# Opposition Brief — FMC Corp. v. Gander

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385020_1569%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1990
- **Citation:** 498 U.S. 878

## Text

Se Uy ae hon at Te eh oe See ES ERIGE Cee Ny TOUR gee, See? Pee he eS malls £ oN aha ll aS 3 td er: ene

Woahs beck 6x. i
. FILED

WN 18 199

o JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR,

No. 89-1829 —

An Tue
_: Supreme Court of the Bnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1989

FMC CorPoORATION,
Petitioner,

VS.
Topp GANDER,
Respondent.

_ BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

THE HULLVERSON LAW FIRM
JAMES E. HULLVERSON, JR.
Counsel of Record
1010 Market Street, Suite 1550
St. Louis, Missouri 63101
(314) 421-2313 pce

and
STEPHEN H. RINGKAMP
Counsel for Respondent

St. Louis Law Printing Co., Inc., 13307 Manchester Road 63131 314-231-4477

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. In a diversity action for personal injuries based
on product liability law of Missouri, does federal
law mandate jury instructions on (a) the effect of
taxes on future lost earnings and (b) the non-

taxability of a jury’s award of damages where ap-
plicable Missouri law precludes such instructions?

II. Is an appropriate case presented for review of

Question I by certiorari where the defendant failed
to tender such instructions at trial and made no
complaint in the Court of Appeals regarding the
absence of such instructions?

III. In such a diversity action, does federal law

_-mandate cross-examination by defense counsel of

plaintiff's economist regarding the income tax ef-
fects on lost future earnings where Missouri law
precludes such cross-examination?

IV. Is an appropriate case presented for review of
Question III by certiorari where the trial court
allowed defense counsel to conduct such cross-
examination, but also stated it would grant a
mistrial if plaintiff could show that such cross-
examination was improper, and defense counsel

_ Voluntarily chose to make no further efforts to
cross-examine the economist about income taxes?

V. Where Missouri law permits no reduction of
damages under a strict liability theory in connec-
tion with an assessment of a percentage of fault to
plaintiff under a comparative negligence theory,
and where the Court of Appeals expressly recogniz-
ed that the jury was properly instructed on those
issues, is a new trial mandated by «@@" of a con-
gluding “‘note’’ in a verdict form \.vt an instruc-

tion as petitioner represents to the Court) which the
Court of Appeals held was legally correct but
‘‘potentially confusing’?

‘VI. Is an appropriate case presented for review of
Question V by certiorari where the defendant made —
no specific objection to the concluding ‘‘note”’.

under Rule 51, Fed.R.Civ.Pro., and tendered no
alternative verdict form or language to clarify the
meaning of that ‘‘note’’?

iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Questions Presented ............. ccc cece eee cece cee i
Table of Authorities .............. geieiiel take ae
Statement of the Case ............ccccceeceeeeeeees 1
Summary of Argument .................0e ec ee eens 4
PNAS, elas oia5'v tine nins 1 ee Pe 17
Statutes, Rules and Texts:
Ne PE, Foc pccccccvccescsdcvcecis 23
Rc oc criccenixpsenesnccesesces 19,20
Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 103(a)(2) ............ 15
Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 611(b)............... 15

Federal Jury Practice & Instructions, Devitt, Blackmar
& Wolff, Vol. 3, Fourth Edition, Sec. 74.12 ...... 22

vi

Federal Jury Practice &.Instructions, Devitt, Blackmar
& Wolff, Fourth Edition, Vol. 3, Sec. 85.11 ......

9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure,
Sec. 2551 and 2553 (1971).....eecccccccccccecce

Missouri Approved Jury Instructions, Third Edition,
AE Ge 0 0.0. 0:0/0.04 dOOR The ceed deeb wil aen ble

Missouri Approved Jury Instructions, Third Edition,
Illustration 35.15, 1989 Pocket Part, pages 122-133

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 43 U.S.C., Sec. 1331
5 Bs .0:h'0-00.0'c.4 Ladin wane chdee bn cetekaw anade

Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 914(a)(2) (1977) ...
Supreme Court Rule 10.1(a@) ...........ccccccceeeecs
DTG TEND Bcd voce ccccndescceceetecivencn
ED UNTIED 0.0 0 p.nes. 50400 bheenaccawaue

No. 89-1829

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Bnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1989

Ww

FMC CorPoRATION,
Petitioner,

vs.

Topp GANDER,
Respondent.

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Defendant FMC Corporation (hereinafter ‘‘FMC’’) appealed
a judgment in favor of Todd Gander for Two Million Dollars.
This judgment was entered by the District Court on July 13,
1988, following a jury trial.

Jurisdiction in the District Court was based on diversity of
citizenship. Missouri law of product liability was applicable.

Gander’s theories of recovery for personal injuries were alter-
native theories of strict liability and negligence. Under Missouri
law, comparative negligence applied only to a negligence theory
and not to the strict liability theory. The jury found in favor of
Gander on the strict liability theory. The jury also found in
favor of Gander on the negligence theory and assessed ten per-
cent fault to FMC and ninety percent fault to Gander. The jury
assessed Gander’s total damages at Two Million Dollars.

hae aaen

The District Court initially entered judgment for Two Hun-
dred Thousand Dollars. However, on Gander’s motion to
amend judgment, the District Court held that Gander was en-
titled to Two Million Dollars on the strict liability claim which
could not be reduced by Gander’s comparative fault under
Missouri law. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Gander v. FMC Corp., 892 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1990).

On February 23, 1985, while working for Anheuser-Busch in
St. Louis, Todd Gander lost his right arm at the elbow while
working as a coal conveyor operator. At the time of trial, the
average pay for coal conveyor operators was approximately
$48,000.00 plus benefits.

The coal conveyor on which Gander was injured was
manufactured by defendant FMC without a guard at the in-
running nip point at the head pulley drum.

As coal was being conveyed, coal dust would accumulate on
the drum. On February 23, 1985, the head pulley drum on the
FMC conveyor had become clogged with coal and was responsi-
ble for a major coal spill. Gander had been taught to clean the
drum with a fox tail brush. As Gander proceeded to clean the
drum with a fox tail brush, the rolling drum caught the brush
and pulled Gander’s forearm into the device before he was able
to let go. Gander’s right arm was severed at the elbow when it
came into contact with a shear guard.

Gander was taken to a hospital where his arm was reattached.
However, his arm is useless. Attempts at vocational rehabilita-
tion were unsuccessful and Gander was discharged from work in
August of 1987. He now does volunteer work at a local
hospital.

Uncontradicted figures for lost wages, past and future,
establish damages in excess of Two Million Dollars. Gander’s
lost wages for his work life expectancy of twenty-seven years

" -

would be close to One Million Seven Hundred Thousand
Dollars. R., Vol. 1, 318. Alternative lost wage scenarios ranged
from One Million Eight Hundred Thousand Dollars to Two
Million Two Hundred Thousand Dollars. Jd. at 320-22.

Gander’s physicians testified that his right arm was almost
useless. He has no use of his fingers, which frequently swell and
develop ulcers. Gander has permanent, burning pain in his fin-
gers, which are otherwise numb. He must wear a splint to sup-
port his wrist and a glove to keep down the swelling in his hand.
The arm is subject to injury and heals slowly. These injuries are
permanent. R., Vol. 2 at 34-59.

Gander’s psychiatrist testified that his injuries have caused
substantial psychological problems. Initially, Gander was
severely depressed and suicidal and had to be hospitalized for
treatment. R., Vol. 2 at 75. Gander is still under monthly psy-
chiatric treatment with his symptoms in a constant state of flux.
R., vol. 2, 75, 80. While Gander is no longer suicidal, the scars
on his body from skin grafts, nerve and vein transplants, and
muscle harvesting are devastating to Gander’s self-image. R..,
Vol. 2 at 77. Gander suffers from insomnia, is easily frustrated
and irritable, has decreased interest in intimacy with his wife,
and harbors feelings of hopelessness and worthlessness with a
poor outlook for the future. R., Vol. 2 at 90. The psychiatrist
testified that Gander was totally disabled on the basis of his psy-
chiatric difficulties alone. R., Vol. 2 at 84. Thus, the Court of
Appeals held that there was substantial evidence supporting the
jury’s calculation of total damages at Two Million Dollars. 892
F.2d at 1380. See Appendix, A-12.

aaien

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Tand II. This Court’s decision in Liepelt does not mandate jury
instructions on the effect of taxes on future lost earnings and
the non-taxability of a jury award for personal injuries in a
diversity action based on product liability law of Missouri.
Missouri law precludes such jury instructions. The Eighth Cir-
cuit correctly ruled this issue. Petitioner failed to request any
**tax’’ iastructions in the District Court and made no complaint
in the Court of Appeals regarding the absence of such instruc-
tions. Therefore, Petitioner does not present an appropriate

issue for review by this Court.

Ii and IV. Liepelt does not mandate cross-examination of plain-
tiff’s economist regarding income tax effects on lost future earn-
ings in a diversity action under Missouri law. Missouri law
precludes such cross-examination. The Eighth Circuit correctly
ruled this issue. The relevant District Court ruling actually a//ow-
ed Petitioner to conduct such cross-examination with the caveat
that plaintiff would be granted a mistrial if plaintiff proved the
ruling to be wrong. Petitioner vo/untarily made no further ef-
forts at such cross-examination and made no offer of proof.
Therefore, Petitioner does not present an appropriate issue for

i=,

review.

V and VI. Under Missouri law of product liability, comparative
negligence of the plaintiff does reduce damages under a strict
liability theory. Jury instructions on those issues were held to be
clear and correct by the Eighth Circuit. A new trial is not re-

~~

quired because of a closing ‘‘note’’ on a verdict form (not an in-
struction as represented by Petitioner) which the Court of Ap-
peals also held was legally correct but may have been ‘‘poten-
tially confusing’. Petitioner failed to object to that ‘‘note’’ at
trial (Rule 51, Fed.R.Civ.Pro.) and failed to tender an alter-
native verdict form or clarifying language for the ‘‘note’’. The
Court of Appeals correctly ruled this issue. Therefore, Peti-
tioner does not present an appropriate case for review.

— a

ARGUMENT
I

THIS CASE INVOLVES A DIVERSITY ACTION FOR
PERSONAL INJURIES BASED ON PRODUCT
LIABILITY LAW OF MISSOURI. APPLICABLE
MISSOURI LAW PRECLUDES JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS ON THE EFFECT OF TAXES ON FUTURE
LOST EARNINGS AND THE NON-TAXABILITY OF
A JURY’S AWARD OF DAMAGES. THIS COURT’S
DECISION IN LIEPELT DOES NOT MANDATE
SUCH INSTRUCTIONS IN DIVERSITY ACTIONS
DETERMINED UNDER STATE LAW.

Petitioner, FMC Corporation (hereinafter ‘‘FMC’’), inap-
propriately lumps together issues regarding evidence, argument,
and jury instruction involving the effects of federal income tax
on a plaintiff’s lost income stream and on the non-iaxability of
a jury’s damage award. FMC apparently does so in an attempt
to obfuscate the issues in order to obtain review by this Court
despite the fact that many of these issues were neither preserved
in the trial court nor raised in the Court of Appeals. FMC also
represents to the Court that the decision of the Court of Ap-
peals in this case is in conflict with the decision of the Seventh
Circuit in Jn Re: Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., 701 F.2d
1189 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 866, 78 L.Ed.2d 178, 104
S.Ct. 204 (1983). FMC conveniently fails to cite to this Court
the vast body of law decided by the United States Courts of Ap-
peals to the effect that taxability instructions in diversity cases
are questions of state law and that such instructions are not
mandated in diversity cases by this Court’s decision in Norfolk
& Western Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 62 L.Ed.2d 689,
100 S.Ct. 755 (1980).

This case involves a diversity action for personal injuries bas-
ed on product liability law of the State of Missouri. Plaintiff,
Todd Gander, had his arm literally torn off by an unguarded
piece of machinery manufactured by FMC.

Ce

—_ on

Applicable Missouri law precludes jury instructions on the ef-
fect of taxes on future lost earnings and the non-taxability of a
jury’s award of damages. Missouri Approved Jury Instruc-
tions, Third Edition, MAI 4.01; Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp.,
693 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. 1985); Tennis v. General Motors Corp.,
625 S.W.2d 218 (Mo.App. 1981); and Senter v. Ferguson, 486

S.W.2d 644 (Mo.App. 1972).

"This Court’s decision in Liepelt determined that, in FELA ac-
tions, the jury should receive evidence of the effect of income
taxes on lost wages and an instruction on the non-taxability of a
final award. The decision in Liepelt was premised upon the
federal questions involved in FELA cases and the need for uni-
formity in cases decided under federal law.

The rationale of Liepe/t was further delineated by this Court
in Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 69
L.Ed.2d 784, 101 S.Ct. 2870 (1981). In Gulf Offshore Co., this
Court remanded a case under the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act (43 U.S.C., Sec. 1331 et. seq.) to the Texas Court of
Civil Appeals for a determination of whether Louisiana law re-
quired a ‘‘non-taxability instruction”’ and, if it did not, whether
Liepeit displaced the state rule in an OCSLA case. That case
was remanded with directions from this Court that, if it was er-
ror to refuse such an instruction, the state court could then ad-
dress arguments that failure to give such an instruction did not
constitute prejudicial error.

Numerous decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals
have expressly recognized that taxability instructions are ques-
tions of state law in diversity cases and that Liepelt does not
mandate such instructions in diversity actions determined under
state law. Gander v. FMC Corp., 892 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1990);
Adams v. Fuqua Industries, Inc., 820 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1987);
Bartak v. Bell-Galyardt & Wells, Inc., 629 F.2d 523 (8th Cir.
1980); Losey v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics
Corp., 792 F.2d 58, 61-62 (6th Cir. 1986); Estate of Spinosa,
621 F.2d 1154, 1158-59 (1st Cir. 1980); Vasina v. Grumman

Corp., 644 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1981); Shu-Tao Lin v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1984);
Croce v. Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d 1084, 1096-97 (Sth Cir.
1980), cert. denied, sub nom Bromley Corp. v. Cortese, 450
U.S. 981, 100 S.Ct. 1516, 67 L.Ed.2d 816 (1981); Hansen v.
Johns-Manville Products Corp., 734 F.2d 1036, 1045 (Sth Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051, 105 S.Ct. 1739, 84 L.Ed.2d
814; Fenasci v. Traveler’s Insurance Co., 642 F.2d 986, 989 (Sth
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123, 100 S.Ct. 971, 71 L.Ed.2d

110 (1981).

A close reading of the Seventh Circuit decision in Jn Re: Air
Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., 701 F.2d 1189, 1200 (7th Cir.
1983), indicates that there is no real conflict among the circuits.
In that case, the Seventh Circuit reviewed Illinois law and stated
its belief that Illinois decisions were based on a misapprehension
of federal law and that the giving of a ‘‘non-taxability instruc-
tion’’ would be harmless at most. Jd. 701 F.2d 1199, 1200. The
Seventh Circuit also recognized that its conclusion would be dif-
ferent if Illinois interpreted its own substantive law to preclude
such an instruction. Jd. 701 F.2d at 1200, n. 7. The Seventh
Circuit did not hold that federal law mandated such an instruc-
tion in a diversity case. Rather, the Seventh Circuit held that
the District Court was free to give the tax instruction despite
contrary state procedure. Jd. 701 F.2d 1200.

Therefore, under Supreme Court Rule 10.1(a), there is no
‘*conflict’”” among the circuits on these issues. Rather, the Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals are relatively uniform and support the
decision of the Eighth Circuit in this case.

-_ 9

PETITIONER FAILED TO TENDER ANY “INCOME
TAX”’ INSTRUCTIONS TO THE TRIAL COURT AND
MADE NO COMP IN THE COURT OF AP-
PEALS REGARDING THE ABSENCE OF SUCH IN-
STRUCTIONS. THEREFORE, THIS CASE IS NOT
APPROPRIATE FOR REVIEW BY CERTIORARI ON

THAT ISSUE.

Supreme Court Rule 15.1 requires that a Brief in Opposition to
a Petition for Certiorari should address any perceived misstate-
ments of fact or law which have a bearing on the question of
what issues would properly be before the Court if certiorari were
granted. FMC seeks review by certiorari by contending that
Liepelt mandates the giving of ‘‘taxability instructions’. How-
ever, FMC completely fails to advise this Court that FMC totally
failed to preserve any such issue in either the District Court or in
the Court of Appeals.

FMC requested no instructions regarding income tax effects
on lost future income.

FMC requested no instruction on the non-taxability of a
jury’s award of damages.

FMC made no objection to the damage instruction given by
the trial court at the request of plaintiff.

The only instruction relating to damages tendered by FMC at
trial was a ‘‘present value’’ instruction patterned after Federal
Jury Practice & Instructions, Devitt, Blackmar & Wolff, Fourth
Edition, Vol. 3, Sec. 85.11. This ‘‘present value’ instruction
had absolutely no relationship to, and did not mention, taxes.

In its Brief on Appeal before the Eighth Circuit, the only
issue raised by FMC related to cross-examination of plaintiff’s
damage witnesses and closing argument. Quoted portions from
FMC’s “‘Brief for Appellant’’, consisting of Question 3 from

on

the Questions Presented section, and Point III from the Argu-
ment section, are as follows:

Question 3: Whether counsel for FMC Corporation
should have been permitted to cross examine plaintiff’s

damages witnesses regarding the effects of ineome tax
upon plaintiff’s lost income stream, and to mention those

effects during closing argument. (Brief for Appellant,
page 3.)
POINT III

“OUNSEL FOR FMC SHOULD HAVE BEEN PER-
NM.:TTED TO CROSS EXAMINE PLAINTIFF’S
DAMAGES WITNESSES REGARDING THE EFFECTS
OF INCOME TAX UPON THE PLAINTIFF’S LOST
INCOME STREAM, AND TO ARGUE THOSE EF-
FECTS DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT. (Brief for

Appellant, page 17)

As is obvious, FMC completely failed to preserve any allega-
tion of error regarding instructions relating to taxes in either the
District Court or in the Court of Appeals.

For these reasons, review by certiorari would not be ap-
propriate.

MISSOURI LAW PRECLUDES' CROSS-
EXAMINATION REGARDING INCOME TAX EF-
FECTS ON LOST FUTURE EARNINGS. FEDERAL
LAW DOES NOT MANDATE SUCH CROSS-

EXAMINATION.

The Eighth Circuit quite properly held that Missouri law
precludes cross-examination and closing argument regarding in-
come tax effects on lost future earnings. Gander v. FMC Corp.,
892 F.2d 1373, 1383 (8th Cir. 1990). In Dempsey v. Thompson,
363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1952); the Missouri Supreme

Court held that:

The trial court did not err either in refusing to permit
defendant to cross-examine the plaintiff’s actuarial witness
relative to income tax liability or in refusing to permit
defendant to argue to the jury that in arriving at the
amount of its award it should consider only the amount of
future earnings lost to plaintiff after deduction of income
taxes for which he would have been liable had he continued

his employment without injury.

In this regard, Missouri follows the majority rule set forth in
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 914(a)(2) (1977), which
provides as follows:

*‘The amount of an award of tort damages is ordinarily
not diminished because of the fact that, although the

award is not of itself taxed, all or part of it is to compen-
sate for the loss of future benefits that would have been

subject to taxation.”’

wee

_—

For all of the reasons set forth in Point I of this Brief, federal
law does not mandate such cross-examination or closing argu-

ment in a diversity case.

FMC attempts to rely on Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft,
Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1986). Nesseirode did not involve
any issue of cross-examination or closing argument regarding
income tax effects on lost future earnings. Rather, Nesselrode
involved alleged error in the use of a table which allegedly did
not contain reductions to present value. Jd. at 385-386. This
‘‘present value’ issue in Nesselrode was decided in light of the
fact that the defendant itself failed to present any evidence of
present value. Jd. at 387. In deciding this issue, the Missouri
Supreme Court mentioned in passing that cross-examination
was conducted with regard to the fact that the decedent’s pro-
jected stream of lost income did not take into consideration his

anticipated income tax obligations. Jd. at 388.

The propriety of this cross-examination was not at issue in
Nesselrode and was not addressed by the Missouri Supreme
Court. The decision in Dempsey was not even discussed in
Nesselrode. Certainly the decision in Dempsey was not overrul-
ed by Nesselrode.

The Eighth Circuit properly decided this issue and certiorari
would be inappropriate in this case.

— 13 —

IV

THE TRIAL COURT RULED THAT iT WOULD
ALLOW PETITIONER TO CROSS-EXAMINE PLAIN-
TIFF’S ECONOMIST ON INCOME TAX EFFECTS ON
FUTURE EARNINGS, AND ALSO STATED THAT IT
WOULD GRANT A MISTRIAL IF PLAINTIFF
COULD SHOW SUCH CROSS-EXAMINATION WAS
IMPROPER. PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY CHOSE
TO MAKE NO FURTHER EFFORTS TO CROSS-
EXAMINE THE ECONOMIST ABOUT INCOME
TAXES. THEREFORE, THIS CASE IS NOT AP-
PROPRIATE FOR REVIEW BY CERTIORARI ON
THAT ISSUE.

Despite the fact that the Eighth Circuit generously considered
the merits of FMC’s argument regarding cross-examination of
plaintiff’s economist on income tax effects on future earnings,
FMC fails to advise this Court that the ruling of the trial court
was actually in FMC’s favor. The trial transcript on appeal con-
tains the following exchange and ruling by the trial court. (R.,
Vol 1, pages 344, line 14 through 345, line 12).

** THE COURT: Mr. Hullverson says as a matter of law
that you can’t get into it.

MR. HULLVERSON: That’s correct.

MR. VENKER: I think that’s wrong, Judge, and I think
it would hamper me prejudicially with an economist pre-
sent to not be able to question him in that regard. That is,
if there were no economist maybe we couldn’t get an in-
struction on it at the end of the case.

THE COURT: Well, if you do I’ll go ahead and let you
— Mr. Hullverson shows that I’m wrong I’ll grant a

mistrial at your request, okay?

_—" o

MR. HULLVERSON: Okay.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. VENKER: So we're talking about —

THE COURT: I’m going ahead and letting you based
on your representation, but if you’re wrong I’m going to
grant a mistrial.

MR. VENKER: Your Honor —

THE COURT: Okay?

MR. VENKER: — are we talking about income tax or
present value or both?

THE COURT: Whatever you want to do.

MR. VENKER: All right.’’

The trial court indicated that it would allow FMC to do
whatever it wanted to do with regard to cross-examination on
the subject of income taxes and present value. The trial court
cautioned that if plaintiff could show that such cross-
examination was improper, a mistrial would be granted.

FMC voluntarily chose to make no further efforts to cross-
examine the economist about income taxes.

On such a record, this case clearly is not appropriate for
review by certiorari on that issue.

The only other incident regarding income taxes which took
place at trial involved plaintiff’s witness, Crawford. Crawford

woe Bas

was a union representative who testified briefly about wages
earned by coal conveyor operators. FMC attempted to ask
whether Crawford’s income figures were ‘“‘net or gross’’. An
objection to this question of this witness was sustained. (R.,
Vol. 2, 70-71). The trial court was well within its discretion in
refusing to allow this cross-examination at this juncture of the
trial. Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 611(b). Such evidence
would have been completely out of context and without any op-
portunity for explanation. Plaintiff's economist had concluded
his testimony and FMC had no economist waiting to testify.

Crawford was a lay witness - basically a records custodian.
No foundation was established by FMC that this witness was
competent to testify about income taxes. Even if the witness
had been allowed to respond that the wage rate for coal
Operators was a ‘“‘gross’’ rate, such testimony would have been
in a vacuum, unrelated to any meaningful testimony by any
economist or other witness.

FMC fails to advise this Court that FMC never even attemp-
ted to make an offer of proof with either one of these witnesses.

Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 103(a)2).

Therefore, FMC was not the victim of an adverse ruling by
the trial court in connection with the economist’s testimony.
The only relevant ruling made by the trial court was actually in
favor of FMC. No appropriate issue was before the Appellate
Court. Certainly, there is no appropriate issue before this Court
for review by certiorari.

MISSOURI LAW PERMITS NO REDUCTION OF
DAMAGES AWARDED UNDER A STRICT LIABILI-
TY THEORY BY ANY PERCENTAGE OF FAULT
ASSESSED TO PLAINTIFF UNDER A .COM-
PARATIVE NEGLIGENCE THEORY. THE COURT
OF APPEALS EXPRESSLY RECOGNIZED THAT
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON THOSE ISSUES
WERE CLEAR AND CORRECT. A NEW TRIAL IS
NOT REQUIRED BY REASON OF A CONCLUDING
‘‘NOTE”’ IN A VERDICT FORM (NOT AN INSTRUC-
TION AS REPRESENTED BY THE PETITIONER TO
THIS COURT) WHICH THE COURT OF APPEALS
HELD WAS LEGALLY CORRECT BUT “POTEN-

TIALLY CONFUSING”.

This product liability case was submitted to the jury on alter-
native theories of strict liability and negligence against defen-
dant FMC in accordance with Missouri Supreme Court approv-
ed Illustration 35.15 (effective January 1, 1988). Missouri Ap-
proved Jury Instructions, Third Edition, 1989 Pocket Part,
pages 122-133. MAI Illustration 35.15 is the Missouri Supreme
Court approved method for submission of negligence and strict
liability where comparative fault is applicable only to the
negligence theory in accordance with the decision in Lippard v.
Houdaille Industries, 715 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. 1986).

In Lippard, the Missouri Supreme Court stated as foliows:

‘“We conclude that there should be no change in the
Missouri common law rule, as established in the Keener
opinion (citation omitted), that the plaintiff’s contributory
negligence is not at issue in a products liability case. /t
should neither defeat nor diminish recovery . . . if the pro-
duct is a legal cause of injury, then even a negligent plain-
tiff should be able to recover.’’ (715 S.W.2d at 493, em-
phasis supplied).

— 17 —

‘*We adhere to the view that distributors of ‘defective pro-
ducts unreasonably dangerous’ should pay damages for in-
juries caused by the products, without reduction because a
plaintiff may have been guilty of a degree of carelessness. 5
(715 S.W.2d at 494).

The Missouri Supreme Court clearly has indicated the viabili-
ty of submission of alternative theories of strict liability and
negligence in a products liability case. Lippard v. Houdaille In-
dustries, 715 S.W.2d at 494, n. 3; and Nesselrode v. Executive
Beachcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371, 373 (Mo. 1986). Likewise,
the decisions of the Eighth Circuit have recognized that the sub-
mission of multiple theories of negligence and strict liabilitv is
appropriate under Missouri law. Vanskike v. ACF Industries,
Inc., 665 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1981); and Lewy v. Remington
Arms Co., Inc., 836 F.2d 1104, 1106 (8th Cir. 1988).

In this case, the jury clearly found in favor of plaintiff and
against the defendant on the strict liability theory. On the
negligence theory, the jury determined that both FMC and the
plaintiff were negligent. On this negligence theory, the jury
assessed ten percent fault to the defendant and ninety percent
fault to the plaintiff. Under Lippard, comparative fault applies
only to a negligence theory and does not apply to a theory of
strict liability. Finally, the jury determined that plaintiff's total
damages, disregarding fault on the part of the plaintiff, was
Two Million Dollars.

The following statement appears on pages 1 and 2 of the
Jurisdictional Statement of FMC’s Petition for Writ of Cer-
tiorari.

**On March 15, 1988, the jury returned a verdict in favor
of plaintiff and the trial judge entered judgment in the
amount of $200,000.00. See infra Appendix at A-!. On
July 13, 1988, the trial judge amended the jury’s award to
$2,000,000.00 and entered judgment in that amount. See
infra Appendix at A-2.”’

These characterizations of the verdict and the trial court’s ac-
tions are misleading. The only amount set forth by the jury in
the verdict form was Two Million Dollars ($2,000,000.00). A
Two Hundred Thousand Dollar figure nowhere appears in the
verdict form as completed by the jury. The trial judge did not
amend the jury award. The trial judge merely entered judg-
ment, in accordance with Lippard, for Two Million Dollars on
the strict liability theory, for Two Hundred Thousand Dollars
on the negligence theory, with the proviso that the amount
recoverable under the negligence theory would not be in addi-
tion to the amount recoverable under the strict liability theory.
See Appendix at A-24-25. This judgment was perfectly correct
under Missouri law. FMC inappropriately palters by referring
to the jury verdict as one ‘“‘for Two Hundred Thousand
Dollars’’ and by making it appear that the trial judge entered an
additur.

FMC concedes that the only difficulty with the verdict form is
contained in the closing ‘‘note’’. See Appendix at A-7. In seek-
ing certiorari on this basis, FMC conveniently omits any discus-
sion of the actual jury instructions in this case. In its opinion in
this case, 892 F.2d at 1378, the Eighth Circuit expressly held
that the actual jury instructions in this case ‘‘were quite clear
that the jury finding on comparative fault does not so apply’’ to
the strict liability theory. See Appendix at A-10. The Eighth
Circuit stated that the actual jury instructions properly in-
structed the jury that comparative fault principles do not apply
to strict liability claims. The Eighth Circuit also recognized that
the actual jury instructions advised the jury that the percentage
of fault assessed to plaintiff under the negligence theory would
only affect the recovery on that negligence theory. See Appen-
dix at A-9. y

The Eighth Circuit utilized the appropriate standard of ap-
pellate review with regard to jury instructions when it stated:

‘*As a whole, the instructions correctly and specifically in-
structed the jury about the ambiguities the [verdict] form

— 19 —

may have created. Given this correct and explicit instruc-
tion, it is mere speculation that the jury calculated total
damages at $2,000,000.00 in anticipation of a reduction for
plaintiff's comparative fault on the negligence claim.’’ 892
F.2d at 1378-79. See Appendix at A-10.

Given this very explicit finding by the Eighth Circuit, there is
simply no issue presented which is worthy of consideration by
this Court on a Petition for Writ of Certiorari under Supreme
Court Rule 10.1(a). This is particularly true, as more fully set
forth in Point VI of this Brief, because FMC failed to make any
specific objection to the closing ‘‘note’’ in the verdict form
under Rule 51, Fed.R.Civ.Pro., and failed to offer an alter-
native verdict form or clarifying language.

a

VI

THE ISSUE INVOLVING THE CONCLUDING
‘‘NOTE” IN THE VERDICT FORM DOES NOT PRE-
SENT AN APPROPRIATE CASE FOR REVIEW BY
CERTIORARI WHERE THE PETITIONER MADE NO
SPECIFIC OBJECTION TO THAT “NOTE” UNDER
RULE 51, FED.R.CIV.PRO., AND FAILED TO
TENDER AN ALTERNATIVE VERDICT FORM OR
CLARIFYING LANGUAGE.

At trial, the only comment that counsel for FMC had with
respect to the verdict form is reflected at R., Vol. 3, page 209, as
follows:

‘* MR. VENKER: The only objection that I had to it,
Your Honor, was that I stated earlier and that is just that I
think with two verdict directors on two different theories
there should be two verdict forms. I mean I’ve seen this
this morning for the first time and haven’t had a chance to
draft my own, but I would just say simply that they ought
to be separate and not put together in the same verdict
form.”’

Rule 51, Fed.R.Civ.Pro. provides in pertinent part, as
follows:

‘* |. . No party may assign an error the giving or the failing
to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto
before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating
distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the ob-
jection...”

a«e, eo

The only complaint relating to alleged-instructional error
made by petitioner FMC, pertains to the concluding ‘‘Note’’ on
the verdict form used at trial. At no time during trial did FMC
ever raise any issue with regard to that concluding ‘‘note’’. The
only objection made at trial by FMC with respect to the verdict
form was the suggestion by FMC that the claims based on
theories of negligence and strict liability should be submitted by
way of separate verdict forms on each theory.

As such, FMC has waived any allegation of error with respect
to that verdict form on the grounds asserted in its Petition.
Rouse v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co., 474
F.2d 1180, 1184 (8th Cir. 1973); 9 C. Wright & A. Miller,
Federal Practice & Procedure, Sec. 2551 and 2553 (1971).

“*A party may not state one ground when objecting to an
instruction and attempt to rely on a different ground for
the objection on appeal or on a motion for a new trial. Nor
will an objection to one part o° the charge permit a party to
assert error later in a different part of the charge.’’ Jd. at
645, 646.

FMC had every opportunity to appropriately object to the
concluding note in the verdict form. It failed to do so. FMC
had every opportunity to tender an alternative verdict form. It
failed to do so. FMC had every opportunity to suggest a
clarification or amendment to the verdict form used by the
District Court. It failed to do so. FMC had every opportunity
to tender a special verdict form submitting special inter-
rogatories recommended for a product liability case submitting

te HD nin

both negligence and strict liability, which may be found at
Federal Jury Practice & Instructions, Devitt, Blackmar &
Wolff, Vol. 3, Fourth Edition, Sec. 74.12. FMC failed to do so.

At no time did FMC object or attempt to clarify the ‘“‘note’’
which it now contends would have made the verdict form more
clear to the jury. Also, at no time during final argument did
FMC ever explain to the jury the effect of the joint submission
of negligence and strict liability theories. FMC had every op-
portunity to argue these issues to the jury. FMC failed to do so.

Under these circumstances, this case does not present an ap-
propriate issue for review by certiorari by this Court. This is
especially true by virtue of the fact that the Eighth Circuit ex-
pressly held that the concluding ‘‘note’’ in the verdict form was
legally correct and did not misstate Missouri law. 892 F.2d at
1377. See Appendix at A-8.

ee i

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, FMC’s Petition for Writ of Cer-

tiorari should be denied.

Given the numerous omissions of fact and law by FMC in its
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, this Court may wish to consider
application of Supreme Court Rule 42.2 or a direction to the
District Court to consider application of Rule 11,

Fed.R.Civ.Pro.

Respectfully submitted,

The Hullverson Law Firm

James E. Hullverson, Jr.
Counsel of Record

1010 Market Street, Suite 1550

St. Louis, Missouri 63101

(314) 421-2313

and

Stephen H. Ringkam
Counsel for Respondent

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 88-2823

Todd Gander,
Appellee,
v.
FMC Corporation,
Appellant.
Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri.

Submitted: September 13, 1989
Filed: January 12, 1990

Before ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit
Judge, and BEAM, Circuit Judge.

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

FMC Corporation appeals a judgment in favor of Todd
Gander for $2,000,000, entered on July 13, 1988, following a
jury trial. Gander’s theories of recovery for personal injuries
sounded in both strict liability in tort and negligence, and the
jury found in favor of Gander on both claims. The jury also

ee ll aes

assessed Gander’s comparative fault on the negligence claim at
90%. On appeal, FMC argues that the verdict form was confus-
ing and misstated the law, and that the district court should
have allowed FMC to cross-examine Gander’s witnesses about
the effects of income tax assessments on Gander’s lost income.
While we have some reservations about the verdict form, we af-
firm.

I. BACKGROUND

Gander lost his right arm at the elbow on February 23, 1985,
while working for Anheuser-Busch in St. Louis. Gander work-
ed as a coal conveyor operator, and made $34,560 plus benefits
in 1984. At the time of trial in 1986, the average pay for coal
conveyor operators was $47,891 plus benefits.

As a coal conveyor operator, Gander’s work entailed
shepherding coal from its entry into the plant to the boilers
where it was converted to electrical energy. The conveyor belts
which transported the coal frequently would ride to one side of
their drive drums as the result of coal dust accumulating on the
drums. When the conveyor belt rode to one side, it would often
climb the wall, causing coal spills.

On February 23, 1985, Gander was working near a head
pulley drum which had become clogged with coal, and which
was partly responsible for a major coal spill. Gander had been
taught to clean the drum with a fox tail brush, without shutting
off the system. Gander thus proceeded to clean the drum with
the fox tail brush, but the rolling drum caught the fox tail brush,
pulling Gander’s forearm into the device before he was able to
let go. The rolling drum literally lifted Gander off the ground,
and his arm was severed at the elbow when it came into contact
with a shear guard. Fellow workers took Gander to Barnes
Hospital where his arm was reattached.

Although Gander’s surgery was successful to the extent that
he still has his right arm, he testified at trial that the arm is

|

Merete —

a

essentially useless. ‘‘It’s just like an ornament hanging on, it’s
no good.”” Trial Transcript, vol. 1, at 122. He has only limited
movement in his shoulder and must wear a brace to keep his
wrist straight. It otherwise flops limply. Gander has no feeling
in his fingers, has lost his fingernails, and must wear a glove on
his hand to prevent swelling. Gander’s useless right arm causes
him problems with minor things, like buttoning the top of his
shirt or tying his shoe laces; Gander testified that these problems
cause him to be frustrated and irritable. Moreover, attempts at
vocational rehabilitation were unsuccessful, and Gander was
discharged from Anheuser-Busch on August 31, 1987. He now
does some volunteer work at a local hospital. The trial
testimony indicated that the injury has enormcusly changed
Ganders life.

As indicated, the case was tried to a jury on theories of strict
products liability and negligence. The single verdict form sub-
mitted to the jury contained reference to both theories. Part I
required a verdict on the strict liability claim. Part II required
the jury to assess the comparative fault of the plaintiff and the
defendant in the event that it found for the plaintiff or the
negligence claim. Part III required the jury to assess total
damages. The jury found for Gander on both theories, assessed
Gander’s fault at 90%, and found total damages to be
$2,000,000.

After the jury was dismissed, however, the district court ex-
pressed doubt about whether the jury verdict was for $2,000,000
or for $200,000; i.e., $2,000,000 total damages reduced by the
90% fault assessed to Gander. The district court initially
entered judgment for $200,000. On Gander’s motion to amend
the judgment, however, the court decided that Gander was en-
titled to $2,000,000 on the strict liability claim, which could not
be reduced by Gander’s comparative fault under Missouri law.
This appeal followed.

sy

li. DISCUSSION
A. The Verdict Form

FMC argues on appeal that the district court erred both in
submitting to the jury Gander’s verdict form, which it argues
was confusing and inaccurate, and in amending judgment.
While the arguments are closely related and both ultimately turn
on whether the verdict form correctly stated Missouri law, we

treat the arguments separately.

The verdict form was submitted by Gander, and was taken
from the Missouri Approved Jury Instructions. MAI 35.15 il-
lustration (3d ed. Supp. 1989) (the form is indicated as Verdict
A, and is taken from MAI 36.01 and 37.07). The form used is
approved, at least as an illustration, by the Missouri Supreme
Court for the submission of both strict liability and negligence
claims, and was new at the time of trial. Brief for Appeilant at
9. It contains three parts,' the first dealing with the strict liabili-

' Beginning with Part I, the verdict form reads as follows:
NOTE: Complete this form as required by your verdict.

On the claim of plaintiff Todd Gander for personal injury based on
the theory of strict liability against defendant FMC/Link-Belt Cor-
poration, we, the jury, find in favor of:

ses
PART II
NOTE: Complete the following by filling in the blanks as required by
your verdict on the claim of plaintiff for personal injury based on the
claim of negligence whether or not you found in favor of plaintiff on
his claim for personal injury based on product defect. If you assess a
percentage of fault to any of those listed below, write in a percentage
not greater than 100%. Otherwise, write in ‘‘zero’’ next to that name.

If you assess a percentage of fault to any of those listed below, the
total of such percentages must be 100%.

On the claim of plaintiff for personal injury based on negligence, we,
the jury, assess percentages of fault as follows:

eS

ty claim, the second with comparative fault on the negligence
claim, and the third with total damages. The difficulty the
district court had, and the arguable error in the form, stems
from the closing note, which explains the reduction in damages
for plaintiff’s comparative fault on the negligence claim.

After the jury had been dismissed, FMC remarked that the ver-
dict appeared to be $200,000; i.e., $2,000,000 total damages
reduced by the 90% fault assessed to Gander. - Trial Transcript,
vol, 3, at 270. Gander argued that the verdict was for 12,000,000,
since the jury found for Gander on the strict liability claim, which
could not be reduced by Gander’s comparative fault. Jd. at 272.
The district court replied: ‘‘Not based on the note on part three.’’
Id. After quoting the note, the court continued: ‘‘This is direct-
ing me to reduce that by 90 percent.’’ Jd. at 274. The district
court then entered judgment for $200,000.

NOTE: If you assessed a percentage of fault to any defen-
dant on plaintiff’s claim for personal injury based on negli-
gence, the judge will reduce the total amount of plaintiff’s
damages by any percentage of fault you assess to plaintiff.

Upon Gander’s motion to amend, however, the district court
decided that it had improperly reduced the total damages by the

PART Ill

NOTE: Complete the following paragraph if you find in favor of
plaintiff on his claim for personal injury besed on product defect or if
you assessed a percentage of fault to any defendant on plaintiff’s
claim for personal injury based on negligence.

We, the jury, find the total amount of plaintiff’s damages disregard-
ing any fault on the part of plaintiff to be

ees =

NOTE: If you assessed a percentage of fault to any defendant on
plaintiff’s claim for personal injury based on negligence, the judge
will reduce the total amount of plaintiff’s damages by any percentage
of fault you assess to plaintiff.

Tom

percentage of comparative fault assessed to Gander. ‘‘In-
asmuch as this is a case in which comparative negligence prin-
ciples apply only to the jury’s determination on the negligence
claim and not to the strict liability claim, the jury’s findings as
reflected on the verdict form entitle plaintiff to a judgment in
the amount of Two Million Dollars ($2,000,000).’” Memoran-
dum and Order, No. 87-1155C(6), July 13, 1988, at 2.

To the extent that FMC argues that the district court erred in
amending its judgment, we disagree. ‘“The decision to grant or
deny a Rule 59 motion is committed to the sound discretion of
the trial court.”” A.W. v. Northwest R-1 School Dist., 813 F.2d
158, 165 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987); Slater v.
KFC Corp., 621 F.2d 932, 939 (8th Cir. 1980). Under Missouri
law, which we are bound to apply in this diversity case, see
Walker v. Paccar, Inc., 802 F.2d 1053, 1055 (8th Cir. 1986), the
district court was correct in amending the judgment. Missouri
law is clear that a verdict resting on a strict liability claim cannot
be reduced by a plaintiff’s comparative fault. In Lippard v.
Houdaille Indus., 715 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. 1986), the Missouri
Supreme Court held that ‘‘the plaintiff’s contributory negli-
gence is not at issue in a products liability case.’’ Id. at 493. The
court explained that negligence on the part of plaintiff should
neither prohibit nor reduce plaintiff’s recovery on a strict liabili-
ty claim. ‘‘We adhere to the view that distributors of ‘defective
products unreasonably dangerous’ should pay damages for in-
juries caused by the products, without reduction because a
plaintiff may have been guilty of a degree of carelessness.’’ Jd.
at 494. As defense counsel admitted at oral argument, the judg-
ment of $200,000 under the strict liability theory was clearly
incorrect as a matter of Missouri law. Therefore, we find no
abuse of discretion by the district court.

This does not, however, end the matter. FMC’s argument is
better stated in terms of the verdict form’s correctness. That is,
the fact that the amended judgment properly reflected Missouri
law does not mean that the verdict form itself did not misstate

—_

Missouri law or unduly confuse the jury. Thus, FMC argues that
the form was incorrect as a matter of law, or, in the alternative,
that it was so confusing that the intent of the jury is unclear. The
jury may, indeed, have been misled by the closing note, which
could be read (as first read by the district court) to apply com-
parative fault to the strict liability claim as well as to the
negligence claim. On its face, the note is not specifically limited
to one negligence claim. Nor does the note specifically apply to
the strict liability claim. Because of this ambiguity, the jury, ac-
cording to FMC, may have been led to conclude that total
damages would be reduced by any percentage of fault assessed to
Gander, even though it found in Gander’s favor on the strict
liability claim. Hence, FMC argues, the jury probably intended
that Gander receive only $200,000, and thus assessed total
damages of $2,000,000 because it thought that total damages
would be reduced by 90%. We must, therefore, consider wheth-
er the verdict form is legally incorrect or unduly misleading.

While it is a close question, we do not think that the verdict
form misstates Missouri law. FMC agreed at oral argument that
the difficulty with the form stems from the closing note, which,
as indicated, can be read to require a reduction, based on plain-
tiff’s comparative fault on the negligence claim, in the strict
liability claim. Although the note leaves open this possibility, it
does not, as the district court initially thought, require it.
Because of its grammatical structure and location, the note is
somewhat misleading. The note can be read to indicate a con-
nection between a finding of contributory fault on the negli-
gence claim and a reduction in total damages. Jf the jury asses-
ses a percentage of fault to any defendant, then ‘‘the judge will
reduce’ total damages accordingly. The reduction in damages
thus can be caused by the jury assessing fault, regardless of any
finding on the strict liability claim. While this is a possible
reading of the note, it is not a required reading.

However, as a matter of law, the note is not incorrect; it is
simply unclear. Given that Missouri law is clear that the judge

—

cannot apply comparative negligence principles to the strict
liability claim, the strict liability claim will, in fact, be unaf-
fected by any percentage of fault assessed to plaintiff on the
negligence claim. The note does not require otherwise, and thus
is not legally incorrect. It does not misstate Missouri law.

The verdict form is, however, at least potentially confusing to
the jury.2, We must, therefore, consider whether the form,
taken together with the instructions to the jury, is so misleading
or confusing that the jury verdict cannot stand. In determining
whether the verdict form is confusing, we must consider it in
light of the instruction given. See United States v. Hines, 728
F.2d 421, 427 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1246 (1984). It
is enough if the ‘‘charge as a whole . . . state[s] the governing
law fairly; technical imperfections or a lack of absolute clarity
will not render the instructions erroneous.’’ Toro Co. v. R&R
Products Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1215 (8th Cir. 1986). We find that
the jury was correctly and adequately instructed on Missouri
law, and, therefore, that the verdict form, not clearly wrong,
also is not so confusing that the jury verdict must be upset.

The important inquiry is whether the jury was properly in-
structed that damages were to be calculated regardless of any
fault assessed to plaintiff on the negligence claim. Initially, we
note that the verdict form itself is clear and correct on this mat-
ter. In Part III, in which the jury finds total damages, the form
states: ‘‘We, the jury, find the total amount of plaintiff’s

2 Although we hold that the verdict form is technically correct, and
that we cannot set aside the jury verdict in this case, we recommend
that the form not be used by the federal district courts of this circuit as
presently written. The form could be substantially clarified by simply
eliminating the concluding note, which FMC agreed at oral argument
is the main problem with the form. MAI 37.03 as written in the MAI
35.15 illustration clearly and correctly instructs the jury on the same
matters which the concluding note attempts to cover. The note is,
therefore, unnecessary. If a note is deemed to be required, several
alternative versions that clarify the problem readily come to mind.

<_< a

damages disregarding any fault on the part of plaintiff to be
__.”’ (emphasis added). This instruction that comparative
fault is not to be considered in calculating total damages is much
clearer than is any inference from the concluding note that
might lead the jury to inflate total damages in anticipation of a
reduction for plaintiff’s comparative fault on the negligence
claim. Instruction number 18 further provided that, if the jury
found in favor of Gander on the strict liability claim, or assessed
a percentage of fault to FMC on the negligence claim, then

disregarding any fault on the part of plaintiff, you must
determine the total amount of his damages to be such sum
as will fairly and justly compensate him for any damages
you believe he sustained and is reasonably certain to sus-
tain in the future as a direct result of the occurrence men-
tioned in the evidence.

Moreover, the jury was specifically instructed, through instruc-
tion number 18, that it should calculate total damages regardless
of plaintiff’s fault. ‘‘In determining the total amount of plain-
tiff’s Camages, you must not reduce such damages by any per-
centage of fault you may assess to plaintiff.’’ Instruction
number 18, see also MAI 37.03 (3d ed. 1989 Supp.). Thus, the
district court correctly instructed the jury that its function was
not to determine the amount of plaintiff’s recovery, but to de-
termine the amount of plaintiff’s total damages. Any efforts by
the jury to calculate damages in terms of plaintiff’s recovery
would be contrary to the court’s instructions. |

Not only was the jury properly instructed on its role in calcu-
lating damages, but the district court also properly instructed
the jury that comparative fault principles do not apply to strict
liability claims. Instruction number 18 provided that: ‘‘The
judge will compute any recovery on plaintiff’s claim for per-
sonal injury based on negligence by reducing the amount you
find as plaintiff’s total damages by any percentage of fault you
assess to plaintiff.’’ Instruction number 18, see also MAI 35.15

=v

illustration (3d ed. Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).’ Thus, while
the verdict form may be unclear about whether its concluding
note applies to the strict liability claim, the instructions were
quite clear that the jury finding on comparative fault does not
so apply. As a whole, the instructions correctly and specifically
instructed the jury about the ambiguities the form may have
created. Given this correct and explicit instruction, it is mere
speculation that the jury calculated total damages at $2,000,000
in anticipation of a reduction for plaintiff’s comparative fault
on the negligence claim.

Moreover, mere speculation that a jury verdict may have been
based on the jury’s own misunderstanding of the law, even
though properly instructed, is an insufficient basis on which to
upset a jury verdict. ‘‘It is well settled that a jury’s misunder-
standing of testimony, misapprehension of law, errors in compu-
tation or improper methods of computation, unsound reasoning
or other improper motives cannot be used to impeach a verdict.”’
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R. v. Speth, 404 F.2d 291, 295
(8th Cir. 1968). In Speth, the jury assessed plaintiff’s con-
tributory negligence at 40% and awarded $16,000 in damages.
The district court, sua sponte, asked the jury whether its damage
award was net or gross. The jury responded that its calculation
was a net figure, compensating for plaintiff’s contributory
negligence. The jury thus intended for plaintiff to recover
$16,000. When the district court sent the jury back to recalculate
damages, it returned with a figure of $40,000. On appeal, this
court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the issue of
damages. /d. at 296. This is not to say, however, that when a
jury verdict ‘‘on its face shows a clear disregard for the court’s in-

‘MAI 37.03, from which the illustration is drawn, differs materially
from the illustration and from the instruction given at trial. MAI
37.03 does not discuss alternate theories of liability submitted to the
jury, and thus the specific reference to Gander’s claim based on
negligence, emphasized in the text above, varies from MAI 37.03.

— A-ll —

structions,’’ id. at 295, it cannot be corrected. But given correct
instruction on the law and no clear disregard for that instruction
on the face of the verdict, a jury verdict must remain immune
from questioning by the district court and from speculation by an
appellate court that the verdict may be based on a misunder-
standing of the law. Whether the jury misunderstood a correct
instruction of the law is an improper subject for mere specu-
lation. See 6A J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice { 59.08[4], at
59-115 to 116 (1989) (‘fa verdict cannot be upset by
speculation’’); id. at 59-127 (“‘A mere suspicion, however, that
the jury has not followed the court’s instructions is not sufficient,
since that would make the verdict too vulnerable and would
needlessly prolong litigation.’’); Peveto v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
807 F.2d 486, 490 (Sth Cir. 1987) (‘‘Whether or not the jury
misunderstood the charge of the court is not a question to be
reexamined after the verdict has been rendered.’’) (citation omit-
ted).

Our holding finds support as well in the cases which, based on
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), forbid improper impeachment
of a jury verdict. While no improper impeachment occurred in
this case, Rule 606(b) establishes that it would have been im-
proper to inquire of the jurors what they really intended by their
verdict. In Karl v. Burlington Northern Ry. Co., 880 F.2d 68
(8th Cir. 1989), the jury returned a verdict in a personal injury
action in favor of plaintiff. Jd. at 69. The jury found plaintiff
to be 75% at fault, id. at 70 n.3, and assessed damages at
$273,750. The jury was instructed to assess damages ‘‘without
taking into consideration any reduction of the plaintiff’s claim
due to her own negligence.’’ Jd. at 70 n.4. The district court,
however, called the jury foreman at the request of plaintiff’s
counsel, to determine whether the jury calculated damages with-
out regard for plaintiff’s contributory negligence. Jd. at 71. The
jury foreman explained that $273,750 was 25% of what plaintiff
asked for, and was what the jury intended plaintiff to recover.
Id. The district court then amended judgment to reflect actual
damages of $1,095,000. Jd. at 72.

— A-12 —

This court reversed the amended judgment. Relying on Rule
606(b), which provides that a juror may not testify about the
jury’s thought processes during deliberations for purposes of
impeaching the verdict, we found the amendment to be impro-
per. Jd. at 73-74. The impeaching testimony concerned ‘‘how
the jury interpreted the court’s instructions, and concerns the
jurors’ ‘mental processes.’ ’’ Jd. at 74. The testimony,
therefore, violated Rule 606(b). Given that ‘‘there is no other
indication that the jury’s first verdict was deficient,’’ id. at 75,
this court remanded to reinstate the first verdict.

Similarly, while no impeachment of the jury verdict took
place in this case, any inquiry by the district court would have
been improper. Nor is there any ‘‘other indication that the
jury’s verdict was deficient.’’ We are, therefore, unwilling to
speculate that the jury, even though properly instructed, mis-
understood the law and, therefore, did not intend to award
plaintiff damages of $2,000,000. See also Scogin v. Century
Fitness, Inc., 780 F.2d 1316, 1320 (8th Cir. 1985); Peveto, 807
F.2d at 489.

Finally we find it persuasive that the evidence of damages in
this case is sufficient to support the jury’s calculation of dam-
ages of $2,000,000. The uncontradicted figures for lost wages,
past and future, provided by plaintiff’s expert witness, Viscusi,
establish damages in excess of $2,000,000. Viscusi testified that
at the contract wage for an oiler (all Anheuser-Busch oilers were
actually paid more), Gander’s lost wages for the next twenty
seven years would be $1,395,711. Trial Transcript, vol. 1, at
316. Given Gander’s substantial earnings growth of 15% for
the four years prior to the accident, id. at 307, Viscusi called this
figure “‘ludicrous.’”’ Jd. at 317. Rather, Gander’s lost wages
were more accurately reflected by considering wages for the
average oiler, and would be closer to $1,693,000. Jd. at 318.
Viscusi also gave lost wage scenarios which calculated Gander’s
wage growth at better than the rate of interest, and gave figures
ranging from $1,808,714 to $2,217,761. Jd. at 320-22. Gander’s

Pee ee

— A-13 —

counsel used these figures, together with past wage losses,
medical bills and pain and suffering, to argue for $3,000,000 in
damages. /d. vol. 3, at 234-35.‘

Nor were these figures at all excessive in light of Gander’s in-
jury. Gander’s physician testified that Gander’s right arm is
almost useless; that he has no use of his fingers, which frequent-
ly swell and develop ulcers; that he has permanent, burning pain
in his thumb, index and middle fingers, which are otherwise
numb; that he must wear a splint to support his wrist and a
glove to keep down the swelling in his hand; that his arm is sub-
ject to injury and heals slowly; that the swelling in his arm is
likely permanent; and that Gander’s arm is 95% permanently
disabled. Id. vol. 2, at 34-59.

Gander’s psychiatrist also testified that the injury has caused
substantial psychological problems. When Gander first con-
tacted the psychiatrist, he was severely depressed and suicidal,
and had to be hospitalized for treatment. Jd. at 75. The psy-
chiatrist still sees Gander monthly, and testified that his symp-
toms are in a constant state of flux. Jd. at 80. While Gander is
no longer suicidal, the scars on his body from skin grafts, nerve
and vein transpiants, and muscle harvesting are devastating to
Gander’s self-image. Jd. at 77. Gander is also easily frustrated
and irritable, suffers from insomnia, a decreased interest in in-
timacy with his wife, feelings of hopelessness and worthlessness,
and generally has a poor outlook for the future. Jd. at 90.
Moreover, the psychiatrist testified that, on the basis of psy-
chology alone, Gander should not return to work, where he
would likely be frustrated and perhaps disposed to again think
of suicide. Jd. at 84. The psychiatrist testified that Gander’s
long range outlook is poor. Jd.

* While counsel said at oral argument that Gander asked for
$4,900,000 in damages, the trial transcript contains only the
$3,000,000 figure. Trial Transcript, vol. 3, at 234-35.

— Al4 —

Thus, given the substantial evidence supporting the jury’s
calculation of damages at $2,000,000, the correct instruction of
the law, and mere speculation that the jury may have intended
to award Gander only $200,000, we cannot set aside the jury
verdict on the ground that the verdict form was unclear.

B. Income Taxes

FMC next argues that the district court erred in not permit-
ting cross-examination of Gander’s witnesses about the effect of
income taxes on Gander’s lost income. FMC first attempted to
cross-examine Viscusi, the economist who testified about
Gander’s lost wages, FMC asked Viscusi whether the figures he
was using were in terms of gross-income. Counsel then asked
whether Gander would actually get those gross dollars, to which
Gander objected. Trial Transcript, vol. 1, at 340-41. At the
bench, Gander said that under Missouri law, income tax
assessments were inappropriate subjects for cross-examination,
and that any contrary holdings from FELA cases could not app-
ly in this diversity case. Jd. at 342. FMC suggested that it
should be able to cross-examine the economist, but when asked
by the court whether the law was clear that such cross-
examination was permissible, FMC counsel responded: ‘‘I think
I can.”’ Id. at 343. The district court allowed FMC to cross-
examine on income taxes, but also said that it would grant a
mistrial if Gander were able to show that such cross-
examination was improper. Jd. at 344. FMC made no further
efforts to cross-examine Viscusi about income taxes.

The second exchange over income taxes occurred at the
bench, when FMC presented to the court Nesselrode v. Ex-
ecutive Beachcraft, Inc., 7070 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1986), which
FMC said permitted cross-examination on income taxes. Trial
Transcript, vol. 2, at 2-3. The district court noted, however,
that Nesselrode made the law no clearer, and thus adhered to its

original ruling. Jd. at 4.

FMC then attemped to cross-examine Crawford, Gander’s
witness from the union. Counsel asked Crawford, who testified

— A-15 —

about wages earned by coal conveyor operators at Anheuser-
Busch, whether his figures were net or gross. Gander objected
on the basis of the previous discussions, and this time the objec-
tion was explicitly sustained. Jd. at 70-71.’

Finally, FMC tendered an instruction on reduction to present
value, which it then linked to the issue of whether the total
award was subject to income taxation. /d. vol. 3, at 214-15.
Gander objected to the instruction and the court agreed, thus
precluding FMC from arguing the taxability of the award to the
jury. Jd. at 215.° It is somewhat unclear from the objections
and the discussions at trial whether FMC appeals from the
district court’s rulings on cross-examination or from the district
court’s refusal to instruct the jury that the judgment was not
subject to income taxation. In either case, however, Missouri
law is clear that the trial court did not err in its rulings.

We must first consider the appropriate governing law, for
FMC argues in its brief that these issues are controlled by Nor-
JSolk & Western Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980) and Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523 (1983). In Liepelt,
and FELA action, the Supreme Court considered whether the

* While the district court’s initial ruling on Gander’s first objection
to FMC’s cross-examination was to conditionally allow it subject to
the same sort of cross-examination. Thus, while Gander argued at
oral argument that FMC could not appeal from the district court’s rul-
ing in its favor, we think that FMC’s claim that it was effectively pro-
hibited from undertaking its proposed cross-examination is essentially
accurate.

* It is clear that the prior discussions related only to cross-
examination about the effects of income taxes on Gander’s lost in-
come. With reference to the present value instruction and proposed
argument on income taxes, however, FMC makes reference to
Gander’s income tax liability on the judgment, a different matter.
Trial Transcript, vol. 3, at 215. FMC may have been concerned that
the jury would inflate the judgment to compensate for income taxes if
it were not informed that the judgment is not subject to income tax.

—~Ad6 —

jury should receive both evidence of the effect of income taxes
on lost wages and an instruction on the taxability of a final
award. As to the effects of taxes on a lost income stream, the
Supreme Court held that such evidence was neither too
speculative nor complex for a modern jury to understand, and
thus, was proper to establish after-tax earnings. Liepelt, 444
U.S. at 494. The Supreme Court also held that it was error to
refuse to give an instruction that the final award was not subject
to income tax. Jd. at 498.’ FMC argues that these cases
establish that the district court erred in its rulings.‘

Thése cases, however, are not controlling. We have
specifically held, in Adams v. Fuqua Indus., 820 F.2d 271 (8th
Cir. 1987), that Liepelt does not control in non-FELA cases. In
Adams, appellant argued that the rationale of Liepelt
transcends the FELA context and that it should, therefore, app-
ly in diversity actions. Jd. at 276. This court rejected the argu-
ment, and, in considering an instruction on the taxability of an
award, held that: ‘‘Whether to give or withhold a taxability in-
struction is a question of state law, which we are bound to
follow.’’ Id. at 277. More generally, the law is perfectly clear
that ‘‘when a tort action is brought in federal court pursuant to
diversity jurisdiction, basing liability on state law, the court
must apply state law in regard to availability and computation
of damages.’’ Jd. (quoting Losey v. North American Philips
Consumer Electronics Corp., 792 F.2d 58, 61-62 (6th Cir.

’ The Supreme Court relied in part on the Missouri case, Dempsey
v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952). The approved in-
struction was as follows: ‘‘Your award will not be subject to any in-
come taxes, and you should not consider such taxes in fixing the
amount of your award.”’ Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 492.

* Jones & Laughlin essentially follows Liepelt, and holds that in
calculating a lost income stream, income tax evidence is appropriate.
**Since the damages award is tax-free, the relevant stream is ideally of
after-tax wages and benefits. Jones & Laughlin, 462 U.S. at 534.

_

— A-17 —

(1986)). Moreover, this court in Adams specifically rejected a
Seventh Circuit case’ which applied Liepe/t in a diversity case.
We defer instead to ‘‘Missouri’s right to create its own law free
from federal interference.’’ Adams, 820 F.2d at 278. Thus, we
apply Missouri law. ,

Missouri law is clear that it is not error for a court to refuse to
give an instruction that an award is not subject to income taxa-
tion. At one time, Missouri law favored such an instruction. In
Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952), an
FELA case, defendant argued error in the court’s refusal to give
an instruction that no income tax would be assessed on the judg-
ment. Jd. at 43-44. The Missouri Supreme Court agreed, find-
ing no reason not to give the instruction, especially given the
danger that the jury could incorrectly overcompensate for taxes
on the judgment. It was, therefore, error to refuse the instruc-
tion. Jd. at 45. More recent Missouri cases, however, establish
that Dempsey has been superseded by Missouri Approved Jury
Instructions (MAI) outside of the FELA context, and that it is
not error to refuse such an instruction.

The Missouri Court of Appeals reviewed several decisions on
this issue in Tennis v. General Motors Corp., 625 S.W.2d 218
(Mo. Ct. App. 1981). Noting that Dempsey was an FELA case
and was decided before the Missouri Approved Jury Instruc-
tions were approved by the Missouri Supreme Court, the court
explained its ruling in Senter v. Ferguson, 486 S.W.2d 644 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1972), in which the court held that it was error to give
the same instruction given in Dempsey. In Tennis, the court ex-
plained that Senter was a post-MAI case, and that MAI 4.01,
not Dempsey, controlled the instruction issue in a non-FELA
case. MAI 4.01, the only permissible and authorized damage in-
struction in a non-FELA case, explicitly did not incorporate the

* In re Air Crash Disaster, 701 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 866 (1983).

— A-18 —

Dempsey FELA instruction. Thus, to give the instruction
would be error, since the instruction is ‘‘clearly an addition to or
‘modification’ of MAI 4.01.’’ Tennis,-625 S.W.2d at 226.
Moreover, the second edition of MAI did not include the Demp-
sey instruction even in its damage instructions for FELA cases,
MAI 8.01 and 8.02. Following the Supreme Court decision in
Liepelt, however, both FELA instructions were modified in the
third edition to contain the charge that ‘‘ ‘any award you may
make is not subject to income tax.’ ”’ Jd. at 227. ‘‘It seems wor-
thy of note that although FELA instructions MAI 8.01 and 8.02
‘ were changed in the 3rd Edition of MAI in compliance with
Norfolk, MAI [4.01] has not been altered nor amended to in-
clude a direction that any awarded damages are ‘not subject iv
income tax.’ ’’ Id. Thus, in Tennis, the Missouri Court of Ap-
peals found no error in the lower court’s refusal to give the in-
struction in a non-FELA case.

Again, in Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., 693 S.W.2d 83 (Mo.
1985), appellant argued error in the court’s refusal to give a
similar instruction. Jd. at 96. The Missouri Supreme Court
reviewed the law, and affirmed the lower court. ‘‘The trial
court here cannot be convicted of error, requiring a new trial, in
following the established law of this state.’’ Jd. at 96.

Thus, to the extent that FMC presented the court with an in-
struction that the judgment would not be subject to income tax-
ation, we find no error in the district court’s refusal to give such
an instruction.

Missouri law is somewhat less clear, however, regarding the
admissibility of evidence relating to the effects of income tax on
a lost-income stream. The controlling case appears to be Demp-
sey. In Dempsey, defendant argued on appeal that the trial
court had erred in refusing to permit defendant to cross-
examine plaintiff’s witness about the effects of income tax on a
personal injury award. Dempsey, 251 S.W.2d at 43. The
Missouri Supreme Court held that:

— A-19 —

The trial court did not err either in refusing to permit
defendant to cross-examine plaintiff’s actuarial witness
relative to income tax liability or in refusing to permit
defendant to argue to the jury that in arriving at the
amount of its award it should consider only the amount of
future earnings lost to plaintiff after deduction of income
taxes for which he would have been liable had he continued
his employment without injury.

Id. at 45. While it is unclear as to whether FMC’s attempted
cross-examination concerned Gander’s tax liability on the
award or the effects of income taxes on lost income, the
Missouri court’s reference to defendant’s proposed argument is
exactly on point. This is precisely what FMC attempted to do in
this case, and it is this point of law about which FMC admitted
to the district court that it was uncertain. To the extent that
Dempsey is the controlling law, the district court did not err in
refusing FMC’s proposed cross-examination.

The issue is somewhat clouded, however, by Nesselrode, 707
S.W.2d 371. FMC argues that in Nesselrode the Missouri
Supreme Court explicitly found the sort of cross-examination
that FMC attempted to be permissible. By implication, FMC
argues that Nesselrode silently overrules the precise holding of
Dempsey which found no error in refusing exactly the sort of
cross-examination FMC attempted. We do not agree that
Nesselrode controls this case.

Indeed, whether a defendant can cross-examine about the ef-
fects of income taxes on plaintiff’s lost income stream was not
even at issue in Nesselrode. Rather, the context in which the
court makes the reference to cross-examination on which FMC
relies concerns a dispute about the reduction of lost income to
present value. Both parties in Nesselrode argued error in failing
to establish the present value of plaintiff’s lost income. Specifi-
cally, defendant argued that the court should not have allowed
the jury to consider a table indicating plaintiff’s lost income,

E =

since the table contained no reductions to present value. /d. at
385-86. The Missouri Supreme Court characterized the issue
even more narrowly. It found the issue to be whether defendant
could object to the trial court’s ruling on plaintiff’s presentation
of lost income when defendant itself failed to present any
evidence of present value. Jd. at 387. ‘

In this context, the court mentioned in passing that while
defendant did not challenge plaintiff’s presentation of present
value, defendant did challenge plaintiff’s claim for damages.
‘*This was done by presenting evidence in connection with dece-
dent’s history of health problems, questioning the three
daughters’ monetary reliance on decedent, and by pointing out
through cross-examination that decedent’s projected stream of
lost-income does not take into consideration his income tax
obligations.’’ Id. at 388 (emphasis added). We do not believe
that this passing reference to cross-examination can be inter-
preted in such a way as to overrule Dempsey. The propriety of
the cross-examination was not at issue in Nesselrode and was
not addressed by the court. Nor, apparently, was the cross-
examination in Nesselrode the subject of an objection by plain-
tiff’s counsel at trial. This language in Nesselrode, then, is just
a mere, isolated reference in passing to the sort of cross-
examination attempted by FMC. This same sort of cross-
examination, by contrast, was specifically addressed in Demp-
sey. FMC presented no persuasive law to the district court in
support of such cross-examination, and it likewise presents none
here. Thus, we find no error in the district court’s ruling.

Ill. CONCLUSION

We have considered FMC’s other arguments on appeal and
find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated, we affirm
the judgment of the district court.

HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.

— is —

The majority acknowledges that the note at the end of the
verdict form was confusing; so confusing, in fact, that the
district judge read it one way at trial, only to reach a radically
different interpretation a few months later. The majority even
goes so far as to recommend that the form as it is now written
not be used in future cases. Nevertheless, the court is unable to
conclude that use of the form was improper here.

If the district court had given an appropriate instruction that
the plaintiff’s fault would not reduce his recovery under the
strict liability claim, I might be less concerned about the verdict
form. The majority points out that the trial judge instructed the
jury to find the total amount of damages ‘‘disregarding any
fault on the part of the plaintiff’’ and that the jury was told the
plaintiff's recovery for negligence would be reduced by the
percentage of his fault. These directives, however, provided no
guidance on whether the plaintiff’s fault would affect his
recovery under the strict liability claim. The jury could have
understood and followed all of its instructions and still have
logically interpreted the note on the verdict form to mean that
the plaintiff’s recovery under strict liability would be reduced by
the percentage of his fault. In these circumstances, I do not
believe that the ‘‘charge as a whole . . . state[d] the governing
law fairly.”’ Toro Co. v. R & R Products Co., 787 F.2d 1208,
1215 (8th Cir. 1986).

There is another troublesome aspect to this case. The majori-
ty summarily dismisses without discussing the defendant’s argu-
ment that the district court should have defined the term
‘*defective condition’’ in instructing the jury regarding the strict
liability theory. The trial judge described in explicit detail what
would constitute negligence on the part of the defendant and the
plaintiff. See, e.g., Instruction No. 14 (instructing jury to assess
a percentage of fault to the defendant if at the time the coal con-
veyor was sold, the conveyor ‘‘had an in-running nip point and
shear edge at the transfer chute and was therefore dangerous
when put to a use reasonably anticipated’’); Instruction No. 16

— A-22 —

(‘‘The term ‘negligent’ or ‘negligence’ as used in these instruc-
tions with respect to Todd Gander means the failure to use that
degree of care that an ordinarily careful and prudent coal con-
veyor operator would use under the same or similar cir-
cumstances.’’). In contrast, the district court gave no descrip-
tion of what facts would warrant a finding that the conveyor
was sold in a ‘‘defective condition,’’ as required by the strict
liability theory. Given that the district court’s ultimate decision
regarding the plaintiff’s recovery was based on the outcome of
the strict liability claim without any regard to jury’s findings on
the negligence cause of action, it is ironic that the jury had such
explicit instructions regarding what particular facts would con-
stitute negligence while being left with no guidance at all regard-
ing the definition of a ‘‘defective condition.’”’

Concededly it might be permissible for a trial judge not to
give an instruction regarding the definition of a ‘‘defective con-
dition’’ in a single issue products liability action involving a sim-
ple consumer good. Yet I cannot agree that a jury may be left
with no guidance at all on the definition in a case involving fac-
tory equipment with which few typical jurors can be expected to
be familiar, and in a case where negligence is defined and the
jury can infer from the verdict form that recovery on either
negligence, strict liability, or both will be reduced by the percen-
tage of plaintiff’s fault.

' The Missouri Supreme Court has indicated in dicta that the
Missouri approved jury instructions (MAJ) require that the jury not be
given a definition of ‘‘defective condition.’’ See Nesselrode v. Ex-
ecutive Beachcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371, 378 & n.11 (Mo. 1986) (en
banc); see also Jarrell v. Fort Worth Steel & Mfg. Co., 666 S.W.2d
828, 837 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). We have held, however, the MAI pro-
vide only guidance, not binding authority, for the giving of instruc-
tions in a federal diversity case. See, e.g., Bersett v. K-Mart Corp.,
869 F.2d 1131, 1134-35 (8th Cir. 1989); cf. Cowens v. Siemens-Elema
AB, 837 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 1988) (rejecting argument that
Nesselrode reasoning prohibited the district court in a diversity case
from defining the term ‘‘unreasonably dangerous’’ as used in a strict
liability instruction).

— A-23 —

I recognize that the plaintiff suffered a grievous injury that
might warrant a two-million dollar damage award. I am con-
cerned, however, that the award be the result of a verdict which
is free of the taints that affect the one here. Thus, I would
reverse and remand for a new trial.

A true copy.
Attest:
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

ack Ren

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

No: 87-1155C(6)

Todd Gander,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FMC Corporation,
Defendant.

JUDGMENT
(Filed July 13, 1988)

This action came before the Court and jury with the parties
having appeared in person and by their respective attorneys.
The issues were duly tried and the jury rendered its verdict on
March 15, 1988.

WHEREAS, on the claim of plaintiff, Todd Gander, for per-
sonal injuries based on the theory of strict liablity/product
defect against defendant FMC Corporation, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of plaintiff, Todd Gander.

WHEREAS, on the claim of plaintiff, Todd Gander, for per-
sonal injuries based on the theory of negligence, the jury assess-
ed percentages of fault as follows: to defendant FMC Corpora-
tion - 10%; to plaintiff Todd Gander - 90%.

WHEREAS, the jury further found the total damages of
plaintiff, Todd Gander, to be TWO MILLION DOLLARS
($2,000,000.00).

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED on plaintiff’s claim for personal injury based on the
theory of strict liability/ product defect, that the plaintiff, Todd

— A-25 —

Gander, have and recover from defendant, FMC Corporation,
the sum of TWO MILLION DOLLARS ($2,000,000.00),
together with court costs.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby further ORDERED, ADJUDG-
ED and DECREED that plaintiff, Todd Gander, on his claim
for personal injuries based on the theory of negligence, have
and recover from defendant FMC Corporation, the sum of
TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS ($200,000.00),
together with court costs.

It is further ORDERED that the amount of damages
recoverable under that portion of this JUDGMENT based on
the negligence theory shall not be in addition to the amount of
damages recoverable under that portion of this JUDGMENT
based on the theory of strict liability/product defect.

SO ORDERED:

/s/ George F. Gunn, Jr.
District Judge

DATE: 7/13/88

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385020_1569%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
