# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque v. Barnhart

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1991
- **Citation:** 498 U.S. 1109

## Text

ai : |;. Supreme Cou
90 783 iii FILED

NOV 16 1999

JOBERA F. AWOL, JR
No. OLaeK

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1990

VILLAGE OF LOS RANCHOS' DE

ALBUQUERQUE and RIO GRANDE

VALLEY PRESERVATION SOCIETY,
Petitioners,

V.

R.H.BARNHART, Administrator of the
Federal Highway Administration, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM G. WALKER
Counsel for Petitioners
150 Louisiana NE

Albuquerque, NM 87108
505/268-4551

Il.

i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Is a state highway project always
exempt, as a matter of law, from
federal environmental requirements,
despite extensive federal involvement
in the project, including federal
development funds, location approval
from the Federal Highway
Administration and eligibility for
further federal funding, if it has not
actually received federal construction
funds?

Is the Montano Bridge Project to cross
the Rio Grande a "major federal
action" or "federal or federally
assisted undertaking" within the
purview of federal environmental and
historic preservation laws as a result
of the "exhaustive" involvement and
control of the project by the National
Highway Administration and the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers?

ii
PARTIES

VILLAGE OF LOS RANCHOS DE ALBUQUERQUE, RIO
GRANDE VALLEY PRESERVATION SOCIETY,

Petitioners,

and

ELBERT KING, JOAN MCGINNIS, VELMA WHIPPLE,
TOMAS MONTOYA, PRICILLA MONTOYA, JOHN
TROTTER AND KIT SARGEANT,

Plaintiffs,
Vv.

R.H.BARNHART, Administrator of the Federal
Highway Administration, ELIZABETH DOLE,
Secretary of the Department of
Transportation, PETER A. LOMBARD,
Environmental Protection Specialist for the
Federal Highway Administration, DANIEL
DAKE, Director, Office of Planning and
Programming Development of the Federal
Highway Administration and DEWEY LONSBERRY,
Federal Highway Division, Administrator,
CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, and THE COUNTY OF
BERNALILLO,

Respondents.

ow ih chat stn mae tt

iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED......eeeeeeeecevces
LIST OF PARTIES....-eeeeeeeees eoccccces
OPINIONS BELOW... cece ecceccrennccesees
JURISDICTION... cc eeccceenereeeccceseves
RELATED CASES... cceeceeeseerccesecccees
STATUTES INVOLVED. ...--eeeeeevcerrecs
STATEMENT OF THE CASE....-eeeeeeecevees
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.......---

~-

oo, U& Nee

LS

I. The Tenth Circuit's decision that a
highway project which is eligible for
Federal construction funds and has
received "exhaustive" Federal
assistance, planning funds, and
locaticn approval is, nevertheless,
not a “major federal action" nor a
“federal or federally assisted
undertaking" if federal funds for
actual construction have not been used
or approved a) conflicts with
decisions of other Circuits and b)
unreasonably restricts the reach of 42
USC §4321 ef Seq. (NEPA), 16 USC §470 ef
seq. (NHPA), 23 USC §138 (FAHWA), and 49

usc §303 et Seq. (DOTA)... eee eeeces 20

II. Despite the confluence of the FHWA
location approval and the assertion of
jurisdiction and “major federal
action" status by the Corps of
Engineers, the Tenth Circuit's
aecision that the Montafio Bridge
Project is not a "major federal
action" raises important and
unresolved problemsS.......+esese+e++- 34

CONCLUSION. ccccccccecccccccccccececccce 44
APPENDIX eeeeeee70ee*eeneeeeeweeneeeeeeneeeeeeee 14

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:

Citizens for Balanced Environ. & Transp., Inc. v.
Volpe, 376 FSupp 806 (D.Conn.),
aff'd percuriam, 503 F2d 601 (2nd
Cir.1974), cert. denied, 423 US 870
caervees «+ « «ss s. OB) 83, 38, M6,

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
ae eee: Caen. 6 6 Se eo a ee Ee fe

City of Boston v.Volpe, 464 F2d 254 (1st
ee I a

Historic Preservation Guild of Bay View v.
Burnley, 896 F2d 985 (6th Cir.
Ee te | oe ae a ee el a

Indiana Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 484 F2a
Se eee, SOURS ss cee

La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337 FSupp 221
(N.D.Cal. 1971), cert. denied 409 US
890 (1972) (prematurely filed),
supplemented by 57 FRD 94 (atty'‘s
fees), affd 488 F2d 559 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 US 964
a ee A eh es Ge tf

Lee v. Thornburgh, 877 F2da 1053 (D.c.
DT 6-4, 0S « «6 & & @ 6 ¢

Maryland Conservation Council v. Gilchrist,
808 F2d 1039 (4th Cir.1987) ...

39,40

29

26

22-25

29

PP cei 9 tates oe oto snseeiiionnl

Vv

Named Individual Members of San Antonio
Conservation Society v. Texas Highway Dept.,
446 F2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971) . . 26, 30

NRDC v. Calloway, 389 FSupp. 1263 (D.
Conn. 1974), rev’d on other grounds,
524 F2d 79 (2d Cir.1975) ... 40, 41

Quince Orchard Valley Citizens Ass'n v. Hodel,
872 F2d 75 (4th Cir. 1989). .... . 28

River v. Richmond Metropolitan Authority ,
359 FSupp 611 (E.D.Va.
Richmond Div. 1973) . ...+. +... 25

Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Witherspoon,
638 FSupp 1158 (E.D.La. 1986) .. . .37

Scottsdale Mall v. State of Indiana, 549 F2da
484 (7th Cir. 1977), cer.denied,
434 US 1008 (1978) .... 26, 28

Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F2d 1068
(10th Cir.1988). . « « «© «© « « 17, 43

Village of Los Ranchos v. Hatch,
No. CIV 88-1032JC (D.N.M.),
Nos. 90-2012, 90-2026, 90-2052
(10th Cir.) (pending). . . .3, 5, 6, 14, 34

Statutes:

16 USC §470 ef Seq., National
Historic Preservation Act
(NHPA). . « «© « « 7, 10, 14, 18-21,
eee 8 6 6 8 «8 0 oe eee Gee eee ae

vi
a oe ee. “es « sé ee 6 ete 68 6 6 ss SS

2: 5C §138, Federal-Aid Highways
At (FAHWA) . .7, 10, 19-21, 25-26, 107a

TE. Sa cg we ee ke 4
28 USC §1291 eo oO es * — o .* _ eo * . 7 . 4
28 usc §1331 e e - e oa . o J] e . * * . 4
ee
33 USC §1344, Clean Water Act
(§404) . .6, 10, 14, 18, 19, 22, 29, 34,
oe e . @ oe s o eo J . oO oe 36-39, 41, 110a

42 USC §4321, 4332 ef seq.,
National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) .. 6, 7, 10, 14, 16, 19-21,
°o © « « 25, 28, 33, 34, 38-40, 42, 119a

49 usc §303, Department of
Transportation Act (DOTA)

§4(f) .. 7, 10, 14, 19-21, 25,
oO e * . oe a o e . o o 26, 28, 126a
Rules and Regulations:

ee |
36 CFR §800.2(c)(1986) ....... 31
36 CFR §800.2(0) (1989) . .... 31, 138a
40 CFR Part 1500, efseg. (1986) . . 42, 139a

40 CFR §1508.18 . .....e. 43, 163a

vii
40 CFR §1501.6, CEQ Regs... . 4l, 144a
40 CFR §1501.7, CEQ Regs. .. . 41, 146a
46 Fed.Reg. 18026 (1981), Forty
Most Asked Questions Concerning

CEQ's NEPA Regulations . . .41, 42, 173a

Executive Order 11990, Protection
of Wetlands ...+«+«e«e«e.-s. 10, 19

Deer Autasistes:

FAHWA Policy and Procedures
Memorandum 20-8 .... +. +++. -«-+ 25

S.Rep.No. 91-296, 91 Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1969) . o . . . ca . . . 7 . 41

1

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1990

VILLAGE OF LOS RANCHOS' DE

ALBUQUERQUE and RIO GRANDE

VALLEY PRESERVATION SOCIETY,
Petitioners,

Vv.

R.H.BARNHART, Administrator of the
Federal Highway Administration, ef al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

The petitioners, Village of Los

Ranchos de Albuquerque, efail., respectfully

pray that a writ of certiorari issue to
review the judgment and opinion of the

United States Court of Appeals for the

2
Tenth Circuit, entered in the above-
entitled proceeding on June 2, 1990, with
petitioners' rehearing petition denied on

August 22, 1990.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit is reported at 906
F2d 1477, and is reprinted in the appendix,

p. la, infra. The denial of rehearing in the

Tenth Circuit is reprinted in the appendix
at p. 34a, infra.

The memorandum decision of the United
States District Court for the District of
New Mexico (Burciaga, D.J.) has not been

reported. It is reprinted in the appendix,
p. 36a, infra.
The memorandum decision of May 8,

1989, of the United States District Court

3
for the District of New Mexico (Conway,

D.J.) in a related case, Village of Los Ranchos
v. Hatch, No. CIV 88-10327C (D.N.M.), See p.
5, infra, has not been reported. a

reprinted in the appendix hereto, p. 70a,

infra.

4

JURISDICTION

The decision, order and opinion of the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit affirming the decision of the
trial court was entered on July 2, 1990 and
is reported at 906 F2d 1477 (10th Cir.
1990). The Court's order denying rehearing
was entered on August 22, 1990.

Jurisdiction is conferred on this
Court to review the order by writ of
certiorari to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals by 28 USC §1254(1).

The jurisdiction of the United States
District Court for the District of New
Mexico was invoked pursuant to 28 USC §1331
(federal question) and 28 USC §§2201-2202
(declaratory judgment). The jurisdiction
of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was

invoked pursuant to 28 USC §1291.

3
;
:

Pe A ae ae ee

5

RELATED CASES

1. Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque, et al., v.
Lt. Gen. Hatch, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, et al., No. CIV 88-10323C (the "Hatch"

case), United States District Court for the
District of New Mexico, currently on appeal
to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit, Nos. 90-2012, 90-2026
and 90-2052 (unconsolidated appeals).
Summary judgment in favor of the federal
defendants was granted on June 9, 1987 by
the District Court. Briefing is complete
and oral argument has not yet been set in
the Tenth Circuit. One of thre. memorandum

decisions rendered in the Hatch case is set

out in the appendix at p. 70a, infra.'

’ In the Hatch case the Village of
Los Ranchos de Albuquerque and other
plaintiffs have sued the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers following its issuance of a

6

2. State of New Mexico, ex rel., Village of Los
Ranchos de Albuquerque, et al., v. City of Albuquerque, No.

CV-89-02766, New Mexico District Court for
the Second Judicial District. AK
preliminary injunction halting work on the
Montano Bridge Project was issued by the
District Court on June 16, 1989 and the
City of Albuquerque took an interlocutory
appeal to the New Mexico Court of Appeals
(No. 11688). The case has been briefed and
argued. A decision is pending. The
memorandum decision in the state case is

not included in the appendix.?

permit pursuant to §404 of the Clean Water
Act, 33 USC §1344, to the City of
Albuquerque to dredge and fill the Rio
Grande for the Montano Bridge Project. The
basic allegation is that in failing to
prepare an EIS or supplement the one
prepared by the FHWA the Corps has violated
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 USC
§4332 (NEPA).

: The basis of the Preliminary
Injunction is that the bridge will be a
public nuisance because of noise, injury to

7

STATUTES INVOLVED

16 USC §470 ef Seq., National Historic

Preservation Act (NHPA). Reprinted at
Appendix, pp. 105a-106a.

23 USC §138, Federal-Aid Highways Act
(FAHWA) . Reprinted at Appendix pp.
107a-109a.

33 USC §1344, Clean Water Act. Reprinted
at pp. 110a-118a.

42 USC §4321 ef Seq., National Environmental

Policy Act (NEPA). Reprinted at
Appendix, pp. 119a-125a.

49 USC §303, Department of Transportation
Act (DOTA) §4(f). Reprinted at

Appendix pp. 126a-127a.

historic sites and injury to wildlife
habitat in the bosque.

8

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case concerns a controversy over
the Montano Bridge Project of the City of
Albuquerque ("City"). The Project involves
construction of a bridge across the Rio
Grande in north-central New Mexico which
will necessarily destroy many acres of rich
riparian wildlife habitat and wetland and
fracture an unbroken six mile segment of
riparian bosque (forest and wetland). The
bridge and its approach road will pass
through Los Poblanos National Historic
District. It will also bifurcate the
Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque, an
incorporated village located north of the
City of Albuquerque.

Petitioners are the Village of Los
Ranchos de Albuquerque and the Rio Grande
Valley Preservation Society (collectively

with certain individual residents of the

vere See a ee eee

9
North Valley of Albuquerque, who were
plaintiffs below but are not petitioners,
referred to herein as the "Village").

The Village brought suit in the United
States District Court for the District of
New Mexico on August 30, 1984. It sought
declaratory and injunctive relief following
decisions of the Federal Highway
Administration ("FHWA") : 1) to approve an
Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") by
the New Mexico State Highway Department
("NMSHD"), 2) to give location approval to
the river-crossing sites recommended by the
location study and 3) not to prepare a
site-specific EIS for the approved river-
crossings of the Rio Grande in the North
Valley of Albuquerque.

The Complaint sought to enjoin the
federal defendants from proceeding with the
North Valley River Crossings until such

time as they complied with the National

10

Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"),

42 USC §4321, et seq.; the National Historic

Preservation Act ("NHPA"), 16 USC §§470-
470W-6; §4(f) of the Department of
Transportation Act ("DOTA"), 49 USC §303;
the Federal-Aid Highways Act ("FAHWA"), 23
USC §138°; and Executive Order 11990
(1977) (Protection of Wetlands).

In 1979 the NMSHD requested FHWA
financial and technical assistance in
preparing a location study for additional
river-crossings in the North Valley. The
state requested the assistance from the
FHWA, in part, because

Factors which led the UTPPB to

make the decision to conduct a

location-environmental study were: ...

4) Section 404 permits would be
required from the U.S. Army Corps of

’ Both 49 USC §303 and 23 USC §138
are usually referred to as "§4(f)," the
former section number by which the parkland

and historic property protection provision
became well known.

BP esa ght ge

11

Engineers before construction of the
bridges could commence, thus federal
National Environmental Policy Act
compliance relating to the Section 404
permit applications would be required
in any event.

Dist.Ct.Mem., p. 42a-43a, n.2, infra. By a

federal-aid project agreement and Letter of
Approval and/or Authorization, FHWA agreed
to provide nearly $59,000 of the $75,000
cost of the location study and associated
EIS. In addition to funding the location
study and the option evaluating EIS,
"it is safe to say that the actual
preparation of the EIS required fairly
exhaustive’ federal assistance from
approving agencies and individual FHWA
personnel. The process is lengthy
and, ... the actual sufficiency of the
EIS itself is not at this time before
the Court...."

906 F2d at 1479, p. 5a, infra (quoting

Burciaga, D.J., p. 44a, infra).

‘ The Tenth Circuit substituted the
word "exhaustive" for the word "extensive,"
which was the word used by the District
Court.

12
The location study determined that six
additional river-crossing lanes were needed
and selected two new bridge locations in
the North Valley at El Pueblo and Montano
to provide the lanes. FHWA then reviewed

and approved the location study. See Record

below, Doc. 100, Defendants' Summary
Judgment Memorandum, Ex. 1, 44. Doc. 111,
Plaintiffs' Response, Ex. 1, p. 10.

In 1983, FHWA entered into a formal
Memorandum of Agreement with NMSHD, which
committed FHWA to continued monitoring of
and involvement in the Montano bridge

project. See Record below, Doc. 100,

Defendants' Memorandum, Ex. 1A, Vol. 2, p.
1-T; Ex. 8B, p. 9. Moreover, although
construction of the project is currently
funded solely by City monies, the City
retains the option of seeking reimbursement

via the federal-aid highway system. See

owe ee

13
Record below, Doc. 111, Plaintiffs'
Response, Ex. 4. In fact, the federal
defendants have specifically and formally
granted the City and/or State permission to
proceed to the next stage for requesting

federal funding. See Record below, Doc.

100, Ex. 8B, Ex. 9, pp. 39-43.

The part of the lawsuit relating to El
Pueblo (now Paseo del Norte) bridge was
settled on October 11, 1985. Only the
Montano bridge project is at issue in this
Petition. The District Court granted the
federal defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment on June 9, 1987. P. 66a, infra.

The City of Albuquerque and County of
Bernalillo's Motion to Dismiss® was granted

on October 7, 1987. p. 68a, infra. Appeal

5 The claims against the City and
County Defendants were dismissed on the
same basis as the District Court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the Federal
Defendants.

14
to the Tenth Circuit was timely taken.

In the lawsuit the Village sought 1)
review of the adequacy of the EIS and 2)
restriction on federal approval of the
location study and further federal action
until the federal agencies comply with
NEPA, NHPA and §4(f).° Several aspects of
the Opinions of the District Court and the
Tenth Circuit require emphasis:

1. Both courts held that "federal
involvement with the bridge project[] was

minimal, and, as a matter of law, did not

. Both the Draft EIS and Final EIS
prepared by the NMSHD and FHWA in
cooperation with, inter alia, the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, were relied upon by the
Corps in preparing its Environmental
Assessment ("EA") of the Montano project
and granting a dredge and fill permit to
the City §404(b) of the Clean Water Act.
The DEIS and FEIS are incorporated into the
EA and supporting Administrative Record.
The Village was not permitted to challenge
the EIS in either the case against the
preparing agency, the FHWA, or the case
against the Corps (the Hatch case).

15
rise to the level of 'major federal action'
so as to bring the project within the
purview of federal environmental laws."

Pp. 18a and 38a, infra. In doing so both

courts restricted their analysis to two
factors:

a. A state highway project that

may, but has not yet, received federal

highway construction funds, can never

be a “major federal action." See pp.
13a-15a, infra.

b. Federal funding for and
"exhaustive" involvement in the
decision-waking process of selecting
and approving river-crossing locations
is insignificant to an analysis of
whether a project is a "major federal
action" or a "federal or federally

assisted undertaking." See pp. i15a-

20a, infra.

16
2. Both courts used EIS preparation
and "location approval" interchangeably.
The Tenth Circuit equated the location
study, EIS and location approval. At
footnote 2, 906 F2d 1477, 1481, p. 15a,

infra, the Tenth Circuit struggles with the

distinction and cites the following from
the Village's Reply Brief:
it is the funding and preparation
assistance by the FHWA of the location
study that preceded the EIS that
triggers NEPA. (emphasis added)
The Court says a location study is somehow
"lesser" than a "greater" preparation of
the EIS. Therefore, since a lesser cannot
control a greater, the Court says:
[W]e construe plair* ffs' argument as
stating that the «IS, which in this
case includes the location study, is
the major federal action.
The Court then goes on to say that since an

EIS can never be a "major federal action,"

there was no major federal action here. See

4

17

906 F2d at 1481-82, pp. 15a-17a, infra.

Neither Court considered nor analyzed
the location study with its federal funding
and "exhaustive" federal assistance as the
major federal action triggering the
evaluative document called an EIS. If a
proper and comprehensive EIS had been
prepared it would have provided the FHWA
with a useful tool to use in deciding
whether to grant location approval. The
Village is prepared to prove that the EIS
utilized by the FHWA was inadequate.

3. The Court cited Sierra Club v. Hodel,

848 F2d 1068, 1089 (10th Cir.1988) at pp.
18a-20a, for the proposition that

"(Tjhe distinguishing feature of
'federal' involvement is the ability
to influence or control the outcome in
material respects. The EIS process is
supposed to inform the decision-maker.
This presupposes he has judgment to
exercise."

906 F2d at 1482, p. 19a, infra. Having made

18
this distinction, the Tenth Circuit
nevertheless then stated that the "federal
government had [no] actual power to control
this project. At most, it gave advice as
to the location of the bridge. Thus, we do
not here have any ‘major federal action.'"

906 F2d at 1482, p. 20a, _ infra. Neither

court analyzed their conclusions that a)
location approval authority is not the real
"ability to influence or control" the
location of a highway project, or b) that
location study and approval and EIS
funding, production and approval are not a
very real ability to control the outcome
and eventually control and influence the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") '
§404 permit decision as well.

4. Both courts address the issues
raised by the Village regarding the

National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA),

19

16 USC §470 ef seq. and §4(f) of the

Department of Transportation Act, 49 USC
§303 and 23 USC §138, and Executive Order
11990, as subsets of the analysis of "major
federal action." Insofar as each act
required that a covered project be a
"Federal or federally assisted
undertaking," the courts held that the
project was not "federal" based upon the

analysis of the EIS and therefore not

subject to federal law.

5. The Tenth Circuit ignored and the
District Court did not discuss, except to
mention inn. 2, Memorandum Opinion, p.42a-

43a, infra, that a principal reason for the

state's request for federal involvement was
the known requirement that a §404 permit
from the Corps and NEPA compliance would be
required "before construction of the

bridges could commence."

20

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. The Tenth Circuit's decision that a
highway project which is eligible for
Federal construction funds and has
received "exhaustive" Federal
assistance, planning funds, and
location approval is, nevertheless,
not a “major federal action" nor a
"federal or federally assisted
undertaking" if federal funds for
actual construction have not been used
or approved a) conflicts with
decisions of other Circuits and b)
unreasonably restricts the reach of 42
USC §4321 ef Seg. (NEPA), 16 USC §470 ef
seq. (NHPA), 23 USC §138 (FAHWA), and 49

USC §303 ef Seq.(DOTA).

Without statutory authorization, the
Tenth Circuit has restricted the scope and
sweep of the National Environmental Policy

Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 USC §4321, efsSeq., the

National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA),

16 USC §470, efseqg., the Federal-Aid Highway

Act (FAHWA) , 23 usc §138, and the
Department of Transportation Act (DOTA), 49
USC §303. The Court arbitrarily removed

from the scope of these statutes every

$
7
2
“a
4
.
q
i

eer

21
state highway project which had not, at the
time it is challenged, received federal
funds for post-planning and_ location
approval construction or had such funding

approved. Pp. 12a-15a, infra.

The Court excluded from the scope of
NEPA, NHPA, FAHWA and “DOTA, federal
involvement which logically falls within
the intent of Congress. Both courts below,
for example, erroneously assumed that the
state "did not initially need any type of
federal approval" and that the basis of
federal status was the approval of the EIS.
Pp. 16a, 54a-55a.

The actual basis of the federal status
remains a combination of federal funding of
the location studies and the EIS, the
location approval, eligibility and
preliminary application for and preliminary

approval of federal funding, and the

22

requirement that a §404 dredge and fill
permit from the Corps be obtained for every
possible bridge location. Moreover, the
granting of such a permit was always a
"major federal action" and was a known
requirement from the beginnings of the
project. See p.42a-43a, n.2(4).

The Tenth Circuit's restrictions on
these federal acts are similar to, and go
far beyond, the restrictions set out in

Citizens for Balanced Environ. & Transp., Inc. v. Volpe,
376 FSupp 806, 812-813 (D.Conn.), affd per
curiam, 503 F2d 601 (2nd Cir.1974), cert.
denied, 423 US 870 (1975). Both the Second

and Tenth Circuits sharply criticized and
rejected the analysis adopted by the Ninth

Circuit in La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337 FSupp 221
(N.D.Cal. 1971), cert. denied 409 US 890 (1972)

(prematurely filed), supplemented by 57 FRD 94

23

(attorney's fees), affd 488 F2dad 559 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 US 964 (1974).
See pp. 10a-15a, infra. The Tenth Circuit

adopted the reasoning of the Second Circuit
which focused on, disagreed with and

disparaged the La Raza court's determination

that a state option to use federal funds
brings it within the purview of the federal

acts. Compare La Raza, 488 F2d at 561-62 (9th

Cir.) and 337 FSupp at 226-27 (N.D.Cal.);

with Citizens, 503 F2d at 602 (2nd Cir.) and

376 FSupp at 812-813 (D.Conn.) and 906 F2d

at 1481-82 (10th Cir.), pp.12a-14a, infra.

The Circuit Courts disagreed again in
their analyses of other relevant factors.
While the Tenth Circuit determined that
"([jsignificant" federal funding was a
necessary prerequisite to "major federal

action" status, the La Raza court found and

24
held precisely the opposite. The Ninth
Circuit specifically rejected the argument
that federal environmental laws do not
apply until construction funds are
provided.

We do not agree with the Commission's
interpretation of these provisions.
The general purpose of these statutes
and regulations is to assure that
projects for which federai funding
might become available are carried out
in a way that will afford the
protection to those displaced ... and
to the environment, including public
parks,....

We believe Judge Peckham
correctly interpreted the applicable
statutes and regulations to require
compliance by the Commission with
those provisions ... protecting the
environment "before location approval,
(and) prior to federal funding of a
project." La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337
FSupp 221, 231 (N.D.Cal.1971).

La Raza, 488 F2d at 562. The District Court
in La Raza discussed location approval in

some detail, noting that "the state and
federal defendants concede that a project

becomes part of the federal-aid highway

we Se T

25
system upon location approval...." 337
FSupp at 227.’
The Tenth Circuit's new requirement of
"([jsignificant" amounts of federal funding

(p.17a-18a, (infra) to trigger NEPA, NHPA,
FAHWA and DOTA, is in conflict with other
Circuits as well. See, e.g., River v. Richmond
Metropolitan Authority, 359 FSupp 611, 628

(E.D.Va. Richmond Div.1973). In that case
the Court stated, albeit in dicta,

Courts have recognized situations in

"Location approval" is a specific
step in the process of obtaining federal
construction funds. It is step two
following “systems approval" and preceding
"design approval" in the process’ for
obtaining federal funds pursuant to 23 USC
§103 and FAHWA Policy and Procedures
Memorandum 20-8. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337

FSupp 221, 223-24 (N.D.Cal.1971). The EIS
was an evaluative tool focusing on
generalized impacts to the broad reach of
the North Valley and not specific to the
locations of the preferred alternatives.
The location approval is a step which
involves the exercise of judgment by the
FHWA.

26

which no federal funds have been
authorized for a particular highway,
yet the highway has, through various
circumstances, taken on such a federal
character that the purposes behind the
federal laws would be defeated unless
their requirements are met.

359 FSupp at 628; Scottsdale Mall v. State of Indiana,
549 F2d 484 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.denied, 434
US 1008 (1978); Indiana Lookout Alliance v. Volpe,
484 F2d 11 (8th Cir. 1973); City of Boston v.
Volpe, 464 F2d 254 (1st Cir. 1972). Seealso,
Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation
Society v. Texas Highway Dept., 446 F2d 1013, 1027

(5th Cir. 1971).
The Court emphasized the sweep of its

restriction by then apparently defining the

DOTA, 49 USC §303, and the FAHWA, 23 USC
§138, language "use of federal funds to
finance construction" to exclude projects
receiving federal planning funds. The

Tenth Circuit cites three cases as

sel ath

27
supporting this definition. As it happens
none of the cited cases involved or
discussed federal planning funds as part of
their holdings nor was any distinction made
in any of those cases between the funds
used to plan and those used to bulldoze.

In the first cited case, MHistoric
Preservation Guild of Bay View v. Burnley, 896 F2da 985

(6th Cir.1989), the project at issue had
received no federal funds for planning or
any other purpose. Location studies were
entirely state funded® and the federal
government had specifically rejected all

federal funding for the project. Id. at 989.

At no time did the state request federal

8 As noted above, the funds
utilized by the NHWA and NMSHD were
supplied as part of the federal-aid highway
progran. Pp.10-11, supra; federal-aid
project agreement and Letter of Approval
and/or Authorization, both dated February
5, 1979. See Record below, Doc. 100, Ex. 8A.

28

funding. id. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit

|
distinguished the Michigan fact situation
from one like Montano in describing the
difference between its facts and those in

Scottsdale Mall v. State of Indiana, 549 F2d 484 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert.denied, 434 US 1008 (1978):

This absence of federal funding is
not necessarily dispositive in
determining whether a highway project
is imbued with a federal character....

Since the entire project [ Scottsdale
Mall } had been planned in accordance
with federal programming and
procedural requirements, ana had
received design approval from the
Department of Transportation in
addition to some federal funds for
preliminary engineering studies, the
court concluded that the project was a
federal project, and was therefore
subject to the requirements of the
National Environmental Policy Act.
549 F2d at 489."

896 F2d at 985. The Tenth Circuit admits
that Quince Orchard Valley Citizens Ass’n v. Hodel, 872
F2ad 75 (4th Cir.1989), did not decide

whether §4(f) applied when only federal

29
planning funds were present. In the
opinion the Fourth Circuit describes its
earlier opinion? in which it utilized
numerous grounds to reverse the District
Court and remand for compliance with §404
of the Clean Water Act and §6(f) of the
Conservation Act. In dicta it noted it
might also have to comply with §4(f). Its

citation to Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,

401 US 402, 411 (1971), says nothing more
than that the expenditure of "federal
funds" virtually always requires compliance
with federai environmental laws. Neither
Congress nor this Court has ever qualified
the words "federal funds" with the addendum
"except those used for planning."

In addition to its lack of support for

its analysis, the Tenth Circuit opinion is

° Maryland Conservation Council v. Gilchrist,
808 F2d 1039 (4th Cir.1987).

30
in direct conflict with the Fifth Circuit's

opinion in Named Individual Members of San Antonio
Conservation Society v. Texas Highway Dept., 446 F2d

1013, 1027-28 (5th Cir. 1971). In that
case the State of Texas informed the Fifth
Circuit that if federal law interfered with
construction, it would proceed with "100%
state money." The Fifth Circuit stated
that once federal involvement begins,
federal law applies regardless of any
change in funding method.

The Tenth Circuit similarly defines
the words "proposed Federal or federally
assisted undertaking" in the NHPA, 16 USC
§470f, p. 105a-106a, infra, to mean
"([]significant" amounts of federal funds.
Pp. 26a-28a, infra. This definition is not

found in the statute. The regulations
cited by the Village and discussed in

footnote 6 to 906 F2d at 1484, p. 27a-28a,

:
;
i

31

infra, state the opposite.

The Tenth Circuit appears to
invalidate 36 CFR §800.2(c) (1986)
(definition of "undertaking") as exceeding
its statutory authorization." Fortunately,
the statute’ does not contain the
restrictive language suggested by the Tenth
Circuit and therefore the regulation, as
modified, 36 CFR §800.2(0) (1989), should

be upheld as a proper administrative

ba The "definitions" section of the
regulations of the Advisory Council on
Historic Preservation has been revised and
renumbered. The definition referred to by
the Tenth Circuit is now 36 #=CFR
§800.2(0) (1989), p. 138a, infra, and has not
changed in any material way. It now reads,
in pertinent part,

"Undertaking" means any _. project,
activity, or program that can result
in changes in the character or use of
historic properties....The project...
must be under the direct or indirect
jurisdiction of a Federal agency or
licensed or assisted by a Federal
agency.

Id. (emphasis added).

32
interpretation of the statute. The only

case cited by the Tenth Circuit, Lee v.
Thornburgh, 877 F2da 1053 (D.C.Cir.1989)

involved a project using exclusively
District of Columbia funds’ directly
appropriated by Congress. Both the
District and Congress are specifically

exempted from the NHPA. /d. at 1056.

Nevertheless, the interpretation of the
NHPA by the District of Columbia Circuit

Court supports the inclusion, not

—_exclusion, within the ambit of the NHPA of

projects receiving federal funds of any

sort. id. at 1057.

The majority of federal courts have
held that providing planning’ § funds,
location approval, authorization of future
federal participation or a combination of
these and other factors are each sufficient

to confer "major federal action" status

eRe a? 2

Jo
under NEPA. The Montano Bridge Project,
which has received both federal location
approval and authorization of continuing
federal participation, should be treated as
a major federal action.

The confusion engendered by the ever
more disparate positions of the Circuit
Courts on these issues deserves this
Court's attention. Moreover, the clear
error of the courts below warrants review
and reversal by this Court. Plenary
consideration of this matter by this Court
is essential. The Village urges this Court
to issue its Writ of Certiorari to the

Tenth Circuit.

34
II. Despite the confluence of the FHWA
location approval and the assertion of
jurisdiction and "major federal
action" status by the Corps of

Engineers, the Tenth Circuit's

decision that the Montano’ Bridge

Project is not a “major federal

action" raises important and

unresolved problems.

As described above, the Montano Bridge
Project had received federal location and
environmental study funds and location
approval from the FHWA and, at all times,
required a permit from the Corps pursuant
to §404 of the Clean Water Act to dredge
and fill the river before any construction

could occur. In the Hatch case, the Corps,
a federal agency, and the U. S. District
Court have determined the Montano bridge
project to be a "major federal action" for
NEPA purposes. This determination is
setevent to the decision in this case. See
p.70a, infra, Memorandum Opinion, Hatch, at

p.98a ("it is true that the [§404] permit

b
forms the indispensable basis for any
construction of the bridge").
In adopting the analysis of Judge

Newman in Citizens for Balanced Environ. & Transp., Inc.
v. Volpe, 376 F.Supp. 806, 812-813 (D.
Conn.), affd per curiam, 503 F2d 601 (2nd
Cir.1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 870 (1975),

the Tenth Circuit has ignored the final
point of analysis by Judge Newman:

Though not specifically urged by
plaintiffs, it might be
appropriate in some cases to
reach a conclusion of "Federal
action" based on the cumulative
effect of the various factors
considered in this opinion. The
federal dollars to build the spur
that will connect new Route 7 to
I-84 and the small amount of
highway planning and research
funds, the "route revision"
approval by the FHWA and the
state's continued eligibility for
federal funding for later
projects north of Danbury, and
the relationship between the
Danbury-New Milford portion and
the Norwalk-Danbury portion may
well be considered to have a
greater total effect than any

36

factor alone.
376 F.Supp. at 814.

He concluded that although "the
question on these facts is close, it does
not appear that the federal government has
played a sufficient role..." to make the

project a major federal action. Id.

Included within the list above are past and
future actions relating to the project at
issue, but conspicuously absent is a
location approval, a §404 dredge and fill
permit or other conclusively "major federal
action."

The facts in Citizens did not include any

factor which was indubitably "a major
federal action." Nor was it clear that the
Connecticut project itself would
necessarily become a major federal action.
This is significantly different from the

Montano Bridge Project.
i

- ” hy is let a ry,

37

From the beginning of the Montano
project, through all phases of federal or
state consideration, it was known and
recognized that the Montano Bridge Project
required a permit to dredge and fill the
Rio Grande from the Corps pursuant to
§404(b) of the Clean Water Act, and that
the granting of such permits is a "major
federal action." 33 CFR §320, ef seg.; Save
Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Witherspoon, 638 F.Supp. 1158,
1161 (E.D.La. 1986).

In its funding and coordination of the
project the FHWA was acting at all times as
the first federal actor in the §404
permitting process. Other evidence of the
continuous, cumulative process can be found

in a variety of sources. See e.g.:

Le The District Court Memorandun,

p.42a-43a, infra. An affidavit by a City of

Albuquerque officer identifies factors

38
leading to preparation of Rio Grande river-
crossing location-environmertal study:

4) Section 404 permits would be
required from the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers before construction of the
bridges could commence, thus federal
National Environmental Policy Act
compliance relating to the Section 404
permit applications would be required
in any event.

2. The EIS was produced by the FHWA
and the NMSHD with the knowledge that the
project would require a federal permit. The
FEIS is Exhibit 1A in the _ Federal
Defendants' Addendum to their Answer Brief
below. At p. 66 of the FEIS the FHWA and
NMSHD state that the Corps aided the FEIS
preparation and is "the agency which issues
the required 404 Permit for the crossings
of the Rio Grande."

Neither the preparation of the EIS nor
the provision of federal planning funds

serve as a litmus test for the

determination of major federal action under

Pe ee ee ae ere ee ee Fe ee Oe ye me ey

39
NEPA. Having adopted the test set forth in

Citizens, 376 F.Supp. 806 (further citation
supra), the Tenth Circuit added confusion to

the matter by its failure to consider all
of the known and relevant factors
influencing the cumalative portion of the
analysis. Here the preparation and funding
of the EIS and the location study led to
location approval. This was merely one step
in a continuous, cumulative process of
federal iavelvanent ending in the
unquestioned major federal action of
considering and granting a §404 permit.
The initial (planning and study funding)
and intermediate (location and further
funding approval) steps are part of the
same stairway leading to the §404 permit.
They cannot be compartmentalized or
divorced from this certain final step.

When evaluating whether there is a

40
major federal action, a court must look to
the totality of the project: all federal
parts of the project should be "summed-up"
to decide whether there is a major federal

action. Citizens, 376 FSupp at 814. In NRDC
v. Calloway, 389 FSupp. 1263 (D.Conn.1974),
rev'd on other grounds, 524 F2d 79 (2d Cir.1975),

the District Court stated at p. 1272, n.
31, that regardless of the time sequence or
"lead" agency,

"all the federal parts of a

project should be summed in order

to determine whether the project

is 'major' and thus whether NEPA

should apply. Concomitantly, if

NEPA does appiy to a project as a

whole it must apply to each of

its parts."

Indeed it violates the clearly stated
intent of Congress to treat one part of a
project as an "isolated '‘'single-shot'

venture," NRDC v. Calloway, 524 F2d at 88,

without coordination and consideration of

—s YY eee? eee ere eS eee ee

41
related federal actions and projects and

the further actions contemplated. Id.; CEQ

Regulations, 40 CFR §§ 1501.6 and 1501.7

(pp. 144a-146a, infra); See also S.Rep.No.91-

296, 91 Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969).

The EIS was primarily prepared with
federal funds, under at least the partial
control of and subject to the eventual
approval of the FHWA. The process received
"exhaustive" federal assistance with input
from the Corps, and with the knowledge that
every possible location for a bridge
required a §404 permit.

Since the granting of such a permit
was also necessarily a major federal
action, the federal preparers of the
location studies for the Montafio bridge
project should have designated the project
a major federal action at the earliest

preparation stage. — Forty Most Asked Questions

42

Concerning CEQ’s NEPA Regulations, 46 Fed.Reg.

18026 (1981) (Questions and Answers: No.9,
pp. 176a-179a, infra, agencies must integrate
the NEPA process into other planning at the
earliest possible time, including "scoping"
the possible involvement of other agencies
and whether an applicant will eventually
seek federal approval; No.14b, pp. i85a-
187a, infra, & No.21, pp. 190a-194a, infra,
every effort should be made to prepare
joint federal review documents and avoid
duplication of efforts). Accord, 40 CFR
Part 1500, ef seg. (1986), pp.139a-141 (early
NEPA application), 146a-150a (Scoping),
158a-159a (Tiering), 163a-167a (Major
Federal Action & Scope), 167a-171la
(Significantly) and 171la-172a (Tiering),
infra. io
The Tenth Circuit itself has

recognized that when determining whether

ae ey

43
there is a major federal action the CEQ
regulations mandate that the court should
consider non-federal actions which are
potentially subject to Federal control and

responsibility. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d
1068, 1089 (10th Cir. 1988), Citing, CEQ

regulations, 40 CFR §1508.18. Although
this case may incorporate a local project,
it has at all times presented an imminent
and unavoidable federal action and the
actions of the FHWA should be classified as
major federal action. Lower courts will
obviously need guidance as our nation looks
to rebuild its highway infrastructure in an

era of more parsimonious federal funding.

©

44

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, this
petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted. The Village urges the Court to
find the existence of a major federal
action in this case and to consider the
need for clarification and guidance to the

lower courts.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM G. WALKER
Counsel for Petitioners

150 Louisiana NE
Albuquerque, NM 87108
505/268-4551

ia

TABLE OF CONTENTS
OF THE APPENDIX

Tenth Circuit Decision
O06 POR 2477 Goeke SB. BDOR) occ cccccee sD

Order, Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
Robert L. Hoecker (August 2,1990)....34a

Memorandum Opinion and Order
Juan G. Burciaga (June 9, 1987)......36a

Judgment
Juan C. Burciaga (June 9, 1987)......66a

Order
Juan C. Burciaga (October 6, 1987)...68a

Memorandum Opinion and Order
John E. Conway (May 8, 1989).........70a

16 USC §470f National Historic
PEGS IE BGicctcccsvitsieoovectvs --105a

23 USC §138 Federal-Aid Highways Act..107a
33 USC §1344 Clean Water Act (§404)...110a

42 USC §4321 National Environmental
Policy 0 ee ee ee ee >

42 USC §4332 National Environmental
Policy re ee

49 USC §303 Department of
TEAMSPOECACION AGE. cccccccccccccccec tse

23 CFR Part 771 Federal Highway
REMERADETECIOR, BER ccccccsvcccscscckaee

sms ec, re eee % oe.

iia

36 CFR Ch. VIII (1989) Advisory on
Historic Preservation.....ccccccccceel138a

40 CFR §1501 ef Seq. Council on
Environmental Quality Regulations...139a

46 Fed Reg 18026 (1981) Council on
Environmental Quality...............173a

la
906 F2d 1477 (July 2, 1990)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT

VILLAGE OF LOS RANCHOS DE ALBUQUERQUE; and
RIO GRANDE VALLEY PRESERVATION SOCIETY,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and

ELBERT KING; JOAN MCGINNIS; VELMA WHIPPLE;
THOMAS MONTOYA; PRISCILLA MONTOYA;
JOHN TROTTER; KIT SARGENT,

Plaintiffs,
Vv. No. 87-2657

R.H. BARNHART, Administrator of the Federal
Highway Administration; ELIZABETH DOLE,
Secretary of the Department of
Transportation; PETER A. LOMBARD,
Environmental Protection Specialist for the
Federal Highway Administration; DANIEL
DAKE, Director, Office of Planning and
Programming Development of the Federal
Highway Administration; DEWEY LONSBERRY,
Federal Highway Division, Administrator,

Defendants-Appellees,
and

THE CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE; and THE COUNTY
OF BERNALILLO,

Defendants-iIntervenors-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District
Court for the District of New Mexico

2a
(D.C. No. CV-84-1273-JB)

Alice G. Hector of Hector & Associates,
P.A., Albuquerque, New Mexico
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Vicki L. Plaut (Roger J. Marzula, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, William L.
Lutz, United States Attorney, Albuquerque,
New Mexico, Herbert A. Becker, Assistant
United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New
Mexico, Robert L. Klarquist, Attorney,
Department of Justice, Land and Natural
Resources Division, and Jean G. Rogers, of
Counsel, Federal Highway Administration,
with her on the brief) for
Defendants~-Appellees.

James H. Foley, City Attorney, and Edward
R. Pearson, Assistant City Attorney, for
City of Albuquerque, and Joe Cc. Diaz,
County Attorney, and MaryAnn Lunderman,
Deputy County Attorney, for County of
Bernalillo, on the brief for
Defendants-Intervenors- Appellees.

Before LOGAN, MOORE and EBEL, Circuit
Judges.

EBEL, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs (The Village of Los Ranchos
de Albuquerque, the Rio Grande Valley
Preservation Society, and certain named
residents in Albuquerque's North Valley)

appeal from a decision of the United States

3a
District Court for the District of New
Mexico granting summary judgment in favor
of defendants (certain officials in the
Federal Highway Administration ("FHWA"),
the City of Albuquerque, and the County of
Bernalillo). We affirm.
FACTS
The district court summarized the
relevant facts as follows:

The North Valley’ river
crossings project is a proposal
for construction of two bridges
across the Rio Grande River, one
at Paseo del Norte just south of
an existing crossing at Corrales
Road, and another further south
at Montafio Road. Construction on
the Paseo del Norte has begun as
of this writing, while the
Montaho Bridge is still in the
planning stage. Both bridges
involve substantial right-of-way
acquisitions within the Villasce
[of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque],
a rural community northwest of
Albuquerque. Further, the project
involves widening of Village
roads and addition of new roads
to handle the increased bridge
traffic, with resulting effects
of increased noise, etc., on
neighboring Village landowners.

4a

The bridge at Paseo del Norte
will be a four-lane crossing with
an option for later expansion to
six lanes, while the Montano
crossing is proposed to be two
lanes.

While few residential
homeowners would react favorably
to the prospect of having a major
arterial traffic route built
practically in their backyards,
the citizens of the Village are
particularly concerned about the
impact of the new bridges on the
rural quality of their
neighborhood, various sites of
historical interest in that area,
and the effects of the project on
the river bosque wetlands. The
Village has thus brought suit
under various federal
environmental protection
statutes, arguing that, in
approving the bridge projects,
the federal government is taking
action which will adversely
affect the environment, without
adequate study and planning as
required by law.

The central issue in this
motion {for summary judgment) is
whether or not the _ federal
government's involvement in the
river crossings project is
sufficiently major to trigger the
applicable statutes. Therefore,
the extent of that involvement
must here be set forth in some
detail.

Federal involvement in the
river crossings project was

eae NS ee Pee

“—

initiated by a January 1979
decision of the Urban
Transportation Planning Policy
Board ("UTPPB") of the Middle Rio
Grande Council of Governments to
seek a location-environmental
study of the project. This
request was presented to the
Federal Highway Administration
("FHWA"), where, on February 5,
1979, the Division office in
Santa Fe, New Mexico, authorized
preliminary engineering work in
preparation of the environmental
study for the river crossings
project. The authorization form
for the project, Defendants’
Exhibit 8A, estimated the cost of
the location environmental study
at $75,000.00, and authorized
federal financial assistance for
part of these costs, in the
amount of $58,972.50.

In addition to provision of
funding, the federal government
took an active role in the
preparation of the EIS. Without
going into exhaustive detail as
the process is set forth in
Defendants' Answers to
Interrogatories, submitted as
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, it is safe
to say that the actual
preparation of the EIS required
fairly exhaustive federal
assistance from approving
agencies and individual FHWA
personnel. The process is lengthy
and, as the actual sufficiency of
the EIS itself is not at this
time before the Court, the Court

6a

will not here reiterate those
procedures. A Final Environmental
Impact Statement ("FEISS") for the
river crossings project was
approved by Peter Lombard,
Director of the Office of
Planning and Program Development
in the Region 6 Office of the
FHWA, on September 16, 1983.

After approval of the FEIS,
the City of Albuquerque
programmed $4.2 million of 1983
general obligation bond money for
the Montano crossing, and an
additional $6.1 million was
appropriated for the project from
the 1985 bond election.

According to the
affidavit/testimony of Joseph
Martin, Director of New Mexico
Department of Transportation,
Harry E. Kinney, former Mayor of
Albuquerque, and Kenneth E.
Bower, Jr., Director of Technical
Support for the New Mexico State
Highway Department, federal
funding has not been and will not
be requested for any part of the
Montano or the Paseo del Norte
river crossings. Thus, as of the
date of FEIS approval by the
FHWA, federal involvement in the
river crossing came to an end, as
far as any financial assistance
was concerned.

(Memorandum Opinion and Order at 3-5, June
9, 1987) (footnote omitted).

Plaintiffs sought a declaration that

7a
the federal environmental laws were
violated and an injunction against all
further federal participation in the
project. After considering the evidence
submitted by both sides, the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the
federal defendants on the ground that the
FHWA's participation in the bridge projects
was not sufficient to trigger the federal
laws. The district court subsequently
granted summary judgment in favor of the
local defendants "on the same grounds as
stated by the Court for dismissal of
Plaintiff's complaint against the Federal
Defendants." (Order at 1, October 7, 1989.)
Plaintiffs appeal.
ISSUES

Plaintiffs raise four issues on appeal:
(1) whether construction, of the Montano
bridge is a "major federal action" subject

to the requirements of the National

8a
- Environmental Policy Act; (2) if
construction of the bridge is not a major
federal action, whether the bridge project
was properly segmented from the federally
funded I-25/Los Angeles project, which is a
major federal action; (3) whether
construction of the bridge requires
compliance with section 106 of the National
Historic Preservation Act; and (4) whether
construction of the bridge requires
compliance with section 4(E) of the
Department of Transportation Act or
Executive Order 11990.

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT

Plaintiffs argue that the federal
defendants' improper approval of the EIS
for the Montano bridge violated the
National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"),

42 USC §4332 ef seq. NEPA provides in

pertinent part:

9a

The Congress authorizes and
directs that, to the fullest
extent possible: (1) the
policies, regulations, and public
laws of the United States shall
be interpreted and administered
in accordance with the policies
set forth in this chapter, and
(2) all agencies of the Federal
Government shall --

(Cc) include in every
recommendation or report’ on
proposals for legislation and
other major Federal actions
significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment,
a detailed statement by the
responsible official on --

(i) the environmental impact
of the proposed action,

(ii) any adverse
environmental effects which
cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented,

(iii)alternatives to the
proposed action,

(iv) the relationship
between local short-term uses of
man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of
long-term productivity, and

(v) any irreversible and
irretrievable commitments of
resources which would be involved
in the proposed action should it
be implemented.

Section 4332 (emphasis added).

10a

The requirements of NEPA apply only
when the federal government's involvement
in a project is sufficient to constitute
"major federal action." Plaintiffs contend
that the bridge project is a major federal
action because of (1) the local defendants'
eligibility for federal funding or (2) the
FHWA's participation in and approval of the
EIS. We disagree.

i. Eligibility for Federal Funding

Federal courts have not agreed on the
amount of federal involvement necessary to

trigger the applicability of NEPA. In La Raza
Unida v. Volpe, 337 FSupp. 221 (N.D. Cal.
1971), cert. denied 409 US~ 890 (1972)
(prematurely filed), supplemented by 57 FRD 94
(attorney's fees), aff'd 488 F2da 559 (9th
Cir. 1973), cern. denied, 417 US 964 (1974),

the Federal District Court for the Northern

lla
District of California addressed the issue
ef whether "the federal regulations and
statutes apply to a highway project upon
location approval, construction approval,
or some intermediate point when federal

participation is assured[.]" Jd. at 226. The

court analyzed the problem by dividing
highways into three categories: (1)
"highways for whicl; federal funds have been
approved or are immediately sought"; (2)
"state highways constructed without federal
funds, and for which federal participation
has never been sought"; and (3) "those
projects that may eventually receive

federal funds." Jd. at 226-27. The court

said that there is no question that
highways in the first category are major
federal actions, and highways in the second
category clearly are not; the troublesome

category is the third. The court concluded

12a
that highways in the third category are
major federal actions and require
compliance with federal rules because
"[a)jny project that seeks even the possible
protection and assistance of the
federal-government must fall within the

statutes and regulations." Id. at 227.'

The United States District Court for

the District of Connecticut recognized the

. In the case before us, the
district court distinguished La Raza by
noting that in La Raza the local government
still had the option to receive federal
funds, whereas here, the district court
concluded that the local defendants have
foreclosed that possibility and thus fall
into La Raza’s second category. We agree with
the district court that an official
foreclosure of all possibility of federal
assistance will undoubtedly work to exempt
a federal agency from NEPA requirements.
However, here we find no concrete evidence
that the local government was’ ever
officially precluded from seeking federal
assistance even though it expressed its
intention not to seek federal funds. Thus,
we analyze this case on the premise that
the local government still had the
possibility of receiving federal funds.

a re

EE eee EEE

AE SA

i3a

flaws in the approach taken in La Raza, and,
instead of requiring all highways in La
Raza’s third category (state highways that

may eventually receive federal funds) to

submit to federal requirements, rejected La
Raza and held that no highways in that

category should be subject to federal
requirements:

Though recognizing the force of
the argument developed in La Raza
Unida, this Court concludes that
while Congress no doubt has power
to require NEPA compliance in
such circumstances, the existing
legislation simply does not do
sO.

The contentions in [La Raza] are
all sound, but with deference I
do not understand how they
establish that such an option [to
apply for federal funding] on the
part of a state constitutes the
highway a "Federal action" within
the meaning of NEPA. Solicitude
for the environment cannot
substitute for legislation.
Congress has not applied NEPA to
all highways that the states are
eligible to fund with federal
dollars.

14a

The State's option to use federal
dollars, though open virtually
until the concrete is poured, is
nonetheless an option, and the
State's choice should not be
restricted simply because one
alternative of the option (using
state dollars) might result in
less adequate assessment of
environmental considerations. If
the highway is not a federal
action, then a state's decision
to avoid federal involvement
cannot have the paradoxical
effect of establishing federal
involvement.

Citizens for Balanced Environ. & Transp., Inc. v. Volpe,
376 FSupp 806, 812-13 (D. Conn.), affd, 503
F2d 601 (1974), cert. denied, 423 US 870 (1975)
(emphasis in original).

We are persuaded by the analysis of

Citizens and adopt its conclusions. Therefore,

because the State of New Mexico, the City
of Albuquerque, and the County of
Bernalillo here (hereinafter collectively
referred to as "the state") are only

eligible for federal assistance, that

nee MeN

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15a
eligibility in itself is not sufficient to
establish a major federal action requiring
the FHWA to comply with the requirements of

NEPA.

2. Approval of the EIS

Plaintiffs also argue that FHWA's
assistance in and approval of the EIS is
sufficient to make the bridge project a

major federal action.* The district court

In their reply brief, plaintiffs
state that "an EIS itself is not a 'major
federal action,'" and that they "are not
making such an absurd claim." See
Appellant's Reply Brief at 2. Rather,
plaintiffs argue that "it is the funding
and preparation assistance by the FHWA of
the location study that preceded the EIS
that triggers NEPA." Id. However, at oral
argument plaintiffs argued that the
location study is a component of the EIS.
We cannot accept plaintiffs' implicit
argument that the lesser (the location
study) can impose higher standards (such as
compliance with NEPA) than the greater
(preparation of the EIS). Therefore, we
construe plaintiffs' argument as stating
that the EIS, which in this case includes
the location study, is the major federal
action.

16a
rejected this argument on the following
grounds:

Clearly, the state in the
instant case did not initially
need any type of federal
approval, assuming that they
chose not to seek federal money,
in order to proceed with the
river crossings project. The fact
that the state did voluntarily
request a federal EIS, though
they were not legally bound to do
so, should not, without more,
constrain the state to make the
entire project federal. Unless
the state is actually receiving
or is planning to receive federal
funding for a project, mere
preparation and approval of an
EIS is not “major federal
action."

(Memorandum Opinion and Order at 9, June 9,
1987.) We agree with the district court and
would only add that an EIS is what is
required once a project is deemed to be a
major federal action. See 42 42.USC
§4332(C) (i). It would be anomalous indeed
to say that in a case such as this, where
there is no showing that the _ local

Gefendants were involved in a sham

17a
transaction to evade federal environmental
requirements, that the preparation and
approval of an EIS is a major federal
action for which an EIS must be prepared
and approved.

Plaintiffs also point to the fact that
the federal government contributed nearly
$59,000 of the $75,000 cost of the location
study. Although $59,000 is indeed a large
portion of that cost, it was incurred in
connection with the preparation of the EIS
and it is minuscule in comparison with the

cost of the total bridge project.* Cf Citizens
for Balanced Environ. & Transp., Inc. v. Volpe, 376

FSupp 806, 810 (D. Conn.) ("The only other
federal funding indicated is a sum less
than $50,000 of federal highway planning

and research funds that were used in

*

5 The City of Albuquerque floated
$10.3 million in bonds in 1983 and 1984 to
finance the bridge project.

-18a
connection with the planning of the
proposed road. The size of this expenditure
and the totally preliminary purposes of the
funds are too insignificant to render the
proposed multi-million dollar highway a

federal action.") (footnote omitted), affd,
503 F2d 301 (1974), cert. denied, 423 US 870

(1975).

For the foregoing reasons, we agree
with the district court "that federal
involvement with the bridge project[] was
minimal, and, as a matter of law, did not
rise to the level of ‘major federal action'
so as to bring the project within the
purview of federal environmental laws."
Memorandum Opinion and Order at 2, (June 39,
1987).

We draw guidance from Sierra Club v. Hodel,

848 F2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988), as to the

meaning of the phrase "major federal

19a
action." In that case we analyzed whether
and to what extent the Bureau of Land
Management (the "BLM") could exercise
control over a county's major- road
improvement seotect, and then we addressed
whether such input or control by the BLM
constituted "major federal action." First,
we observed that the Council on
Environmental Quality's regulations have
defined major federal action to encompass
not only actions by the federal government
but also nonfederal actions "'with effects
that may be major and which are potentially
subject to Federal control and

responsibility. 40 CFR 5 1508.18.'" Id. at

1089. However, we went on to state that:

"(‘Tlhe distinguishing feature of
‘federal' involvement is’ the
ability to influence or control
the outcome in material respects.
The EIS process is supposed to
inform the decision-maker. This
presupposes he has judgment to
exercise."

20a

The touchstone of major federal
action, in the context of the
case before us, is an agency's
authority to influence
significant nonfederal activity.
This influence must be more than
the power to give nonbinding
advice to the nonfederal actor. .
- + Rather, the federal agency
must possess actual power to
control the nonfederal activity.

Id. at 1089 (quoting W. Rodgers, Environmental
Law 763 (1977) (citation omitted).

Given the decision of the state to
proceed with the bridge project without
federal assistance beyond the initial
location study and EIS preparation, we
conclude that there is no evidence that the
federal government had the actual power to
control this project. At most, it gave
advice as to the location of the bridge.
Thus, we do not here have any "major
federal action."

SEGMENTATION

Plaintiffs argue that even if the

21a

participation in, and approval of, the EIS
alone is not enough to make the project
federal, the bridge project was improperly
"segmented" from the I-25/Los’ Angeles
Interchange project, which is a -major
federal project subject to the requirements
of NEPA. The district court rejected that
argument, holding that "the evidence is
undisputed that the projects are, at best,
only peripherally related, and have not
been improperly segmented from one
another." (Memorandum Opinion and Order at
10, June 9, 1987.) We agree.

"As a general rule under’ NEPA,
segmentation of highway projects. is
improper for purposes of preparing
environmental impact statements." Piedmont

Heights Civic Club, Inc., v. Moreland, 637 F2a 430,

439 (5th Cir. 1981). However, a local

project closely related physically to a

22a
federal project may be deemed independent

for NEPA purposes after consideration of
whether the proposed segment:

(1) has logical termini, (2) has
substantial independent utility,
(3) does not foreclose the
opportunity to consider
alternatives, and (4) does not
irretrievably commit federal
funds for closely related
projects.

2.*

Plaintiffs argue on appeal that the
district court erred in determining that
they had failed to present any issues of

material fact.*? Specifically, they argue

. The district court considered
only the first three factors enumerated in
Piedmont Heights. (Memorandum Opinion and order
at 10-11, June 9, 1987, citing 23 CFR
§771.111(f); Daly v. Volpe, 514 F2d 1106 (9th
Cir. 1975)). The appellants, however, do
not argue that the district court failed to
consider all relevant factors. Instead,
they argue the district court erroneously
found no issue of material fact with
regards to the factors it did consider.

. The district court's findings are
as follow:

>a oS
eis 8 Srila Bude sh Sa

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5
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i

23a

that an affidavit submitted by one of their
transportation consultants demonstrates
that the eastern terminus of the bridge
project, Edith Avenue, is not logical:

8. The . . . Wilson & Company
[traffic] report addresses a Montafo
Corridor with termini at Coors Road
and Edith Boulevard. Figure 2 in that
report indicates that 30% of the
estimated year 2005 bridge traffic (or
5,070 vehicles per day) will use the
section of Montano between Edith
Boulevard and I-25.

9. Since nearly a third of all
bridge traffic will use montano Bridge
east of Edith Boulevard, this strongly
suggests that the logical eastern
terminus for consideration of bridge

The Court finds that there is no
material issue of fact as to whether
such segmentation was proper, as
[plaintiffs have } presented no
evidence to the Court that the [I-25]
project is in any way related to the
Montano bridge crossing, other than
the inevitable relationship caused by
the fact that some of the new frontage
road traffic will undoubtedly use that
route as a means of access to Montano
Road, and hence to the new bridge
crossing.

Memorandum Opinion and Order at 11, (June
9, 1987).

24a

traffic impacts and related
improvements would be I-25, which is
the next major intersecting, regional
route east of Edith Boulevard.

10. An I-25 terminus for Montano
Corridor improvements also has basis
according to the Environmental
Assessment (EA) for the I-25 Frontacge
Road improvements. Section "0" of the
EA notes that among the assumptions
behind the traffic forecasts used in
the I-25 Frontage Road analysis was
the following:

++. a new Montano corridor bridge and

roadway (two-lane limited access

facility) from Coors Road to

Interstate 25 via Montano

Road/Montgomery Boulevard.

Affidavit of Harvey R. Joyner, Doc. 111 at
G 8-10) (emphasis added).

We do not read that evidence to say
that Edith Boulevard is not a logical
terminus. Rather, the affidavit, at most,
merely asserts that the I-25 terminus would
be more logical. That a terminus is the
most logical is not mandated by the
segmentation analysis -- that analysis

requires only that a terminus be "logical."

—
; eo
2h SCONE Ne tenn enn

Ceiba ana tts CE MESS NT tl ics tii BAERS rh

25a

Because plaintiffs point us to no evidence
in the record indicating the Edith
Boulevard is not a logical terminus, we
agree with the district court that there is
no question of material fact on that issue.

Even if a local project terminates at
a point of juncture with a federally funded
project, that would not preclude
segmentation. "Congress has not purported
to apply NEPA requirements to _ ([e)very
highway that connects with a federally-
funded highway, and the fact that the
connection here involves a_e three-mile

overlap makes no difference." Citizens for
BalancedEnviron. & Transp.,Inc. v. Volpe, 376 FSupp
806, 810 (D.Conn.), affd, 503 F2d 301
(1974), cert. denied, 423 US 870 (1975).

Because all local projects must start and
end somewhere, under plaintiffs' theory the

entire highway network across the country

26a
could be considered one project. Such an
implication is obviously indefensible.
Because the criteria advanced in

Piedmont Heights are satisfied here, and

because plaintiffs have not demonstiated
any issues of material fact or raised any
other arguments that would demonstrate that
the district court erroneously granted
summary judgment in favor of defendants, we
affirm the district court's holding that
defendants did not improperly segment the
bridge project from the I-25 project.
NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT
Plaintiffs argue that the construction
of the bridge requires compliance with
section 106 of the National Historic

Preservation Act ("NHPA"), 16 USC §470 ef
seq. The NHPA provides in pertinent part:

The head of any Federal
agency having direct or indirect
jurisdiction over a proposed
Federal or federally assisted

gr Tn ited eel re ners Lane

27a

undertaking in any State...

shall, prior to the approval of

expenditure of any Federal funds

on the undertaking or prior to

the issuance of any license, as

the case may be, take into

account the effect of the

undertaking on any district,

site, building, structure or

object that is included in the

National Register.

16 USC §470f (emphasis added).

As we held above, the participation in
and approval of the EIS in this case did
not render the bridge project federal in
nature. Moreover, the bridge project is not
under the "direct or indirect jurisdiction"
of the FHWA. Therefore’, we cannot say that
it is "a proposed Federal or federally
assisted undertaking" requiring the
FHWA's-compliance with the requirements of

the NHPA.*® See Lee v. Thornburgh, 877 F2da 1053,

6 Plaintiffs refer to the 1986
version of the regulation promulgated to
implement the NHPA, which defines
"undertaking" as |

any Federal, federally assisted

28a
1056 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ACT
and EXECUTIVE ORDER 11990

Plaintiffs argue that the construction
of the bridge requires compliance with
§4(f) of the Department of Transportation
Act ("DTA"), 49 USC App §303 and 23 USC

§138, and Executive Order 11990. We

or federally licensed action,
activity, or program or the
approval, sanction, assistance,
or support of any non-Federal
action, activity or program.
Undertakings include new and
continuing projects and program
activities ... that are

(3) carried out pursuant to a
Federal lease, permit, license,
certificate, approval, or other
form of entitlement or
permission.

36 CFR §800.2(c) (1986) (emphasis added in
Appellants' Brief). Assuming, without
deciding, that this quoted version of the
regulation is the relevant and appropriate
version controlling the present dispute, it
cannot broaden the reach of the statute.
Because the project is neither "federally
assisted" nor under the "direct or indirect
jurisdiction" of any "head of any Federal
Agency," we need not address the definition
of "undertaking" in this regulation.

29a
disagree.

i. Section 4(f)

Section 4(f) provides that it is the
national policy "that special effort should
be made to preserve the natural beauty of
the countryside and public park and
recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl
refuges, and historic sites." To that end,
Section 4(f) permits the Secretary of
Transportation to approve a transportation
project only if

(1) there is no prudent and feasible

alternative to using that land; and

(2) the program or project includes

all possible planning to minimize harm

to the park, recreation area, wildlife
or waterfowl refuge, or historic site
resulting from such use.

49 USC App §303; see 23 USC §138. Plaintiffs

argue that the Secretary's actions in this
case constituted "approval" of the project
such that compliance with §4(f)'s

requirements is necessary.

30a
We hold that, like the NEPA and the
NHPA, §4(f) is only applicable to federal

projects. See Historic Preservation Guild of Bay View v.
Burnley, 896 F2ad 985, 988 (6th Cir.

1989) (Section 4(f) is applicable only to
federal projects, and not state projects);

see also Quince Orchard Valley Citizens Ass’n v. Hodel,

872 F2d 75, 77 (4th Cir. 1989) (assuming,
but not deciding, that Section 4(f) does
not apply to a project that has received

only federal planning funds); cf, Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 US 402, 411

(1971) (The language of §4(f) “is a plain
and explicit bar to the use of federal
funds for construction of highways through
parks--only the most unusual situations are
exempted."). Here, the district court
properly explained that §4(f) does not
apply because it "bars the use of federal

funds to finance construction of highways

—

31a
through parks, without all possible
planning to minimize harm to the park."
Memorandum opinion and Order at 13, June 9,
1987 (emphasis in original).

a. Executive Order 11990

Plaintiffs also argue that defendants
have failed to comply with’ the requirements
of Executive Order 11990. Specifically,
appellants maintain that the defendants’
action fall within the coverage of §1(a) (3)
of Executive Order 11990. That section
provides as follows:

(a) Each agency shall provide
leadership and shall take action to
minimize the destruction, loss or
degradation of wetlands, and, to
preserve and enhance the natural and
beneficial values of wetlands in
carrying out the agency's
responsibilities for . . . (3)
conducting Federal activities and
programs affecting land use, including
but not limited to water and related
land resource planning, regulating,
and licensing activities.

Executive Order 11990, 42 Fed Reg 26961

32a

(May 24, 1977) (emphasis added). The
district court held that the order was
inapplicable to the challenged actions
because there had not been "any significant
federal participation in the river
crossings project." Memorandum Opinion and
Order at 12, (June 9, 1987).

We agree with the district court that
§l(a)(3) of Executive Order 11990 does not
apply in this case. Plaintiffs argue, that
the preparation of the EIS constituted
"land resource planning." While that may be
true, Executive Order 11990 only imposes
obligations upon an executive agency in
carrying out its responsibilities for land
use planning. Giving that term its normel

usage,’ the federal defendants were not

A "responsibility" is defined as

"che state or fact of being...answerable or
accountable, as for something within one's
power or control." Random House College
Dictionary, 1125 (1980).

33a
"responsible" for the land use planning
here at issue because they did not have any
ability to exercise control over the
project unless the state elected to seek
federal funding for the project. Because
the state declined to seek such funding, it
was free to reject whatever federal
location advice was offered in connection
with the preparation of the EIS. Thus, the |
district court correctly concluded that the
defendants' limited involvement in this
project is insufficient federal action to
trigger the requirements of Executive Order
11990.
CONCLUSIONS
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM

the decision of the district court in all

respects.

34a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

VILLAGE OF LOS RANCHOS DE ALBUQUERQUE;
RIO GRANDE VALLEY PRESERVATION SOCIETY,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and

ELBERT KING; JOAN MCGINNIS; VELMA WHIPPLE;
THOMAS MONTOYA; PRISCILLA MONTOYA; JOHN
TROTTER; KIT SARGENT,

Plaintiffs,

Vv. No. 87-
2657

R.H. BARNHART, Administrator of the Federal
Highway Administration; ELIZABETH DOLE,
Secretary of the Department of
Transportation; PETER A. LOMBARD,
Environmental Protection Specialist for the
Federal Uighway Administration; DANIEL
DAKE, Director, Office of Planning and
Programming Development of the Federal
Highway Administration; DEWEY LONSBERRY,
Federal Highway Division, Administrator,

Defendants-Appellees,

CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE; THE COUNTY OF
BERNALILLO,

Defendants-Intervenors-Appellees.

35a

ORDER

Filed August 22, 1990

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and
EBEL, Circuit Judges.

This matter comes on for consideration
of appellant's petition for rehearing in
the captioned case.

Upon consideration whereof, the
petition for rehearing is denied.

Entered for the Court.

_s/
ROBERT L. HOECKER, Clerk

36a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

VILLAGE OF LOS RANCHOS DE _
ALBUQUERQUE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,
Vv. Civil No. 84-1273-JB
R.A. BARNHART, Administrator
of the Federal Highway
Administration, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on
the federal Defendants' motion for summary
judgment. Having reviewed the pleadings,
the evidence of record and the relevant
law, the Court finds that the motion is
well taken and will be granted.

This action involves a long-standing
dispute over construction of two bridges in
the North Valley area of Albuquerque, New
Mexico, one north of El Pueblo Road ["Paseo

del Norte"} and another further south, at

37a
Montano Road. Plaintiff Village of Los
Ranchos de Albuquerque ["the Village')
opposes the construction of these bridges,
charging that the increased traffic will
harm the rural character of the Village,
threaten historical landmarks, and damage
the river bosque wetlands. The Village
alleges that the federal Defendants failed
adequately to consider all environmental
and other factors before approving and
Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") for
the project, in violation of federal
environmental statutes.' Thus, Plaintiffs
contend that they are entitled to
declaratory and injunctive relief with

respect to any further federal involvement

, The Village claims violations of
the National Environmental Policy Act
("“NEPA"], 42 USC §4332 ef Sseq., the National
Historic Preservation Act ["NHPA"], 16 USC
§§470-470W-6, the Department of
Transportation Act of 1966, 49 USC §303,
and Executive Order (°E.0.%) 11990
regarding the preservation of the wetlands.

a

—_-- es

a sll

38a

in the North Valley river crossings

project. However, the Court finds that
federal involvement with the bridge
projects was minimal, and, as a matter of
law, did not rise to the level of "major
federal action" so as to bring the project
within the purview of federal environmental
laws. Thus, Plaintiffs' claims must fail
and summary judgment in favor of the
federal Defendants is warranted.

Facts

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in
this action on August 30, 1984, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief from the
federal Defendants, in the form of (1) a
Court order declaring that federal approval
of an EIS for the river crossings project
violated federal environmental laws; and

(2) an injunction against all further

federal participation in the river

39a

crossings project. The New Mexico State
Highway Commission and Department, and
Bernalillo County, filed motions’ to
intervene as Defendants which subsequently
were granted. On October 11, 1985, the
Village entered into a settlement agreement
with the state Defendants, whereby the
Village agreed to bring no further legal
actions against any Defendant, federal or
state, with respect to the proposed Paseo
del Norte crossing, and further agreed to
dismissal of all of its river-crossing
project claims against the state
Defendants. Thus, the only remaining
Claims in this lawsuit are against the
federal Defendants, with respect to the
proposed Montano crossing.

The North Valley river crossings
project is a proposal for construction of

two bridges across the Rio Grande River,

one at Paseo del Norte just south of an

40a

existing crossing at Corrales Road, and
another further south at Montano Road.
Construction on the Paseo del Norte has
begun as of this writing, while the Montano
Bridge is still in the planning stage.
Both bridges involve substantial right-of-
way acquisitions within the Village, a
rural community northwest of Albuquerque.
Further, the project involves widening of
Village roads and addition of new roods to
handle the increased bridge traffic, with
resulting effects of increased noise, etc.,
on neighboring Village landowners. The
bridge at Paseo del Norte will be a four-
lane crossing with an option for later
expansion to six lanes, while the Montano
crossing is proposed to be two lanes.
While few residential homeowners would
react favorably to the prospect of having a
major arterial traffic route built

practically in their’ backyards, the

4la

citizens of the Village are particularly
concerned about the impact of the new
bridges on the rural quality of their
neighborhood, various sites of historical
interest in that area, and the effects of
the project on the river bosque wetlands.
The Village has thus brought suit under
various federal environmental protection
statutes, arguing that, in approving the
bridge projects, the federal government is
taking action which will adversely affect
the environment, without adequate study and
planning as required by law.

The central issue in this motion is
whether or not the federal government's
involvement in the river crossings project
is sufficiently major to trigger the
applicable statutes. Therefore, the extent
of that involvement must here be set forth
in some detail.

Federal involvement in the river

42a
crossings project was initiated by a
January 1979 decision of the Urban
Transportation Planning Policy Board
("UTPPB"] of the Middle Rio Grande Council
of Governments to seek a location-

environmental study of the project.* This

e According to the A*fidavit of
Thomas B. Hoover, Defendants' Exhibit 10, 4
8, in support of this motion:

Factors which led the UTPPB
to make the decision to conduct a
location-environmental study
were: 1) The State Action Plan
mandates preparation of an EIS
(Environmental Impact Statement)
for all major State Highway
Department projects, whether or
not the project will be federally
funded; any extra work required
to meet federal requirements
would be minimal; 2) desire to
preserve project eligibility for
any additional funding if it
became available under new
federal highway legislation and
if the State and local agencies
elected to apply for it; 3)
public concern for the need to
address the social, economic, and
environmental effects of new
river crossings; 4) Section 404
permits would be required from
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

43a

request was presented to the Federal
Highway Administration ["FHWA"], where, on
February 5, 1979, the Division office in
Santa Fe, New Mexico, authorized
preliminary engineering work in preparation
of the environmental study for the river
crossings project. The authorization form
for the project, Defendants' Exhibit 8A,
estimated the cost of the _ location-
environmental study at $75,000.00, and
authorized federal financial assistance for
part of these costs, in the amount of
$58,972.50

In addition to provision of funding,
the federal government took an active role

in the preparation of the EIS. Without

before construction of the
bridges could commence, thus
federal National Environmental
Policy Act compliance relating to
the Section 404 permit
applications would be required in
any event.

PO RO ee ET

Oe mL, ee Ne a Se eee eee

te a

44a

going in to exhaustive detail as_ the
process is set forth in Defendants' Answers
to Interrogatories, submitted as
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, it is safe to say
that the actual preparation of the EIS
required fairly extensive federal
assistance form approving agencies and
individual FHWA personnel. The process is
lengthy and, as the actual sufficiency of
the EIS itself is not at this time before
the Court, the Court will not here
reiterate those procedures. A Final
Environmental Impact Statement ["FEIS"] for
the river crossings project was approved by
Peter Lombard, Director of the Office of
Planning and Program Development in the
Region 6 Office of the FHWA, on September
16, 1983.

After approval of the FEIS, the city
of Albuquerque programmed $4.2 million of

1983 general obligation bond money for the

45a
Montano crossing, and an additional $6.1
million was appropriated for the project
from the 1985 bond election.

According to the affidavit/deposition
testimony of Joseph Martin, Director of New
Mexico Department of Transportation, Harry
E. Kinney, former Mayor of Albuquerque, and
Kenneth E. Bower, Jr., Director of
Technical Support for the New Mexico State
Highway Department, federal funding has not
been and will not be requested for any part
of the Montano or the Paseo del Norte river
crossings. Thus, as of the date of FEIS
approval by the FHWA, federal involvement
in the river crossings project came to an
end, as far as any financial assistance was

concerned.

Plaintiff's Standing to Sue and Ripeness

The Court must first consider the

jurisdictional issues raised by the federal
}

46a
Defendants, namely that the Village lacks
standing to sue the FHWA, and that this
case is not yet ripe for review. The Court
rejects both of these contentions.

First, with respect to the standing
issue, the Village must allege (1) "a
distinct and palpable injury to itself," or
in the case of an organization, to its
members, and (2) that "the asserted injury
was the consequence of the Defendants’
actions, or that prospective relief will

remove the harm." Warth v. Seldin, 422 US 490,
501, 505 (1975); Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186
(1962); Glover River Organization v. United States
Department of the Interior, 675 F2dad 251 (10th Cir.

1982). The Village meets each of these
criteria. First, the Village and its
members have presented evidence from which
the Court may reasonably conclude that they

will suffer "distinct and palpable injury"

47a
if the Montanc bridge is built as planned.
Such injury would take the form of
increased traffic, noise, and a possible
decrease int he value of the Village
residents' land, as well as, in some cases,
condemnation of all or portions of such
land. Second, if the Court were to grant

all relief requested by the Village, i.e.,

(1) to declare that federal involvement in
the project is "major," and (2) to enjoin
further federal involvement in the project
pending compliance with federal
environmental iaws, such relief would
redress the injury claimed. Work on the
bridge could not then proceed absent
compliance with federal law, should the
Court find such law to be applicable.
Second, with respect to the issue of
ripeness, Defendants ague that the actions
of the FHWA in respect to the bridge

48a
crossings project are not final agency
actions, or even if they are such final
actions, they are not ripe for review. The
real thrust of Defendants' argument is that
the federal Defendants retain no power to
affect the crossing project in any way,
since the EIS was not required by law, and
no further federal assistance was requested
by the state. The Court finds, however, as
a threshoid matter, that it has
jurisdiction to determine whether the
federal Defendants' actions were of
sufficient magnitude to subject them to the
federal environmental laws alleged here,
and thus to the relief requested by the
Village. An already-accomplished action
such as allegedly improper preparation and
approval of an EIS is clearly ripe for
review, in accordance with applicable

standards; See Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Association v.

49a

Watt, 696 F2d 734, 741 (10th Cir. 1982).
"Major Federal Action"

The Village claims that the federal
Defendants' allegedly improper approval of
the EIS for the bridge project violated the
National Environmental Policy Act [NEPA],

42 USC §4332 ef seg. Section 4332 provides,

in part:

The Congress authorizes and
directs that, to the fullest extent
possible: (1) the policies,
regulations, and public laws of the
United States shall be interpreted and
administered in accordance with the
policies set forth in this chapter,
and (2) all agencies of the Federal
Government shall -

zx*kee*ee

(C) include in every recommendation or
report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment, a detailed
statement by the responsible official
on-

(i) the environmental impact of
the proposed action,

(ii) any adverse

tiie

50a
environmental effects which
cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented,

(iii) alternatives to the
proposed action,

(iv) the relationship between
local short-term uses of man's
environment and the maintenance and
enhancement of long-term productivity,
and

(v) any irreversible and
irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the
proposed action should it be
implemented.

Whether this statute even applies to
the bridge project hinges, in this case, on
the question of whether the federal
government's involvement in this project
was sufficient to constitute "major federal
action."

The question of what constitutes
"major federal action" has received varying
interpretations by the courts, but few
cases have found such action to exist

without the presence of at least some

5la
federal funding of the project in question.
In the instant case, Defendants have
presented evidence, as previously set forth
in the factual portion of this opinion,
that no feceral funds have been sought, nor
will any such funding be sought, for the
river crossings project. The Village's
mere argument that the state has not
“officially" shut the door on federal
funding, and thus theoretically retains
that option, is not sufficient to overcome
the federal Defendants' evidence to the
contrary. A motion for summary judgment
properly may be granted only in cases where
there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The
movant bears the burden of demonstrating
the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 54 USLW 4775,

52a

4777 (June 25, 1986); Mustang Fuel Corp. v.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 516 F2d 33, 36 (10th

Cir. 1975). In ruling upon a motion for
summary judgment the Court must view the
record in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion and must consider
factual inferences in the light most
favorable to the existence of triable

issues. Exnicious v. United States, 563 F2d 418

(10th Cir. 1977). The burden on a
defendant moving for summary judgment may
be discharged by offering evidence that
negates an element of the plaintiff's claim
or by showing hat there is an absence of
evidence to support the nonmoving party's

case. Celotex, 54 USLW at 4777-78. Should

the Plaintiff then fail to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case, and

on which that party will bear the burden of

53a
proof at trial, summary judgment in favor

of the moving party is mandated. id. at

4777.

Thus, since the Court finds that no
issue of material fact remains as to future
federal funding, the only issue to be
decided on this motion for summary judgment
is a question of law: whether the federal
government's financial and technical
participation in ok eapewte) of the EIS
for the river crossings project amounted to
"major federal action."

In support of its argument’ that
approval of an EIS can amount to "major
federal action," the Village directs this
Court's attention to several Tenth Circuit

cases dealing with similar issues: Scenic
Rivers Association of Oklahoma v. Lynn, 520 F2d 240

(10th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 426 US

54a

776 (1976), and Davis v. Morton, 469 F2da 593
(10th Cir. 1972). Davis held that the

federal government's granting of a lease on
Indian land was major federal action
requiring subsequent preparations of an EIS
for proposed projects on the land. The

Scenic Rivers case held that federal approval

of a developer's filing under_ the
Interstate Land Sales Act constituted major
federal action, requiring that an EIS be
prepared.

Both of the above-cited cases dealt
with the issue of when a project was
sufficiently federal to require preparation
of an EIS, but those courts did not address
the question of whether approval of the EIS
itself, regardless of whether or not
preparation of an EIS was initially
required by law, constitutes major federal

action. Clearly, the state in the instant

55a
case did not initially need any type of
federal approval, assuming that they chose
not to seek federal money, in order to
proceed with the river crossings project.
The fact that the state did voluntarily
request a federal EIS, though they were not
legally bound to do so, should not, without
more, constrain the state to make the
entire project federal. Unless the state
is actually receiving or is planning to
receive federal funding for a project, mere
preparation and approval of an EIS is not

"major federal action." See Citizens for Balanced
Environment & Transportation, Inc. v., Volpe, 376 FSupp
806 (D. Conn.,), affd, 503 F2d 601 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 423 US 870 (1975). The
Village cites a number of cases contra, see La
Raza Unida of Southern Alameda County v. Volpe, 337

FSupp 221, 226, 227 affd, 488 F.2d 559 (9th

56a

cir. 1973), cert. denied, 409 US 890 (1972); San
Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas Highway Department ,
446 F2d 1013, 1027 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 US 933 (1972); Scottsdale Mall v. State
of Indiana, 549 F2d 484 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 US 1008 (1978) (and cases cited
therein at 488); City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F2d

254, 258-59 (list Cir. 1972).

The cases which hold that mere
preparation of an EIS is a major federal
action reason generally that the option to
receive federal funds is still available to
the state, through preparation of the EIS,
and the state should not therefore be
allowed to "duck" further federal
environmental regulation merely by
asserting that they are not actually
receiving federal funds. However, where,

as here, uncontradicted evidence shows that

57a
a state will not later seek federal funding
for a project,* it seems inconsistent with
basic princip[les] of federalism to
nevertheless require the state to label the
project as federal. It is evident from the
statutory language, "major federal action,"
that Congress did not intend for purely
locally-funded, locally-built projects to
come within the purview of federal
environmental laws. Courts have recognized
that purely local projects, no matter how
great their potential impact on the
environment, do not fall within the purview

of federal law. See Civic Improvement Committee v.

Volpe, 459 F2d 957 (4th Cir. 1972); Bradford

: The Village argues that the state
has not "officially" foreclosed the option
for federal funding, and thus theoretically
may still seek federal money for the
project. However, for purposes of this
motion, the Court relies on evidence
voluntarily presented by Defendants, and
uncontradicted by Plaintiffs, that such
funds will not be sought.

i alt ae 8 ta en

58a

Township v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, 463 F2da
537, 540 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 US 1047

(1972). It is reasonable to conclude that
purely locally~funded and operated
projects, such as the North Valley river
crossings project, do not become "major
federal action" by reason of federal
involvement limited to preparing and
approving an EIS for the project.

Segmentation

The Village further argues that, even
if the preparation of the EIS alone, as the
Court has held, is not enough to make the
entire project federal, the river crossings
project was nevertheless improperly
"segmented" from the I-25/Los Angeles
Interchange project, which is a federal
funded project. Thus, the Village argues
that each project comprises one whole,

"major federal action." The Court rejects

59a

this argument, as the evidence is
undisputed that the projects are, at best,
only peripherally related, and have not
been improperly segmented from one another.
Case law, incorporated in FHWA
regulations at 23 CFR §771.111(f), has
developed the following factors’ for
determining the proper "scope" of a

project:
(1) connects logical termini and is
of sufficient length to address
environmental matters on a broad

scope;

(2) has independent utility oor
independent significance; and

(3) does not restrict consideration
of alternatives for other

reasonably foreseeable
transportation improvements.

See, e.g., Bennett v. Taylor, 505 F Supp 800, 808
(M.D. La. 1980); Daly v. Volpe, 514 F2da 1106

(9th Cir., 1975).

Under the regulations, a project which

60a
meets these criteria is suitable in scope
for a separate evaluation. Such a separate
EIS has been prepared for the Los
Angeles/I-25 project. The Court finds that
there is no material issue of fact as to
whether such segmentation was proper, as
the Village has presented no evidence to
this Court that the project is in any way
related to the Montano bridge crossing,
other than the inevitable relationship
caused by the fact that some of the new
frontage road traffic will undoubtedly use
that route as a means of access to Montano
Road, and hence to the new bridge crossing.
But this factor alone does not mean that
the projects were improperly "segmented" by
the preparation of a separate EIS for each
one. The Los Angeles/I-25 project meets

the criteria for being suitable in scope

6la
for a separate EIS.‘ The Village has
presented no evidence contrary to this
analysis, and the Court finds that he
federal-aid frontage road project is not

impermissibly segmented from the locally-

: Concerning the frontage roads
project as a whole, the first criterion is
not an issue, inasmuch as only safety and
operational improvements to an existing
facility are involved. The Los Angeles and
Montgomery/Montano Interchanges tie into
presently existing facilities. They thus
have logical termini. The length of the
project, from Menaul north some 7.5 miles
to Tramway, also complies with the first
criterion as it is sufficient to address
environmental matter on a broad scope. The
project likewise complies with the second
criterion; the safety and operational
improvements to I-25 have independent
utility in that they are justifiable
without reference to any other project.
Finally, the I-25 project meets the third
criterion of the regulations. The sixteen
alternatives considered in the EIS for the
river crossings indicate that the frontage
roads project did not restrict
consideration of alternatives for the river
crossings. Furthermore, federal approval
of the I-25 project was given before FHWA
approved the EIS on the river crossings,
which suggests that the river crossing
projects did not limit federal
consideration of alternatives to the I-25
improvements.

62a
funded North valley river crossing
projects.

The National Historic Preservation Act

The Village further alleges that
Defendants have not complied with the
National Historic Preservation Act, 16 USC
§§420-470W-6 [NHPA], and that, regardless
of this Court's decision regarding
Plaintiffs' claims under the NEPA, the NHPA
still applies to this case as it requires a
lower threshold of federal participation
than does the NEPA. The Court does not
agree.

The NHPA, 16 USC §470t, provides in
pertinent part:

The head of any Federal Agency having

direct or indirect jurisdiction over'a

proposed Federal or federally
undertaking in any State and the head
of any Federal department or
independent agency having authority to
license any undertaking shall, prior
to the approval of the expenditure of

any Federal funds on the undertaking
or prior to the issuance of any

63a
license ... take into account the
effect of the undertaking on any
district, site, building, structure or
object that is included in the
National Register. (Emphasis added.)
This Court has already held that the
river crossings project is not federally
assisted, nor is the project rendered
"federal" in character by the federal
government's mere participation in and
approval of an EIS for the project. Thus,
as no "Federal" or "federally assisted"
undertaking is involved in this action, the

NHPA does not apply.

Section 4f of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966,
and E.O. 11990

The Village's argument that §4(f), 49
USC §303, and Executive Order 11990 apply
to this action fails for the same reason:
lack of any significant federal
participation in the river crossings

project. Section 4(f) bars the use of

64a
federal funds to finance construction of
highways through parks, without = all
possible planning to minimize harm to the

park. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,

401 US 402, 406 (1971). Similarly, E.O.
11990 applies to federal agencies
“undertaking or providing assistance for
new construction in wetlands ..." (Emphasis
added.) As this Court has already stated,
the river crossings project is not a
federal undertaking nor is it federally
assisted. Therefore, §4(f) and E.O. 11990
have no application to this case.

As the Court finds no significant
federal participation in this action which
would require compliance with the federal
environmental laws asserted by the Village
as grounds for this lawsuit, it follows
that summary judgment in favor of the

federal Defendants is proper.

65a

Wherefore,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that the federal Defendants' motion for
summary judgment be, and the same hereby
is, granted.

DATED this _9th_ day of June, 1987.

—_s/ Juan G. Burciaga_
United States District Judge

66a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

VILLAGE OF IOS RANCHOS DE
ALBUQUERQUE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,
Vv. Civil No. 84-1273-JB
R.A. BARNHART, Administrator
of the Federal Highway
Administration, et al.,

Defendants.

JUDGMENT
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on

the federal Defendants' motion for summary
judgment, and the Court having entered its
Memorandum Opinion and Order herewith
granting the motion;

Wherefore,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that Plaintiffs VILLAGE OF LOS RANCHOS DE
ALBUQUERQUE, RIO GRANDE VALLEY PRESERVATION
SOCIETY, ELBERT KING, JOAN MCGINNIS, VELMA

WHIPPLE, THOMAS MONTOYA, PRISCILLA MONTOYA,

67a
JOHN TROTTER and KIT SARGENT take nothing
by their Complaint § against federal
Defendants R.H. BARNHART, ELIZABETH DOLE,
PETER A. LOMBARD, DANIEL DAKE and DEWEY

LONSBERRY.

DATED this 9th _ day of June, 1987.

_S/Juan G. Burciaga
United States District Judge

68a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

VILLAGE OF LOS RANCHOS DE
ALBUQUERQUE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,
Vv. Civil No. 84-1273-JB
R.A. BARNHART, Administrator
of the Federal Highway
Administration, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
Because of the Court's decision
granting the Federal Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment herein, there are no
Claims remaining against the Defendant
Intervenor, City of Albuquerque = and
Defendant Intervenor, County of Bernalillo,
and the Court being fully advised in the
premises,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant
Intervenor City of Albuquerque and

Defendant Intervenor County of Bernalillo

69a

are hereby dismissed as Defendants in the

above entitled action on the same grounds
as stated by the Court for dismissal of
Plaintiff's complaint against the Federal

Defendants.

DATED this _6th day of _October ,

1987.
—__s/Juan G. Burciaga
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Approved:
_s/

Edward R. Pearson
Assistant City Attorney
Attorney for Defendant
Intervenor, City of
Albuquerque

_8/
Alice G. Hector
Attorney for Plaintiffs

eS
J. Edward Hollington

Attorney for Defendant
Intervenor, County of
Bernalillo

70a
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

Village of Los Ranchos de
Albuquerque, et al.,

Plaintiffs,
vs. NO. CIV 88-1032JC
Lieutenant General Henry J. Hatch, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THIS MATTER is now before the Court on
the defendant City of Albuquerque's Motion
to Dismiss for Failure to State a Clain,
filed March 13, 1989; the defendant City's
Motion for Protective Order, filed March
13, 1989; the federal defendants' Motion
for Protective Order, filed March 17, 1989;
and the defendant City's Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Standing and Estoppel, filed
March 23, 1989. Having reviewed the
memoranda of the parties and the applicable

case law, and being otherwise fully advised

_”

71a

in the premises, the Court finds that the
first Motion to Dismiss is not well-taken
and will be denied. The second Motion to
Dismiss is well-taken and will be granted.
The City's Motion for Protective Order is
moot, and the federal defendants' Motion
for Protective Order is well-taken in part
and will be granted in part. The Court's
reasoning is set forth below.

PART I - MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAIM

On August 29, 1988 the plaintiffs
commenced this action alleging that the
Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service and the City of
Albuquerque violated the National
Environmental Policy At (NEPA), 42 USC
§4321 ef seq., §404 of the Clean Water Act, 33
USC §1341 and the Fish and Wildlife

Coordination Act, 16 USC §662, in granting

Army Permit No. NM-OYT-0458 to the City of

72a
Albuquerque for construction of one aspect
of the Montafo Bridge and Corridor (Montano
Project).

The sole basis for the City
defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure
to State a Claim is that the plaintiffs'
reliance on 28 USC §1331 and §1361 as
jurisdictional basis is misplaced. The
City suggests that the current action can
be sustained only by a petition for
judicial review under the Administrative
Procedures Act (APA), 5 USC §706(2) (A).

A review of the applicable case law
suggests that the defendant's position is
not well-taken, and that the plaintiffs
have properly pled jurisdiction under 28

USC §1331 and 5 USC §706. In Califano v.
Sanders, 430 US 99 (1977), the Supreme Court

indicated that the 1976 modifications to

§1331 jurisdiction conferred "jurisdiction

73a
on the federal courts to review agency
action, regardless of whether the APA of
its own force served as a jurisdictional

predicate." This Court is guided by Califano

and further finds that the APA specifically
contemplated U.S. District Court review of
agency actions. Title 5 USC §702, entitled
"Right to Review" specifically states that
A person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved
by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statu[tje,
is entitled to judicial review
thereof.
This jurisdictional axiom was also

recognized in Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F2d

822 (9th Cir. 1986), a case presented to
this Court by the defendants. There the
circuit court found that the plaintiff's
suit seeking judicial review of an Army

Corps of Engineers issuance of a permit

under §404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 USC

74a
§1344, was properly based on 28 USC §1331

as well as 33 USC §1365. Id. at 827.

The Court finds that paragraph 2 of
the Complaint properly alleges §1331
jurisdiction, and that paragraph 3 of the
Complaint properly alleges review under the
APA at §706. Both paragraphs are
incorporated by reference into each of the
Claims for relief; therefore, jurisdiction
is properly based.

The allegation of §1361 jurisdiction
as it appears in the Complaint is
redundant. In the plaintiffs' Response to
Motion to Dismiss, filed April 5, 1989,
plaintiffs explain that they are seeking
mandamus relief under 28 USC §1361 based on
the duty of the Fish and Wildlife Service -
to recommend adequate mitigation.
Plaintiffs seek an order compelling the

Fish and Wildlife Service to recommend

75a
adequate mitigation as pertains to the
Montafio Project. However, a review of §706
indicates that the relief requested may
properly be granted within the framework of
the APA. Section 706(1) provides that the
reviewing court shall "compel agency action
unlawfully witkrheld or unreasonably
delayed." Plaintiffs' claim of
jurisdiction pursuant to §1361 will
therefore be relegated to the dust bin of

legal excess.

PART II - DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
LACK OF STANDING AND ESTOPPEL

In their motion dated March 23, 1989
the City defendants have moved to dismiss
on grounds that the plaintiffs lack
standing to assert the claims alleged in
the Complaint against the City. The basis
for the defendants' claim is that the

action in question is the federal agency's

76a

granting of the §404 permit and that the
plaintiffs' Claim is against the
sufficiency of the permit as opposed to any
City action. The City asserts that there
is no right of action created by any
federal statute which would allow the
plaintiff to proceed against it. Finally,
the City urges that even if proof of a
federal permitting violation occurred, such
a violation would not form a basis for an
injunction against a wholly non-federal
project which is in fact the City's
exercise of its police power. The City
concedes that it has relied on the validity
of the permit, but it also states that its
actions to date, specifically those related
to the widening of Montano Road, would have
occurred regardless of the issuance of the
permit, and are at any rate within the
legal scope of the City's authority.

On the other hand, the plaintiffs

77a
argue that NEPA covers all proposed actions
and impacts of a project whether those
actions are taken by federal or non-federal
actors. The plaintiffs urge that all
impacts of a project, past, present and
reasonably foreseeable are covered by the
NEPA umbrella under 40 CFR §1508.7. Thus,
plaintiffs argue, the City is properly
named as a defendant since its actions are
a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
issuance of the §404 permit. The
plaintiffs further allege that the §404
permit enabled the City to pursue the
construction of the Montafo Corridor and
Bridge, and as such the non-federal action
is completely linked to and dependent on
the Corps' §404 permit. On that basis, the
plaintiffs argue that an injunction against
the City would be properly and correctly
granted by this Court. This reasoning is

explained below.

78a
As the defendants correctly point out,
standing to sue has traditionally been
accorded those “injured in fact" or
"adversely affected" or "aggrieved" by

actions of the defendants. U.S. v. SCRAP, 412
US 669 (1973). In Allen v. Wright, 468 US 737

(1984), the Supreme Court stated that the
“injury" must be fairly traceable to the
challenged action, and relief from the
injury must be "likely" to follow from a
favorable decision. An association has
standing to sue if individual members of
the association have a cognizable personal
interest at stake and if individual members

have been “injured in fact." Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 US 727 (1972). The Tenth

Circuit has held that associations seeking
review only need allege facts showing that
individual members are adversely affected

as individuals. Citizens Concerned for Separation of

79a

Church and State v. City and County of Denver, 628 F2a
1289 (10th Cir. 1980); Mountain States Legal
Foundation v. Costle, 630 F2d 754 (10th Cir.
1980). Finally, in Save the Bay v. United States
Corps of Engineers, 610 F2d 322 (5th Cir. 1980),

the court ruled that aesthetic and
environmental injury to members of an
association who reside in the geographic
area of concern is sufficient to grant
standing.

This Court now finds that plaintiffs
have properly alleged facts in their
Complaint sufficient to grant standing to
the Village, the Rio Grande Valley
Preservation Society, and the individual
plaintiffs to bring this cause against the
federal defendants. The plaintiffs will be
adversely affected by the Montafio project
and thus all have a personal stake fairly

traceable to and causally connected tc the

80a
challenged conduct of the federal
defendants.

The Village of Los Ranchos meets the
standing test because residents of the
Village live in or near the Montafo
Corridor and use the Bosque and thus will
be affected by the numerous impacts of the
Montano Bridge and Corridor. Individual
plaintiffs have standing because they live
in or near the proposed Montafio Corridor
and use the Bosque and thus will be
affected by the environmental impacts. The
Rio Grande Valley Preservation Society has
standing because many individual members of
the organization live in or near the
proposed Montafho Corridor and use the
Bosque and thus will be affected by the
environmental impacts associated with the
project. Mr. Arnold Sargeant, a resident

of the Bosque area, testified without

objection at the temporary restraining

8la

order hearing before this Court on March
30, 1989 that individual members of the Rio
Grande Valley Preservation Society use and
enjoy the Bosque on a regular basis. He
also testified that one of the purposes of
the organization is to protect the Bosque.
These interests give the Rio Grande Valley
Preservation Society organization standing
in this case.

Having clearly established that the
plaintiffs have standing to sue, the
question before the Court is whether that
standing extends to the claims against the
City. It is this Court's opinion that it
does not. In reaching this decision, the
Court has relied heavily on two separate
themes. First, the actor which has caused
or will cause the alleged injury is the
federal agency through the granting of the

§404 permit. The City has in no manner

been involved in the permitting process but

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for its initial request of the permit.
Thus, it cannot fairly be said that the
City is an actor whose conduct is causally
related to the injury claimed by the
plaintiff.

Secondly, however, the Court
specifically notes that in the event that
an injunction should prove warranted, the
Court's grant of said injunction would have
the same effect on the City as a non-party
as it would on the City and federal
defendants as parties. This reasoning is
explained below.

In urging that standing in fact
exists, the plaintiffs rely in considerable
part on the case of Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772
F2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1985). There the
plaintiffs sued a private developer, along
with federal officials, to prevent

construction of a waterfront housing

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development before preparation of a proper
environmental impact statement. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld = an
injunction against the developer when it
found that the Corps had _ improperly
declined to study related cumulative
impacts of the development. (The Fifth
Circuit only affirmed the district court's
injunction insofar as it prohibited the
private developer from performing
additional work on the land in question
which was within the jurisdiction of the
Corps. [(]The court did not enjoin
development outside of the permit area).
Though somewhat unclear, it appears that
the plaintiffs rely on the _ implicit
assumption in Fritiofson that the court would
not have enjoined the defendant developer

if the plaintiff lacked standing to sue

that party.

84a

This Court deduces from Fritiofson that in

a NEPA claim where a private developer
proposes development on land under the
jurisdiction of a federal agency for
permitting purposes, the developer may
properly be enjoined if there is a finding
that the EIS or EA relied upon as a basis
for the permit is legally deficient.

It is also well established that a
court order granting injunction "is binding
upon parties to an action...and upon those

persons in active concert or participation

with them who receive actual notice of the

order." U.S. v. Hall, 42 F2d 261 (emphasis

added). Furthermore, a court may bind non-
parties to terms of an injunction to
preserve its ability to render a judgment
in a case over which it has jurisdiction.

Vuition et Fils S.A. v. Carousel Handbags, 592 F2d 126

(2nd Cir. 1979). Having considered the

85a

rulings in Fritiofson, Hall and Carousel Handbags,

the Court now determines that dismissal of
the City of Albuquerque’ will not
substantially prejudice the plaintiffs'
rights under the NEPA. While it is
admittedly true that the plaintiffs will
not be able to raise a claim against the
City directly, it is also true that to date
they have not established a basis for doing
so. On the other hand, while the City
defendants will ~ excused from formal
pleading, their actions in regard to the
project will still be significantly
dependent upon the validity of the permit.
It is this Court's belief that this
approach to the litigation focuses the
considerable light shed by the adversary
process on the core issue: Is the §404
permit valid?

Having reached this conclusion, the

86a

Court will grant the City's Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Standing. The issue of
estoppel need not be reached. The Court
will also deny the City's Motion for
Protective Order as moot and order that the
City defendants need not respond to
plaintiffs' propounded interrogatories.

PART III ~- FEDERAL DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER

The federal defendants base their
motion on the assumption that any action
seeking judicial review of the Corps of
Engineers issuance of the §404 permit must
be determined solely on the complete
administrative record. Therefore, any
additional discovery would not and could
not lead to competent admissible evidence.

The general rule is that judicial
review of agency action is limited to a

review of the administrative record. Florida

Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 US 729 (1985),

87a

Camp v. Pitts, 411 US 138 (1973). In addition,

the courts have clearly indicated that in
actions brought requesting relief under APA
§706(2) (A) - which seek to set aside agency
findings as arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion or otherwise not in
accordance with the law - the record
available to the court is limited to the
record of proceedings available to the

administrative agency. Citizens to Protect Overton
Park vy. Volpe, 401 US 402 (1971), Friends of the
Earth v. Hintz, 800 F2d 822 (9th Cir. 1986),
Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F2da

897 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that the
judicial review of agency determinations
conducted under §706(2)(B) and (C) is also
limited to the administrative agency
record).

The courts have clearly indicated that

§706(2)(E) review is also limited to the

administrative agency record. Roberts v.
Morton, 549 F2d 158 (10th Cir. 1977) and
Fishback v. U.S., £519 FSupp 190 (D.N.M. 1981).

Plaintiffs' acknowledge that of their
five claims for relief, the third and
fourth claims, which challenge the actions
and decision of the Corps in regard to the
§404 permitting process, are clearly within
the scope of APA §706(2)(A) review. Thus,
there can be no dispute that this Court
should only review those claims based on
the complete administrative agency record.
Given this scenario, the Court will only
supplement the administrative agency record
if it appears that "there is such a failure
to explain administrative action as to

frustrate effective judicial review." C.F.].

Steel Corp. v. Economic Development Administration, 624

F2d 136 (10th Cir. 1980).

Plaintiffs urge that there exist

89a
several exceptions to the general rule
limiting the reviewing court to the
administrative record, and that’ those
exceptions apply to the first, second and
fifth claims for relief. One such
exception encompasses claims brought
pursuant to the procedural requirements of
NEPA. On that basis, the plaintiffs urge
that additional discovery is appropriate on
its first and second claims for relief
which are premised on NEPA, 42 USC §4321, ef
seq. The Tenth Circuit has had occasion to
Clarify this issue in a context
substantially similar to the current cause.
In National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F2d 995
(10th Cir. 1973), the court was presented
with a challenge to the sufficiency of an
EIS which the Secretary of the Interior had
used as a basis for the decision to

terminate certain helium purchase

90a
contracts. This appeal’ was based on the
district court's ruling that the department
had failed to comply with the mandate of
NEPA because the EIS was’ essentially
lacking in depth.

For the purposes of this case, the
relevant portion of the Tenth Circuit's
opinion is found in Part II beginning at
page 1001. There, the court illustrates
and explains that the record available to
the reviewing district court is dependent
on the type of

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385020_3113%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
