# Appendix — American Federation of Government Employees v. Skinner

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1990
- **Citation:** 495 U.S. 923

## Text

dOSEPH F. SPANION. UR.
K

™'N THE >
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1989

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,
AFL-CIO, et al.,
Petitioners,
V.

SAMUEL K. SKINNER,
Secretary of Transportation,
Respondent.

APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

MARK ROTH

JOE GOLDBERG

80 F Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001

WALTER KAMIAT
LAURENCE GOLD
(Counsel of Record)
815 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 637-5390

WILSON - Eres PRINTING Co., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

® Zw 00

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

A. Opinion Of The United States Court Of Appeals
For The District Of Columbia Circuit —......0............ la

B. Memorandum Opinion And Order Of The United

States District Court For The District Of
ITER wicacotcneianiacriciaresacncccantansacrtunaecaskelecnidteooncegutee rie 29a

C. United States Department Of Transportation
Order 3910.1, “Drug-Free Departmental Work-
ASI S ERE re et pets OR A Dn heres Tint Bee 38a

la
APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 87-5417

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERMENT EMPLOYEES,
AFL-CIO, et al.,
Appellants,
V.

SAMUEL K. SKINNER,
Secretary Department of Transportation, et al.

Argued Oct. 18, 1988
Decided Sept. 8, 1989

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(Civil Action No. 87-01815)

Joe Goldberg, with whom Mark D. Roth and Charles
A. Hobbie, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for
appellants.

John R. Bolton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, with
whom Jay B. Stephens, U.S. Atty., Leonard Schaitman
and Robert V. Zener, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washing-
ton, D.C., were on the brief, for appellees.

2a

William W. Osborne, Jr. and John R. Mooney, Wash-
ington, D.C., were on the brief, for amicus curiae urging
reversal.

Before WALD, Chief Judge; MIKVA and SENTELLE,
Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SEN-
TELLE.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge:

On June 29, 1987, the Secretary of Transportation an-
nounced a plan for testing certain employees of the De-
partment of Transportation (‘Department’) for unlaw-
ful drug use. Order 3910.1, “Drug-Free Departmental
Workplace,” U.S. Dep’t of Transportation, June 29, 1987
(“Order 3910.1”), Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 17. De-
pending on the safety and security “criticalness” of the
duties or prospective duties, employees and applicants
may be subjected to urinalysis in one or more of seven
circumstances.’ Those employed in “Category I”’ positions
—jobs determined by the Department to have a direct
impact on public health, safety, or national security—
may be required to submit to random testing.

Appellants, the American Federation of Government
Employees and certain Category I employees, brought
suit to enjoin the suspicionless testing, alleging, inter alia,

1 Order 3910.1 provides for the following types of testing:

(1) random; (2) periodic; (3) reasonable suspicion; (4) pre-
employment/pre-appointment; (5) accident or unsafe practice;
(6) voluntary; and (7) follow-up. Order 3910.1, Ch. III § 3(A),
J.A. at 28-29. All covered employees are subject to reasonable
suspicion, accident or unsafe practice, and voluntary testing.
Only those who participate in a drug rehabilitation and/or
abatement program are subject to follow-up testing. Id. § 4(G),
J.A. at 30. Periodic testing may be required for certain em-
ployees who are already required to be periodically medically
examined. Jd. §3(A), J.A. at 29.

3a

violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. $§ 701-795i (1982 &
Supp. V 1988), and the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”), 5 U.S.C. $$ 551, et seg. (1982). The District
Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis focused on our opin-
ion in NFFE v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935 (D.C.Cir.
1987), which the trial court interpreted to require the
balancing of factors bearing on reasonableness. AFGE
v. Dole, 670 F.Supp. 445, 447 (D.D.C.1987). After weigh-
ing a variety of factors,* the Court determined that, on
balance, “[t|he random urine drug testing plan is rea-
sonable on its face and must be sustained at this stage.”
Id. The Court disposed of appellants’ statutory challenges
in short order, concluding in a footnote that they were
“not significant.” Jd. at 447 n. 6. Accordingly, the Court
granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment.

In this appeal appellants renew their contentions of
Fourth Amendment and statutory violations. We affirm.

3

According to Executive Order 12,564, signed by Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan on September 15, 1986, on- or off-
duty illegal drug use by federal employees “evidences less

2 On the governmental side of the Fourth Amendment balance, the
Court weighed “whether the search was justified at its inception,
whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect work related drug
use will be uncovered, whether those subjected to the test... are
only those who in fact occupy critical positions . . . and whether
use of illegal drugs is likely to impair a critical employment work
efficiency.” 670 F.Supp. at 448. On the other side of the balance,
the District Court weighed the employees’ privacy interests, while
identifying factors tending to diminish that interest. The Court
emphasized the Department’s advance notice of program implemen-
tation, the employees’ “familiarity with testing safeguards and
procedures,” the preexistence of a periodic urinalysis testing pro-
gram, and the “discreet and private” testing procedures. Id. at
447-48.

4a

than the complete reliability, stability, and good judg-
ment that is consistent with access to sensitive informa-
tion and creates the possibility of coercion, influence, and
irresponsible action under pressure.” Exec. Order No.
12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301
note at 175-77 (Supp. IV 1986). The Order accordingly
directed executive-branch agencies to establish mandatory
programs to test employees in “sensitive positions” for
the use of illegal drugs. The Department became the
first executive agency to impiement a drug-testing pro-
gram pursuant to the President’s Order. Departmental
Order 3910.1 establishes two categories of employees sub-
ject to testing, so designated because of their “safety and
security criticalness.” Order 3910.1, Ch. III, § 2, J.A. at
28. Employees whose positions bear “a direct and im-
mediate impact on public health and safety, the protec-
tion of life and property, law enforcement, or national
security,” 7i.e., Category I employees, are made subject
to five types of testing: (1) random; (2) periodic “if
they are required to take periodic physical examina-
tions”; (3) reasonable suspicion; (4) accident or unsafe
practice; and (5) follow-up. Order 3901.1, Ch. IIT, § 3
(A), J.A. at 28-29. All applicants for Category I posi-
tions must submit to pre-appointment testing. J/d., J.A.
at 29. All other employees in sensitive positions, classi-
fied as “Category II’ employees, are subject to reason-
able suspicion, accident or unsafe practice, and follow-up
testing. Jd. §3(B), J.A. at 29. As of June, 1987, the
Department had classified nearly 30,000 of its approxi-
mately 62,900 employees in Category I. J.A. at 769.

Nearly two-thirds of the employees subject to random
and periodic urinalysis testing are air traffic controllers,
id., a group of employees not party to these proceedings,
see Brief for Appellants at 23 n. 17.° Nearly twenty-two

3 The National Air Traffic Controllers Association, exclusive bar-
gaining representative of the approximately 12,000 controllers em-

5a

percent are employed as “electronic technicians.” J.A. at
769. The remaining twelve percent are, among others,
aviation safety inspectors (3%), motor carrier and high-
way safety specialists (1%), railroad safety inspectors
(1.1%), civil aviation security specialists (.9%), air-
craft mechanics (.7%), and motor vehicle operators
(.2%). Id. at 769-70.*

ployed by the Federal Aviation Administration, a subordinate
agency of the Department, appeared as an amicus curiae in these
proceedings.

4 The complete list of covered employees is as follows:
Office of the Secretary: motor vehicle operators.

United States Coast Guard: firefighters, nurses, criminal in-
vestigators, vessel traffic controllers, maritime traffic controllers
(pilot), electronics mechanics, aircraft electricians, instrument
merchanics, metals inspectors, shipwright foremen, transporta-
tion equipment operation family, aircraft oxygen equipment
mechanics, aircraft engine mechanics, aircraft mechanics, mas-
ter pilots (ferryboat), chief engineers (ferryboat), oiler (ferry-
boat and diesel).

Federal Aviation Administration: electronics technicians,
civil aviation security specialists, aviation safety inspectors, air
traffic control specalists, inspection/flight test pilcts, transpor-
tation equipment operation family, aircraft mechanics.

Federal Highway Administration: highway safety specialists,
motor carrier safety specialists, transportation equipment oper-
ation family.

Federal Railroad Administration: industrial hygienists
(headquarters), general engineer (field and headquarters), civil
engineers (field and headquarters), railroad safety series (field
and headquarters), motor vehicle operators, safety engineer
(headquarters), mechanical engineers (headquarters), electrical
engineers (headquarters), chemical engineer (headquarters),
transportation specialists (headquarters).

Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation: lock and
dam operators, vessel traffic controllers, transportation equip-
ment operation family.

[Continued ]

6a

The testing procedures employed by the Department
are substantially identical to those used by the Army to
test its civilians, which we outlined in NFFE v. Cheney,
884 F.2d 603 (D.C.Cir.1989). Order 3910.1 explicitly
provides that the guidelines for drug testing published
by the Department of Heaith and Human Services are
to govern. Order 3910.1, Ch. III, $1, J.A. at 28. See
“Mandatory Guidelines for Federal Workplace Drug Test-
ing, Programs,” 53 Fed.Reg. 11,970 (Apr. 11, 1988)
(‘HHS Regulations” or “HHS Reg.’). Order 3910.1
supplements the HHS Regulations with additional safe-
guards to be followed in both the sample-collection process
and in the chain of specimen-custody. Order 3910.1 Ch.
III, $$ 8-10, J.A. at 32-39. Like the Army, the Depart-
ment considers a test result positive for proscribed drugs
only if it is positive on each of two separate tests, an
initial test using immunoassay methods and a confirma-
tory test using gas chromatography/mass spectrometry
(GC/MS) techniques. See HHS Reg. § 2(4(e)-(f). “All
specimens negative on [the] initial test or negative on
the confirmatory test shall be reported as negative.” Or-
der 3910.1, Ch. III, §9(B), J.A. at 38 (emphasis in
original). The Department, like the Army, tests urine
for the presence of five drugs (or their metabolites) ;
marijuana, cocaine, PCP, opiates, and amphetamines. Zd.
11(A) (1)-(5), J.A. at 39-40.

Unlike the Army program, the Department’s plan per-
mits an employee who has tested positive to insist that
the sample be tested again, either at the site of the
original tests or, at his own expense, “at another quali-

4 [Continued ] —
Office of Inspector General: criminal investigators.
Maritime Administration: transportation equipment opera-
tion family, engineers (watchstander), maritime general main-
tenance mechanics (deck/engine).

See Order 3910.1 Appendix A. The record does not reveal the allo-
cation of employees in the various covered positions.

Ta

* fied laboratory identified by the employee.” Jd. § 9(E),
J.A. at 39. Although a Category I employee who tests
positive “will be assigned non-safety or non-security du-
ties,” id. Ch. IV, $6, J.A. at 42, he may not be dis-
charged solely because of a single positive test result, id.
Ch. VI, §1(B), J.A. at 45. Absent additional circum-
stances, an employee will be removed from federal service
only if he tests positive a second time.®

II.

As in Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C.Cir.
1989), and Cheney, supra, our analysis in the instant
case is guided by the Supreme Court’s recent opinions in
National Treasury Empioyees Union v. Von Raab,
US. , 109 S.Ct. 1884, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989), and
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association,
U.S. ——, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989). In Von
Raab, the Court sustained urinalysis testing of United
States Customs Service employees slated for promotions
into positions that involved either interdicting illicit
drugs or carrying a firearm. 109 S.Ct. at 1397. The
Court withheld judgment on the reasonableness of testing
employees solely because they would handle classified ma-
terial, instead remanding the case to the Court of Ap-
peals so that it could “clarify the scope of this category
of employees.” Jd. In Skinner, the Court upheld the Fed-
eral Railroad Administration (“FRA”) regulations au-
thorizing railroads to toxicologically test certain employ-
ees involved in train accidents or incidents of violations
of safety rules. 109 S.Ct. at 1420-21. In both cases the

5 The Department retains the right to remove immediately certain
drug-using employees, including employees found to be using illegal
drugs on duty or determined to have engaged in certain drug-related
offenses. Immediate discharge is also required for certain testing-
related violations: refusal to enter or successfully complete a
rehabilitation/abatement program, refusal to provide a specimen,
and adulteration or substitution of a specimen. See Order 3910.-1,
Ch. VI, §1(A)-(F), J.A. at 45.

Sa

Court concluded that suspicionless testing, while a search,
was reasonable and thus conformed with the dictates of
the Fourth Amendment.

In their supplemental brief, filed at our direction after
the Supreme Court issued its opinions, appellants argue
that Skinner and Von Raab “should have little or no
impact upon the decision in the instant case.” Supple-
mental Brief for Appellants at 2. On a general level,
appellants contend that “the results of NTEU and RLEA
have no bearing on the employees in the instant case,”
who are neither engaged in drug interdiction nor em-
ployed as “operational members of train crews.” Id. at
1. Appellants also argue that random testing, the exclu-
sive focus of our attention,” is “vastly more intrusive
than the limited drug testing” approved by the Supreme
Court. Id.

We first must determine whether the Department's
plan “serves special governmental needs, beyond the nor-
mal need of law enforcement.” Von Raab, 109 S.Ct. at
1390. If it does, Skinner and Von Raab make clear that
the plan need not necessarily be supported by probable
‘ause or any level of particularized suspicion in order to
be constitutional. Id.; Skinner, 109 S.Ct. at 1414, 1417.

‘While it is not clear which aspects of the District Court's order
appellants intended to bring forward on appeal, compare Brief for
Appellants at 8 n. 9 “Appe'lants seek appeal of the district courts

dismissal only as to random, periodic, and accident or unsafe
practice drug testing.” vith Supplemental Brief for Appellants at
1 n. 2 (“The appellees (sic) have challenged only random, and acci-
ent or unsafe practice testing.”), in their most recent submission
appellants appear to indicate that their challenge is directed exclu-
ly at random testing, td. But see id. at 7 (Random testing is
the principle (sic) issue of the case presently before the Court.”)
We consider only the random aspect of the Department's plan, both
ause it was the only aspect appellants challenged in their com-
plaint, see Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2,
1A at 2. and because it was the only aspect passed upon by the
District Court, see 670 F. Supp. at 449

9a

Appellants point out that the Department tests only for
the presence of illegal drugs—rather than for any per-
formance-impairing agent—thus making “clear that the
agency’s concern is law enforcement rather than direct
public safety.” Brief for Appellants at 27. Moreover,
the failure to test for legal drugs such as valium “makes
a mockery out of the agency’s pious protestations of con-
cern with public safety.” Jd. at 28. Amicus similarly
argues that the “true objectives” of the Department’s
program have been displaced by “a more saleable” ra-
tionale based on the Department’s “rather idiosyncratic”
aviation safety rationale. Brief for Amicus Curiae at
4, 3.

These contentions give us little pause. Initially, even
if we were to assume, as amicus contends, id. at 5 n. 4,
that the animating motive behind Executive Order 12,564
was the mandatory testing of all federal employees,’ the
Department’s program tests only those whose duties bear
“a direct and immediate impact on public health and
safety, the protection of life and property, law enforce-
ment or national security.” Order 3910.1, Ch. III, §3
(A), J.A. at 28. Law enforcement appears nowhere
among the program’s stated goals, and more to the point,
nonconsensuai disclosure of test results to police author-
ities is proscribed both by regulation and statute. See
HHS Reg. § 2.8; Pub.L. No. 100-71, § 503(e), 101 Stat.
471 (1987).

There can be little doubt, then, that the testing plan
serves needs other than law enforcement, and therefore
need not necessarily be supported by any level of par-
ticularized suspicion. In order to determine the appropri-
ate standard of reasonableness, we are “to balance the
individual[s’] privacy expectations against the Govern-
ment’s interest to determine whether it is impractical to

7 This contention is belied by the fact that the Order recommends
testing only for those who occupy jobs “sensitive” from the stand-
point of security, health, and safety.

10a

require a warrant or some level of individualized sus-
picion in the particular context.” Von Raab, 109 §.Ct.
at 1390. Accord Skinner, 109 S.Ct. at 1414; see also
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719, 107 S.Ct. 1492,
1499, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987). This approach necessarily
recognizes that not every invasion of privacy is proscribed
by the Fourth Amendment. If a careful balancing of in-
terests suggests that the public interest would be best
served by requiring a standard of reasonableness short
of particularized suspicion, we should not hesitate to
adopt that standard. Cf. New Jersey v. T.L.0., 469 US.
325. 105 S.Ct. 733, 742, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1984) (adopt-
ing reasonableness balancing instead of probable cause).
The balance we strike in the present case is substantially
identical to that struck by the Supreme Court in Skinner
and by us in Cheney.

Ill.

The Department identified as Category I personnel
those employed in some twenty different positions relating
to air, rail, highway, and water transportation.” More
than 94° of the employees subject to random testing
under the plan work for the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (“FAA”). J.A. at 769. As we noted earlier,
nearly two-thirds of the covered employees occupy a

* The Department deemed the following positions as those having
the necessary impact on public health, safety, or national security to
warrant their inclusion in Category I: motor vehicle operators;
criminal investigators; vessel traffic controllers; air traffic con-
trollers: mechanics (general maintenance, electronic, instrument,
aircraft oxygen equipment, aircraft engine); aircraft electricians ;
inspectors (metals, aviation, railroad safety series) ; transportation
equipment operation family; pilots (master inspection / flight test) ;
civil aviation security specialists; safety specialists (highway, motor
carrier, railroad, safety engineer); engineers (general, civil, me-
chanical. electrical, chemical) ; firefighters; nurses; shipwright fore-
men: chief engineers (ferryboat); oiler (ferryboat and diesel ) ;
electronics technicians; industrial hygienists; transportation spe-
cialists; lock and dam operators.

lla

single position, air traffic controller, and are not parties
to this litigation. See supra note 3 and accompanying
text. Of the remainder, most are, to varying degrees,
employed in positions relating to transportation safety,
among them mechanics, inspectors, and engineers.

As the District Court noted, written justifications were
not produced for each covered position. See 670 F.Supp.
at 449. Nor for that matter have appellants at any stage
in this litigation challenged the inclusion of the vast
majority of the categories of employees. Rather, they
have singled out three categories, arguing that their in-
clusion evidences the unreasonableness of the entire test-
ing regime.

Before addressing the three specifically challenged posi-
tions, we note that the record amply evidences the
extraordinary safety sensitivity of the bulk of the cov-
ered positions. For example, FRA safety inspectors and
safety specialists are charged with the duties of review-
ing railroad operating practices, inspecting track and sig-
nal conditions, and enforcing compliance with safety laws
and regulations. J.A. at 465. The Federal Highway
Administration’s highway and motor carrier safety spe-
cialists are charged with similar duties, including han-
dling of hazardous materials, investigating trucking
companies’ safety system, and exploring unsafe practices
complaints. J.A. at 771.

The duties of lock and dam operators at the Saint
Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, an operating
administration within the Department, are responsible
for guiding commercial vessels and pleasure craft
through the lock area, which includes the lock chamber,
adjacent control towers, and approach walls. Lock oper-
ators are responsible for negotiating craft through the
lock chamber. J.A. at 471-72. Vessel traffic controllers
are similarly responsible for navigating traffic along 140
miles of the St. Lawrence River, its twenty ports and
Lake Ontario. J.A. at 472.

12a

It would appear that the Supreme Court’s rationale for
upholding testing of certain railroad personnel in Skin-
ner is the natural starting point to determine whether
the Department’s asserted safety interests justify the
testing of employees so intimately involved with safe
transportation. In Skinner, the Supreme Court reviewed
FRA-adopted regulations authorizing private railroads
to toxicologically test certain of their employees. Under
the FRA regulations, private railroads are empowered
to subject to urine and blood or breath tests all railway
crew members and other covered employees “directly in-
volved” in certain incidents and specified safety breaches.
Like the Department’s program, the FRA regulations
provide for two types of urine testing, a screening test
and a confirmatory test utilizing gas chromatography /
mass spectrometry methods, before a sample is deemed
positive for the presence of drugs.

The Court identified several governmental interests
advanced by testing railroad crew members who perform
“duties fraught with... risks of injury.” Skinner, 109
S.Ct. at 1419. First, testing would promote the compel-
ling interest of detecting regular drug users, who, the
Court determined, could ‘cause great human loss before
any signs of impairment become noticeable to supervisors
or others.” Jd. Second, “the FRA regulations supply an
effective means of deterring employees engaged in safety-
sensitive tasks from using controlled substances or alco-
hol in the first place.” Jd. Thus, because testing was
precipitated by “a triggering event, the timing of which
no employee can predict with certainty,” testing would
likely serve as an effective deterrent against on-duty
impairment. Jd. at 1420. Finally, post-incident testing
results would “help railroads obtain invaluable informa-
tion about the causes of major accidents... and to take
appropriate measures to safeguard the general public.”
Id. at 1420 (citations omitted).

We find this analysis fully applicable in the present
case. While it is true that the regulations sustained in

13a

Skinner required testing only after a triggering event
and in a medical environment, we do not find that either
of these facts compels “a fundamentally different analysis
from that pursued by the Supreme Court.” Harmon, 878
F.2d at 489. While it is true that random testing may
increase employee anxiety and the invasion of subjective
expectations of privacy, it also limits discretion in the
selection process® and presumably enhances drug-use
deterrence. Neither can we conclude that testing in a
medical environment is a sine qua non of constitutionally
permissible urine testing, for as even appellants admit,
the regulations approved in Von Raab provided for sam-
ples to be collected by non-medical personnel in a public
restroom. See Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 4.

We also find applicable the reasoning in our decision
in Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 340-41 (D.C.Cir.
1987), vacated sub nom. Jenkins v. Jones, U.S.
——, 109 S.Ct. 1633, 104 L.Ed.2d 149 (1989), replaced,
878 F.2d 1476 (D.C.Cir.1989). Appellee, a school bus
attendant in the District of Columbia Public School Sys-
tem’s transportation branch, challenged the School Sys-
tem’s employee drug-testing program. We found the
criteria for testing reasonable, though we questioned the
validity of testing procedures on grounds no longer vi-
able in light of the later Supreme Court opinions. After
the Supreme Court vacated our judgment in light of
Skinner and Von Raab, we recently reinstated our orig-
inal judgment after appropriately modifying the accom-
panying opinion. In so doing, we noted that “the School
System clearly had a legitimate justification” for testing
“employees involved in the transportation of handicapped
children.” Jones, 878 F.2d 1476, Judgment Order at 2.
Given our conclusion in Jones that the governmental
interest in the health and safety of handicapped children

9 Order 3910.1 requires that each Category I employee “have an
equal statistical chance for being selected for testing within a speci-
fied time frame.” Order 3910.1, Ch. III, §4(A), J.A. at 29.

14a

reasonably warranted testing employees who daily trans-
port them, we are hard pressed to develop any theory
that would prevent the testing of covered employees in
the present case. If anything, the safety justifications
presented here are, in the main, more compelling.

As we noted earlier, appellants have singled out for
attack the inclusion of three categories of employees:
motor vehicle operators, FRA hazardous material inspec-
tors, and FAA aircraft mechanics. See Brief for Appel-
lants at 28-29; cf. Supplemental Brief for Appellants at
1 n.1. The District Court concluded that the inclusion
of these employees was “fully justified within the pro-
gram.” Dole, 670 F.Supp. at 448. We agree. The record
reveals that the assigned duties of a hazardous material
inspector require exposure “to poisonous, explosive, and
highly flammable commodities that could be .. . sud-
denly ignited by improper handling.” J.A. at 771. Fur-
thermore, an FRA inspector may be required to inspect
hazardous materia] shipments and is required to verify
proper packaging, rail operating restrictions, and han-
dling and loading requirements. J.A. at 466. Appellants
have offered nothing to rebut these claims. Ensuring
that these employees—whose exclusive assigned duties
are so intimately related to the prevention of public harm
—are certifiably drug-free is, in our view, a reasonable
precaution against the occurrence of the feared harm.
While the danger posed by a drug-impaired inspector may
be of somewhat lesser proportions than that posed by one
who has “routine access to dangerous nuclear power
facilities,” Skinner, 109 S.Ct. at 1419, it closely paral-
lels the risk posed by drug-impaired Army guards sta-
tioned near explosive munitions. See Cheney, 884 F.2d
at 612. Ultimately, “the public should not bear the risk
that employees who may suffer from impaired perception
and judgment” occupy positions where they are so re-
sponsible for protecting the public. See Von Raab, 109
S.Ct. at 1393.

rea lca

15a

Appellants also challenge the inclusion of an FAA
aircraft mechanic who inspects and maintains FAA air-
craft. We need look no further than our recent opinion
in Cheney for guidance on this classification. In sustain-
ing the Army’s testing of air traffic controllers, pilots,
and aviation mechanics, we noted that “[{a] single drug-
related lapse by any covered employee could have irre-
versible and calamitous consequences.” Cheney, at 610.
The record in the present case amply supports the same
conclusion. Covered mechanics perform pre-flight inspec-
tions and overhauls, and install and maintain electronic
instrumentation and other flight control equipment. J.A.
at 772. Given that a drug-related lapse could portend
irreparable injury to life and property, mandatory, ran-
dem urinalysis does not appear to be an unreasonable
means of detecting and preventing that risk. See also
Von Raab, 109 S.Ct. at 1895 & n. 3; United States v.
Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir.1974) (reasonable-
ness of search depends on balancing need for search
against offensiveness of intrusion); Cheney, 884 F.2d at
610.

The third challenged position, encompassing one-fifth
of one percent of the total number of Category I em-
ployees, is motor vehicle operator. See J.A. at 262. As
their sole argument of unconstitutionality, appellants
point to a union member driver whose exclusive duties
entail driving a mail van, and ask: “Is this a vital posi-
tion requiring compromise of the 4th Amendment for an
overriding public safety concern?” Brief for Appellants
at 28.

10 While appellants have not argued that testing is unnecessary
because of the availability of less intrusive alternatives, the sole
mechanic-affiant on which they rely asserted that each mechanic’s
work is reviewed by a “Quality Assurance Inspector” or “another
certified mechanic.” Even if the assertion rises to the level of a
properly submitted argument, it would fail for essentially the same
reasons we rejected the claim in Cheney that drug testing was
unnecessary in light of proscriptions already in force. See Cheney,
at 610-11; see also Skinner, 109 S.Ct. at 1419 n. 9.

16a

As noted by the District Court, strong safety interests
support the testing of most Department motor vehicle
operators, who are responsible for, inter alia, the trans-
portation of visiting foreign dignitaries and key Depart-
ment officials and the operation of passenger-laden shuttle
buses. See 670 F.Supp. at 448 n. 10; J.A. at 851-52.
Shuttle buses transport as many as 1,200 passengers each
day. J.A. at 852. Thus, obvious safety interests support
the testing of the majority of the Department’s motor
vehicle operators. Appellants’ objection to the inclusion
of motor vehicle operators may in part be rooted in their
mistaken understanding of the Department’s rationale for
testing, which counsel for appellants incorrectly sfm-
marized as follows: The “motor vehicle can run into a
school bus carrying 312 diplomats, cause an international
incident and can then cause a war.” Transcript of Pro-
ceedings at 9 (Oct. 20, 1988).

The inclusion of a mail van operator does not demon-
strate the unreasonableness of the plan. Initially, all
drivers are subject to extensive background investiga-
tions and have either a top secret or secret security clear-
ance. J.A. at 852. Von Raab teaches that the govern-
ment may properly make urine testing a requirement for
those who are “likely to gain access to sensitive informa-
tion.” 109 S.Ct. at 1397. Thus, the Court concluded that
employees seeking promotions to positions that would re-
quire handling classified information may be required to
submit to the Custom Service’s tests. Although the Court
did not delimit the boundaries of “sensitive information,”
nor define what categories of information would be suffi-
ciently sensitive to warrant mandatory drug testing,”
it bears noting that there is no indication in the Court’s
opinion that testing should be limited to those with the
highest security classification.

11 There are three levels of security classification: confidential,
secret, and top secret. See 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (Apr. 6, 1982).

17a

In Harmon, we recognized that whatever the bound-
aries of “truly sensitive” information, top secret mate-
rials “lie at its very core.” Harmon, 878 F.2d at 492
(emphasis added). Accordingly we sustained the Depart-
ment of Justice’s program mandating drug testing for
personnel with top secret clearances. Jd. at 491-492. At
the same time, however, we rejected Justice’s claim that
its interest in protecting confidential but unclassified
information reasonably warranted the random testing of
all prosecutors and all personnel with access to grand
jury information. As we said there: “[{Wle believe that
the term [truly sensitive information] cannot include all
information which is confidential or closed to public view.

. The fact that the employees covered by the Depart-
ment’s drug testing regulations deal with confidential
information .. . does not distinguish them from .. . gov-
ernment employees generally.” Jd. at 492 (emphasis in
original).

In the present case, we believe that faithful application
of the Supreme Court’s teachings in Von Raab and our
own precedent command that we find that the govern-
ment’s interest in protecting truly sensitive information
from one who “ ‘under compulsion of circumstances or for

other reasons, . . . might compromise [such] informa-
tion,” Von Raab, 109 S.Ct. at 1396 (quoting Depart-
ment of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, ——, 108 S.Ct.

818, 824, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988)), outweighs the privacy
interests of tested mail van operators. Their assigned
duties require both the acquisition of a secret or top
secret security clearance and regular access to classified
information. Moreover, all motor vehicle operators are
subject to background investigations, J.A. at 852, which,
the Supreme Court has clearly stated, ‘may be expected
to diminish [the employees’] expectations of privacy in
respect to a urinalysis test.” Von Raab, 109 S.Ct. at
1397 (citation omitted). Each of the above-noted fea-
tures severely reduces motor vehicle operators’ expecta-

18a

tions of privacy, and, therefore, mandatory, random
urinalysis constitutes only a modest additional privacy
intrusion.

We also find significant the fact that employees in
each of the three covered positions work in settings other
than the “more traditional office environments,” Von
Raab, 109 S.Ct. at 1395, where “drug use is, presumably,
more easily detected by means other than urine testing,”
Harmon, 878 F.2d at 488. In short, “[t]he operational
realities of the workplace,” O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S.
709, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 1498, 9 4L.Ed.2d 714 (1987) (plu-
rality opinion), are such that “a diminished expectation
of privacy attaches to information relating to the physi-
cal condition of covered employees.” Skinner, 109 S.Ct.
at 1419.

IV.

Apart from their claims of constitutional error, appel-
lants maintain that the District Court erred in granting
summary judgment, as there remained outstanding is-
sues of material fact. On appeal from an order granting
summary judgment, we review the record de novo to
determine whether it supports that order. Riddell v.
Riddell Washington Corp., 866 F.2d 1480, 1485 (D.C.
Cir.1989) ; Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Rees, 852 F.2d 595,
598 (D.C.Cir.1988). In the “run-of-the-mill civil case,”
when the defendant moves for summary judgment, we en-
quire whether a “fairminded jury could return a verdict
for the plaintiff on the evidence presented.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505,
2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If the record, viewed in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals
no genuine issue as to any material fact and if the mov-
ing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
summary judgment shall be granted in its favor. Id. at
250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. See FED.R.CIv.P. 56(c¢).

The Supreme Court has indicated that the allocation of
the substantive burden of proof informs our decision on

19a

the propriety of the grant of summary judgment. See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct.
2548, 25538, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Celotex instructs
that summary judgment is properly entered “against a
party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof
at trial.” Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552 (emphasis added)
(nonmoving party bore ultimate burden of proof at
trial). See also Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby, 863 F.2d
1029, 1032 (D.C.Cir.1988) (applying Celotex-enunciated
rule where nonmoving party bore initial burden of pro-
duction, but not burden of proof).

There is surprisingly little authority discussing the
allocation of the burden of proof in drug-testing cases.
Although neither Von Raab nor Skinner directly ad-
dressed this question, Von Raab may hint that the bur-
den rests with the government to prove reasonableness:
“lWle believe that the Government has demonstrated
that its compelling interests in safeguarding our borders
and the public safety outweigh the privacy expectations”
of personnel who interdict illegal drugs and carry fire-
arms. 109 S.Ct. at 1396. Such a conclusion would be
consistent with the array of criminal cases placing the
burden of demonstrating the lawfulness of a Fourth
Amendment encounter on the government. See, e.g.,
Unted States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557, 100 S.Ct.
1870, 1878, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (government has
burden of proving consent to accompany government
agents); United States v. Carreon, 872 F.2d 1436, 1441
(10th Cir.1989) (“When a search ... is challenged as
violative of the Fourth Amendment, the burden is on
the government to prove its validity.”) (citations
omitted); United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341,
1349 (11th Cir.1984) (burden on government to prove
reasonable suspicion to justify strip search).

20a

On the other hand, in a civil action brought pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. $ 1983, it appears that the plaintiff should-
ers the burden of proving each element essential to his
ease, including the illegality of the government conduct
in question. See, e.g., Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507,
1512-138 & n. 7 (ilth Cir.1987) (placing on plaintiff
burden of demonstrating unreasonableness of drug-testing
scheme) ; Kunzelman v. Thompson, 799 F.2d 1172, 1176
(7th Cir.1986) (discussing relative burdens in relation
to collateral estoppel) ; Guenther v. Holmgreen, 738 F.2d
879, 888 (7th Cir.1984) (same).'* By the same token,
in the context of the civil forfeiture provisions of the
Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 881(d), where
the government is the plaintiff, it bears the burden of
“establishing the lawfulness of the Fourth Amendment
encounter. See, e.g., Boas v. Smith, 786 F.2d 605, 609
(4th Cir.1986) (burden on government to show probable
cause to believe that the property is linked to illegal
activity); United States v. United States Currency
$31,828, 760 F.2d 228, 230 (8th Cir.1985) (same).

We need not resolve the question of the allocation of
the burden of proving the reasonableness vel non of the
testing regime, for even if we assume that the burden
rests with the government, we conclude that the govern-
ment established that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact that it must prove at trial and that it is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Among the issues identified by appellants as material,
and therefore preclusive of summary judgment, was the
accuracy of the urinalysis testing procedures used by
the Department. See Statement of Genuine Issues of
Material Fact 3, at 1-2, J.A. at 65-66. Inspection of the

12 These cases appear fully consistent with the line of cases under
section 1983 which place upon the defendant the burden of establish-
ing the defense of qualified immunity. See, e.g., Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987);
Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 263 ¢ D.C. Cir. 1987).

2la

referenced portions of the record reveals that the parties
did in fact disagree over the accuracy of the testing
procedures: while the Department contended that the
GC/MS technique could be 100% accurate, appellants
maintained that testing could produce an error rate of
one percent. See J.A. at 143; see also Reply to Defend-
ant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 11. While in some contexts such a dis-
agreement might be sufficient to create a triable question
of faci, such is not the case here. First, because this is a
facial attack on the Department’s program, we decide
only “whether the tests contemplated by the regulations
ean ever be conducted.” Skinner, 109 S.Ct. at 1421 n. 10
(citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560, 99 S.Ct. 1861,
1885, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)) (emphasis in original).
Furthermore, the facts demonstrate “that the tests at
issue here are accurate in the overwhelming majority of
eases.”” Id. As such, Skinner suggests that, even when
viewed in the light most favorable to appellants, the facts
do not create an issue for trial, and summary judgment
was not on this basis improperly granted.

Appellants also identified as a genuine issue of ma-
terial fact the extent of drug use among Department
employees. See Statement of Genuine Issues of Material
Fact B, at 3, J.A. at 67. The referenced portion of the
record reveals that the declarant knew of no drug use
among the fifteen motor vehicle operators with whom
he worked. See J.A. at 262. Even if we were to assume
that the declaration sufficiently demonstrates a genuine
disagreement as to the extent of Department-wide drug
use, the claim would not create a triable issue of fact.
Von Raab indicates that a history of intra-agency drug
use is not an essential ingredient in establishing the
reasonableness of a testing regime. There it was con-
tended that the Customs Service’s program was unrea-
sonable because all but a few of the tested employees
were entirely innocent of wrongdoing. The Court re-

23a

hol, and other personal problems who have not been iden-
tified or tested.” Jd. The OIG also concluded that “FAA
does not know the seriousness of the problem or number
of employees because it does not have an effective drug
and alcohol policy and a strongly endorsed employee as-
sistance program.” Jd. Accordingly, the OIG recom-
mended that the FAA develop and implement a drug
screening and testing program. /d. at 788.

The FAA’s response was mixed. Rather ‘nan flatly
disputing the OIG’s conclusions, the FAA responded that
the OIG report was “unbalanced” because it omitted
“positive” information and was based on “unsupported
data.” J.A. at 802. Furthermore, the FAA did not deny
that some of its employees might be impaired by drug
use; it said only that “[flor the size of the FAA work
force” illicit drug use was “relatively” minimal. Id. at
803. Thus, the FAA concluded that the OIG report
“would more accurately describe the situation if it was
changed from ‘The FAA has .. .’ to ‘The FAA may
have....’” Id. at 802. In light of the sharp increase in
the number of Departmental employees entering drug
counseling programs in the years succeeding the OIG
teport (from 16 in 1984 to 133 in 1986), many of whom
were FAA employees (45 air traffic controllers in one
vear!, J.A. at 765-66, we cannot accept appellants’ con-
tention that the Department was acting upon no evidence.
From this vantage, far from demonstrating the unrea-
sonableness of the Department's action, the Department’s
response to the OIG’s report is more logically viewed as
a hallmark of responsible management.

Appellants also argue that they were wrongly denied
a trial because a genuine issue of fact remained as to
the correlation between a positive urinalysis test result
and current drug impairment. See Statement of Genuine
Issues of Material Fact C, at 3, J.A. at 67. The mater-
iality of such a fact is established, appellants argue, by

24a

the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that testing be
able to detect only job-impairing drug use.

Although the District Court concluded that the De-
partment “presented proof that drug use, at the level
sought by testing generally impairs the normal function-
ing of employees,” Dole, 670 F.Supp. at 448, the Depart-
ment admits that “|t]he district court did overstate the
principal thrust” of its evidence. Brief for Appellee at
20. Appellants’ first contention—that the judgment of
the District Court must be reversed because it accepted
a proposition which is scientifically incorrect—overlooks
the principle that our review of a grant of summary
judgment is de novo. Their alternative claim—that the
issue of the relationship between off-duty drug usage and
on-duty impairment is genuinely disputed and material,
and therefore precluded the granting of a motion for
summary judgment—while more significant, must also
fall.

It should initially be noted that the Department stip-
ulated that urinalysis tests do not necessarily measure
actual physical or mental impairment. Se Defendant's
Response to Plaintiffs’ Statement of Genuine Issues of
Material Fact at 7, J.A. at 74. Thus, we cannot conclude
that any factual disagreement precluded summary judg-
ment. Nor can we conclude that summary judgment was
improperly granted as a matter of law. As we explained
in Cheney, the Supreme Court’s opinions in Skinner and
Von Raab convince us that the failure of a testing tech-
nique to measure actual impairment does not necessarily
impugn its legitimacy. Cheney, 844 F.2d at 609-610.

In Skinner, the Ninth Circuit concluded, as appellants
contend herein, that drug testing was constitutionally
‘nfirm because of its inability to differentiate drug use
that results in on-duty impairment from that which does
not. Railway Labor Exe cutives’ Association v. Burnle ¥,
839 F.2d 575. 588 (9th Cir.1988), rev'd sub nom. Skin-

USS.

ner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association,

25a

) ——, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989). The Su-

| preme Court rejected this view, in part because it over-
looked the principle that relevant evidence need only
make a fact of consequence more or less probable, and
in part because the regulations “are designed not only to
discern impairment but also to deter it.” Skinner, 109
S.Ct. at 1421.

Von Raab, where the Court sustained as reasonable the
Customs Service’s practice of urine testing those whose
post-promotion duties would require carrying a firearm,
also strongly suggests that the inability of the testing
procedures to differentiate on- and off-duty drug impair-
ment is not determinative of the regime’s constitutional-
ity. See Cheney, 884 F.2d at 609-10. As was true in
Von Raab, the agency’s responsibility to “ensur([e]
against the creation of th[e] dangerous risk’ posed by
drug-using covered employees, 109 S.Ct. at 1393, war-
rants reasonable measures to detect drug use. Thus, we
must reject, as we rejected in Cheney, the contention
that urinalysis testing is unconstitutional because of its
failure to differentiate on- and off-duty drug impairment.
884 F.2d at 609-610. Accordingly, the District Court did
not for this reason err in granting the Department’s
summary judgment motion.

Appellants also contend that a trial was necessary to
determine whether drug use manifests itself in signs of
impairment. See Statement of Genuine Issues of Ma-
terial Fact 9, at 2, J.A. at 66. Apps lants claim that the
detectability of impairment is material to the reason-
ableness of drug testing because it “directly affects the
governmental interest portion of the Fourth Amend-
ment.” Brief for Appellants at 48. We agree that in
certain circumstances the detectability of impairment by
means other than urine testing may be a relevant con-
sideration in determining the reasonableness of a drug-
testing plan. Thus, the Von Raab Court credited the
fact that it was “not feasible” to subject interdiction

ed

26a

agents or other field employees “to the kind of day-to-
day scrutiny that is the norm in Von Raab, 109 S.Ct. at
1395. In Harmon, we concluded that the Court viewed
employment in a traditional office environment as rele-
vant because in such circumstances “drug use is, pre-
sumably, more easily detected by means other than urine
testing.”” Harmon, 878 F.2d at 489.

In the context of the present case, appellants have not
even argued that it would be practical or feasible to sub-
ject covered employees to the sort of day-to-day scrutiny
such that testing is unnecessary. We are unable to dis-
cern any other materiality in the ascertainment of
whether drug users display indicia of impairment. In
any event, we could not find that the reasonableness of
the Department’s plan “ ‘necessarily or invariably
turn{s]’”’ on the existence of less intrusive alternatives
to testing. See Skinner, 109 S.Ct. at 1419 n. 9 (quoting
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647, 103 S.Ct. 2605,
2610, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983)). In the present case, no
less than in Skinner, the “insistence on less drastic alter-
natives would require us to second-guess the reasonable
conclusions drawn by the’’ Department. Jd. Moreover,
employees who are subject to testing in this category
“can cause great human loss before any signs of impair-
ment become noticeable to supervisors or others.” See id.
at 1419; see also supra note 10 and accompanying text.

In short, appellants have offered no basis on which we
can find that summary judgment was improperly
granted.

V.

As to appellants’ statutory claims, we agree with the
District Court that they “are not significant.” Dole. 670
F.Supp. at 447 n. 6. First, appellants contend that the
Department’s drug-testing program discriminates against
“handicapped” persons in violation of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. $$ 701-7951 (1982 & Supp. V
1988). The Act protects an “otherwise qualified handi-

27a

capped individual” from discrimination “solely by reason
of his handicap.” Jd. § 794. It should surprise no one,
including appellants, that we will not in the context of
a facial challenge to the Department’s drug-testing pro-
gram conclude that the District Court erred in not adopt-
ing a rationale dependent on the theory that every poten-
tial employee testing positive for drug use is an “other-
wise qualified handicapped” person. Should a day arise
when a handicapped individual within the protection of
the Rehabilitation Act is disadvantaged by this program
and presents a claim in a concrete factual setting, that
will be soon enough to consider the effects of that statute
on the provisions of the testing program. See Doe v. New
York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 776-77 (2d Cir. 1981) (con-
cluding that plaintiff must bear the ultimate burden of
showing “that in spite of the handicap he is qualified
and... that he is at least as well qualified as other
applicants.) ; Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716
F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir.1983) (reviewing plaintiff’s bur-
den of proof). See generally, School Bd. of Nassau
County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 285 n. 14, 107 S.Ct.
1123, 1130 n. 14, 94 L.Ed.2d 307 (1987) (citing with
approval Strathie and Doe).

Appellants’ other statutory claim, based on the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. $$ 551, et seg. (1982),
is hardly more substantial. Appellants argue that the
Department acted arbitrarily and capriciously by institu-
ting a drug-testing program that tested for the five
above-lised categories of drugs, but not for alcohol, “the
drug which is most abused.” Brief for Appellants at 45.
It has never been the law that the government is for-
bidden from addressing a problem unless it addresses all
other problems of similar magnitude. See, e.g., William-
son v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed.
963 (1955). In short, we conclude that the District
Court did not err in its summary disposition of the non-
constitutional claims.

28a
VI.

In their facial challenge to the Department’s imple-
mentation of mandatory, random urine testing, appel-
lants have challenged the program in toto. They have
specifically called into question the inclusion of only three
categories of employees. Although we explicitly requested
in our order for supplemental briefing that appellants
consider the extent to which the testing of the various
job classifications being considered warranted differing
treatment than that in Skinner and Von Raab, appellants
did not alter their previous course. We have found che
privacy interests of employees occupying the three spe-
cifically challenged positions outweighed by the Depart-
ment’s compelling interests in preventing drug _ use
among such personnel. Moreover, we have concluded that
the program is supported by sufficiently compelling cir-
cumstances to justify the invasions of privacy entailed
by conducting such searches without any measure of in-
dividualized suspicion. For these reasons, and the others
stated above, we hold that the mandatory, suspicionless
testing of Category I personnel is reasonable and con-
sistent with the Fourth Amendment, the APA, and the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Accordingly, the judgment
of the District Court is

Affirmed.

29a
APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civ. A. No. 87-1815

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,
AFL-CIO, et al.,
a Plaintiffs,

¥>.

ELIZABETH H. DOLE, Secretary,

Department of Transportation,
Defendant.

Sept. 30, 1987

Mark D. Roth, Joe Goldberg, Washington, D.C. for
plaintiffs.

William W. Osborne, Jr., John R. Mooney, Washing-
ton, D.C., for amicus curiae, Nat. Air Traffic Controllers.

Robert Cynkar, Richard Greenberg, Dept. of Justice,
Richard K. Willard, Wayne Vance, Robert Chesnut,
Dept. of Transp., Washington, D.C., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM
GESELL, District Judge.

This is a suit to enjoin the Department of Transporta-
tion (“DOT”) from continuing to carry out its random
drug testing plan’ developed under authority of Execu-

1“Drug-Free Departmental Workplace,” U.S. Dep’t of Transpor-
tation, June 29, 1987.

30a

tive Order 12,564 captioned “Drug-Free Federal Work-
place.” Exec.Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987).
Plaintiff (“AFGE”) is a labor union representing cer-
tain employees subject to the DOT plan which was an-
nounced June 29, 1987, and went into effect September 8,
1987.

DOT has moved for summary judgment and in oppos-
ing. AFGE has moved for a preliminary injunction,
which in turn is opposed by DOT. Extensive papers
have been filed and all issues were fully argued.”

The DOT plan under attack here supplements other
DOT drug programs for testing certain employees at
time of employment and at intervals scheduled well in
advance by providing for random urinalysis testing of
certain employees in sensitive positions.* Only employees

2 The chronology of this litigation is as follows: AFGE filed the
complaint on July 7, 1987 and DOT promptly filed an answer on
July 15, 1987. On July 30, DOT moved for summary judgment and
AFGE obtained an extension to respond by August 21, with DOT
subsequently replying on August 31.

On August 6, AFGE was advised that if a motion for preliminary
injunction were to be filed it could in the Court’s absence be heard
by the motions judge before Labor Day. AFGE did not file its
motion for preliminary injunction until August 21, when respond-
ing to defendant’s motion for summary judgment. DOT promptly
responded in opposition on August 31, and AFGE replied on Sep-
tember 11. Oral argument was heard on Monday, September 14,
1987.

3 Employees in these positions are chosen for random testing
through haphazard neutral computer selection. At varying times
“from month to month” a list of employees to be tested is randomly
selected. Declaration of Melissa J. Allen, Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary for Administration of the Dept. of Transportation, Defend-
ant’s Exhibit J at para. 12. All employees subject to random testing
have an equal statistical chance to be chosen for each testing list
without regard to previous selections. Jd. This type of testing is
unannounced and could occur on any scheduled workday, apparently
once a month, although the number to be involved is not clear from
the record. See “Drug-Free Departmental Workplace,’”’ U.S. Dep’t
of Transportation, ch. III, § 4, p. III-2, June 29, 1987.

3la

having critical jobs and falling in Category I are sub-

ject to this random testing. These employees are in jobs

: concerned with public health, safety, national security,
and law enforcement; jobs which involve duties calling
for the highest degree of trust and confidence. Each
critical position subject to random testing is supported
by a written justification statement describing why the
job is critical and what would happen if an incumbent
used illegal drugs. These justifications are subject to re-
view and are monitored by an Assistant Secretary. Jobs
from GS-4 to GS-14 and equivalents are covered, thus
including both union and non-union supervisory em-
ployees.

Ninety-four percent of the employees covered hold
aviation-related positions such as air traffic controllers,
electronic technicians, aviation safety inspectors and air-
chaft mechanics. In addition, fire fighters, nurses, rail-
road safety inspectors, armed law enforcement officers
and “top secret” security clearance personnel are among
those subject to random testing. Testing is under con-
siderate procedures refiecting regard for personal pri-
vacy.* No criminal use will be made of the results and
no discipline other than an offer of rehabilitation service
will occur if a first-time random urinalysis test is posi-
tive.” All disciplinary actions that may occur upon fur-

4The Department testing plan is in strict accordance with the
mandatory policies and procedures outlined in the “Scientific and
Technical Guidelines for Drug Testing Programs” issued by the
Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration, Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, on February 13, 1987 (changed
language July 20, 1987). Fed. Reg. (1987).

5 Before any official action is taken, positive test results are first
reported to the Medical Review Officer (“MRO”). The MRO, in
turn, contacts the employee and gives him or her the opportunity
to explain the test results as well as reviewing medical records sub-
mitted by the employee or any other relevant biomedical factors
necessary to determine whether there is a legitimate medical ex-
planation for the positive result. If the MRO determines that a

—VSV— : ’ : . »-* 77 ave - : > :

39a

TABLE OF CONTENTS
DRUG-FREE DEPARTMENTAL WORKPLACE

Page
CHAPTER I—GENERAL PROVISIONS... [42a]
| Section 1. Purpose ....................... - [42a]
| Section 2. Policy... tt [42a]
| Section 3. Coverage... : [43a]
Section 4. References... [43a]
Section 5. Background... ae [45a]
Section 6. Kesponsibilities “ [46a]
Section 7. Medical Review Officer (MRO) [46a]
Section 8. Drug Program Coordinators........... [47a]
Section 9. Drug Use Determination...._...-----..----« [49a]
CHAPTER II—DRUG AWARENESS . [50a]
Section 1. Drug Awareness. . [50a]
CHAPTER III—DRUG TESTING [51a]
Section 1. Policy............. Seen [51a]
Section 2. General Provisions .. {51a}
Section 3. Categories of Employees [51a]
Section 4. Types of Testing [52a]
A. Random Testing . [52a]
B. Periodic Testing .... [53a]
C. Reasonable Suspicion Testing [53a]
D. Pre-employment’ Pre-appointment __ Test-
ing slides . {54a}
E. Accident or Unsafe Practice Testing [54a]
F. Voluntary Testing [54a]
G. Follow-up Testing [54a]

40a

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Section 5. Notification to Employees Subject to

Certain Types of Testing ...............

Section 6. Notification to Applications for Posi-

tions Subject to Testing ..................

action J, COROCUROUe, TRICO vncncccecksostesectsncvctetscvorsccnces

Section 8. Specimen Collection Process ...............

Coen OE CI wacikcrceckdcesacnsetemececstalnanc

B. Balance of Individual Privacy and Speci-
nA MELON RETR aon Ord nara cee

C. Collection Procedures ....... SRE A Ln res eA

Section 9. Laboratory Analysis Procedures

A. Policy Se oe ee ie EEN

B. Reporting Test Results to the MRO

C. Specimen Storage ..

D. Internal External Quality Assurance Pro-

gram ..
E. Independent Testing
Section 10. Reporting Test Results
Section 11. Range of Drugs
CHAPTER IV—REHABILITATION

Section 1. General
Section 2. Employee Assistance Program ....
Section 3. Rehabilitation Abatement Selected
Section 4. Cost
Section 5. Self-referral 0.0000...
Section 6. Reassignment to Other Duties .

CHAPTER V—CONFIDENTIALITY

Section 1.

Policy

Page

4la

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page
Section 2. Procedures to Protect Confidentiality.. [69a]
CHAPTER VI—DISCIPLINARY ACTION ............. [71a]
Section 1. General ............... Fat ne ee [7la]
Section 2. Disciplinary Procedures... [72a]
CHAPTER VII—EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE PRO-
GRAM . SOE)
Section 1. Policy... paeibedeseptecvece Te
Section 2. Assessment and Referral...............,s«&(73a}
A. Developing the Referral Source... [74a]

B. Assessing Rehabilitative/Abatement Or-
ganizations and the Quality of Serv-

ices fe cncatedcamineasbaae ee , . [74a]

C. Developing Procedures for Making F Refer-
vais :...... isaac aeeckis scibe nS otostas i : .
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55a

SECTION 5. NOTIFICATION TO EMPLOYEES

SUBJECT TO CERTAIN TYPES OF
TESTING.

Employees subject to reasonable suspicion testing,
accident or unsafe practice testing or follow-up test-
ing shall receive notice prior to testing that includes
all of the following information:

A.
B.

D,

The reasons for the urinalysis test.

Assurance that the quality of testing procedures
is tightly controlled, that the test used to confirm
use of illegal drugs is highly reliable, and that
test results will be handled with maximum re-
spect for individual privacy, consistent with
safety and security.

. Notice of the opportunity and procedures for sub-

mitting supplemental medical documentation that
may support a legitimate use for a specific drug.

The consequences of a confirmed positive test re-
sult or refusal to be tested, including disciplinary
action.

». The availability of drug abuse counseling and

referral services, including the name and tele-
phone number of the local EAP Coordinator.

SECTION 6. NOTIFICATION TO APPLICANTS

A.

B.

FOR POSITIONS SUBJECT TO
TESTING.

Vacancy announcements for Category I positions
shall contain information that the applicant will
be tested for illegal drug use prior to appoint-
ment.

Applicants will be advised of the opportunity to
submit medical documentation that may support

57a

D. Applicants will be directed to report to the near-
est collection site. Applicants in remote locations
. will be reimbursed for reasonable expenses in-
curred in travel to the collection location.

SECTION 8 SPECIMEN COLLECTION PROCESS.

The procedures contained in this directive were de-
signed to provide consideration for individual pri-
vacy in conjunction with a controlled drug testing
program. The procedures set out below apply to all
seven types of testing, i.e., random, periodic, reason-
able suspicion, pre-employment pre-appointment, ac-
cident or unsafe practice, voluntary and follow-up.

A. Chain of Custody.

(1) In order to ensure that the urine sample
taken from an individual is properly identi-
fied and not accidently confused with any
other sample, strict procedures shall be used
when collecting and transferring the sample.
The total of the procedures, i.e., the official
transfers from the individual providing the
sample to the drug testing laboratory, in-
cluding storage of confirmed positive sam-
ples at the laboratory, is known as the chain
of custody.

'2) While performing any part of the chain of
custody procedures, it is essential that the
urine specimen and chain of custody docu-
ments be under the control of the collector.
The collector may not leave his or her work
station, even momentarily, without securing
the specimen and chain of custody form.
The specimen should be packaged for mail-

ing before the collector leaves the site.

(3) Collectors shall always have the container or
specimen bottle within sight before and af-

59a

tions shall be taken to ensure that a urine speci-
men has not been adulterated or diluted during
the collection procedure and that all information
on the urine bottle and in the log book can be
identified as belonging to a given individual. Col-
lection of urine specimens shall not be made un-
der observation except in those unusual circum-
stances allowed in Executive Order 12564 and
Office of Personnel Management FPM Letters
792-16 and 792-17.

C. Collection Procedures. To ensure that strict chain
of custody is maintained, the following procedures
will be used during the collection of urine speci-
mens:

(1) The collection process will usually be sched-
uled as close to the start of a work shift as
possible.

(2) Upon arrival at the collection site, the col-
lector shall request the individual to present
some type of photo identification. If the in-
dividual does not have proper identification,
this shall be noted on the chain of custody
form. Failure to provide identification will
be considered failure to cooperate and
grounds for possible disciplinary action. Ac-
ceptable forms of identification include:

Employee identification with photo
Driver’s license with photo
School identification card with photo

(3) If the individual fails to appear at the as-
signed time, the collector shall contact the
Drug Program Coordinator to obtain guid-
ance on action to be taken.

| (4: The individual will be asked to fill out a
pre-test information form which serves as

Or

(6}

-)

60a

an identification document for the urine sam-
ple collected. This form will also elicit in-
formation regarding prescription and non-
prescription drugs an employee uses which
may affect the outcome of the test.

The collector shall ask the individual to re-
move any unnecessary outer garments (e.g.,
coat, jacket) that might conceal items or
substances that could be used to tamper with
or adulterate his or her urine specimen.
Also, all personal belongings (e.g., purse,
briefcase) must remain with outer gar-
ments; the individual may, however, retain
his or her wallet. The collector shall note on
the chain of custody form any unusual be-
havior or appearance.

The individual shall be instructed to wash
and dry his or her hands prior to urination.
After washing hands, he or she shall remain
in the presence of the collector and not have
access to water fountains, faucets, soap dis-
pensers, or cleaning agents or any other
materials which could be used to adulterate
the specimen.

To deter the dilution of specimens at the
collection site, toilet bluing agents shall be
placed in the toilet tanks, wherever possible,
so the reservoir of water in the toilet bow]
always remain blue. There should not be
any other source of water (e.g., shower,
sink, ete.) in the enclosure where urination
occurs.

The individual may provide his or her speci-
men in the privacv of a stall, or otherwise
partitioned area that allows for individual
privacy. The collector shall note on the chain

(9)

(10)

cis}

6la

of custody form any unusual behavior by the
individual.

The individual shall be asked to void into a
disposable specimen container and asked not
to flush the toilet until the specimen has been
handed over to the collector. The individual
may then flush the toilet and should then
observe the collector complete the chain of
custody procedure. With regard to females,
a collection container with a wider mouth
may be used to collect the urine and the
sample is then transferred by the collector
to the specimen container. Any transfer of
urine from the collection container to the
specimen bottle should be observed by the
individual.

If the collection site is a public restroom, a
collector of the same gender as the individ-
ual shall accompany the individual into the
public restroom which must be secured dur
ing the collection procedure. Toilet bluine
should be placed into the toilet bowl. The
collector remains in the restroom but outside
the stall until the urine specimen is collected.

Upon receiving the specimen from the indi-
vidual, the collector will determine that it
contains at least 60 milliliters of urine. Tf
there is not sufficient urine in the container,
additional! urine should be collected. The in-
dividual shall be asked to drink fluids to
facilitate urination (e.g., a glass of water).
Employees will remain at the test site for
approximately 2 hours until a urine speci-
men is provided. The inability of an em-
ployee to provide the necessary specimen wil!
be treated as a refusal. The collector shal!
contact the Drug Program Coordinator to
obtain guidance on action to be taken.

(14)

§2a

After the specimen has been provided and
submitted to the collector, the individual
should be allowed to wash his or her hands.

Immediately after collection, the collector
shall measure the temperature of the speci-
men and conduct an inspection to deter-
mine the specimen’s color and signs of con-
taminants. Any unusual findings resulting
from the inspection must be included on the
chain of custody form. The time from uri-
nation to delivery of the sample for tem-
perature measurement is critical and in no
ease shall exceed 4 minutes. If the tempera-
ture of the specimen is outside the range of
32.5-37.7 C 90.5-99.8 F this gives rise t
reason to believe the specimen has been tam-
pered with. Another specimen shall be col-
lected under direct observation and _ both
specimens forwarded to the laboratory. An)
specimen suspected to be adulterated should
always be forwarded for testing.

30th the individual being tested and the col-

lector should keep the specimen in view at
all times until it has been packaged and
sealed for shipment. If the specimen is
transferred to a second container, the col-
lector shall request the individual to observe
the transfer of the specimen and the place-
ment of the tamperproof seal over the bottle
cap and down the sides of the bottle. The
collector will place the identification label
securely on the bottle.

The identification label should contain the
date and individual’s specimen number. The
individual shall initial the label on the speci-
men bottle.

(16)

(17)

(18)

(19)

63a

The collector will enter the identifying in-
formation in a ledger. Both the collector
and the individual shall sign the ledger next
to the identifying information.

The individual shall be asked to read and
sign a certification statement certifying that
the urine in the bottle came from his or her
body at the time of testing. Refusal to sign
this statement shall be noted on the state-
ment form by the collector.

The collector shall complete the appropriate
chain of custody form.

The urine sample and the chain of custody
form are now ready for shipment. If the
specimen is not immediately prepared for
shipment, it must be appropriately secured
during temporary storage. In no instance,
shall the specimen be stored longer than 24
hours after collection.

SECTION 9. LABORATORY ANALYSIS

PROCEDURES.

A. Policy.

(1)

All laboratory testing and laboratory chain
of custody procedures will be done in strict
accordance with the HHS “Scientific and
Technical Guidelines for Drug Testing Pro-
grams.”

The test for drugs will consist of initial
screening to detect the presence of drugs
and confirmation testing of samples where
an initial screen is positive.

The laboratory will assure the chain of cus-
tody procedures are adhered to from the
time of receipt of urine samples until test-

64a

ing is completed, results reported, and while
specimens are in storage.

B. Reporting Test Results to the MRO. Test results
shall be reported to a designated MRO within
five working days of receipt at the laboratory of
the specimens. The report should contain the
assigned specimen number, the drug testing lab-
oratory number, and results of the drug tests.
All specimens negative on initial test or negative
on the confirmatory test shall be reported as neq-
ative. Only specimens confirmed positive shall
be reported positive to the MRO. Results shall
be transmitted to the MRO in a manner con-
sistent with the Privacy Act. It is not permitted
to provide results verbally by telephone. A cer-
tified copy of the original chain of custody form,
signed by the aboratory director or laboratory
certifying official, shall be sent to the MRO.
Copies of all analytical results shall be available
from the laboratory when requested.

C. Specimen Storage. Negative samples will be dis-
carded by the laboratory. Only samples testing
positive after both the screening and confirma-
tion tests will be considered positive for purposes
of retaining the specimen. Positive samples will
be retained at the laboratory in a frozen state
for at least 365 days. Within this 365-day pe-
riod, the Drug Program Coordinator may re-
quest the laboratory to retain the specimen for
an additional period of time. This ensures that
the urine samples will be available for possible
retest during any administrative or disciplinary
proceeding. If the laboratory does not receive a
request to retain the specimen during the initial
365-day period, the specimen may be discarded.

D. Internal/External Quality Assurance Program.
In accordance with the HHS procedures, blind

65a

samples will be randomly intermingled by DOT
and the testing laboratory with individual speci-
men samples and analyzed in the same manner
to ensure the accuracy of our laboratory testing
program.

E. Independent Testing. An employee who tests pos-
itive may request a second test of the sample
coilected at the time of drug screening. That
test may be conducted at the laboratory used by
the Department or at another qualified labora-
tory identified by the employee. In the latter in-
stance, the laboratory used by the Department
will send a portion of the original sample to a
laboratory designated by the employee. The cost
of this test shall be paid by the employee. Strict
chain of custody procedures will be followed for
any transfer between laboratories.

SECTION 10. REPORTING TEST RESULTS.

A. Employees who test positive will receive written
notification of the positive finding. Employees
who test negative on initial screening or on con-
firmation will not receive written notification of
the negative finding.

B. Information will be elicited from employees prior
to providing urine specimens to indicate their
legitimate use for a specific drug. Employees who
test positive for a drug and whose pre-test in-
formation indicates the legitimate use for a spe-
cific drug causing the positive test result will be
notified in writing that their test result is con-
sidered negative.

SECTION 11. RANGE OF DRUGS.

A. Tests will be conducted for the illegal use of the
following drugs considered to be a controlled sub-
stance included in Schedule I or II, as defined by

66a

section 802(6) of Title 21 of the United States
Code, the possession of which is unlawful under
Chapter 13 of that Title:

(1) Marijuana

(2) Cocaine

(3) Opiates

(4) Amphetamines

(5) Pheneyclidine (PCP)

B. Before including any additional drugs (or classes
of drugs), listed in Schedule I or II of the Con-
trolled Substance Act in its testing program, the
Department will petition the Secretary of HHS
or his or her designee for written approval.

C. When conducting reasonable suspicion testing in
accordance with Chapter III, Section 4.C., the
Department may test for any drug identified in
Schedule I or II of the Controlled Substance Act
as set forth in Appendix B.

67a
CHAPTER IV

REHABILITATION

SECTION 1. GENERAL.

When it has been determined that an employee has
used illegal drugs off-duty, it is the responsibility of
management to direct an employee to the Employee
Assistance Program (see Chapter VII). The em-
ployee shall be given an opportunity following the
initial counseling to enter a drug rehabilitation/
abatement program as may be appropriate under the
circumstances. (Abatement is defined as the elimi-
nation of the use of, or dependence on, a substance
through the exercise of individual initiative or
through the encouragement and/or support of
others.) The employee will, in addition to the pro-
gram determined to be appropriate, be subject to
follow-up drug testing for a one-year period after
return to safety or security duties or completion of
the rehabilitation/abatement program, whichever is
later. An employee who successfully completes such
a program will not be subject to disciplinary action
for the first determination of illegal drug usage.

SECTION 2. EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.

An employee directed to an EAP will receive short-
term diagnostic counseling and referral to a reha-
bilitation/abatement program. Information will be
provided to management in accordance with the con-
fidentiality requirements of Chapter V.

SECTION 3. REHABILITATION/ABATEMENT
SELECTED.

The determination of the type of rehabilitation/
abatement assistance required by an employee will
be made by the EAP Coordinator, in consultation as
appropriate, with supervisory and medical personnel.

68a
SECTION 4. COST.

The services provided under existing EAP programs
are provided at no cost to the employee. However,
the cost of further rehabilitative services or treat-
ment is the responsibility of the employee.

SECTION 5. SELF-REFERRAL.

An employee who voluntarily identifies himself or
herself as an off-duty drug user or volunteers for
drug testing prior to being identified through other
means, will not disciplined if he or she meets all of
the following criteria:

A. Obtains counseling and completes rehabilitation.

B. Agrees to follow-up testing for a one year period
after return to safety or security duties or com-
pletion of the rehabilitation/abatement program,
whichever is later.

C. Thereafter refrains from using illegal drugs.

SECTION 6. REASSIGNMENT TO OTHER DUTIES.

Employees in Category I will be assigned non-safety
or non-security duties when they are identified as
having used illegal drugs. This policy will also ap-
ply during any rehabilitation program. The em-
ployee may be removed if there are no non-sensitive
positions to which the employee may be transferred.
However, an employee assigned to non-safety or non-
security duties may be returned to safety or security
duties when an appropriate authority determines
such action would not pose a danger to public health
or safety or the national security. Employees re-
turned to safety or security duties are subject to
follow-up testing for a 1-year period after return to
safety or security duties or completion of the reha-
bilitation ‘abatement program, whichever is later.

69a
CHAPTER V
CONFIDENTIALITY

SECTION 1. POLICY.

Employees and the drug testing laboratory involved
in any aspect of the Departmental drug program are
required to maintain strict standards of confiden-
tiality in carrying out their responsibilities. This
includes all of the following:

A.

B.
C.

Maintaining maximum respect for individual pri-
vacy consistent with safety and security issues.

The handling of test results.

All contacts with medical and health personnel,
counselors, Drug Testing Coordinators, and EAP
Coordinators and administrators.

SECTION 2. PROCEDURES TO PROTECT

CONFIDENTIALITY.

The following procedures to protect the confidential-
ity of negative and confirmed positive- test results
and related medical and rehabilitation records shall
be observed.

A.

Records of the identity, diagnosis, prognosis, or
treatment of any employee who enters a rehabili-
tation/abatement program which are maintained
in connection with this program are patient rec-
ords that must be kept confidential and may be
disclosed only by consent of the patient or under
limited circumstances and specific purposes es-
tablished by 42 CFR Section 2.1 et seq.

Drug abuse treatment records may be disclosed
without the consent of the employee only under
one of the following circumstances:

70a

(1) To medical personnel to the extent necessary
to meet a genuine medical emergency.

(2) To qualified personnel for conducting scien-
tific research, management audits, financial
audits, or program evaluation, with all iden-
tifying information removed from the data.

(3) When authorized by an appropriate court
order granted after application showing good
cause.

C. Any other disclosure may be made only with the
written consent of the employee. Any disclosure
without such consent is strictly prohibited. Such
consensual disclosure may be made for verifica-
tion of treatment or a general evaluation of
treatment progress.

7la
CHAPTER VI

DISCIPLINARY ACTION

SECTION 1. GENERAL.

Disciplinary action as set forth below will be taken
under each of the described circumStances:

A.

Refusal to Enter or Successfully Complete a Re-
habilitation/Abatement Program. If an employee
refuses to enter or successfully complete a reha-
bilitation/abatement program, he or she will be
removed from the Federal service for illegal off-
duty drug use.

Repeat Usage. In all cases of illegal off-duty drug
use, employees who test positive a second time,
or for whom a second determination of illegal
drug use has been made, will be removed from
the Federal service.

. Refusal to Provide a Urine Specimen. An em-

ployee who refuses to provide a urine specimen
or otherwise refuses to cooperate with the collec-
tion procedures will be removed from the Federal
service.

Adulteration or Substitution of Specimen. An
employee who adulterates, substitutes or other-
wise attempts to falsify the results of a urinaly-
sis will be removed from the Federal service.

On-duty Use of Illegal Drugs. On-duty use or
possession of illegal drugs by an employee will
result in removal from the Federal service.

Other Drug-related Offenses. A determination
that an employee has engaged in illegal drug
trafficking, e.g., sale, manufacture, growing, dis-
tribution or transportation, will result in removal
from the Federal service.

72a

SECTION 2. DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES.

Any disciplinary action under this Chapter will be
taken in accordance with the requirements of the
Civil Service Reform Act and other governing regu-
lations which may apply.

73a
CHAPTER VII
EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

SECTION 1. POLICY.

All Operating Elements within DOT shall have an
Employee Assistance Program in accordance with
the regulations, policies, and procedures issued by
the Department, the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM), and HHS. Accordingly, all Departmental
Employee Assistance Programs shall:

A. Provide the EAP with high visibility and, by
utilizing a concerted publicity outreach effort,
inform all employees of the purpose and opera-
tion of the program.

B. Designate an EAP Coordinator to oversee the
program’s operation.

C. Take appropriate steps to assure that only pro-
fessional, accredited, certified, and licensed reha-

bilitation services are provided in connection with
the EAP.

D. Have a plan to evaluate the operation of the EAP
and the quality of services provided.

E. Maintain appropriate records and information
systems.

F. Assure that both in-house and contracted services
comply with DOT, OPM and HHS regulations
and instructions.

G. Provide educational awareness programs on EAP
related subjects.
SECTION 2. ASSESSMENT AND REFERRAL.

All Departmental EAPs must have a rehabilitation/
abatement referral component which includes an up-

74a

to-date referral source of rehabilitation ‘abatement
organizations, the criteria used to assess the or-
ganizations and the quality of services provided, and
the procedures for making a referral.

A. Developing the Referral Source.

(1)

(2)

(3)

EAP Coordinators must maintain or have
readily available a list of rehabilitation/
abatement organizations which provide coun-
seling and rehabilitative programs.

The following information must be included
on each organization: (a) name, address,
and telephone number; (b) the type of serv-
ices provided; (c) hours of operation, in-
cluding emergency hours; (d) name and
telephone number of a contact person; (e)
fee structure, including insurance coverage;
(f) client specialization; and (g) other per-
tinent information.

EAP Coordinators shall establish and main-
tain liaison with counterparts in the em-
ployee assistance field through participation
in meetings, seminars, and other appropriate
professional activities.

B. Assessing Rehabilitative Abatement Organizations
and the Quality of Services.

(1)

EAP Coordinators periodically shall visit re-
habilitative/abatement organizations to: (a)
meet administrative and staff members; (b)
tour the site and observe the physical set-
ting; and (c) ascertain the experience, cer-
tification and edu.-ational level of staff.

EAP Coordinators shall verify licensing and
accreditation of organizations.

75a

(3) EAP Coordinators shall ascertain each or-
ganization’s policy concerning progress re-
ports on clients and post-treatment follow-

up.
C. Developing Procedures for Making Referrals.

(1) Factors that must be considered in making
a referral include: (a) the nature and sever-
ity of the problem; (b) location of the treat-
ment center; (c) cost; (d) levels of care,
i.e, the degree of restrictiveness and/or in-
tensity of treatment environment; (e) avail-
ability of inpatient and/or out-patient care;
and (f) other special needs, such as trans-
portation and child care.

(2) Whenever possible, the employee should be
involved in the selection and choice of a
provider.

(3) Employees shall be allowed up to 1 hour (or
more as necessitated by travel time) of ex-
cused absence for each counseling session, up
to a maximum of six sessions, during the
assessment/referral phase of rehabilitation.
Absences during duty hours for rehabilita-
tion abatement must be charged to the ap-
propriate leave category in accordance with
law and leave regulations.

SECTION 3. TRAINING.

As supervisors have a key role in establishing and
maintaining a drug-free work place, EAPs shall
have a training component to assist supervisors and
managers in identifying and addressing illegal drug
use by employees.

A. Goals and Objectives. All supervisory training
shall meet the following goals and objectives:

(1)

(8)

76a

To understand Departmental policies rele-
vant to work performance problems, drug
use, and the EAP.

To understand the responsibilities of offer-
ing EAP services to employees.

To recognize and document employee per-
formance and behavioral changes.

To understand the roles of the medical staff,
supervisors, personnel, and EAP personnel.

To understand the ways to use the EAP.

To understand how the EAP is linked to the
performance appraisal and the disciplinary
processes,

To understand the process of reintegrating
employees into the work force.

To be aware of legal and liability issues.

B. Requirements. All supervisory training shall
meet the following requirements:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Training is required of all supervisors,
managers, and union representatives where
appropriate.

Training shall be presented as a separate
course, or be included as part of ongoing su-
pervisory training programs.

Training shall be provided as soon as pos-
sible after a person assumes supervisory re-
sponsibility.

The training program shall contain written
material which the supervisor can _ utilize
back at the work site.

C. Specifies of Course Outline. Training courses
shall include but shall not be limited to the fol-
lowing segments:

Tia

(1) Overall Departmental policy.

(2) The prevalence of various employee prob-
lems, i.e., aleohol, drugs, emotional, etc.

(3) The EAP approach to handling problems.

(4) How to identify employees with possible
problems.

(5) Documentation of employee performance or
behavior.

(6) How to approach the employee.
(7) How to utilize the EAP.

(8) Disciplinary measures where employees de-
cline offers of assistance or refuse to com-
plete a rehabilitation’/abatement program.

(9) The reintegration of employees into the
work force.

SECTION 4. CONTRACTING FOR EAP SERVICES.

EAP services provided through contract shall meet
the same requirements as contained in DOT, OPM
and HHS regulations and instructions. In addition,
the Operating Elements must ensure the contract
statement of work provides all of the following:

A. A description of the services to be provided, i.e.,
couiseling and referral, rehabilitation, publicity
outreach, training, educational awareness, and
program evaluation.

B. The location and availability of services.

C. The qualifications of the administrative and
counseling staff.

D. The system for making a referral, i.e., criteria
used to determine appropriate referral and for
determining the quality of provider.

78a

E. A contractor self-evaluation program.
F. A confidentiality provision.
G. A reporting and information system.

H. An overall program evaluation plan.

CHAPTER VIII—IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES
(RESERVED)

[DOT Logo]
Elizabeth Dole
Secretary of Transportation

79a
APPENDIX A

CATEGORIZATION OF EMPLOYEES FOR
DRUG TESTING
DEFINITIONS

Category I—Safety/Security Critical—These are posi-
tions characterized by their critical safety or security
responsibilities as they relate to the mission of the De-
partment. The job functions associated with these posi-
tions have a direct and immediate impact en public
health and safety, the protection of life and property,
law enforcement, or national security. These positions
require the highest degree of trust and confidence.

Category I1—These are positions not included in Cate-
gory I.

Positions are identified for inclusion within the above
categories by their organizational location, occupational
series, job title, security clearance, or combinations of
these characteristics.

POSITION COVERAGE BY SECURITY CLEARANCE

All positions occupied by individuals which require the
possession of a security clearance of “TOP-SECRET” or
higher are included in Category I regardless of their
organization or occupation.

POSITION COVERAGE BY OCCUPATION

The categorization of all other Department of Transpor-
tation positions is accomplished within the context of
their Operating Elements and their job duties. within
that administration. To assure overall consistency, cate-
gory determinations for including or excluding positions
from either Category I or Category II will be made by
the Office of the Secretary in consultation with the Oper-
ating Elements. References to a given job, occupation
series or family include all supervisors and employees in
the occupation regardless of pay plan unless otherwise
noted.

80a

JUSTIFICATION STATEMENTS FOR CATEGORY 1
POSITIONS

Each determination by an Operating Element, OST, or
OIG to include a particular job occupation in Category
I shall be supported by a justification statement clearly
describing why the job is safety/security critical and
specifying the adverse consequences that would likely oc-
cur if an incumbent in that position were to use illegal
drugs. A current justification statement for each job
occupation included in Category I shall remain on file
with the Assistant Secretary for Administration. The
Assistant Secretary for Administration reserves the
right to review each justification statement to ensure
overall consistentcy with the DOT drug program and
among varying occupations throughout the Department
and make appropriate recommendations.

Office of the Secretary
Category 1
Motor Vehicle Operators WG-57XX
United States Coast Guard

Category 1

Firefighters GS- 81
Nurses GS- 610
Criminal Investigators GS-1811
Vessel Traffic Controllers GS-2150
Marine Traffic Controllers (Pilot) GS-2150
Electronic Mechanics WG-2604**
Aircraft Electricians WG-2892**
Instrument Mechanics WG-3359**
Metals Inspectors WG-3801**
Shipwright Foremen WS-5220
Transportation Equipment Operation Family WG-57XX
Aircraft Oxygen Equipment Mechanics WG-8201**

Aircraft Engine Mechanics WG-8602**

8la

Aircraft Mechanics WG-8852**
Master Pilots, Ferryboat WM-9902
Chief, Engineers, Ferryboat WM-9931
Oiler, Ferryboat & Diesel WM-9961

All individuals with “competent person” collateral duties at
the Coast Guard Yard, Curtis Bay, Maryland. These indi-
viduals have responsibility for certifying areas as “safe” for
performing work (such as certifying fuel tanks safe for
welding).

** Only those individuals located at the Aircraft Repair and
Supply Center.

.
Federal Aviation Administration

Category I

Electronics Technicians GS-856

Civil Aviation Security Specialists ! GS-1801**

Aviation Safety Inspectors GS-1825**

Air Traffic Control Specialists ~ GS-2152**

Inspection/Flight Test Pilots GS-2181

Transportation Equipment Operation Family WG-57XX

Aircraft Mechanics WG-8852

** Only GS-2152, GS-1801 and GS-1825 employees who are
required to take periodic physical exams to retain medical
clearances are covered by this program.

Includes persons in other job series who perform Federal
Air Marshall duties and thus require periodic physical ex-
aminations.

Federal Highway Administration

Category I
Highway Safety Specialists GS-2125*
Motor Carrier Safety Specialists GS-2123*

Transportation Equipment Operation Family WG-57XX

* Includes only those GS-2123 and GS-2125 positions with
day-to-day responsibilities for field operations of inspection
and enforcement.

82a

Federal Railroad Administration

Category I

Industrial Hygienists (Headquarters) GS-690
General Engineer (Field & Headquarters) GS-801
Civil Engineers (Field & Headquarters) GS-810 **
Railroad Safety Series (Field & Headquarters) GS-2121**
Motor Vehicle Operators WG-57XX
Safety Engineer (Headquarters) GS-803
Mechanical Engineers (Headquarters) GS-830
Electrical Engineers (Headquarters) GS-855
Chemical Engineer (Headquarters) GS-893
Transportation Specialists (Headquarters) GS-2101*

* Includes only those positions which involve two or more
specialized transportation functions actively engaged in the
development, implementation and monitoring of railroad
safety programs. ‘

** For field positions, includes Railroad Safety Inspectors and
Specialists, Supervisory Inspectors and Specialists, mana-
gerial level Railroad Safety Specialists and Civil Engineers
actively engaged in the inspection of railroad equipment and
services.

Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation

Category I
Lock and Dam Operators WG-5426**
Vessel Traffic Controllers GS-2150**

Transportation Equipment Operation Family WG-57XX**

** Employees in other series who periodically perform the
duties of Vessel Traffic Controller, Lock and Dam Operators
or Heavy Equipment Operators are also included in Category
I.

» 88a

Urban Mass Transportation Administration

Category I
Motor Vehicle Operators

WG-57XX

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Category I

Motor Vehicle Operators
Auto Enforcement Investigators
Criminal Investigators

WG-57XX
GS-1801
GS-1811

Research and Special Programs Administration

Category I

General Engineer (Pipeline)
Petroleum Engineer
Transportation Specialists
Motor Vehicle Operators

* Includes those at grade 13 and above.

Office of Inspector General
Category I

Criminal Investigators

Maritime Administration
Category I

Transportation Equipment Operation Family

Engineers (Watchstander)

Marine General Utility Maintenance
Mechanics (Deck/Engine)

GS-801

GS-881

GS-2101*
WG-57XX

GS-1811

WG-57XX
WM-5352

WM-5352

84a
APPENDIX B

LISTING OF SCHEDULES I AND II
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) (21 U.S.C. § 801
et seq.), among other things, establishes five schedules of
controlled substances. Initial listings of controlled sub-
stances are indicated in section 202 of the CSA (21
U.S.C. § 812). However, under the statute, the Attorney
General may by rule add any drug or other substance to
a schedule, remove it from the schedules or transfer it
between schedules if the drug or other substance meets
certain statutory criteria. The Attorney General’s au-
thority in this matter has been delegated to the Admin-
istrator, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), U.S.
Department of Justice.

The schedules of controlled substances established by sec-
tion 202 of the CSA, as changed, updated and repub-
lished from time to time, are set forth in 21 CFR Part
1308. The current Schedule I and II listings (as of April
1, 1986) are as follows:

SCHEDULES
Section 1308.11 Schedule I.

(a) Schedule I shall consist of the drugs and other sub-
stances, by whatever official name, common or usual
name, chemical name, or brand name designated,
listed in this section. Each drug or substance has
been assigned the DEA Controlled Substances Code
Number set forth opposite it.

(b) Opiates. Unless specifically excepted or unless listed
in another schedule, any of the following opiates,
including their isomers, esters, ethers, salts, and
salts of isomers, esters, and ethers, whenever the
existence of such isomers, esters, ethers, salts is pos-
sible within the specific chemical designation:

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

(8)

(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
(29)
(30)
(31)
(32)
(33)

85a

Acetylmethadol 9601
Alfentanil 9737
Allylprodine 9602
Alphacetylmethadol 9603
Alphameprodine 9604
Alphamethadol 9605

Alpha-methylfentany] (N-(1-(alpha-methyl-
beta-pheny]) ethyl-4-piperidyl) propionanilide;
1- (1-methy]-2-phenylethy]) -4- (N-propanilido)

piperidine) 9814
Benzethidine 9606
Betacetylmethadol 9607
Betameprodine 9608
Betamethadol 9609
Betaprodine 9611
Clonitazene 9612
Dextromoramide 9613
Diampromide 9615
Diethylthiambutene 9616
Difenoxin 9168
Dimenoxadol 9617
Dimepheptanol 9618
Dimethylthiambutene 9619
Dioxaphetyl butyrate 9621
Dipipanone 9622
Ethylmethylthiambutene 9623
Etonitazene 9624
Etoxeridine 9625
Furethidine 9626
Hydroxypethidine 9627
Ketobemidone 9628
Levomoramide 9629
Levophenacylmorphan 9631
Morpheridine 9632
Noracymethadol 9633

Norlevorphanol 9634

(e)

(34)
(35)
(36)
(37)
(38)
(39)
(40)
(41)
(42)
(43)
(44)
(45)
(46)

Opium derivatives.

86a

Normethadone
Norpipanone
Phenadoxone
Phenampromide
Phenomorphan
Phenoperidine
Piritramide
Proheptazine
Properidine
Propiram
Racemoramide
Tilidine
Trimeperidine

9635
9636
9637
9638
9647
9641
9642
9643
9644
9649
9645
9750
9646

Unless specifically excepted or

unless listed in another schedule, any of the follow-
ing opium derivatives, its salts, isomers, and salts of
isomers whenever the existence of such salts, iso-
mers, and salts of isomers is possible within the
specific chemical designation:

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)

Acetorphine
Acetyldihydrocodeine
Benzylmorphine

Codeine methylbromide
Codeine-N-Oxide
Cyprenorphine
Desomorphine
Dihydromorphine
Drotebanol

Etorphine (except hydrochloride salt)
Heroin

Hydromorphinol
Methyldesorphine
Methyldihydromorphine
Morphine methylbromide
Morphine methylsulfonate

9319
9051
9052
9070
9053
9054
9055
9145
9335
9056
9200
9301
9302
9304
9395
9306

(d)

87a

(17) Morphine-N-Oxide 9307
(18) Myrophine 9308
(19) Nicocodeine 9309
(20) Nicomorphine 9312
(21) Normorphine 9313
(22) Pholcodine 9314
(23) Thebacon 9315

Hallucinogeniec substances. Unless specifically ex-
cepted or unless listed in another schedule, any ma-
terial, compound, mixture, or preparation, which con-
tains any quantity of the following hallucinogenic
substances, or which contains any of its salts, iso-
mers, and salts of isomers whenever the existence of
such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible
within the specific chemical designation (for pur-
poses of this paragraph only, the term “isomer” in-
cludes the optical, position and geometric isomers) :

(1) 4-bromo-2, 5-dimethoxy-amphetamine 7391
Some trade or other names: 4-bromo-2,5-
dimethoxy-alpha-methylphenethylamine;
4-bromo-2,5-DMA

(2) 2,5-dimethoxyamphetamine 7396
Some trade or other names; 2,5-dimethoxy-
alpha-methylphenethylamine; 2,5-DMA

(3) 4-methoxyamphetamine 7411
Some trade or other names: 4-methoxy-
alpha-methyl-phenethylamine;
paramethoxyamphetamine, PMA

(4) 5-methoxy-3,4-methylenedioxy-amphetamine 7401

(5) 4-methyl-2,5-dimethoxy-amphetamine 7395

Some trade and other names: 4-methy]-2,5-
dimethoxy-alpha-methylphenethylamine;
“DOM”; and “STP”

(6) 3,4-methylenedioxy amphetamine 7400
(7) 3,4,5-trimethoxy amphetamine 7390

(8)

(9)

(10)

(1)

(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)

(16)

(17)
(18)
(19)

88a

Bufotenine 7433
Some trade and other names: 3- (beta-
Dimethylaminoethy]) -5-hydroxyindole;

3- (2-dimethylaminoethy]) -5-indolol; N,
N-dimethylserotonin ; 5-hydroxy-N,N-
dimethyltryptamine; mappine

Diethyltryptamine 7434

Some trade and other names: N,N-
Diethyltryptamine; DET

Dimethyltryptamine 7435
Some trade or other names: DMT
lbogaine 7260

Some trade and other names: 7-Ethyl-6,6
beta, 7,8,9,10,12,13-octahydro-2-methoxy
6,9-methano-5H-pyrido (1’, 2’:1,2) azepino
(5,4-b) indole; Tabernanthe iboga

Lysergic acid diethylamine 7315
Marihuana 7360
Mescaline 7381
Parahexy] 7374

Some trade or other names: 3-Hexy]-1-
hydroxy-7,8,9,10-tetrahydro-6,6,9-trimethyl-
6H-dibenzo(b,d) pyran; Synhexy]

Peyote 7415
Meaning all parts of the plant presently

classified botanically as Lophophora williamsii
Lemaire, whether growing or not, the seeds

thereof, any extract from any part of such

plant, and every compound, manufacture,

salts, derivative, mixture, or preparation of

such plant, its seeds or extracts.

(Interprets 21 USC 812(c), Schedule

1(c) (12) )

N-ethy1-3-piperidy] benzilate 7482
N-methyl-3-piperidy] benzilate 7484
Psilocybin 7437

(e)

(20)
(21)

(22)

(23)

(24)

89a

Psilocyn 7438

Tetrahydrocannabinols 7370
Synthetic equivalents of the substances

contained in the plant, or in the resinous

extractives of Cannabis, sp. and/or synthetic
substances, derivatives, and their isomers

with similar chemical structure and
pharmacological activity such as the following.

Delta 1 cis or trans tetrahydrocannabinol, and
their optical isomers.

Delta 6 cis or trans tetrahydrocannabinol,

and their optical isomers.

Delta 3,4 cis or trans tetrahydrocannabinol,
and its optical isomers.

(Since nomenclature of these substances is not
internationally standardized, compounds of
these structures, regardless of numerical
designation of atomic positions covered.)

Ethylamine analog of phencyclidine 7455
Some trade or other names: N-ethyl-1-
phenylcyclohexylamine, (1-phenylcyclohexy])
ethylamine, N-(1-phenylcyclo-hexy])

ethylamine, cyclohexamine, PCE

Pyrrolidine analog of phencyclidine 7458
Some trade or other names: 1-(1-
phenylcyclohexy]) -pyrrolidine, PCPy, PHP

Thiophene analogy of phencyclidine 7470
Some trade or other names: 1-(1-(2-thieny]) -
cyclohexyl) -piperidine, 2-thienylanalog of
phencyclidine, TPCP, TCP

Depressants. Unless specifically excepted or unless
listed in another schedule, any material, compound,
mixture, or preparation which contains any quan-
tity of the following substances having a depressant
effect on the central nervous system, including its
salts, isomers, and salts of isomers whenever the

90a

existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers
is possible within the specific chemical designation:

(1) Mecloqualone 2572
(2) Methaqualone 2565

Stimulants. Unless specifically excepted or unless
listed in another schedule, any material, compound,
mixture, or preparation which contain any quantity
of the following substances having a stimulant effect
on the central nervous system, including its salts,
isomers, and salts of isomers:

(1) Fenethylline 1503
(2) N-ethylamphetamine 1475

Temporary listing of substances subject to emer-
gency scheduling. Any material, compound, mixture
or preparation which contains any quantity of the
following substances:

(1) 8-Methylfentany] (N-(3-methyl-1- (2-
phenylethy]) -4-piperidy]) -N-
phenylprpanamide), its optical and geometric
isomers, salts and salts of isomers 9813

(2) 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine
(MDMA), its optical, positional and geometric
isomers, salts and salts of isomers 7405

(3) 1-methyl-4-phenyl-4-propionoxypiperidine
(MPPP), its optical isomers, salts and salts
of isomers 9661

(4) 1-(2-phenylethy]) -4-phenyl-4-
acetyloxypiperidine (PEPAP), its optical
isomers, salts and salts of isomers 9663

(5) N-(1-(1-methyl-2-pheny]) ethyl-4-piperidy]) -
N-phenylacetamide (acetyl-alpha-
methylfentany]l), its optical isomers, salts and
salts of isomers 9815
(6) N-(1-(1-methyl-2- (2-thieny]l) ethy]-4-
piperidyl)-N-phenylpropanamide (alpha-
methylthiofentany]), its optical isomers, salts
and salts of isomers 9832

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

~ (18)

9la

N- (1-benzyl-4-piperidy]) -N-
phenylpropanamide (benz «lfentany]), its
optical isomers, salts and salts of isomers 9818

N- (1-(2-hydroxy-2-pheny]) ethy]-4-piperidy]) -
N-phenylpropanamide (beta-hydroxyfentany]),
its optical isomers, salts and salts of isomers 9830

N- (3-methyl-1- (2-hydroxy-2-pheny]) ethyl-
4-piperidy]) -N-phenylpropanamide (beta-
hydroxy-3-methylfentany]), its optical and
geometric isomers, salts and salts

of isomers 9831

N- (3-methy!-1-2- (2-thieny]) ethyl-4-piperidy]) -
N-phenylpropanamide (3-methylthiofentany]),

its optical and geometric isomers, salts and

salts of isomers 9833

N-(1-(2-thienyl) methyl-4-piperidy]) -N-
phenylpropanamide (thenylfentany]), its
optical isomers, salts and salts of isomers 9834

N- (1-(2-(2-thieny!) ethyl-4-piperidy]) -N-
phenylpropanamide (thiofentany]), its optical
isomers, salts and salts of isomers 9835

N- (1-(2-phenylethy]) -4piperidy]) -N- (4-
fluoropheny]) -propanamide (para-

fluorofentany]), its optical isomers, salts and

salts of isomers 9812

Section 1308.12 Schedule II.
(a) Schedule II shall consist of the drugs and other sub-

(b)

stances by whatever official name, common or usual
name, chemical name, or brand name designated,
listed in this section. Each drug or substance has
been assigned the Controlled Substances Code Num-
ber set forth opposite it.

Substances, vegetable origin or chemical synthesis.
Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in an-
other schedule, any of the following substances

92a

whether produced directly or indirectly by extrac-
tion from substances or vegetable origin, or inde-
pendently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a
combination of extraction and chemical synthesis:

(1) Opium and opiate, and any salt, compound,
derivative, or preparation of opium or opiate
excluding apomorphine, dextrorphan, nalbuphine,
nalmefene, naloxone, and naltrexone, and their
respective salts, but including the following:

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)

Raw Opium
Opium extracts
Opium fluid
Powuered opium
Granulated opium
Tincture of opium
Codeine
Ethylmorphine
Etorphine hydrochloride
Hydrocodone
Hydromorphone
Metopon
Morphine
Oxycodone
Oxymorphone
Thebaine

9600
9610
9620
9639
9640
9630
9050
9190
9050
9183
9150
9280
9300
9143
9652
9333

(2) Any salt, compound, derivative, or preparative
thereof which is chemically equivalent or iden-
tical with any of the substances referred to in
paragraph (b)(1) of this section, except that
these substances shal! not include the isoquino-

(3) Opium poppy and poppy straw.

line alkaloids of opium.

98a

*(4) Coca leaves (9040) and any salt, compound,
derivative, or preparation of coca leaves, and
any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation
thereof which is chemically equivalent or identi-
cal with any of these substances, except that the
substances shall not include decocainized coca
leaves or extraction of coca leaves, which ex-
tractions do not contain cocaine (9041) or
ecogonine (9180).

(5) Concentrate of poppy straw (the crude extract
of poppy straw in either liquid, solid or powder
form which contains the phenanthrene alkaloids
of the opium poppy), 9670.

(c) Opiates. Unless specifically excepted or unless in an-
other schedule any of the following opiates, includ-
ing its isomers, esters, ethers, salts and salts of
isomers, esters and ethers whenever the existence of
such isomers, esters, ethers, and salts is possible
within the specific chemical designation, dextrorphan
and levopropoxyphene excepted:

(1) Alphaprodine 9010
(2) Anileridine 9020
(3) Bezitramide 9800
(4) Bulk dextropropoxyphene (non-dosage

forms) 9273
(5) Dihydrocodeine 9120

* The Drug and Alcohol Dependent Offenders Treatment Act of
1986, P.L. 99-570, Title I, Subtitle Q, amends subsection (a)(4) of
section 202(c) of the CSA (21 U.S.C. 812) as follows:

“(4) Coca leaves (except coca leaves and extracts of coca leaves
from which cocaine, ecgonine, and the derivatives of or their
salts have been removed): cocaine, its salts, optical and geo-
metric isomers, and salts of isomers; and, its derivatives, their
salts, isomers, and salts of isomers.”

To date, 21 CFR Section 1308.12(b) (4) has not been revised to
reflect this legislative amendment.

id)

(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)

(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)

(22)
(23)

Stimulants.

94a

Diphenoxylate

Fentanyl

Isomethadone

Levomethorphan

Levorphanol

Metazocine

Methadone

Methadone-Intermediate, 4-cyano-2-
dimetnylamino-4,4-dipheny! butane
Moramide-Intermediate, 2-methy]-3-
morpholino-1, 1-diphenylpropane-carboxylic
acid

Pethidine (meperidine)
Pethidine-Intermediate-A, 4-cyano-1-methyl-
4-phenylpiperidine
Pethidine-Intermediate-B, ethyl-4-
pheny!piperidine-4-carboxylate
Pethidine-Intermediate-C, 1-methy]-4-
phenylpiperidine-4-carboxylic acid
Phenazocine

Piminodine

Racemethorphan

Racemorphan

Sufentanil

9170
9801
9226
9210
9220
9240
9250

9254

9802
9230

9232

9233

9234
9715
9730
9732
9733
9740

Unless specifically excepted or unless

listed in another schedule, any material, compound,
mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity
of the following substances having a stimulant effect
on the central nervous system:

(1)

(2)

(3)
(4)

Amphetamine, its salts, optical isomers, and
salts of its optical isomer

Methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and
salts of its isomers

Phenmetrazine and its salts
Methylphenidate

1100

1105
1631
1724

95a

(e) Depressants. Unless specifically excepted or unless
listed in another schedule any material compound
mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity
of the following substances having a depressant
effect on the central nervous system, including its
salts, isomers, and salts of isomers whenever the ex-
istence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is
possible within the specific chemical designation:

(1) Amobarbital 2125
(2) Pentobarbital 2270
(3) Phencyclidine 7471
(4) Secobarbital 2315

(f) Immediate precursors. Unless specifically excepted
or unless listed in another schedule, any material,
compound, mixture, or preparation which contains
any quantity of the following substances:

(1) Immediate precursor to amphetamine and
methamphetamine:

(i) Phenylacetone 8501
Some trade or other names: pheny]-2-
propanone; P2P; benzy! methyl] ketone;
methyl benzy! ketone;

(2) Immediate precursors to phencyclidine
(PCP):

(i) 1-phenylcyclohexylamine 7460

(ii) 1-piperidinocyclohexanecarbonitrile
(PCC) 8603

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385020_1063%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
