# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Southern Railway Co. v. Guilford National Bank of Greensboro > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385601_1383%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari - **Published:** January 1, 1964 - **Citation:** 375 U.S. 985 ## Text ‘ Y iz i Office-Supreme Coury ua itd se a “eee. nei ant - FILED i tree a ee ae : e . No. 6 4-6 % ? | ne — nad Sar DAVIS, CLERK IN THE : Supreme Court of the United States PETER 8. SARELAS; . , | en Petitioner, - sf vs. GEORGE §. PORIKOS, JOHN C. -GEEAS, GEORGE W. ALEX- ANDER, ANDREW CARDAKAS, THEMIS ANAGNOST, DEMOSTHENES I. GEORGOULIS, DEMETRIOS . PARRY, ADAMANTIOS ANDROUTSOPOULOS, JAMES P. ECONOMOS, GERARD A: SERRITELLA, PHILLIP 8. MAKIN, CHARLES V. -. FALKENBERG, CATHERINE C. ANAGNOST, and JOHANNA E. ences mae —Respondents. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI .TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT. @ . PETER 8S. SARELAS. 30 North ae Salle Street, i ’ Chicago: 2, Tilwois ; €Entral 6-1442 Petitioner Pro Se. er . ee ee L a ’ UNITED STATES LAW PRINTING CC., CHICAGO 18, ILL. LA keview 5-6581 : INDEX 2 ee ee at = PAGE ~ OpinionBelow SF ERM Robe Pe: MERE Sar tr, aes RD 2 _ Documents and Papers Transmitted with Petition Scene oa Jurisdiétion> 2 RS SLEDS EIN AT fF acta mena vr Questions Presented ° an | : 4 Constitutional and Statiitory Provisions Involved ee. Statement of the Case SOP he i ashe bre sires! So : 7 Reasons for Granting ‘the W rit , ate Peaerahs weet fork 12 Conelusign “ypitiessanetecneeecnesees Sede VE NDE Scone wks tee Seteattind. | A. Opinion apemow AS res ROR mene PEDERSEN os 25 B. Judgment of the Court, i e-erichietereesnere rpeeeshsnnses 28 ‘ES Order Denying Petition ‘for Rehearing ants 29° nA +. CFBATIONS | | Cases - | ‘Baldwin y. Morgan, 5 Cir., 251 F.2d 780, 788 (1958) 24 ‘Bell v: Hood, 227. U.S, 678, 681-683... ee 23 ° Cohen v. Norris, 9 Cir. , 300 F.2d 24, 29-4962) veer & Ex part parte Vi irginia, 100 U.S. 339, : 346- PU ea eee “ Harmon vy. Saperior. Court, 9 Cir ., BOT F. od si 798 _ (1962) 23 — — «& Te leg. Co. v. Loa Atigeles, 33 S.Ct, 312 12, 13, 23 & ww > il ; eae aes a. PAGE Lee v. Hodges, 4+-Cir., 321 F. 2d 480, 483, 484 | 1963 3) .22,23 MeGill v. Uhinois Power Co., 163 N.E.2d 454, 457 : 13,477 McNeese v. Board_of Edugation, $8 S.Ct. 1433. 1435- = 1435, | ae PL nahin at Ps viet tran ee I 23 - Marshall v. Sawyer, 9 Cir., 30] F.2d 6389, 646, (1962) 18, 24 Mon: de ¥. Pape, 365 US. 167, ai 183 1,18, toca ; 23, 2: Romero Vv. Ww eakley, 9 Cir., 226 F.2d 399, 401 (1955) . 2 Screws Vv. United States, 32 5p Ss. 91, 10813 . “Be 240 Skolnick | v, Martin, No. 427, Oct.Term, 1963 omen: | Stiltner: vy. Rhay, 9 Cir., 322 F.2d 3l4y 316 (1963) ......... 21. Stringer’ v. Dilger, 10 Cir. m 313 F. 2d 536. 240 id - 24 United States v. Classic 313 U S/ 299, 326 uneaes “12,28 Tansor v. Checker Taxi, Co:, 88 N LE: 2d 658, 662-663. 15 Williams v. United States, 341 US. 97 VD nnd, 2A te oe A dpetetenaes a . = Congressionai Globe, 42d Congress, Ist Session, .\pp.-. Rb, Statement of Rep.’ singham arena Sea Th spe ED wat - 25 Congressional Globe, 424 Congress, Ist Session; App. _ #315, Statement of Rep. Burehatd | 2...... pevsennene To “Congressional Globe, 42d ongress, Ast Session. App. . 262, ‘Statement of Rep. Dunnell. enherssorecatonienabentenes 18 Csilethalion 7 ei United Btates Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment,” Section 1... Saapuacan saeco tagiecas AUST IPN AET LO eos a ‘iil Statutes ; U.S. Code Annotated, Title 42, Sectiori 1983, wo! nily 14, 17 US. Code Annotated, ‘Title, 42, Section 1985(2) 5,14,17// US. Code Annotated, Title 42, Section "1985(3) rae a .f aw — Pi = * soe o Fre a ee f : : f « * ; Z i ; y, ? eae A 7 > x ay a ‘ f > * . * ‘If two or more persons in any State conspire * *.* for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State * * * from giving or securing to all persons within such State * * * -the equal protection of the law.,;* * * in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived’ of having and exercising ‘any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived:may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one Or more of ‘thie ‘con- spiratgrs.”’ ' no! STATEMENT OF THE CASE. - The petitioner seeks to hold State Court Deposition ix- . aminers, and those that collaborated with them, liable for the. misuse: of the’ power the respondents possessed by virtue of a State Court Order and made possible only because the respondents were*clothed with the authority of the Ilinois ‘State compulsory ‘deposition power. The respondents, armed with the Court Order and clothe with the state compulsory deposition power, perpetrated frauds upon, the petitioner ‘under color of law, and under color of Iinois customs, -practices, and usages. (App. 7-19; Ree. 8-29). 3 : tinder. [linois ‘customs, practices, and usagés, and par-- ticularly in Cook County, Llinois, the deposition is not to assist i the ascertainment ‘of the truth, but rather to ‘assist in reducing the huge backlog of civil4awsuits in the State’ Courts of Cook County. The compulsory qdepositton power is wiclded against deponent-litigants under the color and pretense of law, as a weapon of intimidation to beat down litigation and to foree plaintiffs to abandon their lawsuits. Under Illinois custom, practice,’ and usage, both a defendant and his attorney can be appointed State Court Deposition Exaniiners. The deposition, under Illinois eus- tom, practice, and usage, is Without’ supervision and is held: in a private enclosure, away from the courthouse. ‘Tn addition, under Illinois customs, practic ves, and usages, the State Court Deposition Hxaminer is in charge of the deposition and the notary public, who is yually alse a court reporter, merely attends to take stenographic notes. Under color of these Hlinois customs, practices, and usages, and under the guise and. pretext of taking. the peti- tioner’s deposition, the respondents committed, condoned, caused to be done, acauiese¢ed in, the following overt acts furtherance of a coltispiracy ta obstruet justice in- the 8 See « State Courts of Cook County, Illinois, and to deprive the petitioner of due process and equal protection of the laws, and to damage the petitioner in his person and property for attempting to enforce the equal protection of the laws: 1. Although the petitioner had not waived examina- tion of the transcript of the depositions taken and had not waived his signature, such transer ipt was not sub- = mitted*to the petitioner for examination and mgpatare. (App. 10; Ree. 11). . 2. Such transcript was none ‘theless used as an instru- ment to intimidate the petitioner and had attached to it a’false certificate of a, supposed deposition’ officer, Thomas’ J.. Sheehan, who: was in fact not present at * all of the depositions and -was‘ not the deposition officer as he falsely certified. | Such false certificate - stated: ‘*the said transeript acgurately. state the ques- . tions put and the answers. made’’. (App. 11:12, 15; Ree. 13, 16). An-additional false certificate was at- tached to an adiitional document of *excerpts,-qte- tations or portions’, -prepared by respomdents: and ~~ * such document cuntaienl: ao / (a) at least fifty-tive “(35) false representations . gird designations of the said Sheehan, labeling hiny - as ‘* The Court 479 : (b) More than‘ one hundred (100) separate state-* ments or remarks made by the said Sheehan, con- sisting of his supposed. rulings, striking peti- tioner’s answers, changing petitioner’s answers, and abnsive and derogatory statements agdinst ._ the petitioner, when, in fact, said Sheehan was not’ even present at all.of the depositions and was not ~ _ the deposition officer. . % (¢) Omissions, changes, and deletions of : peti- Honer's answers, — eran Aa , (d). ‘Inclusion of questions without ineluding peti- tioner’ ~ answers thereto. te (e) Omissions of plaintiff's numerous objections, (f) Omission of the exhibits mentioned therein. tg) Findings of fact by said supposed oe oflicer, Sheehan, against the petitioner, when, 1 fact, the said Sheehan Was not even present . some of the depositions. (See, App. 15-14, par. 12, . i’ through and including **g’’; Ree. 15-16). ae The “excerpts” of depositions were presented to the State Court by the respondents, in their eapacity as both: Deposition Examiners and defendants in the State Court lawsuit in which the depositions were taken. Such -prese ntation of the “*exee rpts”’ to the State ¢ ‘ourt was té.defeat the due course Of justice eee ‘THinois, and to ttefame “tind disparage the petitioner by destroying his reputation and his credibility. The - respondents caused such *‘exeerpts’* t» ‘be: presented, knowing what the falsely and illegally certified tran- script contained a multiplicity of omissians, de ‘létions, and insertions, inge niously designed and frandulently inserted j in such trans¢ript. to discredit and oppress the petitioner for hav ieatte mpted to enforce, in the state courts, his right to the equal protection of the laws. (App. 14- 18; Ree. 16-20). / 4. Such "prese ntation of fgandulently Gemektvn “"ex- cerpts"’ was used to damage the petitioner in his property hy causing a State Court. indgment to be entered against the petitioner, without hearing on the piprits, resulting tn “greal seamage and expense to the petitioner for having attempted te /entoree the equal % o f - ' the petiti 10 ke protection of the laws. The petitioner was thus hin- dered,. 1m, a gbstructed, and: prevented from ‘enforcing his right to the leg: il remedic 's In. the state courts of Illinois. (App. 18, 19: Ree: 19, 20-21). 2. None of the respondents madetany effort te prevent er aid in preventing the commission of the wrongs against the petitioner. (App. 18; Ree. 4-20). The petitioner instituted action in the Distriet Court on "June 21, 1962, with Jury Demanded, and sought to invoke the jurisdiction of the District Court under 98 US.CLA.,’ Sections 1343 and 1331, and songht to invoke the sanctions , of 42 ELS.CLA. Sections 1983, ayaa mea 1988, and the sanctions of 18 U.S.C.A. 241 and’ 242. Peti- ttoner’s case arises under the. ( nited States Constitution and partieulariy Amendment XTV, Section l.-and the laws of the United States as aforementioued. A Ustriet Judge, however, refused to entertain petic tioner’s lawsuit. ° ; “The Court: * * * This court will not ente tain such." pe e, Offici: il Transeript of, Proceedings. APD 4 117; hkee, 221)... . 7 ad . The petiintic *, Mnaring pi se; Was not ne speak or. “ies finivh a sentence “The District Judge, or more accurate ly, the’ persen pretending to be such judge, intimi- dated, insulted, and abused the petitioner for attempting to invoke the jurisdiction of the Distriet Court and denied oe the right of aecess tothe Dis triet Court by | threat ard intimidation : *TheCourt: Mr. Marshall. take this gentleman out if he doesn't govout.”” (Otheial, Transeripr of Pro- ‘eoodings, App. 1hs: Ree, eel). = - ; 38 11 ; The District Judge entered a judgment on the pleadings against the petitioner chen. there was nothing before the District Judge. The respondents’ Motion ‘for a judgment on the, pleaditigs was noticed to be presented on’ October. , 1962, vel the District Judge, with nothing before him, . entered a judginent against the. petitioner on October 9, 1962. (App. 113: Ree. 186-187. App. 116: Ree. 216). The District Judge entered-a baseless judgment neny oppo-* site the record, “Such order states: having heard the argiments of eounsél wae PY (App. 116, line ‘s 6-72 Ree. 216). in @ @ & ee . . . “ar 4 . “i . ? ° - Yet.tthe Official Transcript of Proeéedings shows tha! the petitioner, appearing pra se, was not allowed to speak “or address the court .en any subject and was: threatened and intimidated to leave: **Mr, Marshall, take this gentle- man out if he doesn’t go out/? (App. TES; Ree. 221). - = The District Judge entéred such judgment with éosts. yét the petitioner’ was. not permitted to defend himselr against such judgment When and where he was being assailed, as the FFicial Transeript of Proceedings plainty - shows. (App. 116, line 16: Rec. 216. App. 116-118: Ret, D7). 29] ). Loa E The Court af\ Appeals, ignoring the void and illegal . .founmdetion of the. audeme nit of the District ¢ ‘ourt, passed upon ‘the merits of petitioner’ s cas? at the same time affirming dismissal. Yet, the District Judge had réfused to entertain petitioner's suit aye, obviously did not pas- npon the merits.ef peti itfoner's Claim when the petitioner “owas. threate ned "aud intimidated to leave, 12 wt . Reasonis for Granting the Writ. The petitioner's case involves the misitae of the state compulsory deposition power by State Court Deposition ‘Examiners and collaborators, réspondents here, to perpe ° trate frauds upor the petitioner. Another case pending - in this Court involves thie misnse of the state.compulsory deposition, power to perpetrate another type of tort torture ‘and: injury—iaflieted upon a deponéit-litigant, Skolnick v; Martin ét al., he ts, Oc ‘tobereTerm, 1963. In affirming the dismissal of petitioner's case, the Court * wof Appeals relies upon. its decision. in the Skolnick case, -317 F. 2d 855 (Appendix A, infra, p. 27). The’ Court ‘of Appeals indicates that the respondents in the petition er'’s case were not under color of law. But this ruling’ is cmariy contrary to decisions by this Court::° ~* , iotare the provisions of the (Fourteenth) Amend nent as conctusively fixed by previous decisions are generic in their terms, are addressed, of course, ti the states, but adso to every person, whether natural or yuridu al, who is the ve posttory of stale” power, By this construction. the reach -of. the Amendment is shown to be coextensive wih any excercise by a state of pour, tt ecg r aes exerted” Home Tele phone & Tele graph "D, Pe Angeles, 227 US. 27s, 287,33 S, Ct. ny, 314, L. Ed. 510. (Emphasis added). : ° “Misuse of peace, possessed ‘by virtue of state -iaw and made - ‘possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the-anthority of state law, is action taken a ‘under volor of’ state gt United Sattes’y. Classic, es ' 313-TLS. 209, 326, 61S. Ct. 10817 1045, 85, L: Ed. 136s. — (Emphasis added), - % —_—" ae ee 4 The -definition of ‘under color ‘of’ ‘state law ‘as in the Classic case was copied toby this Court in Screws ve United’ States, 325 U.S. 91, 108-113, 69 S. Ct. 1031, 1038- 1041, 89 L. Ed. 1499; in e illiams v. United State s, 341 U.S; 97, 99, 71S. Ct. a6, d78, 99 L. Ed. 7743 and adhered _ toj‘and reaffirmed, in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U:S,\ 16%, 183- ‘185, ALS. Ct. 473, 482-483, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492. - 4 *% As the Mllinais Suprevie Court sdid of Illinois deposi-. tions taken pursuant to law: * ‘*They are the iniidhen of the power: of th» State — to compel the testimony-of witnesses rather than uf the = mgenuity of any lawyer. The State makes available its compulsory process to compel witnesses to attend aud give testimony on a pretrial deposition i in order tv @ssist in the ascertainment of the truth.” McGill v. Ilinois Power Co., 18. Ul. 2d°242, 246, 163 N.E. Sd 454, 457 (Nevember, 1959). (Emphasis added). This vigas by the Illinois Supreme Court was reaffirmed in Tansor yv. Checker Tasi Co.. 27 Ub 2d 250, 188 N.E: 2d 608, 662-663. (March, 1963). - The Court of “Appeals waives away petitioner’ s case Shy characterizing’ it as.an ‘abuse of process in the ‘taking of the depesitions ™’ ( Appendrx A, infra, p. 27). But it has been said : adage lh the settled construction ‘of the (Fourteenth) Amendment is that it presupposes the possibility sot an abuse by-a_ state officer or representative of the powers possessed, atid deals with such a contingency. It provides, therefore, for a case where one who is in possession of state power uses that power to the doing ©, of the wrongs which the Amendment forbids, even although the censummation of the wrong may not be within the powe rs possessed, if the commission of the ~ wrong itself is rendered possible or is efficiently aude d “by the state authority lodacil m the w rongdoe * Home Te dephowne Te leqraph, Co. v. Los Angele 8, 227 UWS. 278, 58 S.Ct. S121. (Emphasis-added). a . . a “4 . . e ¢ Ea, In addition, although-it is necessary to allege that Ux respondents were *‘under color of’’ state. law to make them subject to the sanctions of 42 U.S.C.A. i 1983, it is not necessary: to allege ‘‘under color of’ law to set forth a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1985 (2) (3). The petitioner in his Complaint sts forth AMevations of the overt acts of respondents clothed with the State com- pulsory deposition power and thus ‘‘under color of” law. and allegations of overt acts of respondents jn further- ance of a conspiracy to obstruct justice in the State Court, -and to injure the petitioner for having. enforced,‘ or at- tempted to enforce, the equal protection of the laws: (App. ‘, pars. 8, 9, 10, 11; Ree. 8-9. App. 8, pars. 13, 14; Ree. 9- 10). ‘The Court of Appeals decision in petitioner’ Ss case Is not only clearly contrary to previous rulings by this C ourt >. about ‘‘under color of’’ law, but the decision is. eléarls _ contrary to the legislative débates preceding the passage of the Ku Klux Act, April 20, 1871, Section 2, now Section 1985(2). The petitioner.’s position is that the overt acts of the respondents were ‘tunder color of’*-law, put overt -acts of a combination of persons in furtherance of «a con- spiracy, to obstruct justice, etc., need not be ‘under color of’ law to be- subject to the sanctions of 42 U.S.C.A. See- tion 1985(2). Even if the respondents were only ‘‘indi- viduals’, they would be subject io the sanctions of Sec- tion 1985 (2) : ‘*Who dare say, now that the Constitution has been amended, that the nation cannot by: law provide against*all’such abuses and denials of right as thes? in State and by States, or combinations of persons? . ** * Tf Lanr not right in asserting that the negative’ limitations imposed by the Constitution on States can he enforced by law against ‘individuals and States, then’ the Government Was wrong trom the admizistra v4 15 « oe tion of Washington: dow n, and the Supreme Court of : the United States was wrong every time the question has come before it.’’’ Statément of Representative J. A. Bingham of Ohio: (Mareh 31, 1871),.Congres- sional Globe, 42nd Congress, Ist Session, Appendix 85. ( Emphasis added). ‘If the refusal of a State officer, acting: for the State, to accord equality of civil rights renders him amenable to punishment-for the offense under United States law, conspirators who attempt to prevent such officers from performing such duty-are alse clearlip liable.’’ Statement of Representative TE. C. Burchard of Illinois (April 6, 1871), Congressional Globe, 42n d . Congress, Ist Session,. Appendix: 315: (Emphasis added). "y 2 > This Court should grant certiorari and resolve the Fed- eral questions inherent in petitioner’s case as to the ap- — ‘plieability of 42 U.S.C.A. Section’ 1985(2), and whetlier ‘‘under color of*’ law is, or is not, a. necessary allegation _ to invoke the sanctions of that section. Il. 7 Can: it be wail without making a. mocké@@y of justioe, that the misuse of state compulsory deposition power by State Court. Appointed Deposition ‘Examiners and collabo- . rators, to perpetrate trauds upon a deponent-litigant in order to obstruct justice and to injure -him in his person, or property, tor attempting to enforce the equal proteec- {i tion of tne laws—can it be said that such acts by tue re- spondents are not within the sanctions of the Civil Right» Acts? The misuse of the Illinois state:compulsory depo- sition power is-carried out by way of a ‘natural’ con. spiracy. Under Illinois customs, practices, and usages the > State Court. Deposition ‘Examiners’ are partisans—they - are on other oceasions attorneys for the opponents of the’ deponent-litigant. It is only natural that the opponents, a 16 ~~. being at the same time the State Court Appointed Deposi-, . . . =~ ‘ *, — * . *. . > tion Examiners,~‘the consti#tuted authorities”, should or. .. would conspire, to see to it that the deyonent-litigant is denied the eqval protection of the laws. For example, a plaintiff at a deposition as both a witness and a litigant, | looks to the Deposition Examiner for the equal protection ; of ‘the laws.. But, under the Illinois customs, usages. and © practices, and particularly those custems, practices, and usages of Cook County, the Deposition Examined is not an impartial. persen but a partisan, representing defendants - on other occasions. What équal. protection of the laws would such’a constituted authority grant to such a plain- tifft Logically, none. Under Illinois custom, usage and practice, the State Court Appointed Deposition Examiner é is in charge of the deposition and fhe deposition is taken’ - without supervision. The notary-court reporter attends merely to take stenographic notes. ‘ ; Asa result of and under color of such customs, practices, and-usages, outrages are performed and such ourtages¢ have the majesty of law. At depositions, fist fights-.are not uncommon, though ‘perhaps riot widely reported, and the intimidation and abuse of ‘deponentsHtigants serves the cynical purpose to assist in reducing the huge backlog of cases in’ Cook“County by forcing .deponent-litigants to abandon their lawsuits, by tormeni, injury, and fright. Under’ Hiinois ‘customs. practices and usages, and most particularly the custems, practices; and’ usages of Cook - County, the compulsory deposition power ix wielded espe- -cially by orgarized malefactors#s &h instrument of wrong- -— doine to beat down litigation. The State Courts, if Cook — | ‘County, deny protective orders as a matter of routine, Under Mllinois customs, practices. and usages, this fear- some power is put into the hands of partisans as agents of government, theoretically ‘*to assist in the ascertain: - ” ‘ ° s . cas, 4 a zy . ¢ his lawsuit with costs, but nos allowing such citizen to speak or he heard when and whery he is being vissailed | in his ‘rights. (App. 116, line 6: Ree, 216). 20 *3. In the District Court, judgment was entered on’ the pleadings when there ‘was nothing hefore the Dis- rtict Judge. Respondents’ Motion, for judgment on the pleadings was noticed to be presented a day after the District Judge, or person pretending to he District Judge entered the judgme nt age inst the petitioner. re 116-118; Ree. 219- 222). ‘A District Judge, or person. pretending t to a such ; ae entered a judgment against the petitionér when there was nothing before the District Judge. The District Judges Order states “having heard the argu- ments of counsel’? (App. 116, lines 6-7; Ree. 216). Yet, the Official Transcript of Proceedings shows that the petitioner, appearing pro se, wax not allowed to speak and instead was intimidated and insulted by the District Judge, or person pretending tobe the Dis- trict Judge. : 7 “The Court: Mr. Marshall, take this gentle- _man out.if he doesn’t go out.’? (App. 118; Ree. 221). The judgment) Was without foundation, baseless, and directly opposite to the record. No amount of patch- work cag make such a void judgment a valid judgment. Do. In the Court of Appeais, recitals are made in their written Opinion directly opposite the Record on Appeal. (See, Petition for Rehearing, py. 4+- ). 6. The Court of Appeals considered matters out- side the record and. relied upon and recited the same. in their written Opis, thus enable the respond- ents to perpetrate a fraud upon the Court of Appeals. The petitioner pointed this ont to the Court of Ap- peals, but to no avail. (See, Petition for Rehearing, page 19). — Pe , 21 - 7. The Court of Appeals passed upon the merits of petitioner’s ‘suit, when petitioner was no eard\on the merits of his claim in the District Coyrt—in faet,- not heard at-all. The District Judge roluibed to-en _tertain petitioner’s suit. ‘‘Mr. Marshall, take: thjé gentleman ac Ce 118; RR a 8. The Court of Appeals caused the recitals direct- ly vpposite the record, and from outside the record, to be published (in unofficial reports), thus defaming : and disparaging the petitioner. (320 F.2d 827). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is baseless, with- out foundation, an affirmation of a*void judgment. (Peti- ‘tion for Rehearing in Court of Appeals, @p. 11-13). — No _ amount of patch-work can make it valid.. . If this Court will not grant certiorari and will not use its supervisery power over, the lower federal courts in the 7th Cireuit—then what does it avail a person that he is a law-abiding citizen? If the lower federal courts abdicate ‘their duty and will not give remedy, then where is the citizen to protest’? If the District Court in his district ‘is closed to this petitioner, where shall hé seck redress? What good are Civil Rights Acts when the right of access to the District Court is denied? It surely cannot be duubted that the action of the ‘District Judge, or the - person pretending to be such, amounts to a trespass. ** Indeed, reasonable access to the courts ix basic to. all other rights protected by the (Civil Rights) Act, for it is essential to their enforcement.” Stitmer vy. Rhay, 9 Cir., 822 F.2d 314,516 (Sept. 9, 1963). _ > “ The Court of Appeals’ ruling in petitioner’s case is directly opposite to rulings in other Circuits and directly oppo site to rulings by this Court. A. The District Judge said he. would not cite sisi -a lawsuit as petitioner’ s. (App. 117; Ree. 221 . The Court of appeals said, ‘** *°* we see no de\ial a hearing, « arbitrary action * * *.’’ (Appendix A, infra, page 27 ’. This ruling is in direct conflict with other rulings: (1) ‘*ln refusing to consider appellants’ complaints, the «district court considers the case from a viewpoint exactly contrary to this obvious purpose of the civil ‘rights legislation to give the. litigant his choice of a federal forum rather than that of the state.’ Romero ° v. Weakley, 9 Cir., 226. F.2d 399, 401 (1955). (implhia- sis added). : (2) In direct contliet with: ‘Tntiniating no view on whether the plaintiff should ultimately prevail, we hold that Uo was error for the District Court to dismiss the complaint without hold- ing a hearing to dete rmine the facts.” Lee vy. Hodges, 4 Cir., 321 F.2d 480, 483 (1963). ( Emphasis added ). Brom his complaint it-is evident that he claims | substantial injurv, uader color of state lays at least to his right to the equal protection of thé laws; and he also appears to rely upon, the dune process and the privileges and immunities clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Federal jurisdiction ever. this complaint is well founded and the possthle catstence of state remedies does not affvet this jurisdiction. (( ‘iting Bell v. Hood, S27 & s8e7e, G6 Sc, T7290 TL, Bd. 939, 1946; Mowroe v. Pape, 865 US. 160, P85. ST S.Ct 475, a) L.Ed. 2d 492, 1961; Mi Ne i a Board ol Liducation. S73 US. 668) 83 S.Ct. 143, 10 L.Ed. 2d 622, 1963; Moss v. Jones, 288 F.2d 842, 344.6 Cir. cert. denied, 368 U.S. S68, 82 S.C “98, 7 | L.Bd 2d 65, 1961).°° 32 hed 480, at 484. (Emphasis added). a - Vaughan, 321: F.2d 480, 4 Cir., 1963) Lee v. Hodges, 23 ‘*The defendants contend that fhe case concerns a matter of purely internal state’ business whreh should be handled by the courts of the state. * * * It is notes worthy that the basis for abstention * * * has been undercut by recent action of the Supreme Court. (Citing Johnson v. Virginia,373 U.S. 61, 83 S.e't. 1058," 10 L.Ed. 2d 195, 1963; George vy. Clemmons, 373 U.S. 241, .83 S.Ct. 1296, 10 L.Ed. 2d 409, 1968; Wood v. 4 Cir., 321 F.2d‘ 480, at 484 footnote 6. niga (Em phasis added). . Ce (3) In divoct! -donflict with Bell y. mae 327 U.S. 678, 681-683, 66 S.Ct. 773. 775-776, 90 L.Ed. 939. 167, (4) In. direct confliet with Monroe v. Pape. 365 U.S. 180, 183, 81 S.Ct. 473, 480, 482.5 L.kd.2d 492. (5) In direct confliet with WeNvese v. Board of Educa- tion, : 2d 622 373 U.S. 668, 83 S.C t. 1433, 1435-1436, 1437 , 10 L.Ed (6) In direct and complete conflict: with: “The right to a hearing on the merits of a elaini over which the court has jurisdiction is of the essence of our judicial system, and the judge's feeling that the case is prebably frivolous does not justify by. passing that right.“ Marmon vy. Superior Court, 9 Cir., 307 F.2d 796, 798 (1962). ( Emphasis ‘added.4 B. ents werejot ‘under color of*’ law. This. rwiing. is in-/. The Court of Appeals imdjeates thai tlie respond direct confffet with other rulings. (1) lh direct conflict with Ev Parte Virginie, 100 US. 839, 346-847. 25 Ed. 676, 679. : (2) In direc™ conthiet - with’ Home Telephone & Teie graph Co. v. Las Angeles. 227 US. 208, 286, 55 S.Ct. 312,- 314,57 L.Rd. 510. Z | & (3) In direet conflict with Unites States vo Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326. 61.8.0. 1051, 1045, 85 Led. 1368. ry. 4 | * Byer (4) In direct conflict with Screws v. United States, 325 - US, 91, 108-118, 65 S.Ct. 1051, 1038-1041, 80 L.Ed. 1495. (5) In direet contlict with. W ihiams. enh waited. States, “BLU. 97, 99, 71 S.Ct. 276, 578, 95 L:Kd. 774, (6) In direct and complete ‘conflict with Monroe jv. “Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-172, 81 S.Ct. 473, 476, 5 Likd.2d 492. | . (7) In direct conflict with Marshall vy. Sawiye - y Cir., a 301 F.2d 639, 646 (1962). . aes (8) In direct conflict with Laldwin v; Mor ap Vi ir., 251 F. 2d 780, 788 (1958). / (9) ‘In’ direct conflict with Stringer vy. Dilge r, 10 Cir. 313 F.2d 536, 540 (1963). C.~The Court of Appeals indicates: that/the pe tition was not deprived of *‘any rights * ** sec ‘ured by the Con- stitution and laws * *-*.*’ (Appendix, AY ‘infra, page 27). This ruling is in direct conllit with otKer rulings. ’ (1) In direct conflict with: **In our. view Monroe vy Vape ‘announces the rule that an allegation ofmepurpose to discriminate or a purpose to deprive one of any: federal right, is not “esesnticl ta the statement of a chaim‘under Sec. 1983 predicated on an alleged violation of the due process “clause of the Fourteenth: Am ndment.”” Cohen v. Norris, 9 Cir.,°300 F.2d 24, 29 (-1962). (Jmphasis ° added). _ CONCLUSION. Bay the reasons above stated it is‘re Side ‘ttuliy subigitted that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari be granted. Respectfully submitted, PETER S. SARELAs, Petitioner, Pro Se. 5)”. APPENDIX A ce ° ea 7 ~~ Bited States Court of Appeals For - Sroenth Cirrnit No, 14011 SEPTEMBER T ERM, 1962 -\PRIL Session, 1963 » PETER S. SABELAs, . 1 Plainitf?-Appellant, Vv: i “ GEORGE S. VPortkos, Jous ©. GeEKAS, | ‘eritc ies Sar ALEXANDER, ANDREW jee Tron the Carvaras, THemis ANnacnosr, D- ee ae MOSTHENES |. GeorGotLis, DEme- r re s 1343, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 19835, 1Y8, 1988 26 - The basis of Sarelas’ suit is an earlier acffon in the Cirenit Court of Cook County. The Cireuit Court dis- “missed the conspiracy and defamation charges, | ‘and ‘en- tered summary judgment against Sarelas on an assault and battery charge. The Supreme Court of Illinois’ dis- inissed his appeal and the Supreme Court of the U nited States denied certiorari, 350 U.S. 904. The suit at bar-charges the fourteen defendants, thirteen of whom are Llinois attorneys, with conspiracy, while act- ing under color of Illinois law, to deprive plaintiff of due process and equal protection of the laws, in’ the Illinois Circuit ¢ ‘ourt action. The nub of the overt aets he charges, pursuant to the alleged conspiracy, is abuse of process in procuring, having certified and presenting to the Cireuit Court his depositions taken by virtue of a Cireuit Court order. Affidavits in support of defendants’ motiotis to dismiss and for summary judgment-state that the same claims of — irreguiarities and abuses in taking depositions were pre-_ sented to the Cireuit Court and passed upon by that court: and that the same claims were made to the Supreme Court of Hlineis and on petition for certiorari before the United States Supreme Court. These sworn statements were not denied hy Sarelas ir his counter -affidavit. Sarelay contends the District Court violated his con- stitutional rights in denying him a hearing and dismissing his suit without a motion to dis “miss + having been presented and without an inqurry. . Vue waseho genuine issue of faet before the District Conrt upon the Cirenit Court findings and judgment,. which are fal because plaintiff's appeal to the Supreme Court-of Ilhmeis was dismissed. Thus a question of law only was presented to the Distriet Vourt and the reeord shows the question was extensively briefed by plaintiff, j a tiff of ‘‘any rights , en. ae His motions were called for hearing and the District Court presumably was satisfied on the complaint, motions, affi- davity and briefs, that oral arguments were not ‘needed for decision. The judgment entered was based upon\mofions filed, and the exhaustive briefs, and we see no denial of hearing, or arbitrary action, under the circumstances, Rule 78 EURLCLD., Skolnick v. Martin, 0... F.2d (ith Cir. 1963). It is not important that plaintiff's and not\ de- fendants’ motions triggered the disposition of the case. There is no merit to the contention that the District Court denied plaintiff due process or equal protection of the law, so as to render the District Court judgment void. The vital‘question is whether the District Court erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action upon which reef can be granted under thie Civil Rights Acts. We think not: This ¢ourt dane recently held thit law yers participating ‘in private state court litigation do not act. nnder color of ‘state law within the meaning of the Federal Civil Rights Acts. Skolnick v. Martin, ........ F. 2d ..... _ (ith Cir. 1963). Moreover, taking the facts alleged in the complaint us true, there is no basis for an inference that the defendants, acting ‘under color of any’? state statute, deprived plain- * * * secured by the Constitution and laws * * * °° Whether there were violations of the Illinois Supreme Court rules on discovery procedure did not pre- sent a question of deprivation of ‘any rights * * * secured brit a “question of abuse of process. in the taking of. the depositions. ee ee by the Constitution and laws Por the vr A true Copy: Teste: ‘aeons aiven the nidgment is APFEIRMED. ° Clerk of the United States Court. of . Appeals for the Seventh Circuit: : \ \ a. = | APPENDIX B | _ “UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For The Seventh Circuit Chicago 10, Illinois ‘Tuesday, July 30, 1963 © ° _.._ Before ; -How. F. Ryan Durry, Circwt Judge ~ How. Wis. (i, Knocn, Circuit Judge Hox. Roar J. Kiev, Circuit Judge | | Peter S. SARELAS, moe: | , Plaintiff-Appellont, NG, Somes 0 OO, Vs. (iEORGE Ss. Porikos, ET Mn, . ‘¢ os Defendants- Appellees. ~ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division er e e am > ‘ "Phis cause came on to be heard on the transeript of the - record trom the United States District Court for the ' Northern District of Illinois; astern Division, and was argued by counsel. 4) consideration whereof, it is ordered and adjudged by this court that the judgment of the said District €ourt ini this Gause appealed trom be, and the same is hereby, AFFIRMED, with costs, in accordance with the opinjon of this Court filed, this day. 2 29 APPENDIX C_ U NITED & STATES COU RT OF AP V ALS ’ For the Seventh Circuit. — Chicago 10, Ilinois ” ¥ Wednesday, September 4; 1963 Before ; . _ Hon. F. Ryay Derry, Circuit Judge Hon. Win fi. Kyocnu, Circuit Judge Hoy. Roger J. Kitey, Circuit ‘Judge ~ : : o PETER S. SARELAS, ~~ Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 14011 ; Vs. ; _GEORGE S$. PoriKos, ET AL., a ‘ ‘ie mere Append from the United States District Court for the - Northern’ District ot ‘Illinois, Kastern Division. IT IS ORDERED) by ihe Court that the pefitiontos a rehearing of this cause be, and the same is“hereby, DENIED. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385601_1383%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.