 in accordance with
the usual practice®:

‘“Mr. Burueson, from the Committee on House
Administration, reported that that Committee did on
this day present to the President for his ay proval a bill
of the House of the following title:

e * td
“TLR. 2717 * * * A bill for the relief of Eber

Brother Wine and Liquor Corporation * * *.”’ (italics
supplied ).’

a

The Journal for August 31, 1959, couitaining this notation,
was read and formally approved by the House the following
day: See 105 Cong. Rec. 17539 (Sept. 1, 1959).

3. The Expiration of Ten Days (Sundays Excepted)
without Presidential Action. Upon delivery of H.R. 2717
and the twelve other bills to the White House on August 31,
they were immediately referred by the President’s staff to
the Bureau of the Budget and were processed in the normal

6. The House is required to keep a Journal under the Constitu-
tion. U.S. Const. art. I, §5, cl. 3.

7. A similar notation appeared in the Congressional Record for

August 31, 1959 (Finding 6: 105 Cong. Rec. 16022 (Aug. 31,
1959) ).

7

manner in which bills are processed foliowing presentation
(Finding 7). H.R. 2717 was returned to the White House
with the recommendations of the Bureau of the Budget
and the Treasury Department on September 9 (ibid.). The
other twelve bills were approved by the President on Sep-
tember 8 and September 9, all within ten days following
their eclivery to the White House. The President, however,
took re action on ELR. 2717 until September 14, twelve days
(Sunday excepted) after its delivery. At that time he
returned Bi. 2717 with a message of disapproval to the
House of Representatives (Finding 2), which was then in
recess awaiting adjournment.

The Senate being notified later that day that a ‘*veto”’
message had been received, Senator Keating of New
York inquired on the floor of the Senate whether H.R.
9717 had uot automatically become law upon the expi-
ration of ten days (Sundays excepted) following its de-
livery to the office of the President on August 31, 1959.
The Presiding Officer of the Senate stated that the ques-
tion was ‘‘for the courts to decide:’’ 105 Cong. Ree. 19553
(Sept. 14, 1959). This colloquy on the Senate floor is set
forth in Appendix C, infra, pp. 6a-8a.

4. The President’s Absence. On August 26, 1959, five
days before the delivery of H.R. 2717 to the White House,
President Dwight D. Eisenhower left the United States for
Europe; he was to return on September 7 (Finding 8). On
the occasion of an earlier trip abroad to Geneva in 1955, the
Attorney General had suggested to the Presid« it:

‘‘that you confer with leaders in Congress so that
arrangements can be made under the law for enrolled

EE ean aes ee Rae ane ee te SOS en SES

8

bills or joint resolutions to be held in Congress until
your return.

‘‘In this way, your attention to the important mat-
ters raised in Summit Talks will not be diverted by
consideration of bills which may safely await your
return.

“Tf Congressional leadership believes that the mat-
ter is serious enough to warrant your immediate atten-
tion, it should be advised to forward the bill te the
White House with this understanding:

1. That the entries on the House and Senate Jour-
nals will carry the statement: ‘Delivery to the White
House for forwarding to the President.’’’ Memoran-
dum of Attorney-General Brownell, July 5, 1955, Plain-
tiff’s Exhibit 3, reprinted in Appendix C, infra, page
5a (italics supplied).

Prior to his departure for the trip here in question in
August 1959, the President had ‘‘indicated his desire’’ to
some unidentified person or persons on his staff that ‘‘so
far as possible, he wanted Congressional bills to be held in
Washington until his return’’* (Finding 17) (italics sup-
plied).

The President’s ‘‘desire’’, however, was not imple-
mented in the case of H.R. 2717 by either of the alternative
methods proposed by the Attorney General ‘in 1955: it
was not held in Congress until the President’s return, nor

8. The President’s “desire”, as thus found by the court, is am-
biguous as to the manner in which he desired bills to be held in
Washington, or as to what was understood by “‘so far as possible.”
Presumably, he meant ‘“‘so far as possible” under the Constitution.
The President might have meant (in accordance with the 1955 memo-
randum of Attorney-General Brownell (see text immediately supra) )
that he wished his staff to arrange, “so far as possible’, that Con-
gress delay delivering bills to the White House until his return, and
thus clearly delay their “presentation” to him.

9

did the House Journal reflect that its delivery to the Office
of the President was ‘‘for forwarding’’ to him.* Instead,
two of the President’s aides, Mr. Gerald Morgan” and
Mr. William Hopkins" ‘‘decided that * * * the bills re-
ceived [by the President’s Office] during [the President’ s]
absence should be stamped ‘Held for presentation to the
President upon his return to the United States’ ’’ (Finding
17), ‘language never before used on prior occasions of
Presidential absence from the country’’ (Finding 8). The
legislative clerks on the President’s staff were instructed
to place this stamp on all bills received at the White House
after the President’s departure and on all receipts for
such bills (ibid.).

Prior to the President’s departure on August 26, 1959,
the President’s Deputy Assistant for Congressional Af-
fairs, Mr. Bryce N. Harlow, ‘‘dis enss[ed] * * * the matter”’
with ‘Congressional leaders’’. The record, however, ‘‘does
not disclose what was said in these discussions’’, or even
which ‘‘Congressiona! leaders’? were present, “since, as
the President’s agent, Mr. Harlew did not deem it proper
at the trial to disclose the detail of the conversation’’
(Finding 8); nor is there any indication in the Record of
any congressional aciion whatsoever taken pursuant to
this ‘‘diseussion.”’

Despite the instructions given by the President’s aides
to the White House staff as te the ‘‘Held for presentation
* * **) stamp, the normal ‘‘Received’’ stamp was applied

9. On the cortrary, it recited that the bill had been * ‘presented to
the President” on August 31, 1959 (Finding 6). P

10. Deputy Assistant ty the President.
11. White House Executive Clerk.

10

to H.R. 2717 on August 31, 1959. Upon discovering his
error, the White House clerk who had receipted for the
bill asked the cognizant House clerk to return the original
receipt for restamping. When informed that the receipt
had already been placed in the files of the Committee on
House Administration, the White House clerk then asked
that a piece of paper bearing the new stamp be attached
to the original receipt; upon the advice of the Parliamen-
tarian of the House, this was not done (Finding 9). And,

as already noted, the House Journal states that H.R. 2717
Was

‘on this day [August 31, 1959] presented to the Presi-
dent for his approval’’ (Finding 6).”

5. Treatment of Other Bills During the President’s
Absence. <A total of 72 eurc!led bills were delivered to the
White House while the President was abroad (Finding 12).
70 of these bills were acted upon within ten days (Sundays
excepted) from the time of such delivery (Finding 13).”*
One (S. 994) was approved twelve days after delivery to the
White House (Finding 14), a mere surplusage if delivery
was ‘‘presentation.”’ The seventy-second bill was H.R.
2717. Accordingly, no other bill delivered to the White

12. The enrolled bill bears the stamp ‘“‘PRESENTED TO THE PRES!-
DENT Sep 7 1959” (Finding 10) ; that stamp was affixed by a presi-
dential clerk after the bill had been disapproved by the President on
September 14, 1959 (Finding 17).

13. Whether or not one of these 70 bills, H. R. 6596, was acted
upon within ten days is an open—although moot—question. If the
bill was “presented” on September 3, the date of its delivery to the
White House, it was subjected to a pocket veto on September 15.
If it was “presented” on September 7, the date of the President's
return, the purported “veto” of the bill by the President on September
16 may be valid (although Congress had previously adjourned ).
(see Finding 13n.)

11

House during President Hisenhower’s absence preseats the
question raised in this case.”*

Despite the President’s ‘‘desire”’ that ‘‘so far as pos-
sible’? bills be held in Washingt »n, six bills delivered to
the White House during his absence were in fact flown to
him in Europe by his staff. One of these (H.J. Res. 510)
was delivered to the White House two and a half hours
after the delivery of H.R. 2717. It was signed in Paris
three days later on September 3. Indeed, the President,
while in Paris, on the same day vetoed S. 2539, which had
been delivered to the White House only the day previous,
September 2; the disapproved bill was returned to the
Senate on September 4.

In addition, 23 bills which had been delivered to the
White House before the President’s departuve on August
26, 1959 were also flown to Europe for action by him: in
the view of the President’s staff, ‘‘the President had but
ten days from the date of delivery to the White House in
which to act on the bills’’ since ‘‘tne President was in the
United States at the time the bills were delivered to the
White House’’ (Finding 15).

Reasons for Granting the Writ

The Importance of the Question

One of the great debates of the Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1787 concerned the respective roles of the Congress
and the President in the enactment of laws. Article I,

14. But, as the court below noted, the problem is likely to recur
with increasing frequency. Opinion, p. 4.

12

Section 7, Clause 2 of the Constitution (set forth supra, pp.
2-3) embodies the resolution of that controversy."* Under
that provision, bills become law in one of three ways:

(1) By passage by both Houses of Congress, followed
by the approval of the President ;

(2) By re-passage by a vofe of two-thirds of each
House of Congress after timely return to the originating
House with the objections of the President;

(3) By the expiration of ten days (Sundays excepted)
following presentation to the President of a bill passed by

15. As to the history of the determination to grant the President a
qualified rather than an absolute veto, see the following :

a. The Colonial Experience.

Fisher, The Evolution of the Constitution of the United States
17-18, 95-96, 161-167 (2d ed. 1910), hereinafter cited as Fisher;
4 Elliott, Debates in the Several State C onventions on the Adop-
tion of the Federal Constitution 620-21 (1836); 4 Lincoln, The
Constitutional History of New York 494-496 (1906), hereinafter
cited as Linceln; Bryce, The American Commonwealth 56-59 (3d
ed. 1907); Beard, “Veto Power”, Cyclopedia of American Govern-
ment 613 (1914); Norton, The Constitution of the United States
4i (1940) ; 2 Baker, The Fundamental Law of American Constitu-
tions 381 (1916).

b. The State Experience: 1776-1787.

N. Y. Const. (1777) ; Mass. Const. (1780) ; Warren, The Mak-
ing of the Constitution 185 (1928) ; Farrand, The Framing of the
Constitution 145-146 (7913); Fisher 17-18, 83-85, 95-96, 161-167 ;
Dougherty, Constitutional History of the State of New York 51-52
(2d ed. 1915); Frothingham, A Brief: History of the Constitution
and Government of Massachusetts 94 (1916); 1 Lincoln 504-505,
554-555, 589; 4+ Lincoln 494-496.

c. The Convention.

1 Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention 93-114, 138-44
(Rev. ed. 1937) ; 2 Farrand, supra, 73-80, 298-302, 563-64, 585-87 ;
Notes of Maj. W'm. Pierce, printed in The Formation of the Union
93-94 (House Doc. No. 398, 6%h Cong. Ist Sess.) (1927); The
Federalist, Nos. 69, 73 (Hamilton).

13

both Houses of Congress, the President not having re-
turned the bill to Congress with his objections and Con-
gress not having adjourned within that period.

These methods have been considered by this Court on
five oceasions. As to the first methed, this Court held
that the President’s approval! was effective if given within
ten days after presentation, although Congress was in tem-
porary recess when approval was given. La Abra Silver
Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 428 (1899). It was
subsequently held that such approval was effective although
Congress had, in the meantime, adjourned. Edwards v.
United States, 286 U. S. 482 (1932). The second method was
treated in Missouri P. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U. S. 276
(1919), in which this Court held that a timely veto could be
overridden by a two-thirds vote of a quorum of each House,
rather than of the entire membership. The other two cases
involved the third method. In The Pocket Veto Case, 279
U. %. 655 (1929), it was held that the ‘‘adjournment”’ re-
ferred to in Section 7 included an interim adjournment be-
tween sessions, so that a bill did not become law by this
method when Congress had begun such an adjournment less
than ten days following presentation of the bill without the
President having returned it. And in Wright v. United
States. 302 U. S. 583 (1938), it was held that delivery of a
bill with a message of disapproval to the secretary of the
Senate while the Senate was in temporary recess consti-
tuted a valid ‘‘return”’ of the bill to the Senate, so that the
pill did not become law by this method, such delivery having
been made within ten days of presentation of the bill to the
President.

While each of these cases involved, in one or another
sense, questions of when the ten-day period for Presiden-

14

tial action was applicable, or of what constitutes effective
Presidential action within that period,’® none of them di-
rectly involved the equally important question of what
action is constitutionally required to begin the ten-day
period within which the President can effectively disap-
prove a bill while Congress is in session. In brief, this
Court has not yet directly held what constitutes ‘‘ presenta-
tion’’ of a bill to the President.

The question is of great importance, is directly pre-
sented by this case, and it should now be decided by this
Court.’ That it has historically been a matter of consid-
erable doubt is reflected in the conduct and opinions of
Presidents,’* Congresses,’® and Attorneys-General.”° It is

16. The Court resolved these questions often only after decades of
uncertainty. See, e.g., Edwards v. United States, supra, at 487-90.
Thus, for exam,.le, William Howard Taft could write in 1916 that
the President could not sign a bill after an adjournment of Congress,
although he might do so during a recess. Taft, The Presidency 23
(1916). And, until 1932, Presidents customarily repaired to a special
office at the Capitol to sign bills prior to Congress’ adjourn:nent.

17. See Anthony Lewis, writing on the instant case in The New
York Sunday Times, Sec. 4, p. E7, cols. 2-4 (Oct. 25, 1964) :

“One of the astonishing things about this country’s constitu-
tional history is how long it has taken for some basic clauses of
the Constitution to receive an authoritative interpretation from
the Courts.”

18. See, e.g., Findings 21, 23 as to the conduct of Presidents F. D.
Roosevelt and Eisenhower; see also Finding 22 n. 32 as to such
doubt on the part of the State Department.

19. See, e.g., Remarks of Senator Keating, 105 Cong. Rec. 19553-
54 (Sept. 14, 1959), reprinted in Appendix C, infra; Zinn, The Veto
Power of the President, 12 F. R. D. 207, 220-24 (Report of Law
Revision Counsel to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives) (1951), concerning the “inadequacy” of this Court’s
interpretations of Section 7.

20. See, e.g., Memorandum of Attorney-General Biddle dated
November 10, 1943, set forth in Finding 21; Memorandum of At-
torney-General Brownell dated July 5, 1955, Plaintiff's Exhibit 3,
set forth in Appendix C, infra, p. 5a.

15

a question which is likely to arise with increasing fre-
quency, as the Court below noted:

‘‘Tf the recent past is indeed a prologue, the question
cannot be dismissed as transient. The combination of
increased presidential mobility and concern with for-
eign affairs together with prolonged congressional ses-
sions is likely to result in a recurrent pattern of presi-
dential travel abroad even while Congress is sitting.
The problem will doubtless endure.’’ Opinion, p. 4.

See also Wright v. United States, supra, where on analo-
gous facts, certiorari was granted ‘‘[i]n view of the im-
portance of the question’’ (302 U. S. at 586). It is sub-
mitted that the question presented in tke instant case—
the reciprocal to that in Wright—is ne less important.

The Rationale of the Decision Below: The
President’s Qualified Right Unilaterally to
Demand Personal Presentation

The decision of the court below cannot be regarded as
authoritatively settling the question. Among other things,
it appears to us to be at variance with expressions of this
Court in Wright v. United States, supra, as to which, see
mfra, pp. 21-23. Moreover, to the extent that the decision
below ts treated as defining the constitutional requirements,
it enunciates a constitutional test incapable of sure and
certain application by reference to official and public rec-
ords, so as inevitably to raise doubts as to whether par-
ticular Acts of Congress have indeed become Laws of the
United States.

The court below said, and we agree, that any construc-
tion*#f Section 7 must be tested in terms of ‘‘eras of

16

hostility, coolness, partisan tactics or simple lack of con-
cern,’’ rather than in terms of periods of cooperative
understanding as between the Exeentive and Legislative
branches. Opinion, p. 8. For this reason, among others,
the failure of the court below to provide a clear and certain
constitutional test, so that the constitutional status of bills
raay readily be ascertained during suck times, demonstrates
that its construction of Section 7 is not viable.

Holding that delivery of H.R. 2717 to the Office of the
President at the Seat of the Government by an agent of
the Congress on August 31, 1959 in accordance with time-
honored procedure did not constitute ‘‘presentation’’ of
the bill to the President within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion, the court adopted as its central propositions: (i)
that personal presentation to the President is not required
by Section 7 ;** but (ii) that the President is constitutionally
empowered to demand such presentation. In the court’s
view, the President may, at his sole option, either ‘*insist
that bills be presented to him personally’’, or «dispense
with personal presentation and accept bills through some
other procedure.”’ Opinion, p. 9.

In fact, as the court found, ‘‘some other procedure’’—
consisting of delivery to the Office of the President in the
White House at the Seat of the Government in Washington,
D. C.—has obtained, without variation, for at least the
past forty years (Finding 6). This ‘‘other procedure”’
was followed as io H.R. 2717 precisely as it has been as to
countless other bills over the years (ibid.). Having, how-
ever, postulated that the President had the power uni-

21. The court could not comfortably have held otherwise, since
delivery to the White House has generally been treated as “presenta-
tion” since at least 1931 (Finding 5).

17

laterally to terminate this ‘‘other procedure’’, the court
went on, ex necessitate, to qualify the conditions of its
exercise. Thus the court held:

(a) that as a prerequisite to hic exercise of this
power, the President must have informed Congress
‘sin some manner’’ that the ‘‘other procedure’’ had
been terminated and that personal presentation would
thenceforth be required? Opinion, p. 9.

Once the President has so informed Congress, said the
court, Congress is obligated to present bills to him per-
sonally. But the court further limited this requirement

(b) if personal presentation is demanded, the Pres-
ident must make himself ‘‘reasonably available’’ for
such presentation. Opinion, pp. 9, 10, 11n.

Additionally, the presentation required is not truly per-
sonal, since the court added:

(c) that an ‘‘equivalent’’ to personal presentation
would be ‘delivery to an aide in the immediate vicinity
of the President.’’ Opinion, pp. 9, 10, 11n.

The opinion of the court below does not in terms limit
the right of the President to demand personal presenta-
tion to those occasions when the President is abroad,”* and,

22. It is, of course, apparent that, absent some such limitation, the
President could defeat all Congressional efforts to present bills to
him according to a traditional method by a private, uncommunicated
resolve to terminate the practice.

23. The President's staff, however, have invariably treated deliv-
ery to the Office of the President while he is in the country as presen-
tation, although he may be far from the Seat of the Government.
Findings 15, 23. The court below characterized this practice as
merely “precautionary” rather than “determinative”. Opinion, p. 12.
In the court's view, the President can demand personal presentation
“if he wishes” (Opinion, p. 9), “when he feels it important” (Opinion,

18

indeed, we see no rational basis for so limiting his power,
once it is granted that some such power exists. Neither the
terms of the Constitution nor the opinion below conditions
the exercise of presidential power in general, or specifically
his power to receive, approve or disapprove bills, upon the
personal locus of the President (cf. Opinion, p. 6 and au-
thorities there cited): indeed, the President received, ap-
proved and disapproved bills while abroad on the trip in
question. Nor can distance per se justify the creation of a
constitutional power in the one instance and not in the
other: when the President is in Paris he is closer to Wash-
ington than when he is in Honolulu.*

Delivery of Bills to the President’s Office at the Seat of
the Government Constitutes Adequate “Presenta<ion.”

The ten-day proviso of Section 7, limiting the Presi-
dent’s power to disapprove a bill while Congress has not
yet adjourned, is found at the end of the Section, after the
provision giving Congress the power to override a presi-
dential veto. The Constitution having conferred on the
President only a qualified, and not an ubsolute veto, the
purposes of the ten-day limitation are clear enough: to
deprive the President of the power to delay the effective-

p. 11), or whenever the traditional system “becomes inconvenient or
burdensome to him” (Opinion, p. 10).

Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 provides that the Office of the
President shall devolve on the Vice President in case of the Presi-
dent's “Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties” of the Office.
It has not yet been suggested that the President's absence abroad in-
capacitates him from discharging his powers and duties to receive
bills and to act upon them in accordance with Section 7.

24. Bills delivered to the White House during President Eisen-
hower’s 1960 Far East visit were stamped “Presented to the Presi-
dent” as of the day he landed in Hay. on his return {Finding 23).

i9

ness of laws beyond the allotted period without affording
Congress the opportunity by an appropriate vote to make
its bills into laws despite the President.”” Story, Commen-
taries on the Constitution of the United States §891 (5th
ed. 1891); Black, Handbook of American Constitutional
Law 122 (4th ed. 1927). Moreover, the time limitation has
the very practical effect of limiting the time the President
may force Congress to remain in session. For if the Pres-
ident could effectively delay the return of bills, Congress
would have to remain in session to receive his messages
of disapproval, however long delayed, or surrender its
power to override his veto.”®

The question presented by the rationale of the decision
below is thus whether the President can, by absenting him-
self from the Seat of Government and by demanding per-
sonal presentation, require Congress, if it is to preserve
its power to enact laws over Presidential veto, to remain in
session for the additional period physically required to
effect personal delivery in some other part of the world.
The constitutional question arises in the present case in the
context of modern, instantaneous communication, and

25. One of the central complaints articulated in the Teclaration of
Independence was the Crown's neglect to attend to laws presented
for his approval, and consequent suspension of their effectiveness.

26. The significance of this element of delay is apparent in this
case, The President returned to the United States on September 7,
and Congress adjourned at 6:22 a.m. on September 15. If bills were
not deemed presented until the President’s return, Congress could
have been required to stay in session until after September 18 in

order to insure itself an opportunity to override his vetoes.
The Houses of Congress determine the date of their adjournment,

excer. in case of disagreement between the two Houses, in which case
the President decides. U. S. Const. art. I, §5; U. S. Const. art. EE,

§3.

20

relatively easy and rapid transportation. The governing
constitutional clause, however, was written when commu-
nication and travel were slow, inconvenient, and unreliable,
and when it was simply not to be thought of that the
President might be in Europe while Congress was in ses-
sion. That the Framers did not adopt any principle of
‘‘personal preseniation’’. of Congressional bills to the
President while abroad is evident enough from this: that
a bill ‘‘personally presented’’ to the President ii London
or in Paris in 1789 and immediately acted upon by hir
could not, in those days, physically have been ‘‘returned”’
to the Cougress by the fastest means then available within
the ten days allotted after presentation.

The truth is that the notion of ‘‘personal presenta-
tion’’ of bills to the President while abroad during a Con-
gressional session was simply inconceivable under 18th
Century conditions, while such a doctrine is entirely un-
necessary under modern conditions. 27 And, we submit, the
principle that the President may leave the Seat of the
Government and the country during a Congressional ses-
sion, and require the Congress to send messengers after
him to effect presentation of bills, leaving the risks and
delays of such delivery with the Congress, not the Presi-
dent, is not in keeping with the narrowly circumscribed
powers over legislation conferred upon the Executive.*
We submit that the purposes and structure of the clause

27. See p. 11, supra.

28. We may wonder at the prospect of the Congress applying to a
foreign Government for a visa to permit Congress’ messenger to en-
ter the territory of that Government for the purpose of effecting
presentation of Acts of Congress to the President while in that coun-
try.

21

are best served by a construction which holds that delivery
of bills by Congress to the Office of the President at the
Seat of the G» ernment is ‘‘presentation’’ to the Presi-
dent, though the President be temporarily absent.

In Wright v. United States, 302 U. S. 583 (1938), this
Court held that the President had effectively ‘‘returned”’
a disapproved bill to the originating House within the
meaning of Section 7, prior to the expiration of ten days
following its presentation, by delivering it to the secretary
of the Senate, notwithstanding that the Senate itself was
then in recess. Holding that Congress could not frustrate
the President’s power to ‘‘return’’ a bill within the pre-
seribed time by going into temporary recess, the Court
analogized the ‘‘return’’ to the very situation at bar—the
presentation of a bill to the President during his absence
from the White House:

‘There is no greater difficulty in returning a bill to
one of the two Houses when it is in recess than in
presenting a bill to the President by sending it to the
White House in his temporary absence. Such a pres-
entation is a familiar practice:’’ 302 U. S. at 590.

Just as Wright held that Congress could not by its recess
defeat the President’s right effectively to return a bill
within the ten-day period allotted, we submit that the
President may not by his absence from the Seat of the
Government frustrate or delay Congress’ right effectively
to present a biil, so as to begin the ien days’ running.

The court below distinguished Wright solely on the
basis cf the reference in Wright to the secretary of the
Senate as the Senate’s ‘‘accredited agent”’ (see Opinion,

22

p. 14, n. 17) ; in this case, however, it found the President’s
legislative clerk not so ‘‘aceredited’’, his ‘‘authorization”’
having been revoked. But the secretary of the Senate was
only constructively deemed in Wright to be ‘*accredited”’
for the purpose of receiving bills, in order to effectuate
the President’s constitutional right to return bills to the
Senate during its recess. As the concurring opinion in
Wright points out (302 U. S. at 599-600), there was
nothing in the majority opinion to indicate that the Court
was relying upon any actual ‘‘anthorization’’ of the secre-
tary by the Senate to receive the return of bills during its
recess; or that the secretary was the Senate’s ‘‘agent’’ in
any general or private sense.

The principle for which petitioner eoutends, and which
Wright supports—that delivery of bills to the President’s
Office is ‘‘presentation’’—leaves adequate room for prac-
tical arrangements to be made, with the concurrence of the
Congress, to adapt the law-making process to necessary
presidential absence from the Seat of the Government. As
at least two Attorneys-General have suggested,”* the offi-
cers and committees of the Congress may, at the request
of the President, withhold the signing or delivery of bills
to the White House and so delay their presentation under

Section 7, if the Congress is persuaded that presentation
should be thus delayed.

We think that the power to delay presentation when the
President is absent must reside in Congress, rather than, as
the lower court concluded, in the President, since the ten-
day clause is intended to be a limitation upon the Presi-

29. Memoranda of Attorneys-General Biddle and Brownell, supra,
p. 14 n. 20.

23

dent’s power, and since it is the President who decides
whether or not he will be absent. And just as the President
must be able to fix the date of return, regardless of Cen-
gress’ temporary absence, to prevent Congress from lemit-
ing his power of qualified veto (Wright v. United States,
supra, 302 U.S. at 596-97), so Congress must be able to fix
the date of presentation to prevent the President from
expanding his power of qualified veto.

The Constitutional Scheme Envisioned by the
Decision Below is Uncertain and Unworkable

If the writ is granted, petitioner will argue that the
only principle which workably fulfills the constitutional
scheme is that Congress may at any time ‘‘present’’ bills
to the President under Section 7 by delivery to his Office
at the Seat of the Government. The alternative consti-
tutional scheme envisioned by the court below makes it
uncertain whether particular Acts of Congress have been
‘presented’? in accordance with Section 7 when the Pres-
ident is absent from the Seat of the Government. This
result follows ineluctibly from the conditions and qualifi-
cations which the Court found necessary to place on its
basic principle that the President can unilaterally demand
personal presentation.

Recognizing that an unlimited unilateral power to de-
mand personal presentation would permit the President to
stop the law-making process by the expedient of making
himself unavailable for personal presentation and would
be wholly inconsistent with the constitutional scheme, the
court below imposed several additional limitations: the
President must make himself ‘‘yeasonably available’? for
personal presentation; Congress may deliver pills to an

<A Ae EN Se are

24

‘‘aide in the immediate vicinity’’ of the President as the
‘‘equivalent’’ to personal presentation; and the President
must ‘“‘inform’’ Congress in some way that he requires
personal presentation. See Opinion, pp. 9, 10, 11 n. In
so limiting its principle of personal presentation, the court
below has only substituted the inescapably uncertain for
the absolutely unthinkable.

A. “‘Reasonably available.’’ If the Constitution im-
poses an obligation on the President to make himself ‘‘rea-
sonably available’’ for the presentation of bills, two ques-
tions immediately suggest themselves:

1. What is ‘‘reasonably available’’?

2. What follows if the President is not ‘‘reason-
ably available’’?

That the Court of Claims answered neither question is
not surprising. A general standard of ‘‘reasonableness’’
requires ad hoc, after-the-fact decision in litigation in cases
concerning the effectiveness of particular Acts of Con-
gress. It is, for this very reason, unsatisfactory as a
principle for determining whether and when bills have
been ‘‘presented’’ to the President. The country should
not have to wait for a court to decide whether the Presi-
dent’s unavailability in a given instance was ‘¢reasonable’”’
or ‘unreasonable’? under all the circumstances before it
knows whether a particular Act of Congress has become
law.”

30. Ouaere, whether the question cf the President's “reasonable
availability” would not be a question of fact for a jury in private
litigation (to which the United States wou!d not necessarily even be
a party), determinable by reference not only to the physical acces-
sibility of the President, but also to the Presidential commutments
which made it necessary for him to be physically inaccessible for
varying periods.

25

And if the President fails to make himself ‘‘reasonably
available’? for presentation of bills, may Congress then
deliver such bills to the Office of the President at the Seat
of the Government? Does the ten-day period then begin
on the first day the President is found to have made him-
self ‘‘unreasonably unavailable’’? All these preliminary
questions—akin to questions of personal service in private
litigation—could cast in doubt the very existence of laws,
once one accepts the notion that the President may declare
that a formal, institutional delivery of bills to his Office
shall not constitute ‘‘presentation.’’ *

B. Informing the Congress. Having found that to alter
the customary procedure of ‘‘presentation’”’ by delivery to
the President's Office, the President must ‘‘inform’”’ the
Congress that he requires ‘‘personal presentation’’, the
Court concluded that Congress was adequately informed
in this case:

‘The Congress was informed of this procedure [that
bills would be held by the White House staff until the
President’s return] by a ]’residential aide before the
President departed.’’ Opinion, p. 14.

The conclusion and the evidence upon which it was based
dramatically demonstrates the unworkability and error of
the lower eourt’s qualified principle of personal presenta-
tion.

31. Finding that an “ey:ivalent” to actual persoxal delivery to the
President is “delivery to an aide in the immediate vicinity of the
President” (Opinion, p. 9) seems to us incompatible with the underly-
ing principle that the President may revoke the authority of his Office
at the seat of the Government. If the court holds that a constitution-
ally irrevocable authority exists for presentation to aides in the Presi-
dent's vicinity, why does not a similar constructive authority exist at
the permanently fixed Seat of the Government (see U. S. Const. art I,
$8, cl. 17) where bills have traditionally been presented to the Presi-
dent ?

26

For there is no official document or record of any Presi-
dential action either (a) informing Congress that bills had
to be delivered to him personally during his trip in order
to effect presentation, or (b) declaring that H.R. 2717 was
n° ‘‘presented’’ to the President when delivered to his
Office on August 31, 1959, other than « stamp placed upon
the enrolled bill by the President’s Office after the ten days
following delivery to his Office had already expired (Find-
ing 17). No message was sent to Congress reflecting the
President’s alleged decision that delivery to his office would
not be ‘‘presentation’’ (cf. Memorandum of F. D. Roosevelt
dated November 10, 1943, reprinted in Finding 21). No
Public Proclamation or Executive Order was published in
the Journal of either House, in the Congressional Record
or in the Federal Register. The official Journal of the
House and the Congressional Record indicate to this day
that H.R. 2717 was ‘‘presented’’ to the President as of the
date of its delivery to his Office (Finding 6). And, when
the Senate was informed of the President’s veto message
on the eve of its adjournment, on September 14, 1959, one
Senator inquired whether it had not already become law
(Appendix C, infra, pp. 6a-8a) as the official Journal en-
tries showing presentation on August 31 indicated; he was
advised that whether or not it was a law was now a ques-
tion for the courts.

When the issue did come to court, we find that, ac-
cording to the decision below, the question of whether the
bill is a law depends not upon official records but upon
oral testimony by a former Presidential aide concerning
a ‘‘diseussion’’ between himself and some ‘‘Congressional

~ |. = *

27

leaders.’’ *2 Who those ‘‘leaders’’ were, and whether they
were in fact the Congressional leaders from the Presi-
dent’s (minority) party was not disclosed. Nor was it dis-
closed what was said in that ‘‘diseussion’’, since the aide
refused to divulge such information at the trial on the
grounds that he was acting as a Presidential agent (Find-
ing 8).

In sum, the constitutional precept announced by the
Court below contemplates that whether or not an Act of
Congress was ‘‘presented’’ to the President, and whether
or not it became law, shall depend, not upon official rec-
ords, but upon how far present or former presidential
aides, will go, years after the fact, to disclose the details
of conversations with ‘‘Congressional leaders’’, and how
far they can successfully invoke claims of official secrets.
Only thus, it seems, are we to discover whether Congress
was ‘‘informed’’ that formal delivery of bills to the White
House was no longer to be deemed ‘‘presentation’’, and
consequently whether a particular bill which, according to
all public records, was ‘‘presented’’ to the President on a
certain day was in fact ‘‘presented’’ on that dey. The
uncertainty and possible abuse to which such a principle
can be subject need not be dwelled upon. If anything
is clear, it is that some better principle is required to de-
termine whether an Act of Congress has been ‘‘presented”’
to the President.”

32. Since the question of whether an Act of Congress has become
a law may arise in cases to which the United States is not a party,
such testimony may be given without the Government being repre-
sented.

33. The Pocket Veto Case, supra, is replete with concern that
publicity and certainty attend all phases of the process of the return
of a bill to Congress. See 279 U. S. at 684-685. In Wright.

28

The “Ground” of Congression”l “Acquiescence”

The court below, having stated its interpretation of
Section 7 in Part I of its Opinion, went on to conciade
in Part II that Congress had acquiesced in the Presi-
dent’s decision that bills delivered to the White House
would be received ‘‘only for presentation to him upon
his return to the United States.’’ It is apparent, how-
ever, that the court’s reference to Congressional acqui-
escence did not purport to provide an independent ground
of decision. On the contrary, the court’s reference to
‘‘aequiescence’’ follows the statement in the same para-
graph at page 14 of the court *s opinion that:

‘‘'The President] was free to decide, as he did, that
during his absence bills would be received at the White
House only for presentation to him upon his return to
the United States.’’

Congressional ‘‘acquiescence,’’ in the court’s own reason-
ing thus turns on the main question at issue: whether the
President had the unilateral power under the Constitution
to determine that bills delivered to his office were not ‘‘pre-
sented’? to him. Indeed, this is made even clearer by
the act which the court found to constitute Congressional
acquiescence :

‘‘The Congress, if it did not agree, could have sent
the bills io the President in Europe. But it did not

supra, the Court distinguished The Pocket Veto Case by noting
that return during a three-day recess of the Senate does not re-
sult in “keeping * * * the bill in a state of suspended animation
with no certain knowledge on the part of the public whether it was
seasonably delivered. * * *" 302 U. S. at 595. It is, of course, ap-
parent that the procedure which the Court found adequate in this
case for the President’s “informing” Congress of a requirement of
personal presentation results in precisely the uncertainty which so
concerned this Court.

29

take that course. * * * By failing to take the one step
which would have had that effect [of ‘‘accelerating”’
presentation ]—sending the bill abroad through tts own
messenger—the House must be taken to have acqui-
esced in the President’s new arrangement.””.. Opinion,
p. 14 (emphasis added).

But the act which the Court suggested would evidence non-
acquiescence by Congress—personal presentation by Con-
gressional messenger to the President abroad—would ap-
pear rather to evidence Congressional acquiescence in the
President’s right unilaterally to demand personal presenta-
tion. Non-acquiescence in the President’s assertion of
power to demand personal presentation would seem more
clearly evidenced by a refusal to deliver bills abroad anda
continuation of the policy of delivery to the President’s
Office.

The proposition that Congress could have ‘‘acceler-
ated’? presentation by sending bills abroad, and that Con-
gress accordingly acquiesced by not so ‘‘accelerating”’
presentation is obviously grounded upon the assumption
that delivery to the White House does not constitute pres-
entation when the President has so declared. Since that
proposition assumes the power in dispute, it does not
constitute a separate ground of decision.

Conclusion

Whether or not a Dill has been ‘‘presented’’ to the
President within the meaning of the Constitution requires
a rule which is both simple and certain in its application,
and compatible with the general scheme of the Constitu-
tion. A rule that the President may, without limitation,

~ or Sr Teal +e PRE
aA Onan ae Se Ee ams = sane Gee en ae dene nee ta yon - ae Sy ‘3 ——_
ae Jay = -

30

require pe. onal presentation is not compatible, as the
court below itself concluded, with the basic constitutional
scheme limiting his veto power. A presidential power to
require personal presentation, with the qualifications pro-
posed below, may be less at variance with the basic
scheme, but only at the price of introducing inadmissible
uncertainties as to whether the qualifying conditions have
been met. The only principle consistent both with the in-
tention of the Framers and with the need for clarity
and certainty is that delivery of bills by Congress to the
Office of the President at the Seat of the Government con-
stitutes ‘‘presentation’’ within the meaning of the Consti-
tution, and that the President may not unilaterally require
some other mode of presentation.

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted
that this petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Justin N. Fe,tpMan
Attorney for Petitioner
777 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10017
Of Counsel:

Hersert PraSHKER
Rosert B. SHaprro

and

Po.etti Fremin PrRasHKER
FetpMan & GaRTNER

of New York City

January 14, 1965.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385602_0392%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
