# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Brower's Moving & Storage, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1991
- **Citation:** 499 U.S. 905

## Text

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9U-8 59 Nov 27 1990

WOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR,
! CLERK |

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|

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

No.

BROWER’S MOVING & STORAGE, INC.
Petitioner,

-against-

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD AND
LOCAL 814, AFFILIATED WITH THE
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS,
WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS

OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

ROBERT S. NAYBERG |
Law Offices of

MARTIN H. SCHER
Attorneys for Petitioner

1 Old Country Road, Suite 385
Carle Place, N.Y. 11514

(516) 746-5040

*)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Notwithstanding, that for more than twenty years the Union
had no contact with the Employer or its employees, and never
demanded bargaining nor serviced the shop, the National
Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) found that, in effect,
through the actions of the Union’s ERISA/LMRA-governed*
funds, the Union established its representation of the
Employer’s employees. The Employer’s argument that there
was no collective bargaining relationship and that therefore it
did not violate §8(a) (5) & (1) of the National Labor Relations
Act (“Act”), 29 U.S.C. §158(a) (5) & (1), was rejected by the
NLRB.

The questions presented are:

1) Did the NLRB err in crediting the Funds’ conduct in
pursuing alleged delinquent contributions as evidence of the
Union’s conduct in enforcing the alleged contracts with the
Employer?

2) Whether the Act requires that the Union demand bar-
gaining as a condition precedent for sustaining a “refusal to
bargain” charge under §8(a) (5)?

3) Whether the NLRB misapplied its precedents concerning
the rebuttable presumption of the Union’s majority status dur-
ing the term of the allegedly unexpired collective bargaining

agreement?

*Employee Retirement Income Security Act §§403-06, 29 U.S.C. §§1103-06,
Labor Management Relations Act §302, 29 U.S.C. §186.

=

LIST OF PARTIES

The parties to the proceedings below were the petitioner
Brower’s Moving & Storage, Inc.**. the respondent National
Labor Relations Board and the Intervenor Local 814, affili-
ated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO.

** Brower’s Moving & Storage, Inc, filing this Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
in this case, states that its full name is Brower’s Moving & Storage, Inc. and that it
has no parent companies, or subsidiaries to list pursuant to U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 29.1.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLES OF AUTERORITIES ..n........cc.cccscccssccstescossaceccesccooees iv

RIN MEI WT Ss casasadiessocecodsovasctsesnsineoesessecessescostssnanesesee l

SS RAAT RRR GE” DEAE, CASE ono sccinciccscesscisescoscorenscesecsscseeescee 3

POINT I: BECAUSE THE RECORD IS BEREFT

OF ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE UNION ACTED

TO ENFORCE ITS ALLEGED CONTRACT, THE
SECOND CIRCUIT ERRONEOUSLY PERMITTED

THE NLRB TO RELY UPON THE ACTIONS OF
ERISA/LMRA GOVERNED FUNDS AS

EVIDENCE OF THE UNION’S

EENIRC BIEN E ACTIVITY, ..0....0.cccccrsescescoreccersesessossececeeees 9

POINT Il: THE SECOND CIRCUIT APPLIED AN
IMPROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW TO THE
NLRB’S FINDING THAT THE UNION, THROUGH
THE ACTIONS OF ITS FUNDS, AFFIRMATIVELY
SOUGHT TO ENFORCE THE

POINT II: THE SECOND CIRCUIT ERRED BY
PERMITTING THE NLRB TO RELY UPON THE
ACTIONS OF THE FUNDS AS EVIDENCE OF
THE UNION’S ENFORCEMENT OF THE
CONTRACT, BECAUSE AS A MATTER OF
LAW THE FUNDS CANNOT SERVE
AS THE AGENT OF THE UNION ..............cccesecsesseseees 13

A. The Funds Cannot Serve as the “Agent”

B. In Only Limited Circumstances May
the Funds Serve as the Agent for Both
the Union and Employer ..................sssssssssseeseeesseees 16

POINT IV: WHERE THE UNION ABANDONED THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO INITIATE BARGAINING,
IT CANNOT THEREAFTER ACCUSE
THE EMPLOYER OF VIOLATING THE
EMPLOYER’ STATUTORY DUTY TO BARGAIN.

A. The §8(a) (5) charge cannot be sustained in
the absence of any evidence that the Union

B. Both the NLRB and the Second Circuit
Ignored Their Precedents Requiring the Union
to Demand Bargaining Before a Refusal to
Bargain Charge May be Sustained......................s000 21

POINT V: THE NLRB MISAPPLIED ITS
PRECEDENTS TO CONCLUDE THAT BROWER’S
AND THE UNION INTENDED TO HAVE A

, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RELATIONSHIP .......... 23

a cd hie tasctniscievercuiaseresesneepsonseietessbsetivenesbeecsabasin 29

APPENDIX A: SUMMARY ORDER OF THE U.S.
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT.

APPENDIX B: DECISION AND ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.

APPENDIX C: RESPONDENT’S EXCEPTIONS TO
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S DECISION

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page
A.merican Buslines, Inc., 164 NLRB (No. 136) 1055,
65 LRRM 1265 (1967).............cssccssescessesesssssesssrensesessseess 21, 22

Ace-Doran Hauling & Rigging Co., 171 NLRB (No. 88)
645, 68 LRRM 1298 (1968).............cccccccesssessessessseseesees .23, 24

Altchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v.
Witchita Board of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 93 S.Ct. 2367
(ROTD) iccccsbiacseenis ids covert en editaecntncections 12, 24, 28

Bender Ship Repair Co., Inc., 188 NLRR (No. 86) 615,
TT LIRRM 1007 (1971)..........ssssesssessessessesnssnssrsnsenesnsnssees 23, 24

Benson v. Brower’s Moving & Storage, Inc.,
726 F.Supp. 31 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff’d, 907 F.2d 310
(2d Cir. 1990), cert. petition pending, Docket #90-527.......6,7

Brower’s Moving & Storage, Inc., 297 NLRB No. 28,
E5e Ee Ce COED insiicbtsessipiteresennccntnnesivinssvwcececees passim

Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488,
a cewpunmuesbsonsouneesee 12

Grove Press, Inc. v. Angelton, 649 F.2d 121
Ce BE atic aceite dae deai hb dininstniebintnssnvvsecedenseerececsene 18

Gllenlynn, Inc. d/b/a, McDonald’s Drive-In Restaurant,
204 NLRB (No. 45) 299, 83 LRRM 1356 (1973) ....23, 24, 25

In Re Shulman Transport Enterprises, Inc.,
FG Fe ee a FD aati ga chictntncindinnrccterenscvesereesenceenes 18

Insulating Fabricators, inc., 144 NLRB (No. 125) 1325,

54 LRRM 1246 (1963)............sescsersserscsensesensenenseneseensenensenss .20

International Offset Corp., 210 NLRB (No. 140) 854,

86 LRRM 1305 (1974).............c.sesserssseesesenseseesensnseneensssesensees 22

Island Typographers, Inc., 252 NLRB (No. 3) 9, 105
LRRM 1455 (1980), enf. den., NLRB v. Island

Typographers, Inc., 70S F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1983)................0+ 22

Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 80 S.Ct. 489
(1960) ia dtiintinieiivadpNiasinishcsenavenaseccensis 15

Local 777, Democratic Union, Etc. v. NLRB,
Faia vcccssnececesnsensesccesecsosececerecncoeee ll

Mr. Clean of Nevada, Inc., 288 NLRB No. 101,
DS Te BIAS CFG Ba vcinsen cs sscecevesecsvesecesevscecscseseee 25, 27, 28

NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., Etc., 453 U.S. 322,
NE Fathi ccenicdicnsesvvvcemncorereccccceenccccees 14, 16

NLRB vy. Better Building Supply Corp., 837 F.2d 377
ESET ESSENSE SSSR Oe ll

NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 85 S.Ct. 980
NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., Inc.,
306 U.S. 292, 59. S.Cr. SOL (1939).....c..cccrccccrsescsscees 20, 21, 22

NLRB vy. Cone Mills Corp., 373 F.2d 595
(4th Cir. 1967)......... bine SEE RE A eRe Ene CO ee 19

. vi

NLRB vy. Clerks and Checkers Local No. 1593,
Int | Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO,
644 F.2d 408 (th Cir. 1981), enforcing, 243

NLRB (No. 3) 8, 101 LRRM 1348 (1979) ......cccscsesseens 16
NLRB v. Insurance Agents’ Int’! Union, AFL-CIO,

361 U.S. 477, 80 S.Ct. 419 (1960) ..ccccccccccscscssssesesnssennns 11, 12
NLRB v. Spun-Jee Corp., 385 F.2d 379

I lias aanescheedhanites seatinab vic ddnainvianracrenrreninrsrerrensne 22

NLRB v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters &
Joiners of America, Local #1913, AFL-CIO,
SOT Fee a Sa ae BP aac lasihiccnnssckcscivecesseseavessessssens 17

NLRB vy. West Sand & Gravel Co., 612 F.2d 1326
CR ER Fae tia scons ihc ean athe cant ibsdiclln attain evwinserentecervees 25

Oil Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union Etc. v.
NLRB, 842 F.2d 1141 (Qth Cir. 1988) .......sesccscecscsveesenesenenes 28

Pioneer Inn Assoc., 228 NLRB (No. 160) 1263,
SS Eee Be CTT icicnccaecinssasauibiigesntcbatreccnsrscsvsenccceens 25, 26

Shamrock Dairy, Inc., 124 NLRB (No. 63) 494,
Se ee Ne Ce iditiiincthscaclictihscninttackcnbererieininanssnreserinss 25

Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB. 340 U.S. 474,
Tk ee IE Dhan eidiittiicia tice ienctdaiewigueldinrneiinencarsensnees 12

Waggoner v. Dallaire, 649 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1064,
ae re I ciaiatitihni caneeninectninsainnanerscnrsvecnies 13, 15, 17

EE ee MS ee I LN ne NN Re LSE Se a EN PANO at eA ee hy a ee

vii

Weber's Bakery, 711 NLRB (No. 3) 1, 86 LRRM

Be iieediues eibstnetninsensntatngnsensntenninar~ .ororararstorverrenee 23, 25
White Consolidated Industries, Inc., 154 NLRB
(No. 127) 1593, 60 LRRM 1147 (1965) ..cccccccccuscnnns 20
W.W. —— Inc. v. NLRB, 860 F.24 244
STATUTES
National Labor Relations Act
SN Tie TE COD sacntcancnsecerevasesaseresevernvereveccecesecnens 24
§8(a) (1) & (S), 29 U.S.C. $158(a) (1) & (5) ncn passim
Pe tee RI TRD iccccerscevevscsvesnsvvnssvevnsnresenecesesecnns 2,3
ts can aranenativabennvevererveareersnernens 1,8
Labor Management Relations Act
cash ansnensrscacniicarcesensannet passim
Employee Retirement Macome Security Act
$2(7) & (8), 29 U.S.C. $1002 (2. & (B) rcscscsssrserrvenne 15
+ I UD its coca cccncccerecseecsenseversesesenners 13, 14, 16
I IE vcs cexcncscscscscerssscnceccccecsesanssnsecene 14, 16
I Me SU I ease ccsacecccnsnsnereveccccececscsencavsevesesanencons 14

$406, 29 U.S.C. $1106 ...ccccccn isecsrnearnsecrersavencencaranses 14

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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

No.

BROWER’S MOVING & STORAGE, INC.
Petitioner,

-against-

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD AND
LOCAL 814, AFFILIATED WITH THE
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS,
WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS

OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO,

| Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

8) ge ee en See ee gt SA ee
fies

The Petitioner, Brower’s Moving & Storage, Inc.,
(“Brower’s”) prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the

summary order and opinion of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit entered in this case on August
29, 1990.

OPINIONS BELOW

The unpublished opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit is reported at 914 F.2d 239
and is reprinted in Appendix A. The Decision and Order of
the National Labor Relations Board is reported at 297 NLRB
No. 28 and is reprinted in Appendix B.

JURISDICTION

Pursuant to §10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act
(“Act”), 29 U.S.C. §150(b), the National Labor Relations
Board (“NLRB” or “Board’’) caused to be issued a complaint
alleging that Brower’s violated sections 8(a) (5) and (1) of the
Act, 29 U.S.C. §158(a) (5) and (1). After reviewing the record
established in a hearing before its designated agent, the NLRB
held that Brower’s violated the Act, 29 U.S.C. $158(a) (5) and
(1). Pursuant to §10(e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. $160(e), the
NLRB petitioned the Second Circuit for enforcement of its
Order. The Order was enforced on August 29, 1990.

The jurisdiction of this Court to review the order and
decree of the Second Circuit is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §

1254(1).

|

STATUTE INVOLVED

National Labor Relations Act §§8(a) (1) & (5), and (9)(a),
29 U.S.C. $§158(a) (1) & (5) and 159(a) (in relevant part):

§8(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—

(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the right guaranteed in section 7;

a + * *

(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees, subject to this provisions of section
(a);

§9(a) Representatives designated or selected for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining by a majority of the employees
in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay wages,
hours of employment, or other condition of employment. ...

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Brower’s Moving & Storage, Inc.’s (“Brower’s”) introduc-
tion to Local 814 affiliated with the International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, AFL-CIO (“Union”) occurred in or about 1951
when the Union’s agents forced a Brower’s truck off the road
and demanded that the company become a Union barn. (A:
236, 299.)! A Union representative subsequently came to
Brower’s’ place of business and signed up a number of it’s
employees, including principals and officers, but he never
gave Brower’s a contract to execute. (A: 236-37.) There was
never an election or other means pursuant to §9(a) of the Act
(ie: NLRB certification or the presentation of executed union
cards) establishing that the Union represented the interests of
a majority of the Brower’s employees. (A: 237.)

In addition, the Union never requested nor negotiated an
independent collective bargaining agreement with Brower’s
(A: 238, 256, 299, 301). And, because Brower’s never
belonged to any association of employers with whom the
Union negotiated its collective bargaining agreements (A:
292-93) there is no bargaining history. Brower’s simply
signed printed contracts or stipulations sent to it by the Union.

The Union never administered the agreements Brower’s
signed. It never appointed a Brower’s employee as the shop
steward (A: 75 17 (L), 237-38 and 302), nor a replacement

delegate after its original representative to Brower’s died in
the mid to late 1950’s. (A: 72 44, 238.) Other than a monthly

‘Numbers in parentheses preceded by the letter “A:” refer to the references in
the Joint Appendix filed with the Second Circuit, which included the complete
transcript of the administrative hearing.

visit in the early years by its agent to collect dues directly
from an unknown number of individuals presumably main-
taining their Union membership (A: 236-38), the Union did
nothing to enforce the successive agreements.? (A: 252-56,
Appendix B at 24-26.)

Brower’s’ noncompliance was no secret to the Union. For
example, in or about October 1967, Brower’s directed its
counsel to explore with the Union placing one of its long-time
employees in the Union so he could receive a pension and
hospitalization. (A: 238.) Thus, the Union learned that
Brower’s ernployed someone for approximately ten years
without his ever becoming a member of the Union, but did not
even ask whether there were any other employees who should
also be members of the Union or whether other provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement were being ignored by
Brower’s. (A: 239-40 & Appendix C at 26.) Brower’s’ blatant
noncompliance with the underpinnings of the alleged collec-
tive bargaining relationship (that employees be members of
the Union) was simply ignored by the Union. Even after the
Union and Brower’s agreed that Brower’s would pay one
individual’s back dues and benefit fund contributions to make
him eligible for full benefits, the Union did not ask whether
there were any other Brower’s employees failing to maintain
Union membership. (A: 170, 238-40.)

Another example is that in 1981 the Union’s benefit funds,
Local 814 Pension, Annuity and Welfare Funds (“Funds”),
commenced a state court action against Browe.’s for allegedly

2One exception concerns Wesley Brower, who testified that he was informed by
the Union in 1956 that as an owner he could no longer drive a Brower’s truck with
a Union man sitting next to him. (A:300 & Appendix B at 20.) Mr. Brower rejected
the Union's demand, continued to drive the Brower’s vehicle, and the Union never
raised the issue again. (A: 305.)

delinquent contributions. (Appendix B at 18.) The trustees of
the Funds, who included representatives of the Union, negoti-
ated a settlement based upon an estimation of the delinquen-
cies because no audit was performed. (A: 181 7.) While the
Funds were litigating the issue of delinquent contributions,
Brower’s continued contributing only for the two Brower
family members. (A: 245.) Yet the Union again failed to con-
tact or even ask whether the terms of its agreements were
being complied with, let alone to enforce them. (A: 245-47.)

The Union next demonstrated its abandonment of the con-
tract after the Funds’ December 1987 audit performed by
Peter Furtado. Mr. Furtado, who was fully aware of Brower’s’
noncompliance with the collective bargaining agreement, sub-
sequently became the interim Secretary Treasurer of the
Union on September 9, 1988. (A: 289-90.) Notwithstanding
that Mr. Furtado’s responsibilities as the Secretary Treasurer
included the initiation of Union actions against employers for
their noncompliance with the collective bargaining agreement
(A:290), he did nothing more than advise the Union’s Presi-
dent of Brower’s’ noncompliance. (A: 292.) Thus, even
though the Union, through Mr. Furtado, was aware of
Brower’s’ noncompliance the Union again did nothing.3

*In the hearing below, Brower's served the Union with a subpoena duces tecum
for the production of documents concerning its negotiations with Brower’s, its rep-
resentation of Brower’s’ employees, its designation of Union shop stewards and
delegates and its general administration of the collective bargaining agreements.
(A:157-166.) The Union’s response consisted of the Notice of Delinquency from
the Funds (A: 167), a single form letter sent to all employers asking for a seniority
list and the Union's confirmation of receipt of a list from Brower’s consisting of
the two Brower’s family members. (A: 168-69.) Thus, the Union’s own records
reveal that it was not conducting any business with Brower’s associated with its
alleged representation of the Brower’s’ employees, at least from 1983 to the date
of the hearing.

Significantly, the Union had numerous opportunities to
demonstrate that it did not abandon its representation of
Brower’s’ employees. As early as April 18, 1988 Brower’s
served its Answer on the Funds’ (and Union’s) attorneys in
the federal action brought by the Funds (A: 147-156), Benson
v. Brower’s Moving & Storage, Inc., 726 F.Supp. 31 (E.D.N.Y.
1989), aff’ d, 907 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. petition pend-
ing, Docket No. 90-527, which apprised the Union’s counsel
of Brower’s’ noncompliance. Yet the Union did nothing to
enforce any of its alleged rights under the alleged collective
bargaining agreement, including, but not limited to, demand-
ing bargaining over the litany of provisions that were admit-
tedly not being followed by Brower’s.4

Even after Brower’s filed its election petition with the
NLRB on September 29, 1988 acknowledging noncompliance
with the 1986-89 Agreement (A:71), the Union did not con-
tact Brower’s to discuss, let alone demand, compliance with
any provision of its alleged contract (A: 243-247). Instead, on
October 11, 1988 the Union filed a charge (A:1) alleging that
Brower’s violated §§8(a) (1) and (5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.
§158(a) (1) and (5), by failing and refusing to apply the
alleged contract as if it had inquired into and then demanded
compliance. The NLRB’s General Counsel thereafter issued a
complaint alleging that from April 11, 1988 Brower’s
“refused to bargain collectively and is refusing to bargain col-
lectively with the representative of its employees...” (A: 5,
411.) Brower’s’ Answer denied the allegations. (A: 8).

In the hearing before the NLRB’s Administrative Law

* The ALJ in numerous places erroneously identified the Union as the actor
instead of the Funds. (Appendix B at 17, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26.) Brower’s excepted to
these findings of the ALJ. (See Appendix C.)

Judge (“ALJ”), Brower’s contended that the alleged collective
bargaining agreement and bargaining relationship had long
been abandoned by the Union, that the Union by its conduct
waived any right to enforce the terms of the agreement and
that the General Counsel failed to establish the factual predi-
cate to sustain the substantive allegation of the complaint,
namely, that Brower’s refused to bargain with a union repre-
senting the majority of its employees.

After hearing all of the evidence, the ALJ recommended
the dismissal of the complaint because the Union did not rep-
resent a majority of Brower’s employees and alternatively that
the Union abandoned its representation of the Brower’s
employees (Appendix B at 26 & n.3). The ALJ neither
addressed nor ruled on Brower’s’ third argument that the
Union never demanded bargaining as specifically outlined in
its charge and the General Counsel’s complaint. (A: 1 & 2-7).

Both Brower’s and the Counsel for the General Counsel
filed Exceptions to the ALJ’s conclusions with the NLRB.°
On November 8, 1989, the NLRB issued its Decision and
Order rejecting the recommended order of the ALJ and
finding that Brower’s violated §§8(a) (1) and (5) of the Act by
repudiating and refusing to abide by the terms of the alleged
collective bargaining agreement. (Appendix B at 9.) The
NLRB cited to the Union’s request to Wesley Brower (in
1956!) not to drive a truck, the single request for a seniority

* Five of Brower’s’ six Exceptions (see Appendix C) concerned the ALJ's iden-
tifying the Union or its agents as taking specific actions when in fact the actions
were those of the Funds. For Example, the ALJ erroneously identified the Union as
the plaintiff in Benson v. Brower's Moving & Storage, Inc., 426 F.Supp. 31
(E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 907 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. petition pending Docket
#90-527. In its Decision and Order the NLRB did not address any of Brower's

Exceptions.

list in 1983 and the activities of the Funds as evidence of a
collective bargaining relationship and the Union’s enforce-
ment of the agreements for over thirty years. (Appendix B at
7.)

Brower’s refused to comply with the NLRB’s order to
obtain judicial review pursuant to §10(e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.
§160(e). The NLRB then filed a petition for enforcement with
the Second Circuit. Brower’s answered the petition denying
the NLRB’s allegations and further contending that “the find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law of the NLRB were erro-
neous, and were not supported by substantial evidence on the
record considered as a whole.” (A:341.)

Before the Second Circuit Brower’s argued that a) the
NLRB’s order was unsupported by substantial evidence®, b)
the NLRB erroneously created a new, arbitrary and capricious
rule excusing the Union’s twenty year absence on the grounds
that the Union had not received formal notice of any contract
violations by the Employer; c) the NLRB erroneously sus-

tained a refusal to bargain charge based upon the Union’s sin- .

gle act of filing a charge within the applicable statute of
limitations (§10[b] of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §160[b]), d) the
NLRB erred by not requiring its General Counsel to establish
that the Union demanded bargaining as a condition precedent
to sustaining the §8(a) (5) charge, e) the NLRB erred by hold-
ing that the ERISA/LMRA-governed Funds’ actions were evi-
dence of the Union’s intention to maintain a collective
bargaining relationship as weli as to enforce the alleged con-
tracts, and f) the NLRB improperly applied its precedents
concerning the rebuttable presumption of majority status.

* Brower’s pointed out that in key instances the NLRB cited specific actions as
those of the Union when in fact they were those of the Funds.

By a summary Order, dated August 29, 1990, the Second
Circuit granted the NLRB’s petition finding that substantial
evidence on the record as a whole supported the NLRB’s find-
ings. (Appendix A at 4.)

POINT I

BECAUSE THE RECORD IS BEREFT OF
ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE UNION ACTED TO
ENFORCE ITS ALLEGED CONTRACT, THE SEC-
OND CIRCUIT ERRONEOUSLY PERMITTED
THE NLRB TO RELY UPON THE ACTIONS OF
ERISA/LMRA GOVERNED FUNDS AS EVI-
DENCE OF THE UNION’S ENFORCEMENT
ACTIVITY.

In the absence of evidence that the Union took any action
in the past twenty years to enforce the terms of the alleged
contracts, the Second Circuit erroneously found that:

The Board made a number of findings con-
firming the parties’ intent to form a valid, ongoing
collective bargaining relationship, including the
Company’s assent to successive agreements over a
period of years, its payment of dues and contribu-
tions for several employees over a substantial
period of time and the Union’s efforts on behalf of
employees in a number of instances to secure affir-
mative compliance with the contract.

(Appendix at A-4),?

’ The execution of agreements is not dispositive. (See Point V below.) Brower's
paid dues for only one employee as part of an effort to put him in the Union.
(A:238-39.) The Brower family members, nonemployees under the Act, paid their

dues independently. (A:75 411.)

10

There is simply no factual (or legal) foundation in the
record to support the Second Circuit’s conclusion that the
Union in a number of instances made any effort “to secure
affirmative compliance with the contract.” Since it is undis-
puted that the Union has not had any contact with Brower’s
since in or about 1967, and certainly during the term of the
1986-89 contract at issue before the NLRB, the only means
available to the NLRB and the Second Circuit to reach their
stated conclusion of Union enforcement activity is to hold that
the Funds’ actions were in behalf of the Union—the creation
of an agency relationship between the Union and the
ERISA/LMRA-governed Funds. In the Second Circuit the
NLRB denied that it was relying upon any agency principle.
But in the absence of any evidence in the record that the
Union did anything in the last twenty years other than file the
charge on October 11, 1988, the NLRB’s denial is disingenu-
ous to the extent that it explicitly relied upon the activities of
the Funds as evidence of an enforceable agreement. (Appen-
dix B at 7.)

Furthermore, the NLRB was well-aware that only the
Funds were taking actions against Brower’s because
Brower’s’ Exceptions identify several instances where the
ALJ erroneously labelled actions taken by the Funds pursuant
to their fiduciary responsibilities as the actions of the Union.
(See Appendix C.) Yet the NLRB ignored Brower’s’ Excep-
tions by failing to distinguish the actions of the Funds in car-
rying out their statutory duties from the actions of the Union.
On the record in this case, the NLRB exceeded its mandate
and established the Union’s intent to maintain a collective
bargaining relationship by relying upon the ERISA/LMRA-
governed Funds’ exercise of their fiduciary duties.

ll

POINT I

THE SECOND CIRCUIT APPLIED AN
IMPROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW TO
THE NLRB’S FINDING THAT THE UNION,
THROUGH THE ACTIONS OF ITS FUNDS,
AFFIRMATIVELY SOUGHT TO ENFORCE
THE ALLEGED CONTRACTS.

The NLRB’s interpretation of legal issues outside its man-
date and expertise is entitled to no particular deference from
the reviewing courts. Local 777, Democratic Union, Etc. v.
NL2B, 603 F.2d 862, 869 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Bet-
ter Building Supply Corp., 837 F.2d 377, 378 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Case turned on NLRB’s interpretation of the federal
bankruptcy code which was entitled to no deference from the
reviewing court.) Here, the NLRB exceeded its mandate by
relying upon the actions of the Funds, which Congress
intended to be independent of the parochial concerns of both
the Union and employers, as evidence of the Union’s intention
to enforce the contracts. The NRLB’s involvement of the
Funds in behalf of the Union is contrary to Congress’ intent
and constitutes the NLRB’s unauthorized “movement into a
new area of regulation which Congress had not committed to
it.” NLRB v. Insurance Agents’ Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, 361
U.S. 477, 490, 80 S.Ct. 419, 433 (1960).

The NLRB further errs by failing to articulate a rationale
for its holding that the Union itself made any effort to secure
compliance with the alleged contract where the record is
devoid of any supporting evidence. The NLRB cites only one
incident, in over twenty years, of action taken by the Union,
the 1983 seniority list request. (Appendix B at 7.) Therefore,

12

the only logical deduction is that the NLRB found that the
actions of the third-party beneficiary Funds were evidence of
the Union’s intentions.

The NLRB’s failure to articulate its rule and rationale, a
“ “simple but fundamental rule of administrative law,’ [cite
omitted], that the agency must set forth clearly the grounds on
which it acted” Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v.
Witchita Board of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807, 93 S.Ct. 2367,
2374 (1973), alone warranted the Second Circuit’s denial of
the NLRB’s petition. But the Second Circuit, deferring to the
NLRB’s findings, lock, stock and barrel, shirked its responsi-
bilities under this Court’s holding in NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S.
278, 291-92, 85 S.Ct. 980, 988 (1965) (Reviewing courts obli-
gated to set aside decisions inconsistent with the Act and
which contain erroneous conclusions) and granted the
NLRB’s petition. See also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474, 490, 71 S.Ct. 456, 466 (1951) (NLRB orders
must be set aside when the record does not justify the NLRB’s
conclusions.)

The NLRB’s reliance upon the Funds’ actions is a matter
beyond its recognized area of special competence and its
statutory mandate. NLRB v. Insurance Agents’ Int'l Union,
AFL-CIO, 361 U.S. at 499, 80 S.Ct. at 433. The actions of
independent LMRA/ERISA funds may not be relied upon by
the NLRB to establish the Union’s intent to enforce the
alleged collective bargaining agreements. Such a rule is fun-
damentally inconsistent with the Act because it permits the
NLRB to usurp Congress’ policy decision establishing the
Funds’ independence. See Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S.
488, 497, 99 S.Ct. 1842, 1849 (1979). Note, had the Funds
been delinquent in meeting their fiduciary obligations ar? not

13

sued Brower’s, no court would hold that it was evidence of
the Union’s intention not to enforce the contracts. Waggoner
v. Dallaire, 649 F.2d 1362, 1368 (9th Cir. 1981) (Trust author-
ities have no authority to direct the Union.), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1064, 106 S.Ct. 1374 (1986). Thus no court should hold
that the Funds’ actions are evidence of the Union’s enforce-
ment. The Second Circuit’s failure to address this issue by
applying an improper and deferential standard of review to
the NLRB’s order renders its decision in this case in conflict
with ERISA, the LMRA and the precedents of this Court.
U.S. Sup.Ct. Rule 10.1(c). The writ of certiorari should be

granted.
POINT III

THE SECOND CIRCUIT ERRED BY PER-
MITTING THE NLRB TO RELY UPON THE
ACTIONS OF THE FUNDS AS EVIDENCE OF
THE UNION’S ENFORCEMENT OF THE CON-
TRACT, BECAUSE AS A MATTER OF LAW THE
FUNDS CANNOT SERVE AS THE AGENT OF
THE UNION.

A. The Funds Cannot Serve as the “Agent” for the Union.

Before the NB and the Second Circuit, Brower’s con-
tended that t- _, the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (“ERISA”) §40-4(a) (1), 29 U.S.C. §1104(a) (1), and the
Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) §302(c) (5), 29
U.S.C. §186(c) (5) preclude the NLRB from finding that the
action of the Funds is evidence of the Union’s active enforce-
ment of the alleged contract. The Second Circuit’s Order does
not even address the issue, but simply accepts the NLRB’s
unsupported assertion that the Union enforced the alleged

14

contracts over the past twenty years. (Appendix B at 7.)

The Funds in this case are multi-employer benefit trusts
established “for the sole and exclusive benefit ... of the
employees of ...” the employers who contribute to the Funds.
LMRA §302(c) (5). The Funds, as well as their trustees, must
be completely independent from the Union and employers to
ensure that they function for the sole benefit of the trust bene-
ficiaries. Id; NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., Etc., 453 U.S. 322,
329-31, 101 S.Ct. 2789, 2794-95 (1981). (“[NJothing in the
language of §302(c) (5) reveals any congressional intent that a
trustee should or may administer a trust fund in the interest of
the party that appointed him. ...”)

According to this Court, the same rule of independence is
forced on the trustees and their funds by ERISA:

Section 404(a) (1) of ERISA requires a trustee to
“discharge his duties ... solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries. ...” 29 U.S.C.
$1104(a) (1).'5 Section 406(b) (2) declares that a
trustee may not “act in any transaction involving the
plan on behalf of a party (or represent a party)
whose interests are adverse to the interests of the
plan or the interests of its participants or beneficia-
ries.” 29 U.S.C. §1106(b) (2). Section 405(a)
imposes on each trustee an affirmative duty to pre-
vent every other trustee of the same fund from
breaching fiduciary duties, including the duty to act
solely on behalf of the beneficiaries. 29 U.S.C.
§$1105(a).

Id. at 332-33, 2796.8

* Footnote 15 referred to the ERISA definitions of beneficiaries and participants
which excludes any reference to the smion or employer. §2(7) and (8) of ERISA,
29 U.S.C. §1002(7) & (8).

ja “- = . Cl i Me eS Ot il el gi Ni de ee Se
: -

15

The same fiduciary principles apply to the fund as an entity.
Thus, the NLRB’s reliance upon the Funds’ activities as evi-
dence of the Union's enforcement of the contract is in e:ror as
a matter of law because the Funds cannot act as the “agent”
for the Union and at the same time comply with both the
LMRA and ERISA. "{U]nions are involved with the trust
authorities only to the extent of selecting half of the trustees.”
Waggoner v. Dallaire, 649 F.2d at 1368.

The court in Waggoner reversed the district court’s holding
that the union’s business agent’s observation of contract viola-
tions was effective notice to the funds:

As a matter of federal law, a union and its represen-
tatives are not agents of a trust fund created by a
collective bargaining agreement. Trust authorities
set up pursuant to section 302 of the LMRA have
long been held to constitute a distinct and indepen-
dent entity separate from the union that negotiates
the collective bargaining agreement establishing a
trust. See Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S.
459, 465-71, 80 S.Ct. 489, 493-496, 4 L.Ed.2d 442
(1960). These trust authorities by law have no
authority to direct union activities, and unions are
involved with the trust authorities only to the extent
of selecting half of the trustees. Section 302(c) (5)
of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. §186(c) (5).

Id. at 1368.

The LMRA and ERISA ensure that the trust and its trustees
remain independent of the parties who create (union and
employer) and contribute (employer) to the trust in order to
ensure that the parochial concerns of the parties are separated

16

from the parties’ mutual agreement that the trust benefit the
designated beneficiaries. NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., Etc., 453
U.S. at 329-34, 101 S.Ct. at 2794-96. (Discussion of legisla-
tive history of LMRA §302 and ERISA.) In the instant case,
however, the NLRB is relying upon the fiduciary responsibili-
ties of the trustees (ERISA §403-04, 29 U.S.C. §1103-04) to
establish that the Unio, a separate and distinct legal entity
from the Funds, was actively enforcing the terms of the
alleged contract.

The NLRB and Second Circuit decisions raise an important
_ issue of federal law “which has not been, but should be settled
by this Court. ...” U.S. Sup.Ct. Rule 10.1(c): May the NLRB
rely upon the actions of LMRA/ERISA-governed Funds for
its resolution of a labor law dispute concerning the existence
of a contract between an employer and a union? In addition to
raising a question of federal law to be settled by this Court,
the Second Circuit’s enforcement order, while not a prece-
dent, conflicts with the decisions of other courts of appeals.
Id. Rule 10.1(a).

B.In Only Limited Circumstances May the Funds’ Serve as
the Agent for Both the Union and Employer.

Benefit funds may be the agent for the limited purpose of
receiving contributions. For example, in NLRB v. Clerks and
Checkers Local No. 1593, Int’! Longshoremen’s Association,
AFL-CIO, 644 F.2d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 1981), enforcing, 243
NLRB (No. 3) 8, 101 LRRM 1348 (1979), the court stated:
“This limited agency of the Fund to receive contributions
does not conflict with common law principles relating to fidu-
Ciaries or with ERISA provisions requiring that trustees of
such a fund not be subject to the control of any other person

Calbine

17

or organization”. This is a strictly limited “agency” that can-
not serve to establish the existence of the collective bargain-
ing agreement.

The courts have rejected the NLRB’s attempts to extend the
agency to other matters:

It is generally agreed that both agents and
trustees are fiduciaries, but there are significant dif-
ferences between the two. An agent acts for and on
behalf of his principal and subject to his control. A
trustee acts for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the
trust; he is an agent only if he agrees to hold title for
the benefit and subject to the control of another.
Restatement 2d, Agency §14B; Restatement 2d,
Trusts §8. Unless the Union can be said to have
control of the operations of the Trust, the Trust
should not be treated as the Union’s agent.

NLRB v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of
America, Local #1913, AFL-CIO, 531 F.2d 424, 426-27 & n.1
(9th Cir. 1976) (emphasis in original) (Multiemployer benefit
fund subject to LMRA §302(c) (5) and ERISA.)

Were the union “to have control of the operations of the
Trust”, id., the trust would violate LMRA §302(c) (5) and
ERISA §403. Thus the NLRB’s attempts to find and apply a
common law “agency” relationship between benefit funds and
unions has been rejected. See also Waggoner v. Dallaire,
supra.

The record in this case does not support even a limited
agency because where, as here, the principals (Brower’s and
the Union) disagree over the agent’s (the Funds) conduct (the

18

enforcement of the alleged contract) there can be no agency.
In Re Shulman Transport Enterprises, Inc., 744 F.2d 293, 295
(2d Cir. 1984) (“An essential characteristic of an agency rela-
tionship is that the agent is eae to the principal’s direction
and control.”’)

As a matter of law, the activities of the Funds in pursuit of
their statutory and fiduciary obligations cannot be usurped by
the delinquent Union and relied upon by the NLRB as evi-
dence of the Union’s enforcing its alleged contracts with
Brower’s. The Funds, which could only have been an agent
for both Brower’s and the Union must be shown to act “for
the benefit of, with the knowledge and consent of, and under
some control by” the principals. E.g. Grove Press, Inc. v.
Angelton, 649 F.2d 121, 122 (2d Cir. 1981). No such showing
has been made, and it is ludicrous to even consider that it
could exist on the record in this case because of the conflict-
ing interests of the potential principals. Therefore, the NLRB
exceeded its mandate by relying on the actions of the Funds to
find that the Union sought to enforce the alleged contract.

19

POINT IV

WHERE THE UNION ABANDONED THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO INITIATE BARGAIN-
ING, IT CANNOT THEREAFTER ACCUSE
THE EMPLOYER OF VIOLATING THE
EMPLOYER’S STATUTORY DUTY TO BAR-
GAIN.

Both the NLRB and the Second Circuit failed to address
Brower’s’ contention that the Union’s failure to demand bar-
gaining or even contact Brower’s to discuss the alleged
breaches warranted the dismissal of the complaint (Appendix
C at 4).

A. The §8(a) (5) charge cannot be sustained in the absence
of any evidence that the Union demanded bargaining.

The record in this case is bereft of any evidence that the
Union in the past twenty years demanded that Brower’s bar-
gain over or comply with any of the provisions of any alleged
agreement. (Appendix B at 19, 26.) In fact, just the opposite is
in evidence. In the past twenty years the Union never collec-
tively negotiated a bargaining agreement with Brower’s or its
agent nor demanded bargaining or compliance with any spe-
cific provision of any agreement. (A: 78, 227, 239-40, 252-57,
291-93, 298-301). In the absence of the General Counsel
introducing any evidence that the Union demand negotiations
or that Brower’s refused a request from the Union to bargain,
the Union’s charge cannot be sustained.?

9 That Brower’s’ actions were unilateral is rot per se a refusal to bargain.
NLRB v. Cone Mills Corp., 373 F.2d 595, 599 (4th Cir. 1967). Only where the
record establishes that any demand would have been futile, may a refusal to

(footnote continued)

20

It is well settled that in the absence of a demand, a refusal
to bargain charge cannot be sustained. NLRB v. Columbian
Enameling & Stamping Co., Inc., 306 U.S. 292, 59 S.Ct. 501
(1939). (The union never requested negotiations or even
expressed its willingness and desire to the employer to meet
and negotiate.) This case presents a more compelling set of
facts than those of Columbian Enameling simply because the
historical record, not just the operative period of the NLRB’s
Complaint (A:5, 19(a)), is bereft of any evidence that the
Union even communicated with Brower’s.!° In the absence of
this prima facie showing, the complaint should have been dis-
missed.

The NLRB has unsuccessfully attempted to restrict
Columbian Enameling to instances where the employer is
closing down its facility. See e.g. White Consolidated Indus-
tries, Inc., 154 NLRB (No. 127) 1593, 60 LRRM 1147 (1965)
(No §8(a) (5) violation because union never requested bar-
gaining over the decision to terminate the employer’s opera-
tion.) But as discussed below, the courts, and even the NLRB
on occasion, have not settled on such a narrow application of
Columbian Enameling.

(footnote continued)

bargain be inferred. /nsulating Fabricators, Inc., 144 NLRB (No. 125) 1325,
1332, 54 LRRM 1246, 1248 (1963). The NLRB made no such finding and since
there is no history of bargaining, any such inference is inappropriate. There is sim-
ply nothing in the record to indicate that a demand by the Union would have been
futile.

10 Indeed, the ALJ held that the fact that the Union made no attempts to
enforce the collective bargaining agreements established that the Union aban-
doned the contract. (Appendix B at 26 n.3)

21

B. Both the NLRB and the Second Circuit Ignored Their
Precedents Requiring the Union to Demand Bargaining
Before a Refusal to Bargain Charge May be Sustained.

The principle of failing to demand bargaining stands apart
from the particular issue over which bargaining is allegedly
refused. In American Buslines, Inc., 164 NLRB (No. 136)
1055, 65 LRRM 1265 (1967), the NLRB dismissed the com-
plaint (citing to Columbian Enameling) holding that the
union’s contenting itself with a mere protest over promotions
and the filing of an unfair labor practice charge did not meet
the union’s obligation to demand bargaining. /d. at 1267. The
essential point was that the union “failed to prosecute its
right” to demand negotiations and as a result the employer
could not be charged with a violation of $8(a) (5) of the Act.

The instant case was even more compelling for dismissal of
the complaint because Brower’s not only concealed nothing
from the Union (Appendix B at 26) or its employees with
Union backgrounds (A:307), but the Union was well aware of
Brower’s noncompliance over the years and did nothing about
it. The Union did not even attempt a half-hearted protest as in
American Buslines. If anything, the Union concealed itself
from Brower’s and misled it by never appointing a shop stew-
ard or even sending a delegate to the premises over the past
thirty years. A union cannot charge an employer with a failure
to observe its rights when by its conduct and practice over a
thirty year period the union claims no rights nor demands that
any be observed. The employer is justified in believing that
some arrangement exists between itself and the union, but that
it certainly is not a collective bargaining relationship in which
the employees’ interests are represented.

22

Moreover, the Second Circuit itself has refused to enforce
an NLRB order where the union failed to demand bargaining
over unilateral technological changes. /sland Typographers,
Inc., 252 NLRB (No. 3) 9, 105 LRRM 1455 (1980). enf. den.,
NLRB vy. Island Typographers, Inc., 705 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.
1983). Citing to Columbian Enameling, American Buslines,
Inc., International Offset Corp., 210 NLRB (No. 140) 854, 86
LRRM 1305 (1974) and NLRB vy. Spun-Jee Corp., 385 F.2d
379, 383-84 (2d Cir. 1967) (failure to request bargaining is
waiver of rights), the Second Circuit stated: “Both the Board
and this Court have recognized that a union cannot simply
ignore its responsibility to initiate bargaining over subjects of
concern and thereafter accuse the employer of violating its
statutory duty to bargain.” 705 F.2d at 51. See also W.W.
Grainger, Inc. v. NLRB, 860 F.2d 244, 249 (7th Cir. 1988)
(“We agree with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals that, ‘a
union cannot simply ignore its responsibility to initiate bar-
gaining over subjects of concern and thereafter accuse the
employer of violating its statutory duty to bargain.’ /sland
Typographers, 705 F.2d at 51.”) Thus, the decision of the Sec-
ond Circuit in this case is inconsistent with its own precedent.

The writ of certiorari should be granted because both the
NLRB and the Second Circuit ignored their precedents as
well as those of this Court which required the Union to
demand bargaining. U.S. Sup.Ct. Rule 10.1(c).

23

POINT V

THE NLRB MISAPPLIED ITS PRECEDENTS
TO CONCLUDE THAT BROWER’S AND THE
UNION INTENDED TO HAVE A COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING RELATIONSHIP.

The NLRB attempts to distinguish the cases relied upon by
its ALJ, Ace-Doran Hauling & Rigging Co., 171 NLRB (No.
88) 645, 68 LRRM 1298 (1968), Glenlynn, Inc. d/b/a,
McDonald's Drive-In Restaurant, 204 NLRB (No. 45) 299,
83 LRRM 1356 (1973), Weber’s Bakery, 211 NLRB (No. 3) 1,
86 LRRM 1421 (1974), and Bender Ship Repair Co., Inc.,
188 NLRB (No. 86) 615, 77 LRRM 1007 (1971), by contend-
ing that the contract in the instant case was unambiguous and
that the Union enforced it. (Appendix B at 5-7.) The attempt
to distinguish the cases in which agreements were similarly
signed over the years is really an attempt to redecide them or
to depart from existing NLRB rules.

For example in Ace-Doran Hauling the dispositive factor,
ignored by. the NLRB in the instant case, was that the prac-
tices of the employer and union established that there was no
intention by either party to enter into or maintain a collective

bargaining relationship:

The evidence relating to the practice under the
agreements further makes it clear that the parties did
not intend them to be effective collective-bargaining
contracts, but instead merely regarded them as
arrangements under which Respondent agreed to
check off dues, health and welfare, and pension
payments for Union members only. The acquies-
cence of the Unions in Respondent’s failure both to

Pe ee en Pe ew ee

24

enforce the union-security provisions of the agree-
ments and to pay health and welfare contributions
for all employees, (as ostensibly provided in the
‘Contracts’) makes it clear that the parties did not
believe they were in true collective-bargaining rela-
tionships.

171 NLRB at 646, 68 LRRM at 1299.

Similarly, in this case the parties over the years signed con-
tracts, never bargained, failed to comply with key contract
terms, but continued an “arrangement” covering on occasion a
couple of employees and the Brower family. (The Brower
family members are not “employees” within the meaning of
§2[3] of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §152[3]). Since Brower’s’ intro-
duction to the Union in 1951, there is no evidence that the
parties ever intended to have a collective bargaining relation-
ship.

Bender Ship Repair presents a more compelling case for
dismissal of the complaint to the extent that the NLRB recog-
nized that the units were defined and it was able to state that
“(t]he record lacks evidence of majority status by the Union in
any appropriate unit at any critical date. ...” 188 NLRB at
615, 77 LRRM at 1008 n.2. The NLRB then held that “it is
evident from the practice under this and earlier contracts that
the parties had no intention of entering into a real collective-
bargaining relationship.” /d. at 616, 1009. See also Glenlynn,
Inc., 204 NLRB at 309 (“the record is devoid of independent
evidence of the Union’s majority status in [the] unit. ...”) Yet
the NLRB simply ignores its precedents without regard to its
obligation as an administrative agency to provide a reviewing
court with a basis to “judge the consistency of that act with
the agency’s mandate.” Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway

25

Co. v. Witchita Board of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808, 93 S.Ct.
2367, 2375 (1973).

The NLRB’s attempt to distinguish Weber’s Bakery is
absurd because in that case it found that the unit was not ill-
defined and instead relied upon the fact that “the parties’ prac-
tice under the agreement showed they did not intend a real
collective bargaining agreement” to reject the union’s major-
ity status. (Appendix B at 6 n.10.) Thus, the NLRB should be
following Weber's Bakery in the instant case because for thirty
plus years the Union knew of Brower’s’ noncompliance and
yet never sought to enforce the terms of the successive con-
tracts. The contracts were a “sham.” (See also Glenlynn, Inc.,
204 NLRB at 308-09; NLRB v. West Sand & Gravel Co., 612
F.2d 1325 (1st Cir. 1979) (Application of decisions to case
identical to Brower’s.)

The NLRB further attempts to distinguish and depart from
the application of its Ace-Doran line of decisions by holding
that the presumption of majority status is irrebuttable by cit-
ing to Mr. Clean of Nevada, Inc., 288 NLRB No. 101, 130
LRRM 1345 (1988) and Pioneer Inn Assoc., 288 NLRB No.
(160) 1263, 95 LRRM 1225 (1977)."! Again, the distinctions
fail.

Pioneer Inn concerned the issue of union defunctness

11 The NLRB’s decision is inconsistent on this point. It states that an “incum-
bent union generally enjoys a presumption of continued majority status”
(Appendix B at 5)}—a rebuttable presumption—but then declares the presumption
irrebuttable. /d. at 8. Furthermore, in Shamrock Dairy, Inc., 124 NLRB (No. 63)
494, 44 LRRM 1407, 1408 (1959) the NLRB stated there was no evidence to
rebut the presumption. Why would the NLRB refer to a lack of rebutting evidence
if the presumption was irrebuttable? Either Shamrock should be overruled or the

presumption is rebuttable.

26

which was noi an issue in the instant case. Here, with the
exception of the charge it filed, the Union has not performed a
single act demonstrating any interest in representing Brower’s
employees. Pioneer is therefore both factually and conceptu-
ally inapposite because the dispositive factors in Pioneer were
that after a five year period of inertia from the Union, the
Union “resumed its role” representing the employees by pro-
cessing a grievance, by protesting unilateral changes in the
medical plan and by demanding negotiations to “amend and
modify” its contract. These facts are critical because they
establish that the union administered its contract and that the
employer appears to have been otherwise in compliance—evi-
dence of a collective bargaining relationship. The NLRB hung
its hat in Pioneer on the ALJ’s findings that the Union was
active in the critical period:

[T]he ... conduct alleged by the General Counsei to
be violative of Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act
took place subsequent to June 1974, and, in fact,
subsequent to January 1975, the time specified by
the Administrative Law Judge when the Union
“commenced to represent the unit employees and to
admiuister the collective-bargaining agreement.”

228 NLRB at 1263, 95 LRRM at 1226.

While in Brower’s the contract also was signed, the latter
two critical elements—negotiations and processing grievances
—are absent. The only activity in the instant case by the
Union is the filing of the charge that: “During the past six
months, the Employer has failed and refused to apply its col-
lective bargaining [sic] with the Union.” (A: 1.) The irony of
the charge is that it implies that the Union checked whether
there was compliance and then asked (hence “refusal”)

27

Brower’s to comply. There is no evidence in the record that
the Union lifted its finger to do even these Acts. Pioneer Inn,
a defunctness case, was simply misapplied by the NLRB. The
Second Circuit failed to address the NLRB’s error in enforc-
ing the order.

The decision in Mr. Clean is also both factually and legally
inapposite because the union in Mr. Clean met with Mr.
Clean’s officer and discussed both the initial and renewal con-
tracts with him. (ALJ Decision pp. 15-19 describes the dis-
puted circumstances concerning the execution of both
contracts.) Additional critical distinctions between Brower’s
and Mr. Clean, ignored by the NLRB, are that the union in Mr.
Clean grieved discharges and signed up new employees. (ALJ
Decision at 3, 19.) There is no conduct more consistent with a
union’s desire to represent the employees of an employer than
signing-up new members. In Brower’s, there is no evidence of
contact between Brower’s and the Union for over twenty
years.

Moreover, and in sharp contrast with Brower’s, Mr. Clean
repudiated its contract while the union demanded bargaining,
signed up new members and grieved discharges which is evi-
dence that the union was affirmatively exercising its contrac-
tual rights in behalf of the employees it represented. None of
these facts essential to the outcome in Mr. Clean are present in
Brower’s. Except for the filing of the unfair labor practice
charge there has been only silence from the Union for the past
twenty years.!2 The facts in this case do not permit the appli-

12 The NLRB cited the single instance of the Union requesting én. updated
seniority list in 1983 (A;169, 211-13) as evidence of the Union's enforcement.
(Appendix B at 7.) The letter, however, was a form mass mailed to all employers.

i i let i

28

cation of the NLRB’s Pioneer Inn and Mr. Clean pre-
cedents.!3

Nevertheless, the NLRB is attempting to have it both ways
—retaining its precedents but rejecting the outcome they
require. The facts in the NLRB “precedents” and the instant
case are indistinguishable on the central question whether the
parties evinced any intention to maintain a collective bargain-
ing relationship. The NLRB erroneously failed to follow those
precedents.

If the NLRB is to be supported in its departure from prece-
dents, then it must at the very least establish that it is being
consistent with the mandate of the Act. Cf. Atchison & Topeka
Etc. v. Witchita Board of Trade, supra. Here, the NLRB does
not assert such a departure. Therefore, its actual departure is
an abuse of discretion which the Second Circuit erroneously
reviewed under a deferential standard. See Oil, Chemical &
Atomic Workers Int'l Union Etc. v. NLRB, 842 F.2d 1141,
1143 n.1 (9th Cir. 1988).

The actions of the NLRB and Second Circuit warrant
review by this Court to the extent that they are inconsistent
with the precedents of this Court requiring an administrative
agency to follow its precedents, explain any departures there-
from and remain consistent with the mandate of its enabling
act. The result in this case, thus far, is that the NLRB, with the
acquiescence of the Second Circuit, is arbitrarily forcing a

13 An additional distinction is that in Brower's there was no deception
(Appendix B at 26). Contr. Mr. Clean, Decision and Order at 2, n.4. Moreover,
ary inference of deception here is unsupportable because deception requires con-
tact, communication or avoidance, none of which took place between Brower's
and the Union even though certain Brower’s employees were Union members at
one time. (A:307-08.)

ie te diets ae a?) tine a stein le i a da J a ae

29

union on an employer’s employees without any evidence that
the union ever established having their support, has it now, or
has a valid legal basis for an inference being drawn that such
support exists.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted. The
Second Circuit erroneously applied a deferential standard of
review permitting the NLRB to ignore its precedents as well
as exceed the parameters of its Congressional mandate.

In addition, both the NLRB and the Second Circuit erred by
relying upon the activities of LMRA/ERISA-governed Funds
as evidence of the Union’s intent and actual enforcement of its
contracts. Not only is this a question of federal law that
should be settled by this Court, but the Second Circuit’s order
conflicts with the precedents of other courts of appeals and
this Court. U.S.Sup.Ct. Rule 101.(a), (c).

Dated: Carle Place, New York
November 23, 1990

Respectfully submitted,

Robert S. Nayberg

Law Offices of MARTIN H. SCHER
One Old Country Road, Suite 385
Carle Place, New York 11514

(516) 746-5040

~~.

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
for the
SECOND CIRCUIT

At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the United States Courthouse in
the City of New York, on the 29th day of August, one thou-
sand nine hundred and ninety.

PRESENT:
HONORABLE WILFRED FEINBERG
HONORABLE RICHARD J. CARDAMONE
Circuit Judges
HONORABLE JOSE A. CABRANES*
District Judge

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED AUG 29 1990
ELAINE B. GOLDSMITH, CLERK
SECOND CIRCUIT

90-403 1

*Honorable Jose A. Cabranes, United States District Judge for the District of
C icut, siting by designat

A-2

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
Petitioner,

and

LOCAL 814, AFITILIATED WITH THE
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO,
Intervenor,

against
BROWER’S MOVING & STORAGE, INC.

Respondent,
X

Petition for enforcement of an order of the National Labor
Relations Board.

This cause came on to be heard on the application of the
National Labor Relations Board for enforcement of its Deci-
sion and Order, dated November 8, 1989, and was briefed and
argued by counsel.

UPON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is ordered,
adjudged and decreed that the order of the Board be and it
hereby is ENFORCED.

1. The National Labor Relations Board seeks to enforce its
order, dated November 8, 1989, against Brower’s Moving and

A-3

Storage, Inc., a Port Washington, New York business, which,
among other things, directed Brower’s to comply with the
terms and conditions of its 1986-89 collective bargaining
agreement with Local 814, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Amer-
ica, AFL-CIO. The Board decided, in disagreement with the
ruling of the Administrative Law Judge, that Brower’s vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations
Act by repudiating the terms of its collective bargaining
agreement with the Union and by failing to make the contrac-
tually required contributions to employee Welfare, Pension
and Annuity Funds since April 11, 1988. It should be noted
that this Court recently affirmed the grant by the Unitea States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York of sum-
mary judgment against Brower’s in an action by the Trustees
of the Funds, ordering Brower’s to make unpaid pension con-
tributions to the Funds. Benson, Corbett, Eisenberg, Morgan
& O’Connor v. Brower’s Moving & Storage, Inc., No. 90-
7001 (2d Cir. June 18, 1990).

2. Citing such cases as NLRB v. Marine Optical Associates,
671 F.2d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 1982), Pioneer Inn Associates v.
NLRB, 578 F.2d 835, 838-39 (9th Cir. 1978) and NLRB v.
Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583, 592-93 (2d Cir. 1969),
the Board argues that Brower’s was not legally justified in
challenging the incumbent Union’s majority status and
dishonoring its agreement because, during the term of a col-
lective bargaining agreement of three years or less, the incum-
bent union is entitled to a presumption of majority status. The
Company apparently does not dispute this proposition;
instead, relying principally on Ace-Doran Hauling & Rigging
Co., 171 NLRB 645, 646 (1968), it claims that his presump-
tion does not apply here because the conduct and practice of

A-4

the parties shows that they did not intend their agreement to
function as an effective collective bargaining contract.
Brower’s alleges that the Union’s actions subsequent to its
initial agreement in 1951 indicate that the Union either aban-
doned the contract or acquiesced in the Company’s repudia-
tion of it. The Board, however, found on the record before it
that the parzies’ conduct over a period of years did not negate
the intent to form a valid collective bargaining agreement or
establish that the Union abandoned the contract or acquiesced
in repudiation of it.

3. We find that the Board’s findings of fact are supported
by substantial evidence on the record as a whole and therefore
must be affirmed. The Board made a number of findings con-
fixming the parties’ intent to form a valid, ongoing collective
bargaining relationship, including the Company’s assent to
successive agreements over a period of many years, its pay-
ment of dues and contributions for several employees over a
substantial period of time and the Union’s efforts on behalf of
employees in a number of instances to secure affirmative
compliance with the contract.

4. We have considered all of the Company’s arguments and
find them without merit. We grant the Board’s application to
enforce its order.

’ WILFRED FEINBERG

RICHARD J. CARDAMONE
Circuit Judges

ewe Bee Met a ts OP eel aes. .e ae 8 eae 2
Parr = ; aid eae rere oF os eee
*

A-5

JOSE A. CABRANES,
District Judge

N.B. This summary order will not be published in the Federal
Reporter and should not be cited or otherwise relied upon in
unrelated cases before this or any other court.

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APPENDIX B

297 NLRB No. 28
SCH
D—1027
Port Washington, NY

Case 29—-CA—13733

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

BROWER’S MOVING & STORAGE, INC.

and

LOCAL 814, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO

DECISION AND ORDER

On April 11, 1989, Administrative Law Judge Joel P.
Biblowitz issued the attached decision. The Respondent and
the Acting General Counsel filed exceptions and supporting
briefs, and the Respondent filed an answering brief.

The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.

B-2

The Board has considered the decision and the record in
light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the
judge’s rulings, findings,’ and conclusions only to the extent
consistent with the Decision and Order.

The complaint alleged that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) by repudiating and failing to honor the terms
of its collective-bargaining agreement with the Union and by
failing to make the required contributions to the Teamsters
Local 814 Welfare, Pension and Annuity Funds (the Funds),
covering the employees in the following appropriate unit:

All chauffeurs, warehousemen, packers, hi-low
operators, checkers and helpers employed at the Re-
spondent’s warehouse, excluding guards and super-
visors as defined in Section 2(11) of the Act.

The judge dismissed the complaint. Relying primarily on Ace-
Doran Hauling & Rigging Co.* and McDonald's Drive-In
Restaurant,’ the judge found that the collective-bargaining
agreement between the parties did not give rise to a presump-

' We shall set forth the facts that the judge failed to mention, which support as-
serting jurisdiction over the Respondent. The Respondent, a New York corporation
with an office and place of business at its warehouse located at 18 Avenue A, Port
Washington, New York, is engaged in the warehousing, moving, and storage of
household and commercial furniture and other items. The Respondent, during the
12-month period ending November 30, 1988, which is a representative period, in
the course and conduct of its business had gross revenues in excess of $500,000.
During the same 12-month period, the Respondent purchased and received at its
warehouse goods and material valued in excess of $50,000 directly from sources
located outside the State of New York. We find that the Respondent is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec. 2(6) and (7) of the Act and that
the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec. 2(5) of the Act.

7171 NLRB 645 (1968).

> 204 NLRB 299 (1973). The judge also cited Weber's Bakery, 211 NLRB 1
(1974), and Pender Ship Repair Co., 188 NLRB 615 (1971).

297 NLRB No. 28

B-3

tion of majority status. He concluded that the agreement was
invalid because the parties’ practice under the agreement
demonstrated that they did not intent to established a valid
collective-bargaining relationship. We disagree with the
judge’s failure to find a violation for the following reasons.

The Respondent recognized the Union in 1951 after it de-
manded recognition. The Respondent admits signing succes-
sive collective-bargaining agreements over the years, although
there were never any individual negotiations. Most recently,
the Respondent agreed to be bound by the 1986 to 1989 col-
lective-bargaining agreement between the Union and an em-
ployer association of which the Responuent is not a member.
The agreement states that it covers employees classified as
chauffeurs, warehousemen, packers, hi-low operators, check-
ers, and helpers. Although the Respondent has never estab-
lished the specific job classifications described in the contract,
it has employees who perform many of the functions included
in those classifications.

It is undisputed that over the years the Respondent failed to
honor and abide by the wage, holiday, vacation, union secu-
rity, and other provisions of the successive agreements. There
is no affirmative evidence that the Union was aware of these
lapses other than failure to pay into the Funds until the instant
unfair labor practice charge was filed. From 1951 to 1954 a
union representative visited the Respondent’s facility on a
monthly basis to collect dues. No grievances were ever filed
and no steward was appointed, and after 1954 no union repre-
sentative visited the Respondent’s facility.

Over the years the Union’s Funds sent the Respondent
monthly contribution remiftamee reports. Until 1968 the Re-

B-4

spondent made Fund contributions only on behalf of a few
family members employed by the Respondent, despite the fact
that the Respondent employed other individuals in the unit de-
scribed in the contract. The Respondent had contributed to the
Funds on behalf of Wesley Brower until 1956 when the Union
informed him that, because he was an owner of the Respon-
dent, he could not work on trucks with members of the bar-
gaining unit.

In 1968, the Respondent contacted the Union about getting
an employee “set up” with hospitalization coverage and other
benefits. In March 1982 the Respondent paid the back dues
and Fund contributions that the Union required in order for
the employee to be eligible. The parties settled a 1981 suit
brought by the trustees of the Funds for delinquent contribu-
tions for the period July 1975 to January 1981. In September
1987, the Respondent ceased making any Fund contributions.
In December 1987, the Funds conducted an audit of the Re-
spondent’s payroll records and found a sizeable delinquency
in contributions due from April 1983 through September
1987. The Funds regularly sent past due notices to the Re-
spondent on a monthly basis showing delinquencies dating
back to 1981. The Respondent did not respond to bills for the
delinquency, and the Funds filed suit.

By letter dated October 14, 1983, the Union requested all
employers with collective-bargaining agreements, including
the Respondent, to submit an updated seniority list. This re-
quest was made pursuant to a provision of the collective-bar-
gaining agreement. The Respondent replied by sending the
Union a letter listing some family members who worked for
it. At that time the Respondent also requested that the Union
provide it with the dates of entry and years of credit for the

B-5

few family members that the Respondent had listed in its re-
sponse. The Union responded by submitting this information
to the Respondent. It appears that the Respondent, in actuality,
employed more unit employees than those listed in its re-
sponse and never informed the Union of the existence of these
additional employees. On October 11, 1988, the Union filed
the charge herein.

We find that since 1951, the Union has been the designated
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the em-
ployees in the unit described in the complaint, which we find
appropriate for collective bargaining, and that the Union has
been recognized as such by the Respondent. Since 1951 such
recognition has been embodied in successive collective-bar-
gaining agreements between the Respondent and the Union,
the most recent of which is effective by its terms for the pe-
riod April 1, 1986, to March 31, 1989. The Respondent has
repudiated and, by its own admission, failed to honor and
abide by the wage, vacation, holiday, union security, and other
provisions of its agreement with the Union. We find that,
since April 11, 1988, by this conduct, the Respondent has vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. We further find that
the Respondent has since April 11, 1988, violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) by failing to make the contractually required
contributions to the Union’s Funds.‘

We reject the Respondent’s contention and the judge’s find-
ing that there is no valid collective-bargaining agreement and
that the Union was not supported by a majority of the employ-
ees in an appropriate unit. We find that the cases relied on by
the judge are distinguishable. As the judge noted, it is well-
established in Board Law that an incumbent union generally

‘Mr. Clean of Nevada, 288 NLRB No. 101 (May 11, 1988).

enjoys a presumption of continued majority status during the
term of a collective-bargaining agreement. In Ace-Doran
Hauling & Rigging Co., supra, the Board found a narrow ex-
ception to that general rule when two factors undermined the
validity of the contract and the presumption of majority status.
First, the Board found that the unit was not defined with suffi-
cient clarity “to warrant a finding that the contracts are ones
to which a presumption of majority status can attach.” Sec-
ond, the Board found that both parties’ practice under the
agreements showed that the parties did not intend them to be
effective collective-bargaining agreements, but merely ar-
rangements to check off dues and to procure benefits for
union members only.* Similarly, in Bender Ship Repair Co.,
supra, the Board found a “patent ambiguity” in the contrac-
tual unit definition and that the union acquiesced in the appli-
cation of the contract to only a few favored employees.* In
McDonald's Drive-In Restaurani, supra,’ the Board adopted
the judge’s finding that the unit purported to be covered by
the contract was ambiguous and that the union never bothered
to enforce its contract.”

The aforementioned cases are distinguishable because the
collective-bargaining agreement in this case suffers from no

*171 NLRB at 645.

* Id. at 646.

’ 188 NLRB at 615.
* Id. at 616.

* 204 NLRB 299, 309 (1973).

* The judge also cited Weber's Bakery, supra. In that case the board adopted the
judge’s finding that, although the unit definition in the contract was adequate to
support the contract's validity, the parties’ practice under the agreement showed
presumption of majority status did not attach. The judge in Weber's Bakery found
that the contract was a sham and that the Union acquiesced in, at most, token com-
pliance with the contract.

211 NLRB at 12.

— Te ee a eee eee ee 1: Alasiae

B-7

such infirmities. It clearly specifies the unit, and the judge
specifically found it was not a “members only” contract. In
addition, the Union has clearly taken affirmative steps to en-
force its contract over the years. When the contract was first
signed, a union representative went to the facility to sign up
employees and thereafter visited monthly for 3 years to col-
lect dues. In 1956 the Union sought to stop the Respondent’s
owner, Wesley Brower, from performing unit work. In 1968
the Union responded to the Respondent’s request to sign up
one of its employees and required that the Respondent comply
with the contract by paying back dues and benefit contribu-
tions to the employee’s date of hire. In 1983, the Union re-
quested that the Respondent submit an updated seniority list.
Moreover, the activity of the Funds in filing suit in 1981 and
in auditing the Respondent’s books and records in 1987 and
instituting another suit for the delinquencies discovered is
consistent with a finding that there was in existence a valid
enforceable collective-bargaining agreement between the par-
ties.

While no steward was appointed and no grievances filed,
the Respondent admitted it never told its unit employees they
were represented by the Union or that there was an applicable
contract. Therefore, the employees were denied the knowl-
edge necessary to seek assistance from the Union. And, as
discussed earlier, the Union was also denied knowledge con-
cerning the unit employees when it asked for it. The Umion
filed the charge herein in October 1988 and has actively pur-
sued it.

Thus, we find that there is no evidence that the Union ever
acquiesced in a repudiation of substantial portions of the con-
tract or that the Union and the Respondent ever had an ar-

rangement or understanding that would negate an intent to
enter into a valid collective-bargaining relationship."

Accordingly, we find that the 1986-1989 contract is valid
and gives rise to an irrebutable presumption of majority status
and that the Union has not abandoned its administration of the
contract. We further find that the Respondent has violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by repudiating and failing
to comply with the contract’s terms and by failing to make the
required Fund contributions.”

" KBMS, Inc., 278 NLRB 826, 846 (1986).

We note that the Respondent itself has engaged in conduct that is inconsistent
with its position that there is no valid contract. It has signed successive agreements
over a period of 36 years and paid dues and made benefit contributions pursuant to
those collective-bargaining agreements for several employees over a substantial
part of that time. In 1968 the Respondent called on the Union to sign up an em-
ployee so he could receive union benefits, and it complied with the Union’s re-
quirement to pay back dues and benefits for that employee so that employee would
be ligible.

We also reject the Respondent’s contention that the contract is not valid be-
cause the Union lacked majority status at the time of the initial recognition in
1951. The Board has held:

[A]n employer may not defend against a refusal-to-bargain allegation
on the basis that the original recognition, occurring more than 6
months before charges had been filed in the proceeding raising the
issue, was unlawful. Any such defense is barred by Section 10(b) of
the Act.

Morse Shoe, Inc., 227 NLRB 391, 394 (1976), and the cases cited therein. Mr.
Clean of Nevada, supra. Even if the initial recognition in 1951 were flawed, it is
outside the 10(b) period, and the Resondent is precluded from attacking the current
contract on that basis.

® Mr. Clean of Nevada, supra, KBMS, Inc., supra; Pioneer Inn & Pioneer Inn
Casino, 228 NLRB 1263 (1977), enfd. 578 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1978).

We reject the Respondent’s contention and the jucye’s finding that the Union
has abandoned the contract and the unit. As the Board stated in Pioneer Inn, supra
at 1264:

[T]he lack of any basis for finding the contract to be invalid calls irito
effect the long-established Board presumption of the Union's major-
ity status during the term of the contract, irrespective of the degree to
which the Union may or may not have been deficient in the adminis-

(Footnote continued)

B-9

Conclusions of Law
‘

1. Brower’s Moving & Storage, Inc. is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.

2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.

3. The Union is the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of the employees in the following appropriate unit:

All chauffeurs, warehousemen, packers, hi-low op-
erators, checkers and helpers employed by Brower’s
Moving & Storage, Inc., at its Port Washington,
New York facility, excluding guards and supervisors
as defined in the Act.

4. Since April 11, 1988, the Respondent has violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by repudiating and failing to
honor or abide by the terms of its collective-bargaining agree-
ment with the Union, and by failing to make the required
Fund contributions.

5. The above-described violations of the Act constitute un-
fair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.

tration of that agreement.
To preserve the validity of a contract for contract bar purposes, a recognized union
need only show that it is willing and able to represent the covered employees at the
time its status is called into question. Loree Footwear Corp., 197 NLRB 360
(1972); Road Materials, 193 NLRB 990, 991 (1971). There is no evidence that the
Union is either unwilling or unable to represent the Respondent’s employees cov-
ered by the contract.

B-10

The Remedy

Having found that the Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, we shall order that it cease and de-
sist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.

Specifically, we shall order the Respondent to honor and
abide by the terms of its collective-bargaining agreement with
the Union, to make the unit employees whole for any losses
they may have suffered because of the Respondent’s failure to
abide by the terms of the agreement, for the period beginning
April 11, 1988, to be computed in the manner set forth in
Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), plus interest
to be computed in the manner prescribed in New Horizons for
the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), and to remit the contri-
butions required by the agreement for the period beginning
April 11, 1988, to the Union’s Funds, with interest to be com-
puted according to the practice set forth in Merryweather Op-
tical Co., 240 NLRB 1213, 126 fn. 7 (1979). The Respondent
shall also reimburse its employees for any expenses ensuing
from its failure to make contributions to the Funds, as set
forth in Kraft Plumbing & Heating, 252 NLRB 891 fn. 2
(1980), enfd. mem. 661 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1981).

ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the Re-
spondent, Brower’s Moving & Storage, Inc., Port Washing-
ton, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,

shall

1. Cease and desist from

B-11

(a) Repudiating and failing to honor and abide by the terms
of its collective-bargaining agreement with the Union cover-
ing the employees in the following unit:

All chauffeurs, warehousemen, packers, hi-low op-
erators, checkers and helpers employed by Brower’s
Moving & Storage, Inc., at its Port Washington,
New York facility, excluding guards and supervisors
as defined in the Act.

(b) Failing to make pension, welfare, and annuity Fund
contributions as required by its collective-bargaining agree-
ment with the Union for the unit employees described above.

(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them by Section 7 of the Act.

2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act. |

(a) Honor and abide by the terms of its collective-bargain-
ing agreement with the Union.

(b) Make whole all unit employees for any losses they may
have suffered as a result of the Respondent’s refusal to honor
the terms of its collective-bargaining agreement for the period
beginning April 11, 1988, in the manner described in the rem-
edy section of this decision.

(c) Make whole tne Union’s Funds for any payments the
Respondent failed to make for the period beginning April 11,
1988, in the manner described in the remedy section of this
Decision.

B-12

(d) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board or
its agents for examination and copying, all payroll records,
social security payment records, timecards, personnel records
and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of reimbursements due.

(e) Post at its Port Washington, New York facility copies of
the attached notice marked “Appendix.””® Copies of the no-
tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
29, after being signed by the Respondent’s representative,
shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt
and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to employees are custom<r-
ily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent
to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.

(f) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.

Dated, Washington, D.C. November 8, 1989

James M. Stephens, Chairman
Mary Miller Cracraft, Member
John E. Higgins, Jr. Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

" If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals,
the words in the notice reading “POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD” shall read “POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDG-
MENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING AN
ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.”

B-13

APP.NDIX

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

WE WILL NOT repudiate or fail to honor and abide by the
terms of our collective-bargaining agreement with Local 814,
International Brotherhood Of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO covering the
employees in the following unit:

All chauffeurs, warehousemen, packers, hi-low op-
erators, checkers and helpers employed by Brower’s
Moving & Storage, Inc., at its Port Washington,
New York facility, excluding guards and supervisors
as defined in the Act.

WE WILL NOT fail to make pension, welfare, and annuity
Fund contributions as required by our collective-bargaining
agreement with che Union for the employees described above.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.

WE WILL honor and abide by the terms of our coilective-bar-
gaining agreement with the Union.

B-14

WE WILL make whole all unit employees for any losses they
may have suffered as a result of our refusal to honor the terms
of our collective-bargaining agreement from April 11, 1988,
with interest.

WE WILL make whole the Union’s Funds for any payments
we failed to make from April 11, 1988, with interest.

BROWER’S MOVING & STORAGE, INC.

(Employer)

Dated By
(Representative) (Title)

This is an official notice and must not be defaced by any-
one.

This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this
notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to
the Board’s Office, 75 Clinton Street, Eighth Floor, Brooklyn,
New York 11201-0001, Telephone 718-330-2862.

B-15

JD(NY)-30—89
Port Washington, NY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
NEW YORK BRANCH OFFICE

Case No. 29-CA—13733

BROWER’S MOVING & STORAGE, INC.

.

and

LOCAL 814, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA

Carol L. O’Rourke, Esq. and James J. Paulsen, Esq.
for the General Counsel

Michael Barrett, Esq., Friedman, Levy, Warren & Moss,
for the Charging Party

Robert S. Nayberg, Esq. and Richard A. Ivers, &sq.
Law Offices of Martin H. Scher, for the Respondent

B-16

DECISION
Statement of the Case

JOEL P. BIBLOWITZ, Administrative Law Judge:
This case was heard by me on February 9, 1989 in Brooklyn,
New York. The Complaint and Notice of Hearing herein,
which issued on November 30, 1988,’ and was based upon an
unfair labor practice charge filed on October 11 by Local 814,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America, herein called the Union,
alleges that Brower’s Moving & Storage, Inc., herein called
Respondent, violated Section 8(a)(1)(5) of the Act by repudi-
ating and failing to abide by its contract with the Union by,
inter alia, failing to make pension fund, welfare fund and an-
nuity fund contributions, as required by the contract, and by
failing to comply with the contract’s terms regarding wages,
holidays, vacations and union security.

Upon the entire record, I make the following:
Findings of Fact
L. Jurisdiction and Labor Organization Status
Therein being no dispute, I find that Respondent is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section

2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act, and the Union is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.

Unless indicated otherwise, all dates referred to herein relate to the year 1988.

B-17

II. Facts and Analysis

Respondent is engaged in the warehousing and moving and
storage business and has maintained a collective bargaining
relationship (of sorts) with the Union since 1951. At that time,
Respondent recognized the Union and the Union delegate
came to Respondent’s facility and had a number of employees
(principally members of the Brower family) join the Union.
From that time until his death in 1954, the Union delegate
came to the facility regularly to collect Union dues from these
individuals. From 1954 until the visit of Peter Furtado (as dis-
cussed, infra) nobody from the Union ever visited the shop.
Respondent never formally negotiated a contract with the
Union, but, apparently, every few years executed a Memoran-
dum of Agreement agreeing to be bound by an agreement en-
tered into by the Union with one of the employer associations
with which it negotiates, and to execute the printed contract as
soon as it was available. The last such Memorandum of
Agreement is effective April 1, 1986 through March 31, 1989.

During 1988, Respondent had a complement of from ten to
twenty employees; this number does not include Dorothy
Golden, bookkeeper and sister-in-law of the owners. It does
include Clifford Brower, Secretary-treasurer of Respondent
(“I take care of the books in the office and work around the
warehouse just like everybody else”), Wesley Brower, Presi-
dent of Respondent and another owner with Clifford Brower,
Gary Brower (“He drives a truck, he works around the ware-
house, anything that has to be done”), Wesley Brower’s son
and John Brower, a truck driver and also Wesley Brower’s
son. Gary and John Brower each owns some stock in Respon-
dent. Gary and John Brower are two of Respondent’s four
regular drivers; Respondent also employs people who do

B-18

packing and warehousing.

At least since 1967, the only two employees for whom Re-
spondent has transmitted dues and contributions to the Union
are Clifford and John Brower. Until about 1956, Respondent,
contributed, as well, for Wesley Brower; at that time, a repre-
sentative of the Union told him that he could not work along-
side the other employees, and Respondent ceased transmitting
dues and contributions to the Union on his behalf. In about
1967, Respondent contacted the Union and informed them
that it had a driver in its employ for about nine years and that
it had not been deducting or transmitting dues or contributions
on his behalf; at that time, Respondent and the Union entered
into an agreement for the Respondent to pay about $20,000 to
the Union over eighteen months so that the employee would
be eligible for benefits upon his retirement. Respondent made
the final payment pursuant to this agreement in 1969. Prior to
1982, Respondent also made the required contributions for
employee George Finley and, possibly, others.

In 1981, the trustees of the Union’s Welfare, Pension and
Annuity Trust Fund, herein called the Funds, sued Respon-
dent in Supreme Court, Queens County for failing to pay to
the funds the sum of $14,105 for the period July 1975 through
January, 1981;? the lawsuit added an additional $7,500 as in-
terest and attorney’s fees. By a Stipulation entered into in
March 1982, Respondent agreed to pay $19,000 to the funds
over a period of about two years and said payments were
made.

By letter dated October 14, 1983 “to All Employers” (in-

2 It is not clear whether this lawsuit covered payments only for John and Clif-
ford Browers, or whether it included payments for others, as weil.

B-19

cluding Respondent) the Union, by Charles Martelli, its Sec-
retary treasurer, wrote: ;

In accordance with the requirements of Section
21(A) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, it is
expected that each Employer shall mail, to the
Union’s office, no later than November 15, 1983, an
up-to-date seniority list, showing the date of origi-
nal hire and the classification seniority date for all
employees.

The above requirement must be complied with
without exception.

On the bottom of this letter, Clifford Brower wrote: “Char-
lie—Please check and see what year we got in the Union and
how many years we have .o our credit.” Underneath, he listed
his name together with John Brower. By letter dated Nover-
ber 28, 1983, Martelli stated: “Please be informed that we are
in receipt of your seniority list and wish to inform you of the
following information.” The letter gave October 16, 1967 as
date of initiation for both, Clifford and John Brower, together
their pension credits.

Other than the above recited situations, and the Complaint
filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York on February 11 (as more fully described,
infra) the Union has never filed a grievance or court action
against Respondent, nor did any Union representative ever ap-
pear at Respondent’s facility to question Respondent’s com-
pliance with the contract even though the uncontradicted testi-
mony establishes that Respondent did not comply with a vast
majority of the contractual terms, including the following:

B-20

Article 1 (Wages)

Article 3 (Birthday Holidays)

Article 4 (Vacations)

Articles 5, 6 and 7 (Job Classifications)
Article 9 E (Pay for Meals and Lodging for
Overnight Hauls)

Articles 11 and 12 (Conditions and Rates Paid
Employees)

Article 13 (Union Security Clause)

Article 16 (Check-Off of Dues)

Article 17 (Shop Steward)

Article 21 (Seniority)

Article 23 (Death in Family)

Articles 29, 30 and 31 (Pension, Welfare and
Annuity Fund)

Article 32 (Cost of Living Allowance)

More particularly (as regards the more important of these pro-
visions) Respondent did not pay the wages as set forth in the
contract or make the contributions to the Union’s funds for
any of Respondent’s employees except for Clifford and John
Brower. In addition, Respondent did not maintain a seniority
list, did not notify the Union upon the hiring of new em-
ployees or after their thirty first day of employment, and
never had any employee designated as a shop steward. As
stated, supra, in about 1956 Wesiey Brower was informed
that, as an owner of Respondent, he could not work on the
trucks with members of the Union. At that time, Respondent
ceased making payments to the Union and the funds on his
behalf, but he “...still worked on the truck next to whoever
was there with me”, without any complaints from the Union.

Beginning in January, the Union has sent Past Due Notices

B-21

(“This will inform you that your monthly payment to the
Teamsters Local 814 Pension, Welfare and Annuity Trust
Funds as set forth below has not been received. This matter
needs your immediate attention”.) to Respondent stating that
the delinquency period was 1981 through 1987; apparently,
Respondent never responded to these notices. Rather, Respon-
dent continued to make the required contributions to the
Funds for Clifford and John Brower, at least, through the end
of 1987.

On December 21, 1987, Peter Furtado, who, at the time,
was an auditor for the Funds, audited Respondent’s books
pursuant to the Funds normal procedures. On January 14, the
Funds sent Respondent a Notice of Audit Delinquency stating
that Respondent had underpaid the Funds in the amount of
$239,000 for the period April 1983 through September 1987;
that amount, together with interest and “liquidated damages”
of twenty percent brought the amount Respondent owed to
$377,000. Payment was demanded within fifteen days; Re-
spondent was informed that if payment was not made the mat-
ter would be turned over to the Funds’ attorneys. On February
11, 1988, the Funds sued Respondent in Federal District Court
in Brooklyn for $239,000 plus interest, liquidated damages
and costs. Apparently, this matter has not yet reached the trial
stage. Respondent has not paid this amount to the Union.

Respondent defends on three grounds: there is no contract,
even if there were a contract, it has long since been aban-
doned by the Union, and, even if it has not been abandoned,
after so many years of not enforcing the agreements, the
Union is estopped from attempting to do so now.

The Board has long held that an incumbent union generally

B-22

enjoys a presumption of continued majority status (a prerequi-
site, of course, to a Section 8(a)(5) violation) during the dura-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement. Pioneer Inn Associ-
ates, d/B/A Pioneer Inn and Pioneer Inn Casino, 228 NLRB
1263; Colson Equipment, Inc., 257 NLRB 78. An exception
to this rule was set forth in Ace-Doran Hauling & Rigging
Co., 171 NLRB 645 where the Board found that the contracts
between the parties did not raise a presumption of regularity
or that the union was the majority representative of the em-
ployer’s employees.

The evidence relating to the practice under the
agreements further makes it clear that the parties did
not intend them to be effective collective-bargaining
contracts, but instead merely regarded them as ar-
rangements under which Respondent agreed to
check off dues, health and welfare, and pension
payments for union members only. The acquies-
cence of the Unions in Respondent’s failure both to
enforce the union-security provisions of the agree-
ments and to pay health and welfare contributions
for all employees (as ostensibly provided by the
“contracts”), makes it clear that the parties did not
believe that they were in true collective-bargaining
relationships.

Since the alleged agreements are not such as
would give rise to a presumption of majority status,
we find that the General Counsel has failed to sus-
tain his burden of proof and therefore that the com-
plaint should be dismissed.

See also Bender Ship Repair Company, Inc., 188 NLRB
615, Weber’s Bakery, 211 NLRB 1; and Glenlynn, Inc., 204
NLRB 299, which stated at 309:

B-23

However, the Board has held that this presump-
tion may not attach following the termination of the
contract where the contract does not define the bar-
gaining unit with sufficient clarity or where the
practices thereunder demonstrate that the parties
never intended to establish a real bargaining rela-
tionship.

Apart from the ambiguity thus surrounding the
scope of the bargaining unit, the evidence leaves
one highly skeptical that a real collective-bargaining
relationship emanated from the execution of the
Alton contract. As previously discussed, it is undis-
puted that the Union neither administered the con-
tract nor serviced the employees. As a result, not
only were the employees deprived of contractual
benefits pertaining to such matters as wage rates,
health and welfare contributions, meals, uniforms,
job duties, and holidays, but they were subjected to
working conditions unilaterally imposed by the Re-
spondent without any protest from the Union. More-
over, whatever grievances or complaints they had
they personally presented to, and discussed with,
management and it was not until the closing days of
the contract that the Union undertook to submit sev-
eral employee grievances to the Company. In addi-
tion to the Union’s indifference to employee inter-
ests, it did not bother to enforce them. Apparently,
the Union was not content with the few employees
the Respondent periodically signed up for the Union
and with the initiation fees and dues the Respondent
deducted from the wages of these employees. It was
only near the end of the contract term that the Union
took more affirmative steps to enlist the Respon-
dent’s assistance to force the employees to join.

B-24

In sum, I find that the parties never entered into a
true collective-bargaining relationship out of which
a presumption of the Union’s majority status may
arise. At best, the relationship was a token one
where “the Union was willing to exact little in the
way of contract enforcement and ... [the Respon-
dent was] never satisfied to reap the financial bene-
fits of lower costs.” In these circumstances, and in
view of equivocal nature of the bargaining unit, I
find the evidence insufficient to support a presump-
tion that the Union was the majority representative
of the employees in the alleged Alton store unit.

I cannot imagine a better example of the situation referred
to in Glenlynn and Ace Doran, supra, as the instant matter.
Respondent initially recognized the Union in about 1951 and
about every three years the Union sent Respondent a Memo-
randum of Agreement to execute; by signing each of these,
Respondent agreed to be bound by the contract the Union was
to negotiate with an association. After Respondent agreed to
recognize the Union in 1951 (without any majority support
from Respondent’s employees) the Union’s subsequent activ-
ity (up until the December 1987 audit of Respondent’s books
and the subsequent filing of the Federal Court action in
February) was as follows:

After Respondent recognized the Union, a representative of
the Union came to the Respondent’s facility and signed Clif-
ford and Wesley Brower as Union members; it is not clear
whether any other employee joined the Union at that time.

In 1967, Respondent contacted the Union and informed them
that it wanted Merriweather, a driver in its employ for nine
years, to be a member of the Union and covered by the Funds

B-25

so that he could receive a pension from the Union upon retire-
ment. The Union determined the amount due it since Merri-
weather began his employment, with Respondent in 1959—
almost $20,000—and Respondent paid this amount to Re-
spondent.

In 1981, the Union funds sued Respondent for $14,000 delin-
quency in payments to the funds from 1975; a year later, this
matter was settled when Respondent agreed to pay this
amount in installments. This lawsuit involved only the annu-
ity, welfare and pension funds not any other payments Re-
spondent failed to make under the contracts.

In 1983 the Union requested all employers under contract to
supply them with a seniority list; Respondent asked the Union
for the seniority dates of the only two individuals who were
members—Clifford and John Brower—and the following
month the Union supplied them with their date of initiation
into the Union—1967.

On a monthly basis (beginning in, at least, April 1986) trans-
mitted to Respondent a combined Monthly Welfare, Pension
and Annuity Contribution Report with only John and Clif-
ford’s name filled in; Respondent then listed forty hours for
each, together with the amount due and a check to cover this
amount. Between the 1981 lawsuit and the December 1987
audit, Respondent never questioned these reports.

The record clearly establishes that aside from the dues and
fund payments for Clifford, and John Brower (and for a pe-
riod, Merriweather and Wesley Brower) the contracts between
the parties were totally disregarded; employees were not
members of the Union as required by the union security

B-26

clause of the agreement nor did they receive the terms and
conditions of employment as specified in the contracts.
Rather, it appears that (with the exception of the 1981 lawsuit)
between 1951 and December 1987, the Union did nothing to
enforce its contract with Respondent. General Counsel, in her
brief, cites Mr. Clean of Nevada, Inc., 288 NLRB No. 101.
However, that case is distinguishable from the instant matter
because that bargaining relationship lasted only two years and
four months and involved deception by the employer. In the
instant matter, the parties had a collective bargaining relation-
ship for thirty six years before the Union took any action to
enforce the contract, and Respondent never engaged in any
positive deceptions; it simply made believe that the contract
did not exist.

The 1986 through 1989 contract therefore does not give
rise to a presumption of majority status, Ace-Doran, supra, |
therefore find that the General Counsel has failed to sustain
her burden of proof and accordingly recommend that the
Complaint be dismissed.’

? Although I have recommended that the Complaint be dismissed on this
ground, two other theories—members only and abandonment—should be men-
tioned. In Don Mendenhall, Inc., 194 NLRB 1109 the Board refused to find a Sec-

‘ tion 8(aX5) violation because the agreement between the company and the union
was appiied to members only. Members only is not applicable to the instant sitta-
tion because the contract did not even cover the terms and conditions of employ-
ment of the only two members—John and Clifford Brower, it only covered them
for the annuity, pension and welfare funds. On the other hand, I cannot imagine a
clearer case of abandonment by a union; in the situation herein, the Union (as dif-
ferentiated from the trustees of the Funds) made no attempt to enforce the provi-
sions of its agreements with Respondent for approximately thirty six years. To me,
this indicates an “unwillingness to represent the employees in the unit.” Road Ma-
terials, Inc., 193 NLRB 990 at 991. See also Industrial Paper Stock Company, 66
NLRB 1185.1 would therefore recommend the dismissal of this Complaint for that
reason, as well.

B-27

Conclusions of Law

1. Brower’s Moving & Storage, Inc., is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.

2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.

3. Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(1)(5) of the Act
as alleged in the Complaint. 2

Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Na-
tional Labor Pelations Act, as amended, I hereby issue the
following recommended:

ORDER‘

It having been found and conciuded that Respondent,
Brower Moving & Storage, Inc., has not engaged in unfair
labor practices as alleged, the Complaint is hereby dismissed
in its entirety.

}

Dated: April 11, 1989

Joel P. Biblowitz
Administrative Law Judge

* If no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of the Board's Rules
and Regulations, the findings, conclusions and recommended Order shall, as pro-
vided in Section 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to
them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.

APPENDIX C

BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BROWER’S MOVING & STORAGE, INC.,
Respondent/Employer,
and
LOCAL 814, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD
OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA,

Union.

RESPONDENT’S EXCEPTIONS TO
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S DECISION

C-2

The Respondent, BROWER’S MOVING & STORAGE,
INC., excepts to the Decision of Administrative Law Judge
Joel P. Biblowitz (“ALJ”) dated 11 April 1989.

Pursuant to section 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of
the National Labor Relations Board, the Respondent sets forth
the following exceptions to the ALJ’s Decision:

Exception #1: To the finding that: “From 1954 until
the visit of Peter Furtado ... nobody from the Union
ever visited the shop.” (ALJD 2 lines 15-16).*

Grounds: The ALJ erroneously found that Mr.
Peter Furtado was a representative of the Union
when he audited Respondent’s books in or about
December, 1987. In fact, Mr. Furtado was a field
auditor employed by the benefit Funds and was not
at the time employed by the Union. (Tr. 85-86 &
91.)

Exception #2: To the finding that “Other than the
above-recited situations and the Complaint filed in
the United States District Court of the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York on February 11 (as more fully
described, infra) the Union has never filed a
grievance or court action against Respondent. ...”
(ALJD 3 lines 40-44)

*“G.C. Ex.” refers to the exhibits of the General Counsel. “Tr. refers to the
transcript of the hearing. “ALJD” refers to the Decision and recommended Order
of the Administrative Law Judge dated April 11, 1990.

C-3

Grounds: The ALJ erroneously concluded that the
Union initiated the action against Brower’s and is a
party to that action. In fact, the Funds commenced
the action. The Funds are an independent and a dis-
tinct entity, separate and apart from the Union and
the Union is not a party to that action. (G.C. Ex. 9

Complaint #4)

Exception #3: To the finding that “Beginning in
January, the Union has sent Past Due Notices. ...
(ALJD 4 line 38.)

Grounds: The ALJ erred in concluding that the
Past Due Notices (which were admitted into evi-
dence as G.C. Exhibit #6) were sent by the Union
since Mr. Anthony Mandile, the Funds’s Office
Manager (Tr. 71) testified that the G.C. Exhibit #6
was sent by the Fund (not the Union). (Tr. 74.)

Exception #4: To the finding that “The Respondent
has not paid this amount to the Union.” (ALJD 5
line 12), in referring to the Federal District Court
action.

Grounds: The ALJ’s conclusion is in error since
the Union is not a party to the Federal District Court
action, has never demanded payment of the alleged
delinquency and is not entitled to such payment.
The word “Funds” should be replaced for the word
“Union.”

Exception #5: To the finding that “After Respon-
dent agreed to recognize the Union in 1951 (without

C-4

any showing of majority support from Respondent’s
employees) the Union’s subsequent activity (up
until the December 1987 audit of Respondent’s
books and the subsequent filing of the Federal Court
action in February) was. ...” (ALJD 7 lines 21-25.)

Grounds: The ALJ erroneously concluded that the
1987 audit was the Union’s activity. The audit was
the sole action of the Funds.

Exception #6: To the failed review and ruling on
the Respondent’s argument that the Union’s failure
to demand bargaining at any time rendered the
charge invalid.

Grounds: The Union’s failure to demand bargain-
ing over the alleged contract violations at any time
establishes a) an alternative ground for dismissal of ,
the charge and b) supports the ALJ’s conclusion that
the Union did not have the support of the majority
of the Respondent’s employees (ALJD 8) and aban-
doned the collective bargaining relationship (ALJD
8 n. 3).

. Dated: Carle Place, New York
May 25, 1989

C-5

Respectfully submitted,

Law Offices of MARTIN H. SCHER
Attorneys for Respondent

BROWER’S MOVING & STORAGE, INC.

S/
By: Robert S. Nayberg

One Old Country Road, Suite 385
Carle Place, New York 11514
(516) 746-5040

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385020_3184%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
