# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Van Vranken

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1990
- **Citation:** 494 U.S. 1005

## Text

JOSEPH FS
trou

In the Supreme Court-.-— —
OF THE

United States
OcTOBER TERM, 1989 -

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY,
Petitioner,
VS.
DON VAN VRANKEN,
on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, and
Lew & Ten's SERVICE, INC.,
Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
TEMPORARY EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE UNITED STATES

WILLIAM H. ALSUP
Counsel of Record
F. BRUCE DODGE
SAMUEL R. MILLER
THEODORE P. SENGER
MORRISON & FOERSTER
345 California Sucet
San Francisco, California 94104-2675
Telephone: (415) 677-7000

Counsel for Petitioner
Atlantic Richfield Company

QUESTION PRESENTED

In order to be free of restrictions imposed by a substantively and
procedurally invalid regulation, must a regulated firm either participate
in litigation challenging the regulation or obtain the permission of the
regulating agency?

LIST OF PARTIES AND RULE 28.1 LIST

The parties to the proceeding below were the petitioner Atlantic
Richfield Company (“ARCO”), the respondents Don Van Vranken
and Lew and Ted’s Service, Inc., and the respondent class of
wholesale purchaser-resellers of gasoline, butane, aviation fuels and
propane from ARCO between May 1976 and January 1981.

The following companies are subsidiaries of petitioner ARCO
(other than wholly-owned subsidiaries):

ARCO Chemical Company

Lyondell Petroleum Company

iil

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Ss i
LIST OF PARTIES AND RULE 28.1 LIST ................. t
ee Vv
a l
ee ac iicls cc iuniccnaccnancahvsesnonws l
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED .......... l
sd 2
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .................. 3

I. THE DECISION OF THE TEMPORARY
EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS
REQUIRING REGULATED FIRMS TO
EITHER PARTICIPATE IN LITIGATION
CHALLENGING A REGULATION OR
SEEK LEAVE OF THE REGULATING
AGENCY TO AVOID COMPLIANCE ONCE
THE REGULATION IS STRUCK DOWN
CONFLICTS IN PRINCIPLE WITH
DECISIONS OF OTHER COURTS OF

iV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

II. THE DECISION OF THE TEMPORARY
EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS
DEPARTS FROM THE ACCEPTED
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
AND PRESENTS IMPORTANT
QUESTIONS REGARDING JUDICIAL
SUPERVISION OF REGULATORY
AGENCIES WHICH SHOULD BE
SETTLED BY THES CUURT .......c0ccescersnens 6

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)
Cases

Bethesda Hospital Ass nv. Bowen,

485 U.S. 399,

Se a a a: A issn ciccinccdantesanteniabasebanaass |
Mobil Oil Corp. v. DOE,

610 F.2d 796 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979),

Cart. Gemiad, GS U.S. Fat CHMOD svewssccdcevncscevataete 2
Mobil Oil Corp. v. DOE,

647 F.2d 142 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981) ............ 2
Mobil Oil Corp. v. DCE,

678 F.2d 1083 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982) ........... ae
Tallahassee Memorial Regional Med. Center v. Bowen,

815 F.2d 1435 (11th Cir. 1987),

Cert. Gembed, WIGS. Ch. TS 7S CIGGE) cvs cevcccvesccesecse 4,5,7
Wirtz v. Baldor Electric Co.,

Da7 Tae SUG CA RR: BI ccicetep erence 4,5,7

Statutes and Regulations

Economic Stabilization Act of 1970,

ecto ZIG, 12 U.K. © TSG GROG) occa ccccsccncesni 3

Section 211, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (note) .................... 3

Section 211(g), 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (note) ................ |

Vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973,
TS U.S.C. BS 751, CF SOG. 2 .crccrcceccccccsccscossevcssees |
Section 4(b), 15 U.S.C. § 753(D)(1) «2... cece eee eee ee es 2
ee SES USL, © FIED vcciccevscseverssecssaeseceys 3
EB SZ IEL) oi cn sceccccssersccsassscccnccsonsennsasans 1
Be ME. © UPB). nn ccc cncccncsncsccvessnesseccesavenseasens 3
ot > Ra Ba) Serres hsaecapenenehaesheuee 3
PW ZISBHE) cccscccsserrscsccccvnescnssccssenssveses 1,2
BE CP R.. B ZUZ.1U2GLG) .n...nnccnrecccesccrnsonsernsscnnansees 1,5
39 Fed. Reg. 1924, 1954-56 (Jan. 15, 1974) «00... 2

39 Fed. Reg. 15139 (May 1, 1984) ..........ceeeeeee eee ee ees 1,2

The petitioner Atlantic Richfield Company (“ARCO”) respectfully
prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the decision of the

Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals entered on October 10,
1989.

OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals was
issued as a slip opinion on October 10, 1989, and has not yet been
reported. (Appendix A.)

The Nunc Pro Tunc June 1, 1988 Order of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California entered
September 26, 1988 is not reported. (Appendix B, 10a.)

JURISDICTION

The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals entered its final
decision on October 10, 1989, and denied ARCO’s timely motion for
rehearing on November 20, 1989. (See Appendix C, 27a, Order
Denying Rehearing.)

ARCO invokes the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) and section 211(g) of the Economic
Stabilization Act of 1970 (“ESA”), 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note.

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

This action involves regulations promulgated by the Department of
Energy (““DOE”’) pursuant to the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act
of 1973 (““EPAA”), 15 U.S.C. § 751 et seq. The regulation
involved, 10 C.F.R. § 212.83(c), and the invalid amendment to that
regulation, 39 Fed. Reg. 15139 (May 1, 1974), are reprinted at
Appendix D, 28a-29a. The “refiling ” regulation cited by the court
below, 10 C.F.R. § 212.126(d), is reprinted at Appendix E, 30a.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves the effect on regulated firms of a final decision
by a controlling court that a federal regulation is invalid on substantive
and procedural grounds.

Between 1973 and 1981, the prices of petroleum products were
controlled pursuant to regulations promulgated under the ESA and
EPAA. The method for calculating the maximum permissible price
was based on a formula for allocating crude oil and refining costs
among the various petroleum products. See 10 C.F.R. § 212.83(c),
39 Fed. Reg. 1924, 1954-56 (Jan. 15, 1974). On April 30, 1974,
DOE sought to amend the cost allocation formula without prior notice
to affected parties and without considering the factors and objectives
set out in the EPAA as a substantive limitation on DOE’s rulemaking
authority. See 39 Fed. Reg. 15139 (May 1, 1974). Mobil Oil
Corp. v. DOE, 610 F.2d 796, 801-02 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937 (1980) (“Mobil I”).' This April 1974
amendment to the cost allocation regulations would have prevented
regulated firms from fully recovering their increased costs. See
Mobil 1, 610 F.2d at 800 and n. 4; Mobil Oil Corp. v. DOE,
678 F.2d 1083, 1085-86 n.6 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982)
(“Mobil lil”). The April 1974 amendment was ultimately declared
void and invalid on procedural and substantive grounds by the
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals. Mobill, 610 F.2d
at 802-04; see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. DOE, 647 F.2d 142 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1981) (‘Mobil 1” ); Mobil II], 678 F.2d at 1088.

1! Under the EPAA, DOE was required to consider the following factors and
objectives, among others, in formulating regulations: “preservation of an
economically sound and competitive petroleum industry .. . economic
efficiency; and minimization of economic distortion, inflexibility, and
unnecessary interference with market mechanisms.” EPAA § 4(b),
15 U.S.C. § 753(b)(1); see Mobil, 610 F.2d at 801 n.6.

The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over cases arising under the ESA and EPAA and,
absent review by this Court, its 1979 decision striking down the April
1974 amendment was controlling precedent. ESA § 211, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1904 note; EPAA § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 754(a). Prior to 1979,
ARCO complied with the April 1974 amendment in its cost
calculations. Shortly after the April 1974 amendment was struck
down, ARCO reallocated its costs in conformance with the pre-
existing regulations without obtaining permission from DOE.?

In 1979, plaintiffs filed this action pursuant to section 210 of the
ESA, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note, alleging that ARCO had overcharged a
class of “wholesale purchaser-resellers " (see 10 C.F.R. § 211.51)
on purchases of petroleum products. A class of wholesale purchaser-
resellers was certified by the district court and plaintifis’ complaint
was subsequently amended to include purchases from May 1976
through January 1981.

On June 1, 1988, the district court ruled that ARCO was not
entitled to reallocate its costs based on the invalidation of the April
1974 amendment because it was not a party to litigation challenging
the amendment and had not obtained DOE’s permission to reallocate
its costs. (Appendix B, 19a-22a.) The Temporary Emergency Court
of Appeals granted ARCO leave to file an interlocutory appeal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and, by decision entered
October 10, 1989, affirmed the order of the district court.
(Appendix A.)

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The decision of the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals
conflicts in principle with the decisions of other Courts of Appeal in

2 The reallocation permitted ARCO to recognize over $100 million in
additional increased costs in calculating its maximum permissible prices.

requiring a regulated firm to either participate in a legal challenge to a
regulation or seck the permission of the regulating agency in order to
be free of the requirements of an invalid regulation. The decision also
departs from the accepted course of judicial proceedings and raises
important questions regarding judicial supervision of regulatory
agencies by creating incentives for duplicative litigation and
authorizing regulatory agencies to determine the extent of their
compliance with judicial decisions invalidating regulations. Thus, as
explained below, ARCO’s petition for writ of certiorari should be
granted.

IL THE DECISION OF THE TEMPORARY
EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS REQUIRING
REGULATED FIRMS TO EITHER PARTICIPATE IN
LITIGATION CHALLENGING A REGULATION OR
SEEK LEAVE OF THE REGULATING AGENCY TO
AVOID COMPLIANCE ONCE THE REGULATION IS
STRUCK DOWN CONFLICTS IN PRINCIPLE WITH
DECISIONS OF OTHER COURTS OF APPEAL

Two Couns of Appeal have held that where a regulation is held to
be invalid, the regulation is unenforceable as to all persons similarly
situated, and not merely as to those who brought the suit attacking it.
See Tallahassee Memorial Regional Med. Center v. Bowen,
815 F.2d 1435, 1446 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1573 (1988) (“Tallahassee”) ‘ruling by controlling court that
regulation is invalid is “binding precedent’), Wirtz v. Baldor Electric
Co., 337 F.2d 518, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The Temporary
Emergency Court of Appeals is the first federal appellate court to reach
a contrary result.

In Wirtz, the court recognized that invalidating a minimum wage
regulation as to only those plaintiffs bringing the lawsuit would give
them an “unconscionable ” advantage over other firms in the industry.
337 F.2d at 534. Further, the court found that Congress must have
intended in authorizing the promulgation of regulations that the

regulations be applied fairly and uniformly to all regulated firms. (/d.)
In contrast, the decision of the Temporary Emergency Coun of
Appeals in this case grants an economic advantage to Mobil Oil
Corporation as a reward for having brought the lawsuit challenging the
April 1974 amendment and punishes Mobil’s competitors for failing to
bring duplicative actions. (See Appendix A, 3a, 8a.)

In Tallahassee, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that a decision by a
controlling court invalidating a regulation is binding precedent in all
subsequent actions and the regulatory agency is powerless to alter that
precedent. 815 F.2d at 1446. As recognized by the court in
Tallahassee, a regulatory agency may in some cases seck to cure a
regulatory gap caused by the invalidation of a regulation by adopting a
new retroactive regulation. 815 F.2d at 1446-57. In this case,
DOE’s attempt to retroactively impose a regulation restoring the
requirements of the invalid April 1974 amendment was also struck
down by the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals. Mobil I//,
678 F.2d at 1090-91. Absent adoption of a valid retroactive
regulation, DOE lacked the power or authority to enforce the
requiremenits of the invalid April 1974 amendment.3

3 The decision below relies in part on a regulation regarding “refiling” of
cost allocation reports, 10 C.F.R. § 212.126(d). (See Appendix A, 6a-8a.)
The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals would authorize DOE to use
the refiling regulation to preserve substantively and procedurally invalid
regulatory requirements. In contrast, in Bethesda Hospital Ass'n v. Bowen,
485 U.S. 399, 108 S. Ct. 1255, 1258 (1988), this Court stated that
“submission of a cost report in full compliance with the unambiguous
dictates of the... regulations does not, by itself, bar... claiming
dissatisfaction with the ... regulations.”

If the rule of law stated in Wirtz and Tallahassee is correct and an
invalid regulauon is void as to all regulated firms, then cither tie Temporary
Emergency Court of Appeals has simply misinterpreted the refiling
regulation, or DOE has sought through the refiling regulation to delegate to
itself a power which it cannot have -- the power to ignore decisions by the
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals and to impose invalid regulatory
requirements on some firms and not others.

The decision of the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals in this
action ignores this fundamental principle of administrative law. The
decision would require regulated firms to either participate in every
legal challviige to a regulation or engage in the meaningless and time-
consuming ritual of obtaining approval of the regulatory agency to
conform to the dictates of binding judicial precedent. (Appendix A,
8a.) The decision conflicts in principle with the decisions of other
Courts of Appeal and should be reviewed by this Court.

Il. THE DECISION OF THE TEMPORARY
EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTS
FROM THE ACCEPTED COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS AND PRESENTS IMPORTANT
QUESTIONS REGARDING JUDICIAL SUPERVISION
OF REGULATORY AGENCIES WHICH SHOULD BE
SETTLED BY THIS COURT

The decision of the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals
departs from the accepted course of judicial proceedings and
introduces powerful incentives for regulatory noncompliance and
redundant lawsuits. Left unchecked, such incentives will disrupt
judicial supervision of regulatory action.

The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals criticizes ARCO for
abiding by the 1974 amendment until it was struck down and failing to
file a lawsuit duplicative of the action brought by Mobil. The court
slates:

ARCO consistently abided by the April 1974
amendment.... Two companies - Mobil and Getty -
did not abide by the... amendment. Getty applied for and
was granted administrative relief. Mobil challenged the
validity of the amendment before a panel of this court.

If ARCO believed the 1974 amendment was invalid, the
company should have taken steps to protest the regulation
rather than attempt to jump on Mobil’s coattails [in 1979] five
years after the amendment became effective. ARCO could
have, like Mobil, challenged the regulation.

(Appendix A, 3a, 8a.) Having abided by the regulation and avoided a
redundant lawsuit, the court concludes that ARCO could not cease
abiding by the regulation after it was struck down absent permission
from DOE. (Appendix A, 6a-8a.) Indeed, under the court’s ruling,
DOE could have compelled ARCO to continue complying with the
invalid regulation since the count finds that “ARCO waived its right to
relief by not challenging the regulation in a timely manner. ”
(Appendix A, 8a.)

The decision of the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals would
punish ARCO for its regulatory compliance and reward Mobil for its
legal challenge to the regulation by providing Mobil with an advantage
over other regulated firms in the industry. Thus, the ruling creates a
powerful incentive for regulatory noncompliance and duplicative
litigation, and results in the application of invalid regulatory
requirements to some firms and not others. In contrast, the accepted
rule of administrative law endorsed in Wirtz and Tallahassee
minimizes litigation, treats similarly situated firms equally, and avoids
punishing firms for regulatory compliance.

Further, by purporting to allow federal regulatory agencies to
decide which firms will be subject to invalid regulatory requirements,
the decision would permit federal agencies to determine the extent to
which they will comply with judicial decisions invalidating regulatory
requirements. Thus, the decision would severely limit the ability of
the federal courts to supervise the actions of federal regulatory
agencics.

CONCLUSION

An appellate decision encouraging duplicative lawsuits, punishing
regulatory compliance, and applying regulations to some firms and not
to others based only on the happenstance of which firm filed the
original legal challenge is a prescription for regulatory chaos. Only
this Court can provide the legal guidance necessary to restore the
proper incentives for regulatory compliance and legal restraint and
ensure fair and uniform application of regulatory requirements to
similarly situated parties. Consequently, ARCO respectfully submits
that the Court needs to speak.

Dated: December 20, 1989
Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM H. ALSUP

Counsel of Record

F. BRUCE DODGE

SAMUEL R. MILLER
THEODORE P. SENGER
MORRISON & FOERSTER
345 Califomia Street

San Francisco, California 94104
(415) 677-7000

Counsel for Petitioner
Atlantic Richfield Company

EE ee ee

la
APPENDIX A

Cemporary Emergency Court of Appeals
of the United States

No. 9-101

DON VAN VRANKEN, et al.,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES,

Vv.

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California

(Civil Action No. C-79-0627)
Argued: May 26, 1989 Decided: October 10, 1989

F. BRUCE DODGE, Samuel R. Miller, Theodore P. Senger,-
Morrison & Foerster, San Francisco, California, were on
the brief for Appellant Atlantic Richfield Company.

TRACY R. KIRKHAM and Robert B. Ericson. Hennigan &
Mercer, Los Angeles, California, and Josef D. Cooper,
San Francisco, California, were on the brief for Plaintiffs-
Appellees.

Before: BECKER, WEIGEL, and THORNBERRY, Judges.
THORNEERRY, Judge:

Defendant /appellant Atlantic Richfield Company
(“ARCO”) appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Don Van Vranken, et al. (plaintiffs /
appellees), prohibiting ARCO from retroactively reallo-
cating crude oil costs.

FACTS

In 1973, pursuant to the Economic Stabilization Act of
1970, 12 U.S.C. section 1904, et seg. (“the ESA”), the

2a

Cost of Living Council (“the CLC’) promulgated man-
datory price control regulations for all petroleum and pe-
troleum products. These regulations permitted compa-
nies to pass along increases in crude oil costs in the price
of their petroleum products. The method for calculating
the maximum permissible price depended on the nature
of the goods. This appeal concerns the calculation of
maximum prices for “covered goods” as that term is de-
fined in the regulations.

The CLC established a formula for determining the
amount of a refiner’s increased crude oil costs that could
be attributed to recover goods. This calculation, known
as the ‘“V factor,” entailed taking the total volume of a
given covered good sold and dividing it by the total vol-
ume of al] covered goods sold. The resulting fraction was
used to determine the amount of the increased crude oil
costs that could be attributed to the covered product. Re-
finers had the choice of either increasing the price of the
covered goods or banking the increased costs to be used
to offset overcharges.

Before the ESA was scheduled to expire on Apri! 30,
1974, Congress passed the Emergency Petroleum Ailoca-
tion Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. section 751 et seg. (“the
EPAA”), to succeed the ESA. Congress, however, ex-
empted certain petroleum products from the price con-
trols under the EPAA. Pursuant to the statute exempt-
ing these products, the Department of Energy (“the
DOE”) issued regulations reflecting the exemption of
these products from the price controls. The exclusion of
these products from the price controls had a significant
impact on the calculation of the permissible price in-
creases for covered goods. Under the new regulations,
the increased cost of crude oil used to produce the newly
exempt goods was included in the total increased cost
of producing covered goods; however, the volume of the
newly exempt goods that were sold was not included in
the denominator of the V factor. Increased crude oil

a |

3a

costs to produce newly exempt goods could therefore be
passed on in the price of non-exempt, covered goods. Ef-
fectively, under the new regulations, companies could
pass on the increased crude oil costs to produce newly
exempt goods in the price of the newly exempt goods
themselves and the price of the covered goods.

By emergency regulatory amendment, without provid-
ing an opportunity for notice or comment, on April 30,
1974, the DOE redefined the V Factor to add the volume
of newly exempt goods to the denominator of the V fac-
tor. This amendment resolved the problem created by the
post-EPAA regulations and prevented refiners from ap-
portioning increased crude oil costs attributable to ex-
empt goods to the price of their covered products. The
result was that only the increased crude oil costs attrib-
utable to covered goods could be passed on in the price
of covered goods.

ARCO consistently abided by the April 1974 amend-
ment, including allocating increased crude oil in direct
volumetric proportion to the covered goods sold. Two
companies—Mobil and Getty—did not abide by the V
factor provisions in the amendment. Getty applied for
and was granted administrative relief. Mobil challenged
the validity of the amendment before a panel of this
court. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. DOE, 610 F.2d 796 ‘TECA
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937, 100 S.Ct. 2156, 64
L.Ed.2d 790 (1980) (Mobil I), a TECA panel found that
the 1974 amendment was invalid because DOE failed to
provide a period of notice and comment. Later. in Mobil
Oil Corp. v. DOE, 647 F.2d 142 (TECA 1981) (Mobil
II), this court permitted Mobil to reallocate crude oil
costs incurred producing exempt goods to the cost of
procucing covered goods. Following the decisions in ‘Joh?!
I and Mobil II, many refiners, including ARCO, sought
to retroactively reallocate millions of dollars of increased
crude oil costs used to produce exempt products that. ab-

4a

sent the 1974 amendment, could have been attributed to
covered products.’

In March 1979, the plaintiffs filed suit against ARCO,
alleging that ARCO had improperly recalculated its May
1973 costs for crude oil. In determining whether ARCO
had in fact overcharged the plaintiffs, the district court
had to review ARCO’s calculation of its banks of unre-
covered costs to determine whether ARCO’s banks were
sufficient to offset any overcharges. The effect of the in-
validation of the April 1974 amendment was critical to
determining the amount of ARCO’s banked unrecovered
costs. ARCO, in a motion for summary judgment, urged
that pursuant to the Mobil decisions it could retroactively
reallocate its costs for producing exempt goods to cov-
ered goods and thereby increase its banks. The plain-
tiffs in their motion for summary judgment, argued that
ARCO could not retroactively reallocate these costs. The
district court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment.

On Appeal, ARCO urges that (1) in light of the in-
validation of the 1974 amendment, it must retroactively
reallocate its costs from exempt to covered goods: and
(2) it may reallocate its costs from exempt to covered
goods. Several lower courts have addressed these issues
and have rejected the arguments ARCO presently ad-
vances. See Naph-Sol Refining Co. v. Murphy Oil Corp.,
550 F.Supp. 297 (W.D. Mich. 1982), mod’d on other
grounds, sub nom. Mobil Oil Corp. v. DOE, 728 F.2d
1477 (1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255, 104 S.Ct. 3545,
82 L.Ed.2d 849 (1984) ; Kickapoo Oil Co., Inc. v. Murphy

1The DOF issued further regulations at various points
after the April 1974 amendment. Van Vranken urges that
these amendments were validly promulgated and that they
had the same effect as the April 1974 amendment. We need
not reach the validity of these amendments because we find
that ARCO cannot retroactively reallocate its costs even
absent the amendments.

5a

Oil Corp., No. 78-C-478-C (W.D. Wis. December 28,
1983); Martin Oil Service, Inc. v. Koch Refining Co.,
No. 81-C-1844 (N.D. Il. March 21, 1989); U.S. Oil
Comp., Inc. v. Koch Refining Company, No. 79-C-659
(E.D. Wis. March 13, 1989).

ARCO’S CLAIM THAT IT MUST RETROACTIVELY
REALLOCATE ITS COSTS

ARCO urges that because Mobil J invalidated the 1974
amendment the only legal method for allocating increased
crude oil costs is to allocate the increased crude oil costs
for producing exempt goods to covered gceods. For the
following reasons, we reject this argument. First, neither
Mobil I nor Mobil II required Mobil to retroactively re-
allocate costs. Rather, the Mobil I panel “permitted .. .
Mobil to allocate exempt product costs to covered prod-
ucts.” Mobil I, 620 F.2d at 805: see also Modi! II, 647
F.2d at 146-47 (holding that “the judgment is correct
insofar as it permits Mobil to allocate exempt product
costs to covered products...").

Second, even absent the 1974 amendment, nothing in
the regulations required that costs for exempt goods be
attributed to covered goods when calculating the maxi-
mum allowable price for covered goods. In fact. the rele-
vant regulation stated that “in computing [maximum al-

lowable] prices =. .a refiner may increase its May 15.
1973 selling prices ... by an amount to reflect .. . in-
creased product costs... .” 10 C.F.R. Section 212.83

‘c) (1) (emphasis added). Nothing in this regulation
requires that a refiner bank or increase the price of cov-
ered goods to compensate for increased crude 0‘! cos‘s.

Third, there vas nothing unlawful about the mann>r
in which ARCO allocated its increased costs. The price
ARCO charged for covered goods was within the lawful!
maximum. See Longview Refining Co. v. Shore. 554 F.2d
1006,_1017 (TECA), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 126, 434 U.S.
836 (1977) (holding that there is no legal wrong if a

6a

plaintiff is charged less than the maximum price). If, ab-
sent the 1974 amendment, the regulations required ARCO
to allocate the increased costs of producing exempt goods
to the price of covered goods, it would be unlawful for
ARCO to have failed to allocate the increased costs to
the price of the covered goods. No one, including the
DOE, has contended that ARCO violated the law.

ARCO’S CLAIM THAT IT MAY RETROACTIVELY
REALLOCATE ITS COSTS

Given that there is no support for ARCO’s contention
that refiners are required to retroactively reallocate costs
based on Mobil I and Mobil II, there remains only the
question of whether ARCO may retroactively reallocate
the costs to covered goods. In reviewing this question,
two issues arise: first, whether ARCO must obtain per-
mission from the DOE before retroactively reallocating
costs: and second, whether ARCO waived any right to
retroactive reallocation by failing to timely challenge the
1974 amendment.

ARCO’s failure to obtain the DOE’s permission to refile

In Eastern Air Lines v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 712
F.2d 1402, 1408-09 (TECA), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915,
104 S.Ct. 278, 64 L.Ed.2d 790 (1983), a panel of this
court prohibited ARCO from retroactively reallocating
costs to compensate for overcharges. In Eastern Airlines,
ARCO sought to take costs allocated to gasoline and re-
allocate them to a specified product group. Under the reg-
ulations, ARCO initially had the option of allocating the
costs to either gasoline or the product group. We found
that, although ARCO initially had the choice where to
allocate the costs, the regulations did not permit retroac-
tive reallocation absent permission from the DOE. 7d. at
1408, n.14. The relevant regulations provide that:

DOE will routinely accept resubmissions or refiling
of [eost allocation] reports only within one year

7a

after the original filing or submission. Any entry
contained in an otherwise timely report which pur-
ports to change or adjust retroactively an entry or
allocation contained in a report previously filed or
submitted shall be considered a refiling or resubmis-
sion for purposes of the paragraph and wiil not be
given force or effect absent compliance with the pro-
visions of this paragraph. ...

Notwithstanding the provisions . . . of this section,
a refiner may resubmit or refile reports until June
1, 1979, for months of measurement beginning with
September 1973; where expressly authorized by DOE
regulation or order; or where DOE grants written

permission to resubmit or refile for good cause
shown.

10 C.F.R. section 212.126 (d) (1)-(2) (emphasis added).

In the instant case, ARCO sought, but did not obtain.
permission from the DOE to retroactively reallocate costs.
As in Eastern Airlines, ARCO’s failure to obtain per-
mission from the DOE precludes it from any relief by
this court.*

ARCO attempts to distinguish Eastern Air Lines on
the grounds that in Eastern Air Lines ARCO could choose
how to allocate costs while in the instant case only one
method for allocating increased costs was available. We
do not find this distinction consequential. The central
basis of the decision in Eastern Air Lines was that
ARCO failed to obtain permission from the DOE to
retroactively reallocate costs as required by the regula-
tions. The failure to obtain permission from the DOE.
not the nature of the initial allocation of costs. deter-
mined the outcome in Eastern Air Lines. We therefore

2 If Arco thought the DOE erred in not granting the com-
pany permission to retroactively reallocate its costs, ARCO
could presumably have brought an action appealing the DOE’s
decision.

8a

find the distinction between Eastern Air Lines and the
instant case immaterial.

ARCO further argues that the above regulations are
not relevant in the context of a claim for relief based on
the invalidation of a regulation. ARCO urges that be-
cause the 1974 amendment was invalid, this court can
award relief in the form of retroactive reallocation re-
gardless of the DOE refiling regulations. We disagree.
Nothing in the invalidation of the 1974 amendment had
any effect on the refiling regulations and nothing in the
refiling regulations excepts refiners from compliance when
an allocation regulation is invalidated. We thus find that
the regulations governing retroactive reallocation are no
less effective because the 1974 amendment was invali-
dated. Had ARCO time!y challenged the 1974 amend-
ment as Mobil did, it could have sought relief from the
amendment and would have presumably been awarded
the relief it now seeks without having to file reallocation
reports. Having failed to do so, ARCO cannot avoid the
clear language of the regulation requiring permission
from the DOE before reallocating costs.

ARCO’s failure to timely challenge the regulation

We further find that ARCO waived its right to relief
by not challenging the regulation in a timely manner. At
oral argument, ARCO suggested that once we declared
the 1974 amendment invalid, refiners had an indefinite
period in which te retroactively reallocate their costs.
This argument is without merit. If ARCO believed the
1974 amendment was invalid, the company should have
taken steps to protest the regulation rather than attempt
to jump on Mobil’s coattails five years after the amend-
ment became effective. ARCO could have, like Mobil,
challenged the regulation. The company could have also
sought to intervene in Mobil’s action, or requested ad-
ministrative relief as Getty did. Having failed to chal-

9a

lenge the regulation in a timely manner, ARCO is not
entitled to relief at this late date.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district
court’s judgment.

10a

APPENDIX B

FILED
SEP 26, 1988

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DON VAN VRANKEN, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly
situated, and LEW & TED’S
SERVICE, INC.,

No. C-79 0627 SW

ORDER NUNC PRO
TUNC JUNE 1, 1988,
GRANTING PLAIN-
TIFFS’ CROSS-
MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON THE
‘V FACTOR’ ISSUE
AND GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON
DAMAGES

Plaintiffs,
Vv.

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD
COMPANY,

Defendant.

NN Ne NN a ee

On April 4, 1988, partics made cross-summary judgment motions
on the issue of volumetric apportionment, known as the *V factor.’

lla

The parties also bricfed the issue of whether any money sent to
plaintiff class members from the Department of Energy pursuant to the
Special Refund Proceeding HEF-0591 can be offset against any
damages award. Afier oral argument, the court took the matters under
submission. On June 1, 1988, this court filed its ruling which
granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff class
represented by Don Van Vranken and denied defendant’s motion for
summary judgment on the V factor issue. Section II of the order
addressed the issue of damages.

After the order was filed, counsel for both parties brought to the
court’s attention certain typographical errors and mischaracterizations
contained in the order. Therefore, this court now files this corrected
ordcr nunc pro tunc June 1, 1988.

REGULATORY BACKGROUND

Any coherent resolution of this complex and somewhat
anachronistic aspect of the petroleum regulations requires at Icast a
brief discussion of the unique background that applies to this case.

In 1974, when the authority to regulate the oil industry passed from
the Cost of Living Council to the Federal Energy Office (FEO), the
FEO established a cost allocation formula for the oil industry. At that
time, authority to regulate the oil industry was derived from two
Statutes, the Economic Stabilization Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1904
(hereinafter ESA), which controlled the price of most of the goods and
services in the nation’s economy, and the newly enacted Emergency
Petroleum Allocation Act, 15 U.S.C. § 751 (hereinafter EPAA),
which controlled the price of crude and refined petroleum products.
The FEO formula provided for volumetric apportionment of crude oil
costs known as the “V factor.” Its purpose was to allocate the total
increased crude oil costs among various refined products. The
V factor is a fraction. Under the EPAA, the numerator consists of the
total volume sold of a particular product in a specified time period.
The denominator is the total volume of all “covered products other

12a

than special products” sold in that same period. Among covered
products. the refiners could redistribute increased costs from
whichever of these products the refiner chose.! For the special
products, the refiner had to apportion exactly a pro rata share of costs
from the refiner’s increased costs associated with that special product.

When the ESA expired in 1974, the Department of Energy lost its
authority to regulate certain petroleum by-products. However, the
ESA expiration did not require the DOE to amend its cost allocation
formulas. The successor statute to the ESA, the Emergency Petroleum
Allocation Act, 15 U.S.C. § 751 [hereinafter EPAA], exempted
certain petroleum by-products which previously fell under the price
controls of the ESA.2 On April 3, 1974, DOE amended the
regulations to redefine “ covered products.” It excluded those
products which it no longer had authority to regulate.

Unfortunaicly, the agency neglected to alter its allocation formulas
for the products. To keep the regulations intemally consistent, DOE
should have included the newly exempted petroleum by-products in
the V factor denominator which would have had the cffect of
excluding their costs from those available for allocation to regulated
products. On April 30, 1974, the date the ESA expired, DOE
promulgated an amendment to the Mandatory Petroleum Price
Regulations which included petroleum by-products in the V factor
denominator. 10 C.F.R. § 212.83(c)(2) [hereinafter April 30, 1974

! Alternatively, the refiner could “bank” these increased costs and use
them to offset any future overcharges for which the refiner might be
responsible.

2 These products were petroleum coke, petroleum wax, asphalt, road oil
and refinery gas. The substances are petroleum by-products, or refinery
residue, that result from the processing of crude oil into refined products
such as gasoline.

13a

amendment].? The upshot of this amendment was that refiners could
no longer reapportion to the price of covered products their increased
costs attributable to these petroleum goods in any manner they desired.
Mobil Oil Corporation was one refiner that made its objections to the
amendment known to DOE through administrative remedies. DOE
rejected Mobil’s protests. Finally, Mobil Oil sued.

DISCUSSION
I. VOLUMETRIC APPORTIONMENT

Don Van Vranken represents the plaintiff class. It has charged
ARCO with improperly reallocating exempt products to justify prices it
charged the plaintiff class for regulated products. The class claims that
up to $343 million of exempt product costs are in excess of the
maximum allowed by law.

Four conflicts surface in the cross-motions for summary judgment.
First, the partics dispute whether prior litigation between Mobil Oil
Corporation and the Department of Energy only provided relief to
Mobil based on an injunction which granted Mobil Extraordinary
Exception Relief from the V factor regulations after a showing of
serious hardship. Second, ARCO believes the voiding of the
April 30, 1974 amendment requires it to now add exempt product
costs to covered product prices. Plaintiff class, however, argues that
ARCO’s figures amount to illegal retroactive reallocation. Third,
plaintiff class coritends that if ARCO is allowed to add exempt product
costs it is limited to three months —- May, June and July 1974 -
because three V factor regulations promulgated in August 1974,
December 1974 and March 1975 prohibit the allocation of exempt

3 The denominator was changed to include “the total volume of all
covered products and all products refined from crude petroleum other than
covered products... .”

14a

product costs to covered product costs. Finally, it must be resolved
whether ARCO sought and received permission from DOE to add
exempt product costs.

A. Application of the Mobil Decisions

Defendant ARCO contends that three decisions by the Temporary
Court of Appeals —- or TECA — provide an avenue for refiners like
ARCO to add the increased costs to the V factor they used. The
defendant’s interpretation is too broad. These cases, the Mobil
decisions, do not necessarily apply across the board to all refiners
similarly situated.

In Mobil Oil v. Dep't of Energy, 610 F.2d 796 (TECA 1979)
{hereinafter Mobil !}, TECA upheld a district court holding and ruled
in favor of Mobil. The court held that DOE had failed to consider each
of the statutory commands of the EPAA when it promulgated the
Apnil 30, 1974 amendment. Thus, the amendment was procedurally
invalid. In addition, DOE failed to provide notice and comment to
interested partics as usually required by the Administrative Procedures
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 [hereinafter APA], for informal rulemaking
procedures. TECA established that none of the exceptions to the
notice and comment requirement applied to DOE. For instance, DOE
could not argue that the expiration of ESA came as a surprise. Nor did
the agency’s forgetfulness provide an excuse. Accordingly, TECA
reaffirmed the district court’s holding that the amendment was “
arbitrary and capricious” and therefore “ null and void.” /d. at 80S.

The disinict court had ruled that Mobil could retroactively allocate
increased costs from exempt petroleum by-products “ continuously
from April, 1974 up to the present (November, 1979].” Jd. TECA
held that a portion of this district court judgment contravened a
December 1975 amendment to the EPAA which prohibited any method
other than direct proportionate distribution of cost pass-throughs to
certain products, including No. 2 heating oil and No. 2 diesel fuel,
aviation fuel and propane produced from crude. 15 U.S.C.

15a

§ 753(b)(2)(D). Accordingly, TECA remanded the case for findings
consistent with these restrictions.4 On remand, the district court held
that Mobil could reallocate its costs from April 1974, except that from
February 1, 1976 forward, the restrictions on products such as No. 2
heating oil applied. Thus, Mobil could allocate exempt product costs
to covered products for the period prior to February 1, 1976.5

In Mobil 1], DOE appealed the remanded district coun holding.
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 647 F.2d 142 (TECA 1981).
DOE urged that Mobil should not be allowed to reallocate increased
crude oil costs from exempt products to covered products after
February 1, 1976. TECA agreed, and held that Mobil could reallocate
only for the period preceding February 1, 1976. TECA did point out
that the Mobil / decision did not address the question of whether the
later rulemakings, such as the February regulation, validly
promulgated the same regulation on their effective dates.

In Mobil III, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dep’ t of Energy, 678 F.2d 1083
(TECA 1982), TECA dealt with DOE’s attempted third bite at the
apple and the subsequent abolishing of the V factor altogether. On
January 16, 1981, DOE adopted a regulation which retroactively
repromulgated the April 30, 1974 amendiment to the April 1974 date.
TECA ruled that DOE could not retroactively repromulgate its rule.
The decision in Mobil / had made it clear that the April 1974

4 Mobil I also established that a new rulemaking in September 1974 did
not cure the April 30, 1974 amendment problems. First, TECA held that
the September statute addressed non-product costs pass-throughs. The April
1974 amendment concemed product cost pass-throughs, so the two were
unrelated. Second, TECA noted that an opportunity for notice and comment
regarding a subsequent rulemaking cannot cure previous rulemaking defects.
Mobil I, 610 F.2d at 805 n.11.

5 The district court used the February 1976 date instead of December
1975 because the December statute directed new regulations to take effect no
later than February 1, 1976. 15 U.S.C. § 758.

16a

amendment was not necessary to fulfill the EPAA’s design. Thus, a
retroactive statute did not fulfill that design. /d. at 1090.

In addition, the February 1, 1976 and other subsequent
amendments brought in a new cost allocation, the “ R factor,” for the
old V factor.© Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA),
5 U.S.C. § 751. TECA ruled that this substitution was prospective
enforcement and therefore proper. Mobil II], 678 F.2d at 1091.

In accordance with its filing regulations, DOE set up a specific
grace period and appeal process to determine whether the agency
would accept refilings based on the new invalidation of the Apnil
amendment. There was no carte blanche for all refiners to refer to the
Mobil decisions and increase their costs.

In general, DOE did not allow refiners to refile cost allocation
reports that sought to change the allocation of crude oil costs based on
the invalidation of the April 1974 amendment unless the refiners
applied within the grace period or with the permission of the DOE.
The agency noted that, if permitted, the filings could result in total
refiner claims for retroactive increases in banked costs of over
$50 billion at that time. 45 Fed. Reg. 58,872-73 (Sept. 5, 1980).’

© The V factor was based on volume of products sold. The R factor
was based on volume of products refined. The V factor was eliminated
entirely as of March 1, 1977 in favor of the R factor.

7 Indeed, DOE prophesied the exact complaint Van Vranken makes here:

Many (refiners) have claimed that, because the April 30, 1974 rule was
declared invalid, their pool of increased costs for the period thereafter can
be enlarged, such that alleged violations based on their

contemporancously reported increased costs are either diminished or
obliterated.

46 Fed. Reg. 7782 (Jan. 23, 1981). DOE found no good cause to allow
this to happen.

17a

The court agrees with the concems expressed in Kickapoo Oil
Co. v. Murphy Oil Corp., No. C 78-478, slip op. at 17-24 (W.D.
Wis. Dec. 28, 1983). There, the court concluded that, while DOE
could not enforce the invalid regulation against nonparties to the Mobil
cases, those regulations do not necessarily enable all those who
applied the invalid regulation to later seek reallocation of their crude oil
costs increases.

The court does not, however, accept the interpretation of the Mobil
decisions offered by the plaintiff class. It suggests that the scope of
the decisions is limited to Mobil Oil Corporation because the holdings
provided emergency relief in accordance with an injunction. This is a

misreading of the cases. TECA struck down the April 30, 1974

amendment because it did not follow the APA or the EPAA. The court
clearly did not reach the issue of whether DOE was justified when the
agency tumed down Mobil’s administrative appeals for emergency
relief.

B. Reallocation of Exempt Product Costs

Having held that the Mobil decisions do not automatically allow
ARCO to reallocate its crude oil costs, this court must next determine
whether the April 30, 1974 amendment allows or mandates ARCO
add these costs to its covered product prices. The plaintiff class has
asked this court to rule that ARCO cannot inject additional increased
costs into its banks today when those costs were not contained in
contemporancous filings with the DOE. For the reasons presented
below, the court rules in favor of the class.

18a

1. The relevant issues.

ARCO contends that plaintiff class has mischaracterized the nature
of the issue presented. The refiner suggests that the question is
whether the class can establish that it was in fact overcharged during
the applicable time period. In antithesis, the court believes ARCO’s
approach places the cart before the horse.

ARCO relies on the ruling expressed in Longview Refining Co. v.
Shore, 554 F.2d 1006 (TECA), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 836 (1977).
In that case, the court ruled that the customer had not shown that the
refiner had failed to implement the price regulations.’ Here, this court
must first determine what the pertinent price regulations require.
Then, after applying those regulations, plaintiff class must establish
that actual overcharges occurred, by, among other things, showing
that ARCO improperly inflated its banked costs used to support prices.
See Kickapoo, 788 F.2d at 20; Longview, 554 F.2d at 1011.
Finally, the class must then show that the overcharges or excessive
banks were made with the requisite intent and willfulness. /d.
at 1023.9

8 Shore complained that Longview Refining charged them too much for
gasoline and diesel as allowed under the applicable regulations. TECA
struck down the district court’s findings of facts and conclusions of law
because the facts did not sufficienuy support a conclusion that an overcharge
occurred. TECA noted that “plaintiffs have the burden in this case to
provide the specific data needed to prove the existence of an overcharge.”
Longview, 554 F.2d at 1011. TECA found many aspects of the district
court’s findings lacking in foundation, including the fact that the district
court apparently only used plainuff’s version of the proper pricing structure.

9 TECA also retied on the absence of a showing of intent in its reversal
in Longview. The court noted that a § 210 action requires plaintiff to prove
that defendants “intentionally charg[{ed] a price known to be in excess of the
applicable ceiling price allowable under the pricing regulations.” /d.
at 1022-23. Clear proof of willfulness is required because of the
complexity of the regulations: The court remarked that these regulations
were so convoluted that even the government could not determine how to

Footnote continucd on next page.

19a

2. Recovery of exempt product costs.

ARCO urges this court to rule that the refiner must follow the pre-
April 30, 1974 definition, that this definition required the recovery of
the five later exempted product costs in covered product prices, and
the invalidation of the April 30 amendmeni continued this mandate
until February 1, 1976. This cannot be.

Obviously the Mobil decisions invalidating the April 1974
amendment establish that a plaintiff cannot sue for over-recoverics
which stemmed from a refiner’s improper use of this rule. The
decisions indicate that correct posture for a refiner in an exogenous
world would have been to ignore the amendment and to continue to
include the exempt product prices in the denominator of the
V factor.!° Refiners like ARCO, however, followed the amendment
and excluded the prices. The fact that the Mobil decisions later
invalidated the amendment does not mean that ARCO can now go back _
and allocate more costs to the products it sold and thus expand its
banked costs. The court notes that this proposal would be akin to

properly calculate the pricing structures. The Longview court speaks of
willfulness “in the criminal sense.” Nonetheless, here TECA seems to refer
to the accountants’ inability to understand what they were supposed to do.
It is unclear how TECA would have ruled if the court had found that the
refiner understood the regulations but still failed to follow their
requirements. Thus, it is not clear that, in the case before this court, the
plainuff class must show ARCO acted with criminal intent. In addition,
this problem was not crucial to TECA’s analysis; TECA clearly could
reverse the district court without relying on this issue. Finally, TECA does
warn that “mere failure to employ the formula” is noi a “legal wrong.” But
this proscription provides for the case when the refiner fails to follow the
price formulas but still manages to charge the customer less than the price
to which the refiner is entitled.

10 The court does not think it unrealistic that refiners might indeed
realize that the EPAA was always intended to remain consistent even after
the expiration of its predecessor ESA and keep exempt products and covered
products separate.

20a

permitting a refiner to retum to its customers after a dozen years had
passed and inform them that it undercharged them: The refiner
mistakenly operated under a recently invalidated regulation which set
the prices too low, so it should now be permitted to ask the customers
to pay the difference on products sold and consumed many years ago.
Whether the costs are banked for the future or extracted from the
customer in the price of today’s goods, the result is the same.

The court finds support in the reasons expressed in Kickapoo and
Naph-sol Refining Co. v. Murphy Oil Corp., 550 F. Supp. 297
(W.D. Mich. 1982), modified on other grounds sub nom. Mobil Oil
Corp. v. DOE, 728 F.2d 1477 (TECA 1983). These courts concluded
that DOE had indeed sect forth an invalid April 1974 amendment. As a
result, the amendment was improper, and refiners were to use the old,
albeit intemalliy inconsistent, rule which removed EPAA exempt
products from the V factor denominator.'! Thus, the Mobil
decisions allowed the refiners to use the amendment resulting from the
DOE’s slip-up. But the refiners were not required to use the
amendment at that time. /d. As plaintiff class points out, the Mobil
courts always uscd permissive language rather than compulsory
language when describing Mobil’s ability to allocate costs.

The court finds the reasoning in Kickapoo particularly persuasive
on this point. There, the court noted that the only directives the price
regulations ever contained regarding exempt product costs were
prohibitions barring thcir use to justify increasing covered prices. The
court interpreted the effect of the invalidation of the Apmnil 30
regulation on the cost allocation as a temporary suspension of this
pronibition. It follows that this temporary suspension does not
automatically compel the addition of exempt product costs to the

!! As noted above, the denominator should have included volumes of
both covered products and exempt products in order to exclude exempt
product costs from allocation to covered product prices. Discussion, supra,
at 2-3.

21a

covered prices calculation. As recognized in Kickapoo, it was never a
violation of the regulations to not increase covered product prices in
order to recover exempt product costs, even during the period that the
April 30 V factor prohibition was void.

It is one thing to allow refiners a pricing practice which violated the
spint of the EPAA but held consistent to the letter when that regulation
was in effect. It is a different thing to allow the refiner to retroactively
use that inconsistent regulation to its benefit now that the regulation is
Outdated. Indeed, this reasoning is the underpinning of the decisions
in Tenneco Oil Co., 1 DOE § 85,512 (1977), and Eastern Airlines,
Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., No. 74-1207 Civ-JM (S.D. Fla.,
Jan. 12, 1982), aff d, 712 F.2d 1402 (TECA 1983), and points to
the root of the persuasiveness of those cases to that here. This court is
aware that the subject of those cases was voluntary reallocations of “
H factor dollars,”!? and not recalculation of the V factor, as is the
case here. In those cases, the seller chose the amouwt of costs to
assign to particular products and then later sought to reallocate costs to
eliminate over-recoverics. The courts refused to allow this practice.
The reasoning they expressed counsels against unnecessary retroactive
reallocations in general and indicates compelling policy concems that
this court, too, must consider.'3

Accordingly, this court rejects the suggestion by ARCO that it
analogize the casc fiere to that in Mamula v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 346 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1965). In that case, a
taxpayer, in good faith, reported income pursuant to a method which
the government determined to be incorrect in a subsequent audit. The
court found he was not bound to the method he chose because the IRS

12 These reflect the costs allocated into and out of a product group.

13 Similarly, the Naph-Sol court noted that public policy should
prohibit letter a seller retroacuvecly adjust its prices in order to benefit itself,
550 F. Supp. at 313.

22a

had ruled that it did not appropriately apply to his income source. The
court allowed him to choose one of two other methods available to
recalculate the tax; naturally, he chose the system which better
benefitted his finances.

That is what ARCO would like to do here: choose between the pre-
amendment posture or the April 1974 amendment requirements to
achieve the highest banked costs. Yet, in the case before this court,
the government has never ruled that a recalculation is required.'4
Furthermore, the concept of volumetric allotment was considered
fundamental to the framework of the petroleum regulations. Unlike
the law in Mamula, the prohibition required by the April 30, 1974
amendment had always been, and later continued to be, the heart of the
volumetric regulations. The method of tax payment in Mamula never
was the appropriate choice for that piaintiff to follow. The fact that he
was later allowed to correct his mistake cannot be relevant to ARCO’s
predicament.

C. ARCO’s Revised Cost Forms

Because this court holds that ARCO’s recalculation of its V factor
constitutes an improper retroactive reallocation of its exempt product
costs, the court necd not address the issue of the August 1974,
September 1974 and March 1975 subsequent rulemakings. Instead,
this court must next confront the issue of ARCO’s revised cost forms.
If ARCO had reccived permission from the DOE to include the exempt
products costs in its covered products costs, or if ARCO ever applied
to the DOE during a grace period. it is possible that the refiner might
still be allowed to adjust its V factor as it desires. The coun
determines that ARCO did neither of these things.

14 The courts in Naph-Sol, 550 F. Supp. at 313, and Kickapoo,
No. C 78-478, at 21-24, make a similar distinction.

23a

10 C.F.R. § 212.126(d) states that the refiner must obtain DOE's
written permission for any refiling that covers a period more than
one year prior to the resubmission:

(1) DOE will routinely accept resubmissions or refiling of
such reports only within one year after the original refiling or
submission. Any entry contained in an otherwise timely
report which purports to change or adjust retroactively an
entry or allocation contained in a report previously filed or
submitted shall be considered a refiling or resubmission. . .
and will not be given force or effect absent compliance with
the provisions of this paragraph.

(2) Exceptions Notwithstanding the provisions of
subparagraph (d)(1) of this section, a refiner may resubmit or
refile reports... where DOE grants written permission to
resubmit or rcfile for good cause shown.

ARCO did make R factor refilings. ARCO points to three aspects
of the R factor revisions to imply it resolved its volumctric
apportionment problems with DOE. In a Proposed Remedial Order,
ERA No. RARHO00204, September 30, 1983, DOE challenged
ARCO’s R factor adjustments for March 1979 through December
1980. ARCO claims that the PRO specifically declined to challenge or
criticize the refincr’s V factor adjustment. Actually, the PRO directs
nothing to the V factor in the face of the Order. Absence of a
discussion does not carry any significance.

ARCO further relics on another inapplicable document. When
ARCO applied for the R factor refilings, DOE wrote a response brief.
Response of Economic Regulatory Administration to Statement of
Objections of Atlantic Richfield Company, No. HRO-0223. At
footnote 79, the Response noted that DOE did not challenge the
propricty of allocuting exempt product costs to all covered products
before February 1, 1976. But that remark clearly refers to the TECA

24a

rulings in Mobil, not to any such requests specifically made by
ARCO. ARCO Icaves this distinction out.

Finally, ARCO relies on another footnote, number 77, in the same
Response. The DOE noted that, with respect to ARCO’s refilings in
August 1981, it did not object to “ legitimate costs incurred” if ARCO
accurately reported them consistent with the regulations. It is clear that
DOE is agreeing to nothing more than what ARCO was entitled to by
law. This footnote does not take the place of written acceptance of a
refiling as required by the statutes. Indeed, as counsel for DOE
commented at oral argument, a footnote in a brief could not imply the
DOE's acceptance of a refiling.'*

Il. DAMAGES

In 1985, ARCO and DOE settled a number of pending
administrative proceedings pursuant to § 211 of the ESA. See
50 Fed. Reg. 8366, 8368 (March 1, 1985). As described in the
Notice of Proposed Consent Order, upon execution of the settlement:

ARCO deposited $65.7 million in an interest bearing escrow
account pending public consideration of the settlement. If the
Consent Order is made final, ERA will petition the Office of
Hearings and Appeals (OHA) to implement a Special Refund
Proceeding pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Pant 206, Subpan V. In
that proceeding, any person who claims to have suffered
injury from ARCO’s alleged overcharges would have the
opponunity to submit a refund claim to OHA.

'S In supplemental information, ARCO brings up an attempt it made at
rcfiling on March 24, 1982. Apparently, DOE ignored this submission
because it was made after the regulations expired and during settlement
negouiauions in DOE cnforcement proceedings. Thus, this too lacks the
permission required and lacks “force or effect.”

25a

Id. at 8366. Plaintiff class contends that money paid to its members
from the Consent Order fund is “ collateral” to the treble damages
awardable under the class’s own private cause of action under § 210.
The class also argues that the Consent Order fund is attributable to
overcharges which are not currently recoverable in this action. As
explained below, such a ruling would permit an excess of recovery to
the class members.

First, the DOE scituement pertains to alleged overcharges related to
ARCO’s compliance with the Mandatory Petroleum Price Regulations
during the period of January 1973 through January 1981. The escrow
fund is intended to provide restitution to purchasers of ARCO’s
refined petroleum products during this time. 50 Fed. Reg. at 8371.
The Consent Order clearly covers damages claimed in plaintiffs’
private cause of action. Indeed, earlier this year, parties signed a
setticment agreement regarding the class’s § 210 claims with moncy
that would have come from the Consent Order fund.

Second, the collateral source rule provides that “ if an injured pany
received some compensation from a source wholly independent of the
tortfcasor, such payments should not be deducted from the damages
which the plaintiff would otherwise collect from the tonfeasor.”
Hrnjak v. Graymar, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 725, 729 (1971). Plaintiff class
uses this rule to assent that DOE's actions are remedial and therefore
have no beanng on any award made in this case. The class cites to
Bulzan v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 620 F.2d 278 (TECA 1980). It is
correct insolar as the DOE's administrative enforcement acuion docs
not affect the class's nght to file and maintain a privaic cause of
action under § 210. However, Bulzan docs not stand for the
proposition that the class may collect twice from ARCO. Other cases
support this conclusion. The coun in U.S. Oil Co., Inc. v. Koch
Refining Co., 518 F. Supp. 957, 962 (E.D. Wis. 1981), recognized
that administrative enforcement actions and separaic pnvaie actions
could expose a deicndant to double liability. The coun went on to
note that this probicm is climinated if courts * reduce any poicntial
exposure by offsetiing any amount a particular plaintiff might recover

26a

by way of DOE’s actions against any recovery for a private suit. DOE
could also offset recoveries in private suits against any restitution
order.” See also Martin Oil Service, Inc. v. Koch Refining Co.,
No. C 81-1844, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 1982) (where the
court suggested the offset problem may be minimized if a defendant
who has already paid restitution on a private action may assert this as a
defense to an enforcement action by DOE).

The count does agree with the plaintiff class in that the offset should
be subtracted from the total amount of damages after trebling. In
actions like this where treble damages are available, the plaintiff is
entitled to full satisfaction of the claim for harm done. The amount
awarded as damages is then trebled as punishment to the defendant. If
the offset were subtracted from the initial damage award, the class
members would be denied the full satisfaction of their claim.

CONCLUSION

This court has held that ARCO’s attempts to alter its banked costs
constitute an improper retroactive reallocation of its exempt product
costs. Accordingly, it grants partial summary judgment to the plaintiff
class represented by Don Van Vranken on this issue. ARCO may
offset moncy that would go to these class members from the DOE
Consent Order fund against any amount of damages due the members
under their privaic cause of action. The offset will be made after
damages are trebied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 9-26-88

Ls/_
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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APPENDIX C

TEMPORARY EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 9-101

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY,
Appellant,

Vv.

DON VAN VRANKEN, on behalf of himself

and all others similarly situated,

and LEW & TED’S SERVICE, INC., ‘
Appellees.

Before: BECKER, WEIGEL and THORNBERRY, Judges.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s petition for rehearing and
suggestion for rehearing en banc, it is

ORDERED that said petition for rehearing is DENIED.

It is FURTHER ORDERED that the suggestion for rehearing en
banc is DENIED. The Court’s mandate shall issue seven days from
the date of this order - Monday, November 27, 1989.

FOR THE COURT:
/s/

Cynthia A. Dykes
Clerk

November 20, 1989

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APPENDIX D

Cost Allocation Regulation,
10 C.F.R. § 212.83(c)(2)

(c) Allocation of increased costs

(2) General Formulae. (i) For special products (i=1 and i=2):

(ii) For covered products other than special products (i=3):
pit = al vilyv") + Bib + Gié +H”

Where for (i) and (i1):

Vv" = The total volume of all covered products sold
in the period “‘n” (the consecutive three-month period
of the preceding year such that the middle month of
the period corresponds to the current month “u’”’).

(39 Fed. Reg. 1955 (Jan. 15, 1974).)

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Invalid Amendment to Cost Allocation Regulation,

10 C.F.R. § 212.83(c)(2)

Section 212.83(c)(2) is amended in the definition of ““V”’ to read as

follows:

~ § 212.83

(C)

(2)

Allocation of refiner’s increased product costs.

Allocation of increased costs.

General Formulae...

V"= The total volume of all covered products and
all products refined from crude petroleum other than
covered products sold in the period “n” (the
consecutive three-month period of the preceding year
such that the middle month of the period corresponds
to the current month ‘“‘u’’)

(39 Fed. Reg. 15139 (May 1, 1974).)

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APPENDIX E

Refiling Regulation, 10 C.F.R. § 212.126(d)

(d) (1) Resubmissions and refiling of reports by
refiners. A refiner shall exercise due care and diligence in the
preparation of cost allocation reports filed pursuant to this section.
DOE will routinely accept resubmissions or refiling of such reports
only within one year after the orginal filing or submission. Any entry
contained in an otherwise timely report which purports to change or
adjust retroactively an entry or allocation contained in a report
previously filed or submitted shall be considered a refiling or
resubmission for purposes of this paragraph and will not be given
force or effect absent compliance with the provisions of this
paragraph.

(2) Exceptions. Notwithstanding the provisions of
subparagraph (d)(1) of this section, a refiner may resubmit or refile
reports until June 1, 1979, for months of measurement beginning
with September 1973; where expressly authorized by DOE regulation
or order, or where DOE grants written permission to resubmit or refile
for good cause shown.

(3) Applications to resubmit or refile. In any
application for permission to resubmit or refile a report pursuant to
subparagraph (d)(2), DOE will not make a finding of good cause
routincly. Where it appears that such a finding may adversely affect
the interest of the consuming public, a firm must demonstrate in its
application, at a minimum, that the claimed errors or omissions in the
report or reports which the firm secks to replace or modify did not
result from a failure to exercise due care and diligence. Firms must
apply for permission pursuant to subparagraph (d)(2), in writing, to
the DOE office of Special Counsel for Compliance or Office of
Enforcement, as appropriate. Applications to resubmit or refile must
be accompanicd by a wrilicn statement completely describing the
proposed adjustments and the reasons therefor, and a numerical

3la

schedule which reflects both the previously submitted figures and the
proposed adjusted figures. The appropriate DOE Office will dispose of
each application in writing, with a concise statement of the reasons for
granting or denying the application. The disposition of such an
application shall be subject to appeal as an order, under Subpart H of
Part 205.

(44 Fed. Reg. 14536 (March 13, 1979).)

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385020_0894%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
