# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Acmat Corp. v. School District of Philadelphia

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1991
- **Citation:** 498 U.S. 1024

## Text

No.

In The

Supreme Court Of The United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

ACMAT CORPORATION,
Petitioner,

SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

RAY GODDARD
675 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10017
(212) 949-0555
Counsel of Record and
Attorney for Petitioner
Joseph P. Dineen
Edward A. Stein
Goddard & Blum
Of Counsel

i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether due process is violated when a federal court sitting in
diversity ignores controlling precedent and holds that a political
subdivision, as party to a publicly bid construction contract, can
unilaterally adjudicate a contractor’s clainis without any hearing and
without any availability for judicial review.

2. Whether a federal court sitting in diversity may reject the
controlling precedent set forth in Teodori v. Penn Hills School
District Authority, 413 Pa. 127, 196 A.2d 306 (1964), and hold that
a coniract approved by the School Board with a differing site
condition clause requires additional School Board approval foreach
and every item of additional work performed on account of differing
site conditions.

3. Whether a contractual site inspection clause may abrogate a
provision mandating an equitable adjustment for differing site
conditions.

4. Whether the Court’s construction of ambiguous contractual
language on a motion for summary judgment is reversible error.

5. Whether triable issues of material fact precluded entry of
summary judgment in favor of the School District.

6. Whether a federal court sitting in diversity may ignore
controlling precedent and determine on a motion for summary
judgment that qualified exculpatory language in a contract deprives
a contractor of damages for delay.

*Petitioner’s corporate parent, subsidiary and affiliates are:
Amins, Inc., Geremia Electric Co., Acmat of Texas, Inc., Acstar
Holdings, Inc., United Coasts Corp., Acstar Insurance Co. and
United Coastal Insurance Co.

ii
PARTIES

The names of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose
judgment is sought to be reviewed here appear in the caption of the
case. Although Hughes Urethane Construction, Inc., is listed as a
third-party defendant in the caption of the Court of Appeals’
Judgment Order, it had been dismissed from the action. Hughes
Urethane Construction, Inc. has no interest in the outcome of the
petition and is not considered a party to this proceeding. There is no
other party with an interest in the outcome of the petition.

PU

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................... i
vie ae a ii
enge> nt lon pag pe J iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES................. viii
tra cos 1
JURISDICTION ..... pee PSIMOMIGA TORK. 2
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISION Ss
hk oss whan c ence. 2

A. Constitutional Provisions................ 2

B. StatutoryProvisions .................. 4
STATEMENT OFTHECASE................. 6

A. StatementofFacts ................... 7

ee 7
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .......... 9

I. THIS CASE INVOLVES IMPORTANT
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS OF DUE PROCESS
AND THE DEPARTURE FROM ACCEPTED AND
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS . . 9

iv

A. The district court ignored binding state court precedent
set forth in John F. Harkins Co., Inc. v. School District of

Philadelphia and made the School District’s determination
of Acmat’s claims final and binding without a hearing and

I THE DETERMINATION THAT ACMAT’S CLAIMS
FOR DIFFERING SITE CONDITIONS ARE BARRED IS
CONTRARY TO THE CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT
AND THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT'S
HOLDING IN TEODORI V. PENN HILLS SCHOOL
yl ey ee Pres 17

A. Article 14 was misinterpreted by the lower courts. . 17

B. The holding that the contract site inspection clause
subsumes the differing site conditions clause is contrary

to United States v. Spearin and prevailinglaw. ... 20
Iii. DISMISSAL OF ACMAT’S BREACH OF CONTRACT
CLAIMS IS CONTRARY TOLAW .......... 23

IV. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY DECIDED
DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT ON A
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. ...... 24

V. THE DETERMINATION THAT THE CONTRACTOR IS
BARRED FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES FOR
DELAY IS CONTRARY TO COATESVILLE
CONTRACTORS & ENGINEERS, INC. V. BOROUGH
GP CREME Bs Bocce cc rcesseseses 26

VI. ACMAT WAS DENIED A FULL AND FAIR HEARING
ON THE CLAIM FOR CONTRACT RETAINAGES . 28

v

A. The alleged failure to furnish dump tickets was an
immaterial breach of the Contract............ 28

VII. DISMISSAL OF THE CLAIM FOR QUANTUM MERUIT
RECOVERY WAS IMPROPER AND CONTRARY TO
DERRY TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT V. SUBURBAN
eee 28

TORU RAL CEE TAME 31

vi
APPENDIX

Appendix A—Per Curiam Judgment Order of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
affirming the judgment of the districtcourt. ......... la

Appendix B—Order of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, denying the Petition
= revery etl LETT Tr 3a

Appendix D—Transcript and decision issued from
the bench by the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on petitioner's

Appendix F—Amended Final Judgment of the United

Appendix G—Transcript of argument before the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of

Appendix H—Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-
Appellee submitted to the United States Court
of Appeals forthe Third Circuit... .. .

ieee ee

vii

Appendix I—Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of
Cross-Appellee submitted to the United States

ew. a & €& S

Appeal for the Third Circuit.

26 6.8 © © 6 6.6 66

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page
Acmat Corporation v. School Disirict of Philadelphia,

904 F.2d. 693 (3rd Cir. 1990) 2... eee ee ee eee 1
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1936) ....... Lf
Annenberg v. Roberts, 333 Pa. 203, 2 A.2d.

GE BAGS CCHS Re EEE eee ecerece 16
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.

Ct. 780, 28 LEG 2d 113 (1971) .......220-- 14, 15
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548,

Ol LBA DADES (ISS 2. ww cc cre c cs cscccce 24
Coatesviile Contractors & Engineers, Inc. v.

Borough of Ridley Park, S09 Pa. 553,

CE 26

Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty
Co., 393 U.S. 145, 89 S. Ct. 337, 21 L.Ed.2d 2301
(1968), rehearing denied, 393 U.S.1112.......... 16

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. General Asphalt
Paving Co., 46 Pa. Commw. Ct. 114, 405

Pe) Ty Pee ee 27
Derry Township School District v. Suburban

Roofing Co., Inc., 102 Pa. Commw.

Ct. 54, 517 A.2d 225 (1986) .. 2... ee ee eee 29, 30
Dussia v. Barger, 466 Pa. 152, 351 A.2d 667 (1976). .... 16

Erie R. Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.
Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938) .........222ee, 12

ix
Farnsworth & Chambers Co., Inc. v. U.S., 346

F.2d 577, 171 Cx. C1. 30(1965) .. 2...

Formigli Corp. v. Fox, 348 F.Supp. 629 (E.D-Pa. 1972) . . . . 28

Gray v. Weiss, 519 A.2d 716 (Me. 1986) .....

John F . Harkins Co., Inc. v. School District of
Philadelphia, 313 Pa. Super. Ct. 425,

460 A.2d 260 (1983)... 2... eee ee

Logan v. Zimmerman, 4S5 U.S. 422, 102 S.

Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed. 2d 265 (1982) ........

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Cr. 1348,

89 L.Ed. 2d 538 (1986) ..... eG eneces

Nether Providence Township School Aushority v.
Thomas M. Durkin & Sons, inc., 505 Pa. 42,

ere

Teodori v. Penn Hills School District Authority,

413 Pa. 127, 196 A.2d 306 (1964)... .....

Town of Longboat Key v. Carl E. Widell & Son,

362 So. 2d 719 (Fia. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) . . . .

Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Cr.

GUS UUMUEPENEEE Sc wccccecc cs

United Contractors v. U.S., 368 F. 2d 585,

SUG EEE we Sic cesecccce

U.S. v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 39 S. Ct. 59,

SE PPUED 6 & 66 Kin wee acces

Statutes
Pennsylvania Public School Code of 1949, 24

PORE ee ee OTe ee
Pennsylvania Constitution, P.S. Const. Art. 1,§1. . .
Pennsylvania Constitution, P.S. Const. Art. 1,§6. . .
Pennsylvania Constitution, P.S. Const. Art. 1,§9. . .
Pennsylvania Constitution, P.S. Const. Art. 1,§11 ....
Pennsylvania Constitution, P.S. Const. Art. 5,§9. . .

PBUBC. GIZA . ccc ccvcvevevevece
PBUBC.GISSZ 0. ccc crv ccccecccrccce

Other Authorities

P.LE. Constitutional Law §135.........++-.

es

In The

Supreme Court Of The United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

No.

ACMAT CORPORATION,
Petitioner,

SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA,
Respondent.
=Ooooo_=_=_=_=_LLLSS
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
———————

OPINIONS BELOW

The per curiam judgment order of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, affirming the amended final judgment
of the district court is officially reported as Acmat Corporation v.
School District of Philadelphia, 904 F.2d. 693 (3rd Cir. 1990) and
appears in Appendix A hereto at 1a-2a. The decision of the United

2

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, denying Acmat
Corporation’s (“Acmat”) Petition for Rehearing, not officially
reported, is printed in Appendix B hereto at 3a-4a. The opinion and
order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, deciding the summary judgment motion by the
School District of Philadelphia (“School District’), not officially
reported, is printed in Appendix C hereto at 5a-24a. The district
court’s decision on Acmat’s motion for reargument of the summary
judgment motion was issued in open court, not officially reported,
is printed in Appendix D hereto at 51a-53a.

JURISDICTION

The judgment order of the United States Court of Appeals is dated
May 23, 1990. Acmat’s petition for rehearing was denied by order
dated June 22, 1990. In accordance with Rule 13.1 and Rule 13.4,
this petition is filed within 90 days of the date of the denial of the

petition for rehearing. The jurisdiction of this court is invoked
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1254.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED

A. Constitutional Provisions

The “Due Process Clause” of the 14th Amendment of the United
States Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, $1, provides:

Section 1. All persons bom or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which rhall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens for the United States; nor shall

any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or

3

property, without due process of law; nor Jeny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.

Article 1, Sections 1, 6,9 and 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,

P.S. Const. Art. 1, §§1, 6, 9, 11 provide:

Section 1. Inherent rights of mankind

All men are bom equally free and independent, and
have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among
which are those of enjoying and defending life and
liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting
property and reputation, and of pursuing their own
happiness.

Sec. 6. Trial by jury

Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right
thereof remain inviolate. The General Assembly may
provide, however, by law, that a verdict may be
rendered by not less than five-sixths of the jury in any
civil case.

Section 9. Rights of accused in criminal prosecutions
In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to
be heard by himself and his counsel, to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to meet
the witnesses face to face, to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and, in
prosecutions by indictment or information, a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage; he
cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself,
nor can he be deprived of his life, liberty, or property,
unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the
land. The use of a suppressed voluntary admission or

voluntary confession to impeach the credibility of a

4

person may be permitted and shall not be construed as
compelling a person to give evidence against
themself.

Sec. 11. Courts to be open; suits against the
Commonwea!th

All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury
done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation
shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and
justice administered without sale, denial or delay.
Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in
such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the
Legislature may by law direct.

Article 5, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, P.S. Const.
Art. 5, $9, provides:

§9. Right of appeal

There shall be a right of appeal in all cases to a court
of record from a court not of record; and there shall
also be a right of appeal from a court of record or from
an administrative agency to a court of record or to an
appellate court, the selection of such court to be as
provided by law; and there shall be such other rights

of appeal as may be provided by law.
B. STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Section 5-508 of the Pennsylvania Public School Code of 1949,
24 P.S. §5-508, provides:

§5-508. Majority vote required; recording

The affirmative vote of a majority of all the members
of the board of school directors in every school
district, duly recorded, showing how each member
voted, shall be required in order to take action on the

eet BOGEN OP AI La OP TE etal n° ts = Oe St ert Ne pee Rte

following subjects:—

Fixing length of school term.

Adopting textbooks.

Appointing or dismissing district superintendents,
assistant district superintendents, associate
superintendents, principals, and teachers.
Appointing tax collectors and other appointees.
Adopting the annual budget
Levying and assessing taxes
Purchasing, selling or condemning land.

Locating new buildings or changing the locations of
old ones.

Dismissing a teacher after a hearing.

Creating or increasing any indebtedness.

Adopting courses of study.
Establishing additional schools or departments.
Designating depositories for school funds.

Entering into contracts of any kind, including
contracts for the purchase of fuel or any supplies,
where the amount involved exceeds one hundred
dollars ($100).

Fixing salaries or compensation of officers, teachers,
or other appointees of the board of school directors.
Entering into contracts with and making
appropriations to the intermediate unit for the
district’s proportionate share of the cost of services
provided orto be provided for by the intermediate unit.
Failure to comply with the provisions of this section
shall render such acts of the board of school directors
void and unenforcible.

6
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

An important issue raised by this case is whether the district
court’s interpretation of a construction contract, that makes the
School District the sole judge and jury over a contractor’s claims,
violates due process of law. The lower courts’ holdings sanctioned
a procedure whereby the Government in a public contract deprived
acontractor of any hearing of its contract claims and further deprived
the contractor of judicial review. The decisions make the School
District judge of its own cause. Significantly, the lower courts’

holdings sharply conflict with controlling Pennsylvania precedent
and decisions issued by other federal courts. In addition, the district

court, in contravention of the rules governing summary judgment,
lumped many of Acmat’s claims together, labelled them “extra
work” items and summarily dismissed those claims without regard
to the fact that many of the items had their genesis in breach of
contract, differing site conditions and delays caused by the School
District. As a consequence, the lower courts imbued the School
District with contractual immunity, a principle that the Pennsylvania
legislature has declined to enact into law.

This is an issue of great practical significance because the
decision deviates from well settled Pennsylvania precedent that

permits a contractor to sue a political subdivision for breach of
contract and also to recover for differing site conditions when its
contract so provides. If the lower courts’ holdings are allowed to
stand, they will impact on the entire construction industry in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and will undoubtedly result in
skyrocketing construction costs to the Commonwealth. Moreover,
the decisions represent a major leap backward in the evolution of
‘construction contract law in the United States and the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

coer stam.

A. Statement of Facts

In or about April and June 1984, Acmat and the School District
entered into separate contracts for asbestos abatement in three
school buildings in the City of Philadelphia. The significant
provisions are identically worded in each of the contracts. The
pertinent portion of the Rush School contract is annexed in
Appendix (“App.”) E at 82a-96a. Almost from the start, Acmat
encountered conditions that differed materially from those shown
on the plans and specifications for the projects and differed from
those it observed in pre-bid inspections. Moreover, the School
District breached the contracts in many respects. The School
District unreasonably interfered with construction by permitting the
premises to flood, conducting improper and late inspections, issuing
defective plans and specifications and ordering work that caused
disruptions. Other breaches involved a dispute over the scope of
work required by the contracts. The foregoing resulted in enormous
delays and the loss of millions of dollars by the contractor.

B. Prior Proceedings

The action was commenced in 1985 with the filing of a complaint
in the United States District Court for the Easter District of

Pennsylvania. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship.
28 U.S.C. §1332.

The District Court (Giles, J.) by order dated December 21, 1988,
granted partial summary judgment to the School District (App. C at
5a-24a). The District Court dismissed the claims for differing site
conditions because of its erroneous determination that additional
School Board approval was required for each such claim despite the
School Board's initial approval of the contracts with a differing site
condition clause by the School Board. Similarly, the claims for

breach of contract were summarily dismissed because of the absence
of School Board approval for the additional labor and concomitant
costs for work made more difficult and expensive by School District
breaches.

Other claims asserted by Acmat were allowed by the district
court, but only because of School District acknowledgment of their
legitimacy. However, the district court, relying on certain contract
language, restricted compensation for these claims to that amount
unilaterally determined by the School District, and further held that
“..., the claims for time and material costs are not subject to judicial
review.” (App. C at 9a).

The claims for delay damages were dismissed by the district court
based upon certain purported exculpatory contract language.

Accordingly, the district court’s order was based primarily on its
misinterpretation of applicable Pennsylvania state law and the
erroneous construction of an agreement that was patently ambiguous
and required interpretation by the jury. The district court made
factual determinations of disputed material issues of fact and ruled
that Acmat’s claims were subject to summary dismissal.

The district court ignored the state court precedents cited, infra,
which allow Acmat recovery of its damages. A motion to reconsider
was also denied. (App D at 51a-53a).

The School District’s counterclaims and A.cmat’s sole remaining claim
for contract retainages was tried to a jury and culminated in a
Amended Final Judgment dated October 24, 1989. (App. F at 97a-98a).
However, after trial, but before the Amended Final Judgment was
entered, the district court entertained argument and thereafter
reduced the amount previously awarded Acmat because the School District’s
expert re-evaluated the amounts it would have allowed Acmat for
work it acknowledged was compensable. (App.G at 99a-128a).

LAO at C0 A i Rao Gh Matas

So NA ALOE AL 0th

9

Acmat’s appeal and the School District’s cross-appeal were
argued before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. A Per Curiam Judgment Order, without any discussion of
the case, affirming the judgment of the District Court is dated May
23, 1990. Acmat Corporation v. School District of Philadelphia,
904 F.2d 693 (3rd Cir. 1990). (App. A at la-2a). Acmat’s Petition
for Rehearing was denied by decision dated June 22, 1990. (App.
B at 3a-4a).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

L THIS CASE INVOLVES IMPORTANT
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS OF DUE PROCESS
AND THE DEPARTURE FROM ACCEPTED AND USUAL
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

A. The district court ignored binding state court precedent set
forth in John F. Harkins Co., Inc. v. School District of
Philadelphia and made the School District’s determination of
Acmat’s claims final and binding without a hearing and
without the availability of judicial review.

Although the great majority of Acmat’s claims were summarily
dismissed in the district court’s order of December 21, 1988, the
court did find entitlement for a group of claims that the School
District acknowledged in writing. Having made that determination,
the district court adopted the sum unilaterally and arbitrarily
designated by the School District as being due. There was no
hearing conducted or evidence received since the court concluded
that it was without jurisdiction to rule on the question.

Net ot a on ak

Pt ee

11

language, to the School District’s final determination
as to net costs of labor and material. Thus, the claims
for time and material costs are not subject to judicial
review. The School District’s contractual right of
final determination necessarily includes the form and
extent of proof and actual expenditures by the
contractor. However, the court can decide whether
there was written authorization from the School
District to ACMAT to undertake work on a time and
material basis. App. C at 9a.

The district court then proceeded to list each of Acmat's claims
and to accept the meager amount allocated by the School District on
a minority of the c.aims and nothing on the remaining claims.

This approach was totally contrary to the holding of the
Pennsylvania Superior Court which expressly rejected the idea that
the subject language could make the School District's determination

final and binding.

In John F. Harkins Co., Inc. v. School District of Philadelphia,
313 Pa. Super. Ct. 425, 460 A.2d 260 (1983), the Court wrote:

In the first place, the school district was to be the final
arbiter of the contractor’s net cost. Pursuant to the
provisions of the contract, it made a determination of
appellee's net increase in the cost of labor and made
payment accordingly. The burden of proving by a fair
preponderance of the evidence that additional
damages had been incurred was on the contractor.

(d) Verbal instruction given by any of the officers, agents, or employees of the
Board which depart frm the contract documents shall not be binding upon the
Board.

12

John F. Harkins, supra at page 265. Emphasis
supplied.

The Court in Harkins, consistent with principles of due process,
construed the subject language as simply requiring an intermediate
step in the process of having a dispute with the School District
resolved in court. The contractor was permitted to try its claims,
even though the agreement contained contractual terms that are very
similar to those under review herein. Regrettably, neither the district
court nor the Court of Appeals addressed the Harkins case although
they had the obligation to apply state precedent in this diversity
action. Erie R. Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82
L.Ed. 1188 (1938). It is clear that Acmat never waived its
constitutional right to a hearing or to have its claims heard in a court
of law. Such a waiver, if it could be effective, would surely have to
be explicit and unequivocal. That standard was not been met by the
contracts and certainly was not met by Article 14.

Consequently, the application given the contractual provisions by
the district court clearly violated the guarantee of due process as
required by the constitutions of the United States and the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Clearly one party to a contract
has too great a pecuniary and other interests in the outcome of its
own dispute to allow it to sit as judge and jury without a hearing and
without judicial review. The lower courts’ holdings put the
proverbial “fox in charge of the chicken coop”.

In Logan v. Zimmerman, 455 U.S. 422, 102 S. Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.
2d 265 (1982), this Court held that it would be a demial of due process

to permit the state to deprive litigants from using established
' adjudicatory procedures.

The Court wrote:

ee ee tts

13

Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause has been interpreted as preventing the States
from denying potential litigants use of established
adjudicatory procedures, when such an action would
be “the equivalent of denying them an opportunity to
be heard upon their claimed right[s].” Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,380 (1971).

Each of our due process cases has recognized, either
explicitly or implicitly, that because “minimum
[procedural] requirements [are] a matter of federal
law, they are not diminished by the fact that the State
may have specified its own procedures that it may
deem adequate for determining the preconditions to
adverse official action.” Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.
480,491(1980). See Amett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S., at
166-167 (POWELL, J., concurring in part); id., at 211
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Indeed, any other
conclusion would allow the State to destroy at will
virtually any state-created property interest. The
Court has considered and rejected such an approach:
“*While the legislature may elect not to confer a
property interest,...it may not constitutionally
authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once
conferred, without appropriate procedural
safeguards...[Tjhe adequacy of statutory procedures
for deprivation of a statutorily created property
interest must be analyzed in constitutional terms."”
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S., at 490-491, n. 6, quoting
Amett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S., at 167 (opinion
concurring in part).

14
ees

As our decisions have emphasized time and again, the
Due Process Clause grants the aggrieved party the
opportunity to present his case and have its merits
fairly judged. Thus it has become a truism that “some
form of hearing” is required before the owner is finally
deprived of a protected property interest. Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S., at 570-571, n. 8 (emphasis
in original). And that is why the Court has stressed
that, when a “statutory scheme makes liability an
important factor in the State’s determination..., the
State may not, consistent with due process, eliminate
consideration of that factor in its prior hearing.” Bell
v. Burson, 402 U.S., at 541. To put it as plainly as
possible, the State may not finally destroy a property
interest without first giving the putative owner an
opportunity to present his claim of entitlement. See
id., at 542 Logan v. Zimmerman, supra at pages 429,
430, 432, 433 and 434.

In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S. Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.
2d 113 (1971), this Court interpreted access to the Courts as an
element of due process and wrote:

It is to courts, or other quasi-judicial official bodies,
that we ultimately look for the implemeniation of a
regularized, orderly process of dispute settlement.
Within this framework, those who wrote our original
Constitution, in the Fifth Amendment, and later those
who drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, recognized
the centrality of the concept of due process in the
operation of this system. Without this guarantee that
one may not be deprived of his rights, neither liberty

~ wetew

15

nor property, without due process of law, the State’s
monopoly over techniques for binding conflict
resolution could hardly be said to be acceptable under
our scheme of things. Only by providing that the
social enforcement mechanism must function strictly
within these bounds can we hope to maintain an
ordered society that is also just. It is upon this premise

- that this Court has through years of adjudication put
flesh upon the due process principle.

The State’s obligations under the Fourteenth
Amendment are not simply generalized ones, rather,
the State owes to each individual that process which,
in light of the values of a free society, can be
characterized as due. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
at 375, 380.

In Tuney v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed.
749 (1927), tie Court held that due process was violated when an
officer acting in a judicial capacity had an interest in the controversy.
The mayor in Tumey, supra, as the School District in the case at bar,
was charged with fiscal responsibilities and could not be expected
to adjudicate a dispute that impacted on those obligations. Acmat,
like the accused in Tuwmey, supra, has a right to an impartial judge.
Unlike the accused in Twney, supra, Acmat did not have a hearing
of any kind on those items where the district court simply adopted
the position of the School District.

It is submitted that the provisions of the Pennsylvania
Constitution set forth above lend additional support to this argument.
See also, P.L.E. Constitutional law §135.

16
Similarly, it is well established that due process is violated when
a third-party acting as judge of acontroversy has some bias or where

there is a commingling of judicial and prosecutorial functions.
Dussia v. Barger, 466 Pa. 152,351 A.2d 667 (1976).

In Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.,
393 US. 145, 150, 89 S. Ct. 337, 340 (1968), rehearing denied, 393
U.S. 1112, the Court held:

This rule of arbitration and this canon of judicial ethics
rest on the premise that any tribunal permitted by law
to try cases and controversies not only must be
unbiased but also must avoid even the appearance of
bias. We cannot believe that it was the purpose of
Congress to authorize litigants to submit their cases
and controversies to arbitration boards that might
reasonably be thought biased against one litigant and
favorable to another.

In Annenberg v. Roberts, 333 Pa. 203, 2 A.2d. 612(1938), the
Court held that a party aggrieved in proceedings before a nonjudicial
body is entitled to the opportunity for a judicial hearing The instant
case is even more compelling than those immediately cited above
since there wasn’t even the pretense of a hearing.

It is apparent that the construction given Article 14 of the
contracts by the lower courts is contrary to due process. The
Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Harkins, supra, clearly stated that
the subject language was to be construed as only requiring an
intermediate step in the adjudicatory process.

There was no waiver of Acmat’s constitutional right to access to
the courts. The Court of Appeals unfortunately sanctioned the
district court’s departure from these fundamental principles of law.

net taelaneaitereacaa emanates

17

ILTHE DETERMINATION THAT ACMAT’S CLAIMS
FOR DIFFERING SITE CONDITIONS ARE BARRED IS
CONTRARY TO THE CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT
AND THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT’S
HOLDING IN TEODORI V. PENN HILLS
SCHOOL DISTRICT AUTHORITY

A. Article 14 was misinterpreted by the lower courts.

Fundamentally, the lower courts failed to understand that each of
; Acmat’s claims was precipitated by a different event. Some of the
Claims were caused by breaches of contract. Other claims resulted
from differing site conditions or delays caused by the owner. The
common law and provisions of the contracts provided a mechanism
for compensating the cortractor. A review of Article 14 of the
contracts shows that the lower courts misconstrued its provisions
and ignored the precedent set forth in Teodori v. Penn Hills School
District Authority, 413 Pa. 127, 196 A.2d 306 (1964), which made
crucial distinctions among the provisions of the School District
contracts. Article 14(a) is intended to cover those situations where
the School District unilaterally orders changes to the contract.”
Article 14(c) is intended to cover those situations where differing
site conditions cause more work to be performed. Work that results
from causes governed by either Article 14(a) or Article 14(c) is to
be compensated in accordance with the provisions of Article 14(b).
In all other respects, Articles 14(a) and 14(c) are separate and distinct
from each other. The unit prices referred to in Article 14(b) were not

OA ATA Ab OR eA ee Se 2 eee

2 Acmat’s claim arising under Article 14(a) is for work that received School Board
approval before it was performed because the School District initiated changes
which all parties recognized were not within the parameters of the initial contract.

However, Acmat did not agree to a lump sum change in its contract price and
: Acmat alleged that it was entitled to an equitable adjustment. It is a clear denial
of due process to permit the School District to unilaterally order changes in work
and also to unilaterally determine the amount that Acmat should be paid therefor.

a

18
applicable and the parties could not agree on a lump sum settlement
for any of the claims. Accordingly, actual net cost was to form the
basis for compensation of the differing site condition claims arising
under Article 14(c).

The foregoing categorization and distinctions were examined and
adopted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Teodori v. Penn
Hills School District Authority, supra.> The Teodori decision clearly

3 Authority next argues that the contract between the parties provided no agreement
to pay for extra work in the amount claimed by Teodori. This contention is based
upon the “Changes and Alterations” section of the contract, which clearly
provides that such “changes and alterations” be made by written order. This
atgument completely ignores the section of the contract dealing with “Conditions
Differing From Those Shown on Plans or Indicated In Specifications”, set forth
in full above. The parties obviously contemplated the possibility of the exact
type of contingency which arose, and provided for it in the contract.

We agree with the conclusion of the Court below, that Teodori’s right to extra
compensation, if any, is governed by the “differing conditions” clause, and not
by the “changes and alterations” clause, the extra compensation not being ©
sought for “changes” and/or “alterations” as those texms were used in the contract.

Nor are we moved by Authority's argument that the award of extra compensation
is contrary to the provisions of the School Code or Municipality Authorities Act... .

The contract in the instant case was entered into under circumstances which fully
complied with the above statute. The extra work which the plaintiff was required
to do and upon which his claim is based was a natural extension of the quantum
of the work contemplated by the original contract and was clearly covered by an
express provision thereof. No work not encompassed in the original contract
was presented by discovery of the gasoline line, and thus no physical changes
or alterations in the contract documents were necessitated thereby. The end
product of the site preparation remained exactly es originally planned; only the
manner of accomplishing it was affected. The contract unequivocally provided
for this contingency, and the plaintiff hed a clear contractual right to adjust his
method of operation and tw recover his additional costs within the contract
framework.

a

8 ner cht Ae RENE ce 6a TR OR

19

shows that provisions in the changes section of Article 14(a) have
no bearing on claims made under the differing site conditions clause
of Article 14(c).

The lower courts ignored’ the controlling precedent of Teodori
and improperly merged the terms of Articles 14(a) and 14(c) so as
to require School Board approval of differing site condition claims.
Contrary to the statements made in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the District
Court’s order (App. C at 7a), School Board approval is not a
requirement in Article 14(c). (App. E at 91a). Nor were changes in
plans required or a necessary condition to compensation for
differing site conditions. Article 14(c) refers only to changes in
drawings by the School District, “as it may find necessary”. In this
instance the differing site conditions did not require changes in
drawings. The fact that notice was given by Acmat of the differing
site conditions and that written direction to proceed was issued by
the School District is fully documented and was part of the record
before the lower courts. School Board approval of the differing site
provision was received prior to the execution of the contracts. The
contracts do not indicate that further School Board approval is
required in order to recover for claims necessitated by differing site
conditions. At the very least, the district court’s order does reflect,
what may be ambiguities in Article 14 that create a jury question
and which should have resulted in denial of summary judgment.

Here, the contract foresaw the possibility of what actually occurred, and Teodori
complied with the governing provisions of the contract . . . Teodori v. Penn Hills
School District Authority, 196 A. 2d at 309. Emphasis supplied.

4 Indeed, the lower courts did not even discuss the application of Teodori, although
it was cited and extensively briefed by Acmat.

20

B. The holding that the contract site inspection clause subsumes
the differing site conditions clause is contrary to United States
y. Spearin and prevailing law.

Another reason given by the district court for denying claims
made under the differing site conditions clause was its conclusion
that Acmat did not make a reasonable site inspection.” (App. C at
8a, 9a). The fact that a site inspection was conducted was established
by affidavit. Further affidavits were fumished on the motion for
reargument, but were apparently ignored by the lower courts. The
record Clearly showed that a site inspection was made and that the
question of how reasonable it was under the circumstances was a
matter for the jury. Moreover, the pre-bid site inspection clauses
do not mandate a comprehensive investigation that would require
dismantling of permanent structures. Rather, the contract required

5 This was a disputed issue of material fact improperly decided by the judge on
motion for summary judgment.

© ‘The first inspection Clause is contained in paragraph 7 of the General Conditions
and states the following:
7. CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE WORK
(a) The Contractor shall be responsible for ascertaining the nature and location
of the work and the general and local conditions which can affect the work or
the cost thereof. Any failure by the Contractor to do so will not relieve him from
responsibility for successfully performing the work without additional expense
to the School District. The School District assumes no responsibility for any
understanding or representations concerning conditions made by any of its
officers or agents prior to the receipt and opening of bids other than by a bulletin
or addendum that is duly issued. App. E at 88a.
The second site inspection clause is contained in Article SC-07 of the Special
Conditions and reads as follows:

SC-07 EXAMINATION OF THE SITE

The contractor bidding on this work must inspect the sites before submitting the
proposal and will be responsible for informing himself fully on all determinable,
existing conditions and limitations of the sites and will assume responsibility for
all charges and costs resulting from his failure to verify same. (Emphasis
supplied). App. E at 95a.

21

Se ee ae enn Ge CUTER OF Sp
work.

In U.S. v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 137, 39 S.Ct. 59, 63 L.Ed 166
(1918), this Court held:

But the insertion of the articles prescribing the
character, dimensions and location of the sewer
imported a warranty that, if the specifications were
: complied with, the sewer would be adequate. This
implied warranty is not overcome by the general
Clauses requiring the contractor, to examine the site,
to check up the plans, and to assume the responsibility
for the work until completion and acceptance. The
obligation to examine the site did not impose upon him
the duty of making a diligent enquiry into the history
of the locality with a view to determining, at his peril,
whether the sewer specifically prescribed by the
Government would prove adequate. The duty to
check plans did not impose the obligation to pass upon
their adequacy to accomplish the purpose in view.
And the provision concerning contractor’s
responsibility cannot be construed as abridging rights
arising under specific provisions of the contract.

Ce ce ee we

7 A differing site condition is not a condition that either party knows about in
advance of bidding. It is not a condition that a mere site inspection would
: disclose. If it were, since the owner and its representatives are even more
familiar with the site than are prospective bidders, such work would be included
in the base contract. The differing site conditions clause is included w
compensate a contractor for those conditions that neither party knows about, that
may be encountered, and are not readily ascertainable at the time of bidding.
Certainly, it is not included, with its concomitant promise to pay, only to be later
snatched back with spurious arguments to the effect that the bidder should have
somehow “discovered” the condition prior to bidding.

22

In United Contractors v. U.S., 368 F. 2d 585, 598, 177 Ct.CL. 151
(1966), the Court wrote the following:

But we have held, in comparable circumstances, that
broad exculpatory clauses (identical in effect with this
one) cannot be given their full literal reach, and “do
not relieve the defendant of liability for changed
conditions as the broad language thereof would seem
to indicate.” Fehlhaber Corp. v. United States, 151 F.
Supp. 817, 825, 138 Ct. Cl. 571, 584 (1957), cert.
denied 355 U.S. 877,78 S. Ct. 141, 2 L.Ed.2d 108. As
Fehlhaber said, general portions of the specification
should not lightly be read to override the Changed
Conditions clause. Ibid. It takes clear and
unambiguous language to do that, for “the provision
sought to be eliminated, or subordinated, is a standard
mandatory clause of broad application * * *.”
Thompson Ramo Woodridge Inc. v. United States, 361
F, 2d 222, 238,175Ct.ClL =, Ss (1966).

See also, Farnsworth & Chambers Co., Inc. v. U.S., 346 F.2d
577, 171 Ct. CL. 30 (1965) and Town of Longboat Key v. Cari E.
Widell & Son, 362 So. 2d 719 (Fila. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). Reliance
by the district court on Nether Providence Township School
Authority v. Thomas M. Durkin & Sons, Inc., 505 Pa. 42, 476 A.2d
904 (1984), was misplaced. The site investigation clause in Nether,
supra, was far more comprehensive than the one in the School
District contracts and there was no differing site condition clause to
consider in Nether.

Sl nadate wh ae

t ~ AO A kA et we

23

IIL. DISMISSAL OF ACMAT’S BREACH OF CONTRACT
CLAIMS IS CONTRARY TO LAW

The School District breached the contracts in several respects.
Acmat was ordered to perform work out of sequence and was
compelled to clean and re-clean areas to a point that exceeded
contractual requirements. Moreover, the School District permitted
elevators that were used to move materials to stop functioning and
permitted pipes to break and flood one building. These breaches by
the School District caused Acmat to remain on the project far longer
than it would have otherwise and to expend additional sums of
money for labor and materials. Despite these serious allegations the
district court in paragraph 1 of its order (App. C at Sa) dismissed the
breach of contract claims because of its perception that the breach
Claims constituted “extra work” and were barred by Section 5-508
of the Pennsylvania School Code of 1949, 24 P.S. §5-508 (requiring
prior School Board approval) and Nether Providence Township
School Authority v. Thomas M. Durkin & Sons, Inc., 505 Pa. 42,476
A.2d 904 (1984). In short, the district court’s holding was that a
contractor cannot recover for breach of contract unless the School
Board approves the School District’s breach, a clear denial of due

process.

As aconsequence, the district court and the Court of Appeals have
imbued the School District with an immunity from claims for breach
of contract that the legislature has declined to enact into law. Indeed,
the Pennsylvania Constitution permits such suits to be brought. P.S.
Const. Art. 1, §11. Although more work and a concomitant increase
in costs were the result of the School District's breaches, the breach
Claims are not transformed into a claim for “extra work” which
involves a change in scope to the original contract. The claims at
issue herein involve contract work which was made more difficult
and expensive by virtue of the School District’s breaches. In Nether
Providence Township School Authority, supra, the claims involved

24

the clearing of an area not included in the scope of work and was
extra to the contract. It did not concem breaches that impacted on
work that was within the original scope of work. The district court’s
order and the Court of Appeals’ affirmation of that order show a
failure to understand these well recognized distinctions. For these
reasons, the district court’s reference to the School Code is
inapposite. Moreover, the district court's categorization of claims
as extra work was incongruous, and at the very least, an issue for
the jury. Dismissal of the breach of contract claims was aclear denial

of due process.

IV. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY DECIDED
DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT ON A MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Even a cursory review of the district court’s order shows that it
made impermissible findings of fact in a motion for summary

judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986),
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed. 2d 265

(1986) and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Lid. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed. 2d 538 (1986).

In the instant case, the district court addressed each of Acmat’s
claims, made findings of fact, including whether or not conditions
were concealed, and fully adjudicated Acmat's claims, except the
claim for contract retainages. Most unusual was the district court’s
categorization of claims as “extra work” when the evidence showed
that the claims derived, for the most part, from breaches of contract
and differing site conditions. Thus, the district court's factual
determination, in the context of summary judgment, that work was
“extra” to the contract was improper and should have been left to

the jury.

|

25

Another critical issue of fact decided by the district court on
summary judgment, was that Acmat did not conduct a reasonable
pre-bid site inspection. (App. C at 7a-9a). Moreover, the District
Court eschewed the idea that a differing site condition clause could
allow a contractor to receive compensation beyond its contract price.

To permit a contractor to claim belatedly that it could
not discover the scope of the work through pre-bid
inspection, and without more, to collect for work not
approved as an “extra”, would nullify the contract
provisions controlling bidding and performance and
undermine the fiscal authority and responsibility of
the public contracting body. (App. C at 8a).

The district court’s apparent concern about fiscal responsibility
was entirely inappropriate, but does support the principle that the
School District cannot sit in judgment of its own cause.
Significantly, the School District could have let the contract without
a differing site condition clause, if it wished to entertain large bids
in anticipation of contingencies that could arise. However,
Government entities, including the United States Government and
the Commonwealth, have discovered that their overall expenditures
for construction are lower when their contracts contain a differing
site condition clause.

There was more than enough evidence to show that a reasonable

site inspection was performed. Of course, the question of the
“reasonableness” of the inspection was a matter for the jury.

Moreover, it is submitted that the ambiguity of the contract
language required interpretation by the trier of fact.

26

V. THE DETERMINATION THAT THE CONTRACTOR
IS BARRED FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES FOR
DELAY IS CONTRARY TO COATESVILLE
CONTRACTORS & ENGINEERS, INC.

V. BOROUGH OF RIDLEY PARK

The District Court simply denied Acmat’s claims for delay

damages because of “specific language ot the written contracts”.®
(App. C at 9a). It made no inquiry into the factual basis of Acmat's
claims and ignored the Pennsylvania precedent that permits
damages for delay despite exculpatory contractual language.

In Coatesville Contractors & Engineers, Inc. v. Borough of
Ridley Park, 509 Pa. 553, 506 A.2d 862, 865, 866 (1986), the Court
held:

The rule in Pennsylvania is that exculpatory
provisions in a contract cannot be raised as a defense
where (1) there is an affirmative or positive
interference by the owner with the contractor's work,
or (2) there is a failure on the part of the owner to act
in some essential matter necessary in the prosecution
of the work. Gasparini Excavating Co. v.
Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 409 Pa. 465, 187
A.2d 157 (1963); . . . “[WJhere an owner by an

8 Article 15(c) of the contract provides:

If any contractor shall be delayed in the completion of his work by reason of
unforeseeable causes beyond his control and without his fault or negligence,
including but not restricted to, acts of God, acts or neglect of the School District,
acts or neglect of any other contractor, fires, floods, epidemics, quarantine
restrictions, strikes, or freight embargoes, the period herein-above specified for
completion of his work may be extended by such time as shall be fixed by the
School District, but the contractor shall not be entitled to any damages or
compensation from the School District on account of any delay or delays
resulting from any of the aforesaid causes. (App. E at 92a).

27

unwarranted positive act interferes with the execution
of a contract, or where the owner unreasonably
neglects to perform an essential element of the work
in furtherance thereof, to the detriment of the
contractor, [the owner] will be liable for damages
resulting therefrom.” Henry Shenk Company v. Erie
County, 319 Pa. 100, 178 A. 662 (1935)

See also, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. General Asphalt
Paving Co., 46 Pa. Commw. Ct. 114, 405 A.2d 1138 (1979).

Thocnsegdieuncuementet in Comtesvills ware Geageecian events
that occurred in the instant case. Clearly a factual determination was
required prior to a ruling by the Court as to the nature of the School
District’s conduct in causing delays to the Project. The record
before the district court was more than sufficient to permit the issue
of delays to go to the jury. The School District, in numerous
instances, actively interfered with the work or failed to act in some
essential manner.

Delays caused by unanticipated changes at the job site are
certainly compensable. In addition, the School District’s breaches,
including unreasonable inspection requirements and delays in
inspection, all impacted on the progress of the job and constituted
active interference.

Acmat was denied the opportunity of showing that the
exculpatory language did not apply to it under the circumstances of
this case.

28

VL. ACMAT WAS DENIED A FULL AND FAIR HEARING
ON THE CLAIM FOR CONTRACT RETAINAGES

A. The alleged failure to furnish dump tickets was an immaterial
breach of the Contract.

The only claim of Acmat to survive summary judgment was for
contract retainges in the sum of $150,909.14. The district court
ruled, however, that Acmat must furnish all of the asbestos dump
tickets to recover its contract retainages. The Court refused to allow
the jury to find that the dump tickets were an immaterial breach and
did not instruct them on this issue. Parenthetically, dump tickets are
the documentary receipt given at the dump sites upon delivery of
debris. Significantly, there was no claim of injury or damages on
account of the School District’s not having the dump tickets. Nor
was there any allegation that the debris was not properly removed.
In spite of this fact, the district court ruled that the dump tickets were
an absolute condition precedent to recovery of the retainage. This
was Clear error. See Gray v. Weiss, 519 A.2d 716 (Me. 1986) and
Formigli Corp. v. Fox, 348 F.Supp. 629(E.D.Pa. 1972).

VIL DISMISSAL OF THE CLAIM FOR QUANTUM MERUIT
RECOVERY WAS IMPROPER AND CONTRARY TO
DERRY TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT V.
SUBURBAN ROOFING CO., INC.

The district court’s order dismissing Acmat’s alternative count
for quantum meruit recovery was based on the absence of School
Board approval.” It is axiomatic that no claim for quantum meruit
recovery will have School Board approval. It is the lack of formal

9 Plaintiff's other contract claims, based upon theories of quantum meruit, unjust
enrichment, equitable adjustment, promissory estoppel, and modified contract,
also fail because of the absence of formal approval of the claimed extra work by
& majority of the members of the School Board as is required by state statute.
(App. C at 6a).

29

prerequisites that give rise to quantum meruit recovery.
Accordingly, the district court’s decision dismissing the quantum
meruit count in the amended complaint on the grounds that there
was no School Board approval is paradoxical and contrary to law.
The issue is whether the factual basis of Acmat’s fifty-eight or so
claims can give rise to quantum meruit recovery, if not otherwise
recoverable on a contractual theory. Of course, this requires a
factual determination based on oral and documentary evidence.

In Derry Township School District v. Suburban Roofing Co., Inc.,
102 Pa. Commw. Ct. 54, 517 A.2d 225, 229 (1986), the Court
allowed quantum meruit recovery and wrote:

The District misrepresents the Contractor’s claim
which is not for compensation for extra work
performed under changes to the contract, rather, the
Contractor is asserting a claim for its reasonable costs
incurred in reliance upon the District’s interpretation
of the Contractor’s performance under the terms of the
contract, which interpretation the District later altered
to the Contractor’s detriment. This is a proper case
for equitable estoppel. In Department of
Environmental Resources v. Dixon Contracting Co.,
Inc., 80 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 438, 471 A.2d 934
(1984), we held that equitable estoppel can be applied
to a governmental agency to preclude that agency
from depriving a person of a reasonable expectation
when such agency knew or should have known that
such person would rely upon the representation of the
agency. Id. at 443, 471 A.2d at 936-937; see also, De

Frank v. County of Greene, 50 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
30,412 A.2d 663 (1980).

30

As was the case in Derry, supra, Acmat was severely damaged
by the School District’s interpretation of the contract and was
compelled to expend substantial additional sums to perform the
work. If not otherwise recoverable under one of the other theories
discussed previously, these claims should be redressed on a
quasi-contractual basis. A claim that stands out as a prime example
is the work in the faculty cafeteria at the Lincoln School. Acmat
was ordered to perform asbestos abatement in the area and did all
the work preparatory to the actual abatement. The School District
then halted the work and refused to compensate Acmat for the
additional work claiming it was within the scope of the original
contract.

Another example was the orderto clean instructional material that
was later rescinded after causing much havoc and disruption to
Acmat’s performance.

The issue is factual in nature and not, as the district court stated,
whether the School Board ever approved the work. It was reversible
error to summarily dismiss the quantum meruit count.

31
CONCLUSION |
For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should be issued to review

the judgment order of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,
Ray Goddard
675 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10017
(212) 949-0555
Counsel of Record and
Attorney for Petitioner
Acmat Corporation
Joseph P. Dineen
Edward A. Stein
Goddard & Blum
Of Counsel

September 17, 1990

la

APPENDIX A—PER CURIAM JUDGMENT ORDER OF
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
THIRD CIRCUIT, AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT
OF THE DISTRICT COURT

United States Court Of Appeals For
The Third Circuit

NOS. 89.1930 and 89-1953

ACMAT CORPORATION,
Appellant in No. 89-1930

Vv.

SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA,

Plaintiff on a Counterclaim,
Appellant in No. 89-1953

Vv.

ACMAT CORPORATION,
Defendant on a Counterclaim

Vv.

HUGHES URETHANE CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Third-Party Defendant on a Counterclaim

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastem District of Pennsylvania

2a
Appendix A
(D.C. Civil No. 85-7067)

Argued May 21, 1990

Before: SLOVITER, NYGAARD, and ALDISERT,
Circuit Judges

JUDGMENT ORDER
After consideration of all contentions raised by appellants, it is

ADJUDGED and ORDERED that the judgment of the district
court be and is hereby affirmed.

Each party to bear its own costs.

By the Court,
signature
Circuit Judge
Attest:
signature
Sally Mrvos, Clerk

3a

APPENDIX B—ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT,
DENYING THE PETITION FOR REHEARING

United States Court Of Appeals Hor
Che Third Cirrnit

Nos. 89-1930 and 89-1953
ACMAT CORPORATION,
Appellant-Cross- Appellee
Vv.
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA

SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING

Present: HIGGINBOTHAM, Chief Judge, SLOVITER,
BECKER, STAPLETON, MANSMANN, GREENBERG,
HUTCHINSON, SCIRICA, COWEN, NYGAARD and
ALDISERT®, Circuit Judges

The petition for rehearing filed by Appellant-Cross-Appellee
Acmat Corporation in the above-entitled case having been submitted
to the judges who participated in the decision of this court and to all
the other available circuit judges of the circuit in regular active
service, and no judge who concurred in the decision having asked
for rehearing, and a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit in
regular active service not having voted for rehearing by the court in
banc, the petition for rehearing is denied.

OM

Dated: June 22 1990

* Hon. Ruggero J. Aldisert, Senior Circuit Judge, as to panel
rehearing only.

5a

APPENDIX C—ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
PENNSYLVANIA DATED DECEMBER 21, 1988

| IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

/Stamp/

ACMAT CORPORATION
CIVIL ACTION

Oh EN NI AI ti se ti

NO. 85-7067

Rh elie

SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA, et al.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 21st day of December, 1988, upon consideration
) of the motion for partial summary judgement of defendant, School
District of Philadelphia and the response in opposition of plaintiff,
ACMAT Corporation, is it hereby ORDERED that the School
District’s motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, for the
following reasons and to the following extent:

1. The claims for breach of express contract are barred, as a matter
of law, except where noted below, due to the absence of Philadelphia
School Board approval of the claimed extra through formal
. resolution by a majority of its members. Such written approval is
required by statute, Section 5-508 of the Pennsylvania Public School
Code of 1949, 24 Pa. Stat, Ann. § 5-508, and the specific provisions
of the underlying contracts. Waiver of public contract provisions
regulating change orders can be accomplished only by the public

ee)

ne

6a
Appendix C

body authorized to enter into the contract. Nether Providence
Township School Authority v. Thomas M. Durkin & Sons, Inc., 505
Pa. 42,476 A.2d 904, 907 (1984). Anything less falls short of School

Board approval.

2. Plaintiff's other contract claims, based upon theories of
quantum meriut, unjust enrichment, equitable adjustment,
promissory estoppel, and modified contract, also fail because of the
absence of formal approval of the claimed extra work by a majority
of the members of the School Board as is required by state statute.

3. The claim of fraud is dismissed for failure to state a claim. By
reason of express provisions of the School Board approved
contracts, ACMAT knew that any work that it undertook which it
believed to be beyond the scope of an original contract, and for
which it would seek to be paid extra, required formal approval by a
majority of the members of the School Board. Where it did not have
such approval before commencing the extra work, and had no
contract addendum, ACMAT could not have selied justifiably upon
the advices or representations of the employees of the School
District as binding upon the members of the School Board. Any
reliance upon such advice had to have been done knowingly at
defendant's own peril, that is to say, with the hope that the extra
work, and documentation of it, would prove satisfactory to the
School District and win School Board ratification. Therefore, as a
matter of law, the fraud claim fails both against the School Board
and the School District.

. 4. The RICO claim fails to state a claim because, inter alia, there
was no fraud. Moreover, the School District cannot be both the
“person” charged with the RICO violation and the enterprise under
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).

OAD Am A i en the ed fel

RAO or: hae .

Ao ae

_°
Appendix C
5. The negligence claims are barred as matter of law because the
School District is immune from liability for negligent behavior
under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A. §

8541, et seq. Any basis for recovery on the plaintiff's contracts must
be based on contract law, not tort law.

6. Section 14(c) of the contracts does not permit payment forextra
work without School Board approval even if the School District
made changes in drawings and/or specifications. The contracts
require Board approval of all changes in scope and price, and all
changes to be in writing. The phrase “an equitable adjustment shali
be made” is modified by a preceeding sentence which advises that
any change in drawings or specifications requires Board approval.
In short, Section 14(c) gives notice that the Board has the right not
to fund a project unless and until it is satisfied both as to the change
in scope of work and the price and approval is formalized.

7. Section 16(c) of the contracts does not relieve the defendant of
obtaining School Board approval of extra work orders. The contract
requires that if the contractor incurs conditions at the site materially
different than anticipated, the School District must be notified to
investigate the conditions and to determine if any change in the
contract is necessary, whether there exists an emergency or not.
Newly discovered materially different conditions are required to be
left undisturbed pending School District investigation and
evaluation. If a change is proposed as to scope of work or price
because of materially different conditions, any change must be
accomplished in accordance with Section 14(c) of the contracts
which requires written School Board approval.

8. The School District is entitled generally to summary judgment
on the Rush School “overspray” claims because there was failure on

8a
Appendix C

defendant’s part to comply with the procedures of Section 16(c) of
the contract requiring School Board approval of any change in scope
of work or contract price occasioned by discovery of conditions not
allegedly reasonably anticipated. Fundamentally, however, the
contract documents specify that ACMAT assumed responsibility for
“ascertaining the nature and location of the work and the general and
local conditions which can affect the work or costs thereof”, and
further, that defendant’s failure to ascertain what was entailed in
performing the contracted work could not be visited upon the School
District but would be the contractor’s “responsibility for
successfully performing...without additional expense to the School
District.” To the same effect, see Nether Providence Township
School Authority, supra. Prior to bidding, ACMAT had the
Opportunity to remove the ceiling tiles and make whatever
inspection it deemed necessary. Alternatively, ACMAT could have
attempted to negotiate a reservation of rights clause for conditions
which are not observable. The contractor also had the option of not
performing the work and thereby causing the dispute to be limited
to one of contract interpretation. To permit a contractor to claim
belatedly that it could not discover the scope of the work through
pre-bid inspection, and without more, to collect for work not
approved as an “extra”, would nullify the contract provisions
controlling bidding and performance and undermine the fiscal
authority and responsibility of the public contracting body.

9. The Henry A. Nozko Affidavit pertaining to the Rush School
has no probative value for opposition to the summary judgment
motion. It is not based upon personal knowledge that a reasonable
investigation of the site could not have. been made. Moreover, there
is no evidence that ACMAT was prevented by any action of the
School District in making its own inspection. On the contrary, there

——

9a
Appendix C

is undisputed evidence that ACMAT was not impeded by School
District action. According to ACMAT, it was advised, prebid, that
there was asbestos above the ceilings of the second floor of the
school. It was also advised that, prior to bidding, it could inform
itself of the nature of the job by an earnest inspection, that is, by

looking beyond the ceiling tiles, or accept the risk of a lesser
examination. It chose the latter course.

10. Work directed to be undertaken by ACMAT on a time and
material basis was subject, by contract language, to the School
District’s final determination as to net costs of labor and material.
Thus, the claims for time and material costs are not subject to judicial
review. The School District’s contractual right of final
determination necessarily includes the form and extent of proof and
actual expenditures by the contractor. However, the court can decide
whether there was written authorization from the School District to
ACMAT to undertake work on a time and material basis.

11. ACMAT’s claim for delay damages is barred by the specific
language of the written contracts.

12. Derry Township School District v. Suburban Roofing, 102 Pa.
Commw. 54, 517 A.2d 255 (1986) is not applicable. It is not an
“extra work order” case.

13. ACMAT understood and agreed that with regard to any claims
for extra work in the performance of the contract, it had to propose
why the work should be considered outside the scope of the
agreement, specify alump sum amount if no unit price was specified,
provide detailed support for the proposal for School District review
and await approval or disapproval before doing the work.

10a
Appendix C

14. Where it was agreed that the work was extra to the contact,
but the School District and ACMAT could not agree on a lump sum
price, ACMAT was to perform the work on a time and material basis
plus 15% with the School District determining the net cost of time
and material under the contact.

15. With these criteria, the court now proceeds to consider
separately each aspect of ACMAT’s claim under the summary
judgment standard of review.

16. The Rush School

(a) Item 1. Decontamination of Building Contents. The School
District directed ACMAT to perform certain work on a time and
material basis. A change order issued. ACMAT claimed
$148,398.22. The School Board approved $63,282.89 of the claim
as the reasonable value for the work based upon its review of
invoices submitted. ACMAT continues to claim $85,115.33, yet it
executed the change orderon May 10, 1985, acknowledging that the
School District would be obligated to pay $63,282.89 for the work.
It cannot now claim more.

(b) Item 2. Teachers’ Closets and Boxed Rail for Folding
Partition. ACMAT hung two layers of polyethylene on the walls
which sealed off built-in lockers, cabinets, shelves, and closets. It
then removed asbestos containing fireproofing from structural steel
beams in the classrooms on the second floor. Then, it proceeded to
Clean up the second floor area. After > 13

227a
Appendix J
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page

Acmat Corporation v. School District of Philadelphia,
No. 85-7067, Slip. Op. (E.D. Pa.

DIE BR Gbbobeeseccsseccecs 3
Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) ......... 6
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986). ....... 5
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) ......0.0040s 5
Coatesville Contractors & Engineers, Inc. v. Borough

of Ridley Park, 506 A.24 $62 (1986) .......... 2,12
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. General

Asphalt Paving Co., 46 Pa. Commw. Ct.

114,405 A.24 1138 (1979) 2... eee eee oo
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). ......... 2
First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities

cS TL Tee 6
John F. Harkins Co., Inc. v. School District of

Philadelphia, 313 Pa. Super. Ct. 425,

A 1, 10, 12
Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. Lid. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. $74 (1986) ......000000. 5,6

Mellon Bank, NA. v. Aetna Business Credit,
Inc., 619 F.2d 1001 (3rd Cir. 1980) 2... .....004Gs y

228a

Appendix J
Nether Providence Township School Authority

vy. thomas M. Durkin & Sons, Inc., 305

Pa. 42,476 A.24904 (1984) 0. eens 3
Ozark Dam Constructors v. U.S., 127 F.

Supp 187 (Ct. CL. 1955) 2. cece eee une ase
Teodorl v. Penn Hills Schcol District Authority,

413 Pa. 127, 196 A.24 306 (1964) 2. eae 1,9, 10
US. Vv, Diebold, Inc., 39 US. 654, (1962) aw 6 be 4 @ 6-28 6
US. v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132 (1918) 60 cee 2
Commentary
P.LE. ConstitutionLaw $135 ....00 00 ccc eceeeeue 11
P.LE. Constitutional Law $181 ....0.00 66 cc eueuus 11
P.LE. Constitutional Law §272 . 0. cc eee 1,10
Vol. 2 Moore’s Manual, Federal Prac.

BOT cc cect be receceveeneereras 5
Statutes and Rules
Fed. RApp.R.3SQ) occ ccc ssccccccccccrees 2
P.S.COmM AMI, G1 occ cece ccc erreeeneas 10

Section 5-508 of the Pennsyivania Public School
Code of 1949,24P.S.§5-S0B 0. ccc eens 1,4

2298
Appendix J
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Plaintiff-Appeliant-Cross-Appeliee, Acmat Corporation
(“Acmat”) respectfully requests rehearing of the decision of a panel
of this Court affirming the District Court's order of summary
judgment dismissing the majority of Acmat's claims for breach of
4 construction contract and in permitting the
defendant-appelice-cross-appeliant, School District of
Philadelphia's (“School District”) to make the final determination
of the amour of damages to which Acmat was entitied. The appeai
also concerns reversible errors made st trial. Pwrther, petitioner
requests that this case be reheard in banc.

Rehearing should be granted because the appendix on appeal
Cleatly shows the existence of genuine issues of material fact
precluding summary judgment and that the District Court
improperly resolved disputed issues of fact in arriving at its decision.
Moreover, the interpretation given Section 5-50% of the
Pennsylvania Public School Code of 1949, 24 P.S. §5-508 and
Article 14 of the contract’ deprived Acmat of due process of law in
contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and the relevant provisions of the Penneyivanis
Constitution. P.L.E, Constitutional Law §272. Further, the Court's
decision in this diversity action contravenes principles of
Pennsylvania lew as enunciated in decisions such as Teodori v. Penn
Hills School District Authority, 413 Pa. 127, 196 A.24 306 (1964)
(allowing damages for differing site conditions
School Code Section 3-308), John F. Harkins Co., Ine. ¥. School
District of Philadelphia, 313 Pa. Super, Ct. 425, (1) 460 A.24 260

i Three separate contracts are in issue. For ease of reference, citations to the
contracts cor: sepond with sections in the Rush agreement that appears in the
appendix at page 21974.

2308
Appendix J

(1983) (allowing the contractor to prove actual additional damages
despite contractual language making the School District the “final
afbiver” of costs for addidonal work) and Coatesville Contractors
& Engineers, ine. v. Borough of Ridley Park, 506 A.24 $62 (1986)
(allowing a contractor damages for delay to the projéeci, despite
exculpatory contract language purportedly precluding such relief),
ali in violation of the mandates set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Erie &. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) and
ite progeny. The panel’s decision is also at odds with the Supreme
Court's decision in U 8, v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 137 (1918), which
rejected the notion that a bare site ifepection clause could exculpate
the Government from responsibility for issuing proper contract
documents.

This case should be reheard in baric because the panel decision
deviates from well setiled Pennsylvania precedem afd the issues
involved are of exceptional ifportance to the entite construction
industry performing work for the Commonwealth of Penrisylv ania
and its political subdivisions. Fed. R. App. P. 35(a). If the District
Court's decision is allowed to stand, contractors will be denied
recovery for differing site conditions, despite the preserice of
contractual representations providing squitable adjustment therefor,
a6 well as, for breaches of contract. It is of great importance that
this precedent not be pertnitied to remain law if this Cirowit. If it
does, the construction industry doing business with the
Commonwealth of Penrisylv ania will be faced with the necessity of
either fot bidding Commonwealth projects or inclucing huge
contingencies in theif bids to cover such whanticipated costs
resulting in higher overall costs to the Commonwealth. This would
represent a giant step backwards (2) i the evotution of construction

2318
Appendia J
Contract law in the United Siaies and the Commonwealth of
‘te .

Significantly, the District Court’ s interpretation of Section 5-508
of the Pennisylvania School Code effectively cloaks the School
Distfiet with imitienity from suit for ite breaches of contract and
constitutes af improper judicial usurpation of legislative authority.
Contrary 16 the Distriet Court's riling, Section §-508 was fot
enacted for the purpose of precluding the award of just
compensation to contractors who incur additional costs and damages

a6 & result of differing sité conditions, delays and breaches of
contract by the Scheel District.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Proceedings in the District Court

in 1984 Aemat and the School District entered into separate
contracts for asbestos abatement in tires schoo! buildings in the City
of Philadetptia. This action was browght to recover Uarages thet
were sustained of account of differing site conditions materially
differemt from these reflected im the plato and specifications,
breaches of contract by the School District, delays caused by the
School Distfiet and additional compensation for work unilaterally
ordered by the Schoot District. The Distriet Court (Giles, J.) by
order dated Deceniber 21, 1988, granted partial sernmiary judgment
to the Seisel District. Aemat Corporation ¥. School District af
Philadelphia, Ne. 85-7067 , Sip Op. (B.D. Pa. December 21, 1988).

The District Court, relying on Nether Providence Township
School Authority v. Thomas M. Durkin & Sons, iné., $05 Pa. 42,476
A.24 904 (1984), Gisthissed the majority of the breach of contract
claims based wpon the absence of Schoo! Board approval ss de fined

232a
Appendix J

[3] in Section 5-508 of the Pennsylvania School Code and also its
interpretation of Article 14 of the contract.

The claims based on quantum meruit and equitable adjustment
were also dismissed because of the absence of School Board
approval.

The claims for differing site conditions were dismissed because
of the District Court’s interpretation that changes in the scope of
work and price required School Board approval. Moreover, the
District Court found as fact that Acmat was obligated to perform a
reasonable site inspection prior to bidding the work and that Acmat’s
inspection was unreasonable.

Other claims asserted by Acmat were allowed by the District
Court. However, the Court relying on certain contract language,
restricted compensation for these claims to that amount unilaterally
determined by the School District, and further held that “..., the
claims for time and material costs are not subject to judicial review.”
(120a)

The claims for delay damages were dismissed by the District
Court based upon certain purported exculpatory contract language.

Accordingly, the District Court’s order was based primarily on
its misinterpretation of applicable Pennsylvania law and the
erroneous construction of an agreement that was patently ambiguous
and required interpretation by the jury. The District Court made
factual determinations of disputed material issues of fact and held
that Acmat’s claims were subject to summary dismissal.

The District Court ignored the State Court precedents cited,
supra, which would have allowed Acmat recovery of its [4] damages
and a motion to reargue was filed by Acmat. This too was denied.

233a
Appendix J
The School District’s counterclaim was tried to a jury and the

case culminated in an amended Final Judgment dated October 24,
1989.

B. Proceedings Before This Court

Acmat filed a Notice of Appeal in October 1989 and the School
District cross-appealed. The appeals were argued before Judges
Sloviter, Nygaard and Aldisert on May 21, 1990. A Per Curiam
Judgment Order affirming the judgment of the District Court was
entered on May 23, 1990.

ARGUMENT

I. THE RECORD BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT AND
THE PANEL DEMONSTRATED THAT DISPUTED ISSUES
OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTED AND REQUIRED
DENIAL OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
FAVOR OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT.

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Vol 2 Moore’s Manual, Federal Prac. & Pro.

$17.10. In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, any doubt
over whether there is a genuine issue of material fact must be

resolved in favor of the non-moving party. In determining whether
a genuine factual issue exists, the judge’s “function is not himself
(sic) to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but
to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317 (1986); Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. Lid. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The moving party retains the
burden of first showing the absence of a genuine issue of material

23a
Appendix J

fact. Celotex, supra. If, in a plausible case, [5S] the non-moving party
produces sufficient evidence of disagreement, then the motion for
summary judgment must be denied. Matsushita, supra, citing First
National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253. And,
of course, the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must
be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion. Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), quoting
United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).

In the instant case, a critical issue of fact decided by the District
Court on summary judgment was that Acmat did not conduct a
reasonable pre-bid site investigation. This was clear error on the
part of the District Court since the question of whether Acmat
performed a reasonable site investigation could only be determined
by what a reasonable contractor should have done under the
circumstances presented. Clearly, a question for the jury. Acmat’s
alleged failure to conduct a reasonable pre-bid site investigation was
cited as an additional ground for denial of the claim asserted under
the Differing Site Condition Clause of Article 14(c). The record
before the District Court at the time summary judgment was granted
showed that genuine issues of material fact existed. There were
literally hundreds of pages of documents attached to the answer to
the motion for summary judgment (156a-334a),” as well as, a
detailed statement itemizing and substantiating 56 separate claims
with several volumes of supporting exhibits. (346a-84 1a). An index
of the work items and the related exhibits appears at pages
487a-49 1a of the appendix. These documents were not mentioned
_in the District Court’s order. [6] The documents show that the
School District was on notice of the differing site conditions and

2 Numbers in parenthesis represent pages in the Appendix on Appeal. Number:
with the prefix SA refer tw the Supplemental Appendix.

235a
Appendix J

ordered that the additional work be performed. The asbestos
overspray condition encountered at the Rush School is one exampie.
(641a-644a) Although the School District later maintained that the
asbestos overspray was not a differing site condition, it agreed to
pay for overspray in ceiling fixtures on a time and material basis in
a memorandum dated November 6, 1984. (516a) See also, page
622a. Ina contemporaneous letter dated December 27, 1984, Acmat
wrote:

ACMAT maintains the position that overspray on this
project far exceeds anything that could have been
considered by any bidder on the project and
consequently is extra to the contract and must be paid
as a change order. (654a)

On reargument, the affidavits of Eugene Lord (897a) and
Frederick F. Dalton (906a) further established that the overspray was
a differing site condition when they stated that no reasonable pre-bid
inspection would have revealed the extensive overspray ultimately
discovered at the Rush School. Moreover, even the School District
and its team of consultants were unaware of the overspray condition.

Thus, Acmat did show that it conducted a reasonabi- site
inspection, but that it did not detect the differing site conditions.
Moreover, the District Court incorrectly construed the site
inspection clause as abrogating the clause mandating equitable
compensation for differing site conditions. The panel’s decision
must be reheard, preferably in banc, because it deviates from well
settled principies of construction law and will have a deleterious
effect on the entire construction industry doing business with the
"School District in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Differing
site condition clauses are designed to reduce the Commonwealth's

236a
Appendix J
expenditures for construction since such conditions are seldom [7]
encountered. The panel’s decision will return matters to the time
when the Commonwealth paid excessive sums for construction

because the contractor absorbed the costs for all hidden conditions
at the work site.

Other claims involving differing site conditions are as follows
and were categorized at page SA613 in the Memorandum of Law in
Support of Reargument.

Rush 2, 3,4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 20,
23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29.

Lincoln 3
Fairhill 2,3and 10

Many of the differing site conditions claims involve differences
between the first and second floors of the Rush School. The first

floor was added by Supplemental Agreement and there was no time
to conduct an inspection. The Nozko affidavit at page 880a and the

contemporaneous writing at page 608a show this to be the case.
Accordingly, there was more than sufficient evidence before the
District Court to deny the motion for summary judgment. Indeed,
in view of the overwhelming factual evidence presented by Acmat
in opposition to the motion, it is apparent that the District Court’s
order is predominantly the result of the District Court’s
misapplication of Pennsylvania law.

237a
Appendix J
I. THE DISTRICT COURT MISCONSTRUED THE
CONTRACT AND WRONGFULLY INTERPRETED

AMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE THAT CREATED
A JURY QUESTION

Many of the ambiguous provisions of the contract were factually
resolved against Acmat by the District Court. For example, contrary
to the District Court’s finding, the site inspection clauses of
paragraph 7 of the General Conditions (2242a) and in Article SC-07
of the Special Conditions (2271a) simply do not require the type of
exhaustive inspection imposed by the District Court. Similarly, the
District Court’s construction of [8] Article 14(c), as requiring School
Board approval is nowhere to be found in its express language. The
District Court reached for language from an unrelated portion of
Article 14(a) which governs School District directed extra work to
justify its decision.

In affirming the summary judgment order, the panel did not
follow the standard enunciated by this Court in Mellon Bank, NA.
v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc.,619 F.2d 1C91, 1011 (3rd Cir. 1980):

It is the role of the judge to consider the words of the
contract, the alternative meaning suggested by
counsel, and the nature of the objective evidence to be
offered in support of that meaning. The trial judge
must then determine if a full evidentiary hearing is
warramted. If a reasonable altemative interpretation
is suggested, even though it may be alien to the judge’s
linguistic experience, objective evidence in support of
that interpretation should be considered by the fact
finder. See Corbin, Contracts §542. (Emphasis in
original)

238a
Appendix J

Moreover, the District Court’s decision, as affirmed by the panel,
improperly merged the language of the changes clause in Article
14(a) with the differing site condition clause of Article 14(c). It is
squarely at odds with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision
in Teodori v. Penn Hills School District Authority, 413 Pa. 127, 196
A.2d 306, 309 (1964), in which the following was stated:

Authority next argues that the contract between the
parties provided no agreement to pay for extra work
in the amount claimed by Teodori. This contention is
based upon the “Changes and Alterations” section of
the contract, which clearly provides that such
“changes and alterations” be made by written order.
This argument completely ignores the section of the
contract dealing with “Conditions Differing From
those Shown on Plans or Indicated In Specifications”,
set forth in, full above. The parties obviously
contemplated the possibility of the exact type of
contingency which arose, and provided for it in the
contract.

We agree pith the conclusion of the Court below, that
Teodori’s right to extra [9] compensation, if any, is
governed by the “differing conditions” clause, and
not by the “changes and alterations” clause, the extra
compensation not being sought for “changes” and/or
“altemations” as those terms were used in the contract.
(Emphasis supplied).

Neither the District Court nor the panel addressed the Teodori
decision. The differing site condition clause, as interpreted by the
Teodori Court, has been at the heart cf the Government’s efforts to

239a
Appendix J
reduce construction costs. If this decision is allowed to stand, it will

most certainly cause a sharp increase in the amounts bid on
government construction work in the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania.

IIL MAKING THE SCHOOL DISTRICT’S
DETERMINATION OF NET COSTS FINAL AND NOT
SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW VIOLATES THE
GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS AND IS CONTRARY
TO PENNSYLVANIA LAW AS SET FORTH IN JOHN F.
HARKINS CO., INC. V. st satan apa
OF PHILADELPHIA’

Article 14(b) of the contract sets forth alternative formulas for
calculating adjustments to the contract price on account of
unilaterally directed work and work made necessary by differing site
conditions. It concludes with language making the School District
the final arbiter as to what Acmat’s costs were on any particular item
of work.

The District Court literally construed the clause as written and
deprived Acmat of any judicial review of the School District's
inadequate and patently erroneous determination of Acmat’s costs.
This finding was clearly contrary to the guarantees of due process
found in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and the relevant provisions of the Pennsylvania
Constitution. See P.S. Const. Art. 1, §1; PLE. Constitutional Law
§272. Acmat had no hearing of any kind, as the School District
arbitrarily assigned amounts to Acmat’s claims and simply denied
[10] others. Consequently, the impossible situation where one party

3 313 Pa. Super. Ct. 425, 460 A.24 260

240a
Appendix J

to a contract adjudicated the merits of the other parties’ claim was
sanctioned by the panel.

In P.LE. Constitutional Law $135, the following appears in
pertinent part:

It is provided, in the Declaration of Rights contained
in our Constitution, that “All courts shall be open; and
every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods,
person or reputation shall have remedy by due course
of law, and right and justice administered without sale,
denial or delay. Suits may be brougit against the
Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in
such cases as the Legislature may by law direct.

Sec also, P.LE. Constitutional Law §181.

Indved, the Pennsylvania Superior Court expressly rejected the
idea ‘hat the subject contractual language would make the School
District’s determination final and binding in John F. Harkins Co.,
Inc. v. School District of Philadelphia, 313 Pa. Super. Ct. 425, 460
A.24 260 (1983).

The Court held the following:

In the first place, the school district was to be the final
arbiter of the contractor’s net cost. Pursuant to the
provisions of the contract, it made a determination of
appellee’s net increase in the cost of labor and made
paymem accordingly. The burden of proving by a fair
preponderance of the evidence that additional
damages had been incurred was on the contractor.
John F. Harkins, supra at page 265. Emphasis
supplied.

imerference by the owner with the contractor's work.
OF (2) there is 2 failure on the pant of the owner to act
in some essential matter necessary in the prosecution
of the work. Gasparini Excavating Co. v.

4 $06 4.24962.

VAs
Appendix J

PennsylvaniaTurnpike Commission, 409 P.465,187
A.24 137 (1963), ... “(Wihere an owner by an
unwarranted positive act interferes with the execution
of a contract, or where the owner unreasonably
neglects to perform an essential element of the work
in furtherance thereof, to the detriment of the
contractor, (the owner] will be liable for damages
resulting therefrom.” Henry Shenk Company v. Erie
County, 319 Pa. 100, 178 A. 662 (1935)

See ais0, Commonwealth of Pennsytvaxia v. General Aspnalt
Paving Co., 46 Pa. Commw. Ct. 114, 405 A246 1138 (1979).

Clearly, a factual determination was required prior to a ruling by
the Court. it is submitted that the record before the District Court
was more than sufficient to permit the issue of delays to go to the
jury. The School District, in numerous instances, actively imerfered
with the work or failed to act in some essential manner. (12)

Delays caused by wnanticipated changes at the job site are
certainty compensatie. In addition, the School District’s breaches,
including unreasonable inspection requiremems and delays in
inspection ail impacted on the progress of the job and constituted
active interference. Other examples include the loss of elevator
service and loss of efficiency because of the School District's failure
to heat the building during the wimter season.

Indeed, the principle that prohibics an owner from interfering with
& contractor's work is so strong that a clause shectving the owner
from responsibility for delays due to its negligence will rarely be
upheld. Ozark Dam Constructors v. U.5., 127 F. Supp. 187, 190,
191, (Cx. C1. 1955).

3a
Appendix J

Surely, such acts as the School District's failure to heat the Rusti
School, to allow pipes to bursi and flood the building constitute the

types of conduct that are compensable.

Accordingly, the School District cannot exculpate itself from
liability for delays under the circumsiances of this case. The
question of compensation for delays should have gone to the jury.
The panet’ s affirmance of the District Court's order was contrary to

Pennsyivanis law,

V. THE SCHOOL DISTRICT IS NOT IMMUNE FROM
DAMAGES FOR COMMON LAW BREACH OF
CONTRACT

Acmat asseried, and the record before the District Court
established, that the School District had breached the contracts in
several respects. The School District wnreasonably interfered with
construction by failing to heat the premises, allowing the elevator to
stop functioning, conducting improper inspections and
reinspections, conducting late inspections and issuing defective
plans and specifications. Kt is clear thai an owner May hot impede
the progress of 4 contractor, Yet thai is precisely what the School
District did when i ordered the Cleaning of closets and (13) rails a
the Rush School after the area was fully cleaned. As 4 consequence,
the endre floor became recontaminated and had to be recleaned at
great additional expense and time. The failure to heat the building
caused flooding and additional cleaning. School personnel
Contaminated restricted areas by entering them without taking
appropriate precautions. Clearly, the School District impeded
progress and interfered with the planned sequence of work at the
project.

2448
Appendix J

These and other breaches committed by the Schoo! District
clearly entitle Acmat to compensation. Ne provision of the contract
is designed 16 deal with thess citcunistances and Acriat’s only
fecOurss IS to thé courts. However, the District Court's decision, as
af” tned by the panel, closed this avenue to Actiat and left it once
again a the mercy of the School District. Hf sowed to stand, the
Circuit Cowrt will have ivbued the School District with the type of
immunity that the legislatere has refrained from enacting into law.

Construction contractors sid others who contract with the
6 moth ‘detache naibdid miintdons ust
he able to rely on principtes of stare decisis and the interpretation
afforded contract langwage in their contractucl and conmmerciai
dealings. Contractors sech as Acmat need to know with reasonable
certainty the legal effect of they actors before entering into
contractadl arrangements. The decision of the Distct Court
retroactively altered the legal effect of contractwal terms and totally
frustrated the legitimate expectations of Acriat who mevery Respect.
fehed on prevailing lew in its dealings with the Schoo! District. [14]

For the foregoing masons, it is respectfally sequested fhat this
pane! rehear the appeal or that the Court hear the appeal in banc.
Dated: June $, 1990

675 Thind Avenue
New York, New York 10017
(212) 949-0555

45a
Appendix J
Ot —_—_—_——
Gerddord

Ray
Thereby certify that | am a member of fhe bar of the United States
Court of Appeais for the Third Cireutt.
Ee
Ray Goddard

STATEMENT OF COUNSEL

l express a belief, based on a reasoned and studied professional
jodgmient, that fic panel decision is contrary to decisions of
Pennsylvania Cowrts, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit or the Supreme Court of the United States, and that
consideration by the fell court is necessary fo secure and maintain
uniformity of decisions, to-wit, die panel's decision is coivtrary to
the decisions in US. v. Spearin, 748 US. 132 (1918), Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 742 (1986); Calotet v. Catratt, 477 US.
317 (1986), Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. Lid. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 974 (1986), Mellon Bark, NA. v. Aétha Business
Crédit, Iné., 18 F24 1001 Grd Cit. 1980), Teodori v. Penn Hills
Schook District Authority, 443 Pa. 127, 196 A.24 386 (1964), Jonn
P.. Harlans €o0., Ine. v. School District of Philadelphia, 313 Pa.
Super. C425, 460 A.24 260 (1989) and Coatesville Contractors &
Engineers, Ine. v. Borough of Ridléy Park, $08 A.24 862 (1986).

Moreover, this appeal involves a question of exceptionel
importance im that enforcement of fhe contract im the manner
sanctioned by the pane! will impact on aff contractors doing business
with the School District anc will result i higher construction costs
to the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions.

Signature (Ray Goddars)

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385020_2864%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
