# Opposition Brief — Baker v. Federal Aviation Administration

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1991
- **Citation:** 499 U.S. 936

## Text

: @

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

JOHN H. BAKER, ET AL., PETITIONERS
Vv.

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

KENNETH W. STARR
Solicitor General

STUART M. GERSON
Assistant Attorney General

LEONARD SCHAITMAN
ROBERT M. LOEB
Attorneys

Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 514-2217

BEST AVAILABLE COPY”

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the court of appeals properly rejected petitioners’
challenge to the Federal Aviation Adminisiration’s denial
of their request for an exemption from an FAA regulation
(14 C.F.R. 121.383) prohibiting persons over the age of sixty
from piloting large commercial airliners.

(I)

eters a

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Ee ee er eae l
Tg l
rs Ss Lk bn 6p 0 oan a ew 6 os 2
eae Sas awk eee eevee eee es 5
A SERIE er 13
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int'l vy. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892
(2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962
ee tee bn 5 6 5 4 as a a 0.8 2° whe eaee 6, 7
Airmark Corp. v. FAA, 758 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir.
i sn ww bee Fan 1]
Aman v. FAA, 856 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1988) ...2, 3, 6,
7, 8, 10
Grav v. FAA, $94 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1979) ... 8
Keating v. FAA, 610 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1979) .. 8
O’Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59 (9th Cir.
a ag et Ml ile a 7
Rombough v. FAA, 594 F.2d 893 (2d Cir.
ee kee ea eka 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1978) .... 6,7,
8, 9, 10
Statutes and regulations:
Federal Aviation Administration of 1958, 49 U.S.C.
NS. ore CE a
TET NT yeu eseu evens 9
ccc be ereen es 2,7,9
a ce ks kk oe ek oe ene 2
me are, pees eee (1962) ............... 7
ee )

IV

Regulations — Continued: Page
14 C.F.R.:
Pt. ii:
RE ig irs Pena Sage eas 4
Pt. 121:
REM tt he owt eee 6
Ba errs 2
Sections 121-385-121.389 ............. 6
Miscellaneous:
24 Fed. Reg. (1959):
i a aa Sot Sake 4 ado 48 ae Rok 2
8 ere nee eee eres eee 6

oe eM ere 2

Jn the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

No. 90-1049
JOHN H. BAKER, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit is reported at 917 F.2d 318. Pet App. la-19a. The order
of the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) is unreported. Pet. App. 2la-83a.

JURISDICTION

The order of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirming the FAA’s decision was entered on October
31, 1990. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on
January 2, 1991. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

(1)

2

STATEMENT

1. In 1959, pursuant to its statutory authority to pro-
mote safety in air commerce, the Federal Aviation Ad-—
ministration (FAA) promulgated a regulation (now codified
at 14 C.F.R. 121.383(c)) prohibiting individuals over the
age of sixty from piloting commercial airline jets seating
more than thirty passengers. The FAA explained that the
“age sixty” rule is based upon: 1) studies indicating that sud-
den incapacity and other risks due to medical impairments
become significantly more frequent when a person reaches
the age sixty; and 2) the fact that the possibility of such in-
capacity and other problems occurring cannot be accurate-
ly predicted as to any specific individual. See Pet. App.
28a-29a; 24 Fed. Reg. 9767 (1959). See also 49 Fed. Reg.
14,695 (1984).

The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 provides that the FAA
“may grant” exemptions to its general rules if it “finds that
such action would be in the public interest.” 49 U.S.C.
1421(c). Although over the years a number of individuals
have sought exemptions from the “age sixty” rule, none has
ever been granted. See Pet. App. 2a.

2. In 1986, petitioners filed for exemptions from the
FAA’s age sixty rule. Specifically, petitioners argued that
a battery of tests devised by an expert panel (assembled by
petitioners) could be used as a basic protocol for assessing
the fitness of pilots over the age of sixty. See Aman v. FAA,
856 F.2d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 1988). Petitioners claimed that:
1) pilots over sixty who passed the battery of tests were no
more likely to cause an accident due to sudden incapacita-
tion or undetected deterioration than a pilot under age sixty;
and 2) older pilots who passed the tests were actually safer
than their younger counterparts when their respective ex-
perience was taken into account. /d. at 952. See also Pet.
App. 2a. The FAA denied the petition for exemption and
petitioners sought review (under 49 U.S.C. 1486(a)).

3

3. The Seventh Circuit upheld the FAA’s ruling in part.
The court held that the FAA “adduced substantial evidence
supporting its rejection of the contention that the petitioners’
protocol, combined with existing methods of operational
testing, would screen out all increased risks of incapacita-
tion or undetected skill deterioration among pilots older than
60.” Aman v. FAA, 856 F.2d at 957; see also id. at 954.
The court, however, held that “the FAA failed to set forth
a sufficient factual or legal basis for its rejection of the peti-
tioners’ claim that older pilots’ edge in experience offsets
any undetected physical losses.” id. at 957. The court
remanded the case to the agency to provide findings and
explanations with regard to that claim. /bid.; see also Pet.
App. 2a. Further, the court ordered the FAA to explain why
the agency had a inore flexible exemption policy for pilots
under the age of sixty with heart disease or alcoholism prob-
lems. 856 F.2d at 957; Pet. App. 7a.

4. To implement the Seventh Circuit’s directive, the
FAA opened a 30-day comment period to receive comments
on the issue of “age versus experience.” Pet. App. 24a. Ap-
proximately 178 comments were received. In addition, peti-
tioners filed three additional supplements to explain why
they should be granted exemptions. /bid.

After reviewing the comments and the additional infor-
mation provided by the petitioners, the Administrator issued
an order denying the exemptions and explaining the reasons
for the denials. Pet. App. 21a-83a. The order analyzed the
comments and additional evidence, and concluded that there
was not sufficient proof that the experience of a pilot off-
sets the “danger of deterioration” associated with the aging
process. /d. at 8a, 24a-66a. The Administrator found the
comments and studies relied upon by petitioners to be faulty
and inconclusive. See, e.g., id. at 40a-46a, 50a-58a, 66a.
The Administrator also concluded that the anecdotal
evidence submitted by petitioners (regarding heroic acts per-

4

formed by pilots approaching or over the age of sixty) did
not evidence a pattern from which any valid assumptions
could be made, and did not demonstrate that experience
offsets the dangers associated with sudden incapacitation
and undetected deterioration. /d. at 46a-S0a.

Further, the Administrator explained that the agency’s
policy regarding exemptions to the age sixty rule was not
inconsistent with the agency’s approach to special issuances
for pilots under the age of sixty with an identifiabie medical
condition:

For the person with known disease, the prognosis of
the disease can be assessed and specific tests or evalua-
tions identified to monitor the condition.* * * Where
[a special issuance] is granted, the condition in ques-
tion has been clearly identified, and the agency has been
able to develop a means of assessment and surveillance

- specifically designed to demonstrate the individual’s
capabilities and to identify any adverse changes. * * *
Such is not the case in aging, since there are no gencrally
applicable medical tests that can, at this time, adequate-
ly determine which individual pilots are subject to in-
capacitation * * *,

Pet. App. 68a-69a.

Pursuant to 14 C.F.R. 11.25, the FAA held that the peti-
tioners failed to provide reasons why the granting of such
exemptions would not adversely affect safety or would
otherwise provide a level of safety equal to that provided
by strict adherence to the age sixty rule. Pet. App. 69a.

5. Petitioners again sought review of the FAA’s order
in the Seventh Circuit. The court of appeals affirmed the
FAA’s order. The court agreed with the Administrator that
petitioners’ studies and analysis did not present “a persuasive
statistical record.” Pet. App. 4a. The court held that peti-
tioners’ anecdotal evidence was not especially relevant given

the fact that none of the pilots before the court were ones
who performed the “aeronautical miracles.” /d. at 3a-4a.
The court recognized it was petitioners’ burden to show that
they deserved an exemption, and concluded that petitioners
failed to carry their burden of establishing that the Ad-
ministrator acted improperly in concluding that the public
interest in safety wou'd not be served by granting the ex-
emptions sought. /d. at 3a, 8a-9a. The court stated, “we
cannot justify a conclusion that, on average, experience suf-
ficiently offsets possible age-related impairment of health
or skills to clearly guarantee a net constancy or increase in
safety.” Jd. at 2a.

Further, the court rejected petitioners’ challenge to the
agency’s rationale for issuing exemptions to younger pilots
with specific medical problems that can be safely monitored,
while not issuing exemptions to pilots over sixty. The court
found that petitioners had not demonstrated that the agen-
cy’s distinction was invalid “either theoretically or practical-
ly.” Pet. App. 7a.!

ARGUMENT

The FAA’s “age sixty” rule, prohibiting persons over the
age of sixty from piloting large commercial passenger jets,
has been upheld by every court that has addressed its validi-
ty. Moreover, every court that has examined the FAA’s strict
approach to exemptions from the age sixty rule has upheld
the agency’s exemption policy, as well as the specific ex-
emption denials. Here, the court of appeals correctly upheld

' Judge Will dissented. Pet. App. 9a-19a. The dissent argued that
the FAA must further justify its finding that pilots over sixty “are
significantly more prone to medical catastrophe than other pilots.” /d.
at I4a. Further, the dissent argued that the FAA policy of refusing to
grant any exemptions to the age sixty rule was not warranted by the
evidence or by common sense. /d. at 17a.

6

the FAA’s decision in ruling that petitioners had failed to
demonstrate adequately that granting them exemptions from
the age sixty rule would benefit public safety. The present
case was correctly decided and does not conflict with the
decision of any other court of appeals, or of this Court.
Accordingly, further review by this Court is not warranted.

1. The FAA adopted the “age sixty” rule in 1959 based
upon concerns about the danger posed to the public when
a pilot of a large commercial jet is suddenly physically in-
capacitated. After extensive study, the Administrator found
that “sudden incapacitation due to heart attacks or strokes
become more frequent as men approach age sixty and pre-
sent medical knowledge is such that it is impossible to predict
with accuracy those individuals most likely to suffer at-
tacks.” Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int'l vy. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892,
898 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962 (1961).
Because of the high risks at stake (which are elevated by
the fact that older pilots with established seniority tend to
fly the largest and fastest airplanes), the Administrator
barred any person from piloting large commercial jets after
reaching his sixtieth birthday. [bid.; 24 Fed. Reg. 9767-9768
(1959). See, also Rombough v. FAA, 594 F.2d 893, 897-898
(2d Cir. 1979).?

Since adoption of the age sixty rule, numerous parties
have challenged the reasonableness of the rule and its fac-
tual predicate. However, every court to address the issue
has upheld the FAA’s regulation. See, e.g., Starrv. FAA,

2 The age sixty rule does not, however, require the pilot to retire.
He may still continue to pilot private and commercial jets outside of
the coverage of 14 C.F.R. Pt. 121 (see 14 C.F.R. 121.1), and can, if
certified, continue to work in the cockpit of large commercial crafts
covered by Part 121 in a position other than pilot (e.g., flight engineer
or navigator). See Aman v. FAA, 856 F.2d at 948; 14 C.F.R.
121.385-121.389.

5

589 F.2d 307, 312-314 (7th Cir. 1978); O’Donnell v. Shaffer,
491 F.2d 59, 61-62 (9th Cir. 1974); Air Line Pilots Ass’n
Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d at 898. The courts have recog-
nized that although there may be difference of opinion and
conflicting evidence, Congress has granted the FAA the
Statutory responsibility for air passenger safety and that the
agency’s rule is adequately supported and well within the
agency’s authority. See Rombough v. FAA, 594 F.2d at
899-900; Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d at 312-313; Air Line Pilots
Ass’n Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d at 898.

Despite the unanimous judicial acceptance of the age sixty
rule, the FAA has recognized that the rule is not indelible.
The agency has continued to research and examine whether
new advances in medical science can identify individual
pilots over the age of sixty who do not pose a risk to public
safety. See Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d at 312 (the FAA has
“not shirked its duty” to examine new advances).* The courts
have recognized the FAA’s continuing efforts and have held
that the FAA may continue to adhere to the age sixty rule
“as long as it continues to consider new advances in medical
technology.” Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d at 314.

2. Petitioners here, like others before them, have sought
to circumvent the FAA’s age sixty rule by seeking exemp-
tions from the rule under 49 U.S.C. 1421(c), which states
the FAA “may grant” exemptions to its general rules if it
“finds that such action would be in the public interest.” Peti-
tioners’ arguments do not seek merely to justify individual
exemptions, but rather are frontal attacks on the
reasonableness of adhering to the age sixty rule. See Pet.
18-19; Aman, 856 F.2d at 949 n.2. The FAA’s response to

> For example, the FAA reviewed both a Navy study of the health
histories of 1,000 pilots, and a study by the National Institutes of Health
(see 49 U.S.C. 1421 note (1982)), and determined to retain the age sixty
rule See Aman v. FAA, 856 F.2d at 948.

petitioners and others seeking exemptions has been that it
will not grant the exemption unless the agency determines
that there is a medically reliable method of determining the
risk of sudden incapacitation and other pertinent risks. See
Pet. App. 67a-69a.

Up until the present date, the FAA has not been satisfied
that the medical tests or other procedures suggested by in-
terested parties, or independently investigated by the agen-
cy, can adequately assess the risks of sudden impairment.
And without such a determination, the agency has “simply
chosen what it considers the safer” approach —/.e., to con-
tinue to adhere to the age sixty rule. See Starr v. FAA, 589
F.2d at 312. See also Pet. App. 67a-69a; Aman v. FAA,
856 F.2d at 954; Keating v. FAA, 610 F.2d 611, 613 (9th
Cir. 1979).

In light of these factors, it is hardly surprising that every
court to rule on the reasonableness of the FAA’s exercise
of its administrative discretion in this context has upheld
the policy, as well as the individual exemption denials. See,
e.g., Keating v. FAA, 610 F.2d at 613 (“the medical tests
proposed by Keating are not sufficiently reliable to compel
his employment in a position of great stress and respon-
sibility where sudden incapacitation could jeopardize many
lives”); Rombough v. FAA, 594 F.2d at 899 (the
“psychological and physiological changes due to age can-
not be tested with sufficient reliability to justify the safety
risks involved”); Gray v. FAA, 594 F.2d 793, 795 (10th Cir.
1979) (“At some point, the state of the medical art may
become so compellingly supportive of a capacity to deter-
mine functional age equivalents in individual cases that it
would be an abuse of discretion not to grant an exemption.
It is apparent to us, however, that present medical opinion
is far from unanimous on the question.”); Starr v. FAA,
589 F.2d at 314 (“The FAA has the discretionary power to
establish a policy that there will be no exemptions granted

9

until it is satisfied that medical standards can demonstrate
an absence of risk factors in an individual sufficient to war-
rant a more liberal application of the Age 60 Rule.”).

3. Petitioners contend that the agency’s refusal to issue
any exemption to the age sixty rule conflicts with the Act’s
exemption provision. See Pet. 9-12. However, 49 U.S.C.
1421(c) only empowers the Administrator to grant exemp-
tions. It states that the FAA “may grant” exemptions to its
general rules if it “finds that such action would be in the
public interest.” There is no statutory entitlement to an ex-
emption and no statutory mandate to issue one. See S/arr
v. FAA, 589 F.2d at 312 (the statutory language “does not
mean that the administrator must grant exemptions from
the challenged regulation”). Moreover, whether to issue an
excepuion clearly involves an exercise of policy-making and
discretion by the agency vested by Congress to ensure the
public safety. See 29 U.S.C. 1421(b).

Petitioners cite the Seventh Circuit’s Starr decision as
authority that the agency must issue some exemptions. Sec
Pet. 9. However, that opinion expressly holds that it can
be reasonable for the FAA to refuse to grant exemptions
to some rules. See Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d at 311-312. Fur-
ther, the court explained the virtue of adopting a no-
exemption policy in certain circumstances. Jd. at 312. In-
deed, the Sarr court held that the issue was whether the
FAA’s no-exemption policy to the age sixty rule was an
abuse of discretion, and the court correctly concluded that
it was not. /d. at 312-314.

4. Petitioners further assert that the FAA’s refusal to
grant exemptions is impermissible in light of the medical
evidence, studies and anecdotal evidence they have sub-
mitted. Pet. 18-22. However. as explained above, the courts
have uniformly upheld the FAA’s policy of denying exemp-
tions until it determines that medical science can adequate-
ly assess the age related risks on an individual pilot basis.

10

See pp. 6-7, supra. In petitioners’ initial challenge, the
Seventh Circuit similarly upheld the agency’s general poiicy
and, more specifically, held that petitioners’ medical pro-
tocol did not sufficiently eliminate the risks associated with
sudden incapacitation and undetected deterioration, and
thus did not show the FAA’s continued adherence to its
policy to be unreasonable. See Aman v. FAA, 856 F.2d at
953-954. See also Pet. App. 2a.

Petitioners are in reality asking this Court to second guess
the agency’s evaluation of the medical evidence. That is en-
tirely contrary to the ordinary rules of deference, but is
especially inappropriate here, where the issues pertain to
scientific, medical and safety related issues, and where the
degree of proof required to merit an exemption is itself in-
herently a policy decision. See Rombough v. FAA, 594 F.2d
at 899-900; Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d at 314.

The focus of the remand in this case was to address
whether pilot experience offsets the health related risks. The
FAA considered the numerous comments and evidence sub-
mitted, but was not convinced that experience compensated
for the risks associated with sudden incapacitation and
undetected deterioration. See Pet. App. 66a. Indeed, the
agency found that when the youngest pilots were excluded
from the analysis, and experienced “young” pilots were com-
pared with experienced older pilots, the data demonstrated
that the older pilots were more prone to accidents. See id.
at 66a-67a.

[In addition, petitioners submitted anecdotal evidence
regarding the heroic deeds performed by experienced pilots
near or over the age of sixty. See Pet. App. 46a-50a. The
FAA properly concluded that several isolated acts do not
create a pattern from which any general conclusions or
assumptions could be drawn. /d. at 47a. The agency agreed
that experience can be helpful in emergencies, but concluded
that petitioners’ anecdotal reports and other evidence simply
did not demonstrate that experience offsets the danger of

11
sudden incapacitation and other decrements which the FAA
concluded are greater once a pilot reaches the age of sixty.
Id. at 47a, 67a.

The court of appeals correctly upheld the FAA’s decision
that the evidence did not demonstrate the invalidity of the
FAA’s determination that experience does not offset the
health risks associated with age. See Pet. App. 7a-9a. Even
the dissenter in the court of appeals recognized that it is
highly unlikely that the incremental value of experience
could offset the problems associated with “sudden in-
capacitation.” Jd. at 14a. Accordingly, the decision below
was correct and no further review is warranted.

5. Petitioners also contend that the decision below is
in conflict with Airmark Corp. v. FAA, 758 F.2d 685 (D.C.
Cir. 1985). Pet. 14-15. Airmark simply holds that the FAA
must apply consistent criteria in granting or denying peti-
tions for exemptions in like cases. 758 F.2d. at 691-692.
However, the FAA is applying consistent criteria to exemp-
tions from the age sixty rule: there will be no exemption
uniess and until the FAA determines that medical science
can assess the individual pilots’ risks of sudden incapacita-
tion and other pertinent risks. Petitioners’ claim of a con-
flict is thus incorrect.?

With regard to exemptions, petitioners .also assert that
the agency’s willingness to grant special issuances to some
airline pilots under the age of sixty with known medical
conditions is at odds with the agency’s failure to grant ex-
emptions to pilots over the age of sixty, and that this in-
consistency conflicts with Airmark. Pet. 16-17. This con-
tention is incorrect.

Petitioners’ premise that pilots with known medical con-
ditions are indistinguishable from pilots over 60 is un-

4 For the same reason, petitioners’ reliance on decisions in accord
with Airmark (see Pet. 14-15 & n.3) is also misplaced.

founded. Pilots can only obtain a special issuance of medical
certificate if the agency has determined that a known
medical disease or deficiency can be clearly identified and
monitored, and then only if the agency has approved ade-
quate means for assessment and surveillance of the condi-
tion for any adverse change. Pet. App. 68a. On the other
hand, after examining and reexamining the medical evidence
available, the Administrator has determined that medical
technology does not yet allow reliable predictions regarding
the physical consequences of the aging process (including
the risk of sudden incapacitation) as to one particular in-
dividual pilot. /d. at 69a. Thus, there is clear distinction
between these two contexts.

In any event, the Seventh Circuit is the only court that
has directly addressed the issue of whether the FAA’s denials
of petitions for exemptions to the age sixty rule is inconsis-
tent with the grant of exceptions of medical applications.
In Starr v. FAA, the court held that the FAA’s granting
of exemption to younger pilots suffering from specific
medical problems did not make the failure to issue exemp-
tion to those over sixty unreasonable. The court explained:

The rationale for exemptions is to allow an ad-
ministrator flexibility. Ruling that a liberal exemption
policy for one set of circumstances requires such a
policy in other circumstances deemed by the agency to
be less suitable to safe exemption processes would result
in an all-or-nothing policy of exemptions, with the
possible effect of denying exemptions in all cases, and
limiting the administrator’s ability to provide optimum
air safety in the public interest.
589 F.2d at 313.
In the case at bar, the Seventh Circuit has again upheld
the FAA’s distinction (Pet. App. 7a), and petitioners’ claim
does not warrant review.

EEO

13

CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.

KENNETH W. STARR
Solicitor General

STUART M. GERSON
Assistant Attorney General

LEONARD SCHAITMAN
ROBERT M. LOEB
Attorneys

MARCH 199]

US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1991-282 061

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385020_3348%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
