# Memorandum for Respondent — Britt v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Memorandum for Respondent
- **Published:** January 1, 1965
- **Citation:** 379 U.S. 971

## Text

Page
Statement_....--------------.------------------------- 1
A. The underlying facts__-.-------------~--------- 2
B. The state court and other proceedings------------ 8
Discussion.......-----------------------+-------------- 12
Conclusion_....----.---------------------+------------ 25
CITATIONS
Cases :
American Smelting and Refining Co., 92 NLRB 1451-- 17
Bank of United States v. Planters’ Bank of Georgia,
a stan 19, 21, 23
Brown Shipbuilding Co., 87 NLRB 326...------------ 17
Ps Employees v. Missouri, 3174 U.S. 74------ Siena | a
California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553---.-----~------+--- 23
Carbide and Carbon Chemical Corp., 73 NLRB 134--- 17
Civilian Cafeteria Board, 106 NLRB 208--~--------- 18
Copolymer Corp., 52. NLRB 578.------------------- 17
Cosmopolitan Shipping Co., 2 NLRB 159------------ 17

Creekmore v. Public Belt B.R. Comm'n of New Or-
leans, 134 F. 2d }76, certiorari denied, 320 US. 742... 18

Division 1267 v. O1dman, 320 F. 24 T29-.------------ 2,11
Emergency Fleet Corp., U--ited States Shipping Board

v, Western Union Tel. ('0., 275 U.S. 415------------ 2A
Fruco Construction Co. v. McClelland, 192 F. 2d 241-_- 17
Garner Aviation Service Corp., 101 NLRB 517------ 17
Geronimo Service Co., 129 NLRB 366_-------------- 17

Hoosier Veneer Co,, 21 NLRB 907, modified and en-
forced, sub nor:. National Labor Relations Board v.
Bachelder, 120 F. 2d 574, certiorari denied, 314 U.S,

CF incincccaumenmamiiants PR ete NOE ON 22
Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical “Workers, Al J.

Schneider Co. 81 NLRB 99--..------------------ 18, 23
Middle Dept. Assoc. of Tire Underwriter, 122 NLRB

BB nce cceeee ee nddbeqnacnpsageeneeneg~nees 19
Mobile Steamship Association, 8 NLRB 1297------- 18
Montgomery Steel Products Corp., 94 NLRB 225---- 18
National Faod Corp., 88 NLRB 1500_-------------- 18

758-580—_64—_1 (1)

a |

Cases-—Continued
National Labor Relations Board v. Atkins & Co., 331

National Labor Relations Board v. Bank of ‘ merica,
etc., 130 F. 2d 624, certiorari denied, 318 U.S. 791_-
National Labor Relations Board v. Carroll, 120 F. 2d

National Labor Relations Board v. Concrete Haulers,
Ine., RR ee one ee

National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin
Beees Carp, BH TE, Gi cc sceienncctccdicmsanine
National Labor Relations Board v. Lund, 103 F. 2d

New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 33 LRRM 1528__---
Ownard Harbor District, 34 NLRB 1285_...-._.----
Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State

Docks Department, 377 U.S. 184.----------------
Patton v. Roane-Anderson Co., 192 F. 2d 965_.-------
Peter D. Furness, 117 NLRB 437, enforced sub nom.

National Labor Relations Board v. Local Union No.

SEB, Bi, FO FB Bi ncntinnicniincsiodiminanace
Plumbers’ Union v. Door County, 359 U.S. 354_-..---
Public Service Corporation of New Jersey, 72 NLRB

Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746_-------
Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. Merryfield, 134

Roane-Anderson Co., 95 NLRB 1501__-------
Sloan Shipyards v. United States Shipping Board,
Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549...--------
State v. Dade County, 142 So. 2d 79_---------------
Tampa Shipbuilding Co., Inc., 62 NLRB 954_-..----
Thiokol Chemical Corp., 113 NLRB 547_---.--------
Toledo Board of Trade, 117 NLRB 1504___-_-_-_---
Tri-County Electric Membership Corp., 145 NLRB No.

I ‘
Cases—Continued

Page

United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258__ 22, 23

War Hemp Industries, Inc., 57 NLRB 1709____._____ 17
Statutes:

National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat.
136, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. 151, et seg.) :

Section 2(1)- cen analntieneeibeneniamiimnmmaaiei 23
Section 2(2)..-___ 2,9, 10, 18, 14, 15, 16, 19, 22, 28, 94, 95
Section at eiesnninanastemtinccniiasatnilcniesinsaim 11
cn RE ELOISE ae 10
I I a cescssncersetsctnicninnistrennioneshvcsarensa rene 10
Section 8(a)(5)----..-_________ tineninhsdbitehinaten tines 10
Section 8(b) (4)- ~~ a
Section 10(b)- 11
Urban “{sss Transportation Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 302
et 8eq.:
I 12
4” iT ae 12
Miscellaneous :
109 Cong. Rec. 5672-5674_..............__._._ 12
Fordham, Revenue Bond Sanctions, 42 Col. L. Rev.
Sian nila pte daiihihdheceemthininia tecesithinaiainemnnesons 20
Lag. Hist. of the Labor Management Relations Act,
nS eA 15, 16
Leg. Hist. of the National Labor Relations Act, 1935
IN MN iaiiihialaitestechinhccicicnisaienitaeinictansienen academe 15

Nehemkis, The Public Authority: Some Legal and
Practical Aspects, 47 Yale L.J. 14..-....-________ 20

En the Sugreme Gourt of the United States

Ocrongr TERM, 1964

No. 388

AMALGAMATED ASSOCIATION OF Srruer Execrric Rat-
way aND Motor CoacH EMPLOYEES OF AMERICA,
Division 1267, PETITIONER

v.

Dape County, a PoirricaL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE
or Forma, AND THE MeErropouitaNn Dave County
Transit AuTHORITY, A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY OF
Dave County, FLoripa

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF FLURIDA

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

STATEMENT

This memorandum is filed pursuant to the request
of the Court for the government’s views on the issues
raised by the Union’s peution for certiorari. The
petition seeks review of a judgment of the State courts
of Florida declaring that Dade County and its Trans-
it Authority are not permitted, under State law, to
recognize and bargain with the Union as the collec-

(1)

2

tive bargaining representative of the Transit Author-
ity’s employees, and enjoining the Union from engag-
ing in strike action to compel such recognition or
bargaining (Pet. 5-6; Pet. App. A3-A4, A12-A13,
AJ4, A47-A48). The basic question presented is
whether Dade County and its Transit Authority in
their operation of a traasit system in Miami, Florida,
are removed from the coverage of the National Labor
Relations Act by the governmental exemption in Sec-
tion 2(2) of the Act. That section provides:

The term ‘‘employer’’ includes any person
acting as an agent of an employer, directly or
indirectly, but shall not include the United
States or any wholly owned Gevernment cor-
poration, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any
State or political subdivision thereof * * *.

A. THE UNDERLYING FACTS

In the summer of 1960, the Board of County Com-
missioners for Dade County, Florida, enacted an ordi-
nance creating the Metropolitan Dade County Transit
Authority, composed of five members, appointed by
the County Commissioners (R. 1389-1390; J.A. 33).’
The Transit Authority is empowered, under the ordi-
nance, to perform functions with respect to ‘‘the ac-
quisition, establishment, financing, operation, mainte-
nance, control and expansion of a mass transit sys-

1“R.” refers to the portions of the record in the court below filed
with the petition. “J.A.” refers to the joint appendix to the briefs
in Division 1267 v. Ordman (infra, p. 11), which is an item
listed in the index to the transcript of record. However, since
a copy of the joint appendix apparently has not been trans-
mitted, we are filing a copy thereof with this memorandum.

3

tem * * *, under the direct supervision and control
of the Board of County Commissioners’’ (R. 1390;
J.A. 35). Approximately a year after enactment of
the ordinance, the County, on the recommendation of
the Transit Authority, entered into an agreement for
the purchase of four private transit companies from
W. D. Pawley (R. 1401, 1405; J.A. 62).

Under the purchase arrangements, Pawley trans-
ferred his shares in the companies to the County at
an agreed valuation of $7,705,274, minus the liabilities
outstanding at the time of closing (R. 1405-1406;
J.A. 63). The County did not pledge its faith and
credit, or taxing power for payment of this price
(J.A. 64, 140). Instead, the County issued Special
Revenue Transit bonds in the aggregate principal
amount of $9,000,000 (R. 1407; J.A. 64). Out of this
total issue, the County paid Pawley the bulk of the
purchase price for his transit companies, i of
the appropriate principal amount (R. 1 :
J.A. 63-64).2 The balance of the bonds, over and
above the purchase price, were sold for cash at face
value to customers supplied by Pawley, and the pro-
ceeds of these sales were put into the operation of
the transit system (R. 1407, 1409; J.A. 64, 65, 74).
The bonds pay five percent interest annually and
mature serially within the 15 years between 1962 and
1977 (R. 101-102; J.A. 79). Upon specitie authoriza-
tion by County ordinance, however, the bond debt

?Thé only part of the purchase price that Pawley did not re-
ceive in bonds was $300,000, which the County paid in cash
from the proceeds of the sale of certain transit properties not
needed for the County’s operations (R. 1426; J.A. 74).

as eee eis Sent n Pees ee ae ee + eee + +

4

may be refunded up to 40 years (J.A. 88-89). Bond
principal and interest payments are to be met exclu-
sively from the revenues of the transit system, which,
under the terms of a Trust Agreement (discussed
below), are to be held in trust pending the retirement
of all bonds (R. 1407, 1564; J.A. 64-65, 74a, 138-139).
Although the bonds constitute a first lien on the tran-
sit revenues (J.A. 74b, 112-113, 121), they are not
to be “construed * * * as conveying or mortgaging
the Transit System or any part thereof’ (R. 1578;
J.A. 140, 64-65). Thus, when Pawley, on February
9, 1962, relinquished full ownership of the transit
companies and their assets to the County, he was
remitted solely to the rights of a bondholder (R. 1460;
J.A. 240-241).

Pawley~and the other bondholders have extensive
protection for their investment under the Trust
Agreement for the transit revenues (R. 1564-1568;
J.A. 71-141). The Bankers Truzt Compary and the
Miami Beach First National Bank are named as
trustee and co-trustee under this Agreement (R. 1564;
J.A. 72). Their function is to act as custodians of
the revenues, chsuneling sums into the various ac-
counting funds,* in accordaace with the requirements
of the Trust Agreement and the current county
budget, and paying moneys out of these funds upon
requisitions signed by the County Finance Director

* These funds include an operating fund, a damage reserve
account, a construction fund, an eqaipment reserve fund, an im-
provement fund, a special reserve fund, a revenue bond interest

and sinking fund, and a renewal and replacement fund (J.A.
83, 105).

5

and the transit superintendent (R. 1565-1566; J.A.
92, 93-94, 102-103, 104-105, 109, 111, 112).

In addition, the County is obligated by the Trust
Agreement to employ a designated “management
agency” (National City Management Ccrapany) and
a designated firm of “‘consulting engineers” (Cover-
dale & Colpitts), for the transit operation (J.A. 116-
117).*. The primary function of the management
agency is to provide the professional and supervisory
personnel who direct “day-to-day” transit opera-
tions (R. 1545-1547; J.A. 177-178). It is authorized,
for example, to prepare a proposed annual operating
budget, subject to review- by the Transit Authority
and the Board of County Commissioners; to recom-
mend changes in routes, schedules, and fares ; to estab-
lish equipment maintenance and repair procedures;
to assign transit drivers to their runs; to keep attend-
ance schedules; and generally to implement the labor
policies established by the County Personnel Depart-
ment (R. 1437, 1545-1547; J.A. 177-181, 189-191).

‘The written approval of the trustee is needed before the
County is authorized to employ anyone other than the com-
panies designated, as management agency or consulting en-
gineers (J.A. 116-117). The trustees themselves are removable
by a vote of the holders of not less than a majority of the out-
standing bonds or for breach of duty, by any court of compe-
tent jurisdiction upon the application of the Board of County
Commissioners—or the holders of not less than five percent of
the outstanding bonds (R. 1577-1578; J.A. 132). New trustees
may be-named by the Board of County Commissioners or by
the holders of a majority of the bonds with the latters’
choice taking precedence in the event of a disagreement (J.A.
132-134).

The cousulting engineers are concerned with the
general financial and operational policies of the
Transit System (J.A. 95, 96, 97, 114, 117-118, 121-
122). For exampie, the County covenants in the
Trust Agreement to begin operations charging the
same transit rates that were in effect under private
operation, or “‘such other rates’’ as are approved by
the consulting engineers (R. 1567; J.A. 94-95).°
Thereafter, the County is obligated not to reduce
rates without the consulting engineers’ assent (R.
1569-1570; J.A. 96, 97). Although the County may
refuse to institute rate increases recommended by the
consulting engineers or may institute increases that
are not recommended, it is encouraged to follow the
recommendations of the consulting engineers by a
provision in the Trust Agreement that excuses any
default in bond payments provided these recommenda-
tions have been followed (R. 1571; J.A. 97-98).

Finally, the Trust Agreement contains certain
covenants of sound operation. The County agrees
that ‘‘all compensation, salaries, fees and wages paid
by the Transit Authority * * * will be reasonable,
that no more persons will be employed * * * than
are necessary for the efficient and economical opera-
tion of the Transit System, that it will maintain and
operate the Transit System in an efficient and eco-

° The approval of the consulting engineers is also needed for
any change in the transit routes (J.A. 117), or any alienation
of the transit system’s assets (J.A. 121-122). Similarly, the
Transit Authority must secure the approval of the consulting
engineers for a transit system insurance program and for the
plans and specifications of a central transit system garage
(J.A. 117-118, 114).

nomical manner * * * and that, from the Revenues
thereof, it will at all times maintain the same in good
repair and in sound operating condition * * *”’
(J.A. 115-116). If the County defaults in the ‘‘due
and punctual performance” of any of these covenants,
the trustee may, and upon written request of the
holders of not less than 20 percent of the outstanding
bonds shall, declare the principal on all bonds to be
immediately due and payable (J.A. 126). Further,
the trustee may, and upon the written request of the
holders of not less than 10 percent of the outstanding
bonds shall, proceed to protect and enforce the rights
of the bondholders by such ‘‘suits, actions or special
proceedings in equity or at law, either for the specific
performance of any covenant or agreement con-
tained * * * [in the Trust Agreement] or in aid or
execution of any proper legal or equitable remedy, as
the Trustee, being duly advised by counsel, shall
deem most effectual to protect and enforce such
rights”’ (J.A. 127).

The County has ultimate control of the Transit
System’s labor relations. Thus, the County Person-
nel Department handles all matters connected with
the hiring of the transit system’s employees, inelud-
ing the taking of job applications, the giving of com-
petitive examinations, and the establishment of hiring
standards (R. 1545-1547; J.A. 189-191). The Person-
nel Department also has authority io fire, promote, and
discipline employees (J.A. 178-181, 190-191). In Oc-
tober 1961, the County and the Transit Authority dis-
tributed Working Rules and Regulations that were

ABSIT BRA aint BAP Pa hp

patterned on the contract terms, including pay scales,
previously negotiated between the Union and the
private transit companies, prior to the County’s take-
over of the system (J.A. 177, 188-189, 269-270).
These rules provide that the employees of the Transit
Authority shall be county employees, generally inte-
grated into the classified civil service; that, as county
employees, they may belong to unions that do not
assert a right to strike against the County or ‘‘to
force collective bargaining procedure’’; and that the
employees, or their representatives, may participate
in the public hearings that are to be held prior to
periodic revisions of ‘‘the rules and regulations relat-
ing to the working conditions of employees of the
Authority” (J.A. 267-268). The rules further pro-
vide that, whenever practical, promotional positions
will be filled by competitive examinations under the
personnel rules for the classified civil service set out
in the Code of Metropolitan Dade County (J.A. 270-
271, 266).

B. THE JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

On November 30, 1961, prior to the actual transfer
of Pawley’s assets and the commencement o/ operations
by the County, the County and the Transit Authority
instituted the present suit in the Cireuit Court of Dade
County (R. 12; J.A. 149, 163). The complaint stated
that the Union had demanded that the County and
the Transit Authority recognize it as the exclusive
bargaining representative of all Transit Authority
employees; that they assume the obligations of the

employer under the existing labor agreements be-
tween the Union and the private transit companies ;
and that they enter into negotiations looking toward
the execution of a new collective bargaining agreement
with the Union (Pet. App. A5; R. 19-20; J.A. 156).
The plaintiffs asked the court to enjoin a strike
threatened in support of these demands and prayed
for a judgment declaring that State law bars Dade
County and the Transit Authority from recognizing
the Union, or bargaining or entering into an agree-
ment with it, as the collective bargaining representa-
tive of the transit employees (Pet. App. A5-A6, A9-
A10). The Union moved to dismiss the suit on the
ground, inter alia, that the rights of the transit em-
ployees were protected by the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, and that the State court the:efore lacked
jurisdiction of the subject matter (Pet. App. A7; R.
“163; J.A. 28).

The county court rejected the Union’s contention.
It held that, although the purchase agreement left
Pawley with substantial financial or operational con-
trol of the transit system, this was not sufficient to
divest the County of the governmental immunity pro-
vided by Section 2(2) of the National Labor Relations
Act. The court further ruled that, under State law,
the County and the Transit Authority were not obli-
gated to bargain with the Union on behalf of the
transit employees and the Union did not have the
right to strike for that purpose. It issued a declara-
tory judgment to that effect, and an injunction re-
straining the Union from striking to obtain recognition

758-580—_64-—__2

10

or a contract from the County (Pet. App. A19-A53).
On November 1, 1963, this decision was affirmed on
appeal by the Florida District Court of Appeals
(Pet. App. A2—A18).°

While the State court proceeding was pending, the
Union filed with the Board unfair labor practice
charges against W. D. Pawley, Dade County, and the
Transit Authority. These charges alleged that the ob-
ject of the transfer agreement was to enable Pawley
to evade the statutory obligation to bargain with the
Union and to deprive the employees of their right to
strike; that, pursuant to this agreement, the charged
parties had refused to bargain with the Union, and
had made employment in the transit system condi-
tional on relinquishment of the right io strike; and
that the charged parties had thereby violated Sections
8(a) (5), (3) and (1) of the National Labor Relations
Act (R. 173-176, 306-307 ; J.A. 9-18).

On March 2, 1962, the Regional Director of the
Board notified all parties by letter that he had decided
not to issue a complaint on the Union’s charges be-
cause “in the present posture of the case the County
is the employer of the employees who are or will be
engaged in the operation of the transferred transit
lines,” and the statutory exemption in Section 2(2)

*The lower court had held that the transit employees, al-
though County employees, were not eligible under State law
to be included in the classified civil service (Pet. App. A20).
The appellate court reversed this ruling, remanding the case
for a determination of the rights of the employees who ac-
cepted employment with the County to classified civil service
status and other benefits under State law (Pet. App. A15-A16).

Senha DAE 0 ae Siay I Bilin STEM aD re ede 2 She “ a. . “ Sk Nt ed AAR Bin Si A

11

of the Act was therefore applicable. The letter
added, however, that the charges would not be dis-
missed at that time because the outcome of the pend-
ing State litigation might “conceivably have an im-
pact” on the issues raised by the charges, and dismis-
sal prior to completion of the State proceeding might
therefore prejudice the rights of the charging parties
under the limitations period imposed by Section 10(b)
(Pet. App. A7—A8; R. 292-293).". On June 21, 1962,
the General Counsel of the Board affirmed this ruling
(J.A. 23-24).

On November 7, 1962, the Union filed suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Col-
umbia against the General Counsel, seeking a judg-
ment declaring that the arrangements for purchase of
the transit system by Dade County did not remove
that system from the coverage of the National Labor
Relations Act. The district court dismissed the com-
plaint for want of jurisdiction over the action (Pet.
19). On appeal by the Union, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. It held
that the complaint failed to state a claim warranting
relief because ‘‘[t]he General Counsel’s decision to
defer action on the Union’s charge was within
[his] * * * jurisdiction [under Section 3(d) of the
Act].’? Division 1267 v. Ordman, 320 F'. 2d 729, 730.

7 Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act pro-
vides that “no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor
practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of
the charge with the Board * * *.”

12
DISCUSSION

It is, of course, clear that the provision of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act exempting governmental
employers from coverage is fully applicable to an en-
terprise which was once in private hands but has been
transferred to public control. Indeed, Congress has
anly recently recognized that consequence when it
enacted the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964
78 Stat. 302, providing, inter alia, for grants and
loans “to assist State and local public bodies and
agencies thereof in financing the acquisition * * * of
facilities and equipment for use * * * in mass trans-
portation service in urban areas * * *’’ (Sec. 3(a)).
See 109 Cong. Rec. 5672-5674." The only question
here is whether there has been a sufficient transfer of
the transit systems involved to Dade County so as to
make it the employer.

The Board’s view is that under settled principles
the question should be answered affirmatively.

1. Dade County has made a bona fide purchase of
the transit lines formerly owned by W. D. Pawley.
Although, instead of paying cash, the County issued
bonds that are redeemable over a 15-year period out
of the revenues of the transit system, the transfer is

*In order to cushion this result, the new law provides that
it “shall be a conditien of any assistance under this Act that
fair and equitable arrangements are made, as determined by
the Secretary of Labor, to protect the interests of employees
affected by such assistance,” including “(1) the preservation of
rights, privileges, and benefit. <including continuation of pension
rights and benefits) under existing collective bargaining agree-
ments or otherwise; (2) the continuation of collective bar-
gaining rights * * *” (Sec. 10(c)).

13

complete. There is no evidence that the transaction
was arranged to evade the requirements of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act in an invidious sense. The
record indicates only that the parties were aware of
the exemption provided governmental employers un-
der Section 2(2) of the Act and regarded the resulting
freedom from strikes and collective bargaining as
among the advantages of State ownership and opera-
tion of the transit system (J.A. 55-57). In short,
we are not confronted with the question of the effect
of a sham transaction in pursuance of a collusive plot
to defeat National Labor Relations Act coverage.

2. Nor is this a case where government has shared
emplorer controls with a private party. In the
Board’s judgment, the controls reserved by Pawley,
though substantial, do not have a sufficiently direct
bearing on employment conditions to make Pawley a
co-employer of the transit employees.’ There is no
evider.xe that Pawley can directly countermand the
labor policy fixed by the County Personnei Depart-
ment, or otherwise directly regulate the working con-
ditions of the transit employees, who are paid by the
County. If Pawley believes that the County is pay-
ing too much of the transit revenues out in wages, he
could, through his contro] over the trustees, presum-
ably induce them to bring a suit against the County
for breach of the trust covenants; but, in order to
succeed, he would have to satisfy the court that the

®* Whether one is an employer of particular employees for
purposes of the Act is ordinarily determined by whether he has
power directly to control their employment conditions. See
infra. pp. 15-17.

14

wages were not ‘‘reasonable’’ (J.A. 115). More-
over, it does not appear that Pawley has any control
of the employment relation through the management
agency or the consulting engineers. First, these firms
are not themselves vested with employer controls under
the Trust Agreement.” Second, although Pawley ap-
proved the firms selected for these positions, they are
independent companies which have other clients.
There is no reason to believe that they would be sub-
servient to Pawley’s wishes. And, if the County is
satisfied with their services, no provision is made in
the Trust Agreement for their displacement by the
bondholders; the trustee’s power to approve other
firms to be employed as management agency or con-
sulting engineers comes into play only if the Coun’y
desires to make a change.

3. Th» Union does not seriously contend that the
County or the Transit Authority shares the employer
controls with Pawley or any private entity. Rather,
the Union’s basic position is that the governmental
immunity conferred by Section 2(2) of the Act is
lost whenever a State agency enters into a joint
venture with private interests, and that the County
has done so here by vesting private parties with sub-

1° Of the private interests involved, the management agency
has the closest contact with the transit employees. It sets bus
routes, assigns drivers, keeps attendance records, and estab-
lishes procedures for the regular maintenance and repair of the
equipment. But, so far as labor relations are concerned, the
management company’s employees simply implement policies
established by the County and the Transit Authority in much
the same way thet any supervisory employee carries out the
policies of his employer.

a

15

stantial powers (albeit not power over employment
conditions and labor relations) in respect to the oper-
ation of the transit system. Accordingly, the issue
comes down to whether a governmental agency loses
the immunity conferred by Section 2(2) of the Act
whenever it shares control with private interests, or
only when it gives up control over employiaent con-
ditions and labor relations to a private party. The
Board is of the view that Section 2(2) immunity is
lost only in the latter case, and that, since there was
no sharing of employer controls with private interests
here, the State courts correctly concluded that the
County-operated transit system was removed from the
coverage of the National Labor Relations Act.
Section 2(2) provides that the term employer shall
not include ‘‘the United States or any wholly owned
Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve
~~Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof.’’
This exemption appeared in the original Wagner Act,
except for the phrase ‘‘or any wholly owned Govern-
ment corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank,”’
which was added in 1947. The legislative history of
the provision is sparse, but it indicates that Congress’
purpose was to avoid intrusion upon relations be-
tween the federal, State and municipal governments
and their em; !vyees, who traditionally were denied
the right to strike against the government.” Con-

"See Leg. H.st. of the National Labor Relations Act, 1935
(G.P.@., 1949) 1117, 2653; Leg. Hist. of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, 1947 (G.P.O., 1948) 1535.

The addition in 1947 was designed to make clear that the
exemption extended to such governmental entities as TVA or

16

sistent with this objective, the immunity should apply
only where the government can directly control the
employment conditions of the employees involved;
t.e., where the government, under the tests for deter-
mining employer status under the Act,” would be re-
garded as the employer or a co-employer of the em-
ployees. For only where the government was able to
exercise such control over employment conditions
would the Act’s requirements be likely to impinge on
contrary governmental policies respecting collective
bargaining and strike activity by employees.

The Board has applied the governmental exemption
in Section 2(2) in accordance with this view. Its pre-
cedents in this area may be divided into two categories.
In the first category are cases involving agreements by
government with private independent contractors for
the performance of services or the supplying of goods.
There, the Board has inquired who has the relevant em-
ployer controls. If governm at alone possesses them,
the Board has held that the statutory exemption at-

RFC, but did not include an essentially private corporation
merely because the United States happened to own some stock
therein. See Leg. Hist. of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 1947 (G.P.O., 1948) 303, 536, 1605-1606; and National
Labor Relations Board v. Bank of America, etc., 130 F. 2d
624, 627, n. 4 (C.A. 9), certiorari denied, 318 U.S. 791, decided
prior to enactment of the amendment.

12 See National Labor Relations Board v. Lund, 103 F. 2d
815, 819 (C.A. 8); National Labor Relations Board vy. Con-
densor Corp., 128 F. 2d 67, 71-72 (C.A. 3); National Labor
Relations Board v. Concrete Haulers, Inc., 212 F. 2d 477, 479
(C.A. 5); Public Service Corporation of New Jersey, 72
NLEB 224, 225-226.

17

taches to deprive it of jurisdiction.” If the independ-
ent contractor has the employer controls, the Board
has ruled that he comes within the coverage of the
Act, even though government holds title to all prop-
erty, the contract is on « cost-plus-fixed fee basis, and
cost items (including wages) are subject to govern-
mental review and approval.* And, where the em-
ployer controls are shared by government and a
private entity, the Board has concluded that the Act’s
coverage is limited ‘‘to those aspects of the labor
relations’ within the control of the private entity.
Tampa Shipbuilding Co., Inc., 62 NLRB 954, 961.”

8 Roane-Anderson Co., 95 NLRB 1501, 1503. See, also Fruco
Ccnstruction Co. v. McClelland, 192 F. 2d 241, 244-245 (C.A.
8): Patton v. Roane-Anderson Co.. 192 F. 2d 965, 967-968
{C.A. 6).

1* Thiokol Chemical Corp. 113 NLRB 547, 548; Carbide and
Carbon Chemical Corp., 73 NLRB 134, 135-136; Garner Avia-
tion Service Corp. 101 NLRB 517, 518; American Smelting
and Refining Co., 92 NLRB 1451, 1452; Cosmopolitan Shipping
Co., 2 NLRB 759, 761-762. See, also, National Labor Relations
Board v. Carroll, 126 F. 2d 457 (C.A. 1); Geronimo Service
Co.. 129 NLRB 366, 368; War Hemp Industries, Inc., 57 NLRB
1709, 1710, n. 3; Brown Shipbuilding Co.. 57 NLRB 326, 328;
Copolymer Corp., 52 NLRB 578, 579.

13 See National Laber Relations Board v. Atkins & Co., 331
U.S. 398, 412-413, 414-415: “We cannot say that the Board was
without. warrant in law or in fact in concluding that respondent
retained ‘a sufficient residual measure of control over the terms
and conditions of employment of the guards’ so that they might
fairly be described as employees of respondent. The most im-
portant incidents of the employer-employees relationship * * *
remamed matters to be determined by respondent rather than
by the Army. * * *

“Here we have the Board's considered * * * judgment that
miiltarized plant guards may safely be permitted to-ein unions
and bargain collectively and that their military duties

18

In the second category of cases, someone who con-
trols the employment relationship contends that it is
an arm or instrumentality of government and, as such,
is entitled to the exemption. The Board has sustained
this contention where the entity claiming the statu-
tory exemption has been created directly by the State,
or is administered by State appointed or publicly
elected individuals. On the other hand, where the
State has merely lent a label to the entity or has

and obligations do not suffer thereby * * *. [Consistent
with this judgment, the] regulations and directives [of the War
Department] have clearly acknowledged the feasibility of recog-
nizing collective bargaining rights of these guards during war-
time, provided only that no encroachment is made upon mili-
tary necessities.” See, also, National Labor Relations Board v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416, 425426; Mont-
gomery Steel Products Corp., 94 NLRB 225, 226, n. 2.

16 Mobile Steamship Association, 8 NLRB 1297, 1305, 1308
(State Docks Commission held division of the State of Ala-
bama); Oanard Harbor District, 34 NLRB 1285, 1290 (Harbor
District held political subdivision of the State of California) ;
New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 33 LRRM 1528, April 16,
1954, Administrative Decision, not officially reported (Turn-
pike Authority entitled to employer exemption under Sec. 2
(2)); /ntl Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Al J. Schneider
Co., 87 NLRB 99, 100 (Board of Education held pol cal sub-
division of the Commonwealth of Kentucky); New Bedford,
Wood’s Hole, Martha’s Vineyard, etc., 127 NLRB 1322,
13824 (Advisory Opinion, Steamship Authority held po-
litical subdivision or instrumentality of the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts) ; Civilian Cafeteria Board, 106 NLRB
208 (Cafeteria Board held agency of the United States). Cf.
National F v0d Corp., 88 NLRB 1500, 1501 (Pentagon Post
Restaurant held government agent, but management services
performed by National Food Corporation found to entail em-
ployer controls bringing corporation itself within coverage of
the Act). See, also, Creekmore v. Public Belt R.R. Comm'n of

19

simply exercised certain regulatory controls over an
essentially private operation, the claim of immunity
has been denied. Randolph Electric Membership
Corp., 145 NLRR No. 79, pending on petition for
enforcement with a companion case, Tri-County Elec-
tric Membership Corp., 145 NLRB No. 10, (C.A. 4),
Nos. 9437, 9438; Middle Dept. Assoc. of Fire Under-
writers, 122 NLRB 1115; Toledo Board of Trade, 117
NLRB 1504, 1506-1507.

Under these precedents, the County, in its operation
of the transit system, is entitled to the immunity con-
ferred by Section 2(2). It possesses the relevant
controls over employment conditions and labor rela-
tions, and does not share them with Pawley (see
supra, pp. 7-8). Moreover, the County is 2 polit-
ical subdivision of the State and operates through
publicly elected officials, and the Transit Authority
was directly created by the County.

There is no merit to the Union’s argument (Pet.
25-26) that the specific exclusion for “any wholly
owned Government corporation’? indicates that im-
munity is not afforded where government shares
‘ownership controls” with private persons, as here.
As noted (n. 11, p. 15, supra), that provision,” which
was added in 1947, was designed to make clear that
the exemption in Section 2(2) extended to such gov-

New Orleans, 134 F. 2d 576, 577-578 (C.A. 5), certiorari de-
nied, 820 U.S. 742.

17'The provision ap ears to reflect the rule of such early de-
cisions as Bank of the United States v. Planters’ Bank of
Georgia, 9 Wheat. 398, 399, that a private corporation does not
acquire governmental status just because the government grants
it a charter or owns some of its stock, infra, p. 23.

MR OY A, NR le

20

ernmental entities as TVA or RFC, but did not in-
clude an essentially private corporation merely be-
cause the United States happened to own some stock
therein. The present situation is not analogous to
that in which the government merely holds stock in a
private corporation. Here, the government owner-
ship is total rather than partial. The County holds
title to all transit system assets, and, although Pawley
and the other bendholders have power to mature the
bonds should the County default or breach the cove-
nants of the Trust Agreement, they have no owner-
ship interes’ in the Transit System assets; rather, the
interest of the bondholders, including Pawley, is essen-
tially merely that of a preferred creditor.” Cf. Re-
construction Finance Corporation v. Merryfield, 134
F. 2d 998, 991-992 (C.A. 1), where the financial in-

** Contrary to the Union (Pet. 8-9), the power of the bond-
holders to call up all the bonds in the event of a default. and
to institute, through the trustee, suits for specific performance
of the covevants of the Trust Agreement does not give Pawley
a right of reversion in the Transit System upon default in the
bond payments or breach of the covenants of sound operation.
Under the Agreement for Delivery of Possession, Pawley is
deemed to have relinquished full ownership of the Transit Sys-
tem and its assets to the County and is remitted solely to the
rights of a bondholder. Although the bonds issued entitled
Pawley and the other bondholders to a first lien on the transit
revenues for payment of the bond principal plus interest, they
specifically recite that they are not to be “construed * * * as
conveying or mortgaging the Transit System or any part there-
of.” See p. 4, supra, and the discussion such provisions
in Fordham, Revenue Bond Sanctions, 42 Col. Li. Rev. 395, 431,
433, and Nehemkis, The Public Authority: Some Legal and
Practical Aspects, 47 Yale L. J. 14, 23-24. See, also, State v.
Dade County, 142 So. 2d 79, 88 (S.Ct. Fla.) validating the
Transit Revenue Bonds.

21

terest and control of the RFC in the affairs of a shoe
corporation was held not to create an employer-em-
ployee relationship within the coverage of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.”

The cases relied on by the Union do not require 4
contrary conclusion. In Bus Employees Vv. Missouri,
374 U.S. 74, the Court held that the State could not,
through its strike seizure procedure, defeat the Sec-
tion 7 right of public utility employees to strike.
However, the Court emphasized that (374 U.S. at
81):

* * * the State’s involvement fell far short of
creating a state-owned and operated utility
whose labor relations are by definition excluded
from the coverage of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. The employees of the company did
not become employees of ‘Missouri. Missouri
did not pay their wages, and did not direct or
supervise their duties. No property of the
company was actually conveyed, transferred,
or otherwise turned over to the State. Mis-
souri did not participate in any way in the
actual management of the company, and there
was no change of any kind in the conduct of
the company’s business. * * *

Here, on the other hand, the employees of the tran-
sit system became County employees, the County paid

1#In any event, even if the trust for the bondholders could
be analogized to a corporation in which the bondholders par-
ticipate as shareholders with the County, by virtue of their
right to receive interest and to enforce the covenants protecting
the security of their investment, any waiver of the County’s im-
munity which could be inferable from its joint participation
therein (cf. Planters’ Bank, pp. 23-24, infra) would appear to
be applicable only to proceedings against the trust itself, which
is certainly not an employer under the Act.

22

their wages and supervised their duties, and the prop-
erty was actually conveyed, transferred, and other-
wise turned over to the County.

In United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S.
258, the government seized the coal mines under an
arrangement whereby it “substituted itself for the pri-
vate employer in dealing with those matters which
formerly were the subject of collective bargaining
between the union and the operators,’’ negotiating a
new collective agreement with the union. In these
circumstances, the Court held that the government be-
came the employer of the employees, with the result
that a strike could be enjoined wihout regard to the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, notwithstanding that the gov-
ernment retained the private managers of the mines
with substantially the same functions and authority
as before;” that “none of the earnings or liabilities
resulting from the operation of the mines, while under
seizure, are for the account or at the risk or expense
of the Government; that the companies continue to
be liable for all Federal, State, and local taxes; and
that the mining companies remain subject to suit”
(230 U.S. at 287, 288). The governmental involve-
ment here is far greater and has none of the tempo-
rary features present in Mine Workers.” Moreover,

2° The Court noted that the government retained ultimate
control, since its regulations provided for remove! of the man-
agers at the discretion of the Coal Mines Administrator.

2 Cf. Hoosier Veneer Co., 21 NLRB 907, 935-937, modified
and enforced sub nom. National Labor Relations Board v.
Bachelder, 120 F. 2d 574 (C.A. 7), certiorari denied, 314 US.
647, also cited by petitioner (Pet. 23-24), where a court-ap-
pointed receiver was found to be a “person acting in the in-
terest of an employer,” under Section 2(2) of the Wagner Act.

Mine Workers shows, contrary to the Union’s conten-
tion, that governmental immunity is not automatically
lost where the government shares some of the inci-
dents of ownership and control with private interests.

Petitioner also relies on cases in which coverage of
the States and their subdivisions is implied in the
absence of any statutory exemption for such govern-
mental entities (Pet. 21, 22, 23, 24, 27). Parden v.
Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks De-
partment, 377 U.S. 184, 188-189 (Federal Employers’
Liability Act); California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553,
564-565 (Railway Labor Act). These decisions have
little bearing on the issue of coverage under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act which expressly excludes
from the definition of employer in Section 2(2) ‘fany
State or political subdivision thereof.” ” Similarly
the language in Bank of United States v. Planters’
Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheat. 398, 399, that ‘“‘when a
government becomes a partner in any trading
company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the urans-

22. Plumbers’ Union v. Door County, 359 U.S. at 354, 358-
359, and Al J. Schneider Co., 81 NLRB 99, 100-101, cited by
petitioner (Pet. 21-22). These cases involve the definition of
“person” under Section 2(1) of the Act which does not extlude
governmental entities. Thus, the question there presented was the
right of political subdivisions to the protection against second-
ary pressure afforded “person[s]” under Section 8(b) (4). As
the Board stated, in a case involving the exey») tion of govern-
mental employers in Section 2(2), such hold. \ “are inapposite
as they involve action directed against, rather than jurisdiction
over, governmental agencies.” New Bedford, Wood's Hols,
Martha’s Vineyard, etc., 127 NURB 1822, 1323-1324. See, also,
Peter D. Furness, 117 NLRB 437, 439-441, enforced, sub nom.
National Labor Relotions Board v. Local Union No. 313, ete.,
254 F. 2d°221 (C.A. 3), overruling Al J. Schneider, Co.,
supra.

ee CO |

24

actions of that company, of its sovereign character,
and takes that of a private citizen,” is addressed to
a totally different problem. As indicated, supra, n. 17,
p. 19, the question there was simply whether a suit
against a bank was a suit against the State, and thus
barred under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitu-

..tion, because the State had issued incorporation papers
to the bank and owned some of its stock. The Court held
that those circumstances were insufficient to cloak the
corporation with the sovereignty and immunities of the
State. Here, on the other hand, the question is not
whether a private corporation acquires governmental
immunity because the government is a participant,”
but, rather, whether the government itself loses its
immunity with respect to an euuerprise which it
wholly owns, and exercises employer control over,
merely because, instead of paying cash for the assets,
it buys on the installment plan and accords the bond-
holders certain financial controls as security for the
debt: owed them.

4. The decisions requiring State courts te stay their
hand in matters “arguably”’ within the jurisdiction of
the Board are inapposite here. The underlying facts
are not disputed and the issue is the scope of the stat-
utory exemption for governmental employers. The

8 Cf. also the cases cited at p. 24, n. 10 of the petition. Com-
pare Emergency ivleet Corp., United “tates Shipping Board v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 275 U.S. 415, 422-423, 425-426 (Pet. 24)
with Sloan Shipyards v. United States Shipping Board Emer-
gency Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549, 567-568 (Pet. 22) for the differ-
ing treetment that a claim of sovereign privilege by a wholly
owned government corporation may receive in different contexts.
See the express exemption accorded “wholly owned Government
corporation[s]” in Section 2(2) of the Act.

at ele hE,

25

‘General Counsel—whose decision bars the Board from
taking jurisdiction—has declined to act on the express
ground that the employer in suit is outside the scope
of the Act. And, with the benefit of the fully developed
record here, the Board itself has now expressed its view
to the same effect. Whatever the ‘‘arguability’’ of the
question when the Florida courts first asserted juris-
diction, it is now the Board’s considered submission
that they did not invade a pre-empted area. Cf.
Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 755-756.

In closing, we note that the Board is not aware of
any similar case in which the present question is

presented.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Board believes that
the Florida courts correctly concluded that the transit
system operated by Dade County was removed from
the National Labor Relations Act by the governmental
exemption in Section 2(2).

Respectfully submitted.

ARCHIBALD Cox,
Solicitor General.
ARNOLD ORDMAN,
General Counsel,
Dominick L. MANOLI,
Associate General Counsel,

Norton J. CoME,

. Assistant General Counsel,

Marion L. GRIFFIN,

Attorney,
National Labor Relations Board.

DECEMBER, 1964.

U.S. COVER™ MENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385602_0259%3A6. Public record. Not legal advice.
