# Reply Brief — Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation (No. 90-131)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1900

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S,

(1) © | FILEQ

No. 89-2001 and No. 90-131 SEP

' BR

a F. SPANIOL, Up

IN THE

CLERK

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

PANHANDLE EASTERN PIPE LINE COMPANY, et al.,
” Petitioners,

COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION CORPORATION, et al.,
Respondents.

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION,
. Petitioner,

COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION CORPORATION, et al.,
Respondents.

On Petitions for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit

PIPELINE PETITIONERS’ REPLY TO RESPONDENTS’

BRIEFS IN OPPOSITION
MERLIN E. REMMENGA RAYMOND N. SHIBLEY
PANHANDLE EASTERN PIPE Counsel of Record
LINE COMPANY BRUCE W. NEELY
TRUNKLINE GAS COMPANY MARLENE L. STEIN
5400 Westheimer Court LEBOEUvUF, LAMB, LEIBY &
Houston, Texas 77056 MACRAE
(713) 627-5400 1333 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Suite 1100

Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 457-7500

Attorneys for Panhandle Eastern
Pipe Line Company and
Trunkline Gas Company

(Attorneys Continued on Inside Cover)

AAT 2. TT ER SPT TT PE LSE ARNO A Fn
WILSON - Epgs PRINTING Co., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

rT

Kim M. CoCcKLIN
Senior Vice President and
Generai Counsel
DOUGLAS FIELD, JR.
Assistant General Counsel
TEXAS GAS TRANSMISSION
CORPORATION
3860 Frederica Street
Owensboro, Kentucky 42301
(502) 926-8686

JEFFREY A. BRUNER
General Attorney
TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPE
LINE CORPORATION
P.O. Box 1396
Houston, Texas 77251
(713) 439-3156

September 6, 1990

ROBERT W. PERDUE
ANDREWS & KURTH
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 662-2700

Aitorneys for Texas Gas
Transmission Corporation

ROBERT G. HARDY

MICHAEL J. FREMUTH
ANDREWS & KURTH
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 662-2700

Attorneys for Transcontinental
Gas Pipe Line Corporation

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
i sinemman bem nonsniohensaihbibs 1
Ge ML et) 11, y en 1
pr a! Sy ae Deiat NGS ERO RARER od 9 re TPO Pe nae 2

RPP UPEPRORPIIINI TY aicvcicensnsensonceccaceones Bore tre capeladupatacveanesenanssyareres 10

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571

Page

UIE shceincsssccpacesadiancdtenceaxmuniaaicergumvencianarritieaiy - 1,3

Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC, 893 F.2d
349 (D.C. Cir. 1989), reh’g denied, 898 F.2d 809
(D.C. Cir. 1990), petitions for cert. pending,

Us TI IE WII cibrcccdciksersnscencococantedcesuneimisuaniaonsic 2, 9-10

Interstate Natural Gas Ass’n, Inc. v. FERC, 756
F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847
UE cecukaneaddstdcsheshianieasneionck aieaiectnace aehaatetantete at

Interstate Natural Gas Ass’n, Ine. v. FERC, 716
F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
ST I od conic nics cvasaesgaseonphahacala tt eceass tae aoe

Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel,
Inc., No. 89-624 (June 21, 1990) ...............00000.....

Mobil Expleration and Producing North America,
Inc. v. FERC, 881 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1989)...

Plaquemines Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 450 F.2d 1334
es es MN ce eleccaeanee

Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. FERC, 769
F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
See MI clare ee eee

Administrative Decisions and Orders:

Order No. 94, FERC Stats. & Regs. (CCH), Regs.
Preambles {| 30,178 (1980) —..........00
Order No. 94-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. (CCH),
Regs. Preambles {| 30,419 (1983)...
Order No. 380, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,778 (1984), aff'd
sub nom. Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, 770 F.2d
1144 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
4 BCR IR TRERSAe pin nite dn TaN «A
Order No. 399-A, 49 Fed. Reg. 46,353 (1984).
Order No. 436, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408 (1985), aff’d
in part and vacated sub nom. Associated Gas
Distributors v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988)... :

» (mineereenernameetaacaaiiataiaaaiamasuaiaiaa ami

ili

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page
Order No. 500-H, FERC Stats. & Regs. (CCH),
Regs. Preambles * 30,867 (1989), aff'd sub nom.
American Gas Ass’n v. FERC, Nos. 87-1588,
et al. (D.C. Cir. August 24, 1990)... 8
Phillips Petroleum Co., 12 FERC % 61,080 (1980) .. x
Statutes:
Natural Gas Act
Section 4, 15 U.S.C. § 717c¢ (1988) -....00000000..... _ 4, 8-9

Section 4(d), 15 U.S.C. § 717c(d) (1988) 1, 2-3, 9
Natural Gas Policy Act
Section 110, 15 U.S.C. § 3320 (1988) -................ passim

Regulations:
18 C.F.R. § 154.63 (e) (2) (1990) —..... 6

PIPELINE PETITIONERS’ REPLY TO RESPONDENTS’
BRIEFS IN OPPOSITION

INTRODUCTION

The pipeline petitioners' hereby reply to the briefs
in opposition filed by the Municipal Defense Group
(“MDG”) on July 25 and August 31, 1990, and by
Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation, et a/. (“Colum-
bia”) and Process Gas Consumers Group, et al. (“PGC”)
on August 31, 1990.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. Respondents’ briefs in opposition succeed only in
showing that this case does indeed present a question
worthy of this Court’s review. First, respondents claim
that the Court’s decision late last term in Maislin Indus-
tries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., No. 89-624 (June
21, 1990), forecloses the Commission from granting a
waiver under Section 4‘d) of the Natural Gas Act to
permit a surcharge for gas sold in a past period, as it
did here. But that is the precise question the Court ex-
pressly left open in Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall
(“Arkla v. Hall”), 453 U.S. 571, 578 n8& (1981).
Whether Mais/in intended to decide, sub silentio, the issue
preserved for future consideration in footnote eight of
the Court’s opinion in Arkla v. Hall ‘as respondents
claim) is itself surely a question worthy of this Court’s
plenary review. Second, respondents’ own arguments
demonstrate that the equitable allocation of large, past-
period gas costs among pipeline customers is a serious
and recurring problem in pipeline rate proceedings be-
fore the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“Com-
mission”). The pervasiveness of this problem fur-
ther reinforces the need for this Court to resolve the
question of the Commission's statutory authority. Fi-
nally, by their own submissions, respondents would com-

' The list of all parent companies and subsidiaries of the peti-
tioners, as required by Rule 29.1 of the Court's Rules, was pro-
vided on p. iii of the petition for certiorari in No, 89-2001.

2

pletely upset the time-honored symmetry of the statute
by making utilities responsible for refunding past-period
overcharges to all customers while allowing select groups
of customers to escape their fair share of responsibility
for past-period undercharges. This perversion of the
statutory purposes likewise warrants this Court’s review.

2. Respondents’ briefs in opposition contain several
material inaccuracies of fact. We correct those herein.

3. Finally, respondents plainly are wrong in urging
that the Court deny certiorari in this case regardless
of any action it may take in Associated Gas Distributors
v. FERC, 893 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1989), reh’g denied,
898 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1990), petitions for cert. pend-
ing, Nos. 89-1988, et al. (“AGD-II’’).

ARGUMENT

1. a. Both Columbia (Br. 21) and MDG (Br. 2 n.2,
8 n.7, 9, 22-23) argue that this case is controlled by the
Court’s recent decision in Maislin Industries, supra. We
submit that this claim cannot withstand analysis, and
that, in any event, respondents’ own arguments demon-
strate that this case presents an issue worthy of cer-
tiorari.

Reduced to its essentials, Maislin, like Arkla v. Hall
and this Court’s other “filed rate doctrine” cases, holds
only that the terms of a private agreement for a regu-
lated service, such as rail transportation, cannot, as a
matter of law, supersede the filed rate. In Maislin, the
Court held that this rule applied even when the regula-
tory body ‘in that case the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission (“ICC’)) declared in response to a referral
from a federal trial court that the filed rate should not
prevail. As the Court explained, the filed rate continued
to have the force of law unless found to be “unreason-
able” by the ICC, which did not occur. Mais/in, slip op.
11-12 and n.10.

In contrast, this case concerns the Commission's au-
thority, under the waiver provisions of Section 4(d) of

3

the Natura! Gas Act, to approve a change in the filed
rate, upon a proper filing by the regulated utility. per-
mitting the utility to impose a surcharge for past un-
dercollections that resulted from a Commission mandate
to defer cost recovery. That is a question never before
decided by this Court, and, indeed, expressly left open by
Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court in Arkia \
Hall, 453 U.S. at 578 n.8. Columbia (Br. 18 and n.22

suggests that the cases appearing to recognize such a
waiver power on the part of the Commission under Sec-
tion 4(d) may have been implicitly overruled by Mais!in.
We disagree; but, in any event, respondents’ submission
by its own terms shows that this case raises a question
worthy of certiorari.

There is absolutely no merit to the suggestion (Colum-
bia Br. 3, 17-18: MDG Br. (No. 90-131) at 3) that this
ease is distinguishable from the situation envisioned by
footnote eight in Arkla v. Hall, because of a purported
lack of contractual agreement between the petitioner
pipelines and their wholesale customers for payment by
the customers of the costs at issue here. It is beyond
dispute that the underlying service agreements between
the pipelines and their customers, like the producer-
pipeline contracts under which these costs originally were
incurred, provide simply that the customer will pay the
FERC-approved rate for gas, subject only to the custom-
er’s right to protest and seek a hearing concerning rate
changes.

b. Columbia’s theory of the case is that the “purchased
gas adjustment” (“PGA”) provisions found in many
pipeline tariffs provide an effective and lawful method for
recovering large amounts of deferred costs from past
periods. E.g., Columbia Br. 5 and n.7, Br. 10 and n.15,
Br. 19. Thus, Columbia (Br. 10 n.15) notes that the
Commission in one instance authorized one of the pipe-
line petitioners to collect some $170 million in unrecoy-
ered gas costs accured during a prior period by amortiz-
ing the total amount and collecting it in installments
through its PGA account.

4

Again, Columbia’s submission only reinforces our con-
tention that this case does indeed warrant this Court’s
review. First, the instances cited by Columbia (and
many others could be cited), in which gas purchase costs
from past periods are passed th.ough to pipeline cus-
tomers in the current period, demonstrate that the prob-
lem presented here—.e., the deferred recovery of
production-related costs under Section 110 of the Na-
tural Gas Policy Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3320—is not an iso-
lated or unusual situation, but rather a recurring prob-
lem, particularly during the massive restructuring now
underway in the industry. The Commission’s statutory
authority to handie these situations in an equitable and
lawful manner thus presents a question of very substan-
tial practical importance.

Second, respondents, in attempting to discredit the
direct billing methodology employed by the Commission
in this case, prove too much. If the Commission is with-
out power to impose the surcharge it attempted to impose
in this case, as Columbia claims, then it is difficult to
believe that the same costs would not be challenged if pe-
titioners had employed a surcharge under the PGA mech-
anism. Indeed respondent MDG expressly challenges the
use of the PGA for this purpose (MDG Reply Br. in
Columbia II (filed August 22, 1989) at 5). Columbia
(Br. 5 n.7) acknowledges that ‘‘the PGA mechanism for
‘truing up’ recovery of past gas costs is a departure from
the normal process of setting fixed rates for the future
based on estimates derived from historical experience,”
but suggests that the distinction lies in the fact that “the
PGA mechanism itself is on file as part of the pipeline’s
tariffs.” But that is no distinction at all, because the pe-
titioner pipelines likewise proposed their direct billing
plans by means of Section 4 rate filings; the Commission
designated the charge as a “rate” and permitted it to be-
come effective. F’.g., Pet. App. (No. 89-2001) 72a.

ce. Respondents also claim that the direct billing mech-
anism approved by the Commission in this case promotes
an ‘asymmetrical outcome” (Columbia Br. 17) by per-

5

mitting retroactive rate increases which undermine the
“consumer protection” purposes of the Natural Gas Act
(Columbia Br. 16-17; MDG Br. (No. 89-2001) 26-27;
MDG Br. (No. 90-131) 12, 14, 16; PGC Br. 4-5). In
truth, however, it is respondents’ position that results in
a perversion of the statutory purposes.

Under the respondents’ view of the law (as adopted by
the court of appeals in this case), if a pipeline overcol-
lects its costs in one period, it has an absolute obligation
to refund those amounts at the earliest possible moment,
to assure that the refunds reach those consumers whose
payments proved to be too high. Yet, if during the same
period the pipeline wndercollects its gas costs—either be-
cause of a flawed projection (as often happens in PGA
proceedings) or (as here) because the Commission had
not yet permitted the pipelines to include certain costs
in their then-current charges—the respondents would
allow the customer to avoid meeting its cost responsibil-
ity by simply cutting back on its current purchases,
which would shift the same costs to other customers. The
Natural Gas Act obviously was not enacted in order to
enabie one subgroup of consumers to benefit at the ex-
pense of others in this manner.”

2.a. Columbia is fundamentally wrong, as a factual
matter, in its repeated references to “delay” by the peti-
tioner pipelines in seeking to recover the Section 110
costs authorized under Order No. 94-A (Br. 6, 7, 20
n.25), and in its related suggestion (id. at 8 n.12) that
the pipelines were dilatory in not filing their direct bill-
ing proposals until some two years after the moratorium

2 The amounts at issue have long since been collected by the pipe-
lines from their customers, including respondents. What respond-
ents seek is to recover their payments and impose their share of the
costs on the pipelines’ other customer or on the pipelines themselves.
None of the respondents has ever taken issue with the Commission’s
conclusion that the direct billing methodology is the most equitable
way of allocating these costs among pipeline customers.

6

on cost recovery was lifted in 1983. In fact, as the re-
spondents are well aware, the Commission and the in-
dustry throughout this period were intensively engaged
in developing an appropriate, equitable means of per-
mitting the pipelines to pass through to their customers
the Section 110 costs at issue here.

First, Order No. 94-A, while lifting the moratorium
as of January 1983, specifically permitted first sellers to
collect the retroactive production-related costs from the
pipelines “over a time period commencing with the date
this order becomes effective and ending December 31,
1984.” Order No. 94-A, FERC Stats. & Regs., Regs.
Preambles (CCH) (‘‘Regs. Preambles’”) { 30,419 at
30,368 (1983). Consequently, many pipelines were pre-
cluded from filing to recover all the relevant costs until
late 1984 or early 1985 at the earliest, even when they
were promptly billed by their producer-suppliers (which
often was not the case). See 18 C.F.R. § 154.63 (e) (2).

Moreover, in order to minimize the impact of the pass-
through of these production-related costs, the pipelines
proposed and the Commission ultimately approved an al-
ternative mechanism that would synchronize pipeline ob-
ligations to first sellers under Order No. 94-A with first
seller refund obligations to the pipelines for essentially
the same sales of gas. Specifically, this plan permitted
the pipelines to offset their Section 110 costs payable to
producers against the amounts the same producers owed
the pipelines in refunds—due to overcollections from a
separate Commission regulation that the D.C. Circuit had
invalidated in 1983 in /nterstate Natural Gas Ass’n, Inc.
v. FERC, 716 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1108 (1984). On November 20, 1984, the Commis-
sion approved this offset mechanism. Order No. 399-A,
49 Fed. Reg. 46,353 (1984). But, on March 5, 1985, a
split panel of the D.C. Circuit (over a dissent by then-
Judge Scalia) declared it invalid, on the ground that the
pipelines’ customers should get the refunds due from the
producers immediately, without waiting to resolve issues
concerning the amounts owed to the producers by the

7

pipelines. Interstate Natural Gas Ass’n, Ine. V. FERC,
756 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847
(1985).

Thus, it was only shortly after the D.C. Circuit invali-
dated the offset pian in March 1985—and while the pipe-
lines’ challenge to the Commission’s Section 110 rules was
still pending before the Fifth Circuit ‘—that petitioner
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation, on May 22,
1985, filed the first of the pipeline direct billing proposals
with the Commission. See Pet. App. (No. 89-2001) 60a:
Columbia App. la-25a. The other pipelines filed their
respective plans shortly thereafter. There was no “delay”
on the part of the pipelines in this case. Moreover, in
light of this history, in which all pipelines and their
customers were involved, it is astonishing for respond-
ents now to argue that they were unaware of their po-
tential liabilities.

b. Equally inaccurate is Columbia’s suggestion (Br.
20, 23) that the recent Commission-driven restructur-
ing of the natural gas pipeline industry postdated the
pipelines’ direct billing proposals and thus has no con-
nection with this case. In fact, the most critical event
that allowed Columbia and its fellow respondents to cut
back or discontinue gas purchases from their traditional
pipeline suppliers was Commission Order No. 380," is-
sued in June 1984, at the heart of the events in this
case. Order No. 380 invalidated longstanding minimum
purchase agreements in contracts between interstate pipe-

3 Tronically, were it not for that action by the D.C. Circuit, the
“retroactivity” that the court condemned in the instant case simply
would not have occurred,

*It was not until August 19, 1985, that the Fifth Circuit issued
its opinion in Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. Vv. FERC, 769
F.2d 1053 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1114 (1986 ), affirming the
Commission’s orders requiring retroactive payment of Section 110
costs by the pipelines to producers.

*Order No. 380, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,778 (1984), aff'd sub nom.
Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, 770 F.2d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1114 (1986).

8

lines and their wholesale customers.® It was this dra-
matic, Commission-imposed seachange in pipeline gas
sales markets that made it infeasible for the pipeline
petitioners to attempt to recover Section 110 gas costs
through the normal PGA process. In 1985, in Order No.
436,’ the Commission, in effect, dropped the other shoe by
mandating that the interstate pipelines become ‘open-
access’? transporters. Thus, Columbia’s attempt to dis-
sociate this case from the backdrop cf industry restruc-
turing must fail.

ec. MDG also errs in its assertion (MDG Br. 21-22,
23) that the Fifth Circuit’s Texas Eastern decision,
which approved the retroactive billing of production-
related costs by first sellers to their purchasers, did not
arise under Section 4 cf the Natural Gas Act, as this
case does, but rather arose solely under Section 110 of
the NGPA. MDG miscontrues this admittedly complex
statutory scheme, which involves both the Natural Gas
Act and the NGPA working in tandem.* As the Com-
mission clearly articulated in the Order No. 94 series,
Section 110 applies to all of the price categories set out
in Title I of the NGPA, including those categories that
remain subject to the Commission’s Natural Gas Act

* The profound impact of Order No. 380 on pipeline sales is
graphically illustrated in Table 3 of Commission Order No. 500-H,
Regs. Preambles { 30,867 at 31,520 (1989), aff'd sub nom. Ameri-
can Gas Ass’n V. FERC, Nos. 87-1588, et al. (D.C. Cir. August 24,
1990), which shows that gas sales by the interstate pipelines
began to fall off precipitously, and that consequent pipeline ex-
posure to producer claims for “take-or-pay” liability began to
increase, immediately after issuance of Order No. 380 in 1984.

“Order No. 436, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408 (1985), afftd in part and
vacated sub nom. Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC, 824 F.2d
981 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988).

*’ Thus, for example, Order No. 94 expressly permitted sellers of
NGA-regulated gas “to apply for, and receive, production-related
costs in addition to the Natural Gas Act allowances.” Regs. Pre-
ambles £ 30,178 at 31,211 (1980); see also id. at 31,213, 31,214
and 31,216. Accord, Phillips Petroleum Co., 12 FERC © 61,080
(1980).

9

jurisdiction. Thus, the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Texas
Eastern, 769 F.2d at 1066, that the retroactive collection
of Section 110 costs “was a fair balancing of the various
problems involved” which did not constitute invalid ret-
roactive ratemaking, necessarily did encompass, in part,
producer sales that remained subject to Section 4 of the
Natural Gas Act.” Accordingly, contrary to MDQ’s view,
Texas Eastern is directly in conflict with the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s decisions in the instant case.

3. Finally, we note that both Columbia and MDG take
an unduly narrow view of the case when they assert
(Columbia Br. 22-23; MDG Br. (No. 90-131) 17-18)
that the issue presented here is distinct from that in
AGD-II, supra, and therefore that the Court should deny
the petition for certiorari here even if it grants the peti-
tion in AGD-II. In fact, the two cases are plainly re-
lated. Both concern the Commission’s authority to au-
thorize a surcharge premised upon a customer’s pur-
chases during a past period. Both cases arise in the
midst of—and directly because of—a massive restructur-
ing in the industry, which would cause grave inequities
among different groups of ratepayers if the normal pass-
through mechanisms were employed. In both cases, more-
over, the D.C. Circuit adopted essentially the same re-
strictive view of the Commission’s ratemaking powers
under Section 4 of the Natural Gas Act. The only dif-
ference is that in this case the Commission grounded
its decision in the waiver provisions of Section 4(d). But

® Accord, Mobil Exploration and Producing North America, Inc.
v. FERC, 881 F.2d 193, 197 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Problems of retro-
activity [in cases arising under Section 4] are resolved on the
basis of balancing considerations of fairness and the necessities
of practical administration.”) (citations omitted); id. at 198
(‘Although the successor’s sales made privr to receiving a suc-
cessor’s certificate are in technical violation of the NGA and the
filed rate doctrine, FERC can properly exercise its equitable powers
to make the successor filing relate back to the time of transfer.”’)
(citing Plaquemines Oil & Gas Co. Vv. FPC, 450 F.2d 1334 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) ).

10

that is a distinction which, if anything, militates in
favor of the Court’s granting plenary review in this case,
rather than merely holding it in abeyance pending the out-
come of AGD-II. It certainly does not suggest a basis for
denying certiorari here.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Court
should grant the petitions for certiorari in No. 89-2001
and in No. 90-131.

Respectfully submitted,

MERLIN E. REMMENGA RAYMOND N. SHIBLEY

PANHANDLE EASTERN PIPE

LINE COMPANY
TRUNKLINE GAS COMPANY
5400 Westheimer Court
Houston, Texas 77056
(713) 627-5400

KIM M. COCKLIN

Senior Vice President and
General Counsel

DOUGLAS FIELD, JR.

Assistant General Counsel

TEXAS GAS TRANSMISSION
CORPORATION

3800 Frederica Street

Owensboro, Kentucky 42301

(502) 926-8686

JEFFREY A. BRUNER

General Attorney

TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPE
LINE CORPORATION

P.O. Box 1396

Houston, Texas 77251

(713) 439-3156

September 6, 1990

Counsel of Record

BRUCE W. NEELY

MARLENE L. STEIN
LEBOEUF, LAMB, LEIBY &

MACRAE

1333 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Suite 1100
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 457-7500

Attorneys for Panhandle Eastern
Pipe Line Company and
Trunkline Gas Company

ROBERT W. PERDUE
ANDREWS & KURTH
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 662-2700

Attorneys for Texas Gas
Transmission Corporation

ROBERT G. HARDY

MICHAEL J. FREMUTH
ANDREWS & KURTH
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 662-2700

Attorneys for Transcontinental!
Gas Pipe Line Corporation

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385020_2528%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.