# Appendix — Fiumara v. Texaco, Inc.

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385601_0865%3A3

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1963
- **Citation:** 372 U.S. 976

## Text

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
: ~FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

‘ No. 8049
: as is Ab “me
John E. Parks, Jr, and Robert M. Foote and Albert
McHugh and Paul Ziegler and Silvio Stamerro, Individ-
> ually an? as Representatives of the members of loca! .28,
~ LBZE.W.. ina Class Action, and Local Union 28, Inter-_
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Q. Appellees and Cross- Appellants;

Versus .
International Brotherhood of Ilectrical Workers,

Appellant and Cross-Appellee.

a Local Union No. 24 (fBEW), ee
‘ Intervenor, — \ ;

’ . > au
Cross-Arperats FROM THE UNItED STATES DIstRICT
CourT FOR THE Pisrricr or MaryLanp, vt BaLtrore.
Roszet C. ‘Trromsen, District’ J ence. :

otras:

iene June ‘14, 1962. Deci ‘ed January 23, 1963.)

¢

s

‘
I UA RES ep la tit top 2 A

' Before Sopeiorr, Chief tudien, an : SoPE k and J. SPENCER
Beir, Cirenit Judges.

s John Henry [ewin and Thomas X. Dunn (Robert R.

: Bair, and Venable, Paetjer & I[loward on brief) for
Appellant and Cross-Appellee; George Cochran Doub ,
(Weinberg and Green on brief) for Intervenor-Appel- b
lant; Melvin J. Sykes ( Patrick A. O'\Doherty on prief)
for “Appellees and gre Appellants ; and J. Albert: Woll
and Theodore J. St. Antoine on brief for American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organ- °
izations as Amicus Curiae. ss

SoBELOFF, Chief Judge:

A dispute between af international union and one of its
~ component local unions which led to the revocation of the
local’s charter and the establishment of a new local em-
bracing its jurisdiction, occasioned two suits against the
international. One was brought by the local union and the
other by five of its members in behalf of the membership,
both suits seeking declaratory judgments and injunctive
relief to restore the local to good standing in the interna-
tional and to obtain incidental relief, The two suits have
been consolidated. The revocation action complained of
was taken by the International Brotherhood of Electrical
workers (IBEW) after its Local Union No. 28-IBEW
(Local 28) went out on strike without obtaining the ap-
proval of the IBEW International President (IP) in con-
travention of the IBEW Constitution and failed to return
to work in defiance of his repeated directions to do so. The
strike was undertaken by the Local to enforce demands
made by it in the course of contract negotiations with the
Maryland Chapter of the National Electrical Contractors
Association.

The plaintiffs contended below that the IP had no con.”
stitutional authority to refuse permission for the strike or
to revoke Local 28’s charter for disregard of his order.
They further contended that even if constitutionally author-
ized, the action was invalid because: (1) it was in breach
of a duty owed to the Local and its members, and was |
taken in bad faith for improper reasons; (2) the Local
was not afforded a fair hearing before a properly consti-
tuted tribunal; and (3) the revocation Was unjust and an
unreasonably severe sanction in the circumstances,

sg

tanith il Nati

e ee ee shad

istddnitde ight oo wa Sti.

PW ae baw ee Cele ag:

3

More particularly, the plaintiffs maintained that the IP
improperly collaborated with the National Electrical Con-
tractors Association (NECA) during Local 28's collective
bargaining negotiations. with the Maryland Chapter of
NECA; illegally sought to impose a perpetual collective
bargaining agreement on the Local; and harbored animos-
ity toward the\ Local and its leadership because of their
efforts to maintain local autonomy. Moreover, they as-
serted that by deciding the charges against Local 28 when
his own good faith was called into question, the IP denied
the Local a fair hearing—a defect which was not cured by
the appellate review of the IBEW International Executive

Council. @

The International replied that the revocation was justi-
fied because by engaging in a strike contrary to the IP's
order, Local 28 was in clear violation of the IBEW Con-
stitution ; that the revocation was reasonable and necessary
to maintain proper union discipline, did not result from
improper motives on the part of the IP, and was enforced
only after fair procedures provided in accordance with
law and the IBEW Constitution. It contended that, in
any event, the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by their own
unclean hands and failure to exhaust intra-union remedies.
The defendant also raised serious jurisdictional defenses.’

1. The two cases rest on separate legal bases, although the same events are
relied cn as grounds for relief. The individual members’ action, Parks, et al. v.
IBEW, was brought under §§ 101, 102, 302, 304, 609 of the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) of 1959 (29 U.S.C.A, §§ 411, 412, 482,
464, S29) for injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that revocation of
the charter constituted unreasonably severe discipline of the members without a
fair hearing, and also amounted to institution of a trusteeship over the Local.
The District Judge ruled for the plaintiffs on the first: ground, but found no
evidence that the revocation was used as a means of circumventing the Act's
trusteeship limitations. The Local’s action, Union No. 28-IBEW v. IBEW,

4

~~“

The District Judge, after hearing evidence and argu-
ment for twenty-two days, held that the strike did require
approval of the IP. He further held that there was 1 > suf-
ficient evidence that the IP had been moved by “express or
particular malice, i.¢., ill-will, spite, a grudge, or a desire
to be revenged on a patticular person or persons, resulting
in a deliberate intention to commit an injury.” 203 F.
Supp. at 309. Nevertheless he concluded that the IP had
acted from “mixed motives” amounting to “legal malice”
in forbidding the strike and in revoking the charter. With
respect to the fairness of the hearing and the Severity of
the discipline, the Jndge, Aipheld :the plaintiffs.

| x ;
The decree ordered the restoration of the charter ‘of
local 28 and all appiirtenant rights and privileges. It en-

joined Any retrial or future charges against that Local for .

any past conduct involving the issues in the instant cases,

but did not preclude the proper officials of the defendant.

from pressing charges for such past misconduct against
certain members who were the sjngleaders in defying the
IP’s order forbidding the strike. The decree expressly
did not enjoin disciplinary action for breaches of the’ de-
-fendant’s Constitution occurring after the decree, including
continuation of the present strike after reasonable notice
from the IP “issued with proper motives.” The charter of
Local 24, which was organized by IBEW to take over the
jurisdiction of Local 28, was ordered revoked. The plain-
tiffs’ claims for damages and counsel fees were denied.

‘4
« Was instituted under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA) (29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a)) on the grounds that the IBEW Constitu-
tion was a “contract * * * between * * * labor organizations” within the meaniag
of that section, and that the IP’s actions amounted to a ‘breach of that contract
entitling the Local to injunctive relief and damages. /The District Judge granted
injunctive relief but denied damages and counsel fées.|

¥rom the order of the District Judge for the restoration
of the charter of’Local 28 and the revocation ot the charter
of the newly created substitute, Local Union No. 24, the
International appeals. From the denial of additional re-
lief requested by the plaintiffe? they appeal. Local 24 has
intervened on appeal claiming that as it was not a party to
the action in the court below, that court’s decree could not
alter its status.

I. FACTS .

The nature and complexity of the issues raised require
not only close examination of the proximately operative
facts, but also of the context in which the dispute developed.
Particularly is it necessary to study the relationship, within
the electrical contracting industry, of the IBEW with its
component local unions and individual members, and with
the principal employers’ association, NECA. One cannot
decide the issue of “breach of duty owed the Local and its
members” without first considering carefully what, were
the respective duties resting in the IP, the Local, and its
members.”

Organization and Structure of the IBEW *.

The IBEW, one of eighteen members of the AFL-CIO
Building and Construction Trades Department, is about
seventy years old and has 750,000 members organized into
almost 1800 component local unions. About 150,000 of

SS 9

2. In addition to the District Court's decision now under review, reported as
Parkg v. IBEW, 203 F. Supp. 288 (D. Md. 1962), there have been several
earlier District Court opinions that bear upon the present case. See Executive
Board, Local 28 v. IBEW, 184 F. Supp. 649 (D. Md. 1960) ; Local 28 v. Mary-
land Chapter, National Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 194 F.Supp. 491, 194 F.
Supp. 494 (D. Md. 1961) ; Local 28 v. IBEW, 197 F. Supp. 99 (D. Md. 1961).

6

these members work if the electrical construction mdustry.
These belong to locals in the United States and Canada
having about 800 working agreements with chapters of
NECA and a few other employer associations.’

local 28 received its charter from the IBEW in 1900,
and through the years it has served as the uncertified bar-
gaining represemtative for its members. As of June 1,
1961, it: had about 1400 members, most of whom were
employed in the electrical construction industry in Balti-
more City and the ten nearby Maryland counties. As
authorized by the IBEW ‘Constitution, it includes among
its members supervisory and managerial personnel who
are restricted from voting or attending meetings. (IBEW
Const. Art. XVII, § 6). See §-14(a) of the LMRA, 29
U.S.GA. § 164(a).*. The Local operated a hiring hall and
provided a local pension and other benefit funds. Its
welfare assets amounted to between one-half and three-
quarters of a million dollars.

3. NECA is a national association ot employers in the construction industry ;
"it is comprised of local chapters representing electrical contractors in particular
geographic areas for purposes of collective bargaining. Some contractors who
are not members also designate WECA or an area chapter as their collective
bargaining agent.

The Maryland Chapter represents 26 electrical contractors doing approx-
imately 80% of the major construction in and around Baltimore ; over the years
the Maryland Chapter has vegotiated successjve collective bargaining agreements
with Local 28

NECAtoffers advice and assistance to its chapters in collective bargaining
matters. For years NECA and I BFW have conferred on a national level to
further their common interest in stabilizing labor relations in thévelectrical
construction industry. The principal vehicle for advancing this common purpose
is the Council on Industrial Relations fér the Flectrical Contracting Industry
of the United States and Canada. (CIR or Council). %.

4. Its leadership includes former supervisors and contractors to whom these
restrictions do not apply. The inc'lusion of such active members in a union is
not illegal, and is traditional in thiis' industry.

The organizational structure of the I1}EW and the re-
lations, rights and duties therein are pervasively governed
by the International Constitution.’ The International Con-,
vention (IC), comprised of representatives % the locals,
is the ultimate governing body. During intervals between
conventions control is in the International Executtye Coun-
cil (IEC), composed of nine members meeting quarterly,
the International President and subsidiary officers.

Actualiy, effective control of IBEW activitieS is en-
trusted to the IP who, since 1955, has been Gordon M.
Freeman. He is empowered to decide all controversies in-
cluding questions of law (.Art. IV, § 3(2)); to remove
International officers for cause and to fill vacancies by
appointment (Art. IV, § 2); to enter into agreements with
national or international labor organizations or associa-
tions of. employers, or with companies doing an interstate
business in electrical work, to cover the entire jurisdiction
of the IBEW (Art. IV, § 3(12)). “The I.P. can, in any
situation, delegate the powers of his office to an Interna-
tional Representative, Vice-President or Assistant.” (Art.
IV, § 4). He may also appoint “a referee who may or
may not be a member, to take testimony and report to
him.” (Art. IV, § 3(11)).

The IP’s authority over local yhions is notably extensive.
(See Art. IV, § 3(8), (9), (10); Arts. XV & XVIT).
Locals receive their charters only upon his authorization.
(Art. XV, § 1). He assigns the locals their jurisdiction,
can merge or amalgamate locals or suspend or revoke a
local’s charter if it does not organize or protect its juris-
diction. (Art. XV, §§ 2-4). In addition, ‘when. necessary

5. Many of the material provisions of the Constitution are set forth in 197 F.
Supp. at 102 n. 2.

°

to protect or advance the interests of its members, the IP
can take charge of the affairs of any local, (Art. IV, §
3(9)); he can also remove or suspend local. officers for
various reasons. (Art. IV, § 3(10)).

Locals may not affiliate with central labor councils and
the like without his permission. (Art. XVII, § 5). Al-
though locals are empowered to make their own bylaws
and working rules, these are null and void if they conflict
with the International Constitution.* And all bylaws,
amendments and rules and all agreements of any kind are
null and void unless approved by the IP who has the right
to “correct” them to conform to the IBEW’s Constitution
and policies. (Art. XVII, §§ 7-9). In addition, no agree-
ment can be abrogated without his approval. (Art. XVII,
§ 11); and no general work stoppage can be undertaken
without his consent and “‘[t]he I.P., or his representative,
_ has the power at any time to enter any situation or con-
troversy involving a L.U. [Local Union] or any of its
members, and the decision of the I.P., direct or through
his representative, shall be accepted by the L.U. and its
officers, subject to appeal to the I.E.C. and IL.C.” (Art.
XVII, §,13). By way of ultimate enforcement sanction,
the IP. is empowered: ae

*“Either to suspend or revoke the charter of any
_L.U., or have the I.S. [International Secretary] re-
ject the per capita tax from any L.U. that fails or
refuses to observe the laws and rules of the I.B.E.W.”
(Art. TV. § 3(8)). . '

-

-
©>

12. Consistent with this stand, and in fulfillment of its statutory obligation,
§ 8(d) of LMRA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d), on February 24, Logal 28 also sent a
“Notice to Mediation Agencies” to the federal and state agencies, notifying them
that a dispute existed concerning the collective bargaining agreement, and of the
proposed termination of the agreement. %

en

17 ,

; ‘
kal 28, “after notitving the Maryland Chapter of its
intention to do so, brought an action on March 28, 1901,
in the District Court tor a declaratory judgment upholding
its right to terminate the agreement as of April, 1, 1901.
On March 31 it notitied the Chapter that it considered the
agreement |terminated. Thereafter, local bargaining ses-
sions were temporarily suspended. ‘ -
These developments were brought to the attention of
the membership in a meeting of Local 28 on April 1, 1961,
at which time the members were cautioned by’ business
Manager Beckhardt ° ‘to preBare yourseli economically tor

the worst” but not to take any “action yourself that will - .

embarfass yourself or the Union” as a strike prior to deci-
sion in the declaratory judgment suit might endanger, the
assets of the Local. The International learned of these oc-
currences in correspondence from Beckhardt ‘to Interra-
tional Vice-President Blankenship, and through a meeting
‘on April 11, between International: Representative Frapk
Adams, who had been sent to Baltimore to assist in nego-
tiations when NECA sent a representative to aid the
Maryland Chapter, and officers of the Local.- The Interna
tional was also informed of the Local’s demand for an
immediate 35¢ wage increase and of its intention to strike

\

_if necessary to achieve it. “ae

i

The Districi Judge found that the Local reasonably
believed it had. the support of the International in its et-
forts to obtain a substantial increase. ‘This finding is ‘ap-
parently based on the correspondence ‘betw een Beckhardt

aa IVP Blankenship. Precisely what Blankenship wrote —
>: “I assure you that Local Union 28 will have my °

pion as well as any other IBEW Local Union that is

consistent with the working agreement, IBEW constitution

e

ve

‘and policy and ede ral and State laws.” (Emphasis
added.) Moreover, as the -court. also found, International
cea agrees gaa told the Local in “April: that in Its
wage gquands it wa shooting for the mgon.”

.
-

While its International Representative was attempting
to assist Local 28 in the negotiations, IBEW = was con-
ferring With the Marykind Chapter and with NECA in
the first-of several meetings concerning. the litigation com-
menced by the Local. Thus, on April 7, 1961, Louis
Sherman, General Counsel for IBEW, met with James P.
(iafland, attorney for the Maryland Chapter, a with
other representatives of the Chapter and of NECA, at the

Washington ottices of NECA to obtain information on the.

status-of the case and ‘the. legal issues involved. The testi-
mony establishes that an underlying purpose was to
determine whether [BT V or the Council should sascha
in the litigation. One ot the complaints. of the, ‘LOecal i
that it was not turrently informed of these meefings.

On April 171901, the Chapter’s motion to dismiss ~
action against it was. demied, set 194 Fo Supp. 491;
\pril 21, the Chapter formally invited the Local to join tn
the submission of issues to the Councii land notined the

Local that gtherwise tt wor'd do so umilaterally; and on’

\pril 28, the Chapter flea .ts case before the Council,
presenting ali issues (previously: exchanged $&tween, the
partigs, sincluding the issue of “termination of the con-

tract, , ‘ z ‘ss

-

fu the meantime, on April 25, aie a tormal strike
vote, and without having sought or received permission
strike from the IP. about half of the members of Local 2
went out on strike. Ostensibiy a wild cat strmke, the ie

°
*

6 ap -) ; 19
“ : :
trict Judge found that it was in tact subject to the control
of Eveson and Beckhardt, and of O'Doherty, local 28's
, attorney.”

*

Collective bargaining between the Local and the Chapter
was resumed on April 27, and the Council scheduled a
hearing tor May 15 on the issues submittad by the Mary:
land Chapter. On May 4 Local 28 filed another suit in the’
District Court to enjoin any decision by the Council based
on the unilateral submission.” This suit was eomsolidated
with the earlier decl ratory judgment action against the
- Maryland Chapter and a hearing was held on May 10 and
11. At its conclusion the District Judge orally announced
his decis¥on that the Local had the right to and did etfee:
‘tively términate its agreement on March 31, 1461; as the
terms of i agreement did not require the issue of termi
nation toe submitted to the Council. The court inti
mated, without finding it necessary to decide, ‘that if the
contract weré construed to be perpetual it would: be invalid.

Opinion, May 16, 194 F. Supp. 494.

9 “At the court’s suggestion, the parties agreed to continue

to bargain, in good faith, thes Maryland Chapter agreed: to

_ take any appeal promptly,’and the Local Union agreed with

the concurrénce of the large number of its members:in the

courtroom to return its members to work and to rerhain

: at work tuntil a decision of the’ Court4r Appeals was
rendered “or until July 31, 1961, i@ no,appeal is take n,”

194 F. Supp. at 502. The court further suggested that the

parties voluntarily submit their differences to the Council

Bi _ h- Other than to note its surprise, the Local makes no effort,to contest this
finding, except to point out that the finding was not that the strike was caused
by the Local's leadership. j e
y

*o

ere

for conciliation, refusing either to require arbitration as
requested by the Chapter or to enjoin the Council from
rendering a decision as requested by the Local.

Thereupon, the members of Local 28 returned to ‘work.
“The local negotiafors resumed their meetings on May 13.
There was discussion -of-a possible wage increase of 50¢
over a three-year period, an amount substantially higher
than the last offer on May 5 which had been 5¢ for 1961,
5 for 1962, and 10 for 1963, a total increase of 20¢ under
a three-year contract otherwise unchanged. By letter of
May 14, Beckhardt reported to Freeman that eg pana
was coming up with * ‘far more substantial o \d

On. May 15, the Maryland Chapter’s submission, came
on for hearing before the Council. Local 28 did not appear,
but sent a letter to the Council setting forth its reasons
and accusing the Chapter of not bargaining in good faith.
The Chapter representatives informed the Council of *the
court's ruling of May 11, and requested that no_binding
determination be reached but that the Council confine itself
to an advisory opinion. There is evidence that Freeman
‘became angry and ordered the Chapter to proceed with

its case.
+ .

After the hearing, the Council met in executive session
for an hour and a half. The District Court found, on con-
flicting evidence, that a tentative decision was reached with
_ the approval of. the IP allowing a 10¢ per hour wage in-
crease. The existing contract was to remain otherwise
unchanged. At this particular stage, apparently, there was
no insistence on an “evergreen” clause. Final action, how-
ever, was deferred and on June 2 the Council announced:

that in view of. the — litigation no decision would
be issued. :

\

t

e

2}

In the meantime, an May“18, the negotiating committee
met and management again increased its. ofter—l0¢ for.
1961, 10¢ for 1962, 2nd 5¢ for 1963. Though the Chapter’s —
» new offer of 10¢ for 1964 coincided to that extent with
the Council’s tentative decision of, May 15, the District.
Judge found as a ‘fact that Local 28 had failed to prove
that knowledge of the tentative decision reached the
Chapter. |

The Chapter promptly noted its appeal front the judg-
ment of the District Court in the declaratory. judgment
case. Thereafter, sometime before June 2, Freeman and
Geary (the ‘NECA chief executive) conferred; Geary G
stated that he was recommending dismissal of the appeal,
and Freeman assured him that he. would do all that he
could to see that Local 28 would submit to the Council all
" issues, concerning a new contract, which were not resolved
on ‘& local level. At a further meeting on June 2 in
Sherman’s office between him, Geary and the attorneys
for NECA and the Maryland Chapter, it was decided that
the appeal’ should be dismissed. Shortly thereafter, Geary
sent a representative to advise the Maryland Chapter with
respect to its negotiations, particularly to ask for the Coun-
: cil’s recommended “yellow sheet” Council clause. At the
next bargaining session on June 5, the Chapter’s proposed
terms for a new one-year cortract were a 10¢ wage in-
crease plus the “yellow shéet” Council clause.

:

; The June Strike

The Maryland Chapter dismissed its appeal on June 9. )
Local 28 held a strike meeting on June 13. Answering a
question from the floor as to whether the IP had consented
to the strike, Business Manager Beckhardt falsely an- ,

#.

— 22

S

cwered that the Local had been given the “‘green"light.”
‘The vote was 740 to 79 in favor of a strike to begin June

16. By telegram of June 14, the Local notified the IP of
the strike, adding, * ‘Any instructions from you would be
appreciated.”

. The IP’s telegraphic reply of June 15 advised that a
strike without his eonsent would be a‘ violation of the
Constitution. He reminded the Local that in the recent
~ case against the Maryland Chapter it was agreed, that the
members of» the Local Union would return’ to Avork and
continue working until decision on appeal or until July 31
if no appeal were taken. The parties, he added, had agreed
to continue bargaining in good faith. He noted that the
Chapter s appeal: had been - dismissed, and that it had been
agreed that the members would “continue at: »Work during
collective bargaining®* * * until July 31, 1961. He refused

his consent to a_strike-or other work stoppage, and. in- -

structed the officers to permit no such strike. The reasons
he gave for his refusal were that the Local was violating
the suggestions ‘of the court, that it had not asked permis-
sion to strike in advance, that it was the general policy of

IBEW to faver reference of all collective bargaining dis-

putes to the Council when the agreement contained a Coun-

° 7 cil clause, and that. he felt that a Council clause could be

acgotien which would be acceptable to both parties.

The IP" s telegram was received befare the strike began,
but the local officers did not then inform the members.
* The telegram was discussed at a meeting of the Local’s
Executive Board on June 16. A meeting of the membership
was called for June 22, and in the meantime, on June 19,

* the strike was allowed to begin. On Jiihe 19, the Local: |

answered the IP by telegram, and the next day its officers

>

23

met him in Washington. In justification of the strike,
was argued to Freeman that the Local's agreement avith
the court was to work only until an appeal was taken and
decided. and that the appeal had been taken: and dismissed ;
that the Maryland Chapter was not bargaining in good
faith in insisting on a perpetual Council clause; that on >
account of this the Local was fiting charges with the
NLRB: and that Local 28 had good hopes of suecess and
had already signed up a few individual contractors at the
35¢ figure.”* The local officers also contended that this was
not.a general work stoppage within the constitutional pro-

s

hibition.

Freeman again refused to consent to the strike. He
wished the Local suceess in its negotiations, but repeated
that he wanted issues which the parties were unable to
resolve to be referred to the Council. He said he would
do nothing until the meeting of the Local called for June
23. and the Local’s officers, though refusing to promise to
~ send the men back to work, agreed to read the IP’s tele-
gram to the members at that meeting.

S

The meeting of June 22 was attended by an Interna-
tional Representative sent by Freeman. Local 28's at-
torney, O'Doherty, read the IP’s telegram ‘and addressed
the membtrs at length. He expressed disagreement with
the IP’s interpretation of the IBEW Constitutien and
criticised the International and the Maryland Chapter.
O'Doherty called for a vote of “non-concurrence” with
the IP. which was overwhelmingly given. '

¢

°
-——_ os

14. These agreements providing-for a 35M wage increase were subject, however;
to the condition that ghe Local would refund the différence between that figure
and any lesser amount ultimately agreed upon with the Chapter.”

24

-

Meetings of the local negotiators had been held on June
“12. On June.16 and 17 they met before a Federal Medi-
ator, and there were additional meetings in June but no
satisfactory. accord was-reached. Local 28 would not re-
cede from its demand for a 35¢ wage increase for 1961
other than to offer to split its demand by accepting 10¢
April 1, 10¢ August 1, and [5¢ December 1, 1961. The
Maryland Chapter, on the other hand, while raising its
affer on June 16 to a 20¢ increase for 1961 as part of a°
three-year contract, insisted on a “‘yellow sheet” Council
clause which was unacceptable to the Local. Collective
bargaining ceased on July 6, when the Maryland —
broke off negotiations.”

The Charter Revocation
2 @ % °
After Local 28 voted to disobey the IP’s order not to
strike, Freeman»never waivered in his determination to
assert the authority of the International and to terminate
the unauthorized strike. .

i wm 4 273, 279-83' (1962) ; see generally, Summers, “The Law of

31 ;

to include the more substantive of Professor Cox’s five

requirements.”° | .

While these standards for judicial intervention were .

developed under state common law, it was appropriate for
the District Court to. aecept Professor Cox’s formulation
as a guide for decision in these cases arising under federal
aw. The Supreme Court has told us that in fashioning
federal law in suits brought under, section 301i upon col-
lective bargaining agreements, “state live: 1f compatible
with the purpose, of § 301, may be resorted to in order: to
find the-rule that will best effectuate the federal “policy.”
Textile Workers vz Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457
(1957).- It has’not been suggested if this case that the
same may not be done in suits based on “contracts * nas
between * * * labor organizations.” In addition, it Is ap-

w . 7

Union, Disciptine : What: the Courts Do ip Fact,”. 70 Yale L. J. 175 (1960);
Summers, “Legal Limitations on Union Discipline,” 64 Harv. L. Bev. 1049
(1951) ; Annotation, 21 A.L.R.2d 1397 (1952). wi

20. See Ellis v. AFL. 48°Cal. App.2d 440, 120 P.2d 79 (1941); Hatch v.
Grand Lodge Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 233 Il. App. 495 (1924);
Gardner v. Newbert, 74 Ind. App. 183, 128 N.F. 704 (1920) ; Mixed Local v.
Hotel & Restauran? Employees International, 212 Minn. 587, 593, 4 N.W.2d
771, 775 (1942); Naylor zw. Harkins, 11 N.J> 435, 94 A:2d 825 (1953) ‘affirming
issuance of a preliminary injunction), 32. N.J. Super. 559, 571, 109 A.2d 19, 26
(App. Div. 1954), ordering a permanent injunction and. r@ersing, 27 N.J. Super.
594, 99 A.2d 849 (Chancery, Div. 1953); Mayer @. Liutcheson, 18 N.Y.S.2d 691

(Sup. Ct.), reversed oa other grounds, 260 App. Diy. 130. 20 N.Y.S.2d 698 ©

(1940), aff'd 285 N.Y. 832, 35 N.E.2a 501 (1941); Moore

no precedent for the obdurate persistence of this Local
after ample warnings. | - ,

Although this court recognizes that in determining the
validity of disciplinary proceedings there is an obligation
to draw upon standards of fairness beyond those expressed
or embraced in the union constitution, much more is in
question here than the mere propriety of an act of disei-
pline., Even as formulated by the District Judge, the issues
invalve considerations ef basie union policy and struc:
ture. i.e.. how shall the power over collective bargaining
be distributed within the labor organization?

e &

What has been granted the pant body as its proper
yrovince in collective bargaining and what has been ‘re-
tained by the localperhaps it is more acctirate to put it
the other way: what has been retained by the parent and
what has been granted to the subordinate—is a matter of
internal govertiment resting upon the contract the local
and its members have made in accepting a charter irom
the parent. This court is advertent to the prevailing policy
favoring internal union democracy*” and, of course, it
recognizes that in appropriate cases courts may intervene
to redress grievances arising from the imposition of dis-
cipline upon locals or individual members; but, in the
absence of specific legislation, it does not lie within the
authority of a court to give effect to its general preferences
between international power,gnd local autonomy in mat-
ters of collective bargaining. Questions as to how rela-

o

SS

25. See the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 401 et. seq; see also, e.g., Cox, “Internal

Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959,” 58 Mth. L.

Rev. 819, 829-31 (1960); Summers, “American Legislation for Union Democ-
racy,” 25 Modern L. Rev. 273, 273-79 (1962).

ee Ber ae

m7]

tions ‘between an international and its local might best Be
regulated are for internal settlement er for Congress,
which possesses the legislative -power. ‘Judges lack -that
power even when they are convinced of the desirability of
. improvements in the law. =
{
~ Although state courts have traditionally exercised some
supervisory function over local-international relations,”
and the federal courts are now erapowered to intervene in
some afeas under a nomber of provisions of the LMRDA,
federal judges may not, on their own, cure whatever detficien-
cies they may think exist in the pattern the parties have
iashioned, | ray

In return for the strength the local gets from the inter-
“national it accepts a measure of international control,’
This is plainly spelled out in this Union's Constitution,
and as a rule such a structural arrarigement has been
- theighi iwcessaly itt the labor movement. As Professor

tarbash has written, “When a local union makes a col-
lective bargajning decision which seriously prejudices larger
interests in the union, these latter are to all intents and
purposes being excluded from a voice in a decision on

L)
&

26. See, e.g., Cohn, . “The International and the Local Uaien: "-11 N.Y.U.
Ann. Conf. Labor 7 (1958); Summers, “Union Schism in Perspective: Flexi-
ble Doctrines, Double Standards and Projected parle 45 Va. L. Rev! 261
(1959).

27. The Dicttict Court correctly. recognized that :

“The evidence in thé instant cases; however, makes it clear that those
[worthy] results {of the Council's service] have been achieved through a
tight control over the agreements of most lotal unions by the international
officers of the IBEW, particularly the ]P, at the cost of a large measure of
the autonomy of the local unions. The IBEW Constitution gives at least lip
service to the principle that the local unions shall Go the collective bargain-

° = ‘i Vv

> 39

se28

which (democratically ) they have a right to. be hdrd.

The broad mandate of power to the IP made by the

Union Constitution is designed to be used by him_to pro-

mot® such methods of collective bargaining as seem con-
ducive to the interests of the entire organization. If the
policy of the IBEW is to favor the Council device, or 1f
in the IP's discretion it seems suitable in a particular in-
stance, oc if-in his judgment an impending strike is not an
appropriate bargaining weapon, there is nothing in the
law that Sorbids his insisting that the’ local accede to his
judgment. When the IBEW's Constitution and its experi-
ence over the years are broaght into focus, such insistence
by the IP in this case could well have been thought by him
the only feasible method of accomplishing a peaceful and
proper solution of the dispute between I.ocal 28 and the

Maryland Chapter.

We have seen in the statement of facts how completely
committed the IBEW has been over a span of decades to
the policy of requiring its locals to bargain collectively
before the CIR, the chosen instrument for the resolution
of disagreements which could not be settled at the local
level. And it is undisputed that this policy has served the

ing for their members put it a > contains provisions which appear to author-
ize the control over the affairs of the local unions exercised by the IP.
“The provisions which shall be included in the constitution and ‘the policies
which shall be followed by the officers are matters for the union as a whole
to decide, subject to the restraints imposed by law. Federal courts may
impose such restraints only within the jurisdictional limits provided by Con-

gressional enactments, and must follow the policies established by the. statutes, _

as interpreted by authoritative decisions.” 203 F. Supp. at 310.

28. Barbash, “Power and the Pattern of Union Government”, 9 Lab. a! J.
628, 633 (1958); see also, Anderson, “Landrum-Griffin and the Trusteeship
Imbroglio,” 71 Yale L.J. 1460, 1462 (1962); cf. Spitz, Democracy and the
Challenge of Power (1958) pp. 82-84. 4

t \*

-

/

:

~~

‘&

xz

40

parties. well over the years.” The IP, as a witness in court,
made no concealment of the fact that he favors Council
clauses in all agreeménts and that he has on occasion used -
pressure on reluctant locals to accept them, even to the
extent of ¢hreatening to transfer one local’s jurisdiction to
another.

Additionally, the conferences between IBEW, NECA
and Maryland Chapter officials, relative to the Council
and other matters of mutual concern, e.g., the meetings in
which it was decided not to appeal from the Dist¥ict
Court’s order ruling the 1958 agreement terminable, can-
not in fairness be cast in the sinister terms of a breach of
fiduciary obligation to the Local. Even as it spoke of the
International’s duty to the Local the court itself recognized
that “the officers of the International and of NECA: have

~~ e

29. During the trial in Local 28's action to determine the terminability of the
1958 agreement the court declared: ’

“I am not saying that the arbitration clause is not a very good thing. It .

obviously has been a splendid thing for the industry. It has prevented strikes
=

and the whole system is a good system.
7) * ¢- * * @

the years it has.done a fine job * * *,”

In its opinion the court said: @ .
“Certainly, it is highly. desirable that the local unions of the IBEW and the
chapters of NECA take advantage of the, services of the Council; the evi-

. dence shows that it has served all parties well over the years.” 194 F. Supp.
at 501-02. -' . ma
In the opinion under review the District Judge concluded that the wage

increases granted by the Council to the Local in 1958, 1959, and 1960 were:

~“ * * * not unfair-or unreasonable under ‘all the circumstances, including the
wage rates of comparable building trades in Baltimore, where unions are
not as strong as in Philadelphia, Wilmington and Washington.” 203 F.
Supp. at 299.

And most ‘specifically the court stated :

“I adhere to the view that the Council has served th® parties well over the
years. Wages have steadily increased, in line with other comparable build-
ing trades, and there have been remarkably few strikes.” 203 F. Supp. at 310,

« I do not make any criticism of the Council, * * * it is perfectly obvious over

a
vu

ts 4]

ast
‘

a common interest in the Council as a means of stabilizing
labor relations in the industry, which renders a large:
measure of cooperation between the two national organi-
zations reasonable and desirable.” 203 F. Supp. at 300
n:22.°°

ce

While there is talk by the plaintiffs of local autonoiny,
it is plain that under theeInternational Constitution the
‘Jocal can neither make r nor abrogate a collective ae re
agreement without the IP’s sanction. (Art. XVII, NS
11). That official is authorized to intervene in local nego= °
tiations at any stage and may ‘negotiate agreements cover-
ing the entire industry, thereby pre-empting the locdl’s
autonomy. (Art. XVIP, § 13; Art. IV, § 3(12)). The

. . é e |e . . . . . be
policy underlying this Union's Constitution and its prac-
tice has been to permit the International's intervention, if
that ‘is deemed nécessary tO prevent an infterruption in the

30. Findings that IBEW, NECA atid Maryland Chapter officials cooperated
in the founding of Local 24 by dissident members of Local 24 including super-
visory personnel of two employers who had resigned their supervisory positions

to take a more active part in union activities, were also a part of the res gestae
that led the court to hold that the IP acted with “legal or constructive makece.”
We are ‘of ‘the opinion that, in this industry where there is admittedly close
rapport between employers and the union and relatively free mobility between
the employer and ‘employee categories, the activities shown to have occurred
during the formation Sf the new kocal cannot be said to have breached a
fiduciary obligation owed by the International to the existing Local and its.
mem rs. e

ile not a breach of fiduciary obligation under the facts in this case, to
the extent that there may be employer domination of the new Local, as ‘com-
prehended under § 8(a)te) of the LMRA, 29. U:S.C.A. § 158(a)(2), tl
matter is for the Labor Board to rectify.

To qhe extent that members of Local 28 who hereafter join Local 24 may
be denied equal ‘re within Local 24, in violation of § 101(a)¢¥) of the
LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A, 8 411 (a) (1), the plaintiffs are complaining of matters
that may more properly be raised in new proceedings where concrete facts of

alleged specific denials of equal right to particular individuals may be adduced.
ef,, eg, Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 ¢1961),

42

work when a breakdown has o¢curred in the local negotia=
tions. The durability of the Council evidences that partic-
ipation of the International is the accepted format of
collective bargaining in this industry.”

Here it was not misconduct or a violation of fiduciary
obligation for the IP to press for the reference of all .un-
resolved bargaining issues between the Local, and the
Maryland Chapter to the Council for final solutién. This
is all that the District Court found the IP had-told Geary,
NECA chief executive, that he would do. The IP's deci-
sion denying permission to strike and his revocation order
were corisistent with this. ;

One of the unresolved issues between the Local and the
Chapter was whether a Council clause should be included
in the collective bargaining agreement and, if so, what, its
scope should be. Even if it is assumed that at the time of
the strike the IP was irrevocably committed ? the impo-
sition on the: Local of. a “yellow sheet” ‘levergreen”
clause,” such a clause would do no more than-keep the
parties negotiating during a dispute instead of engaging
in industria} warfare. As Professor John T. Dunlop,

t

31. Although the general literature bearing directly on international. union
intervention in local negotiations is sparse, there are indications of a tendency
towar! increased international control in collective bargaining. .See Barbash,
Labor's Grass Roots (1961) 149-50; Leiserson, American Trade Union Democ-

racy (1959) 287-88; Anderson, “Landrum-Griffin and the. Trusteeship Imbrog-

lio,” 71 Yale L. J. 1460, 1462-63 (1962) ; see also, Pierson, “Multi-Employer
Bargaining,” in Bakke, Kerr and Anrod, Unions, Management and the Public .
(1960) 343-49; Slichter, Healy and Livernash, The — of Collective Bar-
gain.ng on Management (1960) 927-30.

32. The evidence on this pelat | was conflicting. Although the District Judge
intimated that the IP was so committed, he made no specific finding to this
effect. See 203 F. Supp. at 298, 302 n.27, 304,

>

43

Cc : . . tte p
\ |
Chairman of the Department of Economics at Harvard,
University, a man vastly experienced in labor negotiation’
procedures, testiffed at the t “Prial:

~“The facts of life are that the parties really don’t
have much opportunity for divorce * * * and they
are going to have to work out an agreement before
a strike, or after a strike * * *.”"*

This being the reality of industrial life, it cannot be.said

by a court: that as a matter of law the IP overstepped his

authority or ‘ignored or breached his obligation to the .

Local by pressing for « stich a Council clause,

_ Without actually deciding the question, the District
Judge made known his belief that an “evergreen” clause,
making the “issue of termination justicible before the
Countil, would be illegal. He chose, however, to rest his
decision on the ground that, aside from the questions that
were debated concerning the “yellow sheet” clause, the
IP’s conduct was an attempt to usurp the Local’s role in
collective bargaining. .This court is of the opinion that
even assuming that an “evergreen” clause would be un-
ilaterally terminable under .§ 8(d) of the LMRA, 29
U.S.C.A. J ISB t it was still within the right of the

33. See also, Chamberlain, “Collective Bargaining and the Concert of Con-
tracts,” 48 Colum. L. Rev. 829 (1948); Kotif, “Labor Agreements n Collec-
tive Bargaining,” 6 N.Y.U. Ann. Conf. Lab. 1, 5-6 (1953); Summers “Judicial
Review of Labor Arbitration or Alice Through the Looking Glass,” 2 Buffalo
L. Rev. 1, 14-15 (1952) ; Goldberg, “Labor Arbitration—A*Symposiwn: Intro-
duction,” 37 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 359-61 (1962).

34, See Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 988, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ;
Boeing Airplane Co. v. Aeronautical Industrial Dist. Ledge 751, IAM, 91 F,
Supp. 596, 603 (W.D. Wash.°1950), aff'd: per curiam, 188 F.2d 356 (%h Cir.),

IP to insist, as a matter of policy within the union organ-
ization, that such .a ‘clause be accepted. Even if we
assume the correctness of the District Court’s obitur dic-
‘tum that the “yellow sheet” clause was. illegal, in the sense
that it was tinenforceable, it was certainly not_so evil or
contra bona mores as to ‘vitiate the IP’s constitutional ”
powers to control colléetive bargaining. |

2
4 .

It has been argued, however, that the “evergreen” clause
is defective, perhaps: illegal, as a divestiture of the.statu-
torily protected power, of the union to strike. “The pres-
ence of economic weapons m reserve, ‘and their actual
exercise on occasion by the parties,” the Supreme Court
has said, “is part and parcel of the system that the Wagner
and Taft-Hartley Acts have recegnized.” ‘NLRB v. In-
surance Agents’ International Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489
(1960).. But it is not the purpose of the law to ampose a
straight jacket on the format of collective bargaining or
to require that the parti€és always maintain economic: force
as an alternative. The Court has in fact recognized that
economic weapons may be relinquished, at least for a time,
and particularly in exchange for an agreement. 'to settle
disputes by arbitration, . see «Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957); Teamsters Local v.
Lucas Flou¥ Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104-06 (1962),°° which is°

”

cert. denied, 342 U.S. 821 (1951); cf., Boston Printing Pressnsen’§ Union v.
Potter Press, 141 F. Supp. 553 (D. Mass. 1956), aff’d. 241 F.2d 787 (Ast Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 817 (1957) ; Couch v. Prescolite Mfg. Corp., 191 F. Supp.
737 (W.D. Ark. 1961); In re Valencia Baxt Express, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 103
(D.P-R. 1961) ; but cf., Division 892 v. M.K. & O. Transit Lines, 210 F. Supp.
351 (N.D. Okla. 1962). (Holding, although a contract had been terminated -
arbitration could still be demanded in respect to the terms of the new contract).

35. There the Court stated that “the basic policy of national labor legislation
{is to promote the drbitral process as a substitute for econon¥ warfare.” Id.
at 103. es

the use of economic force.

45

-

+ ‘ we cay
om

the. touchstone of the practice of peaceful industrial self-
government. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 577-82 (1960). ‘Submis-.
sion to the Council’ is not élasSical arbitration, but re-
sembles it sufficiently to. fall within the afbit of this

policy, >
Q ,

Even if

economié Aveapons perpetually, there is nothing in the law

- 7 E . .
union cannot be compelled to relinquish

“to suggest that it fhay not volantarily forebear from the.

use Gf force as long as it chooses to do so. At most, the

International can he said to have attempted to compel one

of its component bodies to do this. It is not for the courts

- to say that a superior union body cannot require its sub-

ordinate to look to high level bargaining Yather than to. -

2 .

°

‘Actually, adoption of the more stringent Council clause

would not surrender the strike weapon irretrievably; it

wotld merely fortify the provision in the Constitution
vesting control over this we: apon in the International. It
would remain within the power of the International to

‘restore the strike weapon to a local. The District Court
. found that “‘[t]he IP had given hi consent to a nui gber
_ of strikes where a Council clause appeared in the contract

* * *” 203 F. Supp. at-302 n.26. Apparently this was
done without disturbing the Council machinery. More-

-over, the International, could: work within the Council for

the termination of an “evergreen” agreement. The point
is that while the IP*can be said to have attempted to com-
pel the Local to forebear from resorting to the strike, the
IBEW its. . did not surrender the strike instrument. It’,
is not for the court to say that the International could not

put this restraint on its Local.

46 ;

z . ¢

It ‘should be emphasized that we are not called upon to
determine whether aad under what circumstances a per-
petual agreement between a labor organization. and an
employer may or may not be enforceable. What is before
us is an internal union agreement vesting extensive powers
in an international *body-——incliding the power. to veto the
use of the strike weapon by its local unions. It this Inter-
national insists that its locals shall “complete the collective
bargaining process before the Council, composed equally
of representatives of the International Union and of the
Employer Association, such insistence is certainly not il-
legal. Nor does it™become illegal if the International seeks
to etthance the stability of this system hy requiring that
not only proposed alterations in the collective bargaining
agreement but its termination as well shall be a justicible
sestte before the Council. The impact of the court’s deci-
sion in this case is to impose a method of collective bar-
gaining different from that contemplated in the Union
‘Constitution, long and satisfactorily used by employer and
employees. This it cannot do.

o

Earlier Sitits

The final purportedly improper ingredient in the “mixed
motives” was that, as the court found, the IP was partly
influenced to revoke Local 28’s charter because suits had
been brought challenging the authority of the IBEW,
without first exhausting available internal remedies. As
the basis for this finding the court cites the fact that the
IP had “stated publicly that he ‘hated’ the Landrum-Griffin
Act because it protected access to the courts by union
members.” 203 F. Supp. at 302, 304..This finding would
appear to relate-to an address made by the IP before the
60th,Convention pf NECA in October, 1961—two months
after the revocation order. |

——
v

PA

’

47

There were in fact three suits filed prior to. 1961—on
December 11, 1959, March 22, 1960, and apparently in
April, 1960. The last two were dismissed on November 9
and December 20, 1960, and the District Court found that
“(f]Jrom*August 1960 until March 1961*the relations. be-
tween local 28 and the International officers were appar-
ently friendly.” 203 F. Supp. at 299. The unauthorized
strike.did not occur until the middle of June, 1961, and
the Local’s charter was revoked by an order dated August

1.1961.

Accepting this finding of some relation between the
earlier suits and the IP’s actions, we think it may not be
given controlling significance over the array of valid and

legitimate motives shown and the court’s unequivocal find-

ing absolving the IP from Jexpress or particular malice,
i.e. ill-will, spite, a grudge, or a de&ire to be revenged on
a particular person or persons, resulting in a deliberate
intention to.commit an injury.” 203 FF. Supp. at 309." It
would bea distortion of the reéord to elevate this factor
to a posifion of pre-eminence, blotting out the permissible
reasons for revocation of the charter.”

This court recognizes that should it be demonstrated # an
appropriate case thit the basic reason for union discipline
was that the plaintiff had resorted to a court of law to

36. ‘This opinion has already demonstrated that other assailed elements of
the “mixed motives,” found by the District Court, were neither in fact nor
law improper. @

37. Compare the instant case with, e.g., Nelson v. Brotherhood of Painters,
Local 386, 47 L.R.R.M. 2441, 41 L.C. par. 16,755 (D. Minn. 1961); Moore v.
Moreschi, 179 Misc. 475, 39 N.Y.S.2d 208, aff’d without dpinion, 265 App. Div.
989,.40 N.Y.S.2d 334, aff'd with minor modifications, 291 N.Y. 81, 50 N.E.2d

352, modified according to mandate, 182 Misc. 264, 44 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1943).

y 48 *
?

secure his rights and that other reasons were mere shams,
such discipline wouldy most likely be invalid both as a
breach of fiduciary obligation and because it is prohibited
under §§ 609 and 101(a) (4) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 529 and 411(a)(4).% But such a case would be dif-
ferent front the present one. That the reasons given by
the IP for the revocation here are not shams is amply
established By the District Court’s reservation of the In-
ternational’s right to retry the leaders of Local 28.

Fair Hearing .

The common law clearly requires that, to be valid, ex-
pulsion of a member or a subordinate body must be ren-
dered after a “fair hearing.” See, e.g., Cox, “Internal?
Affairs of Unions Under-the Labor Reform Act of 1959,”
58 Mich. L. Rev. 819, 835-36 (1960). The elements of
such a “fair hearing” often resemble constitutional due
process requirements and generally encompass full notice
and a reasonable opportunity to be heard—including the
right to present evidence and the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses.“ There is also a body of l@w

e |
—_—_—__——— ; ° »
38. See Sheridan v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 191 F. Supp. 347, 351-52, 194

F. Supp. 664 (D. Del. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 306 F.2d 152 (3d Cir.
1962). :

39. We reject the ae of, the defendant that since under the Constitu-

tion the Local agrees, t charter may be revoked without a hearing, the
hearing given by the IP be beyond challenge. At common law, and now
under the LMRDA, the requirement of a fair hearing exists regardless of
whether the Union Constitution provides that sanctions may be imposed with-
out any hearing. See, Annotation, 21 A.L.R.2d 1397, 1410-13 (1952) ; § 101(a)
(5) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 4ll1(a) (5). Br

40. See, e.g., Summers, “The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do
in Fact,” 70 Yale L.J. 175,°200-06 (1960) ; Cox, “The Role of Law in Preserv- 7

¢ ing Union Democracy,” 72 Harv. L. Rev. 609, 616 (1959).

.

. 49

requiring trial. of an accused before an unbiased tribunal.“
Some commentators seem to think that the courts should”
play a more active role in reviewing not only specific bias,
e.g., pre-judgment or use of discipline pretextuously, but
also built-in bias, e.g., combined prosecuting and judicial
functions and use of “yes men.” They have, however,
generally recognized either that the courts have not been
empowered to do this or that they are unable to reach such
bias for it “is an inevitable. product of the procedure

itself.”
s

The District Court, without passing on the question bf.
whether the IP had the authority to decide this case, held
“it was one which he should have referred to the IEC or
some other impartial tribunal * * *, [aS] the propriety of
his own action and his own good faith and motives in

_ refusing consent to the’strike and in preparing, filing and
pressing the charges were being calied into questicn.”* 203 -
F. Supp. at 307. This supposed defect was held-not to
have been cured by review by the IEC. Although the
court found th@ the IEC was not prejudiced, it held that
the review was in the naturg*pf an appeal, not a trial de ~ 4
novo. We do not agree that, on the facts in this case as
established in the court's findings, there was a procedural+
deféct in the trial before the IP justifying a court of law’
to‘interfere with and to overturn the action taken.

41. See Ibid; Summers, “The Law of Union Discipline? What the Courts
Do in Fact,” 70 Yale L.J. 175, 204-05 (1960); Summers, “Legal Limitations
‘on Union Discipline,” 6 Harv. L. Rev. 1049, 1982-83 (1951) ; Annotation, 21
A.L.R.24 1397, 1425-28 (1952). —

42. Summers, “Legal Limitations on Union. Discipline,” 64 Harv. L. Rev.
1049, 1083 (1951); see Summers, “American Legislation for Union Democ-
racy,” 25 Modern L. Rev. 273, 288-89 (1962) ; Aaron, “The Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,” 73 Harv. L. Rev. 851, 873-75 (1960) ;
Wollett & Lampman, “The Law of Union Factionalism—The Case of the
Sailors,” 4 Stan. L. Rev. 177, 213 (1952) ; Note, 48 Va. L: Rev. 78, 90 (1962).

50

ry

In’ the first place, the IP was clearly empowered, by the
International Constitution, to decide the issues involved
in the revocation proceedings and to revoke the Local’s
charter. The IP’ is empowered, as we have seen, “It]o
decide all questions of law, disputes or questions in con-
troversy however arising, all fis decisions being subj -ct
to appeal, first to the I.E.C. and then the I.C. * * *.” He
as also specifically authorized “le]ither to suspend or re-
voke the charter of any L.U., or have the I.S. reject the’
per capita tax from any L.U. that fails or refuses to
observe the laws and rules of the I.B.E.W." (Art. TV. §
3(2). (8)). And it is provided, in addition, that tiothing
+n the Constitution shall be construedto conflict with any
provision of Article IV, enumerating the powers of the

IP. (Art. FV, § 5).° ; ‘

The real basis for the argument that the IP was biased
is that he was, in a sense, both prosecutor and judge. It
is quite true that he ordered the charges to be brought
and conferred with the International's General C ounsel
in their formulation as well as in the preparation of the
revocation order. But it is also true that the basis ‘fon the
charges was that the Local had struck in defiance of his
repeated admonitions and had reiected his collective bar-
gaining orders.” And there can be no doubt that the
Constitution vested in the IP these combined prosecuting
and judicial functions.”

Although the charge was defiance of the orders that
the IP had issued, his actions in issuing the orders and in

42. It should be noted, however, that the initial factual inquiry was made,
not by the IP, but by a referee found by the District Judge to be “fair and
impartial.” 203 F.Supp. at 307.

¢?

51

their vindication were official not personal. If we are to

give effect to the District Court’s finding exonerating the

IP of “express or particular malice, i.e, ill-will,” ete. (see
203 F. Supp. 509), it cannot hessaid that in. ordering
charges to be brought he wi as acting to vindicate a

_ personal affront rather than the interesr’ot the Union.

m

It may well be theught desirable for unions to adopt
hearing procedures that keep trial functions separate, but
the federal courts are not empowered so to restructure
the disciplinary procedures of unions. Cf., Summers,
“Legal Limitations on Union Discipline,” o4 Hary. 1.
Rev. 1049, 1083 (1951) (implied). Some unterns, like the
United Automobile Workers, have responded to the pres
sure for fairness in internal triai proceedings by establish-
ing, essentially yxtern: al to the union organization, inde-
pendent public review boards having the tinal word in
disciplinary matters." Such unions would appear to have
gone far to separate prosecuting and ultimate judicial
functions. But, in the absence of a ciear congressional
authorization, it is not for the federal courts to compel
such measures.“ This is, in effect: what the District
Court's decision has done.

43. See Brooks, “Impartial Public Review of Qutcrnal Coton Disputes:
Experiment in Democratic Self-Discipline,” 22 Ohio St. L. Rev. 8 (1961);
Oberer, “Voluntary Impartial Review of Labor. Some Reflections,” 58 Mich.
L. Rev. 55 (1959); Aaruof® “The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959,” 73 Harv. L. Rev. 851, 874 (1960).

44. Professor Summers reports that Senator McClellan's proposal to require
that impartial arbitrators determine disciplinary matters was deleted from the
final draft of the LMRDA.. Summers, “American Legislation for Union, De-
mocracy,” 25 Modern L. Rev. #3, 289 (1902). Compare § 101(a) (65@® )- of
the McClellan Amendment, 105 Daily Cong. Rec. 5810 (April 22, 1959), Legis.

- Hist. of the LMRDA, Vol. II, p. 1162, verted 101(a)(5) of the LMRKDA,

29 U.S.C.A. § 411 (a) (5).

52

Separation of functions is not an absolute due process
prerequisite to fairness in administrative proceedings, see
2 Davis. Administrative Law Treatise § 13.02; in internal
union proceedings it traditionally, and under the LMRDA,
has also not been deemed a requirement of fairness.“
Courts. federal courts especially, are justified in ruling a
union tribunal biased only upon a demonstration that it
has been substantially actuated by improper motives—in
other words, only upon a showing of specific prejudice.
This element has-been found absent from the presént case.

Severity of the Sanction

The District Court showed a commendable concern to
protect those members #f Local 28 who refused to join
Local 24 against hardship-resulting from the charter rev-
ocation—a concern which carried over in favor of the
Local itself, though not its leaders. However attractive
the court’s solution may appear, we find no basis or
authority for the court to compel this distinction to be
made between leaders and rank and file. Moreover, in the
- circumstances of this case there evould seem to be no justi-
fication for permitting a retrial of the officers and léaders,
but befere another tribunal, and setting aside the action
against the Local and proscribing any retrial of it or
further proceedings based upon this offense.

The general membership cannot on this record be cast
in the role of blameless victims. If they were for a time
misled by their local leaders as to the IP’s refusal to

©

45. See. ex. Summers, “American Legislation for Union Democracy,” 25
Modern L. Rev. 273, 288-89 (1962); Aaron, “The Labor-Management Report-
ing and Disclosure Act of 1959,” 73 Harv. L. Rev. 851, 874 (1960).

53 :

authorize or approve the strike, it is undisputed yhat when
they later learned the truth they supported these leadets
willingly enough in flouting the International. ‘This they

did in disregard of the District _Judge's clear caution
given May 11, 1961, in open court ‘in the presence of sev-
eral hundred mem d despite three personal letters
from the IP sent/to each member. Upon the facts found
we cannot say that for their sake the sanction imposed
upon the Local must be nullified. The ‘itamediate result
might be an amelioration tor these members; in the long
view such a jadicial directive, even if permissible, could
break down their most effective organizational agency.
At all events, a court is not empowered to grant the dis-
pensation in this case.

46. “(The Court) Have you considered the fact that if you do ge on strike
or if you do refuse to go ahead with this policy which the International has
set up and which afb of the other local umons go atong with and strike
the International would very likely revoke your charter with whatever loss
there is.

“It would seem to me that they have either got to end this whole agree-
ment with these people or revoke your charter, one or the other.

“You are running an awiully close risk, and if you pgople understand that

eyou are running that risk if you go on strike and it you terminate the agree-
ment. without going thtough with this plan, what has certainly up to this
point been clearly demonstrated unless there is evidence to the contrary that
this is the plan and policy of thé Iaternational Union and that it has worked
out to the satisfaction of the Umon as a whole as well as to the employers
as a whole over the years.

“And you people yourselves have taken advantage of tic arbitration pro-
visions within the last three years. So that it is a matter which has been
gone ahead with.

“Now, at the present time I] am very much inclined to think that you have
a right to terminate, but once you terminate, I think you then can't expect to
come to the Court and ask for protectior against the International, if you
terminate and strike.,

“(Mr. O'Doherty) Yes.

“(The Court) Then you have great risks and you ought to do it with

your eyes open. I am not saying what the legal effect is, but it may be severe.”

v

0 84

Ill. secs oincsbanliy QUESTIONS

32
1ffaddition to the defenses” on the merits, the defendant
interposes a series of defenses on jurisdictional grounds.

We have deemed it better to defer the discussion of these
questions till now, when the reader has been made familiar
with the factual background.

Labor Management Reiations « Act Fr

As the basis for district court jurisdiction, ‘Local 28
relies upon § 301(a) of the L MR. \, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a),
which provides:

“Suits for violation of contracts between employer ,
and a labor organization representing employees in
an industry affecting, commerce as défined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations,
may be brought in any district court of the United
States havitg jurisdiction of the parties, without re-
spect to va teenage in controversy or without regard
to the citiz¢nship of the parties.” (Emphasis added. )

4 g

Concluding that the Local’s suit was’based upon violations

of a “contract” (the International Constitution) between

“labor organizations” (Local 28 and the IBEW) as both
, terms are used in section 301(a), the District Court held

it had jurisdiction under that provision. Although the is-
, sue is by no means free from doubt, we are inclined to
agree.

_The Supreme Court has only recently focused its atten-
tion on the “between any such labor organizations” clause.
In Retail Clerks International Ass’n 0. Lion Dry G oods,

Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962), it concludéd that the word
“contfacts” as used in section 301(a) was not limited to
collective bargaining agreements but was broad enough
te-comprehend-strike settlement agreements, — In reaching

. ‘ ‘
this result the Court reasoned that the term “contracts”:

had to be broader than collective bargaining agreements,

otherwise the “between: any such labor organizations” |

clause would have been surplusage—which it was not—
for a collective bargaining agreement between a union as

‘an employer and another union as representative of em-

ployees would be a contract “between An employer and a
labor organization.” 369 U.S. at 20-27" So saying, the
Court cited with favor United Textile Workers v, Textile
Workers Union, 258 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1958), a°case in
which the Court of. Appeals affirmed enforcement, under

section 301(a), of an AFL-CIO. sponsored no-raiding :

agreement between two international unions.

©

Although it is now clear that at least some “contracts,”
not. collective bargaining agreements, between at least
some types of “labor® organizations” are enforceable under
section 301(a), the Supreme Court-has not yet addressed
itself to the particular questions which eoncern us here,
namely, (1) whether, an international’s constitution is a
“gontract” within’ the meaning of section 301(a) and (2)
whether a local «nion and its international parent .are
“labor organizations” within the-meaning of that section.

There is almost no congressional history pertaining to
the “between any such labor organizations” clause. This
clause was inserted in section 301(a) in conference only
shortly before the bill’s passage, and there is nothing to
indicate what Congress specifically intended by its inelu-
sion. Plausible arguments have been made that the clause

.

4

56

should be interpreted as granting jurisdiction only over
-suits for violations of contracts that, like the AFL-CIO
no-raiding agreements, have been freely negotiated be-
tween wholly autonomous or separate labor organiza-
tions.’ This interpretation, opposing jurisdiction in suits
like that of Local 28, is fundamentally grounded in the
belief that Congress did not intend federal courts to be-
come entangled in contrdéversies within what is really a
single union organization, and that it would be inappro-
priate for them to act in this area." )

Congressional history relating to provisions of the 1947
LMRA, other than section 301(a), tends to negative a
congressional purpose to effect extensive and detailed stat-
utory regulation of internal union affairs.” This history

a a

47. See Meltzer, “The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over
Labor Relations : 11,” 59 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 297 n.287 (1959) ; Note, “Apply-
. ing the’*Contracts Between’ Labor Organizations’ Clause of Taft-Hartley Sec-
; tion 301. A Plea for Restraint,” O Yalg L. J. 299 (1959).

48. See Sun Shipbuilding & Dry-Dock Co. v. Industrial Union of Marine

Workers, 95 F. Supp. 50 (E.D. Pa. 1950); Loca? 33, laternational Hod Car-
riers v. Mason Tenders District Gampcil, 186 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1960),
aff'd on other grownds, 201 F.2d 498% 2d Cir. 1961); cf., Snoots v. Vejlupek,
8&7 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1949) ; Kriss v. White, 87 F. Supp. 734 4S5.D.N.Y.
1949).
‘Courts have also been concerned with pdssible conflicts between a broad
interpretation of the “between any such labér organizations” clause and the
Norris-LaGuardia and National Labor Relations Acts. See Local 33, Inter-
national Hod Carriers v. Mason Tenders District Council, 186 F. Supp. 737
(S.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd om other grounds, 291 F.2d 496, 505 (2d Cir. 1961)
(Friendly, J. concurring specially) ; international Union of Doli Workers v.
_ Metal Polishers International Union, 180 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1960). See
also, Note, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 202 (1959). The problems of accommodating
the several labor statutes will be considered later. “

49. Provisions regulating¢t detail certain aspects of internal union affairs,”
by declaring, some acts to be unfair labor practices (thereby remediable by
the Labor Board), were deleted in the House-Senate Conference. See House
Rep. No. 510 on H.R. 3020, p. 46, in 1 Legis. Hist. LMRA at 550; 93 Cong.
Rec. 6859 (June 12, 1947), 2 Legis. Hist. LMRA at 1623 (Senator, Tait,
Supplementary Analysis of the Labor. Bill as Passed, discussing § 8(b)(5));

wn
a
*

ee

- may only indicate that Congress did not mean at the time
to regulate by detailed substantive legislation enforceable
by the Labor Board the relations between individual mem-
bers and unions. Such a congressional purpose is not
necessarily inconsistent with a vesting in the—federal dis-
trict courts of jurisdiction to enforce contractual obliga-
tions agreed upon by an international and its locals.

The most that can T% said with certainty is that Con-
gress did not anticipate the problem. Looking to expres-
sions of congressional purpose in regard to other provisions
of the Act, it is possible to infer that had Congress con-
sidered, the problem it would have limitec section 301 (a)
jurisdiction so that federal courts would not thereby be in
a pogtign to settle such internal disputes. It is also pos-
sible, however, to conclude that Congress would have
_ deemed it appropriate for federal courts to exercise juris-

diction over such disputes because, as the present one, they
have traumatic industrial and economic repercussions. See

Q

Compare §§ 7 & 8, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 157 & 158, with H.R. 3020, 80th Cong. Ist
Sess., §§ 7(b) & &(c), in 1 Legis. Hist. LMRA at 49-50, 52-56; see also, 93+

Cong. Rec. 6443 (June 5, 1947), 2. Legis. Hist. LLMRA at 1540 (Senator Taft

on § 8(b) (5)) 3293 Cong. Rec. 6503 (June 6, 1947), 2 Legis. Hist. LMRA at
1879 (Senator Murray, summary of differences between conference agreement .

and bill passed by Senate, discussing § &(b)¢5)). “

In addition, tg assute that § 8(b)(1)(A) of LMRA, 29 U.S.G@A. § 158 b)

(1) (A), did not interfere with union membership, policy, the proviso was added

that “this paragraph shall not impair the right of a ‘abor organization ta
prescribe ‘its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of mem

bership therein.” Sce 93 Cong. Rec. 4271-73 (April 30, 1947), 2 Legis. ‘Hid.

LMRA at 1139-43 (debate on proviso); cf, eg. 93 Cong. Rec. 4197 (April

29, 1947), 2 Legis. Hist. of LMRA at 1097 (Senator Tait discussing what is

now § 8(a)(3)). ns
It should be noted that in 1959, with the passage of LMRDA, 29 U®.C.A.
§ 401 et seq., Congress did undertake extensive and detailed statutory regulation
of certain aspects of internal union affairs and organization.

-

\

58. Rare:

aa

§ 1(b) of the 1.MRA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141(b)." Moreover
in interpreting the “between an employer and’a labor or-

ganization” clause, the Supreme Cotrt has consistently -

favored ,the broad view of section 301(a) jurisdiction.”

In ‘the absence of a clear. expresston of congressional
intention to the contrary, we consider it permissible to
adopt the more literal. interpretation of the “between any
such labor organizations” clause—sthe interpretation that
would support’ jurisdiction in this case.” + *

: mete ARE . ‘, : >
“4 Jocal union is a “labor organization” within, the defi-

i) ; ‘
' 4

50. It has been suggested that a holding, of jurisdiction under § 301 (a)

.

“would tend to promote at least two congressional policies. (1) A major pur-

pose of §,301(a) is to overcome state law jurisdictional difficulties and thereby
make unions Samenable to suits as entities’ and to subject their funds to judg-
ments for violations of contracts. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368
US. 502, §11-13 (1962). Section 301(a) juristictibn in cases like Local 28's
would make this responsibility more effective. (2) In 1959, with the passage
of the Labor Management Relations and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C.A.°§ 401,
et. seq., Congress undertook extensive and detailed statutory regulatton of cer-
tain aspects of internal union affairs. It is suggested that even assuming the
LMRDA and § 301(a) may not be construed in pari imateria, it would servé
congressional policy to- construe § 301(a) broadly, thereby making a whole
remedy available in a’ federal cour@ when the same conduct inflicts injury,
adjudicable under LMRDA, upon individual members and also injury, not adju-
dicable uhder LMRDA, upon local unions. ,

51. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957¥; Retail Clerks
International Ass'n v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962); Teamsters
Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) ; Smith v. Evening News Ass'n,
371 U.S. 195 (1962). -

$2. See Local 33, International Hod Carriers v. Mason Tenders District

~ Council,; 291 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1961); Local 2608, Lumber Workers, United

Brotherhood of Carpenters v. » Millmen’s Local 1495, United Brotherhood of
Carpente#@, 109 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Caf. 1958); see also, Burlesque Artists
Ass'n v.. American Guild of Variety Artists, 187 TF. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y.
1958); Anderson, “Landrum-Griffin and the Trusteeship Imbroglio,”, 72 Yale
L.J. 1460, 1485-87 n.150°(1962).

¢

4

nifion of '$-2(5) of the NL RA, 29 U.S.E.A..§ 152(5). 2g
In addition, “contract” as used in section 301(a) should
be taken to include union constitutions. The Supreme
Court itself Has recognized that under state law this.is
~ the generally acce,ted characterization of union constitu-
tidns." : ‘

-

As we think our discussion of ‘de merits makes clear;
this court fully recognizes its weighty obligation not to
expand this initial grant of jurisdiction. into a carte blanche
for unrestrained judicial inventiveness: in the .areds of
union structure and collective bargaining policy. The fed-
eral courts, in exercising jurisdiction under this clause of
section 301(a), are basically réstricted to effectuating
existing congressional policy. Cf., “Textile Workers v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U:S; 448, 456-57 (1957). Qur dis-
agreement with the decision under review is not‘on the
question of section 301(a) jurisdiction to entertain actions
for alleged breaches of inter-union contracts; but we take,
the view that Congress has: not addpted the substantive
policies upon which the court’s decision on the merits was

prédicated. It does not lie within a federal court’s power

or djscretion to remake the cohtract by dintroducing even
salutary provisions not Weiensayrty prescribed or neces-

° sarily saeco

.
o

53. See NLRB v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 124 F.24 SP (Othe Cir. 1941),
aff'd, 318 U.S. 9 ( (1943) : : cf? NLRB v. ‘Highland Park Mfa. Co., 34¥ U.S
322 (1951).

oe ,

54. International Ass'n of Machinists c. Gonsales, 356 U.S. 617, 618-19
(1958) ; see also, Cleveland Orchestra Committee v. Cleveland’ Federation oj
Musicians? 303 F.2d 229, 230 (6th Cir. 1962); Rosen v. District Council No. 9,
198 F. Supp. 46, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).

be]

60.

Jurisdiction to Issue an Injunction in Suit of |
Local 28—Effect of the Norris-LaGuardia Act

The defendant next argues that even if initially there |
is jurisdiction under § 301(a) of the LMRA over Local »
28’s suit, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § ‘101,
et seq., denies the. District Court jurisdiction to issue an
injunction, in this dispute. .The’ District Court held that
the case of the Local does not fall within the classes set
forth ir section 4° in which injunctions’ are ‘absolutely pro-
hibited, and that the case did not involve a “labor dispute”
as used in section 7 and as defined in seé¢tion., 13(c)s
Acknowledging that the issue is debata! ie, we agree with
the District Court’s conclusion that, notwithstanding the
Norris-Il_aGuardia Act, jurisdiction would exist in a proper
case to issue a mandatory injunction.

‘
§5. The relevant provisions of the, Norris-LaGuardia Act include: Section
1, 29 U.S.C.A. § 101: © ;

“No court of the United States * *.* shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or
growing out of a labor dispute, except in strict conformity with the provision

‘of this chapter; nor shall any such restraining order or temporary or per-
«manent injunction be issued cortrary to the public policy expressed in this
chapter.” '

Section 4, 29 U.S.C.A. § 104:

“No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any re-
straining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving
or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons par-
ticipating or interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined)
from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts: [Em-
phasis added] )

“(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any rela-
tion of employment ;

“(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor ‘organization or of
any employer organization * * *; .

.- ** © & @ ‘

“(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts

heretofore specified; and

°

Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed it-
self to the problem of accommodating the “between any
such labor organizations” clause of § 301(a) of the LMRA
and the Norris-l_aGuardia Act, it has said enough to pro-

«

vide useful* guide lines for disposition of the issue as it

arises in this case.”

In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 Ud. 448
(1957), the Court first recognized the broad scope of fed-
eral court jurisdiction that Congress had granted under
§ 301(a) of the LMRA. Holding that an arbitration
clause in a collective bargaining agreement was enforce-
able ynder section 301(a), the Court also held that, not-
withstanding the prohibitions and requirements of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, a mandatory injunction would lie
to compel arbitration. The Court pointed out that histor
ically arbitration was not one of the acts, listed in Norris:
LaGuardia § 4, in respect of which the power to enjoin
had been abused,” and that in fact Congress indicated, in
section 8 of the Norris-l.aGuardia Act, its policy of favor-
ing labor arbitration. It was held, moreover, that there
was no policy justification “for restricting § 301(a) to

,
‘

———— A

90. Preliminarily, it should be noted that the Act does not apply to all cir-
cumstances in which, on its face, it might be thought to apply. We know that
injunctions have been upheld which were issyed (1) to compel arbitration,
Textile Workers. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) ; (2) to enjoin a strike
by a railway union over “minor disputes” cognizable by the Railroad Adjust-
ment Board, see Brotherhoud of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indi-
ana RR, 353 U.S. 30, 39-42 (1957) ; (3) to compel an employer to bargain with
a certified union, Virginian Ry. v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515, 562-63
(1937) ; and (4): to compel a union to per@rm its statutory duty of fair rep-
resentation, Graham v. Brotherhood of Railroad Firemen, 338 U.S. 232, 237-40
(1949) ;-Syres v. Oil Workers International Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955).

57. In the recent case of Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S: 195, 212
(1962), the Court distinguished the situation involving an injunction directed
against a strike, in violation of- a no-strike clause, from Lincoln Mills on the
grounds that in Lincoln Mills “—a mandatory injunction to carry out an agree-
ment to arbitrate—did not enjoin any one of the kinds of conduct which the
specific prohibitions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act withdrew from the injunc-
tive powers of United States Courts.”

qlee

a

63 Li

damage suits, leaving specific performance of a contract
to arbitrate grievance disputes to the inapposite procedural
requirements [of § 7] of that | Norris-laGuardia] Act.”
353 U.S. at 458. %

The injunctive relief sought by [Local 28—restoration
of its charter, ete.—may also be said not to be “a part and
parcel of the abuses against which the Aet,”’ as indicated
by the specific matters listed, in section 4, was directed.
353 U.S. at 458. Here, likéwise, the injunction sought
would not have the proximate effect of “prohibit[ing]
any person or ‘persons participating or interested in such
dispute * * * from doing * * * any of the” acts listed in
section 4. (29 U.S.C.A.°§ 104—emphasis adde).

J .

The crucial question remaining is whether the Local's
case involved a “labor dispute” as detined in section 13(¢)
and used in section 7. If so, that section’s procedural re-
quirements precedent to the issuance of an injunction were
not met in this case and the injunction should not have
been granted. There is little doubt that at its root this
controversy is concerfed with a “labor dispute” as liter-
ally defined by section 13 of the Act. But this case is no
more directly concerned with what is a “labor dispute”
than was Lincoln Mills, yet there the Court held that:

“Though a literal reading might bring the dispute
within the terms of the Act [citation omitted], we
see no justification for restricting § 301(a) to dam-
age suits, leaving specific peg formance of a céntract
to arbitrate grievance disputes to the inapposite pro-
cedural requirements of that Act.” 353 U.S. at 458.

Up

64 ¢ ,

See also, Sinclair Refining Co. vz Atkingpn, 370 U.S. 195,

212; id. at 219 (Justice Brennan's formulation to the
%

same effect ).

Of course, in its decision the Court also relied on its
view that there is a cl@ir congressional policy favoring
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes.
It cannot be said with complete confidence that there is
similarly a clear congressional policy favoring federal
court enforcement of inter-union contracts of the character

at issue in the Local 28 case. But, if it is held (see pp.

54-59 supra) that Congress by section 301 (a) did conter
upon federal courts jurisdiction over such suits, it would
be as inappropriate here as it would have been in Lincoln
Mills to insist upon the stringent procedural requirements
of section 7 when manifestly the matter here enjoined
“was not a part and parcel o1 the abuses against which
the Act was aimed.” 353 U.S. at 458.

Pre-emption and Primary Iurisdiction
Problems in the Local’s Suit

The defendant further contends that the complaint of
Local 28 involves matters arguably subject to § 7 or § 8
of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 157 and 158, and is there-
fore, under San Dieyo Building Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236 (1959), subject to the Labor Board’s exclu-
sive primary jurisdiction. Although phases of the Local's
case involve an alleged breach of the IBEW Constitution,
defendant argues that the case is also arguably concerned
with unfair labor practices. And because the same basic
facts and contentions provide the foundation of both
types of possible actions, the defendant argues that the

a.

65

c

District Judge, despite his efforts, could not separate the
various elements of the case.” :

— Recently the Supreme Court held that in cases under the
“between an employer and a labor organization” clause ot
section 301 thg presemption doctrine of Garmon is not
relevant, regardless of whether the employer's coffluct is
arguably or concededly an unfair labor practice within the
Labor Board’s jurisdiction.” Since we have reached the
conclusion that the District Court had jurisdiction over
this suit under section 301(a), we think it not inappro-
priate to conclude further that the teaching of these deci
sions is applicable here.” Cf.. United Textile Workers &.
Textile Workers Unien, 258 F.2d 743 (7th Cir, 1958);
Lecal 33, International Hod Carriers 7. Mason Tenders
District Council, 201, F.2d 496, 502-05 (2d Cir 1961)

ae

58 The District Court held that ite was not recnred wholly te yield to the
jurisdiction of the Labor Board. Specitically the court held that at had ne
jurisdiction in Local 28's case “to decide whethes the Marviand Chapter tailed
to bargain in good faith,” 203 F Supp at 2030 or whether the TREW “eon
spired with and encouraged the Maryland Chapnes not to hargain tairly,” 1

at 203, or whether “the International attempted to Soerce the members of Local
* . ‘ -
28 in the exercise of the rights protected by sec 7° * *° Jd at 208 n 11

59. Smith v. Evenmag News Assn. 371 US. 198 (I%2) sce Charles Dowd
Ror Co. v. Covrtney, 368 U.S S02, 513 (1962): Teamsters Local > Lucas Flour
Co, 369 US. 95, 101 nO (1962): Atkinson > Sinclar Refining ¢ -
. 238, 245 n.5 (1962); see also Tertile Workers * Arista Vol ;
533 (4th Cir, 1951) agit

13 F 2d 829

0 The recent Supreme Court decisions mvolved the “between an emplover
and a labor organization” clause; it 1s there fore nece ssary te review the policy
considerations that justify applying the Smith rule to the “between any such
labor organizations” clause of § 301/a)

First, it is clear that Congress did not mean to authorize the Labor Board
to concern itself generally with matters of internal union discipline and struc
ture. Seg n.49, supra; see also, e.g, International Association of Machinists ©
Gonsales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958). J

. While it is very possible that some of the tacts may be
invoked as the basis for both types of controversies, this
does not mean that the District Court in an appropriate
case must yield the full measure of its jurisdiction. and
await the Board’s determinations.. At most, the court
must merely avoid “affect{ing] the jurisdict on of the
N.L.R.B. to remedy unfair labor practices as su-h.” The
District Court did all that could be required of it by gen- |
erally avoiding decisions tantamount to findings and con-
clusions ay to whether or not unfair labor practices had
been committed.

Parks: Cause of Action

As to the Parks case the International argues that it
should have been dismissed for tailure to state a claim
entitling the plaintiffs to reliet under §$§ 101¢a) and 609

—_————$—

£
Second, there can be no doubt that, just as the enforcement of collective

bargaining agreements has been left to the courts, see ( harles Doud Bex Co
vt. + APS OSD, $13 (2942), most matters directly concerning interna!
union activities, insofar as they are regulated at all, have been left to the
courts. See Gonzales, supra; Bussey v. Plumbers Local No. 3, 286 F.2d 165
(10th Cir. 1961); Kekont v. Shochtay-Garos Union, Local 446, 205 F. Supp.
284, 291-92 (E.D. Pa. 1962), Rodertson » Banana Handlers Local 1800, 183
F. Supp. 423, 425-26 (E.D Louisiana 1990) ; see also, Highway Truck Drivers
Local 107 v. Cohen, 182 F. Supp. 608, 617 (ELD. Pa.), aff'd per curiam, 284
F.2d 162 (3d Cit. 1960), cert. demed, 365 U.S. 833 (1961) (implied). ‘

61. Teamsters Vocal y Lucas Flour Co. 369 U.S. 95, 101 n.9 (1962); cf.,

Burlington Truck ‘ines, Inc. v. Umited States, 371 U.S. 156 (1962).
In Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 197-98 (1962), the Court
stated that “[i]i * * * there are situations in which serious problems will arise
whieh Amount

67

of the LMRDA, 29 ULS.C.A. §§ 411 (a) and 529." To
resolve this question it is necessary to determine whether
the order of revocation “otherwise disciplined” the Local's
members within the nteaning of sections 101 (a )( 5)" and
600." So far as we can determine, this question is one

of first impression. The phrase, “otherwise disciplined,”

i. not defined in the statute and a review of the legislative
history has not revealed any particular meaning attached
to it by Congress. Finally, there have heen few decisions
construing this phrase," except as it may relate to the

°

62. This, of course, is not strictly a jurisdi€tional challenge but rather an

att@k on the merits. Rell 2 Hood, 327 U.S. 678%, @B2 (1946). Jurisdiction
over this cause is. founded on § 102 of the LMRDA, 29 US ¢ AS 412, which
provides that: ;

“Any person whose rights secured hy the provistotis of this subchapter have
heen, infringed by any violation of this subchapter may bring a civil getion
in a district court of the United States for such relret Cine lnding myunetions)
as may be appropriate.”

Section 09, 20 U S.C ASS 52% provides that

“The provisions otf section 412 of this title shall be applieable an enforce

ment. of this. section.”

63. “No member of any labor organization may be fined suspended, ex-

pelled, or otherwise discipimed except for nonpayment of dues by such orgam-
zation or by any officer thereof unless such member has been (A) served
with written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his
defense: (C) afforded a full and fair hearing ~ ( Emphasis added)
64. “It shali be unlawful for any labor organization, or any “officer, agent,
shop steward, dr other representative of a labor organization, or any emplovee
\ thereof to fine, suspend, expel, or othertetse discaplme any of its members
for exercising any ‘right to which he 1s entitled under the provisions of this
chapter. * * * " (Emphasis added.)

63. Cases in which it was held that the plaintiffs were “Otherwise disct-
plined”: Detroy v American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir),
. cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961), reversing on other grounds, 189 F. Supp.
373 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) : Rekant v. Shochtay-Gasos Union, 194 F Supp. 187 CE.D.
Pa. 1961) ; 205 F. Supp. 284, 289 CE.D. Pa. 1962); Duluhery v. Marine Cooks
Union, 199 F. Supp. 270, 273 (S.D. Cal. 1961), Gross © Kennedy, 183 F
Supp. 750, 755-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)

Cases in which it was held that the plaintiffs were not “otherwise disci
plined”: Seeley v. Rratherhood of Paiters, 308 F.2d 52. 58-60 (Sth Cir.

2A

« removal of officers.”

We are disposed to: the view that the plaintiffs have
stated claims under the Act. While it is true that the rev- . Arista Mu’> Co. 193 F. 2d 529, 533
(4th Cir. 1951).

73. See Robertson v. Banana Handlers, Local 1800. supra; cf, Rekant &
Shochtay-Gasos Union, Local 446, supra; International Asseciation of Ma-
chinists v. Gonzales, supra; Bussey v. Plumbers Local No. 3, supra

74. Section 3(h) of the LMRDA defines a trusteeship as “any receivership,
trusteeship or other method of supervision or control whereby a labor organi-
zation suspends the autonomy otherwise available to a subordinate body under
its constitution or bylaws.” 20 U.S.C.A. § 402(h).

75. Section 302, 29 U.S.C_A. § 462, limits the lawiul reasons tor which a
trusteeship may be imposed.’ Section 304(c), 29 U.S.C.A. § 464(c), provides

-

in t ;
72

Preliminarily, a question to be determined is whether
the District Court was empowered to exercise jurisdiction
over this private action for alleged violations-of Title IIl
of the LMRDA, The* jurisdictional, provision of Title
III, § 304(a), 29 UA.C.A. § 464(a), provides that:

/

‘2

_ “Upon thy” written complaint of any member or
subordinate body of a labor organization alleging that
such organization has violated the provisions of this
title (except section 461 of this title) the Secretary
shall investigate the complaint and if the Secretary
finds probable cause to bgheve that such violation has
occurred and has not been remedied he shall, without
disclosing the identity of the complainant, bring a
civil action in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the labor organization for such
relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate.
Any member or subordinate body of a labor organi-
zation affected by any violation of this subchapter
_ (éxcept section. 461 of this title) may bring a civil
action in any district court of the United States hav-
ing jurisdiction of the labor organization for such
relief (including injunctions ) as may be appropriate.”
‘ &
Several district courts have interpreted this to mean that
individual members or subordinate bodies may not bring
a civil action until full resort has been had to the adminis-

that a trusteeship will be presumed valid for a period of eighteen months only
if “established by a labor organization in conformity with the, procedural re-
quirements of its constitution and bylaws and authorized or ratified after a fair
hearing either before the executive board or before such other body as may be
provided in accordance with its constitution or bylaws * * *.” .

“.°

trative remedies available before the Secretary of Labor.”
In_a litigation involving I-ocal 28 and the .IBEW, prior
but’ pertinent to the present one, District Judge R. Dorsey
Watkins had occasion to pass upon this very question.
After a scholarly analysis, he concluded that, at least until
the Secretary of Labor. does bring suit, a private action

‘can be maintained under § 304(a) of the LMRDA. Ex-

ecutive Board, Local 28 7. IBEW, 184 F. Supp. 649, 653-
59 (D. Md. 1960)."7 In this well reasoned view that
section 304(a) does not require recourse to that particular
administrative remedy and action of the Secretary before

a private suit may be entertained, this court coneurs,

Upon review of the evidence, however, Judge Thomsen®
concluded that while it is possible for revocation to be used
as a means of evading-the trusteeship provisions of Title
IlI> it was not proven that revocation was so used.” Al-
though the question is exceedingly close, see Anderson,
“Landrum-Griffin and the Trusteeship [mbroglio,” 71
Yale L. J. 1460, 1478-85 (1962), this court is not per-

” suaded that the District Court’s disposition of the trustee-

ship question should be overturned.

76. See Flaherty v. McDonald, 183 F. Supt, 300, 304-06 (S.D. Cal. 1960);
Flaherty v. United Steelworkers, 46 L.R.R M. 2483, 3006, 41 1.C. par. 16,517
(S.D. Cal. 1960); Cor v. Hutcheson, 204 F. Supp. 442, 446 05.) Ind. 1962) ;
Risso v. Ammond, 182 F. Supp. 456, 471-72 (DN J) 19)

77. Accord, Vars v. International Bhd. of [ert rmakers, 204 F. Supp. 245,
246-47 (D. Coni. 1962) ; see Palisades Lodge No. 173 7 Brotherhood of Ratl-
way Clerks, 47 L.R.R.M. 2605, 41 L.C., par. 16,666 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (by im-
plication) ; see also, Anderson, “Landrum-Griffn and the Trusteeship Imbrog
lio,” 71 Yale L J. 1460, 1498-500 (1962). Note, 48 Va. .. Kev. 78, 96-97 (1962).

78. At least two naocae appear to agree that revocation and reissuance
of a chamer should, atgheast under some circumstances, be held to constitute
the imposition of a trusteeship. See Horowitz, “Possible Effects o1 LMRDA’s
Provisions,” in Symposium on the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959 (1961), egited by. Slovenko, 458, 563; Anderson, “Landrum-Griffin

74

Exhaustion of Internal Remedies—in Both Suits '

™ v
The defendant maintains that both actions should have
been dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust the
reasonable internal remedies that were available to them.
Having filed their suits over a year ago, both Local 28°
and the individual plaintiffs, failed to appeal to the Inter-
national Convention which met this past September aiter
the appeal in this case was argued. In addition, the indi-
vidual plaintiffs in the Parks suit never did appeal to the
IEC from the IP’s revocation order.”

We think that the individual plaintiffs need not have
been actual parties to. the proceeding before the LEC. They
were not themselves direct parties to the revocation order
or proceedings and, since the two cases, Local 28's and
Parks’, are based upon a’common foundation, Local 28's
appeal to the IEC preserved the rights of the individuals
who now challenge the revocation order.

Plaintiffs” failure to appeal. to the Convention did not
bar disposition of the cases by the District Court. ° Al-
though there is a common law doctrine that parties are
not entitled to judicial relief until they have ®xhausted

. - e.

and the Trusteeship Imbroglio,” 71 Yale L. J. 1460, 1478-85 (1962). “fing

Department of Labor adopted the position: i
“that a revocation of a charter, properly conducted and in accordance with a
labor organization's constitution and bylaws, does not create a trusteeship. * * *
The Department has also determined that nothfng in the Act prevents the
creation of a new local, even though it may be composed primarily of the same
individuals formerly belonging to the trusteed local that had its charter re-
voked.” Union Trusteeships: A Report to the Congress, U.S. Dept..of Labor.
BLMR (1962) -33§4.

79. In the earlier injunction proceeding brought by Local 28, Judge Thomsen
denied relief &ince the Local had not pursuéd the available internal remedy
before the IEC. Local 28 v. IBEW, 197 F. Supp. 99, 107-08 (D. Md. 1961).

NJ
4
©

intra-union remedies, there are a number aw ell-recognized
exceptions “which have substantially qualified if not nulli-
fied the rule.” Exceptions are recoznized when resort to
the internal appeal would be unreasonablysburdensome. be-
cause of delay likely to result in irreparable injury.”

In addition to the common law doctrine, as qualified by
its exceptions, there is now § 101(a)(4) of the LMRDA,
20 USCA. § 411(a)(4).% The Second Circuit has
squarely held that the proviso in section 101 (a) (4) is ap-
plicable as a limitation on jurisdiction in suits brought in
the federal courts under section 102 for violations of Title —
| of the LMRDA, Detroy 7. American Guild of Variety

Artists, 286 F 2d 75. 77-78 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 306
U.S. 929 (1961). Not only does section 101(a)(4) gov-
ern the exhaustion! question in the Parks action, but since
it provides an authoritative expression of congressional.
labor policy, it is, insofar as it may modify the common
law exhaustion doctrine, a prime source upon which the
court should draw in forfnulating the federal law in decid-
ing the Local’s case. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).

80. Summers, “i Legal Limitations on Union Discipline,” 64 Harv. L. Rev.
1049, 1086 (1951) ; accord, Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286
F.2d 75, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 ,U.S. 929° (1961): see also, Cox, “The
Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy,” 72 Uarve L. Rev. 609, 614-15
(1959).

81. Summers, “Legal Limitations on Union .Discipline,” 64 Harv. L. Rev
1049, 1086-92 (1951); Summers, “The Law of Union Discipline: What the
Courts Do in Fact,” 70 Yale’ L. J., 175, 207-10 (1960); Annotation, 168
A.L.R. 1462, 1468-82 (1947). . and

(4) continues in full force and effect, without re-
sorting to strike or lock-out, all the terras and condi-
tions of the existing contract for a period of ‘sixty days
after such notice is given or until the expiration date

of such contraet, whichever occurs later: <

; ; ‘ R
The duties imposed upon’ employers, employees and labor
organizations by paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) shall be-
- come inapplicable upon an intervening certificatiort of the
Board, under which the labor organiéation or individual,
which is a party to the contract, has been superseded as or
ceased to be the representative of the employees subject to
the provisions of section 9(a), and the duties so imposed
shall not be construed as requiring either party to discuss

re is in effect a collective-bargain- .

87

i “ z : :
or agrée to any modification of the terms and conditions
containéd in a contract for a fixed period, if such modifi-
cation is to become effective before such terms and ‘con-
ditions can be reopened under the provisions of the con-
tract. Any employee who engages in a strike within the
sixty-day period specified in this subsection shall lose jis

status as an employee of the employer engaged in th
’ particular labor dispute, for the purposes of sections 8,9,
‘and 10 of this Act, as amended, but such loss of status for
such employee shail terminate if ‘@#ad when he is reem-
ployed by such employer.

ven

_ ’ %

t

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385601_0865%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
