# Opposition Brief — Coughlin v. Benjamin > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385020_2688%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Opposition Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1990 - **Citation:** 498 U.S. 951 ## Text ¥ x aes al In The % Rasy “\4 BUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES SSR. ; ‘ Ny Commissioner, New York State Depé ry STEPHEN DALSHEIM, Superintender ‘a EUGENE S. LeFEVRE,. Superint ar and HAROLD SMITH, Super ints “aga ‘nst- ROL DUNKLEY, I RANK FORREST, BARRINGROH MARTIN SPENCE, on behalf of ot} Streco Renee x. “2 - : . ~ of 3). £9 ae ; ears ge ober TO THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF : ‘STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND ¢ id C2 ae on : RO! RI SELCOV (Counsel of STE HEN LATIMER nes DAViD C. LEVEN Pris; a eo. New “York ES - 3 2 Catharine Street - eee on Poughkeepsie, New York 1260: Ts, (914) 473-3810 Fee wi fie 2 SNe Attorneys for Respondents BEST AVAILABLE COP TABLE OF CONTENTS SABLE OF AUTHORITIES « «66s sew QUESTIONS PRESENTED..........-. STALE. OF THe CASE ss sé 6% ess A. The Religious Belief. B. Procedural History... Gs pipet HE oh. 6 A Ae ore ae Ds The Decisions Below... ARGUMENT POINT I THE COURTS BELOW I} THE DOCTRINE OF IS POINT II THE SECOND CIRCUIT APPLIES THIS COURT EVIDENCE IN THE RE: CONFLICT WITH DECI CIRCUITS A The Second Cl followed the analVS1Gs FR ih e ey nabaZ ad Anac — Ww aces |! eee ee ee ee . . _ u@ a . - i. ie 1 i " 4 r > rt - . = - ~ ‘ + ad > + + . . 4 > . G-r4 C - c £ 4 «re ‘ ‘ ; 74 : 4 r = ret§tVri mw \ ’ ) ’ Tw mM 4+ " rs nae 4 J » we > > ‘ > wu wt, “ vy 4 a ‘ I , “ > O&QOh ®@ . “ -~ - . 5 > M4 . 4 ‘ ~ . > pda O & > a 0 W J; Owes j c / qos v onl 4 . rt a _ ‘ a - > — : . + a a i. a ‘ e a m 5 c vi J ; l v a | ot . 3 TI - +e Cc -rd qQ) a > = . A f r ad rt > ’ bh. | 4 ‘ ‘ ~ +? A . + . * - 3 D> 3 c f ‘ ¢ ft wv) - 4 4, © 4 = . > 4 ° ie) ~ mae Y “ > ’ a 4 Q ry ‘ a a Me cs - wt € (x ¢ i ‘ 4 4 “ ©; 4 om > a hy , 4 Ds > ; tf £ ba “ a . - os a = a et ) 4 ; P| 4 + 7 © ti ae " . 71 4 YW it f Ad f “ ad rt © x ‘ f Cc & ; ’ c YW + » — a or + ha ‘ : ‘ + ‘ UY) b. ‘ “ aa anes . - ‘ 4 “4 4 4 : > + J . © mH > 4 » “ . Aa. | UU ‘ » b. > yY OW ef +4 , r 4 2 Y t . o A ow ‘ “a + * oe ey + + « 4 + 4 > @ at _ £ rv) <> + - b + ck Ss ’ SQ + ? . + 4 4 s fc - + uv . = A 4ha @ 4 ; E =H a G ° YU} © © +4 y+ " r + A " . © -— id + = ‘ + “ ‘ TY a4 f | > f i : 4 hy 4/7 -rt) 4 ) bide al . - - ae 7 - ‘ 0 Q A« oe 4 > 4 r + asim @ | io + > } 1 > " 4 4 4s ‘ i ' ~ + + QW a aa 4 - ' e n . | a U b 4 Oo + 4 4 i 4 : rei ik 4 pad 4 n 7 } - ‘ ‘ j O hk al 7 - - -_ r ; 2. > J , 4 D bts a rn = ‘ C my Y { 4 , > ba ! +/ ° a ort = 4) 0 cc}v @ - J f f ' c a) - J 7 . « ' J + \4 c §£ c - n 4 4 4 4 rt VV - J . r 4 Vi oY Vi J] + 4 Ski eA hy 4 i ~ i G4 3 @ Cc ~ ‘ea « ; } a 4 / 4 - | | 4 j “~ Ios @ 4 + 4 {2 | 41 @ pai YU) P . a , ay en + > ' nae ~ va A - a . > ’ ' ° ~ 44 7” : Ait OjViT 4 { i ‘ | ‘ S LU J tax years. For that reason the present case is closer to Monta- 3. At p. 7 of the petition, DOCS purports to quote the statement of the law from Sunnen. That quote is truncated and taken out of context. A full reading shows that it concerns tax liability, and is concerned with preventing tax inequity among similarly situat- ed taxpayers. For instance, they quote the Court as saying: The principle of collateral estoppel...is designed to prevent repetitious lawsuits over matters which have...remained substantially static, factually and legally. It is not meant to create vested rights in decisions that have become obsolete or erroneous... while the Court actually said: But a subsequent mcdification of the signifi- cant facts or a change or development in the controlling legal principles may make that de termination obsolete or erroneous, at least for future purposes. If such a determination is then perpetuated each succeeding year as to the taxpayer involved in the original litigation, he is accorded a tax treatment different from that given to other taxpayers of the same class. As a result, there are inequalities in the administration of the revenue laws, dis- Ccriminatory distinctions in tax liability, and a fertile basis for litigious confusion. Compare United States v. Stone & D. Co., 274 U.S. 225, 235-236. Such consequences, however, are neither necessitated nor justified by the principle of collateral estoppel. That princi- ple is designed to prevent repetitious lawsuits over matters which have once been decided and which have remained substantially static, factually and legally. It is not meant to create vested rights in decisions that have become obsolete or erroneous with time, thereby causing inequities among taxpayers. To apply issue preclusion here will not provide "a fertile basis for litigation confusion" but will grant uniform treatment of all persons who have beliefs similar to plaintiffs. 9 | : ; . . y vw “+ = a. ‘ - = ‘ ; + . : ct » 4 me : ‘ : —/) wy & infavy ral ‘ > aat -f+ayna oy» " , . ’ ‘ -ha ¢ mre : tringent standard than Safley/Shabazz. Those decisions would > bearing on the court's decision. Petitioners here argue that the New York Court of Ap- tatement that "whichever test ["least restrictive" or ated response") is adopted, on this record the regulation plaintiff needlessly infringes on his beliefs, and tand", 68 N.Y.2d at 925, is dicta as concerns the exag- sponse test, and was not essential to the decision. t Say, issue preclusion does not apply. But, the As the Seventh Circuit said in Schellong v. 65 ir. 1986):"...a judgment which is ernative yrounds is an effective adjudication as to aterally conclusive as to both." citing Irving Law ] F.2a 2] ie 2a Cir 1926), See also 1B the Lewis irt's holding was not dicta. i Le he que lon under the more strict standard, whic -ion of the "least restric- est was dicta, because it was not necessary for t m of the case once the court found that under the exag- ated response test the haircut rule was unconstitutional. The New York Court of Appeals found that the same would support judgment for plaintiff under either stand- ard. If that evidence satisfied the exaggerated response test, it must of necessity satisfy the Safley/Shabazz test. POINT II THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S DECISION CAREFULLY APPLIES THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS TO THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD. THERE IS NO CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS FROM OTHER CIRCUITS. Petit ymnner's argue that the onstitutiona lissues should be reviewed by this Court for two reasons First, the state that the Second Circuit failed t follow the appropriate analysis, as set forth in the Safley and Shabazz decisions. Petitioners also claim that the Circuit Court's spinion in ti! case is inconsistent with decisions rendered by other Circuit COUTTS. Neither argument istifies petitioners' r 1 that this case is wortt »f the irt's review A The se : Ciz 1t rrectly f wed the afle abarz 2 p analysis a Under afley/Shabazz, the court must weigh four fact S when deciding whether prison policies are unconstitutional. These are: (1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between the regulation and a legitimate governmental interest; (2) any alternative means available to the prisoners for exercis- ing the right; (3) the impact accommodation of the right will have on guards, other inmates and prison resources generally; ana 4) the existence of any ready alternatives for accommodating the right while still satisfying the government's interests. In its opinion, the Second Circuit noted that its analysis was controlled by the standard set forth in Safley and abazz. The court listed all four factors identified in Safley, and applied them throughout its opinion, including those portions t that are not subject ¢t the instant petition (which dealt . + + + . +> na = = - — > S >| i1ard, peti ‘ + + sfaction awsawriaWvil ms + + + r 7 ad- aU ¢ weve the > nm € aADIEC > ir + + + ~ a a Y + + + + _- uF Licaiiy 4 . > > > . mo ~ > a esume LIA Lt ’ | T \ y > . , P ~-O +h +) i he wa J red. i ] mu I € rea nabileé : aSsumE cnat ne court 7 + bh rocrse ~ -~ - ~ cs ~~ Ca ‘ ~}, Kaeo + ee alten te Ww waa 1 Cwowe * bo © Llic SeUVliUu wad ey ona AZZ La —~-Ul , hehe ; -orrn + it7rOD mo no ry + yvorrrir. a Ine ale > - aaka Y > a ian ho -C ~~) +h = + aiternative means or exercisil j tne rignt, petitioners arg cnat — 2 a MAK aly. + rAnaAr alex Anlb 3 SANA Ok - — + + ¢ cn Second Circul erroneously looked eyond the bare fac f ) grh +her +he - c r y ere er ‘ > . take a rnra - 9 eo Tne Y wnevne! cne pris e 7 Were lea id rig pra ] Cnel re yJior However sfley and sha? red re a ba sY ale} . j 2 4 many riterila anad the extent f the deprivat r sf lid be a r _+ ‘ + “av = + } . + : ‘ + . £ . T ' t + . W + ‘ i eT ; -_ . Ta ot e¢ , + n . é —* Pe > ’ 5 - ’ ¢ > 4 € 2 ‘ T ¢ y ‘ T ' ‘ ’ ree aT "exryacageravrte a: ‘ rT r er’ I a > . —— - — +> ™ ~ + + “A t e i i, a re \ t were ing fac able to prove that the alternative procedure of photograph- the prisoner with his hair pulled tightly back, away from his , was adequate to satisfy petitioners' professed need. Such otograph is as useful as one taken after a haircut in reveal- the personal features that are useful in identifying fugi- ¢ t er I rrectly rgue that the Circuit Court t é pr f them They rely solely on a state- that te that petitioners' arguments about f the alt tive | tographs had been rejected t w that the covrt shifted the f t cit ner any more than did this t t fley "We are aware of no place in W f testified that such ready C t f their se rity concerns." : t emonstrate the existence of t t rison officials will have to W t 11t it e { edure is not adequate. If they f t ebut t pris r's evidence, or do so in an ing anner, the irt will be justified in holding the _ eng procedure to be unconstitutional. However, this does mean that the prisoner does not bear the ultimate burden of that the regulation is not reasonabiy related to legiti- mate penological interests. Petitioners state that the courts below improperly rejected their criticism of the alternative photographing proce- dure because it was unrebutted. Apparently, petitioners would have the courts blindly defer to any expression of security concerns. This Court's decisions do not go that far. Although respondents did not call their own security expert, petitioners' witness was subjec + re ions wy + ~s t to cross-examlination. Many photographs were used during his testimony as he attempted to justify petitioners' policy. Respondents also introduced photographs that were shown to the witness, and which they be- lieve demonstrated to the courts below that the alternative procedure suggested by them was equa in utility to that pre- ferred by petitioners. Tne trial court was able t observe the witness as he testified, and it could properly find his testimony unconvincing. Furthermore, the court can rely on its own common sense in deciding the issues raised, afley at 98 The trier of fact should be allowed to weigh all of the evidence and reach a reasoned conclusion as to whether the petitioners have exaggerat- ed their response to security concerns. The decision in this case is not an example of a court's failing to follow the precedents of this Court. The Courts below were well aware of their duties under the Safley/Shabazz standards. They carefully applied the law to th 16 facts that were presented at trial. This case does not present any important legal question worthy of this court's review. sion below does not conflict with those from other Petitioners attempt to find a conflict with decisions from other circuits by pointing to cases where short hair regula- tions were upheld in the face of free exercise challenges. However, the cases petitioners rely on all involved markedly iifferent rules than that challenged here. The rules in those ses all prohibited prisoners from growing their hair beyond a ertain length during the term of their incarceration. The state nterests justifying the adoption of such rules vary considerably ivanced by petitioners to support their rule. Petitioners say that a haircut is needed to obtain a ture of what the prisoner looks like with short hair. Peti- the w the pris er to grow his hair to any length. ta é is if the prisoner escapes and cuts off his t avoid detection, they will need a picture that can be + identify him This is the only state interest put forward by peti- tioners. The decision below found that petitioners' interest could be fully protected using the alternative photographing procedure. This holding does not conflict with the decisions cited by petitioners because none of them considered the validity of this particular state interest. Conversely, the state inter- 17 , ‘ * oa ’ 4 4 (4 7 & > Cir. 19 , ’ ‘ ‘ nar oe, ¥ > port f ‘ t ss ~ > , + > identif making — Q ~ > he + ‘ . X ’ . 4 wv tin . vY r 2 immedi at rm ~ + + ; LUACi . ~ * , s | Ai) }- ‘ ‘ ‘ ould be ‘ ‘ : m t what type f photograpt an be used to identify é wt lo. not know him personally. fr there nflict | n this case and > > ~ - » > . _ ¥ ~~ ct ry ) 7) ii) | ct? ; ré re ré Lut I DY this Court. The ¥ ‘ . ‘ . ‘ = Ww } it . ly the applica- ‘ be ‘ — ‘ . = — oe The t . » , wa ‘ ’ ThHa®r -eel. ¢ ‘ t at 1€ r s ‘ + + he ¥ . ¢ ffer- ‘ . ac i+ _ CONCLUSION THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED. Dated: September 28, 1990 20 Respectfully submitted, ROBERT SELCOV STEPHEN LATIMER DAVID C. LEVEN Prisoners' Legal Services of New York 2 Catharine Street Poughkeepsie, New York 12601 (914) 473=+3810 Attorneys for Respondents --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385020_2688%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.