# Appendix — General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mackrill

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1964
- **Citation:** 377 U.S. 973

## Text

“APPENDIX A

175 Neb. 631, 122 N.W. 2d 742

.GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION,
a corporation, Appellee, .

Vv. i
Donald E. MACKRILL, Appellant.
No, 35438. |
Supreme Court of Nebraska.
‘July 16, 1963.

Heard before WHITE, C. J., and CARTER, MESS- —
MORE, YEAGER, SPENCER, BOSLAUGH and.
_ BROWER, JJ. _ : :
SPENCER, Justice.

This is a replevin action in which General Motors Ac-
ceptance Corporation, hereinafter refer zed to as plaintiff,
alleges it has a special interest in a1 Chevrolet sedan
pickup Biscayne by reason of being the assignee of a
conditional sale contract entered into between Kizzier
_ Chevrolet Company, a corporation, hereinafter referred
to as Kizzier, and Donald EK: Mackrill, hereinafter re-
ferred to as defendant. Defendant appeals from the over-
ruling of a motion for a new trial after a judgment for
the plaintiff for possession and costs.

On December 9, 1961, defendant: purchased the car in
question from Kizzier and signed what is designated as a
conditional sale contract, obligating himself to pay a bal-
ance of $1,573.76. The financial part of the transaction
is described in the conditional sale contract as follows:

App. 2

‘ ‘‘Undersigned seller hereby sells, ‘and undersigned buyer
or buyers, jointly and severally hereby purchase (s), sub- /
ject to the terms and conditions set forth below and upon
the reverse side ‘hereof, the following property, delivery *
and acceptance of which in good order are hereby acknowl-
edged by ‘buyer; viz. : }

Mew Year No. Make Body Type . Model Manutfac- Motor
or Model Cyl. Trade Name If Truck, ~ Number turer’s No.
- Used Give Tonnage or Series Serial No.

used. _196Q, 8 “Chevrolet sedan pickup Biscayne 01280S 134161 none

For a TOTAL TIME SALE PRICE computed as follows :
1. *CASH SALE PRICE (Including the itemized costs . Sah
; designated below ) © $1895.00(1)
r “TOTAL DOWN PAYMENT under instalment sale—
-- Consisting of $645.00 plus $ none '
(Net Trade-in) (Cash) * —- $ 645.00(2)
DESCRIPTION OF TRADE-IN Make , Chevrolet
, Model Bel Air
Year 1956

3. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ITEMS 1 AND 2- ; ~ $1250.00(3)

4a. COST OF REQUIRED CAR INSURANCE. eee €
(Include this item, if buyer has authorized seller to apply ns

; for the insurance ) $ 80.00(4a)

4b. COST OF CREDITOR INSURANCE ON LIFE OF BUYER

(Exclude this item if buyer does not. authorize

_ Such insurance) Ps $ 9.60(4b)..
Oe cissninsnchnsntaenes $ none (4c)
. 5. ° BASIC TIME PRICE (PRINCIP. AL BALANCE) :
(Add items 3, 4a, 4b and 4c) ~ $1339.60(5)
6. TIME PRICE DIFFERENTIAL $ 234.16(6)
7, TIME PRICE BALANCE (Add items 5 and’6) _ $1573.76(7)
8. TOTAL TIME SALE PRICE (Add, jitems 2 and 7) $2218.76(8)

The Time Price Balance is payable at the seller's office designated below or
at such office of any assignee. as may be hereafter designated in 24 instal-
ments of $......... ieiehaiaeieaneoes as Jisted each, commencing Jan. 10, 1962, and on the
same day of each successive month thereafter, or as indicated in space below.
The final instalment shall equal the amount of time price balance remaining due..

1 @ 200.00 on Jan. 10, 1962 and-23-@ 59.72.”

q

App. 3

Defendant was allowed $845 for his old car, received
$200 of the amount in cash, and was given credit for $645.0
There is a dispute between the parties as to whether this -
$200 was a loan or was advanced by Kizzier on the old
ear for the purpose of paying off an encumbrance of some °
type on the car..For the purpose of a decision herein,
that point is immaterial and will not be discussed.

Subsequent to December 9, 1961, the salesman for Kizzier
advised defendant that he had used a wrong rate for
computing the insurance premiums in the eontract and that
the contract would have to be changed to include an addi-
tional $9. On January 13, 1962, defendant signed a new
contract which is.the contract involved in this action. The
contracts are on the same form and are exactly the same_
except for the changes in the amounts inserted in the
contracts. The itemization of the description of the trans-
action in the January 13, 1962, contract is as follows:

App. 4

“For a TOTAL TIME SALE PRICE computed as follows : abs
1. *CASH SALE ‘PRICE (Including the itemized costs im
designated below ) $1895,00(1)

2. TOTAL DOWN PAYMENT under instalment sale—
Consisting of $645.00 plus $ none

(Net Trade-In) (Cash) . _$ 645.00(2)
DESCRIPT ION OF TRADE-IN Make Chevrolet ;
Model Bel Air -
| Year 1956
- 3.° \DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ITEMS 1 AND2 .. — $1250.00(3)

-4a. COST OF REQUIRED CAR INSURANCE (Include this
item, if buyer has authorized seller to apply for.the insurance) $ 89.00(4a)

4b. COST OF CREDITOR INSURANCE ON LIFE OF BUYER
(Exclude this item if buyer does not authorize

such insurance ) $ 10.47(4b)
OU, .* siiicmseisatinsebicisiebinaiutanicedbabehiatlonstesiahisdstiiniatipsincinialinasenstineint Sestbeaiaehatoene $ none (4c)
5. BASIC TIME PRICE (PRINCIPAL BALANCE) »

* = (Add items 3, 4a, 4b and 4c) - $1349.47(5)
6. TIME PRICE DIFFERENTIAL - $ 231.22(6)
7. . TIME PRICE BALANCE (Add items 5 and 6) : $1580.69(7)
8. TOTAL’ TIME SALE PRICE (Add items 2 and 7) $2225.69(8)

The Time Price Balance is payable at the seller’s office designated below or- :

at such office of any assignee as may be hereafter designated in 24 instalments
of $.... _as listed each, commencing Jan. #0 1962, and on the same day
of each successive month theréafter, or as indicated in Space below. The final

dle oiege shall equal the amount of time price balance remaining due. 1 @
200,00 on Jan. 10, 1962; and 23 @ 60.03.”

Defendant sets out eight assignments of error. . The
_ pertinent ones may be summed up in the contention that
the transaction evidences an installment loan at usurious
rates. It is the plaintiff’s contention that the transaction
is a time price sale and not a loan transaction. [Plaintiff
contends further that, in any event, there is no time price
differential which is in violation gf the Installment Sales
Act or the Installment Loan Act construed with the laws
regulating the amount of interest which may be- charged
by a private person.

App. 5 —

In Elder y. Doerr, Neb., 122 N.W. 2d 528, we held the

Nebraska Installment Sales Act to be unconstitutional. It

will, therefore, not be necessary to discuss any of the
provisions of that act with relation to this tfinsaction.
We are.concerned with only two points. Is the transaction
a bona fide time sale? If not, is the contract usurious and
void under the provisions of the Nebraska Installment
Loan Act?

Is ‘the transaction a valid time sale’ or what -our
cases have denominated as « '%an in violation'of the terms
of the Installment Loan .“°t. In considering whether or
not such a transaction is a time sale made in good faith

or a loan, the court will look through the form and ex-

amine its substance. State ex rel. Beck v. Associates Dis-
count Corp., 168 Neb. 298, 96 N.W. 2d 55. We have said
many times an, essential of a valid time sale price is a
price agreed upon between the parties where the buyer
is actually informed of and has at the time the sale is
made an opportunity to choose between a cash and a time
sale price. See Wood v. Commonwealth Trailer Sales, Inc..
172 Neb. 494, 110 N.W, 2d 87.

This transaction on its face shows a cash: sale price
of #1 895, an allowance for the trade-in, and two ad-

ditional charges for insurance. The total of $1,349.47 is
shown to be the basic time price: The only apparent con-

clusion is thaf the amount of $1,349.47 is to be financed.
' There is then an item designated as time price differential
of $231.22. Regardless. of the term used, this item is a
charge for the loan of money or for forbearance of a
debt. Disguise it by any name or title we will; it is and
remains interest. We are concerned not with the form
but the intent of the transaction.

Dwayne Kizzier testified that the deal with the defendant |

was not accepted on the contract, but on the purchase

¥

App. 6

order. To quote him, ‘‘ * * * but the original’ deal ‘is
made on the purchase order and approved by the Sales
Manager or myself.’’

t

The. purchase order recites the following:

‘**Base price of unit © ; $1895.00
Tot. Credit — 645.00
Sub-Total 1250.00 ~
Insurance Mo 24 Ded 50 ~ 80.00.
Life Ins. . . 9.60
Time Sales Charge Mo. 234.16
Total: of above items 1573.76”"

(Italics supplied.)

This merely emphasizes that an interest charge was
_ made on the unpaid balance. There is no evidence in this
egse that the defendant was give en a choice between ereash
and a time sale price. ‘\

Kizzier. was not licensed to make installment loans.
Under our law, the permissive provisions of the Install-
ment Loan Act will! not apply to a nonlicensee, but a non-
licensee will be bound by the- inhibitory provisions of the
act. Curtis v. Securities Acceptance Corp., 166 Neb. 815,
91 X.W..2d 19.

The highest legal rate which could’ be charged by
a nonlicensee is 9 percent simple interest. The amount to
be. financed was $1,349.47. It was to be financed for a pe: ~
riod of 24 months. Under the contract in this case, it was
payable in installments, with the first payment of $200 ©
due in 1 month? and with an installment payment-\of _
$60.03 due each nionth thereafter for 23..months, so that
at the end of 24 months $1,580.69 would have been paid.
This is $1,349.47 plus the.time price charge of $231.22.

Is $231.22 in excess of 9 percent simple interest
_on this contract? If a 9 percent charge had been made.on
‘ the full amount of $1,349.47 for fhe fult period of 2 2 years, |

App.7

4

”
’ ~_——

it would have only amounted to $242.90. The interest on
the $200 payment for 23 months wovld be $34.50. The
interest on the $60.03 installment due in’ February for
22 months would be $9.70, and cach $60.03 installment
- would increase thé interest rebate approximately 45 cents
each inonth. It is readily apparent, therefore, that the
charge was an usurious one, and the penalties of the In-
*stallment Loan Act are applicable. We determine that
the interest charge’ of 9 percent simple interest on this
contract, with a payment of $200 after 1 month and the
balance in 23 equal installments, would be* approximately
$107. This is ee less than the $231.22 actually
charged. .

-

It is‘ argued that the defendant had at times worked
as a car ‘salesman and, fully) understood the transac-
tion. It could also be argued that the defendant was
not in a position to’ accept a cash sale offer if -one had
been made, and that the very nature of the transaction |
indicated the sale would need to be a time price sale. The
fact that a purchaser has full know ledge of and accepts

_ the terms of the proffered sale is not a defense to a charge
of usury. Nor is his inability to. pay cash a matter for
consideration on whether a purchaser was offered a choice
between aCash and a time sale. The lender herein is the

. Violator of the law, and against him alone are ‘its penalties

enacted. Elder v. Doerr, supra. |

Inasmuch as the transactidn is in violation of the pro-
visions of the Installnient Loan. Act, the contract and any
indebtedness due thereunder is void and uncollectible.
Section 45-155, R.R.S.. 1943. The contract being void, the |
plaintiff was not entitled to succeed in th® replevin.action,

> and judgment should have been entered for.the defendant.. -

For the reasons set out above, we reverse the judgment.
entered herein and remand the cause to the trial court with.

* amobile.

Pan 7 App. 8 | .

directions to set aside. the judgment for the > plaintiff and
to enter a judgment for the defendant for possession, dam- '
ages, and costs. If for any reason the vehicle cannot be
returned to the possession of the defendant, then to deter- |
mine the value thereof as of the date of replevin and to
- enter judgment for said amount, damages, and costs.

Reversed and remanded with directions.
‘BOSLAUGH, Justice (dissenting). . f)

I respectfully dissent from the holding of the majority
in this case.

The purchase order ‘referred to in the majority opinion
contained all of the essential information concerning the
transaction including the number and amount of install-—
ment payments to be made. The defendant testified that
he read the purchase order and that he understood it.
The defendant also testified that at the time he signed the
purchase order he received an invoice which stated the-
‘total cash pricé”’ and “‘total time price’’ for the auto-

This is“a law action in which the findings of the court’
have the effect of a verdict of a jury. It is a question
of fact as to whether the transaction was a time sale -
made. in good fajth or a loan made in violation of the
Installment Loan Act. The burden of proof was on the
defendant to establish that the transaction was a loan.

In my opinion the evidence is sufficient to sustain the
judgment of the trial court and the judgment should have
been affirmed. as :

I am authorized to state that Judge BROWER concurs
‘in.this dissent. :

we

Xa
* <3

APPENDIX B

EXCERPTS FROM MOTION FOR REHEARING IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF NEBRASKA WHICH
; PRESENT THE FEDERAI, a

[p. 7]

34. The 19: 9 Nebraska Installment Sales: Act required
sellers to state a ‘time price differential’’ in a conditional
sales contract. This Court’s decision—tm«this case and
Elder vy. Doerr have held; (1), that the Installment Sales .
Act is unconstitutional; and (8) that~4oing what the
statute required subjected the scller to other Nebraska

- statutes which not only forfeit the property sold to the

buyer without further payment but require the seller to
repay any portions of the purchase prive already collected.
This Court’s decision in this conté xt, as applied to trans-
actions entered into in reliance on the 1959 Act before
its invalidation, has entrapped all persons, including _-
appellee, who gomiplied with the 1959 statute in a manner
so arbitrary, capricious, unfair and unjust as to.consti- .
tute the taking of appellee’s property without due process

‘of law in violation of the Fourteenth Afnendment to the . .

Constitution cf the United States.

35. The decision’ invalidating retroactively, because of

the seller’s compliance with the Installment Sales Act, a

contract which would have constituted a valid time sale
agreement under the previous decisions of this Court, and
thereby subjecting the seller to forfeiture both of his right
to the property sold and to any proceeds from the sale is
arbitrary and capricious and a taking of property without
due process of law in violation of the Due,Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the

_ United States. =

App. 10

36. The decision of the Court holding that. by the use
of the term ‘*time price differential’ in accordance with
the provisions of the Nebraska statute entitled ‘*Nebraska +
Installment Sales. Aet,’’? the difference between the cash
price and time sale, price of the goods was transformed
into interest, is so unexpected, unusual and so at variance
with well settfed law. as to be urireasonable, arbitrary, and

?

. capricious, and so contrary. to prior decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States, the Supreme Court
of Nebraska, and the jurisprudence of, the states of the
United States of America, as to vielate- fundamental eon-
cepts of justice, and constitutes the taking -of appellee's
. property without due process of law, contrary to the Four-
teenth Amendment to the C onstitution of the United States
of America. | | se

37. After enaciment “of rs Installufent Sales Act in
1939 persons of ordinary intelligence could not reasonably
hay e anticipated that by complying with the full disclosure
requirements of that statute, the penalty provisions of the

Installment Loan Act would’ be applied to the facts of this
case, and said Act, -as here applied, to: forfeit appellee’
property rights, is vague, indefinite and uncertain in vio-
jation.of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.
-tocthe ¢ ‘onstituiion of the United States.

38. ‘The Lnstaliment Loan “Aci, in. the light of its am

euage and the prior decisions ofthis Court, and the Lista
ment Sales Aet prior to its invalidation by this ¢ i oN
“not be understood by. persons of ordinary intelligence to

- apply an ordinary time sale sueh as is before the Coart’ .”
in this ease, and said Act, as here applied to forfeit appel
lee's property rights, is vague, iidetinite, and uncertain int
violation of the Due Process Clause 6! the Pourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States,

aA

“App. 11

39. The rule of law which this Court applied retro-
actively so as to forfeit appellee’s property rights was, in
the light of the statutes of Nebraska and this Court’s prior
decisions, so vague, indefinite, uwiicertain and unanticipa-
table that persons of ordinary intelligence could not have
been expected to know of its existence, so that to apply
such rule retroactively to forfeit appellee’s property was
arbitrary and capricious and violative of the Due Proeess
‘Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitutiou
of the United States.

40. The Installment Loan Act, as here interpreted after .
the fact and applied”to situations when such application.
could not have-been anticipated by appellee or others ‘simi-
larly situated, is an impairment of the obligation of con-
tracts forbidden by Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution
of the United States.

41. The holding that ‘‘There is no evidence in this case
- that the afendant was given.a choice between a ‘cash and
a time sale price,’’ which is contrary to the contract giving
the purchaser precisely such a choice before its execution
and is supported by no evidence in the case, violates ap-
pellee’s right to.a fair decision guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Con-
stitution cf the United States. .

“tp. 38). |

Every transaction wherein the statutory requirements
were complied with may be invalidated ‘and the purchasers
-under all installment sales contracts exeeuted since 1959
‘ will be allowed to keep the goods covered by the contracts,
and not pay anything more for the merchandise, and fur-
thermore, recover everything theretofore paid on the con-
tracts. The result will be the forfeiture of hundreds of
miliions of dollars’ worth of property interests which: :

App. 12

sellers must let purchasers: retain free of charge. Such a
result could only be justifiable as applied to a person who
_ enters into’a transaction which he knows is unlawful. This
drastic and enormous forfeiture which should shock the
conscience of this Court, arises because all law abiding
-dealers and financial ipstitutions operating in’ Nebraska, _
- in good faith sought to comply: with the 1959 statute. We —
‘submit that it is utterly wrong to charge them with the
knowledge that the statute would be held unconstitutional
paricularly when'many similar laws have been enacted and
applied, without question, in other states. Thus, the effect
of the 1959 law by this decision was to entrap all dealers
and cooperating financial institutions into a course of con-
duct: which not only forfeited their right to receive or keep
amounts paid for goods sold, but also, to lose the article
. .itself, The decision of this Court which has such an effect _
is so arbitrary, capricious, unfair and unjust as to conflict
with those fundamental principles which have been estab-_
lished in onr system of jurisprudence for the protection
and enforcement of private rights, and to constitute the
taking of appellee’s property without due process of law
in violation of the 14th.amendment to. the Constitution of
the United States: and to constitute an impairment of the
obligation of appellee’s contract ‘rights in violation of —
Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution.

After passage of the Installment Sales Act-and prior to. |
this Court’s decision in these cases, no one in Nebraska
reading the Installment Loan Act could have foretold that.
_ it would apply to the facts of this case—where a sale was
made in the form prescribed by the Installment Sales Act.
tven counsel for appellant did not contend that the latter
statute was unconstitutional. Its constitutionality clearly
was nof obvious. And yet, appellee and countless others.
are subject to forfeiture of their. property without anv

App. 13.

payment for it because of their inability to determine
correctly. that this Court would hold that the Installment
Sales Act was invalid and that compliane ith its re-
quirements as to the form of an installment sale contract’
would violate the small loan. and usury statutes. To con-
strue the Installment Loan Act as applicable in-these cir-
cumstances, retroactively, is to make it as so applied too
vague, indefinite, ‘and uncertain for persons of ordinary
intelligence to have been able to predict, and, therefore,
in violation of the‘Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co.,
267 U.S. 233; Jordan v- DeGearae, 341 UT. S. 223, 231:
Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F. 2d 652, 655 (C.A..9, 1962),
which hold. that the indefiniteness doctrine applies to civil
eases when there is a forfeiture.

_ Federal questions under the Hith Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, arise by réason of the |
Court’s making findings shown by the record to be with- |
out evidence to support them, and contrary to the.only evi-
‘dence on the point, and that such findings were decisive
of the case, amounting to arbitrary or capricious exercise
.of power in ciear conflict with those fundamental prin-
ciples which have been established in our system of ju-
risprudence for the protection and enforcement of pri-
-“vate rights.

If this Court is unwilling to reconsider and change its
decision as -applied to the facts of this case, we urge that
it state clearly that the decision will only apply prospec-
tively insofar as other cases are concerned. Many courts
have adopted this device when-decisions overruling past
doctrine: or holding statutes unconstitutional -would have
serious retroactive effect on contract and property, rights
e. g., Hare vy. General Contract Purchase Corp., 200 Ark.

:

App. 14

601, 249 S.W. 2d 973 (1952); O’Brien v. Atlas Finance

Co., 223 Ark. 176, 264 S. W. 2d 839 (1954); Molitor v.
Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Mil. 2d 11,
163 N. E.'2d 89 (1959); World Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Tapp, 279 Ky. 423, 130 S. W. (2d) 848 (1939); Mutual
- Infe Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Bryant, 296 Ky. 815, 177 S. W.

— (2d) 588 (1943) ; McLean Coal Co. v. Pittsburgh Terminal

—. Coal Corp., 328 Pa. 250, 195 Atl. 4 (1937). The Arkansas

case of Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp. is close-
-ly in point, since it gave prospective operation only to a
decision changing the law governing credit sales in which
the title docutnents are discounted to a finance company.

To apply the decision of this Court retrospectively to
all time sales in Nebraska since the enactment of the In-
stallment Sales Act in 1959 would have the effect of sub-
jecting the sellers of enormous amounts of property, who
could not have been expected to anticipate this Court’s
1963 decisions, to the complete forfeiture of their prop-
erty rights. The result may be bankruptcy for many in-
stitutions; and serious losses for a great many others.

This is precisely the kind of situatton which has caused -

many courts to give prospective effect only to decisions
‘ invalidating statutes (or overruling past. precedent).

---

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