# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Goldstein v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1990
- **Citation:** 493 U.S. 1078

## Text

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1989

LOU C. GOLDSTEIN,
Petitioner - PRO SE,

=;

DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

LOU C. GOLDSTEIN

249 South Colonial Homes Circle, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30309

(404) 355-0539

PETITIONER
PRO SE

i
QUESTION PRESENTED

. Whether the Court of Appeals erroneously ruled on the
substantive law under §510 ERISA by sustaining
credence to Respondents proffered reason for discharge
of employment (pretext of poor dependability) in holding
there is no merit to any of Petitioner's arguments, where
the district court ruling complained of was upon
questions of fact within statutory definition and
questions of law which substantially affect the
substantive rights of Petitioner in federally regulated
employee benefit plan, in action for interference with
Statutory rights under statute prohibiting such
interference, as to which the courts of appeal are in
conflict?

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PARTIES

Petitioner, Lou C. Goldstein, was employed by Delta
Air Lines, Inc., as a flight attendant commencing on or about
October 10, 1966, and continued in such employment until
on or about March 16, 1981, when Delta terminated her
employment.

Respondent, Delta Air Lines, Inc., is a corporation
which is engaged in the commercial airline business
operating both domestically and internationally.

ill
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pages

QUESTIONS PRESENTED i
PARTIES ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS il
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv
OPINIONS BELOW l
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 2
FEDERAL STATUTES INVOLVED 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 12

To Insure the Integrity of the Legislative Intent

of ERISA - Employee Benefit Rights Must Be

Protected
CONCLUSION 20
INDEX TO APPENDIX 21

APPENDIX A: Opinion of the Circuit Court -
APPENDIX B: Rehearing Decision of the Circuit Court
APPENDIX C: Judgment of the Circuit Court
APPENDIX D: Order of the District Court

APPENDIX E: Judgment of the District Court
APPENDIX F: Federal Statute Involved

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

TABLE OF CASES:
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 47 Us :

91 L. Ed 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 16
Chastain v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 496 F.

Supp. 979 (1980) 15
Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F. 2d 834

(3rd. Cir. 1987) 13,14,15,19
Massachussetts Mutual Life Insurance Co.

v. Russell 473 U.S., at 148. 12
Matsushita v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 475

US 574 89 L.Ed. 2d 538 106 S. Ct. 1348
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 463 U.S.

85,90 (1983) 12
Zipf v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co.,

799 F. 2d 889 (3rd Cir. 1986) 13
STATUTES:
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. i, 12, 13, 116, 18
MISCELLANEOUS:

Protection of Employee Benefit Rights
Delta Family Care Disability and Survivorship Plan

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ines es oo OP Ie
; 7 ae re —— = : on Rhee a ee VF, _" - ’ io = = F

MISCELLANEOUS:
Protection of Employee Benefit Rights
Delta Family Care Disability and Survivorship Plan

‘Ce

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1989

LOU C. GOLDSTEIN,
Petitioner - PRO SE,

V.

DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,
Respondent,

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

TO: THE HONORABLE, THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE
UNITED STATED SUPREME COURT AND THE
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

Petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review
the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals was not reported. It
is reproduced in Appendix A.

The decision of the district court was not reported. It is
réproduced in Appendix D.

_ EE ——

2

JURISDICTION

The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered on June
6, 1989. The petitions for rehearing were denied August 31,
1989.

This Court's jurisdiction is invoked under the provisions
of 28 U.S.C. §1254.

FEDERAL STATUTES INVOLVED

The federal statute involved is The Employment
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Public
Law 93-406, 29 U.S.C. §1140.

A copy of the relevant portion is included in Appendix F.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The jurisdiction of the district court was invoked under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C., 93rd
Congress, H.R. 2, Public Law 93-406, (Hereinafter referred
to as ERISA).

Lou C. Goldstein, hereinafter referred to as “Petitioner”
was employed as a flight attendant by Delta Air Lines, Inc.
commencing on October 10, 1966, and continued in such
employment until March 16, 1981, when Delta terminated her
employment for exercising her rights under ERISA.

Delta Air Lines, Inc., hereinafter referred to as
"Respondent", is a corporation which is engaged in the
commercial airline business operating both domestically and
internationally.

As an employee, Petitioner was entitled to certain benefits
provided by Respondent, among which are Delta Family Care
Medical Plan, Delta Family Care Disability and Survivorship
Plan and Delta Family Care Retirement Plan, hereinafter
referred to as "the Plan", all of which are subject to ERISA.

Petitioner had rights and expectations of rights under these
Plans and was entitled to sick leave, short and long term
disability, pension and retirement benefits as set out in the
various Plans.

At such time Petitioner was also eligible to receive short
and long term disability benefits under the Plan and
Retirement benefits under the Plan. Petitioner was also
eligible for sick leave in accordance with Respondent's sick
leave policy. All of these Plans are protected by ERISA.

' il re Disability an rvivorship Plan

lon w follows: An employee who

22

4

is too ill to work is given a certain number of sick leave days
during the year. Once these sick leave days are used up, the
employee must apply for short term disability benefits. In
order to qualify for short term disability benefits, an employee
must be unable to perform his customary occupation. In order
to obtain short term disability benefits, the employee must
provide a medical certificate indicating that he or she is
incapable of performing his or her normal work duties. These
short term benefits are generous, but of fixed duration. Short
term disability benefits are paid for a period of 26 weeks,
including the time an employee received full pay sick leave.
As long as the alleged disability commenced while the
employee was employed, Plan benefits would continue for
that period of disability regardless of the employee's
employment status. Once all of an employee's short term
disability leave has been used up, the employee must either
return to work or apply for long term disability benefits. In
order to obtain long term disability benefits, the employee
must provide medical certification proving that he or she is
incapable of performing any job. Eligibility for benefits under
the Disability and Survivorship Flan is independent from the
employment status of the employee. Thus, as long as the
alleged disability commenced while the employee was
employed, Plan benefits would continue for that period of
disability regardless of the employee's employment status. __
Delta's Sick Leave of Absence Policy provides for leave
without pay for 90 days after benefit denial.
"Effective June 1, 1981, the early retirement age
under the Plan was changed from age 55 to age 52.
In addition, the Plan implemented a special program

:

5

allowing employees to retire at age 50 (however,

benefits would not be payable until age 52) if they

had 25 years of service at age 50." (Affidavit of

Harvey King, R.1, 21.)

"Eligibility for benefits under the Disability and
Survivorship Plan is independent from the
employment status of the employee. Thus, as long
as the alleged disability commenced while the
employee was employed, Plan benefits would
continue for that period of disability regardless of the
employee's employment status" (Affidavit of
Katherine Dodson, R.1, 21.)

"Plaintiffs employment with Delta was
terminated as a result of her failure to maintain
acceptable dependability" (Affidavit of John Hume,

R.1, 28).

Petitioner alleged in her complaint that Respondent
concealed the unlawful termination from her.

On October 26, 1980, Petitioner filed for full pay sick
leave. This illness resulted in termination of employment by
Respondent on March 16, 1981. Petitioner's sick leave
expired on January 3, 1981. She was removed from the
payroll January 4, 1981. "Flight Attendant Sick Leave" forms
must be completed and submitted to supervisor immediately
upon return to work; the Plan handbook states "Claims for
disability should be submitted within 31 days after being
removed from the payroll". In a letter dated January 22,
1981, Respondent specifically informed Petitioner that failure
to submit medical certification would result in termination of

‘ea

6

Petitioner's employment (Ex: D,E,F,G; R1.23 -pp. 3,4; Ex.
Le Re hed

On February 12, 1981, John Hume, Vice President-In-
Flight Service, advised the Manager of In-Flight Service that
Respondent was considering three alternatives regarding
Petitioner's status:

1. Terminating her employment before returning to
work;

2. Allowing her to return to work, placing her on
indefinite suspension, reviewing her record and terminating
her employment.

3. Allowing her to return to work with a strong final
warning.

Hume assured Petitioner that Respondent's only concern
was to make certain that she was well enough to return to
work as a productive employee (Ex. M; R1.21).

In order to qualify for short term disability benefits, an
employee must be unable to perform his customary
occupation. (Affidavit of Katherine Dodson, R1.21,
hereinafter referred to as the "Dodson Affidavit").

Petitioner submitted additional medical certification to
Respondent from her attending physician, as noted in Dr.
Frank's certification of February 19, 1981. Respondent
insisted that Petitioner see Dr. Dennis, a physician on behalf
of Delta (R1.23, pp. 4,5).

A decision was made on February 24, 1981, to terminate
Petitioner's employment. Respondent stated reason was
“poor dependability". Delta's personnel policy requires that
such termination recommendation be reviewed by various
management personnel and final approval for the termination

eee. ~<a

7

was received on March 13, ‘Hume Affidavit R1.21). On
March 16, 1981, petitioner's employment was terminated.
The termination of employment was made effective January 4
- this was a bookkeeping entry - it is Respondent's policy to
back date employment terminations (R1.21, p.24; Ex. H
R1.23, p. 4).

In a letter dated March 11, 1981, to Petitioner,
Respondent specificaily informed Petitioner that all short term
benefits would be stopped and payments halted retroactively
as of February 19, 1981, the date of her first scheduled
appointment, rather than February 27, the date she actually
saw Dr. Dennis (R1.23 p.4).

As long as the alleged disability commenced while the
employee was employed, Plan benefits would continue for
that period of disability regardless of the employee's
employment status (Dodson Affidavit, Ex. ; R1.21).

Petitioner's claim for short term disability was initially
granted for the period January 4 through February 20, 1981,
but denied thereafter on the basis that the medical evidence in
the file did not support her claim that she was unable to
perform her customary work. Petitioner complied with the
provisions under the Plan, she was eligible for benefits, she
qualified for benefits. The evidence was in the file or the
claim would not have been granted. Short term disability
benefits are paid for a period of 26 weeks, including the time
an employee receives full pay sick leave (Dodson Affidavit,
R1.21).

Petitioner was entitled to leave without pay for 90 days
after benefit denial, under Respondent's sick leave of absence
policy (R1.23, p. 5). It is Respondent's practice in some

cee

8

circumstances to set a date certain by which an employee who
has been denied long or short term disability must return to
work so that there can be no question but that if the employee
does not return to work by that deadline, he or she will be
deemed to have have abandoned the job. There is no policy
or practice which requires Respondent to make such a
decision at any particular time. (R1.24, pp 2,3).

Respondent could not continue to consider her employable
(Hume Affidavit, R1.21).

Petitioner felt she had been misinformed and misled and
felt confused (attached to Hum Affidavit, Ex. N: R1.21).

wi recor ll ex from
‘ i ll ments
vit of John H nd the affidavit oi
Katherine Dodson R1.21):

Following the expiration of Petitioner's 26 week short
term disability period on May 7, 1979, the Plan notified her
on July 18, 1979, that based upon Dr. Whaley's medical
examination, it did not appear that she was eligible for long
term disability benefits.

W. nden 14, 1979, in
pertinent part:

I saw no need to accomplish any x-rays or laboratory
evaluation.

If any further information about her comes to your
attention that might alter the above opinion, I would appreciate
your bringing it to me and a supplemented medical report
could be issued.

9

On July 27, 1979, Petitioner was notified by
Respondent's Personnel Department to contact her local
manager regarding returning to work (Hume Affidavit). The
90 day period referenced in Respondent's letter of July 26
begins on July 18 (the date of the disability denial) and refers
to the period in which the employee must notify Respondent
in order to retain employment (Ex. H). Petitioner kept
Respondent apprised of her disability status (Ex. G,]I).
Respondent informed Petitioner it would be necessary to
submit medical certification prior to return to active status (Ex.
| ee n r_ 24, 1979, ba upon _her poor

ndabili nd_her_failur return to work, her

employment was terminated" (Hume Affidavit) Petitioner was
reinstated. Respondent was aware that petitioner's benefit

Ww i r_review ween May and
November 1979 (Ex. K).

Based on Petitioner's benefit appeal of October 22, 1979,
Petitioner was notified on November 9 of her eligibility for
short term disability and found eligible for all short term
disability benefits through May 7, 1979 (Ex. K), effective
retroactively.

In a letter dated January 28, 1980, Respondent specifically
advised Petitioner that she had been on an unauthorized leave
since May 7, 1979 (Ex. J), Petitioner had been appealing the
denial of benefit claims through the Plan's appeal procedure.

Petitioner apprised Respondent that the disability claim
forms were being processed by her physician. The long term
disability claim was denied April 2, 1980, Delta's process
began again. (Motion for Reconsideration/Amendment to
Motion for Reconsideration, R1 and R2; 2nd Supplementatl

10

Record on Appeal). At no time was Petitioner offered a
ground job. Petitioner did not admit dependability prompted
loss of her job. (It was dictated to Petitioner by Respondent.)

Petitioner maintains her position: She did not have proper
discovery; Respondent has engaged in concealment regarding
her; her Motion For Reconsideration and amendment have
merit; her evidence to show prior acts of Respondent,
evidence a particular "design" "purpose" which is of legitimate
probative value.

Effective June 1, 1981, the early retirement age under the
Plan was changed from age 55 to age 52. In addition, the
Plan implemented a special program allowing employees to
retire at age 50 (however, benefits would not be payable until
age 52) if they had 25 years of service at age 50.

The District Court found it was obvious that Respondent
fired Petitioner because she was an undependable employee,
Petitioner had provided no evidence to the contrary, that
Petitioner completely failed to demonstrate any merit to her
claim.

The District Court found that Petitioner complied under the
provisions of the Plan, Petioner qualified for benefits under
the provisions of the Plan, and that Petitioner's claim for short
term disability was granted. Then, the District Court found
Petitioner was not eligible. The reason for halting the claim

n ing the benefits is in di ;

Petitioner's claim was granted. The evidence was in the
file. Petitioner submitted additional certification (Ex. I:
R1.23-4). Respondent insisted Petitioner see Dr. Dennis who
reported no disability. (R1.23, pp 4,5) Respondent maintains
that Petitioner's that Petitioner's status is because the medical

11
evidence in file did not support Petitioner's claim that she was
unable to perform her customary job (Dodson Affidavit,
R1.21). On February 20, 1981, (the date Petitioner's benefit
claim was halted), Respondent also maintains that Delta would
have to llok at Petitioner's dependability record then
terminated Petitioner's employment for poor dependability.

The District Court held that it is obvious that Delta
retroactively decided to make February 19 the cut-off date for
short term disability benefits for administrative reasons. The
District Court in fact stated that "Given ms. Goldstein was not
eligible for short term disability, Delta (Respondent) could just
as easily have cut off her disability benefits on January 4,
1981, the day her sick leave expired."

The District Court found that Respondent "generally"
allows an employee who has been denied disability, 90 days
within which to return to work before deeming the position
abandoned. The Court's decision is attached hereto as D-1.

The Court of Appeals sustained credence to Respondent's
pretext for termination by holding the undisputed facts show
she was terminated because she was an undependable
employee, there is no merit to any of her arguments. The
Court of Appeals ruling is attached hereto as A-3.

Petitioner filed Motion for Rehearing and Rehearing In
Banc, attached hereto as Appendix B.

12
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
To Insure The Integrity Of The

Legislative Intent of ERISA,
Employee Benefit Rights Must Be Protected

ERISA was enacted "to promote the interests of
employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans”,
Shaw vs. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 463 U.S. 85,90 (1983), and
"to protect contractually defined benefits, " Massachusetts
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell 473 U.S., at 148.

To insure the integrity of employee benefit rights,
Congress has enacted the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) and has prohibited interference with
protected rights under the provisions of employee benefit
plans, every employee has the right to be free from
interference. This means that she cannot be discharged, fined,
suspended, expelled or otherwise interfered with in order to
prevent her from receiving benefits or attaining eligibility for
benefits. See Legislative History of the Employee retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, 93rd Cong.

The effect of the Court of Appeals holding in this case -
the undisputed facts, evidence, shows Petioner was an
undependable employee, that Respondent fired her for that
reason, there is no merit to her arguments - fails to apply the
Legislative Intent.

These important questions of federal law should be settled
by this Court to protect and promote the interests of
employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.
an exercise of this Court's power is called upon.any analysis
of these issues must begin with an understanding of the nature

13

of the claims asserted by the Petitioner and the purpose of the
statute under which these claims are brought. As noted, this
case concerns Respondent's termination of Petitioner's
employment under the pretect of poor dependability for
exercising her rights to which she was entitled under the
provisions of the employee benefit plans and for the purpose
of interfering with the attainment of rights to which she was
entitled or may become entitled; Gavalik v. Continental Can
Co., 812 F.2d 834 (3rd. Cir. 1987).

Section 510 of ERISA provides, in pertinent part:
Interference with protected rights.

It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine,
suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a
participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he
is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan ...
or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any
right to which such participant may become entitled under the
plan ... 29 U.S.C.§1140.

It is, of course, true that the employee in a Section 510
suit needs to establish that at the time of the alleged violation,
he or she had the potential of receiving benefits. Otherwise
there can be no credible cclaim that the employer's discharge
or harassment decision was motivated by a desire to prevent
the employee from receiving his or her due. Zipf v. American
Telephone and Telegraph Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3rd Cir. 1986).

An employee who is too ill to work is given a certain
number of sick leave days during the year. petitioner was too
ill to work beginning October 26, 1980. Once these sick leave
days are used up, the employee must apply for short term

disability benefits. in order to obtain short term disability

- .

14

benefits, the employee must provide a medical certificate
indicating that he or she is incapable of performing his or her
work duties. In order to qualify for short term disability
benefits, an employee must be unable to perform his
customary occupation. petitioner filed such certification from
her treating physician, Dr. Frank.

These short term benefits are generous, but of fixed
furation. Short-term disability benefits are paid for a period of
26 weeks, including the time an employee receives full pay
sick leave. Petitioner's short term disability claim was
granted. As long as the alleged disability commenced whiie
the employee was employed, Plan benefits would continue for
that period of disability, regardless of the employee's
employment status.

Respondent interfered with Petitioner's rights under the
ERISA protected Pian. The claim was halted (denied) and
payments stopped on February 20, 1981. Respondent
terminated Petitioner's employment under the pretext of poor
dependability. Pian benefits, as provided, did not continue
for Petitioner.

Congress enacted §510 primarily to prevent unscrupulous
employers from discharging or harrassing their employee in
order to deprive them of their subsiantive nights. Section 510,
unlike other anti-discrimination provisions, is designed to
prevent injury to employee's protected rights not simply to
redress the injury after the goals of a discriminatory plan have
been effected, Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F 2d 834
(3rd Cir. 1987).

The Court held that the claim was initially granted, but
payments were halted after Petitioner was examined by

15

another physician on behalf of Delta, Dr. Dennis, who
concluded that there was no reason why Plaintiff could not
return to her customary job. The fallacy with this position is
that the Court failed to consider that udner the Plan, as long as
the alleged disability commenced while the employee was
employed, Plan benefits would continue for that period of
disability regardless of the employee's employment status. in
the instant case, payments were halted and the claim was
denied on the basis that medical evidence was not in the file.
The Court failed to consider that Petitioner would not have
qualifed under the Plan absent the medical evidence.

"The Court has little trouble determining that the

Administrative Committee that administers Delta's

Plan has sufficiently broad discretionary powers to

trigger the application of the arbitrary and capricious

standard to decisions made by it". _

The Court misapplied the provisions of the Plan. The
Court found that . . ."Given that Ms. Goldstein (Petitioner)
was not eligible for any short term disability, Delta
(Respondent) could just as easily have cut off her disability
benefits as of January 4, 1981, the day her sick leave expired.

eat

This is clearly erroneous. The District Court's decision is in
direct conflict with the Third Circuit. The Gavlik Court held
that "because the district court construed §510 as requiring
actual deprivation of rights, it failed to consider properly the
inchoate components of the liability avoidance scheme that,
though producing no immediate or tangible effects on
appellants’ rights, nevertheless constituted deliberate steps
undertaken for the purpose of interfering with appellants’
attainment of pension eligibility. When so understood, it is

16

clear that the district court's own finding are evincive of
appellants’ satisfaction of their burden to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the plan was infested with
discriminatory intent sufficient to constitute a violation of
ERISA.”

Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing substantive law will properly
preclude the entry of summary judgment under Rule 56(c) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; it is the substantive law's
identification of which facts are critical and which facts are
irrelevant that governs the materiality determination. That is,
while the materiality determination rests on the substantive
law, it is the substantive law's identification of which facts are
critical and which facts are irrelevant that governs. Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 91 L.Ed.2d. 202.

The courts failed to consider that Respondent did not carry
his burden by showing the absence of evidence. Respondent
informed the District Court in the Motion for Summary
Judgement that Delta did not support its Motion with
depositions, interrogatories or admissions on file. What Delta
alleged as admissions on file were alleged admissions in
Delta's files which had not been produced to Plaintiff. These
were not admissions on file with the Court, nor did Delta
produce affirmative evidence. Delta stated in their Motion "At
her deposition, Plaintiff could not point to any facts to support
her claim.” R-1-21-24. A conclusory assertion that Plaintiff
has no evidence is insufficient. Under Rule 56 (c) Delta's
Motion for Summary Judgment was not proper.

The party opposing the motion for summary judgment
bears the burden of responding only after the moving party has

17

met its burden of coming forward with proof of the absence of
any genuine issue of material fact.

The burden of establishing the nonexistence of a ‘genuine
issue’ is on the party moving for summary judgment. This
burden has two distinct components: an initial burden of
production, which shifts to the nonmoving party if satisfied by
the moving party, and an ultimate burden of persuasion, which
always remains on the moving party. The court need not
decide whether the moving party has satisfied its ultimate
burden of persuasion unless and until the court finds that the
moving party has discharged its initial burden of production.

If the burden of persuasion at trial would be on the
nonmoving party, the party moving for summary judgement
may satisfy Rule 56's burden of production in either of two
ways. First, the moving party may submit affirmative
evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving
party's claim. Second, the moving party may demonstrate to
Where the moving party adopts this second option and seeks
summary judgment on the ground that the nonmoving party -
who will bear the burden of persuasion at trial - has no
evidence, th hani
production are somewhat trickier. Plainly, a conclusory
assertion that the nonmoving party has no evidence is
insufficient. Such a ‘burden’ of production is no burden at all
and would simply permit summary judgment procedure to be
converted into a tool for harassment. Rather, as the Court
confirms, a party who moves for summary judgment on the

ground that the nonmoving party has no evidence must

18

confirms, a party who moves for summary judgment on the
ground that the nonmoving party has no evidence must
affirmatively show the absence of evidence in the record. This
may require the moving party to depose the nonmoving party's
witnesses or to establish the inadequacy of documentary
evidence. If there is literally no evidence int he record, the
moving party may demonstrate this by reviewing for the court
the admissions, interrogatories, and other exchanges between
the parties that are in the record. Either way, however,s the
moving party must affirmatively demonstrate that there is no
evidence in the record to support a judgment for the
nonmoving party.

If the moving party has not fully discharged its initial
burden of production, its motion for summary judgment must
be denied, and the court need not consider whether the moving
party has met its ultimate burden of persuasion.

Respondent's proffered reason for termination is a pretext.
mistaken inferences in cases such as this one are especially
costly, because they chill the very conduct that ERISA, in the
instant case, are designed to protect. The evidence on which
the Court of Appeals relied has no relevance to the alleged
ERISA violation. Matsushita v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475, US
574 89 L.Ed2d 538 106 S. Ct. 1348.

Burden of persuasion on plaintiff employees in action
alleging violation of Employee Retirement Income Security Act
section proscribing interference with protected rights did not
require employees to prove that “but for" employer's
consideration of employees’ impending pension eligibility,
employees would have remained at work, but rather, required
oniy proof that “but for" the impermissible consideration,

19

employees would of have lost work. Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, §510, 29 U.S.C.A. $1140.

The plaintiffs’ claim is not that they have been denied their
pensions, but that they have been denied the opportunity to
eventually become entitled to a pension." Gavalik v.
Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834 (3rd Cir. 1987).

To recover under §510, a plaintiff need not prove that "the
sole reason for his (or her) termination was to interfere with
pension rights" Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834
(3rd Cir. 1987).

The Trial Courts findings of fact are governed by the
clearly erroneous standard of review "but as to the legal
component of the conclusion, this Court has plenary review."
Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834 (3rd Cir.
1987).

20
CONCLUSION

Employers must recognize their legal duty under ERISA.
Employment decisions must be undertaken subject to entitled
rights protected under ERISA. Courts must apply the
legislating intent. In order to secure the rights and expectations
brought into being by the Landmark Reform Legislation of
ERISA, it is respectfully submitted that a writ of certiorari be
granted to review the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

LOU C. GOLDSTEIN

249 South Colonial Homes Circle, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30309

(404) 355-0539

PETITIONER
PRO SE

21

INDEX TO APPENDIX

APPENDIX A: Opinion of the Circuit Court
APPENDIX B: Rehearing Decision of the Circuit Court
APPENDIX C: Judgment of the Circuit Court
APPENDIX D: Order of the District Court
APPENDIX E: Judgment of the District Court
APPENDIX F: Order of the District Court

APPENDIX G: Statute, Provision, Policy Involved

A-1
APPENDIX A
DO NOT
PUBLISH

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 87-8951
No. 88-8138
Non-Argument Calendar

D.C. Docket No. 87-8

LOU C. GOLDSTEIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

DELTA AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia

(June 6, 1989)

ee ee ee ee

A-2
Before RONEY, Chief Judge, TIOFLAT and JOHNSON,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff Lou C. Goldstein appeals a summary
judgment for defendant Delta Airlines, Inc.. and the denial
of a motion for reconsideration in Goldstein's action
pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA). Goldstein, a former Delta flight attendant,
contends that the district court erred in granting a summary
judgment and improperly restricting her discovery efforts.
We affirm.

This action is pursuant to the ERISA provisions in 29
U.S.C.A. §§ 1140 and 1141. Section 1140 prohibits,
interalia, discharging and employee for either exercising
her rights under an employee benefits plan or for the
purpose of interfering with her attainment of any rights
under the plan. To establish a cause of action under
ERISA for wrongful termination, the discharged employee
must show that the employer intended to deprive the
employee of ERISA benefits and that this intent was a
motivating factor in the termination. See Gavalik v.
Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 851-52 (ed Cir.),
cert. denied, _—*US.. oe o.Ct.
495, 98 L.Ed.2d 492 (1987).

Since the undisputed facts show that Goldstein was

terminated because she was an undependable employee,
there is no merit to any of her arguments. it is not
necessary to detail all the facts, which are meticulously set
forth in the district court's order and of which the parties

are aware.

Oe eee eee

eee eo ee ae a ee

A-3

Goldstein worked for Delta from October 1966 until it
fired her in March 1981. She missed 29 days of work in
1970, 43 in 1971, 99 in 1972, and 100 in 1975. Delta
suspended her for one month in 1974 and 18 months in
1977 through 1978, for exceeding flight attendant weight
limits. At the time of her discharge in 1981, she had
worked just three months out of the prior four years. She
attributed her absences to chronic flu-like symptoms with
upper respiratory congestion. After she was fired in
1979, Delta granted her request for reinstatement on the
condition that she apply for long-term disability benefits.
She did not receive the disability benefits because a Delta
physician examined her and determined that she was able
to work. Prior to terminating her employment in 1981,
Delta offered to transfer her to a job on the ground. She
declined. Her discharge at age 34 was approximately
three months before the effective date of a change in the
pension plan to allow Delta employees early retirement
benefits at age 52, rather than at 55 as previously allowed.
After her termination, Goldstein requested reinstatement
and admitted that her lack of dependability had caused the
loss of her job.

Viewed in a light most favorable to Goldstein, as must
be done on summary judgment reviews, the evidence
shows that Goldstein was an undependable employee and
that Delta fired her for that reason and not because she
exercised her rights under the employee benefits plan, or
because Delta wanted to prevent the vesting of the new
early retirement benefits. Summary judgment was proper

since there was no genuine issue of material fact and Delta
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Sweat v.

Miller Brewing Co., 708 F.2d 655, 656 (11th Cir. 1983).

A-4

The district court correctly held that Goldstein had no
claim under 29 U.S.C.A. §1141, because only the United
States Attorney General may enforce this provision. See
West v. Butler, 621 F.2d 140, 243-44 (6th Cir. 1980);
Phillips v. Amoco Oil Co., 614 F.Supp. 694, 724 (N.D.
Ala. 1985), affid, 799 F.2d 1464 (11th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1016, 107 S.Ct. 1893, 95 L.Ed.2d 500
(1987).

Goldstein's claim that the district court erred in

limiting discovery also lacks merit. The court entered a
protective order preventing Goldstein from deposing
Ronald Allen, Delta's Board Chairman. The record
shows that Allen did not make the decision to fire
Goldstein, he had no independent recollection of the

BNR RO I a i El Il, LT oer Paitin

events in question, and the information sought from him
was available from the supervisor who fired Goldstein.
The district court has broad discretion in discovery
matters, see Harden v. Adams, 760 F.2d 1158, 1167
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1007, 106 S.Ct. 530,
88 L.Ed.2d 462 (1985), and Fed. R.Civ. P. 26(c)
authorizes it to grant protective orders when warranted.

AFFIRMED

a

|

Sn namie eet it sttahale

APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 87-8951
No. 88-8138

LOU C. GOLDSTEIN,

Plainuff-Appellant,
versus
DELTA AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia

Before RONEY, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT and JOHNSON,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

The Petition(s) for Rehearing are DENIED and no
member. of this panel nor other Judge in regular active
service on the Court having requested that the Court be
polled on hearing in banc (Rule 35, Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure; Eleventh Circuit Rule 35-5), the
Suggestion (s) of Rehearing In Banc are DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Paul H. Roney
United States Circuit Judge

APPENDIX C

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 87-8951 & 88-8138
Non-Argument Calendar

D.C. Docket No. 87-8

LOU C. GOLDSTEIN,

Plainuff-Appellant,
versus
DELTA AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia

Before RONEY, Chief Judge, TIOFLAT and JOHNSON,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
JUDGMENT

These causes came on to be heard on the transcript of
the record from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia, and were taken under
submission by the Court upon the record and briefs on
file, pursuant to Circuit Rule 34-3;

C-2

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOPF, it is now hereby
ordered and adjudged by this court that the judgments of
the said District Court in these causes be and the same are
hereby AFFIRMED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT plaintiff-
appellant pay to defendant-appellee, the costs on appeal to
be taxed by the Clerk of this Court.

Entered: June 6, 1989
For the Court: Miguel J. Cortez, Clerk
By: /s/ David Maland
Deputy Clerk

ISSUED AS MANDATE: _ September 8, 1989

APPENDIX D

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

LOU C. GOLDSTEIN -
VS. : CIVIL NO. C87-8
DELTA AIRLINES, INC.

ORDER

This action seeking damages and reinstaternent under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) is
before the court on Defendant's motion for summary
judgment. Plaintiff, a former flight attendant with Delta
Airlines, claims that she was fired as a pretext in order to
deprive her from receiving benefits under Delta's Family
Care disability and Survivorship Plan and the company's
Family Care Retirement Plan.

Plaintiff was a flight attendant with Delta from
October, 1966 through March 20, 1981. Her performance
record was poor. According to the employee evaluations
attached to Defendant's motion, Plaintiff experienced
chronic problems controlling her weight within acceptable
standards for flight attendants, and also had a very poor
attendance record. !

1 For example, in 1970, she was absent 29 days and
removed from the payroll twice. In 1971, she was out 43
days. In 1972, she was out 99 days. In 1973, when her
attendance record improved, she was cited for substandard
work performance and a poor working attitude.- In 1974,
she was suspended for failure to conform to her weight
restrictions. In 1975, she missed 100 days. In 1977, she
was again placed on weight suspension. Her employment
file contains numerous warnings regarding her attendance
record and weight problems.

D-2

While a portion of Plaintiffs absences were explained
by her ability to take advantage of Delta's generous
vacation benefits and sick leave program, she was
frequently absent due to health problems. Her maladies
ranged from depression to a chronic problem with an
illness of unexplzined origin, which produced cold-like
symptoms, and plagued Plaintiff for over five years.

Delta's Family Care Disability and Survivorship i
Plans, long term and short term, work as follows. An
employee who is too ill to work is given a certain number
of sick leave days during the year. Once these sick leave

days are used up, the employee must apply for short term
disability benefits. In order to obtain short term disability
benefits, the employee must provide a medical certificate
indicating that he or she is incapable of performing his or
her normal work duties. These short term benefits are

generous, but of fixed duration. Once all of an

employee's short term disability leave has been used up,
the employee must either return to work or apply for long
term disability benefits. In order to obtain long term
disability benefits, the employee must provide medical
certification proving that he or she is incapable of
performing any job.

Plaintiff was on short term disability several times
during her career with Delta. The prolonged absence
which culminated in her termination began in November
of 1978. She began taking sick leave at that time, and
exhausted her full-pay sick leave on January 15, 1979.

i

D-3

Plaintiff then filed a claim for short term disability
benefits. Her application was initially denied, however,
this denial was reversed by the administrative
subcommittee set up to review these requests pursuant to
$503 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §1133.

She exhausted this period of short term disability
benefits on May 7, 1979. At that point, she was examined
by a Dr. Whaley on behalf of Delta. He determined that
Plaintiff was capable of performing some occupation.
Delta therefore informed Plaintiff on July 18, 1979 that it
did not appear that she was eligible for long term disability
benefits, although at that time she had not formally filed
such a claim.

Delta generally allows an employee who has been
denied disability 90 days within which to return to work
before deeming the position abandoned. On August 2,
1979, Plaintiff wrote to Jenny Poole, the assistant
manager for in-flight service in Atlanta, and stated that she
felt she would be able to return to work within 90 days
from July 18. In response, Ms. Poole informed Plaintiff
that she would need medical certification covering Plaintiff
for the full period of absence between July 18, 1979, and
the date Ms. Goldstein eventually returned to work. She
stated that such medical certification must be submitted
"prior to your return to active status." On October 8,
Plaintiff again wrote Ms. Poole, and explained that she
would not be able to return to work within the 90 day

period, which expired on October 18. She then asked
whether she needed to submit medical certification, despite

D-4
the fact that Ms. Poole had just advised her that it would
be necessary to do so.

In light of Plaintiff's dismal attendance record, she
was terminated on October 24, 1979. Upon receipt of that
letter, Plaintiff contacted Delta and requested "another
chance," claiming that she was "disabled." Delta agreed to
reinstate her on the condition that she file a claim for long
term disability benefits.

Plaintiff received the forms necessary to file for long
term disability benefits in early December. However, she
delayed filing the request for over three months, finally
submitting the claim form in March of 1980. After
examining the form, Delta determined that she failed to
meet the eligibility requirements for long term disability
and her request for these benefits was denied on April 2,
1980. Another 90 day period was then tolled, and
Plaintiff returned to active flight status on July 1, 1980,
one day before her grace period expired. At that point she
had not flown with Delta for more than 18 months.

During July and August, 1980, Plaintiff flew a total of
17 days. Then, because she managed to accrue certain
vacation and authorized leave benefits during this time,
she took off the entire month of September and the first
three weeks of October. She was scheduled to return to

work on October 26. She called in sick and never
returned.

D-5

On October 16, 1980, Plaintiff again filed for full pay
sick leave. These benefits expired on January 3, 1981.
On January 22, Plaintiff was advised that she must submit
medical certification explaining the necessity for her sick
leave, or face termination. She filed such certification (a
letter from her treating physician) concurrently with an
application for short term disability benefits. The short
term disability claim was initially granted, but payments
were halted after Plaintiff was examined by another
physician on behalf of Delta, Dr. Dennis, who concluded
that there was no reason why Plaintiff could not return to
her customary job.

In February, the in-flight service department
determined that because of her poor dependability,
Plaintiff should be given a ground position.2 She was
offered a ground position and declined it. Soon
afterwards, she was asked for her resignation, and refused
to resign. She was ultimately terminated on March 20,
1981.

Plaintiff claims that Delta's conduct violated §510 and
§511 of ERISA. Section 511 makes it unlawful for any
person to interfere with or prevent the exercise of any right
that an employee may be entitled to under ERISA.

However, the law is clear that this provision does not
provide a private right of action Phillips v. Amoco Oil
Company, 614 F. Supp. 694 (N.D. Ala. 1985), aff'd,
799 F.2d 1464 (lith Cir. 1986). Thus Defendant is
entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

D-6

Plaintiff also c!,ims that Delta's conduct violated §510
of ERISA, which makes it unlawful for any person to
discharge, discipline or discriminate against an ERISA
plan beneficiary for exercising those rights to which the
employee is entitled under the provisions of an employee
benefit plan. It is clear that Plaintiff has completely failed
to provide any evidence in support of this claim. In a case
under §510 of ERISA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
the loss of benefits was not simply a consequence of her
termination; the plaintiff must show that the employer
intended to deprive the employee of ERISA benefits,
and that this intent was a motivating factor
behind the termination. Titsch v. Reliance Group, Inc.,
548 F. Supp. 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) affd, 742 F.2d 1441
(2d Cir. 1983). A mere subjective belief that the
termination was related to an ERISA claim is not enough
to defeat summary judgment. Serb v nier Products
Company Pension Plan and Trust, 658 F. Supp. 6 (E.D.
Mich. 1986). It is obvious that Delta fired Ms. Goldstein
because she was an undependable employee, and Ms.
Goldstein has provided no evidence to the contrary.

2 Federal regulations requiring minimum number of flight
attendants on each flight, and Plaintiffs chronic
absenteeism required that Delta find replacements for her.
It should be noted that :he Disability Plan administrators
who denied her claim are not the same people who were
responsible for the decision to terminate Plaintiff.

D-7

The only argument which Plaintiff presents in support
of her claim is the assertion that Delta had 'decided" to fire
her before she was examined by Dr. Dennis (who
concluded that she was perfectly capable of working).
She bases this claim on the fact that her termination letter
informed her that all short term benefits would be stopped
as of February 19, 1981, the date of her first scheduled
appointment with Dr. Dennis, rather than as of February
27, 1981, the date on which she actually saw Dr. Dennis.
This is absurd. It is obvious that Delta retroactively
decided to make February 19 the cut-off date for short
term disability benefits for administrative reasons. Given
that Ms. Goldstein was not eligible for any short term
disability, Delta could just as easily have cut off her
disability benefits as of January 4, 1981, the day her sick
leave expired. At any rate the six day disparity in in dates
in no way suggests that Delta was trying to deprive Ms.
Goldstein of benefits, or retaliate against her for trying to
claim benefits. 3

3 Plaintiff also argues that Deita violated ERISA by not
giving her another 90 days to retuin to work after she was
denied short term disability. However, Plaintiff never
demonstrates that Delta's policy of considering a position
abandoned after 90 days is in any way connected to an
ERISA-related benefit, nor that Delta terminated her prior
to 90 days after February 27 because it intended to deprive
her of ERISA pian benefits.

: D-8

Finally, Plaintiff claims that she was discharged by Delta
in order to interfere with her ability to obtain early
retirement benefits at age 52 instead of age 55. Apparently
on January 1, 1981, the Delta Family Retirement Plan was
amended to allow early retirement at age 52 instead of age
55, provided that the employee was employed by Delta on
June 1, 1981. Ms. Goldstein has certain vested retirement
benefits, which she wil! receive at age 55. She will not
receive them at age 52 because she was not employed by
Delta on June 1, 1981. However, Plaintiff's argument
that she was intentionally fired by Delta four months
before June 1 for the purpose of depriving her of the
benefits of the amendment to the retirement plan is wholly
unsupported by anything in the record.

Finally, defendant argues that Plaintiff's claim was
barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Given
Plaintiff's complete failure to demonstrate any merit to her
claim, the court declines to address this issue at this time.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter final
judgment for Defendant.

SO ORDERED, this 4 day of November, 1987.

/s/
ORINDA D. EVANS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

LOU C. GOLDSTEIN,

Vv.
DELTA AIRLINES, INC.,
CASE NUMBER C87-8A

JUDGE ORINDA D. EVANS

Decision by Court. This action came for
consideration before the Court. The issues have been
considered and a decision has been rendered granting
defendant's motion for summary judgment.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED hat the plaintiff
take nothing, that the action be dismissed, and that the
defendant, DELTA AIRLINES, INC., recover of the
plaintiff, LOU C. GOLDSTEIN, costs of this action.
FILED IN THE CLERK'S OFFICE
November 5, 1987
ENTERED ON DOCKET

November 6, 1987
LUTHER D. THOMAS, Clerk

By: /s/ B. D. Hatcher

Deputy Clerk
November 5.1987 == |_LUTHERD.THOMAS _
Date Clerk

her
(By) Deputy Clerk

APPENDIX F
FEDERAL STATUTE INVOLVED

EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT
(ERISA)

29 U.S.C. §1140.

I With Righ nder A

SEC. 510. It shall be unlawful for any person to
discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate
against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to
which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee
benefit plan, this title, section 3001, or the Welfare and
Pension Plans Disclosure Act, or for the purpose of
interfering with the attainment of any right to which such
participant may become entitled under the plan, this title, or
the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act. It shall be
unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel,
or discriminate against any person because he has given
informaticn or has testified or is about to testify in any
inquiry or proceeding relating to this Act or the Welfare and
Pension Plans Disclosure Act. The provisions of section
502 shall be applicable in the enforcement of this section.

Title J -- ion of ] nefit Righ
Findings and Declaration of Policy

~- 29 U.S.C. §1002.SEC. 3: For purposes of this title:
(1) The terms “employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare
plan" mean any plan, fund, or program which was
heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an
employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the

extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is

F-2
maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants
or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or
otherwise (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits,
or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability,
death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship
or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship
funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any benefit described
in section 186(c) of this title (other than pensions on
retirement or death, and insurance to provide such
pensions).
lta Famil Disability and Survivorship Plan

Delta's Family Care Disability and Survivorship Plans,
long term and short term, work as follows: An employee
who is too ill to work is given a certain number of sick leave
days during the year. Once these sick leave days are used
up, the employee must apply for short term disability
benefits. In order to qualify for short term disability
benefits, an employee must be unable to perform his
customary occupation. In order to obtain short term
disability benefits, the employee must provide a medical
certificate indicating that he or she is incapable of performing
his or her normal work duties. These short term benefits are
generous, but of fixed duration. Short term disability
benefits are paid for a period of 26 weeks, including the time
an employee received full pay sick leave. As long as the
alleged disability commenced while the employee was
employed, Plan benefits would continue for that period of
disability regardless of the employee's employment status.
Once all of an employee's short term disability leave has

F-3

been used up, the employee must either return to work or
apply for long term disability benefits. In order to obtain
long term disability benefits, the employee must provide
medical certification proving that he or she is incapable of
performing any job. Eligibility for benefits under the
Disability and Survivorship Plan is independent from the
employment status of the employee. Thus, as long as the
alleged disability commenced while the employee was
employed, Plan benefits would continue for that period of
disability regardless of the employee's employment status.

Delta's Sick Leave of Absence Policy provides for leave
without pay for 90 days after benefit denial.

APPENDIX G

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

LOU C. GOLDSTEIN,
CIVIL NO.
VS. : 1:87-cv-8-ODE

DELTA AIRLINES, INC.:

RDER

This ERISA action is before the court on Plaintiff's
motion to proceed pro se, Plaintiffs pro se motion for
reconsideration of this court's order of November 5, 1987;
and Plaintiff's motion to strike Defendant's response to her
motion for reconsideration.

The motion for reconsideration will be denied. It was
untimely filed. Under Local Rule 220-6 for the Northern
District of Georgia such a motion must be filed within ten
days after entry of the order which the party seeks to have
reconsidered. Further, the motion is without merit. Plaintiff
has not presented any argument or evidence to disturb the
court's conclusion that she totally failed to show she was
fired by Defendant in violation of ERISA.

Because Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, thus divesting
this court of jurisdiction on December 7, 1987, the court is
without power to review any further motions filed by

Plaintiff. Accordingly, the same are denied.

G-2
Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is DENIED; the
motion to strike or dismiss Defendant's response to
Plaintiffs motion is DENIED; and Plaintiff's motion to
proceed pro se is DISMISSED AS MOOT. !
SO ORDERED, this_22 day of January, 1988.

AD. EVAN
ORINDA D. EVANS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1 Should Plaintiff wish to proceed pro se on appeal she must
follow the appropriate procedures for doing so according 'o
the Rules of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385020_0845%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.