# Appendices — Weinstein v. New York

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendices
- **Published:** January 1, 1963
- **Citation:** 373 U.S. 904

## Text

APPENDIX A.. .

BS ANE.
Unitep States Court or Apreats
/ For the Eighth Circuit.

No. 16,899

Beatrice Foods Co., Ap aaa from the
Appellant, United States Dis-

trict Court for the
District of Ne-
braska.

vs.

United States of America,
~ Appeilee.

{ January 2, 1963. |

Before Vax Oosternour and Buackmun, Cireuit Judges,’

and Henvey, District Judge.
Buackmun, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from the judgment entered upon a
jury verdict that the defendant Beatrice Foods Co. was
guilty of a conspiracy made illegal by $1, as amended, of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. $1.) A fine of $15,000 was
“imposed. coe

The indictment was returned in August 1958. It named
Beatrice, Roberts Dairy Company and Alamito Dairy
Company as defendants. All three defendants were en-
gaged in the dairy business in the Omaha-Council Bluffs
area. The indictment contained one count which charged
that from January 1954 to April 1957 the defendants, in

s

a

°

¢ 3 2 9S v
e s : @
violation of the Act, ‘“have engaged in a combination and
conspiracy to eliminate and suppress competition in the

sale of milk and cream"’ to the United States Veterans —
Administration Hospital in Omaha and to the United
_ States Offutt Air Force Base near that city. Some of the

specific features of the charge are quoted in the margin.’

Roberts and Alamito submitted’ pleas of nolo contendere:
These were eventually accepted by‘the court. Those two
defendants were. then adjudged guilty and a fine of $5,000
was imposed dpon each of them.

Beatrice, the remaining defendant, moved, pursuant fo
Rule 6(b)(2), F.R.Cr.P., to dismiss the indictment for.the
reason that the grand jury which returned it ‘‘was drawn
from a jury list whieh was ‘not properly or lawfully
selected’’. After a hearing ‘this motion w aus denied. Bea-
trice then entered a plea of not guilty. On the. basis
of an “affidavit of one of its attorneys Beatrice ates moved

1 9 ‘The aforesaid combination and conspiracy Vv han’ ‘consiated of

a

a continuing agreement, understanding, and concert of action ,

among the defendants the substantial terms of which were :

(a) To fix and establish non-competitive prives and dis:
orn for milk and eream>sold and distributed to the Offutt
AF 6

(b) To fix and establish non-competitive prices and dis-
counts for milk and cream sold and distributed by the defend-
ants to the Veterans Hospital ;

(c) To allocate to the defendant Roberts, the bid,contract
business of supplying milk and cream to the Veterans
Hospital ;

(d) To alternately allocate fo the defendants Alaito and
Beatrice the bid contract business of supplying milk and cream
to the Offutt AFB.

* % ° . .

‘*The combination and conspiracy alleged in this indictment has
had, among other things, the following effects:

(a) Prices paid by the Veterans Hospital and Offutt AFB
for milk and cream have been artificially fixed at high) and
seaduaeadiades levels; * * *

(f) Competition among defendants in the sale of milk and
cream to the Offutt AFB and the Veterans Hospital has \been
substantially lessened and eliminated.”’

#

: 29

to quash the indictment “because the indicting grand
jury's sessions and déliberations were tainted and defend-
ant was prejudiced by repeated acts of misconduct by the
United States attoriveys before said jury”’.

_ The case proceeded to trial. At the close of the govern-
ment’s evidence, Beatrice moved for a judgment of ac-
quittal and rested. The adverse verdict was returned and -
judgment was critered. Beatrice then renewed its motions
for dismissal of the indietment and for judgment of ac-
quittalang asked in the alternative for a new trial. These, -
motions were all denied, :

_. The defege urges here (1) impraper se ‘ection of the
grand jury: (2) misconduct off government counsel befere
the grand jury; CT) insufficiency of the evidence ; (4). error
in the reception of evidence, and (5) error in the dnstrue-
tions, We examine these points in turn and recite the
pertinent faets as each is considered.

OW The challenge to the qrand jury array. The govern-
ing statutes;are 28 U.S.CLA, s$ 1861 and 1864. The former?
prescribes as qualifigations for both grand and petit jurors
(ay United States citizenship; (b) attained age of 21
‘years; (@) one year’s residence within the judicial dis->
triet; (d) absence of a criminal record of the kind de-
seribed in if statute; (e) ability te read, write, speak and
eunderstand Rnglish; aml (f) mental and physical capacity

2 § 1861. Qualifications of Federal jurors u

Any citizen of the United States who has attained the age of
twenty one*years and who bas resided for a period of one year
within the judicial district, is competent to serve as a grand or
petit juror unless—

(1) He has been convieted in a State or Federal court of record
of a crime punjshable by imprisonment for more than one year and
his civil right ave not been restored by pardon on amnesty.

(2) He is unable to-read, write. speak, and tinderstand the
English language.

(\) Tle is ineapable, by reason of mental or physical infirmities

to render efficient jury service. .

30 v , 4

to render efficient jury service. This section was given
its present form on September 9, 1957, by the Civil Rights
Act of 1957, Pub. L..85-315, Part V, § 152, 71 Stat. 634, 638.
Theretofore, the. statute had required only residence in
the district, rather .than at least -one year’s residence
there, and had also provided that one who was -incom-
petent to serve as a juror by the law of the state where
the federal court sat was also incompetent to serve as a
federal juror.” Seats e

Section 1864° prov hies that ‘the names of grand jurors
shall{ be drawn from a box containing the names of not
less than 300 then qualified persons and that the bok shall
be refilled from time to time by the clerk of the t and
a jury commissioner having prescribed qualificatibrt.

Beatrice's position is that § 1864 is mandatory and re-
quires the clerk and the commissioner to place the names
of 300 or more qualified persons in thé box; that this |
duty of selection may not be delegated; that the proce-
dure the clerk followed in selecting names for this grand
jury did not meet the statutory requirements ; and ‘that
Beatrice need not. demonstrate individual prejudice to it
by the selection procedures employed.

At the hearing on the motioti to dismiss the indictment
the following facts were dev eloped and 3 are not i in dispute:

3. § 1864, Manner of drawing jury commissioners and their

com neation

e names of grand ond petit jurors shall be publiely drawn
from a box containing the names of not less than three hundred
qualified persons at the time of each drawing.

The jury box shall from time to time be refilled by the clerk of
court, of his deputy, and 4 jury commissioner, appointed by the
court.

e : @ ° ° -e ‘°

The jury commissioner and the clerk, or his deputy, shall alter-.
nately{place one name in the jury box without reference to party
affiliations, until the box shall contain at least’ 300) names or such
larger number as the court determines. :

e . . “@ e

?

31

Mary A. Mullin was the clerk. She served in that

capacity sinee 1939. The jury commissioner was G. V.
Middleton. He was appointed in 1955. He died in July

1958. The. court’s order, for the grand jury was issued on “

October (23, 1957, only one month and two weeksxafter

$1861 was amended. The jury was drawn en 2 era
. 6, was empaneled the following February, was excused for
‘a time, and was reconvened in August 1958 when the in-
dictment of the three defendants was returned.

Miss Mullin, sinceaher Appointment as clerk, main-
tained a list of . jurors, She kept this ‘‘r
vised constantly’’. Names and addresses wére said oh on

cards. Names of. women were on blue cards and those of *
men were on white cards. Middleton maintained his own _

card record. His was separate and apart from the clerk's
and was not under his direction or supervision.. His cards
were orange. Miss Mullin had ne knowledge as to how
Middleton obtained his names. When this grand jury was
empaneled Miss Mullin placed not less than 150 of her
cards in the box and Middleton placed not less than. 150
of his cards there. The clerk and ‘Middleton did this by
placing cards one ata time alternately in the box. Miss
Mullin testified that’ she apportioned blue cards and white
cards consistently but that she had no idea as to the pro-
portion of the one group to the other.

The clerk employed t) ¢ sponsor'system practice of send-
ing to certain persons4n, the district requests for. recom-
“mendations of prospective federal jurors. The form she
used for this purpose quoted § 1871 in full. Tt provided
choices for names of*men or of women or. of both men and
women; upon any particular use of this form she crossed
out two of these three alternatives. She in fact requested
names of persons of both sexes from time to time. On at
least one occasion she used the form to ask for names of
colored men.

\

| 32 ee
ae pe r) por

When Miss Mullin received recommendations from her
sources she clfecked the names submitted against her ex-
isting list. She then sent a mimeographed questionnaire
to each person whose name was not already on her. list.
She did not add a name to the list upon its mere presenta-
(tion by a-sponsor. ° ‘

,The questionnaires were of two types. Each bore the
name of the clerk and advised ‘the recipient that he was
a prospective federal juror. Each asked his age, oceupa-
tion and address, and whethet? he was a voter. One type,
the older, asked whether " was a federal employee. The
other asked the name of his employer and whether he
owned.zeal estate ip his owi diame. Miss Mullin conducted
no personal interview with any prospectis ‘© juror.

There was no evidwnee presented as toghow the names
on Middleton's list were sefected.

It ix important to note that Beatrice does not attack the
indictment on the grounds (a) that any paptieular person
~%n this grand jury was in any way not ualified, or (1)

that the required, numbe® of names were not in the jury

box, or (¢) that the ,jury was not representative of the.
‘community in that an eligible group had.been excluded in
its selection, See, as to this last factor, Thiel v. Southern

Pacifié Co. 1946, 328 U. S. 217, 220; Ballard vy. United

States 1946, 3829 U.S. 187, 195; Hoyt v. Florida 1961, 368

U. S. 57. 59: Smith v. Teras 1940, 311 U.S. 128: Neither

has Beatrice suggested or offered to prove individual
prejudice to it as a defenaant. ry

‘The attack, instead ts directed to claimed deficiencies in
“ie thechanics of the selective, process. Ft is argued that
the letters to the sponsors and the questionnaires ‘‘do
not begin to provide sufficient infér mation to determine
whether or not that person i qualified to act as a federal

juror under® ¢ 1861, particularly with respect.to the Eng-
: .

33
' lish language Tequirement, criminal record, infirmities, and
the one year residence newly preseribed by the 1957
amendment. It is then said that the record clearly estab.
dishes that Miss* Mullin did not know whether the ‘names
she placed in the bex were those of qualified persons, that
“this is a breach of ‘statutory duty, and that it is fatal to

the indictment. a4 os.

It was suggested long axe that the placing of names of
qualified — the ag box is mandatory, United
States v. Chaires, C) C. XN. D. Fla., 1889, 40° F. 820, 821.
Since then, some courts aa specifically so héld. United
States v. Silverman, D. Conn., 1955, 129 F. Supp, 496, 511;
United States v. Brandt, XN... Ohio, 1955, 139 F. Supp. 362,
365. It has been said, too, that’ éhe duty ‘pf selection can-
not be delegated by jury officials. Glasser ve United States
_ 1942, 315 U. S. 60, 85. However, a has prescribed
no particular method of jury esclection. ‘The choice of the
means * * * rests largely in the sound discretion of the
trial courts and their, officers’* under ‘the guidance of the
pertinent statutes. Thiel v. Southern ‘Pacific Co, supra,
pp. 220-21 of 828 U.S.; Glasser vy. United States, supra,
p. 86 of 315 U.S. oT i ‘re is a prestimption that the jury
officials have discharged their duties properly. Poltafico
-y. United States, 6 Cir, 1956, 237 F. 2d 97, 110. cert. den.
352 U.S. 1025; United States v. Fujimoto, D. Hawaii 1952,
105 F. Supp. 727, 729. When the defense elaims the-exist-
ence of a fatal flaw in the selection process it Has the bur-
den of overcoming that presumption.’ Pradier v. United
States 1948, 335 U.S. 497, 508; United States v. Sil tei
supra,,p. 511 of 129 F. Supp.: Walker v. United States
Cir. 1937, 93 F. 2d 383, 392, cert den. 202 U, Sb44; . y
- vy. Henslee, 8 Cir., 1961, IST F.2d 986, 942, cert. den, 368
_U.S. 871,

Accepting all this, we are not persuaded by Beatrice’s
challenge to the array: :

¥

~

: 34

(a) When the jury officials themselves are the ones who
ultimately determine a juror’s qualification, the sponsor
system is not in itseif an invalidating factor. Walker v.
United States, supra, p.'391 of 93 F. 2d, where this court
said that this ‘‘was not a delegation, but a discharge of
duty”’; United States v. oe nnis, 2 Cir., 1950, 183 F. 2d 201,
216-24, affirmed 341 U. S. 494; Padgett v. Buxton-Smith .
peremntee Co., 10 Cir., 1960, 283 F. 2d 597, 598, cert. den.
365 U.S. 828; United States v. Silverman, supra, p. 510 of
129 F. Supp.; United States v. Silverman, D. Conn., 1999,
132 F. Supp. 820, 823-27; United States v.. Romano, D,
Conn., 1961, 191 F. Supp. 772; United States v. Brandt,
ND. Ohie, 1945, 139 F. Supp. 349, 360; United States v.
Hoffa, S. D. Fla. 1952, 205 F. Supp. 710, 719-20. Here a
sponsor’s recommeidation was not-the solé feature of the
selection process. It- was coupled as to each prospect
with a questionnaire directad to most of the qualifications
specified by the statute. Although certain of. the requests
to sponsors were limited as to sex, the requests, taken as
a group, were fot so limited and the one requesting names
of Negro males was sent to a deputy federal court clerk
who was himself a Negro and who reasonably might, he
expected to possess usefully wide acquaintanceship with
othegs of his race. Also, the law docs not contemplate
that the jury officials be personally acquainted with each
prospective juror. Walker v. United States, sapra,’p. 391
of 93 F. 2d.

(b) The fact that the clerk and, the jury commissioner
maintained separate lists does not seem to us to disqualify
the panel. We find nothing in § 1864 w hich requires that
both jury officials pass upon the ‘cualiteations of each pro-
spective juror‘even though it obviously is desirable that
they do so. The policy of the statute is that the jury box
be refilled by both acting alternately. It does not appear
to go so far.as to require agreement upon each name.

- ae eae )

4

-

Compare United States vy, Clancy, 7 © ir., 1960, 276 F; 2d
617; 625, reversed on other grounds, 360 U.S, 3, Local.
36 ete. vy. United States, 9 Cir, 1949, 170 PF. Pd 320, 341,
cert. den, 389°U ‘S. 947.

(c) The questionnaires employed were not i as desirably
complete as they might have been. They did not inqtire,
for example, as to a prospect's fluency 1 1 English, as to
his ‘criminal reeord and as to his me eo ‘and physical
' capacities. Yet they did advise him of the purpose of the
questionnaire itself:and they did inquire as ‘to his being a
voter. The filling out of the form and its return would |

result in some indication of the prospect's language abil-
ity and of his infirmities. Voting status under Nebraska _
law would presumably show United States citizenship, at
least six mowfhs’ residence in the ee R.R.S, Neb.
1943 $°32-102, and something as to erlminai record, RRS :
Neb, §§ 29-112 and 29-102. The information requested as
to age, occupation and employer is not completely unre-
‘vealing as to capacity. Furthermore, the leHer to each
sponsor quoted § 1861. The sponsor therefore knew ex-
actly what was required for those he wis to recommend
as prospective jurors. We are not free to presume that he
ignored these requirements.

(d) It is evident, a8 Beatrice urges, thitt the question-
naires were not so complete or so helptully informative as
the one given as an xample in the September 1960 Re-
port of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Opera-
tion of the Jury System, 26 F.R.D. 409, 507-08. Bunt such
deficiencies as they possessed were largely overcome by
the answers which ,were necessarily foytheoming, by the
natural tendency to make one’s physical infirmities known,
and by the court’s own authority to, excuse unqualified
prospective jurors. United States v. Brandt, supra, p. 365°
of 139 F. Supp. The 1960 Report itself states that its sug:

al 3

r

36

-» gested questionnaire *‘need not be rigidly adhered to”’. 26

F.R.D. 436.2 ™

(e) Nor do we think the fact that the box may have con-
tained names which were on the jury officials’ respective
lists pridr to the 1957 amenetuent imposing the one-year
residence requirement is fatal. See Glasser ¥. United
States, supra, p. 65 of 315 U.S. Compare United States
v. Dennis, supra, pp. 217-18 of 188 F. 2d; United States v.
Flynn, 2 Cir., 1954, 216 F. 2d 354, 385, cert. den. 348 U.S.
909. This jury was drawn less than two months after that
amendment. And the evidence does not disclose: that the
residency requirement was not met as to® ‘these. grand
jurors. See United States v. Austrew, D.. Md., 1961, 190
F. Supp. 632, 634.

(f) We do not regard United States v. Silverman, supra,
“429 F, Supp. 496, and United States v. Brandt, supra, 139
F. -Supp. 362, "as opposing authority. In Sidrerman the

request to sponsors gave no information whatever as to
the statutory qualificationss and the questionnaires em-
ployed were sent outt only after the drawing. Thus there
was no determination by the jury officials theinselves of
the qualifications of the prospects. Compare the disposi-
tion of the second challenge in United States v. Silverman,

supra, pp. 823-27 of 132 F. Supp. In Brandt the challenge ~ .

to the array was not successful.

(g) The facts here fall far short of the more material
situation where an entire cohesive group is exeluded in
the jury selection process. There the jury system itself
is threatened and asa consequence prejudice to the par-
ticular defendant need not be demonstrated. Thiel vy.
Southern Pacific Co., supra, pp. 220-21 and 225 of #28
U.S.; Ballard v. United States, supra, p. 195 of 329 U.S.

(h) Although perfection in jury selection is of course
desired, it is too much to expect that the sy stem in every

37.

federal judicial district will be conducted and will operate
with the -precision of a fine timepiece. Perfect. perform-
ance is not required. United States v. Brandt, supra, p.
360 of 189 F.Supp. This js why we have the matty safe-
guards consisting of the use of the box itself, the drawing
of names from it, the large number of names required,
and the like. At the very niost, there were mere irregu-_
larities in the selection. of the grand jury which indicted
Beatrice and its codefendants. In the absénce of indivi-
dual prejudice to the defendant, these do not justify dis-
miss@l of the indictment. | Agnew v. United States, 1897,
165 U.S. a6, 44: Young v. United States, D.C. Cir. 1994,
212 FL 2d 286, 258-39 and footne te 5, cert. den, 347 U.S.
1015. See Frazier v. United States, supra, p. 503-04 of
339 US. Compare United States v. Greenberg, S.D. N.Y.
1961, 200 F, Supp 382, 387. We equate this feature of this
case owith the situations involved in ‘United States v.
Clancy, 7 Cir. 1960, 276 F. 2d 617, 625, 631-32, reversed on
other grounds, 365 U.S. 312; United States v. Dennis,
‘supra, 2 Cir.p 1950, 183 F. 2d 201; Local 36, ete., v. United
States, supra, & Cir, 1949, 177 F. 2d 320, 341; Abdul v.
United States, 0 Cir, 1960, 278 Fs 2d 234, 235, eert. den:
364 U.S. 832; Romney vy. United States, D.C. Cir. 1948,
167 F. 2d 521, 527. cert. den. 334 U.S. 847; Padgett v.
Burton-Smith Mercantile Co,, supra, 10 Cir. 1960, 283 F.
Md JOT, 599, See Brookman v. United States, & Cir., 1925,
8 F.2d 803, 806-07; Gaughan vy. United States, 8 Cir., 1927,
19 F. 2d 897,.898-99. Compare Walker v. United States,
supra, p. 891 of 93 F. 2d.

We note, incidentally, that the Nebraska jury selection
system employed by this clerk and this jury commissioner
was carefully reviewed once before and was upheld by
Chief District Judge Delehant in an unreported memo-
randum filed September 24, 1956, in) United States v.
Brown, reversed on other grounds, 8 Cir., 1957, 245 F. 2d

™~

d

¢ ,
38 “RO \Aakerasas ADM

-
549. We, tgo, conclude that the system was not disquali-

fying and that the challenge to the array must fail.

2. Misconduct of government counsel before the grand
jury. On the day the.trial was to begin, more than thirty-
two months after the the return of the indictment, Beatrice

™ moved thit the grand jury minutes le produced for in
spection by the defense and the court and that the indict-
ment be dismissed because of misconduct of non-local gov
ernment attorneys before the grand jury. This motion
was supported by an affidavit of ene of the attorneys for
Beatrice to the effect that, immediately following their
appearance hefore the grand jury in T9908, three witnesses,
all agents or employees of Reberts, recorded on tape what
had transpired before the viland jury and that the tape
reflects instances of belligerency toward these witnesses,
accusations of lying, threats of prosecution for perjury,,
and assertions of the very matter under consideration by
the grand jury. In denying this motion and its renewal

‘after judgment the court stated that government counsel
had produced -the grand jury transeript ‘and the Court
having carefully read and studied the entire Grand Jury
transeript in camera, finds that the allegations contained
in the affidavit * * * are not supported by the record and
therefore are without foundation and should be over:
ruled”’. ;

’

Beatrice argues here that the affidavit staads aneontra
dicted in the record: that the conduct of government conn
sel was an abuse of the limited function of the prosecutor
before the grand jury; that Beatrice was thereby deprived .
of its right to a fair and unprejudiced investigation: and
that the paucity of evidence at the trial convineingly dem-
onstrates that the indictment was returned because of

» prosecutorial compulsion rather than because of the force
of the evidence. This court indicated at the oral arguinent, |
that it would eall up the grand jury transcript for its

own in camera examination, Défense counsel since then
have suggested that the same constitutional infirmities
cattach to appellate inspection as to district court review,
Grand jury proceedings, of course, have long enjoyed a
character almost sacrosanct. ‘Grand jury testimony is
ordinarily confidential’. United States vo Socony-Vacuun
Oi Co. W840, S10 Tog. 150, 283. But the Supreme Court
in that case alse said. pe 24, that ‘tafter the grand jury's
funetions are ended, diselosure is wholly proper where
thefends of justice require it’. This is specifieally recog
rized hy Haake te), BR CrP. ~~
— Phis stindispensible secreey of vrand jury proceedings"
us Mr Justice Frankfurter has typified it in United States

V. Johnson, WAS. ST UUS. a08, O18,
“onust net be broken except where there is a com-
pelling necessity. There are instances when that need
Will outweieh the countervailing poliey. But) they
toust he shown with partiGularity '. (sated States v.
Procter d Gamble Co, 1998, 256 US. 677, O82.

“And in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co, v. United States, 1959,
SHG TES. 295, S96, 399400, the Supreme Court has teld us
that, moder Rule Ge). inspeetion of the grand jure min-
utes has been committed to the sound discretion of the
trial judwet’: that the defense does not have a‘ richt"” to
grand jury minutes; and thatinstead it has the burden te-
show ‘ta particnlarized need ™ whick a the pol-
eve Of seereev So

No case preeisely in point here has been cited to us.
Most have applied the Pittsburgh Plate Glass standard to
Situations of alleged or suspected diserepaney between a
Witness’ testimony at the trial and that before the grand
jury. See, for example, Berry v. United States, 8 Cir.,
TOGL, 205 BF. 2d 192, 194-95, cert, den, 368 0, S. 955° Travis
v. United States, 10 Cir, 1959, 269 F.2d O28, 945-46, re-

,

CD

-

. 40

versed on other grounds 364 U.S. 631. General allegations
usually have been frowned upon. United States v. Coduto,:
7 Cir, 1960, 284 F. 2d 464, 468, cert. den. 365 U.S. 881;
Ogden v. United States, 9 Cir., 1962, 308 F. 2d 724, 741-42.
In camera inspection by the trial court has been suggested,
see Brilliant v. United States, 8 Cir., 1962, 297 F. 2d 3835,
391, cert. den. 369 U.S. 871, ahd in some cases has been
employed within limits and not disapproved. - The Second
Cireuit seems to have gone so far as to require in camera
inspection of at least a portion of the grand jury minutes
whenever a suggestion has been made as to discregmney.
United States v. Hernandez, 1960, 282 F. 2d 71; 1961, 290
F. 2d 86, 88-89; United States v. Giampa, 1961, 290 F. 2d 838,
85. Other courts, including our own, have recognized the
drawbacks of routinely. compelling trial judges to indulge |:

such inspection and have upheld, as a non-abused dis-
cretionary matter, “a trial court’s refusal to inspect the
grand jury transcript. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v.
United States, + Cir, 1958, 260 F. 2d 397, 404, affirmed,
supra, 360 U.S. 395; Berry v. United States, supra; Bril-
liant v. United States, supra; Hance v. United States, 8
Cir., 1962, 299 F. 2d 389, 398; Banks v. United States, 8
Gir., 1953, 204 F. 2d 666, 669-70, cert. granted and case re-
manded on other grounds, 348 U.S. 905; Traris v. United
States, supra.

In the present case are a number of facts; each perhaps
of no great significance when constdered alone, which seem
in the aggregate at least to afford a tone to this demand ?
from the defense: (a} The motion was presented to the
court more than two and one-half years after the indict-
ment was returned despite the fact that the affidavit al-
leged that the recorded statements were made immediately
following the witnesses* appearance before the grand jury.
We are not saying, that the motion was untimely for it
was made befere trial as required by Rule 12(b)(2).

. 41

(b) The supporting affidavit was that of counsel and was
sworn to on the day of the trial. No supporting affidavit
from any of the three witnesses was presented. (c) The
Witnesses in question were only three of many which ap-
peared Nefore the grand jury. (d) The witnesses were
agents or employees of Roberts, one-of—the defendants
under consideration. (e) The affidavit itself indicates that
recorded statements were taken from other witnesses but
it ‘contains no similar reference to ansegh thew (f) One
of the three witnesses testified at the triWt

Under these circumstances we cannot say that the de-
fense has established a particularized need for the grand
jury transcript. There is authority to the effect that a
prosecutor, while before the grand jury, may not partici-
pate in its deliberations or express opinions on questions
of fact or attempt to, influence the finding. See, for ex-
ample, United States vy. Wells, D. Idaho, 1908, 163 F. 313,
425-26. But the courts generally have been most cautious
in ‘iyvalidating indictments for alleged grand jury miscon-
duct of the prosecutor. See McKinney v. United States,
& Cir, 1912, 199 F. 25, 28-29; United States vy, Rintelen,
S.D. N.Y... 1916, 235 F. 787, 794-95. ) :

Nor is it effective or significant to say that the attor-
ney’s affidavit stands alone and uncontradicted in’ the
record, The burden is on the defense. The situation is:
not unlike that in Glasser v. United States, supra, where
the Supreme Court said, p. 87 of 315 U.S., ‘the formal
_affidavif alone, even though uncontroverted, is not enough.”’

&

We recognize that this is a situation where the tradi-
tional reasons for grand jury secrecy (see, fer example,
United States v Rose, 3 Cir., 1954, 915 F. 2d 617, 628-29, 8
Wiemore, Evidence (MeNaughton Revision 1961), § 2360),
may have little application. But there is a strong pre-
sumption of regularity accorded to the findings of a grand

6

{9

a

42

jury. United States v. Nunan, 2 Cir., 1956, 236 F. 2d 576,

594, cert. den. 353 U. S. 912. The ‘tends of justice’? are

the guide. We do.not see in the allegations of this affidavit
anything which suggests that the ends of justice require
that the whole or any .part of this transcript. be made
available to the defendant. It follows that the trial court
would not have abused its discretion had it refused to
examine ‘the grand jury minutes. It follows further that
there can then be no error in the district court’s inspection

of the transcript in camera and’in its subsequent denial.

of the defense motion, and that this does not constitute,
as Beatrice suggests, a secret reception of evidence or a

‘denial of due process or a deprival ‘of the confrontation .

guaranty of the Sixth Amendment. It will afford the de-
fense little comfort, perhaps, when we say, for what it is
worth, that we, too, have carefully read the 1,100 pages of
the grand jury transcript. We find nothing in those pro-

ceedings which, in view of the antitrust character of this,

ease, is prejudicially offensive to the ends of justice... On
the basis of that inspection, also, we conclude that. the
trial court’s denial of Beatrice’s motion was not ancabuse
of diseretion. The fact we have done so in this case is not
to & taken as a precedent for thus burdening any court

‘or as a holding. on our part that a review of this kind is

necessary or even indicated in all cases,

Compare, generally, on this point, . Fitts v. Superior
Court, 1935, 4 Cal. 2d 514, 51 P. 2d 66, 70-71; United States
v. Greenberg, S.D. N.Y., 1962, 204 F. Supp. 400; United
States v. Kahaner, S.D. N.Y., 1962, 204 F. Supp. 921.

3. The sufficiency of the evidence. Because of the im-

portance of this issue and the’emphasis given it by the de-
fense, we review the evidence in detail. At the trial the
government introduced a number of exhibits including:
compiled charts. This documentary material disclosed the
following:

o

48
~
(a) The three years preceding April 1954. The Veterans

Hospital opened in early 1951. For ten bid periods all
three defendants submitted offers. Alamito received the
Hospital contract four times, twice at no discount from the
wholesale list price, once at 3%, and one at 10) ;
Beatrice obtained the contract four times, .onee at 1%
discount, once at 4)47, and twice at 5% ; and Roberts re-
ceived the contract twice, onée at 1% discount and once
at 267. On one occasion Beatrice offered a bid of 73%
discount but was outbid by Alamito. For the eight bid
periods at the Air Force Base, “Alamito received the con-
tract twice with no discounts, Roberts received it twice at
zero and 3.966, respectively, and Beatrice received it four
times, twice at 24%, onee at 34%, and once at 5%

(b) April 1954 to early'1957. During this period all con-
- tracts for both the Hospital and the Base were awarded
at a flat 2% discount, with one exception at the Hospital
when. an alternate of 14 discount for six monthsg rather
than 20) for twelve months, was accepted. Each of the
«lefendants won contracts at this level. Roberts was al-
ways the successful bidder at the Hospital during eight,
consegntive bid periods, with Alamita and Beatrice either
not bidding or bidding at zero or 1@ discount. At the
Base Alamito and Beatrice were alternately successful at
9°; + Roberts consistently submitted a bid at no discount;
Beatrice and Alemito, when losing the Base contract, did
so on bids ranging from zero to 14%.

(e) The period after early 1957. At the Hospifal Alamito
obtained the business at 25% discount for the period begin-
ning July 1, 1957; on July 1, 1958, Beatrice gained it at
5% + on Octaber 1, 1958, Roberts acquired it at 10%.” At.
tlie Base, for the’six month period beginning June 1, 1957,
Roberts obtained the contract for milk if gallons at about
So discount: for the six month period begitfhing Decem-

vd

44

ber 1, 1957, Beatrice gained the gallon contract at about
4% ; and for the next succeeding period both Beatrice and
Alamito submitted gallon bids at about 5% discount.

The government's gase also included the following: (a)
Evidence as to the Wids submitted by the three defendants
and others to the University of Nebraska Hospital and to
the Creighton Memorial St. Joseph's Hospital, loth in
Omaha, during the period of the alleged conspiracy. This
showed variations in bidding by the three defendants and
offers of discounts from zero up to 15%. (b) Testimony
of Lewis Klesath, former manager of Beatrf€e’s Council
Blaffs plant, to the effect that in 1956, during the indict-
ment period, he received calls from officials of Roberts and
Alamito a week'or so in advance of contemplated changes
in wholesale list prices in the area and \that he discussed
those, price changes ain] their effective dates with them.
Area prices, of. course, were the base points from which
bid discounts were measured.

It is axiomatic by iow that on an appeal from a convic-
tion it. is not forts to weigh the evidence ‘‘but only to
consider whether the evidence in its most favorable aspect
‘to the Government is legally capable of allowing a juty to
become persuaded of guilt.’’ Phelps ‘v. United States, 8
‘Cir. 1947, 160 F. 2d 858, 868, cert. den. sub. nom. Peters v.
United States, 334 U.S. 860; Glasser ¢. Unitek States,
“supra, 315 U.S. 60, 80; Blanner vo U nited States, sc ir.,
1961, 293 F. 2d 723, 725, cert. den. 368 U.S. 931; Isaacs v.
United States, 8 Cir., 1968, 301 F. 2d 706, 727, cert.-den.
371 U.S. 818. -Participation in a criminal conspiracy may
be shown by circumstantial evidence as well as by direct
evidence. Delli Paoli v. U nited States, 1957, 352 U.S. 232,
- 9360. footnote 4; Blume nthal v. United States, 1947, 332
U.S. 539, 557; . Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 1943, 319
US. 703. Of course, declarations of a conspirator are ad-

e

missible over the objections of an alleged co-conspirator
who was not present when they were made, only if there
is proof aliunde that he is connect ted with the conspiracy,
Glasser v. United States, supra, p. 74 of 315 US.; Tingle
v. United States, 8 Cir, 1930, 38 F. 2d 573, 575.

The government emphasizes and argues (a) that during
the three years preceding the indictment period each of
the three defendants had some share of the fluid milk
business at both the Base and the Hospital; (b) that vig
orous competition had been present during that period with

@ resulting bids varying from zero yp to 1o% discount and
with the last accepted bids at both the Base and the Hos-
pital at 5% and both possessed by Beatrice; (¢) that about
March 1954 a dramatic und complete-change in_the bid
pattern took place, and genuine competition came to an
end; (d) that at the Hospital Beatrice did not renew its
immediately preceding successful 50 bid and, with one
exception, never offered any discount there; (e) that
Alamito offered no discount to the Hospital although, be
fore, it had submitted discount offers up to 10g; (8)
that Roberts received the Hospital business exclusively for
the three and one-quarter year period at a uniform 2
discount; (g) that this was in contrast with Roberts* inter
mittent success in the preceding three years; (h) that
Alamito, being a ‘‘small business,’ could have obtained
any contract with only an equal bid but did not) submit
such a bid; (i) that at the Base Roberts did not reoffer its

- previously successful 3.960 bid and offered no discount
at all; (j) that Beatrice did not repeat its last successful
3% bid there; (k) that Alamite and Beatrice got the Base
business at a uniform 2% diseount;. (1) that it came te
them in almost perfect rotation; (m) that the 2% discount
at the Base was the first ever offered there by Alamito;
(ni) that after the indictment period there was a sudden ,
reversion to the original competitive practices as illus.

-
trated by Roberts’ submitting bids at the Base ranging
from zero.to 8%, by Beatrice*s getting ‘the gallon contract
there for one period ‘at 4%, by 5% bids being offered. by
both Alamito and Beatrice for the succeeding peridd, and
by successful bids by Alamito, Beatrice and Roberts, re-
spectively at 24%, 9 5%, and 10%, all in contrast .to the
uniform 2% prevailin /theretofore ; and (0) that this
documentary proof is buttressed by the Klesath testimony
and by.the naan) carci at the two Omaha community:
hospitals.

The government further argues that for the last bid
‘period before the indictment period the Base volume was
about twice that of the Hospital; that, with Beatrice and
_ Alamito sharing the Base equally and with Roberts having
‘the Hospital exclfgively, the total business was thus
divided equally three ways; that the bid pattern at the
Base and the Hospital at a uniform winning figure of 2%
was obviously unnatural as show by the ntrasting pat-
tern at the University and Creighton hosRitale 3 in which
the defendants participated; that the record contained no
evidence of a ‘‘moral call of community charities for favor-
able prices,’’ as. Beatrice would typify it, with respect to
the two latter hospitals which would account for the bid -
pattern differences; that there was widely disparate bid-
‘ding at the Base and at the Hospital, both before and
after the indictment period; and that it follows that there
was concerted action to fix prices at the two government
institutions during the period in question and to ajlocate
the business there among the three dairies.

Beatrice argues (a) that there is direct evidence against
the existence ef any conspiracy; (b) that there was no
Alamito witness adverse to Beatrice but only one who
said he did not know what the other dairies were going
~' to do; (c) that there was no Roberts witness adverse to

Wid

Beatrice for the Roberts witness testified that her com-
‘pany determined its bids without consultation with
Beatrice; (d) that the Alamito and Roberts witnesses de-
~nied-the existence of the conspiracy ‘and, inasmuch as they
were called by the prosecution, the government is bound
by their testimony; (¢) that the Hospital purchasing de-
partment witness Admitted that, so far as he knew,
’ Beatrice had to do* only with its own bids; (f) that the
“only direct evidence against Beatrice was inadmissible
hearsay; (g) that Roberts’ refusal to offer a discount at
the Base from March 1954 on arose out of ff8 dispute with
the Air Force over the latter’s: taking unwarranted dis-
counts for late cash payments; (h) that Roberts did con-
tinue to bid discounts ac the Hospital; (i) that Roberts
never had bid more than 2%, the 3.96% for one period at
the Base being 2% plus a 2% cash prompt payment dis-
count thereon; (j) that it was the uniformity of price
which the defendants had to pay for raw milk, as required
by a federal milk marketing order, which lajd the founda-
tion for identical wholesale prices in the area; (k) that
- the 2% discount figure was not new in 1954 but had ap- ,
peared in 1952 and°1953 and captured: the business; (1)
that bids were publi¢ly opened and each bidder therefore
knew what the others had offered at preceding bid periods;
(m) that Alamito, in contrast to Roberts and Beatrice,
needed only to meet» the bids of the others in order to get
the business; (n) that the total dollar volume of the Base
and the Hospital from January 1954 to April 1997 was
not divided equally among the three defendants but went
37.7% to Beatrice, 19.8% to Roberts, 40.1% to Alamito
and 2.4% to another dairy; 4 (0) that evidggice of the

4. The wov ernment re plies that these figures find no support in
the record and that any percentage for the hon-defendant dairy is
attributable to cottage cheese, a commodity not specified in the
indictment and not included in the compilation of the gove rnment 's
opposing figures.

48

bidding transactions with the University and Creighton
hospitals has fie~Significance because it was nof demon-
strated that they presented comparable situations as to
cost elements and the like, because there was advertising

-value in being the official datry at a well-patronized general

hospital, and because there was a duty to provide favor-
able prices to community charities ;.(p) that there-was no
proof that the bids at the Base and the Hospital were not
independently prepared or were not the product of inde-
pendent judgments of different businessmen; (q) that the

. bids reflected good business judgments independently ar-

rived at; (r) that the Klesath testimony was immaterial
and, in any event, established nothing more than ex-
changes of information about the Omaha market generally ;
(s) that the government concedes the absence of a con-
spiracy before 1954 and yet there are-instances of iden-
tical bids by all three defendants during that earlier time ;
(t) that the post- conspiracy period reflects similar in-
stances and yet the government concedes no conspiracy
then existed; ‘(u) that the trial degenerated into a mass
of extraneous evidence; (v) that the facts are as consistent .
with innocence as with guilt; and (w) that the government
totally failed to prove the crime charged.

c

In passing: ‘upoh ‘this issue of the sufficiency of the evi-
denee, we have in mind thatthe conspiracy charged here
actually is very confined, It concerns only fluid milk. It
concerns only the’ Veterans Hospital and the Dffutt Air
Force Base. And it concerns only the period fram 1954 to
April 1957. Other outlets in the area and other products
are not embraced in the charge.

We recognize, too, that fluid milk is.a highly standard-
ized commodity which provides little room, if any exists at
all, for quality differences or for special or advantageous
purchases of the raw product from suppliers and which,

SH
Be

o 49

because of uniform labor contracts, encounters processing
costs of rigid consistency. This court noted these very
factors in Pevely Dairy Co, v. United States, 8 8 Cir., 1949,
178 F. 2d 368, 367-69, cert. den. 339 U.S. 942, and observed
there that »
‘We are clear that mere uniformity of prices in the
sale of a standardized commodity such as milk is not

in itself evidenee of a violation of the Sherman Anti-..
Trust Act’’.

These stubborn facts of the milk business, by their very
existence, present difficulties in the prosecution of an anti-
trust case against commercial dairies. But of course they
_ not coustitute an insuperable obstacle to the successful ,
* prosec ution of such a ease, :

After carefully reviewing all the evidence and the entire
transcript here we have coneluded that, although some
might regard the ease as not a strong one, Beatrice was
nevertheless not entitled to a judgment of acquittal. Bea-
trice chose to stand on its motion for that judgment and
offered nothing in opposition or in explanation of the evi-
dence presented by the government. We cannot say that
that evidence, wholly apart from the Vavra and Anderson
testimony Which js mentioned below, was not sufficient to
sustain the jury’s verdict or that it was so affirmatively
adverse as to necessitate an acquittal. The bid patterns
at the Base and Hospital for the pre-conspiracy and post-
conspiracy periods contrast vividly with that prevailing
during the indietment period. The disparity in the bids
at each institution before and after; the 2% uniformity of °
the successful bids at both institutions during the period;
the indicated approximately equal division of the aggre-
gate business among the three defendants; the almost even
rotation, timewis, of the Base business between Beatrice
and Alamito; the absence of tie bids by Alamito; the
contrast with the simultaneously existing bid patterns at

fo
oe

Creighton and the University, and the Klesath testimony
manifestly present, upon the standards enunciated by the
authorities cited abové, an adequate basis for valid infer-
ences of the collusion statutorily forbidden. Of course,
there are arguments w hich can be made to the contrary.
But we are persuaded that those arguments are properly
for the jury and do not compel the acquittal which Beatrice
demands here as a matter of law. That those arguments
did not convince the jury is not any thing with which we
“may presently deal, even though, had the ease been tried
to us in the first instance, it might hay e been possible for
us to decide the issue otherwise.

The defense strenuously urges that there is an utter
absence of any direct and independent evidence of col-
laboration between the alleged conspirators. It is true
that Alamito’s wholesale manager testified that he did not
know what anyone else’s bid figures were going to be, that
Roberts’ treasurer testified that her company did not ob-
tain the approval of Beatrice, before they’ put into effect
their price bulletins designed for intra- plant use, and that
representatives of the Base and Hospital eath testified
that so far as he knew Beatrice had nothing( te do with
the preparation of any bid except its own. But this over-
looks, we feel, the bid pattern at the Base and the Hospital
and also the Klesath testimony. Although the Klesath
conversations had to do with matters affecting the area
generally and were not directed specifically to business at
the Base and the Hospital, the pricing at the latter was
dependent on the former. All this, it seems to us, is basic
evidence from which the inferences which the jury neces-
sarily drew could properly follow.

Beatrice, however, cites as controling authority United
States v. Borden Co., N. D. Tll., 1953, 111 F. Supp. 562, re-
versed as to the ( ‘layton Act issue but affirmed as to the ‘

© o1

Sherman Act issue, 347 U.S. 514; and Pevely Dairy Co. v.
United States, supra, 8 Cir., 1949, 178 F. 2d 363.

Borden was a,civil suit brought by the ‘United States.
Ten defendant dairies were charged with conspiracy to
restrain and monopolize interstate commerce in the sale
of fluid milk to wholesale customers in the Chieage area,
in violation of the Sherman Act, and with price diserim-
ination, in violation of the Clayton Act. Injunetive and
other relief was sought. Five defendants negotiated a
consent deeree. At the conelusion of the government’s
case the five remgining defendants each moved to dismiss.
The court initially observed that conspiracies of the kind
described in the complaint ‘‘are diffienlt to prove, and most
often can be proved only through. the use of evidence
which is cireumstantial and seemingly remote’’; t’ at the
testimony of solicitors of the defendants and of wholesale
customers served by the defendants revealed.‘‘ glaring in-
consistencies’? and cumulatively failed ‘‘to reveal any con-
sistent pattern of business conduct among the defendants’’:
and that the testimony did reveal a ‘‘continuous shuffling
of customers’? which was ‘‘not consonant with the exist-
ence of a monopolized market’’. The court reviewed other
oral- and documentary evidence and indicated that it was
‘‘more impressed with what the documents fail to show
_ rather than that which the documents show’’. The gov-
ernment introduced exhibits which were tabulatiéhs of bids
made bys the dairies for institutional customers. These
showed that particular defendants repeatedly submitted
low bids to particular institutions and that certain defend-
ants were alternately successful in bidding for the busi-
ness of certain institutions. The court refused to draw
from these charts the inferences of collusion for which the
government argued but concluded instead that the exhibits
showed no more than ‘‘a disposition on the part of certain
defendants to bid for the milk requirements of particular

52

public institutions’’. It went on to observe that there was
no direct evidence of an agreement or understanding among
the defendants or of intercorporate communication; that
reasonable businessmen will act similarly when facing a
like problem; that every major dairy in the-area had been
presented with the same problem, namely, the advent of
a new competitor, and that similar action directed toward
this problem did not enable the court to infer a concert
of action, Jt held that the government must present inde-
pendent evidence to jirove that the defendants were partici-
‘pants in a plan. The dismissal of that part of the com-
plaint which charged Sherman Act violations was therefore
granted. As we have noted above, this phase of the trial
court’s decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court, pp.
516-17 of 347 U.S. The remainder of the case continues
in litigation. See United States v. Borden Co., 1962, 370
U.S. 460. |

In Pevely the two tlefendant dairies were convicted by
a jury of a conspiracy to fix wholesale and retail prices
on milk in the St. Louis area in violation of the Sherman
Act. Six individual defendants who were officers or em-
ployees of the corporate defendants were acquitted. One
of the issues raised by the defense was that the evidence
was insufficient to sustain the conviction. This court, in
ruling on the issue, observed that the evidence was wholly
circumstantial and undisputed. It noted that raw milk
prices were fixed by government regulation; that uilk
quality was prescribed by local ordinance; that labor costs
were substantially the same for each defendant; that the
processed product the defendants handled was a standard-
ized product; that the circumstantial evidence ‘consisted of
the uniformity of prices charged and the proximity in
time of price changes; that proved conversations between
employees of the defendants concerning price, announce-
ments occurred only some seven vears before the filing of

ihe

53 i

the indictment; that prices were thoroughly analyzed by
management upon the basis of economic factors; that the
evidence showed that those factors were the only, consider-
atifgns influencing the price changes; that the pricing sys-
tem was in accord with one established by an international
association; that economic principles must be recognized
by the courts; that mere uniformity of prices in the sale
of a standardized commodity such as milk is not in itself
evidence of a violation of the Sherman Act; that the price
changes were not simultanconus and were not uniformly
initiated by the same defendant; that the same economic
factors applied to each defendant; that the evidence was
undisputed that officials of the defendant dairies made no —
agreement with respect to the fixing of prices; that the
acquittal of the individual officials weakened the presump-
tiow of correctness usually attributable to the verdict of a
jury; that the circumstances were not inconsistent with
innocence; and that the motions ‘of the defendants for ac-
quittal should have been sustained. Judge Thomas dis-
sented on this issue.

Borden and Pevely do lend some’ support and arguimen- |
tative material to the position of Beatrice here, We feel,
however, that neither compels a conclusion that the evi-
dence in the present case was insufficient: to support a
jury verdict. In so holding we do net in any way impinge
upon the authority of either Perely or Borden. Both cases
were concerned with conspiracies alleged to exist with re-
svect to broad metropolitan areas, Here only two institu-
tions are involved. “Borden presented instances of what
the court chose to describe as ‘‘glaring inconsistencies in
the testimony’’; there was an absence of evidence of a
pattern of business conduct; and there was continnous
shuffling of customers. In Pevely the government's evi-
dence was Wholly circumstantial; there was evidence of
absence of agreement; no inter-corporate conversation with-

o4

r
in seven years was shown; and there, was proof that prices

were determined by each dairy acting independently upon
its own analysis ef economic factors. In both Borden and
Pevely testimony was presented by the defense which
served to destroy°the inferences the government urged.
In the case before us Beatrice has made no record, there
is at least some direct evidence supporting the circumstan-
tial, and there were bid patterns of definite outline. The
prosecution’s case rises aboye those presented ‘in Borden
and Pevely.

,

In cases of this kind direct testimony of unlawful agree-
ment is usually not available and the prosecution is com-
pelled to rely on inferences drawn from the course’ of con-
duct of the alleged conspirators. Here, as we have noted,
there is some supporting testimony of direct character.
In any event, we regard as pertinent the following lan-
guage of the Supreme Court in Interstate Circuit, Inc, v.
United States 1939, 306 U. S. 208, 225-26:

_. ‘Taken together. the circumstances of the case which
we have mentioned, when uncontradicted and with no
more explanation than the record affords, justify the
inference that the distributors acted in concert and in
common agreement * * *. When the proof supported,
as we think it did, the inference of such concert, the
burden rested on appellants of going forward with
the evidence to explain away or contradict it.’’

That Court has also said, with respect to criminal cases,
‘‘Once the Government has established its case, the de-
fendant remains quiet at his peril’’. Holland vy, United
States, 1954, 348 U. S. 121, 138-39.

4. Errors in the reception of evidence. This is di-
rected to the trial court’s admission into evidence of the
bids of Roberts and Alamito and of the testimony of gov-
ernment witnesses Vavra and Anderson,

55 Ata

The bid evidence is attackéd on the ground that a con-
spiracy cannot be proved by declarations of alleged co-
conspirators made outside the presence of the defendant.
We feel, however, that Beatrice’s own ‘bids are facts which
are pertinent to the issue here. It is true that the bids of
Alamito and Roberts were necessary to show their. par-
ticipation in the alleged conspiracy; when viewed alone,
however, those bids could not implicate Beatrice. It is the
bidding pattern of all three which evidences the con-
spiracy and the bids of all three constituted conduct rather
than declarations.

Vavra was a driver formerly employed by Alamito. He
testified that in May 1955 he started working parttime
for that dairy; that he ran its route to the Base; that in No-
vember of that year he talked with MeCarty, the Alamito
plant manager; that he asked McCarty what he was to Bs
when the route was over and if he would still be et
ployed; that MeCarty said, ‘** * * no, but that I would
probably be back in six months; that Alamito would have
the route out there again’’; that MeCarty told him he
‘*would probably be working every six months * * * it was
the policy of the two companies, Meadow Gold [Beatrice |
and Alaniio, that one would have it for six months and
then the other one’; that he was reemployed when
* Alamito received the contract «gain in June 1956; and that
MeCarty hail died by theetime of the trial.

Beatrice’s objection to the Vavra testimony is that it
was inadmissible in the absence of independent proof of
the claimed conspiracy. Because we feel that independent
proof of the conspiracy was present, we necessarily con-
clude that the district court did not err in admitting this
testimony. 5

Major Anderson was procurement officer at the Base
from 1955 to 1958. He testified that he had a conversa-
tion in his office with his clerk, Phyllis Orth, on May 8,

wv

1956, when bids were to be opened; that Mrs. Orth said,
‘‘T wonder whose turn it is today’’; that in response to
_ his inquiry she furfher said, ‘* Well, those bids are rotated
among the firms’’; and that she said that she based that
comment on ‘‘past observations of bid openings in this
office’’. The district court, on its own motion, struck that
festimony and directed ‘the jury to disregard it because

it was self-servi ing and not binding on Beatrice.

The Major then testified that he was present at the
opening of bids on that day; that he observed the bids
were identical on most fluid milk items; that ‘he announced
that they were. identical; that it was stated by those pres-
ent that the discounts would vary at different times; that
he then’ said,

‘*Do you mean to tell me that your costs of the various
firms are identical on all or a majority of these items
down to a fraction of a cent even though some of you
may have efficient personnel and equipment and some
of you: may have less efficient personnel and equ. p-
ment?”’;

and that they replied in the affirmative. In response to
an immediate inquiry by the court, Anderson conceded
that he had no way of disputing this because he had never
been in the milk business. .

Beatrice objected to the Anderson testimony on the
ground that it was hearsay and not binding on Beatrice.
It argues that the witness would not have ‘een permitted
to testify directly tha. ‘he uniform bids were the. result
of an illegal price-fixing conspiracy and that he should
not be allowed to do the same thing indirectly.

Clearly the Orth-Anderson conversation can be of no
significance on this appeal. With the proot aliunde in this
record we must accept the premise that the jury obeyed
the court’s instructions to disregard this testimony. We
view the situation as oneewhere the instruction has cured

57

the error and not as one of the kind where its withdrawal
cannot’ remove a harmful effect it caused. Compare Dolan
v. United States, 8 Cir. 1955, 218 F. 2d 454, 460, cert.
den, 849 U.S. 923; Wiley v. United States, 8 Cir, 1958, 257
F. 2d 900, 905-6; HNotteakos v. United States, 1946, 328
U. S. 750, 764-65; Deli Paoli v. United States, supra, p-.
242 of 352 U.S.

Although we have doubt as to the admissibility of the
other: Anderson testimony, we are not convinced that, if
its admission was error, there was resulting prejudice.
_ Anderson‘s comment was one which a jury would regard

as a natural reaction for a procurement officer and we
agree that whatever seeming significance it might initially
have had was dulled and dissipated by the — court’s
own rebuke and limiting question. On this recor \we hold
its admission to have been harmless error within the
standard of Rule 52(a), F. R. Cr. P. \

5. Errors in the instructions. Beatrice’s points here

are (a) that the trial court by its instructions in effect
amended the indictment by several times describing the
charge against the defendants as one to fix uniform prices
in the general Omaha area and (b) that the court’s thrice-
repeated emphasis to the jury that it should consider the
evidence as a whole was prejudicially misleading and con-
fusing. Appropriate exceptions were made,

7

We have read the instructions in their entirety and with
great care. It is seldom that counsel in a complicated
criminal case can be satisfied with every phrase of the
court’s charge to the jury. It is seldom, too, that an ap-
pellate court or, for thet matter, a trial court reviewing
his own instructions already delivered cannot find ways in
which those instructions could have been improved.

It would serve little purpose for us to set forth in this
already lengthy opinion the details of the charge which

58 c*) .
4 9

_ the defense aftacks here, It will spffice to -say that the

trial court did\make references to the ‘*¢ Jmaha aréa’’-and-~~
did speak of conspiring to maintain uniform and non-
competitive prices on dairy products in that area. : We
feel, however, that thé charge is neither fataily defective
nor unfair. It seems elpar to us (and, as to this, we have
considered the government's closing arguments and the

fact of the jury’s request, fiot acted upon by the court be- . * |
cause the verdict was returned ily the*interim, for a copy

of the text of the Sherman Act) that the jury did not
assume or understand that Beatrice was charged with
anything. other than a conspiracy directed solely to the
Base and the Hospital or, to express it reversely, that it
undertood Beatrice was not charged with a conspiracy to
fix uniform ‘prices generally in the Omaha market. We
are persuaded as to this by the court’s and counsels’ re-"

' peated emphasis upon the Base and the Hospital:as the

objects of the conspiracy. Also, the indictment .was read

‘to the jury and was specific in its confining aspects. The

evidence itself was overwhelmingly :dirécted tothe two
institutions. Area reference was not improper in itself
for the bids, in terms of discounts from wholesale dist.
prices, were of significatice only in relation to the prices
prevailing in the Omaha niarket. It is often the case that
a court might -properly have, given instructions requested

by the Mefense buttwe cannot say that the instructions here

did not adequately present the issues in a fourm under-—
standable to the jury. The situation is far different from
those involved ®i Stirone v. United States, 1960, 361 U.S.
912, and Bollenbach-v. United States. 1946, 6 U.S. 607,
and other cases suggested by the defense.

Beatrice’s argumeht as to undue emphasis upon the evi-
dence as a whgle also fails to persuade us. It is true that
the jury wis told three separate times during the course
of the instructions to consider the evidence as a whole. .

59 : lacs

But it was also told, and at least-three separate times, that
the cohspiracy had to be established by evidence inde-
pendent of the declarations of co- conspirators. Here, too,
we are not willing to assume on this record that the jury.
‘did not heed the cautionary portion. of this charge or was
e prejudicially confused. ‘*Our theory of -trial relies upon
the ability of a jury to follow. instructions” .,. Opper Y.
United States, 1954, 348 U.S. 84, 95. |

Affirmed. | ,

A true copy.

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Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
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_ APPENDIX B.
re —
| CHARGE TO JURY.

‘
”

By The Court: Ladieg and gentlemen of the Jury: :

Now that the evidence’ftas been’ presented to you and
the arguments of counsel have been made, it becomes my
duty to inforni you of the legal principles and considera-
tions by which you are to be guided in arr iving at your

verdict.

_ Under “your oaths of office you are bound by the law
as the Court shall declare it to you. As these ipstructions
embody the law gov erning this ease, it is ease that
vou give close ‘and careful attention to. them.

At the outset, I may properly urge you to make a.forth-

“rT ight:effort to accomplish.an agreement in your delibera-
.tions. Inconclusive trials are highly undesirable. A com-

mon ‘tinderstanding among competent and intelligent per-’
sons ought to be possible. on oer

Hoxever, this observation must not be construed by 3 any
juror as a suggestion of the abandonment, for the sake of
agreement alone, of an ‘opinion held understandingly and
earnestly p? him gr her. The ‘Court must never coerce
agreements by jurors. But it is appropriate to suggest that
if, during 1 your deliberations you should find yourselves in
apparent disagreement, each of you ought carefully to
examine the ground of his or her opinion before assum-
ing a final position of dissent. f. * ” °

An indictment, ladies and gentfemen, is a formal charge’
in writing against a defendant, or defendants. An indict-
ment is the result of an investigation by the Grand Jury

61 rs

and the officers of the law. This investigation is in no sense
to be taken as a trial, but it simply constitutes the regular
method of bringing the ie before the Court and Jury

for a trial.

The indictment itself is not evidence of¢ the guilt of a

—defendapt nor does it detract in any degreé fram the pre-

sumption of its innocence with which the law surrounds it
until its guilt is proved beyond a-reasonable doubt, and
in this instanee, when I say ‘‘it’’ I refer to the defendant
Beatrice Foods Company. This charge contained ‘in the
indictment the Government must establish by proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt in order to show the defendant

guilty “of the crime with which it stands charged.

Corporations are. entitled to the same fair and impartial
consideration at your hands, as are natural persons and
a corporation has the same intere*® and right that a
natural person has in defenditig its name » andsreputation
against’ imputations of crime.

You enter upon this investigation, ladies and gentlemen,
with. a presumption that Beatrice Foods Company is not
guilty of any crime, and this presumption stands’ as a
witness for it until-it is rebutted ‘and overturned by the
Government by competent and er redible proof. It is, there-
fore, incumbent: upon the Government, before you can
convict the defendant, to establish to your satisfaction be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the crime charged in the
indictment, and every constituent element thereof, has
heen ‘committed, that the same was committed, within the
Judicial District of the State of. Nebraska, and that Beat-
rice Foods Company committed *the crime in such a man-
ner.as would make it guilty under the law heretofore de-
fined and explained to you.

By reasonable doubt is not meant any possible or eap-
tious doubt that may arise in‘your minds, but it is that

A
ij

62
doubt engéndered after the application of the reasoning
of logical processes to. the evidence in the case, and an
inability after such te let the mind rest easily upon, the
certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not de-
manded by the law to convict on any criminal charge, but
‘moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required

as to every proposition of , Proof ee to constitute the
offense charged. ° ;

You are instructed that the ‘fact that the defendant. has
not produced evidence ‘in its behalf should not be con-
sidered or construed. in any way against it, and you are not
_ at liberty to indulge in any presumption of guilt or any
-unfavorable presumption or inference because it has not
produced evidence in its own behalf.

Under our law a defendant is entitled to take the stand
or not as he, she, or it chooses, and under our Constitution
‘ho one is compelled to be a witness .agathst themselves.
No presumption whatsoever is to be ‘indulged against a
defendant _because it does not take the stand, and it does
not ‘change the fact that the burden of proof is upon the
government, to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt.

On ‘August 28, 1958, a Grand Jury for this District re-

turned an indictment in one, count against the defendant .

Beatrice Foods Company. As I have instructed you before:
while Roberts Dairy Company and Alamito Dairy Com-
pany are included in this indictment, they are not on trial
at this time. Py |

The indictment, so far as material for your purposes,
‘reads as ‘follows: , a

‘“‘The Grand Jury charges: Beginning in or about
January of 1954, the exact date being to the grand
jurors unknown, and continuing thereafter up to about
April, 1957, the defendant and others to the grand

a?

jarors unknown have ‘‘engaged in a combination and
conspiracy to éliminate and suppress Competition in
the sale of milk and cream to the Offutt Air Force Base
and the Veterans Hospital in unreasonable restraint
of the aforesaid trade and commerce in violation of
Section 1 of the Act of Congress of July 2, 1890, 26
Stat. 209, as amended (15 U.S. C. 1) entitled ‘An Act
to protect trade and commerce against unlawful
restraints and heintntine,’ commonly known as the

* Sherman Act. The aforesaid combination and con-
spiracy has consisted of a-»continuing agreement,
understanding and cert of action among the de-
fendants, the substanfial terms of which were:

(a) To fix and establish non-competitive prices and
. discounts for milk and cream sold and distributed
to'the Offutt Air Force Base ;

(b) To fix and establish non-competitive prices and
discounts for milk and cream sold and @stributed
by the defendants to the Veterans Hospital ;

(c) To allocate to the defendant Roberts, the bid
contract business of supplying milk and cream to
‘the Veterans Hospital ; oe :

(d) To alternately allocate to the defendants Alamito

and Beatrice the bid contract business of supply-
ing milk and cream to the Offutt Air Force Base.”’

Members of the jury, the purpose of the antitrust laws,
it should probably be briefly explained in the outset, is to
preserve the free flow of commerce among the several
states and to keep its channels open,free and unobstructed
to all. Their further ae is to secure to everyone an —
equal right*and opportunity to engage in the trade and
commerce of the country. They providé, among other
things, against conspiracies in restraint of free competition

in business and commerce which tend to restrict production,

64
fix, raise, stabilize or control-prices, or to maintain uniform
and non-competitive prices or otherwise control the market
to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods or
services, all of which is considered: as being injurious to
the public welfare.

1 shall now explain to you the law as applicable to the
charges in this indictment.

The pertinent’ section of the Sherman Act upon which
the indictment in this case is based reads as follows:

‘tEvéry contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
‘merce among the several states, is declared to be illegal.
K¥ery person who shall make any contract or engage

_ on any combination or conspiracy condemned by«this
Jaw shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished.”

Conspiracy, for your information, is a combination of
two or more persons by concerted action to aceomplish a
criminal, or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in <
itself criminal by unlawful means. Formal agreement
between the parties concerned is not essential to the forma-
tion of a conspiracy, but it is sufficient.if it is a concert
of action of all the parties working together understand-
ingly with a single design for the accofnplishment of. a
common purpose, or purposes. If the evidence of the
separate details of the transaction or transactions as it
or they are carried out indicates with requisite certainty
the existence of a preeneartes plan or purpose, that ts.
sufficient.

°

The conspiracy. is complete. whether the offense whieh
the parties haye agreed, or conspired, to commit, such as
price fixing or price maintenance, is committed or not. A
person may be guilty of a conspiracy if he takes any part

,in same knowingly, as set out, and the burden rests upon

65°
°
the Government to prov e guilty know ledge of the accused

: beyond a reasonable doubt.

A person joining a combination or coming into @ con-
spiracy after it is formed and in some way assisting in its
execution is a party thereto anti is liable therefor to the
same extent as if he had been an original party anda mem-
ber from the inception of the same.

It is not necessary, the Court should advise you, that
one conspirator know of each separate and minute act on
the part of another conspirator or have knowledge of all
of the operations of a conspiracy. *e

The gist of a conspiracy, ladies and gentlemen, is that
two or more persoys shall form a plan for concerted action.
You mist, under the- rules, as the Court has ‘stated, find at
least two of the alleged conspirators herein did this before
you would be justified in convicting the defendant.

— The concerted action or cooperation referred to may
arise from definite, express and well-understood, agreement
or combination, or it may ‘arise as well from a tacit silent’
; understanding. The understanding, comgmation or agree-
ment between the parties in a given cas@ to effect the
unlawful purpose charged must be proved beyond a reason-
able doubt, because without corrupt understanding there

>

is no conspiracy.

The defendant on trial in this case, you understand,
is a corporation. A corporation acts through its agents,
including its employees and officers. Therefore, in, deter-
mining whether the corporate defendant in this case has
violated:-the antitrust laws, it is necessary for you to
determine that the corporation has performed the acts
_ charged in the indictment: by virtue of and through the
acts of its agents, meaning its officers and employees.

In order for a corporation to be responsible for the
acts orestatements of an agent, it is not necessary that the

3

66
corporation, specifically authorize the agent to commit the
act or make the statement. A corporation is legally bound
by the acts and statements of its agenté done or made
within the scope of their express or apparent authority.
Express authority is that specifically given to an agent
by his superior; apparent authority is the authority which

outsiders would normally assume that the agent would -

have, judging from his position with the company and the
circumstances surrounding his past conduct. When the
act of the agent is within the scope of his, apparent author-
ity, the corporation is held legally responsible for it, al-
though it may be contrary to his actual instructions and
although it may be unlawful.

Ladies’ and gentlemen of the jury, the’ Court has in-
structed you that any act done by a party to a conspiracy
in furtherance of a common design and pending the illegal

enterprise, is, ini law, the act of all, and proof thereof. is

evidence against all who parthipate. Likewise, the Court
has instructed you that declarations by one alleged con-
spirator in the same circumstances are competent in evi-
dence against all. In this connection, however, the C ourt
instructs you, and you should keep this in mind in your
consideration of this case, that acts and declarations of an

-o alleged conspirator performed. or ‘made in the absence of

other conspirators, while competent against all who are
connected with the consptracy which has been formed and
which is in existence, such acts and*declarations may be
considered by you only if a conspiracy has-been found by

«3

Wy

you to have been formed and the alleged conspirators are ©

_ ddentified with same. In other words, before you are war-

: oe : a
ranted in considering such acts or statements madé by one

alleged corispiratoy which might implicate other alleged

, conspirators, it is necessary for the Government to show
-the existence of a conspiracy, and this must be done by
independent evidence; that is, other evidence of a substan-

. vaitieg . 67

tial nature, you understand, leaving out the acts and decla-
rations of any alleged conspirator, or conspirators, referred
to. . ,

The question with you is whether or not Beatnce Foods
Company has entered into an agreement to fix and establish
prices ‘and digcounts on milk or to divide or allocate the
bid business of -supplving milk to Offutt Air Force Base

cand the Veterans Hospital. The Government contends that
“such an agreement is proven in part by testimony of tele-
phone conversations prior to price changes which were .
initiated on August 1, 1956, and January 1, 1957. The facts ©
are for yon to decide. Of course, as the Court has stated, an
agreement to fix or establish prices need not be formal nor
need it be spelled out in any certain language. It is for you
‘to consider the entire conversations and the setting in
which they took place, and to determine from that whether
or not Beatrice Foods Company reached a common under-
* standing with Roberts or Alamite, or both, to fix and estab-
lish its price. In this connection it is not necessary for the
Government to prove that every price change initiated or
every bid received by Beatrice Foods Company was pre-
ceded by telephone conversations 3 by Beatrice Foods Com-
pany with Roberts or Alamito and resulted from a price-
" fixing agreement among them. A single agreement to fix,
maintain or establish prices and discounts. constitutes a
violation of the law. F

As a first order of business, tifen, in your consideration. *
of this case, you, will first inquire as-to whether or not.
the Government has’ proven @ conspiracy existed by sepa-
rate and‘ independent evidence before you are wart anted
in considering any actions or declarations made pursuant,
to same as herein stated by the Court...

4

In determining the character of a combination, it is to
be judged not only by examining’ its separate parts, but by

)

4
&

—_—

Sais ae €8

a,
»
Ya)

looking at it as a whole. It is not essential that each and
every act. be unlawful for acts done to give effect to the
unlawful agreement may be, in themselves, wholly innocent
acts, Yet if they are part of the sum of acts entered into
to make effective a price fixing agreement, then the evi-

. y» dence as a whole establishes a violation of the antitrust

oo! J
‘ laws. ..
le SP ”

t

The Court instructs you that it would be a violation of

’ the Sherman Act for a group of individuals or corporations

to act together to fix, stabilize or control the prices to be
charged for dairy products which they handle, or to main-
tain uniform prices thereon, that is » you understand, espe-
‘cially where they control a substantial part of the inter-
state trade and commerce in that commodity. .Where the
members of a group, or- combination, has the power to fix
prices or otherwise regulate or control same and knowingly
act together for that purpose, the combination is illegal
and it is immaterial how reasonable or unreasonable the
prices agreed on ara, or to what extent they are or may be
effected by the combination: If such illegal combination
exists, it does not matter that there might have been other
factors which contribute to the raising of prices. .
To elaborate, the aim and result.of every, price fixing
agreement, if effective, is the elimination of one form of
competition. The power to fix prices, whether reasonably —
exercised or not, involves power to control the market and

- , to fix arbitrary and unréasonable prices. The reasonable

price fixed today may, through economic and business
‘ changes become the unreasonablefrice of tomorrow. Once
established; it may be maintained unchanged because of
the absence of competition secured by the agreement for a
price reasonable when fixed. Agreements which create .
such potential power are in themselves unreasonable or —
> unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute in-
quiry whether a particular price is reasonable or unreason-

vw

. 69 /
@) a
able as fixed and without placing on the Government in
enforcing the antitrust laws the burden of ascertaining
from day to day whether it has become ‘unreasonable
through the mere variation of economic conditions.

Under the Sherman Act, ladies and gentlemen, ‘a com-
bination formed for the purpose and. with the effect of
raising, fixing, stabilizing or controlling or maintaining the
price of a commodity in interstate commerce, such as dairy
products, is illegal per se, or in and of itself, and a viola-
tion of the antitrust laws of the United States.

The Court should probably remind the jury at this point
that there is no controverted issue in the trial of this case
concerning the interstate character of the operation of
the defendants on trial with respect to their produets.
It is stipulated by the parties, as a matter of fact, that
the defendant on tria! was at all times materially eaaged
in interstate commerce, witherespect to the dairy products
here in queStion. - } | pe |

For your information, fixed prices on merchandise or
commodities means agreed prices and an agreement to fix
prices or to maintain uniform prices, as I say, is illegal in
itself, and this is true regardless of the machinery, meech-

e

anism or means employed :to arrive at this results and.
régardless of any cost factors which might enter into the *

manufacture and marketing of such commodities, for such
cost factors are irrelevant and immaterial where prices
are fixed, controlled or, maintained by agreement of the
parties. / ‘

So ladies and gentlemen, whatever justification or mo-—

tive, whether economic, benevolent, or otherwise, that price-
fixing agreements may be said to have, the law does not
permit inquiry into their reasonablenéss. Therefore, if you
determine that the defendants agreed or conspired to fix,
stabilize, or control prices, or agreed to maintain uniform

>

me 70 )
. and non-competitive prices of dairy products in interstate
- commerce within the Omaha area, you must find them guilty
notwithstanding the motives or purposes of the defendant
in so agreeing or acting. ee ;
The Court has stated to you the purposes of the Sherman
Antitgust Act and the restrictions under it, but hfs not
intended to leave the impression that it is unlawful for
dairy operators to sell dairy products at the same or
uniform prices, nor is it unlawful for ne dairy to meet
the price of another dairy, whether the price is lower or
higher. The mere fact that one or more of the dairies in-
volved here may have promptly met the price of another,
or thatethere was aj simultaneous price change, if such is
the evidence in your opinion, is not Sufficient to warrant
you in returning a verdict of guilty. Before you can con-
Vict the defendant on trial in'this case you must find from
the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that any equality
or uniformity of prices at a given time resulted, as the
Court has stated, from a combination or conspiracy to fix,
control or maintain prices of dairy products in the Omaha
area. ,
* Beatrice Foods Company is charged with having com-
bined and conspired to fix and: establish non-competitive
prices and discounts for milk sold to Offutt Air Force
Base or the Veterans Hospital duriyg the period alleged

"in the indictment. Beatrice Foods Company is not eharged

with having combined or conspired to fix and establish
identical prices.

You may consider the facts, if you find them to be true,

that the prices and discounts charged to Offutt Air,Force~

Base or the Veterans Hospital during the period charged in
the indictment were not identical, only. insofar as yén be-
lieve such facts bear upon the question .of whether or not
the defendant entered into a combination or conspiracy to

71 ‘

fix and establish such prices and discounts.’ If, after a
consideration of all the evidenge, you find that the defend-
—antriid engage in a combination or conspiracy to fix aad

establish said prices uty discounts, as charged in +.
indictment, the fact that the prices and discounts were
not identical would not constitute a defense.”

It is not the law, members of the jury, that one cannot

sell his products at any price which is agreeable to him.

He may fix his own price at any level he desires so long
as he does not enter into an agreement or conspiracy with
other’ to fix, cgntrol or maintain the price of his products
which move ig interstate commerce.

The Court i tseyou, of course, that if you believe
the evidence in this casé shows a situation or situations
‘with respect to prices brought about by conditions, or fae-
tors, other than by agreement or agreements between the

defendant and others whicli established non- -competitive

- prices and discounts of dairy products from time, to, time
at Offutt Air Force Base, and the Veterans Hospital it
would be your duty to find in favor of the defendant, since

_ the main charge, as you have been advised, for which the
defendant:is on trial isthat of agreeing or conspiring to fix,
control or maintain the prices of dairy products. ~

Under tke Sherman Act, which is the legal basis for
this indictment, as you understand, it is“not unlawful for
competitors to, discuss labor problems, or the economic
conditions, of the gompanies, or the effect labor contracts

may have upon pricés, or the prices the ‘mselves, so long

as there is no combination, conspiracy or agreement be-

tween the competitors by which they sigree upon, fix or
stabilize their prices. °

‘The mere fact that the Government was the customer

© or prospective customer in the transactions. under examina-

tion is immaterial. The. Government has no o special: rights

27

‘ oT, ie < e 72 ‘

as a customer under thé‘antitrust laws and business firms °

have, the same liberty to decide whether they wish to sell
their products to the Government agenties, on what terms
and prices, as they have with fesnect to selling to private
firms or institutions.

The existence and nature of a! conspiracy or agreement
to restrain ‘trade it violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act is to be determined upon a consideration of*the evi-

denge as a whole. It is not essential that each and ev ery
sact be unlawful, and you may find that many of the .acts

and statements ‘shown by the evidence are wholly immocent
when viewed individually. ‘

If you should find from all of the evidence beyord a

reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed, you must never-
‘theless determine, as to the defendant Beatrice Foods indi-

vidually and separately whether or not it joined such.con-
spiracy. In other words, the membership of the defeudant

Beatrice Foods Company must be determined‘ from’ the © 3

evidence concerning its own actions. ..

If, and when it appears from the evidence presented here
that conspiracy existed, then the acts and statements of
any of the corpogations involved herein found to be a
member of the conspiracy may be considered by the jury
as evidence i in the case as to all of the cor porations, inelud-
ing this defendant, found to have been members. ot the

_ conspiracy, even though the.acts and statements may have |
_ occurred in the absence and without the knowledge of the

other members; provided such acts and statements weré
knewingly done and made during the continuance of such
conspiracy and in furtherance of an object or purpose of
the conspiracy.

Otherwise, any, admission or incriminator y statement
made by one person may not be considered as evidence
against any person who was not present and heard the
statement made.

vw

x

" @

2,
73

=

Ordinarily, ev idence of acts and declarations of.an agent

of a corporation are admissible only as against that cor- .—
poration: Howeve, if you find that some or all of the -

corporations here, including the ‘defendant, acting through
their agents entered into an agreement or: understanding
concerning dairy prices, then evidence of acts or declara-

tions of an agent of one corporation who had agreed will

be binding upon all others who were parties to the same
agreement. This i is true, whether or not the other corpora-
tions, Who you may have found to have agreed, had any
knowledge of the commission of the act or the making of

*

the declar ations. - °° °

For this reason, .it is not necessary to show that all cor-
porations who you may have found to have agreed partici-
pated in every act, so long as one of the group did so act
in furtherance of the unlawful agreement.

You are instructed that in order to justify_a jary in
finding a verdict of guilty based entirely upon circumstan-

-tial evidefice, th@Tacts must not only be consistent with the

guilt of the defendant, but they must be inconsfstent with
any other reasonable hypoth¢sis that can be predicated
upon the evidence, Stated another way, not only must each
fact- relied upon to show guilt be proved beyond a reason-
able doubt, but such fact must be consistent with alk other
facts jntroduced in a chain of circumstances, and such facts
must further be inconsistent with any other rational con-
clusion than that of guilt of the defendant.

As I have said, the guilt of the defendant may be” livin
by circumstantial evidence alone and whether the. guilt of
the defendant has been so established is for you to deter-
mine. Where circumstantial evidence is relied upon to es-
tablish the-conspiracy of any other essential facts, it is not
only necessary that all the circumstances concur to. show
the existence of such conspiracy and facts sought to be

~

*o

Q

74

proved, but such. circumstantial evidence must be incon-

sistent with.any other rational conclusion.

The credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their
testimony are questions exclusively for you to determine.
In determining the weight to be given to the testimony of |
the several witnesses you should take into consideration
their interest in the result of the suit, if any such is proved ; -
their conduct and demeandr while testifying; their. appar- -
ent fairness or bias if any such.appears,.and opportunities
for seeing and knowing the things about which they testify ;

the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the story told by

them, and all the ev ridonée and facts and circumstances
proved tending to corroborate or contradict Such witnesses,
if any such appear.

If you find that any witness in this case has wilfully
testified falsely as to any material fact in the case, then you
are at liberty wholly to disregard all of the #estimony of
that witness, if you gonsider it to be wholly unwo: thy of
credence. However, you are not obliged so to disregard all
of the testimony of such witness and should not do so if in
your opinion any part ‘or parts of such testimony are
worthy of helief.

In this case, the only witnesses you have heard have been

‘ witnesses tendered by the Government. In bringing these

witnesses before you, the Government vouches for them

‘ and cannot, unlegs. the: witnesses have contradicted each

other, disavow any substantial part of their evidence re-.
gardless of whether it was given while the witness was on
direct examination by Government counsel or was given
while the witness was on cros#examination by defense
counsel. . - 8

The Court instructs the jury that the number of wit-

nesses alone testifying for one side or the other should not
determine the question of the guilt or innocence of a de-

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75

°

. fendant. Before you can determine the innocence or guilt

of a defendant it is your duty to consider all the evidence
introduced upon the trial. |

There is nothing peculiarly different in the way a jury
is'to consider the: proof in a criminal case from that by
which men and women give their attention to any question,

depending upon evidence presented to them. You are ex- .

pected to use your good sense, vonsider the evidence for the
purpose only for which it Jias been admitted ang in the
light of your knowledge of the natural tendencies and pro-
pensities of human beings resolve the facts according to
deliberate and cautious judgment, and while ‘remembering
that the defendant is entitled to any reasonable doubt that
may remain in your minds, remember as ‘well that if no
such doubt of guilt remains, the Government is entitled to
a verdict. 3 -

It is the right and duty of an attorney, whether repre-
senting the Government or a defendant, to protect the in-
terests of his client by objecting to the introduction of, or
moving to strike out, evidence he deems improper, as well
as to offer jevidence he helieves competent for admission.
You must not be prejudiced against any party to this case

because the attorney. for such party may_bave made suchs

objections or motions og offers, regardless of the Court’s
ruling thereon.

You. must disregard entirely any personal sympathy
which you may have or feel for the defendant. Likewise,
however, you must entirely disregard, and be utterly un-
influenced by, any inclination to which you may de tempted
towards a personal prejudice against the defendant fie’
out of any consideration and particularly out of the nature
and character of the charge made against the defendant.
You must try and determine the case solely upon the evi-
dence’ before you and the instructions contamed in the
charge now given you by the Court.

°

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76

The punishment provided by law for the siiinns charged
in the indictment is a matter exclusively within the prov-
ince of the Court, and it is not to be considered by the jury
it arriving at an impartial verdict as to the guilt or inno-
cence of the defendant.

. You should carefully and impartially investigate, weigh
and consider all the evidence received in this trial. You are
to found your verdict upon the evidence received and upon
that alone. You are not to presume the —— of -any
fact unless it has been testified to on the trial.” You are not

to supplement what has been testified to with any other |

fact’ that you may think exists but which has not been
proved. In short, you are to determine this case upon>the
evidence before you and not upon what may or may not
exist outside that evidence. You are not to permit your-
selves to be influenced by evidence offered and excluded or
stricken out, if any theré be, nor by any statements of coun-
‘sel during the progress of the trial, or any arguments that
are not justified by the evidence, if any such statements or
arguments have been made.

Ta the trial of this case and in this charze, I have in no
wise attempted to express my opinion as to se guilt or
innocence of the defendant, and you must not construe any

statement, action or ruling by me as the presiding judge in.

the trial of tius cause, nor any of the instructions now given
you, nor this charge as a whole, as an.indication of any
opinion of mine upon the guilt or innocence of the defend-
ant. In this court it is within the province of the judge, in
his charge, to comment, or express his opinion, upon the
evidence or even. upon the guilt or innocence of a defendant
who is on trial. T have endeavored not to do that in this
instance>] have perceived no excepfional or confusing sit-
uation in the evidence, which might reasonably be expected
to elude you without my elucidation. Regardléss of what

\

77

»

- | may have chosen to say, regardless of any comment upon
the facts which you may consider I have actually made, I
must admonish you that you are the sole judges of the
facts; and your verdict must respond to your own recollec-
tion of them and your own conclusion touching them from
the evidence, and not to any intimation of my recollection
_or opinion of the evidence, which you may y consider that you
have discerne® in this charge.

: °

Some of the exhibits which have been received in evi-
dence will be made availabf to you for examination during
your study of the cases They must be returned into court
when you have imaie your deliberations.

Qa

When you retire to the jury room, members of the jury,
yor will first elect one of your members as foreman. It
will th 1 be the foreman’s duty to preside over your delib-

vera s on your verdict; to act as your chairman ; and to

represent you as spokesman i the further conduct of this
case.

— One form of verdict has been prepared and will be‘taken
with you when you retire for your delibe ration... This form

~ of verdict will be adequate for the expression of your ver-

dict in this case. Your foreman only will date and sign the
form reflecting your verdict. The form of verdict must
be returned to the clerk upon thes completion ®f your
deliberations. °

This being a criminal case, you will not hereafter be
allowed to separate until your deliberations have been
completed.

If 9%. becomes necessary during your deliberations to”

communicate with the Court, your foreman may send a
note by the Marshal. : > Never attempt to communicate with
the Court by any means other than a signed w riting. And
bear in mind that you are not to reveal to the Court or to

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78

any person how the jury stands, numerically or otherwise,
until you have reached an unanimous verdict.

Your meals and lodging, while you are heing kept to-
gether will be provided for you under the Marshal's direc-
tion, if your deliberations continue during a ported of of time
sufficient to require such provision.

As the Judge presiding over the trial, I shall be av ailable
in this building throughout the remainder of the present
day and until your verdicts have been returned, and shall
receive them promptly upon their return.

Ladies and gentlemen of the Jury, that completes the
reading of the Court’s charge. Ladies and yentlemen of
the Jury, you will now fepair to your jury room while
counsel for both sides are given an opportunity to take
such exceptions as they may want to take to the Court’s
charge.

DEFENDAN'R® REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO 1.

(Much of this instruction was given as tendered-or in
slightly amended form. ‘However, the paragraph ap-
pearing in boldface was denied.)

INsTRUCTION No. 1.

The indictment charges that ‘in approximately January™
1954, Beatrice Foods Company, Roberts Dairy Company
and Alamito Dairy Company, and others, entered into a
combination and conspiracy to eliminate and suppress com-
petition in the sale of milk and cream to Offutt Air Force
Base and Veterans Hospital, and that the combination and
conspiracy consisted of a continuing agreement, under-
standing and concert of action among those three compa-
nies, the substantial terms of which were:

79

To fix and establish non-competitive prices and dis-

counts for milk and cream sold and distributed to the

Offutt Air Force Base;

To fix and establish non-competitive prices and dis-
counts for milk and cream sold and distributed by the

defendants to the Veterans Hospital ;

To allocate to the defendant Roberts, the bid contract
business of supplying milk and cream to the Veterans -
Hospital ; :

~ To alternately allokate to the defendants Alamito and
Beatrice the bid contract Dysiness of supplying milk
and cream to the Offutt Air Force Base.

The issue in this case is solely whether the Government has
proved the defendant guilty of the particular conspiracy
defined in the indictment. Evidence, if any, of any other
or different conspiracy is immaterial to the ifsue you are
to decide.” The price of milk to the housewife in Omaha or
_to grocery stores or other institutions is not in issue in this
case. (Denied.)

‘

>.
80
R APPENDIX C
\ dasa 74
.: _— Judgment.
Unrrep States Court oF AppEats,
ve tai Eighth Circuit.
> No. 16,899 ; Sictintn Termy, 1962

ee Beatrice Foops Co.,
Appellant,
“ws.

Unitep States or AMERICA.

AppEaL FROM the United States District Court for the
= aan Sa District of Nebraska.

THis CAUSE came on to be heard on the record from the
United States District Court for the ............ District
of Nebraska, and was argued by counsel. ;

On consIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now here-ordered and
* adjudged by this Court, that the judgment and sentence
of the said District Court, in this cause, be, and the same
is — affirmed.

Seaueny 2, 1963.

Order entered in accordance with opinion:

° Rosert ©. TuckER,
Clerk, U. S. Court of Appeals —
for the Eighth Circuit.

A al
Bry

. —

APPENDIX D. :

°

Constitution gf the United States, Amendment V:

“*No person shall be held to answer for a capital or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising. in
the land or naval forees, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger, nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence ‘to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall, be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty. or property,
without due process. of law; nor shall private: prop-
erty be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion.’’ ,

Constitution of: the United States, Amendment VI:

“In all criminal prosecutions, fhe accused shall
enjoy the righ® to a speedy and public trial, by an im-
partial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been:committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed
of the nature and eause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him, to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense:”’

Sherman Act, Section 1, (15 U.S. C.1):

‘Every contract, combination in the form of trust

or otherwisg or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or

commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal: Provided,
-That nothing herein contained shall render illegal,
contracts or agreements prescribing minimum prices
for the resale of a commodity which bears, or the label
or container of which bears, the trade mark, brand, or
name of the producer or distributor of such commodity
and which is in free and open competition with com-
moglities of the same general class produced or dis-

‘.

%3.*

ars

tributed by others, when contracts or agreements of
that description ave lawful as applied to intrastate
transactions, under any statute, law, or public policy
now or hereafter in effect in any’State, Territory, or
the District of Columbia in which such resale is to
be made, or to which the commodity is to be transported
for such resale, and the makjng of such contracts or
- agreements shall not be an unfair method of com-
petition under Section 5, as amended ang supplemented,
of the act entitled ‘An Act to ereatéra Federal Trade
Commission,.to define ‘its powers and duties, and for
other purposes,’ approved September 26, 1914: Pro-
vided further, That the “preceding proviso shall not
make lawful any contract or agreement, prov iding for
the establishment or maintenance of nrinimum resale
prices on any commodity herein involved, between man- -

~ufacturers, or between producers, or- between. whole-
salers, or .between: brokers, or between factors, or >

“between retailers, or- between persons, firms, or cor-_
’ porations in competition with each other, ° Every person
who shall make any contract or engage in any combina-
tion or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall
be deemed guilty of «a misdemeanor, and,.on convie!
tion thereof, shall he punished by fine not exceeding fifty
thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding
one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion
of the court.”’ af :

Clayton Act; Section 5(a) (15 U. S. ¢. 16(a)): e

‘*A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter
rendered in any civil or criminal proceeding brought:
by or on behalf of the United States under the anti-
trust laws to*the effect that a defendant has violated
said laws shall be prima facie evidence against such ,
defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any
other party against such defendant under said laws
or by the United States under section 4A, as to all
matters respecéing which said judgment or degxee
would be an estoppel as between the parties thersto
Provided, That'this section shall not apply to consent
judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has
been taken or To judgments or decrees entered in
actions under section 4A.”’

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385601_0889%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
