# Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Klein v. Walston & Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1963
- **Citation:** 372 U.S. 913

## Text

IN THE

Office Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED

JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK

7s Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1962

719

No.

BORIS S. NADIAK,
Petitioner,
v8.

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD.-and NAJEEB E.
HALABY, Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Agency,

Respondents.

© PETITION FOR A.WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Alian Milledge

Neal Rutledge

Counsel for Petitioner

601 Flagler Federal Building

111 N. E. 1st Street

Miami 32, Florida
Milledge, Rutledge & Milledge eS
Of Counsel ,

a

- INDEX
Citations to Opinions Below
Jurisdiction
Questions Presented
Constitutional Provision and Statute Involved
Statement
Reasons for Granting the Writ

Conclusion

—

7 in

Appendix A ‘Opinion of Court of Appeals Below)

Appendix B ‘Opinion and Order of Civil Aeronau- »

tics Board Below.)

Certificate of Service

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> AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases: Page
Ex parte Endo (1944) 323 U. S. 283 16
Korematsu vs. United States (1944), 323 US.214 + 16
Ex parte Milligan (1866), 4 Wallace 2. . ‘16
Nadiak vs. Civil Aeronautics Board, 305 F.2d 588 a
(CA5, 1962) cs ese * YF
~ Specht vs. Civil Aeronautics Board, 254 F.2d 905
(CA 8; 1958) ) 11
Leonard J. Specht, 25 C.A.B. 859 (1957) 16
Constitutional Provisions and Statutes: . °
_ Fifth Amendment, U. S. Constitution x. a
5 USC 1004 (a) (3) . ; ee 8
28 USC 1254 (1) ie 2
49 USC 1429 x 3-4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 16
49 USC 1486(f) ee ; 2

’ Rules of Civil Aeronautics Board. .

14 CFR 301.13 | . Sie 8
14 CFR 301.13(d) 2
14 CFR 301.18 — | ead 8
14 CFR 301.181) co

14 CFR 30189
14 CFR 301.30
14 CFR 301.45
14 CFR’ 301.46
14 CFR 301.50

> a Me

+

case on July 6, 1962.

IN THE

‘Supreme Court of the United States —

October Term, 1962

ae

No. 7 od e Poa
BORIS S. NADIAK, , te
Petitioner,
° |

US.

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD and NAJEEB FE.
“HALABY, Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Agency,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI = ;
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari issue to

review the judgment of the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the Fifth Circuit, entered’ in the above-entitled

>

CITATIONS TO OPINIONS BELOW

The findings of the hearing examiner of the Civil
Aeronautics Board, dated February 24, 1961, may be
found in the record on appeal, pp. 142-237. The opinion
and order of the Civil Aeronautics Board, dated March

°

2

24, 1961, may be found in the record at pp. 118-138 and
is presented in Appendix B hereto. The opinion of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
printed in Appendix A hereto, is reported in 305 F.2d 588.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered
on July 6, 1962 (R. 1298). Rehearing was denied on Au-
gust 8, 1962. On November 2, 1962, this Court granted
an extension of time to, file this petition to and including |
January 4, 1963. .The jurisdiction of this Court is in-

voker under 28 USC § 1254 (1) and 49 USC § 1486(f).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

(1) Whether the Federal Aviation Administrator
had jurisdiction under proper coygtrumtion of the Fed-

eral Aviation Act of 1958 to inebeetr sens powers
: gratited him by Congress to revoke all the licenses of a
‘commercial airline pilot, where the “emergency” involved
was 23 alleged offenses spanning 10 years, the most re-
cent of wHich occurred eight months prior to the emer-
gency order, and of which the Administrator had knowl-.

edge for more than six months prior to the emergency
order; or in the alternative,

(2) Whether the use of emergency powers by the
Federal Aviation Administrator in an emergency order
charging a commercial airline pilot with 23 acts of mis-
conduct spanning 10 years, the most recent of which oc-
curred eight months prior to the emergency_ order, vio-
lated petitioner’s right to procedural due process under
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND
STATUTE INVOLVED — ° |...

The Constitutional provision involved ‘is the due:
process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution:

“No person shall * * * * be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of *
law: * * * *

The statutory frovision involved is ¥ 609, Federal

“Aviation Act of 1958, 49 USC § 1429, which provides as

follows: °

Reinspection or Reexamination; Amendment,
Suspension, or Revocation of Certificates; Noti-
fication; Hearing; Appeal to Board; Judicial
Review.
“Sec. 609. The Administrator m may, from time
to time, reinspect any civil aircrait, aircraft, en-
e gine, propeller, appliance, air navigation facility,
or air agency, or may reexamine any Civil air-
man. If, as a result of any such reinspection or
reexamination, or if, as a result of any other in-
vestigation made by the Administrator, he de-
terminies that safety in air commerce or air
transportation and the public interest requires,
@the Administrator may issue an order amend-
ing, modifying, suspending, or revoking, in whole
or in part, any type certificate, production cer-
tificate, airworthiness certificate, airman cer- ‘
tificate, air carrier operating certificate, air
—— facility certificate, or air agency

4 “
certificate. Prior to amending, modifying, sus-
pending, or revoking’ any of the foregoing cer-
tificates, the Administrator shall advise the
holder thereof as to any charges or other rea-
sons relied upon by the Administrator for his
proposed action and, except in cases of emer-
gency; shall provide the holder of such a certifi-
cate an opportunity to answer any charges and
. be heard as. to why such certificate should not
be amended, modified,. suspended, or revoked.
Any person whose certificate is affected by such
an order of the Administrator under this section
may appeal the Administrator’s order to the
Board and the Board may, after notice and

hearing, amend, modify, or reverse the Admin- —

istrator’s order if it finds that safety in air
- eommerce or air transportation and the public
interest dé not require affirmation of the Ad-
ministrator’s order. In the conduct of ‘its hear-
ings the Board shall not be bound by findings
of fact of the Administrator. The filing of an
appeal with the Board shall stay the effective-
ness of te Administrator’s order unless the Ad-
ministrator advises the Board that an emergency

exists w saféty in air commerce or air trans- |

portatisn requires the immediate effectiveness
of his. order, in which event the order shall re-
main effective and the Board shall finally dis-
pose of the appeal within sixty days after being
so advised by the Administrator. The person sub-
stantially affected by the Board’s order may
obtain judicial review of said order under the
provisions of section 1006, and the Administrator
shall be made a party to such proceedings.”

STATEMENT :
Petitioner is. a commercial airline pilot) who has
flown for more than 20 years and has flown in scheduled
air transportation for more than 12 years (R. 869%). He
has flown nearly 15,000 hours without accident or injuky
to passengers or equipment (R.&70'. He holds almost
every rating granted by the Federal Aviation Agency
(R. 869). He has never failed a flight check nor received
an unsatisfactory grade (R. 871).
°

On July 22, 1960, the Federal Aviation Administrator
proposed to suspend one of the licenses of the petitioner,
and to issue,in its place a temporary license. This pro-
“posed minor disciplinary-action was because of a reported
incident-on March 15, 1960 of petitioner’s having flown
too close to another aircraft. Petitioner resisted this pro-
posed discipline and the Administrator took no further
action to impose the suspension. But the Federal Avia-
tion Administrator then commenced a full-scale investi-
gation of petitioner, which took more than eight months
to complete (R. 276).

: 2.

On January 12, 1961, the Federal Aviation Adminis-
trator, General E. R. Quesada, acting under the cmer-
gency provisions of $ 609, Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
AS USC $1429, revoked all of the licenses of the peti-
tioner (Re 13-22). The order charged the petitioner wath
23 offenses. The most recent of these offenses wis 2l-
leged to have occurred on, May & 1960, over eight months
prior to the emergency order. The remaining 22 charve-
covered_a period back to #851, with five of the charee-
relating to “an unknown date” (R. 19,20, 21>. Petitioner
appealed this order to the Civi! Aeronautics Board and

a
«

6

on January 27, 1961, the Federal Aviation Administrat
filed a complaint alleging the same 23 offenses againft
petitioner (R. 1-12). On January 24,.1961, the Adminik-
trator notified the Civil Aeronautics Board of the eme
gency character of his order, thereby putting into effect
’ the sixty-day time limit on action by the Civil Aeronautics
Board imposed by § 609 of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 (R. 22). This required the Civil Aeronautics Board
to hold the trial ‘and complete the appeal within 60 days.
A hearing was immediately ordered before a hearing
examiner of the Civil Aeronautics Board, which hearing
commenced February 13, 1961 and was completed on Feb-
fuary 24, 1961 (R. 251-1189). At the commencement of the
hearing, petitioner moved to‘dismiss the charges (R. 265)
~ on the ground, among others, that there was no showing
that an emergency existed, which motion was denied
(R.271). The hearing examiner found that substantially
all of the charges were proved and recommended that the
order of revocation of all licenses of petitioner be af-
firmed (R. 1189).

On March 24, 1961, the Civil Aeronautics Board, dis-
regarding 18 of the charges against petitioner and char-
acterizing many of them as “trivial” and “ambiguous as
to date” (R. 134), found five of the charges to be substan-
tial and proven (R. 118-138). The Board, nonetheless, af-
firmed the order of the Administrator revoking all of
petitioner’s licenses (R.138). The’ petitioner then ap-
pealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. The Court of Appeals, while highly critical of
“the blunderbuss nature of the charges” and the “sand-
bagging a pilot with a whole mass of old, trivial, petty or
insubstantial charges” (305 F.2d at 591), upheld the or-
ders of the Federal Aviation Administrator and the Civil

e

Aeronautics Board as not violating the fundamental rights
of petitioner.

Jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics Board ‘was
founded upon 49 USC § 1429, and jurisdiction of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
rested upon 49 USC § 1486. .

_. The Questions here presented were raised by Peti-
tioner bef*ie the Trial Examiner of the CAB below (R.
265, 2711; to the CAB (R.91); and were argued and con-
sidered by the Court of Appeals below as shown by its

“opinion in Appendix A; and in the Petition for Rehearing
to the Court of Appeals (R. 1299-1301).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Congress has granted vast and awesome emergency
powers to the Federal Aviation Administrator for use in
emergency to protect the safety of the American public.
At best, the use of these emergency powers works a sub-
stantial hardship upon any person against whose interest
these emergency powers are invoked. Upon the invoca-
tion of the emergency powers, a complete trial and ap-
peal must be held and concluded within sixty days. In
the instant case the Federal Aviation Administrator used
these powers when there was no emergency, and in a
manner never intended by Congr ess, anddn such a way
as to assure that the petitioner could not adequately de-
fend himself against the charges made.

Normal Procedures vs. Emergency Procedures

Normally, when the Federal Aviation Administrator
desires to suspend or revoke licenses of an airline pilot,

8

the pilot is informed of the proposed action and has an
opportunity to present evidence to the Administrator and
then to appeal to the Civil Aeronautics Board which must
grant him an opportunity again to present evidence as
well as arguments and written briefs. Under the normal
procedure there is no time limit other than that generally
provided in the Administrative Procedure Act which sim-
ply provides that, “In fixing the times and places for
hearings, due regard shall be had for the convenience and
“necessity of the parties or their peprerenanaves” [USC, -
Title 5, § 1004(a)(3)].
me

The Rules of the Civil Aeronautics Board provide for
‘defensive pleadings including motions to dismiss [CFR,
Title 14, § 301.18], and motions for more definite state-
ment {|CFR, Title 14, § 301.19]. They provide a flexible
time for the commencement of hearings depending in
part upon the convenience of the parties [CFR Title 14,
$ 301.30]. Extensions bs time may be granted for good
cause [CFR Title 14, § 301.13(d)]. The time restrictions
on pleadings [CFR Title 14, § 301.13] and on appellate
procedures [CFR Title 14, § 301.45, 301.46} are similar to
the time limitations of civil actions in the Federal courts.

However, when the emergency powers pyovided by
$ 609 Mf the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 are fvokea by
the Administrator, not only is the pilot grounded pending
the hearing and review by the Civil Aeronautics Board,
but from the date that the Administrator notifies the
Board of the emergency character of the order, the Board
has only 60 days.in which to permit pleadings, to hold the
hearing, to take testimony, to make initial findings and
couelusions, to permit preparation of written briefs, to
grant oral argument, and to dispose of the matter.

» &
”

&
aa

The statute and the CAB rules thereunder, make the
time limitations under the emergency procedures com-
pletely inflexible. There is allowed but eight days to plead
and then but eight days’to prepare for trial [CFR, Title
14, § 301.50|. The appellate time limitations are similarly

saliteeglh No extensions of time are permissible as the

Board has a Congressional mandate to complete the trial

_and appellate procedures within 60 days.

It seems clear when the emergency procedures are
contrasted with the normal procedures, that Congress in-
tended that the emergency procedures should be invoked
immediately upon a serious and patent ya to air

’ safety. Congress clearly did not intend that a pilot should

be required to defend his whole professional career on
short notice under the severe restrictions of the emer-
gency procedures.

ch

This “Emergency” &

The thrust of the charges against the petitioner was
that he lacked competent judgment. His high technical
proficiency and ability were conceded. No accident or in-
jury wag charged. No mental or physical deficiency was
alleged. Only his judgment was attacked, and even his

. judgment was not attacked on the basis of any recent

incidents.

The most recent incident of alleged bad judgment oc-
curred on May &, 1960, more than eight months prior to
the emergency order of. ‘anuary 12, 1961. The most serious
alleged offense occurred on March 15, 1960, an incident

involving a charge of flying too close te another aircraft.

The Administrator admitted that he had knowledge of this

10,
incident at least by April 25, 1960 (R. 276), and that he
then commenced the- investigation of petitioner from which
the other alleged offenses were discovered. On the basis
of this investigation, the Administrator proposed minor
disciplinary action against the petitioner on July 22, 1960.
Thus, with full knowledge of the alieged substantial of-
fenses against petitioner, the Administrator not only did
not declare an emergency but proposed under normal pro-
cedures to impose only minor sanctions against petitioner.
When the petitioner indicated that he wished to oppose the
Jul¥ 22, 1960 minor discipline by the Administrator, the -
Administrator declined to proceed further and declined to
hold hearings and took no further action. Consequently,
he permitted the petitioner to fly as a commercial airline
pilot for National Airlines, transporting thousands of
passengers over thousands of miles for another six months.
The Administrator clearly did not feel that any emergency
existed in July 1960.

What motivated the Administrator some six months
later to declare an “emergency” is not known.' No recent
act was alleged against petitioner in the emergency order
of January 12, 1961, but to the contrary, his conduct since
May 8, 1960, or for more than eight months while under
investigation and presumably under close observation was
apparently correct in every instance.

There is absolutely nothing in the Administrator's
emergency order, nor in the charges against petitioner,
nor anywhere in the entire record to justify the emer-
gency character of the proceedings. To the contrary, it
affirmatively appears that the Administrator, with knowl-
edge, and after three months of investigation, himself, in

'But see record pp. 871 and 872.

<?

1]

July, 1960, did not characterize the situation as an emer-
gency and did not even follow through on proposed minor
disciplinary action once begun.

The action of the Administrator in invoking the
emergency powers granted him by Congress was nothing
short of arbitrary, capricious and willful abuse of power.

The Contemplated Use of the Emergency Powers

When Congress established the 60-day time limit for
both trial and appeal in an air safety emergency, it nec-
essarily contemplated a recent and Serious situation, but
presumably it also had in mind the evidence that is avail-
able in the air industry, particularly that of automatic
recording devices and other scientific equipment whose
authenticity is not subject to the infirmities of human
observation, recollection and interpretation.

The charges against petitioner in the instant case
were based on oral testimony |R. 120], not on scientific
recording devices or taped records of conversations. Com-
pare Specht vs. Civil Aeronautics Board, 254 F.2d 905 (CA
8, 1958). On the contrary, when the petitioner sought to
secure in his own defense the taped recordings of his con-
versations with control towers and other aircraft, he was
informed thatcthe Federal Aviation Agency itself had
routinely destroved the tapes in question [h. 1259]. Be-
cause of this very reason, thé rules of the CAB charac-
terize allegations of offenses more than six months old
as “stale” (CFR, Title 14, £ S0LD&te:). The petitioner,
however, was required to defend himself against 25
“stale” charges allegedly committed at various times over
the past decade and to have occurred at various places,

12

from Boston in the north, to Miami in the south, and
as far west as New Orleans. This he had to do under the
severe time limitations of the emergency provisions of
$ 609 of the Federal*Aviation Act.

CAB Concern

The Administrator presumably conducted his investi-
gation of petitioner from April 25, 1960 until January 12,
1961 with, of course, all the staff and facilities of his
agency at his disposal, to say nothing of the power of that
agency over the air industry. Upon the issuance of the
January 12, 1961 order and the notification to the CAB
of the “emergency,” the Administrator required the pe-
titioner in a matter of several weeks to defend himself
against the Agency’s months of investigation. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the hearing examiner of the
Civil Aeronautics Board found that 22 of the 23 charges
were proved and that the greater amount of evidence was
on the side of the Federal Aviation Agency.

The shotgun tactics used by the Administrator against
the petitioner gave some concern to the Civil Aeronautics
Board. The Board said in its opinion, “We fail to see what
useful purpose is served in an emergency proceeding such
as this by the inclusion of trivial and ill-defined charges,
and such action can only serve to clutter the record with
evidence directed toward establishing, refuting, or ex-
plaining them” (R. 134). In attempting to rationalize the
impossible position in which petitioner was placed by the
Administrator’s use of the emergency provisions, the
Board said, in its opinion, “It is true, of course, that the
accelerated time periods required to meet the 60-day stat-
utory period provided under the emergency provisions of

section 609 place an added burden on the respondent as
well as all others concerned, particularly in a situation
like the present where numerous violations are involved.
This, however, is largely the unavoidable result of the
statutory scheme which the Congress had deemed essen-
tial in furtherance of the overriding interest of air safety”
(R. 133).

The petitioner’s predicament in this case is clearly
not the unavoidable result of the statutory scheme estab-
lisned by Congress, but is the result of the deliberately
chosen course of action of the Administrator.

This case was to be won or lost before the hearing
examiner. °’The Board, in its opinion, finds its function
limited to deciding “whether the findings of the Examiner
are supported by substantial, reliable or probative evi-
dence” (R. 120). On the record made, the Board concluded,
“Here the Examiner's findings are predicated in large
measure on his acceptance of the testimony of the com-
plainant’s witnesses and his rejection of the conflicting
testimony of respondent” (R. 120).

It is no assistance to the petitioner that the Board
disregarded 18 of the charges against him. At the time
for taking testimony he had to defend a!! 28 charges.
Were he clairvoyant, he might have concentrated his ef-
forts on the five charges the Board ultimately determined
to he substantial and proved. However, it cannot be said
that the remaining 18 charges were insignificant, for not
only were several of the 18 similar to the five relied upon
by the Board, but inasmuch as the petitioner’s judgment.
not his ability. was in question, presumably each of the
charges was significant. That each and every charge was

14

significant was clearly the opinion not only of the Admin-
istrator but also of the hearing examiner who refused to
dismiss even the most trivial charges and found all but
one of the charges to have been proven.

Petitioner respectfully submits that it is too pat and
superficial to deal with the shotgun tactics of the Ad-
ministrator as a matter simply of “cluttering up the rec-

rd” and then proceed to pick five of the 23 charges as
the basis for an order depriving a man of his livelihood, |

Concern of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals likewise expressed concern.
Its opinion upholding the result seems to turn on the
doctrine of “harmless error.” The court said in reference
to the shotgun tactics‘of the Administrator, “We combed
every page of this record to make sure that the decision
was not infected with this practice.” 305 F.2d at 591.

The logical deficiency of this statement is patent.
The lack of an opportunity to prepare afi adequate de-
fense to a multiplicity of charges allegedly occurring over
ten years and at places thousands of miles apart will not
affirmatively appear in a record. Only if one were suc-
cessful in his defense, or if the evidence against one were
of a type not susceptible of contradiction or qualification,
could the lack of adequate time to defend be “harmless
error.” Here the whole case rests upon the hearing exam-
iner’s and the Boafd’s “acceptance of the testimony of the
complainant's witnesses and... . rejection of the conflict-
ing testimony of respondent.” The deprivation of the
fundamental rights of petitioner in this case is anything
but harmless.’ The fact that a man fights to defend him-

g

1d :
self with the only means available, in this case his own
testimony, does not mean that he Mas had the opportunity
of a fair trial. 6

The Sanction

One final observation should be made. The sanction
imposed against petitioner was the revocation of all of
his licenses including even his student license. While
technically the revocation is only for one year. the peti-
uioner is required to begin at the bottom rung of the FAA
license structure and again attempt to ascend to the
various commercial ratings. So far, he has been refused
permissior even to apply for a student license, although
the year has expired. Inasmuch as lack of competent
judgment was the basis of the erder revoking all his li-
censes, it is reasonable to assume that petitioner has
little chance of resuming his livelihood as a commercial
airline pilot in the future.

The significance of this observation is that the sanc-
tion imposed was effectively that of depriving petitioner
of his livelihood as a commercial airline pilot and was' the
most severe sanction available. The CAB based its affirm-
ance of the revocation of all licenses of petitioner on peti-
tioner’s “flagrant disregard” of rules of air safety. Even
if the petitioner could not, in a.fair hearing with ade-
quate defense, completely exonerate himself ofall the
charges, the type of sanction imposed depends upon the
quality of petitioner's responsibility for the offenses
charged. Upon this issue an adequate defense would he of
critical significance.

16
Novelty and importance of Questions Involved

Thé question of the power of the Federal Aviation
Administrator to invoke his emergency powers under
: 609 of the Act when no “emergency” exists has not here-
tofore been considered by this Court or by any of the -
eleven United States courts of appeals. In view of the

awesome nature of such power and the corresponding pos-
sibilities of abuse, the question is clearly one of national
importance in the administration of the Act and should
be settled by the considered review and decision: of this
Court. Especially is this so since the CAB has heretofore
held under the predecessor Civil Aeronautics Act that it
lacked authority to review the invocation of emergency
powers by the“Administrator. Leonard J. Specht, 25 C.A.B.
859, 892 (1957). The CAB is apparently persisting in
this same view under the 1958 Act, despite its powers of
review under § 609, as demonstrated by the instant case.
Petitioner respectfully submits that Congress did not in-
tend that the wrongful invocation of emergency powers
when ‘no emergency basis therefor exists and when such
powers are used to deny due process should stand forever
uncorrected by any agency or court. Compare Korematsu
v. United States (1944), 323 U.S. 214, with Ex parte Endo
(1944), 323 U.S. 283, and Ex parte Milligan (1866), 4 Wal-
lace 2. |

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, this:petition for a writ
of certiorari should be granted:

Respectfully submitted,
. Allan Milledge
Pa Neal Rutledge
601 Flagler Federal Building
111 N. E. Ist Street
Miami 32, Florida
Counsel for Petitioner

Milledge, Rutledge & Milledg Pie
Of Counsel

- APPENDIX A

IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
| FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19136

e

BORIS S. NADIAK,
Appellant,
versus :

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD and NAJEEB E.
HALABY, Administrator of the Federal

Aviation Agency, ~ ‘

Appellees.

s

—@
Petition for Review of Orders of the Civil Aeronautics
Board sitting at Washington, D.C.‘

(July 6, 1962)

Before TUTTLE, Chief Judge, and BROWN and BELL,
_ Circuit Judges.

“BROWN, Circuit Judge: This case presents the
basic question of whether the proceedings relating to the
grounding of a commercial airline pilot were procedurally

correct. After a careful reading of every word of 1234 ©

typewritten foolscap pages, plus Q-odd documentary ex-
“hibits, we are convinced that they were, and affirm the
decision of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).

3

App. 2

2 Boris S. Nadiak v. Civil Aeronautics Board

There is no doubt regarding the technical proficiency
of this: pilot. He has flown for more than 20 years—almost
15,000 hours—and during :that time he has never had an
accident which damaged an aircraft or injured a passen-
ger. He has held almost every possible certificate from the
FAA, and has been employed.in scheduled air transporta-
tion for over 12 years as the holder of an Airline Transport
Pilot Certificate. He has never failed a flight check, nor
even received an unsatisfactory- grade. But his technical
proficiency is not in issue here—nor was it below. The Ad-
ministrator’s emergency revocation of Nadiak’s Airman
Certificate was based on a lack of the necessary judgment
and responsibility.

On July 22, 1960, the Administrator proposed to sus-
pend Nadiak’s Airline Transport Certificate“for.60 days.
and to issue injts place a temporary Commercial Pilot
Certificate. This proposed minor-wing-clipping was _ be-
cause of a reported incident on’ March 15, 1960, of his hav-
ing flown tod close to another aircraft in violation of cer-

tain Civil Aeronautics Regulations. His resistance to this
order and his appeal to the Civil Aeronautics Board pre-
cipitated «a full scale investigation, which took over 8
months to complete, covering several thousand miles and
brought into review 12 years of Nadiak’s professional ca-
reer. The result Was an emergency order on January 12,
1961, by the Administrator. This completely grounded
Nadiak by yvevoking all of his certificates.' After a full

'This emergency order is authorized by $609 of the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958, 49 USCA $1429. The effect of the Administrator’s
determination that am emergency exists is to’ give immediate effective-
ness to his order. Because of the peremptory nature of such an order,
an immediate appeal to the CAB by the aggrieved person is permitted.
The appeal must be finally disposed of by that Board within 60 days.

The order in this case provided that Nadiak, could make applica-

App. 3

-" Boris S. Nadiak vv. Cicil Acronauties Board . ae

hearing by an Examiner, the CAB affirmed the Adminis-
trator’s action, and the present Petition for Review fol-
lowed. : -

We feel it important to ‘state at the outset that while
we affirm the order in this case, we join with the CAB in
registering our disapproval of one aspect of the practice
followed in this proceeding. While we conclude without any
reservation whatsoever that no prejudicial harm to Nadiak
occurred as a result of it, the blunderbuss ynature of the

~ charges is the sole thing which gave us any. real concern.,
We combed every page of this record to make sure that the
decision was_pot infected. by this practice. Considering
the awesome nature of the Administrator’s power when
invoked in an emergency proceeding, we think that the
FAA should be more selective than it was here in the spec-
ification of charges. What we have particular reference to
‘is the bringing of some 23 charges, many of which are
vague and trivial, in a proceeding of this nature when time .
for investigation and preparation of defenses is neces-
sarily limited by the statutory timetable. For example, one
of the charges brought three years later in 1961 stated
that “On or about April 18, 1958, | Nadiak| * * A ae
for duty * * * two minutes prior to scheduled departure
time * * * *” Another charged him with “carrying a case
of beer under his arm * * * on several occasions in 1956

tion for another Pilot Certificate after one yea> from the date of the
order, As the one-year period has now elapsed, there is every reason
to assu ie that the Administrator will fully comply with its obligation
eo afforl proper and fair consideration to any such application by
Nadiak. Nothing we say or imply is to be construed as an opposition
to such post-suspensiun relief. Indeed, since it is public safety, and not
punishment, which undergirds the whole stututory scheme and the dis-
ciplinary proceeding, restoration of certification, complete or partial
is a legitimate concern in the exercise of the expert judgment of the
Administrator.
a

App. 4

4 Boris S. Nadiak v. Civil Aeronautics Board

* * * Still another, presumably relating to his qualifi-
cation to hold an Airman’s Certificate, stated that “On
or about May 23, 1956, |Nadiak] * * * pushed [a power

mower | across the ramp at Miami, Florida.”

While we fully appreciate the zealousness of the Ad-
_ministrator in carrying out his assigned responsibilities

of promoting safety in the air lanes and the practical prob-:

lems in doing so within limited time schedules, funda-
mental notions of fair play dictate that one called upon
to defend truly serious charges in an emergency proceed-
ing ought not to have adjudication of such substantial mat-
ters exposed to the possibility of inflammatory contamina-
tion by stale or trivial incidents. We find ourselves in full
agreement with the CAB when, after ruling on the five and
only major charges, it made a “general observation con-
cerning the nature of the remaining charges in the Admin-
- istrator’s complaint, none of which, * * * are pertinent to
our disposition of this proceeding.” Thus, continued the
CAB, “Our examination of them indicates that many ap-
pear trivial and some are ambiguous as to the date upon
which the incident is alleged to have taken place. We fail
to see what useful purpose is served in an emergency pro-
ceeding such as this by the inclusion of trivial and ili-de-
fined charges, and such action can only serve to clutter the
- record with evidence directed toward establishing, refut-
ing, or explaining them.”

To this we would only add the caveat that avoidance
of the practice is more than a janitorial necessity to pre-
vent cluttering up a record. Sandbagging a pilot with a
whole mass of old, trivial, petty or insubstantial charges
may adversely affect fundamental rights. Serious charges
are to be seriously tried as serious charges. The CAB, in

2

App. 5

/ Boris S. Nadiak v. Civil Aeronautics Board 5

its role of the tribunal adjudicating charges filed by the
Administrator, must, as would a Court in relation to the
prosecution, see that charges fairly meet the demands of
our fundamental concepts of a fair trial.

Without translating it specifically into any particular
claim of error by CAB, Nadiak stresses that he was one
of the few remaining “scab” pilots at National Airlines,
and that almost all evidence against him was presented
by Union members. Even though many witnesses testified
that he was an “unpopular” pilot, no evidence was ad-
mitted which would\require a reversal on this ground. At
one time there were approximately 100 nonunion pilots
employed by National. Many of these, including Nadiak,
incurred the wrath of the Union pilots by flying during
the strike against National in 1948. Since that time, their
number has dwindled to less than 20. But with these facts
standing alone, we are unable to perceive just what Na-
diak’s counsel would have us do. With proper enthusiasm
he sought to impeach adverse witnesses by showing a con-
scious effort by the Union and its members to “first
ground [Nadiak| and then drive {him| from the air lanes
altogether,” Flight Engineers v. American Airlines, Inc.,
5 Cir., 1962, — F.2d —, — [No. 19055, June 7, 1962).
But the CAB may well have thought this effort backfired.
Typical of such testimony was the cross examination by
Nadiak’s counsel of one of the Union copilots.

“Q. Were you aware of |Nadiak’s| activities
during the National strike about ten vears ago?

“A. Tam aware that he is a non-ALP Ae mem-
ber, a nonunion pilot, ves.

“Q. Do you like that?

‘ App. 6

6 Boris S. Nadiak v. Civil Aeronautics Board

“A. The best way I can answer that question
is either yea or nay for this reason, that during
that winter period the majority of Captains fly-
ing out of the New York base were non-ALPA
pilots, and I could show my flight log to show that
90% of the pilots I flew with were nonunion
pilots. The fact that Captain Nadiak was non-
union had no bearing whatsoever.”

Of this we can only say at this point that while
credibility choices were available to the Examiner, they
are not open to us. We must take the record as we find it.
Whether, as the CAB found, the contention of Union-in-
duced hostility toward Nadiak would merely “go to the
question of motivation rather than to the factual accuracy
of the testimony rendered,” or would destroy altogether
the credibility of the Union witnesses, was a matter con-
fided to the trier of fact.

Turning now to the assigned errors, we find the usual
one on review of administrative action—that the order is
not supported by substawtial evidence. But even reducing
the matter to the only five major charges which the CAB
sustained, — of evidence to support these is stag-
gering. Admfttedly, there was conflicting evidere on al-
most ,every charge, but our function is not to weigh the
evidence to determine who should win the swearing match.
The function of a reviewing Court is to accept the findings
of fact made by the administrative body if there is sub-
stantial evidence in the record considered as a whole to
support those findings. Federal Aviation, Act, $1006/e),
49 USCA $1486/e) ; 5 USCA $1009/e); ef NLR v. Wal-
ton Manufacturing Co., 1962, Va. ,ena C ,.7

App. 7

Boris S. Nadiak v. Civil Aeronautics Board 7
L. Ed. 829; NLRB v. Ferguson, 5 Cir., 1958, 257 F.2d 88,
90; Specht v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 8 Cir., 1958, 254
F.2d 905, 913. Here there is ample evidence.

o The next contention is that the sanction is too severe.
Under the order the pilot was completely grounded. Na-
diak’s contention is that even accepting the entire mass of
adverse evidence as true, it goes only to show that Nadiak
is not qualified to be a pilot in command of an airplane
carrying passengers. It does not, the argument continues,
show that, for example, he would not be a qualified copilot,
or pilot of a lesser rating. But with that, the Administra-
tor, several experts, the Examiner, and the CAB as a mat-
ter of aeronautical expertness disagreed. Nadiak on abun-
dant evidence was found to have (1) passed too close to
another aircraft and violated regulations specifying pro-
cedure to follow in overtaking other airplanes, (2) vio-
lated an airportcttaffic pattern by turning right after a
take-off and his company’s safety rules by taking off with
an excessive tail wind, (3) landed his aircraft at a time
when the ceiling was below prescribed minimums, (4) de-
viated from flight clearances without obtaining amended
clearances, and (5) violated other regulations by flying

b

through and in close proximity to clouds while operating ~

under VFR ‘(Visual Flight Rules).

Though we do not have the benefit of the technical
background of the two expert agencies charged with pro-
moting safety in the air lanes, we know enough to see that
the agency could properly regard these charges as quite
serious. Such practices would endanger not only the air-
craft piloted, along with its passengers, but other people,
aircraft and property as well. More than that, what was

3

>

App. &

ss Boris S. Nadiak v. Civil Aeronautics Board

at issue was Nadiak’s judgment and responsible use of it
while in the air. The law is fortunately sensible enough
to recognize that in a highly technical area the evaluation
of action and appropriate disciplinary sanction necessarily
requires that the agency be vested with a wide range of
discretion in the imposition of penalties. Walver v. CAB,
2 Cir., 1958, 251 F.2d 954. Our review of the sanction im-
posed is confined to the inquiry of whether there was an
abuse of discr:tion. We find no such abuse here. Cf. Gar-
ber v. CAB, 2 Cir., 1960, 276 F.2d 321; Specht v. CAB,
8 Cir., 1958, 254 F.2d 905; Sisto v. CAB, D.C. Cir., 1949,
179 F.2d 47; Carey v. CAB, 1 Cir., 1960, 275 F.2d 518,
522. And if this seems now or later to be too harsh, amel-
ioration may be sought by Nadiak’s making application
for a certificate upon the expiration of one year from the
date of the order. See note 1, supra.

The last group of assigned errors charged that the
Examiner made numerous errors in his rulings during the
course of the hearing. These are that the Examiner erro-
neously (1) failed to dismiss the complaint because the

#
complete administrative file was not produced,’ (2) did
not require the production of certain tangible evidence, and
(3) allowed Nadiak to be unduly prejudiced by the ad-
mission of hearsay evidence. .

Taking these rulings in reverse order, we find no
merit in the complaints about hearsay. Upon a caréful re-
view of the entire record, we find that most of the evidence
admitted over objection was not subject to the hearsay ex-
clusion anyway. In other words, under the traditional rules

~ 2At oral argument, Nadiak’s ‘counsei stated that the case should
turn on this point.

App.

Boris S. Nadiak v. Civil Aeronautics Board 9

was admissible. But if as to some
f evidence the traditional rules
would have excluded th® Questioned evidence, its admission
does not constitute error requiring reversal of this case
because the technical rules of evidence that govern pro-
cedures in the courts are not necessarily applicable to ad-
ministrative proceedings, Administrative Procedure Act,
S71e), 5USCA 8100616); Falsone v. United States, 5 Cir.
1953, 205 F.2d 734, 742, n. 14, cert. den. 346 U.S. 864, 74
S.Ct. 108, 98 L.Ed. 375; 1 Wigmore, Evidence $4c¢ at 47-48.
Furthermore, even if the evidence in question were ex-
cluded, there would still be’substantial evidence to sustain
the findings. Sisto v. CAB, D.C. Cir, 1949, 179 F.2d 47,
51. That weuld reduce it then to a question whether its
erroneous admission infected the proceedings or critical
fact findings. There is no basis for any such conclusion
here. .

of evidence, the evidence
of these isolafed bits

The assigned error of not producing certain tangible
evidence borders on the frivolous. Early in the proceedings,
Nadiak filed an Application for Production of Docu-
mentary and Tangible Evidence. We find it unnecessary
to rule on the duty of the agency to produce under such
circumstances because the next day the FAA responded
with a letter enclosing much of the requested data. telling
how other parts of it could be obtained, and explaining
that the remainder was not available as it had been rou-
tinely destroyed before the institution of the investigation
into Nadiak’s flight safety practices. In short the FAA
produced all they had of the requested material. No more
could be required.

Lastly—and from his viewpoint most important (see
note 2, supra) —Nadiak asserts that the order should be

App. 10

10 Boris S. Nadiak v. Civil Acronautes Board

reversed because of the failure of the Administrator to pro-
duce his entire file before the Examiner and CARB. This,
he says, is beenuse the file “would add measurably to the
evidence showing qualification.” This rests upon his con-
tention that proceedings before the CAB are appellate in
nature and that their decision should be based upon the
record as a whole. Reliance is placed on the fact that £609,
49 USCA $1429, provides for “an appeal” to the Board.
How proceedings lasting over a week with a parade of wit-
nesses being examined and cross examined can be called
appellate in nature escapes us. Section 609 certainly does
not sustain it. For that same section provides that the
Board is not bound by the Administrator’s findings of
facts, and the Rules of Practice place the burden of proof
upon the Administrator.’

But we do not quibble over nomenclature. “As near
as we can understand it,* the asserted error comes down to
this. The Examiner ‘and the Board should have received
— and therefore read —— the whole investigatory file of
the Administrator. This, he claimed, would have re-
vealed material that “would add measurably to the evi-
dence showing | Nadiak’s| qualification.”

This was not sought for discovery. Nor was it a
dem Arom time to time for a Jencks-like look at a
pa lar witness’ prior written statement. It was,
rather. a broad contention that the whole file should
somehow become a part of the record to give the Board
and the “Examiner the opportunity to review those many
findings of investigation * * * in favor of |Nadiak| * * *”

14 CFR §301.321b). | . -
4This point, and just what Nadiak’s contentions were with respect

to it. was the subject of painstaking inquiry on the oral argument We
have viewed it from every angle remotely suggested —

App. 11

Boris S, Nadiak e. Civd Aeronautics Bord ll

without which “the Examiner cfinnot make a fair deter-
mination * * *.”

But this would destroy the whole structave so care-
fully designed by Congress to separate “completely the in-
quisitorial functions from the adjudicatory function.” This
would be to surrender the long and hard-Sought gains of
the Administrative Procedure Act. See especially <35'¢),
Tid', F USCA S31004¢6), 10061d). Riss & Co. Tne. v.
United States, 1951, 341 ULS, 907, 71 S. Ct. 620, 95 ].. Ed.
1345. reversing 06 F, Supp. 452; Wong Yang Sung v. VWe-
Grath, 1950, 559 U.S. 33, 70 8. Ct. 445, 94 L. Ed. 616.
osfind since the public has a big stake in these proceedings,
the Board was not required to acquiesce in the beguiling
importunities that this undisclosed material coming from
unspecified persons and ucquired under unrevealed cir-
cumstances would soméhow “help him.” The Board was
expected to puss on these serious charges by a proceeding
Which would in all vital respects give the Administrator
and respondent a fair chance to meet and test evidence
offered for and against the complaint. [t is the considered
judgment of Congress that the interest of neither the pub-
lic nor the person under charge is adequately cared for if
the adjudicatory tribunal is to have access to the ex parte
partisan views of the investigatory-prosecutorial staff or
to the material assembled by their efforts. T.S.C. Motor

Fix iqht Lines. fie. asf Unite d States, S.D. Tex., 1960, 186

F. Supp. 777. 740. The wish of a particular pilot that
this fundamental principle be relaxed did not make the
Board's rejection of it-an error.

‘This approach was specifically followed in the overhaul and
marked changes in national air megulatory statutes. See Legislative
History on Federal Aviation Act of 1958, expressiv adopting the stand-

ards of the Administrative. Procedure Act, 1958 US. Code Cong. &
Adm News, p. 3741, 3747-48 ‘

App. 12

12 Boris S. Nadiak v. Civil Ac:enautics Board

The public — including judges who fly — has a vita)
interest in air safety. Responsibility for air safety has
been placed in the administrative hands of those deemed
by Congress to have an expert competence. Air safety
was of primary importance in the adjudication of this
case: The determination was that air safety would be
promoted by the certificate revocation..After permissible
credibility choices, the findings were that numerous regu-
lations and rules of the air lanes — which must not be
ignored or taken lightly — had heen violated. Those
findings were supported by substantial evidence in a hear-
ing which was fair and regular. There it ends.

AFFIRMED.

App. 13
APPENDIX B

Order No. S-1098 .
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD -
WASHINGTON, D. £¢.

Adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board
at its office fn Washington, D. C.,
on the 24th day of March, 1961

,

NAJEEB E. HALABY,
Administrator, Federal Aviation Agency,

Complainant,

VS.

BORIS S.°NADIAK,

vo

\ Docket SE-177

OPINJON AND ORDER

BY THE BOARD: \

This proceeding is before the Board on appeal by
respondent, Boris S. Nadiak, from the Initial Decision’
of Examiner Joseph C. Caldwell, Jr., affirming the Ad-

'The Initial Decision was rendered orally at the conclusign of the -

hearing A copy of the transcript is attached hereto

r

Respondent.

~

App. 14

ministrator’s emergency order,’ which revoked respond-
ent’s airman certificate and provided that he-was ineli-
gible to apply¢for another pilot certificate for one year.
The Initial Decision is based on numerous findings of vio-
lations of.the Civil Air Regulations, including careless and
reckless operation endangering the lives and property of
others: The Examiner concluded on the basis of the record
that the respondent does not measure up to the standards
required by public safety and public interest, in that re-
spondent’s conduct demopstrates that he does not possess
the attributes of a pilot-in-command and that he lacks the
qualification and fitness required of the holder of an
airline transport pilot rating and certificate.

Respondent and the Administrator have filed briefs
with the Board. Oral argument has been heard, and the
case stands submitted for decision.

Respondent requests ‘that the Examiner’s order be
reversed and the action dismissed. He contends that the
Administrator has not adduced substantial, reliable, or
probative evidence to prove his allegations. Moreover,
respondent argues that the Administrator has produced
little, if any, evidence going to the respondent’s qualifi-
cations, and, indeed, that much of the Administrator’s
evidence, although proffered for other purposes, estab-
lishes that respondert has the quaiifications relating to
' judgment, degree of care, and responsibility to’ hold his

2Pursuant to Section 609 of the Act, which provides in pertinent
part ag follows: “The filing of an appeal with the Board shall stay the
effectiveness of the Administrator's order, unless the Administrator
advises the Board that an emergency exists and safety in air commerce
or air transportation requires the immediate effectiveness of his order,
in which event the order shail remain effective and the Board shall
finally dispose of the appeal within sixty days after being so advised
by the Administrator.” By letter docketed on January ,25, 1961, the
> mammal advised the Board of the emergency character of his
order -

a

v

* App. 15.

airline transport rating. In any event, respondent argues
that the Administrator’s case would*only warrant action
against his airline transport pilot rating and would not
require action against his remaining airman certificates
and ratings. The Administrator urges that the Initial
Decision be affirmed.

© After consideration of the contentions of the parties
in light of the record, we conclude that the appeal should
be denied, and that the Administrator’s ordef of revoca-
tion should be affirmed. The findings of the Examiner
.. Yelating to the major charges, in the complaint (para-
XU graphs | IV ‘through VIII) are supported by substantial,

- reliable, and probative evidence.’ In our view, the serious-
ness of these violations warrants the sanction imposed by
the Administrator in his order, which was affirmed by

the Examiner, irrespective of the validity of other alle-

gations contained in the complaint. Accordingly, we find
iL unnecessary “to pass on the re&pondent’s contentions
with respect to the remaining charges.

At the outset we wish to make clear the framework
in which we are considering the issues,in this proceeding
and to comment upon certain general contentions which
permeate respondent’s defense. As provided jin Section
301.47 of our Rules ‘of Practice, we are concerned here
. with whether the findings of the Examiner are supported
by substantial, reliable, or probative evidence. In any
proceeding such as this, not infrequently conflicts in
testimony will arise, and the Examiner. of necessity will
be called upon to resolve them. ‘Because of the role the
Examiner plays in the development of the record, the

‘Except to the extent note.. hereinafter with respect to the charges
in paragraphs V and VI of the complaint. \

9

App. 16

Board, of course, must accord substantial weight to his
conclusions on which of alternative or conflicting versions
of the facts are worthy of belief.’

Here the Examiner's findings are predicated in large
measure on his acceptance of the testimony of complain-
ant’s witnesses and his rejection of the conflicting testi-
mony of respondent. Respondent appears to challenge this .
result because, in his view, (1) the Administrator’s case
“depends primarily on the testimony of Air Line Pilots
Association members, who he asserts were hostile to
respondent; and (2) the fact that the Administrator took
action against him.at a time when he was involved in a
labor dispute with National Airlines somehow contributed
to this result. However, the Examiner specifically re-
jected these allegations, and respondent has shown noth-
ing that would demonstrate error in Examiner’s findings
in this regard. Further, at best, respondent’s contentions
go to the question of motivation rather than to the factual
accuracy of the testimony rendered. All of these matters
were argued fully before the Examiner, he heard the
\ “testimony of the witnegses, and he had the opportunity
to observe their demeanor and manner of testifying.
Based on our examination of the record, we are satisfied
that there is no foundation for a conclusion that the Ex-
aminer acted incorrectly, in any respect material to this
decision, in the judgments he reached on credibility. ;

+) 4

1. Paragraph IV of the Complaint

With respect to the allegations of this paragraph,
the Examiner. found that on March 15, 1960, respondent,

4Administrator v. Specht, Order $-825, September 9, 1957, aff'd sub
nom. Specht v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 254 F. 2d 905 (8th Cir. 19 5).

App. 17

(11 while approaching the Patrick Henry Airport at New-
port News, Virginia, operated a DC-6 which was overtak-
ing a Piper PA-18, and 4id not pass on the right, in viola-
tion of Section 60.14 (di‘eof the Civil Air Regulations;
and (2) operated the DC-6 aireraft in such close proximity
to the PA-18 as to create a collision hazard, in violation of
Section 60.15 of the C.A.R.’. The Examiner found that
respondent’s operation was careless and reckless, endan-
gering the life and property of others, in violation of See-
tion 60.12 of the\C.A:R.° eo A

The respondent contends, inter alia, that the Examiner
erred in failing to consider Section 60.14/e). of the C.A.R.’
and, in this connection, that respondént’s was the leading
aircraft. However, the PA-18 was engaged in a touch-and-
go landing, and under Section 60.14(e) clearly had the
right-of-way in approaching the airport, since it was at
a lower altitude. Respondent is also mistaken in his belief
that the record does not show that respondent was in-
formed that the PA-18 was on a touch-and-go landing.

‘The transcript reads ‘Section 60.14'b)." However, the complaint
was amended at the hearing to correct a typographical error, thus con-
forming to the order of revication. (T. 401.)

6360.14(d): “An aircraft that is being overtaken has the right-of-
way, and the overtaking aircraft, whether climbing, descending, or in
horizontal flight: shall keep out of the way of the ther aircraft by
altering its course to the right, and no subsequent change in the rela-
tive positions of the two aircraft shall absolve the Wertaking aircraft
from this obligation until it is entirely past and clear; * * *”

$60.15: “No person shall operate’ an aircraft in such proximity to
other aircraft as to create a collision hazard. No person shall operate
an aircraft in formation flight when passengers are carried for hire.
No aircraft shall be operated in formation flight except by prearrange-
ment between the pilots in command of such aircraft.”

*$6@.12: “No person shall’ operate an aircraft in a careless or reck-
less manner so as to endanger the life or property of others. * * *"

°$60.14(e): “Aircraft, while on the final approach to land, or while
landing, have the right-of-way over other aircraft in flight or operating
on the surface. When two or more aircraft are approaching an airport
for the purpose of landing, the aircraft at the lower altitude has the
right-of-way, but it shall not take advantage of this rule-to cut in in
front of another which is on final approach to land, or to overtake that
aircran, * * *7

App. 18 »

On the contrary, this fact was,brought out on the direct
examination of respondent’s: witness Scherer,; who was
copilot.of the DC-6.""

Moreover, while we have not had the Examiner’s ad-
vantage of observing the demeanor of the respondent on
the witness stand, the cold record before us does not
reflect favorably on respondent’s credibility with respect
to the incident. He testified first “that the longest time
that I was on base leg would have been under a minute,”
and ‘in almost the same breath asserted that “[t|he base.
leg- was of some minutes duration.”'’ The witness also
denied that he had complained ahout light aircraft being
given preference over his on other occasions,'’ but a docu-
ment-executed in his own handwriting on March 24, 1960,
complained of being held up several months before at
Patrick Henry by “touch and go‘circle and bounce air-
craft.”"). Finally, respondent testified that the tower
operator apologized to him, saying he was sorry that the
light plane apparently failed to observe a red light that
he had directed at it.'* All five of the complainant’s wit-
nesses denied either that a red light was given the PA-18
or that there was a radio communication about a red light,
and even the copilot, who testified for respondent, does
not remember any voice communications about the red
light; nor did he at any time see a red light directed at*
the PA-18."° |

In view of the state of the record on this allegation,
it is clear that the Examiner’s finding is well supported.

}

10T. 132.
11T. 708.
12T. 715.
1sComplainant’s Exh. 23.
14T. 638.
ST. 136.

App. 19
2. a V of the Complaint

The Examiner found that May 24, 1960, respond-
ent, piloting a DC-6 from the Patriek Henry Airport (1)
executed a right turn on takeoff from Runway 6, and
thereby failed to comply with the traffic pattern pre-
scribed for the airport, in violation of Section 60; Ste)
of the C.A.R.;"" and (2) departed downwind at a time
when a 15 knot tail wind existed, in violation of the Com-
pany Flight Manual.’ The Examiner found that by these
actions respondent operated the aircraft in a careless and
reckless manner, so as to endanger the life and property
of others, in violation of Section 60.12.

Respondent contends that the Examiner's findings fail
to consider the official weather report at Patrick Henry
Airport_at the time of the alleged downwind takeoff
showing thé wind to be 7 and & knots from the west.
However, the record shows that respondent took off at
approximately 1345 Eastern time while the official
weather reports were for 1258 and 1355. The Examiner's
finding has ample support since the: record establishes
that the local controller, based on personal observation of —
the wind instruments available to him, advised respondent
immediately prior to his takeoff that the wind was west
southwest at 15." ‘i

« . a

'6360.18(c): “Aircraft operating from an airport shall conform to
the traffic patterns prescribed for that airport;”

17Manual requirements ar®set forth in Sections 40.50 through 40.53
of the Civil Air Regulations.
° \sAlthough respondent does not raise the question, we will modify
the Examiner's finding indicating that the respondent was advised three
times that the wind was 15 knots. Thus, the record shows that the
testimony of the local controller is that, when respondent was cleared -
to Runway 24, he was given the wind direction and velocity as west
southwest at 8 to 10 knots; that when respondent requested Runway 6, °
the controller gave him the wind velocity as between 12 and i4 knots:
and that within one minute of respondent's takeoff, the controller gave
respondent the wind again as west southwest at 15 knots and cared

e

ff

App. 20

Respondent also urges that the Examiner failed to
consider exhibits which confirmed an agreement between.
appropriate authorities allowing right turns from Run-
way 6. But this agreement was not in effect at the time
of the incident involyed here, and, in any event, required
a prior clearance from air traffic control for such action.

3. Paragraph VI of the Complaint ~* .

The Examiner found that on May 8, 1960, respondent,
(1) operating a DC-6 aircraft landed at Logan Interna-
tional Airport, Boston, Mass., when the ceiling and visi-
bility were below the prescribed minimums for landing,
violating Section 40.406 of the C.A.R.;'’ and (2) on this
occasion operated the DC-6 aircraft in wilfull disregard
of company instructions regarding the ceiling and visi-
hifit-- 'anding minimums for said airport. The Examiner
found that respdéndent thereby operated the aircraft in
a reckless and careless manner.so as to endanger the life —
and property of others, in violation of Section 60.12. |

Respondent contends that the Examiner should not
have accepted the copilot’s testimony that the ceiling was
below the prescribed minimum at the time sof landing

him for takeoff. The testimony therefore shows that respondent was
advised of a 15 knot wind only once and the finding is modified accord-
ingly. This modification however, does not affect the Examiner's ulti-
mate finding. Indeed, the record shows that under Company Flight
Manual provisions no downwind takeoff was allowed in a DC-6 when
the tail wind exceeded 8.5 knots. :
19$40.406(a): “Except as provided in paragraphs (c) and (d) of
this section, irrespective of any clearance which may be obtained from
air traffic control, no airplane shall take off or land under IFR when
the ceiling or ground visibility reported by the U. S. Weather Bureau
or by a source approved by the Weather Bureau is less than the mini-
mum approved for the airport when used as a regular airport?

The Examiner's finding that the visibility was below the prescribed
minimum was apparently inadvertent, since he rec ized that the
runway visual range was 2800 feet whereas the pfeatribed minimum
with respect to visibility was 2600 feet (Appendix, p. 895)

App. 21

inasmuch as, in accordance with Section 40.406(¢) of the
regulations,’ respondent, as pilot-in-command, had found
the weather conditions to be better than the preseyjped
minimums. Further, respondent asserts that his evalua-
tion of the weather conditions is supported by the o¥ ficial
Weather observation at 1932, 17 minutes after he landed,
showing weather above the.prescribed minimums. ~*
~ j
We find the respondent's contentions unpersuasive.
Certainly the provisions of Section 40.406(e) do not mean
that the FAA and the Board are bound io accept as final
the respohdent’s subjective assessment of the weather
conditions which in fact existed at the time he landed.
The respondent’s contentions in this regard are subject
to inquiry, and it Was for the Hearing Examiner to judge
initially whether the respondent’s 6r * 1e copilot’s version .
of the incident was correct. We find nothing unreason-
able in the Examiner’s giving greater weight to the testi-
mony of the copilot..' The official weather report showed
a ceiling of 100 feet at 1916, approximately the time of °
the landing, which supports the copilot’s testimony that
° * Me
the aircraft. broke out of. the overcast at 120 feet® The
fact that the ceiling was 200 feet Tthe prescribed mini-~
20$40.406(c}: “An instrument approach procedure may be executed
when the weather report prepared by the U. S. Weather Bureau or by
a source approved by the Weather Bureau indicates that the ceiling or
visibility is less than approved minimum for landing, if the airport is ”
served by ILS and PAR in operative condition and both are used by the
pilot, and tfrereafter a landing may be made, if weather conditions
equal to or better than the prescribed minimums are found to exist by
the pilot in command upon reaching the authorized landing minimum
altitude.” : :

.7!Other evidence of record shows the cdpilot to be a more reliable
-witness. Thus, respondent testified that prior to departing from Balti-
more a check of the weatHer in Boston showed that it “was then ap-
proaching limits, that it was within limits.” (T, 648.) The copilot, on
the other hand, testified that @n arrival at Baltimore respondent and
he checked the weather and the weather a , Boston had been below
minimums for several hours and still was. (T. 186.) The trip log and

the official weather observations for East Boston (Respondent's Exh. E:
Gomplainant’s Exh. 3) confirm 7“ copilot's testimony.

©

App. 22
e

mum) at 1932, ther$fore, does not impair the Examiner's
finding that respgndent landed in weather below the
prescribed minimum.

There is no question that respondent inlanding at
Boston with a reported ceiling of less than 200 feet vio-
lated an operations bulletin of National dated April 1,
1959.27, Respondent’s contention that he was in compliance
with an operations memorandum of March .20, 4950,” is
of no validity, since the later bulletin clearly modified
and superseded this memorandum.”

4. Paragraph VII of the Complaint

-The Examiner found that on April 25, 1960, respond-
ent, in piloting a 1049H Constellation aircraft during
climbout to V295 airway after departing Miami VFR,
(1) operated the aircraft closer than 500 feet vertically
under and 1000 feet over cloud formations, and therefore
violated Section 60.30 of the C.A.R.;?° (2) received an

22Complainant’s Exh. 25. This bulletin provided, inter aha, “It should
be noted that the R.V.R. minimums at ,Idlewild and Boston carry an
additional restriction of a 200 foot ceiling; therefore, a reported ceiling
of 200 feet or better must exist befor landing may be made on the
R.V.R. runway at these airports even though, the R.V.R. value is equal
to or better than minimum.” (Emphasis added.)
# 23:Complainant’s Exh. B. This earlier bulletin read, “When RVR
is hereafter reported in feet, it will automatically indicate that ceiling
height is not a part of legal requirements; that is, RVR alone is con-
troling for landings on the runway coneerned.” d

24We find it unnecessary to determine whether in addition to vio-
lating the Civil Air Regulations, respondent also disregarded company
instructiong in failing to terminate the flight at Providence. Respond-
ent’s action in landing at Boston when the ceiling was below the pre-
scribed minimum supports the Examiner's finding of careless and reck-
less operation.

25$60.30(a)(1): “Aircraft shall not be flown VFR less than 500
feet vertically under, 1,000 feet vertically over, and 2,000 feet horizon-
tally from any cloud formation except that, in the continental control
area. aircraft shall not be flown VFR less than 1,000 feet vertically and
one mile horizontally from any cloud formation. Aircraft shall not be
flown VFR within a control zone beneath the ceiling when the ceiling
is less than 1,000 feet.”

App. 23

IFR clearance from Air Traffic control to maintain 9000
feet, and then deviated from that clearance without first
having obtained an amended clearance and that he there-
fore violated Section 60.21 of the@ AR. and (3) later
received an amended clearance to 11,000 feet but: when
a request for further emendment to 7000 feet was unan-
swered, proceeded on down te that level and then to 1100
feet and flew at that level for 20 or 30 minutes Without
un amended clearance. The Examiner found respondent's
conduct to constitute careless and reckless operation
endangering the life and property of others, in violation
of Section “0.12.

Respondent asserts that the Examiner failed to con-
sider the conflict in testimony between the Administra-
tor’s witness and the fiight engineer, who testified on
behalf of respondent. In addition, respondent alludes to
certain exhibits which he contends were not considered
by the Examiner.

We conclude that the Examiner's findings are sup-
ported by the evidence. The Examiner determined that
the copilot, Cover, gave a more reliable version sof the
events of the flight than did the respondent. Although
the testimony of the flight engineer, Bartish, does not
corroborate Cover’s testimony, neither does it confirm
that of respondent. The flight engineer's testimony is

“$6021: “When an air traffie clearance has been obtained ‘under
either VFR or IFR rules, the pilot in command of the aircraft shall not
deviate from the provisions thereof unless an amended clearance is
obtained. In case emergency authority is used to deviate from. the
provision of an air traffic clearance, the pilot in command shall notifs
air traffic control as soon as possible and, if necessary, obtain an
amended clearance. However, nothing in this section shall prevent a
pilot, operating on an IFR traffic clearance, from notifying air traffic
control that he is canceling his IFR flight pian and proceeding under
VFR: PROVIDED. That he is operating in VFR weather conditions
when he takes such actien"

App. 24

of scant assistance because he was unable to remember
much relating to the flight. Thus, he testified that while
he knew that portions of the flight were under VFR con-
ditions, he could not recall what portions of the flight
were so operated, or whether parts of the flight were
conducted under IFR clearances.*”’ He was unable to tes-
tify if they operated under IFR conditions at any time
during the flight, with one exception.*> He did distinctly
recall looking out in the vicinity of Atlantic City, that
they were “kind of high” there, and weather conditions .
at that particular time were VI'R.*’ This testimony does
not conflict with Cover’s that they were on ATC clear-
ance at 11,000 feet to just south of Atlantic City, and at
this point the weather started coming down and the plane
descended to 7000 feet and then to 1100 feet."’ Since Cover’ °
testified that weather conditions changed near Atlantic
city, Bartish could easily have made his observation prior
to the change and the testimony of both is reconcilable.
And we find nothing in the documentary evidence to
which respondent refers (the trip log, weather observa-
tions at Miami and West Palm Beach, Florida, and a
Jepeo Avigation Chart) whi¢h would justify overturning
the Examiner’s findings.

5. Paragraph VIII of the Complaint °
The Examiner found that on April 4, 1958, the re-
spondent, operating a Constellation on a VFR flight from
New York to Miami, flew through and in close proximity
to clouds without an IFR clearance, in violation of Section
60.30 of the C.A.R.; and that operation of the aircraft

27T. 562
2sT. 611.
2°T. 595
wT. 472

App. 25

under these conditions constitutes careless and reckless
operation of an aircraft endangering the life and prop-
erty of others, in violation of Section 60.12.

Respondent contends that the testimony of the Ad-
ministrator’s witn@&’s, the copilot on the flight, was im-
peached by respondent's exhibits showing a clearance
from the Norfolk Center and later a cancellation of the
clearance, respondent's trip log which was prepared by
the Administrator’s witness, and the testimony of +e-
spohdent’s witness, the flight engineer.

s

It is our conelusion that the Examiner's findings are
supported by substantial, reliable, and probative evidence.
The Examiner determined that the testimony of respond-
ent's copilot, Gupiinski, should be accepted in preference
to that of respondent. Thé record would sustain placing
little or no reliance upon the testimony of respondent's
witness, Bartish, as supporting the testimony of the re-
spondent. For example, Bartish testified on direct exami-
nation that he recalled no argument or conversation in
the cockpit concerning flying under instriment- econdi-
tions without such a clearance.’ On cross-examination
he contradicted this previous testimony by-stating that
he thought there was a discussion between Guminski and
respondent as to the legality of respondent's being able
to fly VFR on top and “a few words were said.” Nor
does the fact that the respondent operated during a por-
tion of the trip with an IFR clearance undermine the
copilot’s testimony that at times respondent operated
under instrument conditions without an instrument clear-
ance:

“SYP. 593, 597-8.
27 608

- ° . App. 26

6. Miscellaneous Contentions

In view of the foregoing findings of violation, no
useful purpose would be served by proceeding to rule on
the remaining charges since, based on the charges we
have already found established, we are convinced that the
Administrator’s order of revocation should be affirmed.
However, before discussing the question of sanction, we
wish to comment on certain other contentions of the
respondent. | }

‘ -

The respondent takes the position that the proceed-
ings before the Board on appeal from the Administrator's
order are essentially appellate in nature, involving a de-
termination, among other things, of whether the Admini-
strator’s order is supported by evidence. In this connec-
tion, respondent maintains that the Administrator had
the duty of presenting all the evidence his investigation
developed, whether favorable or unfavorable to the re-
spondent, for the Board’s consideration. Respondent con-
tends that in view of the Administrator’s failure to submit
all the results of his investigation, the Examiner erred in
denying respondent’s motion to dismiss. He also com- —
plains generaliy of the size of the record developed and
the expedition with which the proceeding was handled.

While Section 609 of the Act speaks of an “appeal” to
the Board, it is clear that such proceedings are not appel-
late in the usual sense. On the contrary, they are full-
scale, de novo, adversary hearings, a fact which & ap-
parent from the language of Section 609" and the Board’s

3Section 609 provides in pertinent part, “In the conduct of its.
hearings the Board shall not de bound by findings of fact of the Ad-

ministrator.” See also H. Rept. 2360, p. 8; H. Rept. 2556, p. 89 «Confer-
ence Report): S. Rept. 1811; Cong. Rec, p. 14738

, App. 27

Rules of Practice. Under the Rules, the Administrator.
has the burden of proving the allegations in his com-
plaint.* Where, as here, the respondent has been fairly
placed on notice of the violations charged, has had ample
opportunity to answer them, and the facts have been
found on the bases of the evidence submitted, in our view
the requirements of the statute are satisfied. It is true,
of course, that the accelerated time periods required to
meet the 60-day statutory period provided under the emer-
gency provisions of Section 609 place an added burden on
the respondent as well as all others concerned, particu-
larly in a situation like the present where numerous viola--
tions are involved. This, however, is largely the unavoid-
able result of the statutory scheme which the Congress
has deemed essential in furtherance of the overriding
interests of air safety. Nothing has been presented which
would warrant us in concluding that respondent has ‘not
been accorded full protection of his procedural rights.
One final matter warrants comment. .Respondent
contends that his rights were substantially impaired when
the Examiner denied his “request to exclude from the :
hearing rdom during the course of the testimony the wit- .
ness Tamalis, the FAA Air Carrier Inspector assigned to
National Airlines. Respondent urges that Tamalis should
have been excluded because he was a witness, and also
because’ the National flight crews who would appear as

“Section 301.32¢b). ,

‘sWe do, however, wish to make a general obset vation concerning
the nature of the remaining charges in the Administrator's complaint,
none of which, as, previously indicated, are pertinent to our disposition
of this proceeding. Our examination of them indicates that many up-
pear trivial and some are &mbiguous as to the date upon which the
incident is alleged to have taken place. We fail to See what useful
purpose is served in an emergen; proceeding such as this by the in-
clusion of trivial and ill-defined charges, and such action can only serve

to clutter the record with evidence directed toward establishing, refut-
ing, or explaining them.

App. 28 ‘ :
witnesses would be reluctant to testify. The “Examiner
denied respondefit’s request upon the representation of
the Administrator’s counsel that Tamalis’ presence was
necessary to guide him on certain technical matters that
might arise, and respondent has made no showing that
he was, in fact, in any way prejudiced by this action.
- Under the circumstances we find ho°prejudicial’ error in
the Examiner's ruling.

7. Sanction

' Having found that the Administrator has established
the major charges contained in his complaint, we turn
now to the question of sanction: The Administrator,
whose stake is large in the promotion of air safety, has
determined that revocation of respondent’s airman certi-
ficate is required because his conduct demonstrates that
he cannot be trusted as a pilot in any capacity. On the
basis of the record, the Examiner has reached the same
‘conclusion,: finding that the respondent demonstrably
does not possess the attributes required of a pilot-in-com-
mand and lacks the qualifieations and fitness required of
the holder of an airline transport pilot rating and certifi-
cate. Accordingly, he would affirm the Administratér’s
emergency order.of revocation. Respondent’s position is
that, assuming the existence of violations which we have |
found, at most action would be warranted only against
his airline transport pilot rating.

After careful consideration of all pertinefit factors,
we. agree with the sanction imposed by the Examiner and
we find that this sanction is required by safety in air
commerce or air transportation and the public interest. It
would be difficult to conceive of a moré flagrant disre-

i) os

App. 29

gard of applicable safety staridards than are exhibited by
this record. Thus the evidence shows, and we have found,

that respondent has deviated from applicable safety.

standards by conduct which resulted in careless and
reckless operation, failure. to maintain the required sepa-
ration from clouds, and there are incidents of landing
when weather conditions were below the prescribed mini-
mums, failing to give the right-of-way, creating a colli-
sion hazard, failure to conform to the traffie pattern
prescribed fan. airport, and deviating from an air
traffic clearance. Each of these violations involves a
most serious infraction of the Civil Air Regulations ;
taken together they constitute a gross affront to air
safety and the public interest which the Board cannet

permit or condone.

We are not unmindful of the fact that respondent
has never failed a line check or a six-months’ proficiency
check. Technical proficiency in, manipulating the controls
of aircraft on certain oceasiqns when respondent was sub-
ject to observation does not establish that responden:
possesses the requir degree of care, Judgement, and
responsibility, for technical proficiency is not alone the
measure of the qualifications essential for an airline
pilot.” On the ether hand, a record of such serious and
unjustified violations of the Civil Air Regulations in the
last three vears — none of which involved a lack of pre-
ficiency in manipulating the controls is more than
enough, in our view, to establish that respondent does not
possess the required degree of judgment.

We have also given consideration to limiting the

‘Administrator v. Specht, supra, Order S-825. pp 5-8) 254 Fo 2d.
pp. 915-917. As the Board said on p. 8 of its opinion, “The pilot whe
can control his plane but cannot control humself es moto safe pales

é App. 30

sanction to the loss of respondent’s Airline Transport
Pilot Rating, and permitting him to retain his certificate.
Thus, in the Specht case, the Board revoked Specht’s pilot-
in-command privileges only, since as a co-pilot Specht
would be under the supervision of other pilots-in-com-
mand.’ However, we do not believe that such a sanction
would afford the public sufficient protection in the case
of respondent. While Specht acted in anger on a single
instance, respondent has deliberately piloted in disregard
of the air safety ruies on a number of occasions, demon-
strating a pattern of conduct which renders him com-
pletely untrustworthy.” In this connection, as pointed
out by the Administrator, under the Civil Air Regulations
the holder of a commercial pilot certificate can operate
as second in command of large aircraft in scheduled and
irregular air carrier operations, and as a pilot-in-com-
mand of small aircraft utilized in irregular air carrier
operations. The Administrator also points out that weré
the respondent permitted to hold a private pilot certi-
ficate, he could operate as pilot-in-command of aircraft
not engaged in air carrier or commercial operations and
could also carry passengers so long as the flight was not
eunducted for compensation or hire. It is clear therefore
that, although the technical proficiency required in these
other pilot categories may vary, respondent nonetheless

esac .

"In a comparable situation, respondent acted even more denger-
ousiy than Specht. The TWA pilot, in anger over not receiving an alti-
tude to which he regarded -himself entitled, declared an emergency
which be knew did not exist and climbed through space known by him
to be oceupied by another airliner. Air traffic control was thereby
cognizant of Specht's action. Respondent, however, made such a change
in altitude without the knowledge of. air traffic control. Thus, on the
April 25, 1960, flight from Miaimi to New York, respondent had obtained
an IFR clearanee to maintain 9,000 feet. Although no emergency ex-
isted, he later desired to climb to 17,500 feet, but was unable to secure
an amended clearance because of communication difficulties. Respond-
ent, nevertheless, climbed to his desired altitude, although he knew
thaf an Eastern Air Lines flight was operating two minutes behind
him at 11,000 feet 7]

App.°31

would be expected to possess and exercise a very high
degree of care, judgment, and responsibility, characteris-
ties which the record establishes are lacking in the re-
spondent. In vieof respondent’s flagrant disregard of
or indifference to the rules of air safety, his, demon-
strated lack of the required qualities of care, judgment,
and responsibility, and all other factors héretofore dis-
cussed, we can only conclude that respondent’s Airman’s
Certificate. and all ratings and privileges held by him
should be revoked. ue?

We have considered the remaining contentions ad-
vanced by the respondent in support of his appeal and
find that they are without substantial merit.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED: |

1. -That, except to the extent indicated herein,
respondent’s appeal from the Examiner’s Initial Decision
be, and it hereby is, denied.

2. That the Administrator’s Order of Emergency
Revocation, dated January 12, 1961, revoking respondent’s
Airman Certificate No. 143266 be, and it hereby is, af-
firmed.

Boyd, Chairman, Gurney, Minetti and_ Géillilland,
Members of the Board, concurred in the above opinion and
order. Murphy, Vice Chairman, did not take part in the
_ decision.

s/ Robert C. Lester
. Robert C. Lester
(SEAL) Secretary

/

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

“a e .
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing

Petition for Writ of Certiorari was served by air mail

this

day of January, 1963, upen:

Honorable Archibald Cox
Solicitor General of the United States

partment of Justice

ttn Avenue and Ninth Street
W)shington, D.C.

Honorable John H. Wanner

General Counsel

Civil Aeronautics Board

Universal Building

Washington, D.C.

Honorable Daggett H. Howard
General Counsel ,
Federal Aviation Agency

1711 New York Avenue
Washington, D.C.

Robert C. Chalfonte, Esquire
Trial Attorney

Federal Aviation Agency
1711 New York Avenue
Washington, D.C.

Of Counsel

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385601_0738%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
