# Opposition Brief — Dorris v. United States > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385020_2632%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Opposition Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1990 - **Citation:** 498 U.S. 1012 ## Text ome CUT tet ——pom ae ‘vt Lotenl fe] \ o — In the Supreme Court of the Cinites States OCTOBER TERM, 1990 JAMES K. DORRIS, PETITIONER Vv. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION KENNETH W. STARR Solicitor General SHIRLEY D. PETERSON Assistant Attorney General ROBERT E. LINDSAY ALAN HECHTKOPF YOEL TOBIN Attorneys Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530 (202) 514-2217 QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether the jury’s verdict was inconsistent and against the weight of the evidence. 2. Whether the district court improperly allowed the government to argue that petitioner’s church was a sham. 3. Whether the district court properly denied peti- tioner’s motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground of selective prosecution. 4. Whether petitioner’s prosecution on one count of the indictment was barred by the statute of limitations. 5. Whether one of the statutes governing the avail- ability of a charitable deduction on an individual tax return is unconstitutionally vague. _ 6. Whether testimony from an IRS agent concerning petitioner’s failure to produce records constituted reversi- ble error even though the court struck the testimony from the evidence at trial. 7. Whether the district court erred in charging the jury that statements made in petitioner’s amended tax returns were material as a matter of law. (I) TABLE OF CONTENTS se otc L5s gas nase kee 4 ieee eae IES a Ra Pe A eS ES Ge ee ee ng oes ld a ele bain Wie Ne RC ER rag ie ec ae EL ae ee rr ee IIS estes re a eka i eg Ge ts TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Davis v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2014 (1990) ..... Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) .............. Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932) ....... Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397 ee UN ye SOUL. eves nba deue ee ke ss Greer v. Miller, 423 U.S. 756 (1987) ............. Hall v. Commissioner, 729 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. ares. . MC ee ee ae ad aa Hansen v. Commissioner, 820 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. Eiger ae ee as ies oe win ace ee es Hernandez v. Commissioner, 109 S. Ct. 2136 ARIS ERRITRE SS SN Se tet Nn ee Mason v. General Brown Central School District, ee ae PD , cng ccc cwscnss cece Pollard v. Commissioner, 786 F.2d 1063 (11th Cir. ee ee ee os one oatea owned a Ng aera on ea sl i, eg United States v. Bassford, 812 F.2d 16 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1022 (1987) ............. United States v. Daly, 756 F.2d 1076 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1022 (1985) ............. United States v. Fawaz, 881 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. NE ea Ee ane mas Eas United States v. Graham, 758 F.2d 879 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 901 (1985) .............. (lil) IV Cases — Continued: Page United States v. Greenwood, 796 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. EC eas > had se oe aan deo a te ee 8 United States v. Lane, 883 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 872 (1990) ....... 13 United States v. Marabelles, 724 ¥.2d 1374 (9th Fee ERAN Ee et cae a A area 2 gh 5 United States v. Peister, 631 F.2d 658 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126(1981)....... 7 United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976) ... 6 United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984) ....... 4 United States v. Samara, 643 ¥.2d 701 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 829(1981).............. 9, 10 United States v. Walsh, 627 F.2d 88 (7th Cir. PE AS Re ete pie aoe AY 4, 6 Virgin Islands v. Harrigan, 791 F.2d 34 (3d Cir. PR ee ee Fen Pe 8 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) ...... a] Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const.: ET eg ge eae ag ae ca tia oa nk as 6,7 Amend. V (Due Process Clause) ............ 12 Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.): bee EGR Sn ae anne a eR 10 Ore 1 I oe oa ha po os Ee oe 10 I 5009.6 i vido hEK dad ena he 10 ET s G23 sx odes 0 65 Ak ORR ) SOME S05 400 ss40.504 444040 e cso uaeaeee > 9 Jn the Supreme Court of the Cinited States OCTOBER TERM, 1990 No. 90-246 JAMES K. DorRRIS, PETITIONER Vv, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 10 THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION OPINION BELOW The judgment order of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 3a-5a) is unpublished, but the judgment is noted at 902 F.2d 1567 (Table). JURISDICTION The judgment of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 3a-5a) was entered on April 10, 1990. A petition for rehearing was denied on May 7, 1990. Pet. App. la-2a. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on August 6, 1990 (a Mon- day). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). (1) 2 STATEMENT Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, petitione: was convicted on three counts of willfully making false state- ments on amended joint income tax returns filed for the 1981, 1982, and 1983 calendar years, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7206(1). C.A. App. 9a, 14a-16a. He was acquitted of willfully making false statements on the original 1982 and 1983 income tax returns, and his wife was acquitted on all counts. Govt. C.A. Br. 6, 8; C.A. App. 9a. Peti- tioner was sentenced to 90 days’ imprisonment, three years’ probation, and a $9,000 fine. Pet. App. 6a-7a. 1. Petitioner and his wife filed joint income tax returns for the years 1979 through 1983. C.A. App. 175a-177a. They also filed amended returns for 1981, 1982, and 1983, which claimed charitable contributions to the Universal Life Church (ULC) in the amounts of $14,034, $11,400, and $11,050, respectively. C.A. App. l4a, 15a, 16a, 185a-189a, 191a-198a. The claimed contri- butions resulted in substantial reductions of the Dorrises’ tax liability. C.A. App. 377a-379a. Each return included a written declaration that it was made under penalties of perjury. C.A. App. 18la-182a. Petitioner admitted that he had prepared the tax returns. C.A. App. 53la. Other than minor processing fees paid to ULC head- quarters, all of the funds claimed as contributions were deposited into the bank accounts of a ULC branch church that the Dorrises established in their home. C.A. App. 277a-278a, 362a-364a. The Dorrises controlled the church bank accounts, and they used money in the accounts to pay their personal expenses. C.A. App. 320a-340a, 343a-346a, 359a-36la, 366a-372a.' Petitioner admitted ' Petitioner and his wife served as two of the church's three board members; the board was operated by majority rule. C.A. App. 542a, j that he had asked his wife to sign checks on the church ae- counts. C.A. App. 533a. Petitioner, who became a “minister” in the Universal Life Church after paying a $25 fee to ULC headquarters, was the “pastor” of his local church, while his wife served as treasurer. C.A. App. 277a, 287a-288a. Although peti- tioner claimed that all members of ULC churches every- where were members of his church, the only members of his local church that he identified were himself, his wife, and those who served as the third member of the church's board. C.A. App. 540a-54la. Petitioner and his wife joined a local Catholic church during the period in which they belonged to the ULC. C.A. App. 266a-267a; 270a. Kenneth Morris was one of a number of individuals who served for a period of time as the third board member. He testified, however, that he never attended any board meet- ings or church services. C.A. App. 217a-218a. Morris had established his own branch of the Universal Life Church, and he and petitioner engaged in “check swapping” by ex- changing checks totalling $1,000 to each other’s church so that they could document contributions for tax purposes. C.A. App. 221a-224a. Although the national Universal Life Church in Modesto, California, was granted status as a tax exempt organization in 1974, its tax exemption was revoked retro- actively in 1984. None of the churches operated by the Dorrises in their various residences was ever declared tax exempt. C.A. App. 238a-239a. 2. On appeal, petitioner raised ten claims of error. Pet. App. 3ja-4a. After considering those contentions, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court without opinion. 545a. A board resolution gave petitioner and his wife the power to sign checks on the church's account. C.A. App. 544a-545a. 4 ARGUMENT |. Petitioner first contends (Pet. 8-12) that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent and against the weight of the evi- dence. His argument is meritless. a. Petitioner argues that, becatise he claimed the samme charitable contributions on both the original and amended 1982 and 1983 returns, the jury’s verdicts that he was not guilty of filing false original returns but was guilty of filing false amended returns are inconsistent. Even if petitioner were correct that the verdicts are inconsistent, he would not be entitled to relief. It is well settled that a defendant cannot attack a jury verdict of guilty on one count becatise it appears to be inconsistent with an acquittal on another cout. United States ¥. Powell, 469 US. 57 (1984); Dinn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932). in any event, there is no inconsistency. Petitioner filed the amended returns after he was inter- viewed in the summer of 1984 by two IRS special agents. At the interview, he was advised that a criminal investiga- tion was being conducted. C.A. App. 275a-277a. In re- sponse to questions, petitioner falsely asserted that the contributions he claimed on his returns had been made to ULC headquarters in Modesto, California. C.A. App. 279a. The jury could have believed that petitioner had not acted willfully in filing the false original returns, but that his awareness of the criminal itivestigation and his act of lying to IRS agents established that he did act willfully in filing the false amended returns. See United States v. Walsh, 627 F.2d 88, 92 (7th Cir. 1980). b. Petitioner also contends that the evidence was in- sufficient to convict him. “Sufficiency-of-the-evidence review involves assessment by the courts ‘of whether the evidence adduced at trial could support any tational deter- mination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. at 67. 5 The evidence against petitioner was clearly sufficient. The elements of filing a false return tinder 26 U.S.C. 7206(1) ate: (1) the defendant made and subscribed a returti that was incorrect as to a material matter; (2) the return cotitaitied a written declaration that it was tnade under penalty of perjury; (3) the defendant did not believe ihe return to be true anid ecortect as to every material mat- ier; anid (4) the defendant falsely subscribed the return willfully. See United States v. Marabelles, 724 F.2d 1374, 1380 (9th Cir. 1984). Of the four elements, petitioner does not dispute that the second elemetit was satisfied. The evidence showed that the returiis at isstie were inaterially incorrect. The law is cleat that 4 person may not claim a charitable deduction for a gift over which he tre- tains control (see Hansen v. Commissioner, 820 F.2d 1464, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987)), and there was substantial evi- dence that petitioner and his wife controlled the accounts of the church to which they “contributed.” Moreover, the claimed charitable deductions affected the computation of the Dorrises’ tax liability. See United States v. Graham, 758 F.2d 879, 886 1.5 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 901 (1985). Therefore, petitioners’ returns were incorrect as to a material matter. The government also proved that petitioner knew that the returns were false. Except for minor processing fees, the “contributions” off which the deductions were based had been made to the branch church established and con- trolled by petitioner and his wife, and the money had been used to pay the family’s personal expenses. This evidence, coupled with evidence that petitioner asked his wife to sign checks to and from the church account, was more than sufficient to establish that he was aware that the claimed “contributions” were deposited into accounts he con- trolled. 6 Finally, there was overwhelming evidence that peti- tioner acted willfully when he falsely subscribed the return, i.e., that he voluntarily and intentionally violated a known legal duty (see United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976)). The evidence that petitioner himself prepared the tax returns demonstrated that he was aware that the deductions at issue had been claimed. There was also ample evidence that he knew his control and personal! use of supposedly contributed funds made the claimed deductions illegal. Prior to filing the amended returns, petitioner, who had a master’s degree in business (C.A. App. 277a), was advised of the criminal investigation and was questioned about the charitable contributions he had previously claimed. Demonstrating his recognition of the falsity of the deductions at issue, he tried to hide the rele- vant facts from investigators: he falsely told two IRS special agents that the “contributions” had been made to the headquarters of the Universal Life Church in Modesto, California, and that the headquarters church had reimbursed him for his expenses. C.A. App. 279a-280a. See United States v. Walsh, 627 F.2d at 92 (false statements to IRS agent constituted proof of willful- ness). Thus, the evidence established that petitioner claimed deductions to which he knew he was not entitled, in intentional violation of a known legal duty to file ac- curate returns.? 2. Petitioner argues (Pet. 12-15) that the trial court er- roneously allowed the prosecutor to argue or suggest that petitioner’s congregation was a sham. He contends that the prosecutor’s argument was “contrary to the weight of the evidence” and violated his First Amendment rights. 2 The returns themselves put petitioner on notice of this duty by re- quiring a declaration, under penalty of perjury, that they were true and correct to the best of petitioner’s belief. 7 Although the First Amendment does not allow the government to question the validity of particular religious beliefs, it does permit inquiry into whether the beliefs are sincerely held and whether a church has been set up by the taxpayer for tax avoidance rather than religious purposes. See United States v. Daly, 756 F.2d 1076, 1081 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1022 (1985); United States v. Peister, 631 F.2d 658, 665 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981). See also Mason v. General Brown Central School District, 85) F.2d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 1988). Cf. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 109 S. Ct. 2136, 2146 (1989). The prosecutor’s argument in this case did not challenge the validity of petitioner’s claimed religious beliefs. The prosecutor specifically told the jury that the government had no intention of attacking petitioner or his wife for any religious principles to which they may have adhered and that the government did not intend to attack the Universal Life Church or its religious doctrines. C.A. App. 158a.3 The prosecutor’s argument focused instead on the conten- tion that petitioner’s church served as a vehicle for peti- tioner and his wife to generate checks to support improper charitable contributions. C.A. App. 157a-158a, 672a. Be- cause that argument did not implicate any First Amend- ment concerns, petitioner’s claim of error is meritless. 3. Petitioner claims (Pet. 15-19) that the trial court erred in denying, without an evidentiary hearing, his mo- tion to dismiss the indictment on the basis of selective prosecution. To prevail on a selective prosecution claim, a defendant must show that the government was motivated by a dis- * The trial court charged the jury that the “dogma or * * * practices” of the Universal Life Church were not at issue in the case. C.A. App. 749a. iS 8 criminatory purpose and that its actions had a discrimina- tory effect. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985). He must demonstrate both that he has been “singled out” while similarly situated persons have not been prosecuted, and that the decision to prosecute him was made on the basis of such impermissible considera- tions as race or religion. United States v. Greenwood, 796 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1986); Virgin Islands v. Harrigan, 791 F.2d 34, 36 (3d Cir. 1986). To obtain an evidentiary hearing, petitioner was required to allege some facts tend- ing to show that he was selectively prosecuted and raising a reasonable doubt about the prosecution’s purpose. United States v. Bassford, 812 F.2d 16, 19 (ist Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1022 (1987). Petitioner asserts that the fact that “[nJumerous tax payers have been assessed civil tax liabilities based upon their alleged contributions to the Universal Life Church” establishes that “others who were similarly situated as the Dorris family have not been * * * prosecuted for the same conduct.” Pet. 18. Yet proof that the government has not prosecuted others who have contributed to petitioner’s religion logically cannot support a conclusion that the government is discriminating against adherents of that religion. Moreover, in light of the flagrancy of petitioner’s conduct and the strong evidence of willfulness, it was cn- tirely reasonable for the government to proceed criminai- ly, rather than civilly, in this case. Petitioner’s allegation is therefore insufficient to support a seleciive prosecution claim. Petitioner’s assertion that numerous members of the ULC have been the subjects of IRS enforcement actions does not give rise to an inference that members of that church have been improperly targeted. The government is not forbidden to examine closely tive returns of individuals who deduct charitable contributions to an organization Uti hh——e————— 9 like the ULC. See Mason v. General Brown Central School District, 851 F.2d at 52-53. At the very least, a pre- requisite to a selective prosecution claim would have to be evidence that the government does not investigate or pros- ecute individuals who fraudulently deduct contributions to other churches. Yet petitioner does not present any such evidence. 4. Petitioner argues (Pet. 19-20) that Count 3 of the indictment, which charged him with making and subscrib- ing a false amended return for the 1981 calendar year, was barred by the statute of limitations. The limitations period with respect to Section 7206(1) is six years. 26 U.S.C. 6531(5). The amended return for 1981 was filed on Janu- ary 8, 1985 (C.A. App. 188a-189a). The indictment was filed on March 21, 1989,° slightly over four years after the date of filing of the return and thus well within the limita- tions period. See United States v. Samara, 643 F.2d 701, 704 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 829 (1981). Petitioner contends, however, that the limitations period ran from the due date of his original return for 1981, rather than the date on which he filed the amended return, because the same charitable deductions were claimed in both returns. That is clearly incorrect. Section 7206(1) proscribes “willfully mak[ing] and subscrib[ing] * Petitioner also asserts (Pet. 18) that his prosecution for making false contributions to the ULC on his tax returns for 1981, 1982, and 1983 “constitutes, in essence, a form of retroactive prosecution” (Pet. 18), since the Internal Revenue Service first revoked the tax exempt status of the parent ULC church in August 1984. The tax status of the _ parent church, however, was not relevant to this prosecution, which involved only “contributions” to the church located in petitioner’s own home. . > A superseding indictment correcting minor typograghical errors was filed on August 22, 1989. Gov't C.A. Br. 6; C.A. App. 2a, 3a. 10 any return, statement, or Other document” that the tax- payer “does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter.” The amended return constituted a “return ** * or other document” separate from the original return. Therefore, a new violation Occurred when the amended return was filed. The fact that the new viola- tion consisted of the repetition of an earlier false statement is immaterial. See United States v. Samara, 643 ¥.2d at 704. 5. Petitioner claims (Pet. 20-21) that 26 U.S.C. 170, the provision governing the deductibility of his claimed charitable contributions, is unconstitutionally vague. Peti- lioner’s argument centers around the definition of “charitable contribution” in 26 U.S.C. 170(c). That sub- secuion, in relevant part, defines a “charitable contribu- lion” as a contribution or gift to or for the use of * * * Q)A corporation, trust, Or community chest, fund, or foundation * * * (B) organized and operated ex- clusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes * * *. (C) no part of the net earnings Of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual * * *. Petitioner argues that the phrase “net earnings” is too vague tO support a criminal conviction. The plain terms of Section 170 put petitioner on notice that he could not deduct as charitable contributions pay- ments that went into accounts he controlled and were ulti- mately used to fund his personal expenses. Insofar as the terms of the statute require explication on this point, courts have long held, with respect to the provision of 26 U.S.C. SO01(c)(3) employing the same terms, that “a mem- ber’s ready use of the religious organization’s funds for personal use * * * violates the inurement requirement.” United States v. Daly, 756 &.2d at 1083. Accord Fall v. Commissioner, 729 b.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1984); Found- ing Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 .2d 1197, 1202 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1009 (1970). See also Smith v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 930, 934 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). Iven without regard to the “inurement” requirement, petilioner’s “contributions” were not deductible. Since petitioner and his wife retained control over the purported donations, those donations did not constitute “contribu tions” or “gilts” under the statute. See Hansen v. Commis sioner, 820 F.2d 1464, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987); Pollard v. Commissioner, 786 F.2d 1063, 1067 (Lith Cir. 1986). CE. Davis v. United States, WOS. Ct. 2014 (1990). In addition, contributions are deductible only if made to a recipient “organized and operated exclusively for religious * * * purposes.” 26 U.S.C. 170(c)(2)(B). The evidence in this case established that a primary purpose behind petitioner’s church was to generate tax benefits for petitioner. Not withstanding petitioner’s contention (Pet. 21) that the Code does not define the term “religious purposes,” the venerauion of tax benefits clearly does not qualify as a “religious purpose.” See /lansen v. Commisstoner, 820 I .2d at 1468. 6. Petitioner claims (Pet. 21-22) that the prosecutor’s quesuoning Of IRS Special Agent Jack Bell concerning whether Bell ever received church records requested from peuuuioner constituted reversible error, Avent Bell testified that he asked petitioner about his church records during a July 1984 interview and that peti- tioncr described) those records. C.A. App. 275a, 2kla-282a. Agent Bell further testified that he requested the records. C.A. App. 282a. Bell was then asked whether he had ever received any of the records, and he replied that he had not. /bid. Petitioner’s counsel objected at sidebar to the question and answer. /bid. The court struck them 12 and, at petitioner’s request (C.A. App. 283a), told the jury to disregard them. C.A. App. 286a-287a.® Although peti- tioner did not move for a mistrial, the court stated that none would be granted. C.A. App. 285a. Relying on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), peti- tioner asserts that the stricken question and answer were “in violation of Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment right and required a reversal of the conviction.” Pet. 22. Petitioner’s assertion lacks merit. In Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619, the Court held that it violated the Due Process Clause for the prose- cutor to make use of a defendant’s silence at the time of ar- rest after receiving Miranda warnings. Later cases indicate that Doyle rests on the fundamental unfairness of using a suspect’s silence against him after he has been implicitly assured by Miranda warnings that it will not be so used. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 763 (1987). There was no Doyle violation in this case. This Court in Greer noted that the Due Process Clause merely bars “the use” of a defendant’s post arrest silence. 483 U.S. at 763 (quoting Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. at 619) (emphasis in Greer)). Here, the trial court struck the question and answer at issue and clearly instructed the jury to disregard them. The fact that Agent Bell requested and did not re- ceive the records “was not submitted to the jury as evi- dence from which it was allowed to draw any permissible inference, and thus no Doyle violation occurred in this © The court told the jury: although it’s been some time since the last question was asked and answered, I’m asking you, if you remember it, to disregard it. The question should not have been asked and * * * there shouldn’t have been an answer either. So that the question and the answer are stricken. The defendant had no obligation to produce records for the agent on request. Therefore, you should draw no in- ference from the fact that the records were requested or that they were not produced. C.A. App. 286a-287a. 13 case.” Greer, 483 U.S. at 764-765. See also United States v. Lane, 883 F.2d 1484, 1493-1495 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 872 (1990). 7. Finally, petitioner contends (Pet. 22) that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the charitable con- tributions claimed in petitioner’s amended returns were material as a matter of law. The courts of appeals that have addressed the question have all agreed that the materiality of a false statement on a tax return is a question of law for the judge to decide. See United States v. Fawaz, 881 F.2d 259, 261-262 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing cases from the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits). The improper charitable deductions that petitioner claimed on his returns affected the computation of his tax liability. C.A. App. 377a-379a. The claimed deductions were there- fore material as a matter of law, see United States v. Graham, 758 F.2d at 886 n.5, regardless of whether they had also appeared on petitioner’s original returns. CONCLUSION The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied. Respectfully submitted. KENNETH W. STARR Solicitor General SHIRLEY D. PETERSON Assistant Attorney General ROBERT E. LINDSAY ALAN HECHTKOPE YOEL TOBIN Altorneys NOVEMBER 1990 --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385020_2632%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.