# Appendix — Grimes v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385020_0721%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Appendix - **Published:** January 1, 1990 - **Citation:** 493 U.S. 1058 ## Text . ; Suprem ' SI-Sug RJ | DEC 4 7989 NO. f] JOser ‘ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM, 1989 KENNETH C. GRIMES PETITIONER VERSUS LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE R. CO. RESPONDENT ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT APPENDIX Date: 12/04/89 Kenneth C. Grimes 621 East Gum Street Evansville, Indiana 47713 1-812-423-1600 if » _ } _oC te VOUNSCL aS FIFO se em eeeesy I J-I K EXHIBITS AND APPENDIX INDEX Date 9/6/89 1/27/89 2/26/89 2/17/88 9/15/87 9/18/86 6/25/86 6/23/86 6/2/86 4/22/86 6/25/85 6/12/85 10/18/84 Title Den rehear app. Affirm Dist Ct. Judge. Cre ci codec eens ow eeeeue of Appeal (Notice).........-. Den Plt Mo To Vacte Cte GORMEE Jac ccccccescesoss Den Den Den Den Supreme Ctrcceceseveecees Order Den Writ of Cert PUDT ORD Glas cccceceewcavess Order of Docket, Supreme Ct....... erry Order Den Rehearing ...eeee Order Aff Dist Ct. Judge, App. Cter.wwseseeee eo Ammend Notice of Appeal.... ct.(Order).. Mot To Conf (Order)..... Suspend of Effect(Order) 15-17 18-25 Rehear Supreme Ct.(Order) 26 Rehear Supreme Ct.(Order) see 29 28 M 10/12/84 N 9/14/84 0 4/24/84 P 3/9/84 Q 2/10/84 R 5/6/82 S 6/13/79 T 6/11/81 U V . x Y 6/11/87 Z 7/9/82 I 7/2/87 II 7/16/87 III 4/9/88 Notice of Appeal.... Order Dist Cout. Order Interloc Appeal, App.~ 3 BOCTCOe OF AOWccicces Order Dist Ct. Order Summary Judge Endsley Da a's ue ee 6 eevnve?e#?e Complaint.... Art III 7th Amend Const, 45 USCS 45 uSCS a GORE kc kc Ret Claim. Bee FUPSS CF) a cevc 153 Second, PELICION C6 COATIFMicccevcce Transcript, of Near Summary were mee CO BISNtS8iccceces PLT ROSDONSC.. cccess PLT Main Appeal Brief...... Page 34 36-51 34+39 54 55-92 207-20! 93-98 181-20 105-101 99 100-10: 101-10: 107-15: 211-21. 152-15 157-16 161-16 Page IV 5/20/88 PLTT Reply Brief, cciccacces 167°k70 V 2/9/89 PLT Rehear Brief. wccccccces 173h9e VI Exhibit (A) Agreement,..... 207-210 VII Exhibit (B) Docket Entries, VIII Exhibit (C) Transcript..... 211-212 IX Exhibit (D) Award.......... 93-98 X NRAB Decision One 153 (M). 180 XI Job Abolishment.......e062- 178 XII Pur 1OGERs 6660020604 ba8ate0n OTe Exhibit F. Affadavit XIV : Exhibit E. Motion to Confirm Exhibit G. Response to Deft Motion to strike Jury Demand mm me EE mE He Fe & & EF " (see Cal. Horn v. Garewitz, 67 Cat, Sptr. 791i, 26% C.A. 26. 255). The 8i¢- trict Court never demonstrated this to being the case, because to do so would be in consis- tant with the finding of seniority rights impairment. Thus in the absence of two suits and a valid final judgment the above case for res- judicata must fail. As shown earlier’ in Plaintiff's main brief confirmation on p. 12 the procedure is not separate, because all controversies grew out of this single unit for specific performance from a arbitration sta- tute and contract. 178 LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY Office of the Master Mechanic Evansville, Indiana Bulletin No. 881 Date March 23, 1981 NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES CONCERNED: The following position(s) will be abolished effective 7:00 AM, March 30, 1981, due to decline in business. Days of Hours of Position Assignment Assignment Electrician Mon. Thru Fri. 7 AM to 3 PM Apprent. off Sat. & Sun. (K.C. Grimes, incumbent) Please be governed accordingly. B. R. Montgomery Master Mechanic cc: Local Chairman--B. E. Knight 179 LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY Office of the Master Mechanic - Evansville, Indiana March 23, 1981 Bulletin No. 882 NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES CONCERNED: The following employee in furloughed effective 7:00 AM, March 30, 1981, due to deadline in business: K.C. Grimes, ID 422219, electrician apprentice, seniority date February 26, 1976. B. R. Montgomery Master Mechanic cc: Bulletin Boards K.C. Grimes Local Chairman 180 NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD 220 SOUTH STATE STREET CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60604 September 11, 1979 . AWARD 7956 L&N-EW Mr. Kenneth C. Grimes 1240 Hatfield Drive Evansville, Indiana Dear Sir: This will acknowledge receipt of your letter, wherein you appeal any and all aspects of Award 7956 that does not make you whole with respect to your wages for the period Sept. 21, 1976 to July 20, 1979. Please be advised that the Railway Labor Act, Section 3 First (m) states in part "*** the awards shall be final and binding upon both parties to the dispute ***," Very truly yours, Executive Secretary National Railroad Adjustment Board By Order of Second Division rb By /S/ Rosemarie Brasch Rosemarie Brascnh Administrative Assistant 181 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA EVANSVILLE DIVISION KENNETH C. GRIMES, Plaintif£ *VS. CAUSE NO. EV 81-130-C LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY and LOCAL 1353, INTERNATIONAL) BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL) WORKERS, ) Defendants ) COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF I. JURISDICTION 1. This action presents special Federal Questions and is instituted _ pursuant to 28 USC § 1331(b), 28 USC § 1343(1) and 28 usc § 1343(4). Jurisdiction is founded upon Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, June 23, 1947, c. 121, Title III, Section 301, 61 Stat. 156, as amended; Section 151 et seq. of the Railway Labor Act. 1934, 48 Stat. 1185, 45 USC § 151 Chapter 8, as amended; Title VII — 182 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, 42 USC § 2000e et seq.; and 42 USC § 1985, without respect to the amount in controversy and without regard to the citizenship of the parties. II. NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 2. This is a proceeding for back pay and benefits, a Declaratory Judgment as to the Plaintiff's rights and for a permanent injunction enjoining the Defendants from retaliating against the Plaintiff in violation of Section 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC § -2000e-3(a), discriminating against the Plaintiff because of his race or color with respect to his job classification, seniority status, apprenticeship status, assignments, promotions, and terms, conditions and privileges of employment and from conspiring together to do so. 3. This is also an action 183 Brought by an employee wrongfully discharged from his employment by his employer, Louisville and and Nashville Railroad Company (hereinafter "Company") in violation of the collective bargaining agreement then in force and for violations continuing to occur with respect to that employee sibaainnwkte. 4. This is also an action being brought by an employee union member againast his collec- tive bargaining representative, Local 1353, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, (hereinafter "Union") for failure of the “Union” to fairly and lawfully represent this employee. III. THE PARTIES Se The Plaintiff is a Black Male individual residing in the City of Evansville, County of Vanderburgh, State of Indiana who at all times material to this 184 claim was employed by the defendant, "Company" or was a wrongfully discharged employee of the "Company" and was a member of the "Union". 6. The Defendant, Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company" (Company") is a corporation maintaining its principal place of business at 908 West Broadway, Louisville, Kentucky 40203 and is doing business in the State of Indiana. Fe Defendant "Company" is an employer within the meaning of 42 USC 2000e-(b), 45 USC Sec. 151 and is engaged as a carrier within the meaning of 45 USC Sec. 151 in an industry affecting interstate commerce within the meaning of 42 USC Sec. 2000e-(h), and has maintained fifteen (15) or more employees at all times relative to this action. 8. Defendant, Local 1353, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers ("Union") is an unincorporated association, maintaining a principal place of business at 6804 Tropic Court, Louisville, Kentucky 40291. 185 9. Defendant, "Union" has at all times relevant to this action, a total membership of over twenty-five (25) employees and is the bargaining representative for, and has entered into a collective bargaining agreement with Defendant "Company" concerning the terms and conditions of employment of railway employees working out of the Howell Yards in the City of Evansville, Indiana. 10. Defendant, "Union" is a labor organi- zation within the meaning of 42 USC Sec. 2000e-(d) and is a named defendant herein as a necessary party pursuant to Rule 19(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS Bie Beginning on February 26, 1976 and continuing until September 21, 19/76, the Plaintiff was an employee of the Defendant "Company" and a dues-paying member of Defen- dant "Union". 192 (a) that the penalty of dismissal under the circumstances was excessive, (b) that the Claimant (Plaintiff herein) was to be reinstated to service with his seniority rights unimpaired, but (c) denied him compensation for the three years lost wages and benefits since the date of his dismissal; such decision was the final step in the administrative remedies required to be exhausted under the guidelines established by the "Agreement” and the Railway Labor Act. 24. From September 22, 1976, when the Plaintiff was wrongfully suspended and later discharged, until July 9, 1979, when the Plaintiff was reinstated to service, Plaintiff was unable to obtain other employment and received no income. 25. When Plaintiff was reinstated to employment with the "Company", said reinstatement was to a Classification and pay scale which were inferior to the 186 12. During most of this period, Plaintiff was an Apprentice Electrician, Upgraded, and was the only Black male in 16. On the occasion of his suspension and his discharge and at all relevant times herein, Plaintiff, in each instance immed- iately advised Defendant "Union" of his grievances and requested that they enforce his rights under the “Agreement", 34% Although "Union" provided Plaintiff with representation at his discharge hearing, said representation was of poor quality by a Union Stweard who was unprepared and was admittedly without experience and training. ‘e. Despite Plaintiff's requests to the "Union", Plaintiff discovered that only by applying constant pressure upon the "“Union" officials did the "Union" react by pursuing the initial steps of the above-described contractual grievance procedure. 187 _his classification who was assigned to the Howell yards located in Evansville, Indiana. 13. During the period of Plaintiff's employement and subsequent thereto, Plaintiff was subject to the terms, conditions and provisions of a Collective Bargaining Agreement between "Company" and "Union" dated September l, 1943, with revisions thereto, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto and marked "Exhibit A", hereinafter referred to as "Agreement", which includes the following sections: Rule 39(£) which provides that : "An apprentice shall not be dismissed except for just and sufficient cause before completing his apprenticeship.” Rule 34 which provides that : "No employee shall be disciplined without a fair hearing by designated officers of the carrier...." And that: "If it is found that an employee has 188 been unjustly suspended or dismissed from service such employee shall be reinstated with his seniority rights unimpaired, and compensated for wage loss, if any, resulting from said suspension or dismissal." Rule 29(a) which provides that: "Seniority of each employee covered by this agreement will begin from the date and time the employee starts to work." Rule 26(a) which provides that: "When it becomes necessary to reduce expenses, the force at any point or in any department shall be reduced, seniority as per Rule 29 to govern...." 14. On or about September 22, 1976, Plaintiff had a minor altercation With one L. J. Fieber, his temporary Supervisor, over the installation of a switch. On that date, Plaintiff was unlawfully and unjustifiably suspended. 15. On or about September 27, 1976, the Defendant "Company" terminated Plaintiff's employment and advised the Plaintiff that he was being discharged for insubordination. 19. 189 Despite the fact that the Plaintiff was suspended from service on September 22, 1976, and dismissed on anna ail 190 September 27, 1976, and despite Plaintiff's continuing pursuit of this matter and continuing pressure on the "Union", the Plaintiff's appeal did not come before the National Railroad Adjustment Board until almost three (3) years after the incident, though such appeal should have been heard within nine (9) months from the date of the last denial by the "Company". 20. This unlawful delay which caused substantial hardship on the Plaintiff's already overburdened financial condition was in no way caused by or at the instance of the Plaintiff; rather, this _ delay was caused by or instigated, either solely or jointly by the "union" and/or the "Company" to further damage the Plaintiff and deprive him of his rights. 21. Despite Plaintiff's protestations to the "Union" that these delays and improper representation were greatly endangering the health and 191 well-being of the Plaintiff and his family, who, without the Plaintiff's income, were able to "enjoy" only the barest necessities of life, "Union" took no action to pursue the timely resolution of Plaintiff's grievance. 22. Following the procedure set forth in the "Agreement" in Article V of Appendix D thereto and the Railway Labor Act (45 USC § 151 et seq.), the Plaintiff timely pursued his administrative remedies, culminating in his appeal before the Second Division of the National Railroad Adjustment Board in June, 1979. 23. That on or before the 13th day of June, 1979, almost three (3) years after his wrongful dismissal, the National Railroad Adjustment Board, Second District, rendered a Decision and Award, numbered 7956, Docket No. 7776, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto and marked "Exhibit B"; said Board's decision being: 495 position and pay scale which he had held prior to his wrongful discharge, in violation of Section 34 of the "Agreement" ("Exhibit A" hereto) and contrary to the Award of the National Railroad Adjustment Board. 26. Plaintiff's reinstatement was in an inferior position on the seniority roster and apprenticeship program; employees hired later than Plaintiff were in higher positions and were promoted over Plaintiff, in direct violation of Section 29(a) of the "Agreement" and the Award of the National Railroad Adjustment Board. 27. Defendant "Union" again failed to represent the Plaintiff in pursuit of his seniority rights under the "Agreement" and under the terms of Award of the National Railroad Adjustment Board, damaging Plaintiff further. 28. On or about March 16, 1981, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination 194 against the Defendant "Company" with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging that the Defendant "Company" had discriminated against the Plaintiff because of his race. Thereafter, the "Company" retaliated against the Plaintiff for having ‘£ilea such charge by, on March 30, 1981, unlawfully and maliciously laying off the Plaintiff, the only Black in the trade and 29. At the date of filing, Plaintiff is still laid off, and the Defendant "Union" continues to fail to represent the interests of the Plaintiff, damaging him still further. V. PLEADING PARAGRAPH 1 The Plaintiff, for his first claim, alleges: 30. Paragraph One through Twenty-Nine are hereby incorporated in and made a part of Pleading Paragraph l. 31. The suspension and discharge z the only person to be so furloughed. .Of the Plaintiff by the Defendant 195 "Company", as well as their reinstatement of Plaintiff in an inferior position and at an inferior salary, respect to his position and salary at date of discharge and his subsequent layoff represent direct blatant violations and breaches by Defendant "Company" of the aforesaid "Agreement", and especially of Rule 39(f) relating to discharge, Rule 34 relating to discipline and reinstatement, Rule 29(a) relating to seniority, and Rule 26(a) relating to layoffs. VI. PLEADING PARAGRAPH 2 The Plaintiff, for his second Claim, alleges: | 32. Paragraphs One through twenty-Nine are hereby incorporated and made a part of Pleading Paragraph 2. 33. The arbitrary and bad faith failure of the Defendant "Union" to fairly, adequately, and competently, properly and timely reprsent Plaintiff without bias, in 196 regard to his unlawful suspension, discharge and furlough, and to remedy the inequity apparent in the manner of his reinstatement represent blatant and willful breaches of the Defendant "Union's" duties to fairly represent the Plaintiff, which duties arise under and constitute a violation of the statutory mandate of the National Labor Relations Act and of the "Agreement". Vil. PLEADING PARAGRAPH 3 The Plaintiff, for his third Claim, alleges: 34. Paragraphs One through Twenty-Nine are hereby incorporated and Made a part of Pleading Paragraph 3. 35. The unlawful and discriminatory employment practices of the Defendants, and each of them, have deprived the Plaintiff of the same right to employment opportunities as are enjoyed by white persons. Such practices are 197 degrading to the Plaintiff and cause him and his family severe financial, mental and emotional distress. Such practices of invidious racial discrimination against the Plaintiff serve to stigmatize him solely on the basis of his race. 36. The racially discriminatory employment practices of the Defendants and their retaliation toward the Plaintiff were undertaken by the Defendants, and each of them, consciously, intentionally, and maliciously for the invidious purpose of discriminating against the Plaintiff due to his race, and had as their object to deprive him of his civil right to equal Opportunity in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. VIII. PLEADING PARAGRAPH 4 The Plaintiff, for his fourth Claim, alleges: 37. Paragraphs One through Twenty-Nine are hereby incorporated and 198 Twenty-Nine are hereby incorporated and made a part of Pleading Paragraph 4. 38. The racially discriminatory practices of Defendants, and each of them, as described herein, as well as the retaliation of "Company" combined with "Union's" failure to defend and protect Plaintiff's rights therefrom, were undertaken consciously, intentionally and maliciously for the invidious purpose of discriminating against the Plaintiff solely on the basis of race. 39. The practices and policies of the Defendants "Union" and “Company” constitute a conspiracy, the intentional and malicious object thereof being to deprive Plaintiff of his civil rights to equal employment opportunity at the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company. 40. Each of the unlawful employment practices, as described herein and the retaliation against Plaintiff 1 ee ee 199 herein, were implemented intentionally by Defendants, and each of them, in furtherance of this unlawful conspiracy, causing irreparable injury to Plaintiff, including, but not Tre to: loss of equal promotional opportunity, salary, wages, fringe benefits and pension differentials, as well as causing extreme emotional anguish and mental distress to Plaintiff. IX. PLEADING PARAGRAPH 5 The Plaintiff, for his fifth claim, alleges: 41. Paragraphs One through Twenty-Nine are hereby incorporated and made a part of Pleading Paragraph 5. 42. Pleading Paragraph 5 is an Appeal pursuant to 45 USC § 151 et seq., from the Award of the National Railroad Adjustment Board, Second Division, numbered 7956, Docket No. 7776 ("Exhibit B" herein) insofar as it denies Plaintiff compensation 200 for lost wages, benefits and increments from September 22, 1976, through July 7, 1979. 43. The National Railroad Adjustment Board found that there were mitigating and extenuating circumstances such as the relative lack of experience of both parties to the underlying incident and that, this being the case, "the discipline of dismissal was excessive...” 44. Having made said findings, the National Railroad Adjustment Board, in a decision contrary to the evidence, proceeded to impose a harsh, unfair, and discriminatory penalty upon the Plaintiff by failing to compensate him for his thirty-seven (37) months without wages or benefits and during which time he suffered extreme financial, mental and emotional distress. 45. Section 34 of the "Agreement" ("Exhibit A" hereto) provides a specific, 201 definite and exclusive remedy for unjust Suspension or dismissal of an employee as set forth in Rhetorical Paragraph 13 herein. 46. The Order of the National Railroad Adjustment Board denying Plaintiff compensation for thirty-seven (37) months of losses, in direct contradiction of its own findings as well as of the mandates of the Railway Labor Act (45 USC § 151 et seq.) is excessive, harsh, discriminatory, arbitrary, capricious and is in complete disregard for the bargained-for explicit - and unambiguous provisions of the "Agreement" ("Exhibit A" herein). X. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT 47. Plaintiff has complied with all conditions precedent to all causes of action herein. XI. IRREPARABLE INJURY 48. The Plaintiff has no total, plain, adequate or complete remedy at law 202 to redress the wrongs alleged herein and a suit for back-pay and benefits, and injunctive and declaratory judgment is his only means for securing adequate relief. Plaintiff is now suffering and continues to suffer irreparable injury from the Defendant's unlawful practices as set forth herein unless enjoined by this Honorable Court. XII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays that the Court: A. Enter a Declaratory Judgment that the practices of the Defendants "Company" and "Union", in the acts, practices, policies and procedures complained of herein have violated and continue to violate the rights of Plaintiff as secured by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 USC § 2000e et seq., and 42 USC §1985(3). B. Grant to the Plaintiff a 203 preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining the Defendants and their agents, Successors, employees, attorneys and other representatives acting in their behalf, from engaging in any employment practice or policy which discriminates against the Plaintiff on the basis of his race. C. Order that a preliminary and permanent injunction issue directing that Defendant "Company" comply with the decision of the National Railroad Appeals Board and restore to him all of his seniority rights and apprenticeship status unimpaired, and directing full and complete compliance with the said decision and award as to those provisions. D. Enter a Declaratory Judgment, vacating, setting aside and declaring void and unenforceable that section of the Award of the National Railroad Adjustment Board, number 7956, Docket No. 7776, insofar as it constitutes an excessive penalty and that 204 it unjustly, arbitrarily and discriminately denies to Plaintiff his lost wages, benefits and increments for the period from Setpember 22, 1976, until July 9, 1979. E. Grant to the Plaintiff a judgment against the Defendant "Company" for all wages, benefits and increments which the Plaintiff would have received had he not been unlawfully terminated; reimbursement for loss of promotional opportunity, apprenticeship experience and education, and other benefits which he might have received had he not been discriminated against. F. Grant to the Plaintiff compensatory damages in the amount of One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00), and punitive damages in the amount of Three Million Dollars ($3,000,000.00). a G. Allow to Plaintiff an allowance and reimbursement for all attorney fees and expenses occasioned by 205 policies and practices, and Plaintiff's costs herein. H. Grant to Plaintiff such further and alternative relief as the Court i Defendant's deliberate and malicious shall deem just and reasonable in the premises. Respectfully Submitted, KENNETH C. GRIMES Ey KATHARINE VAN OST Attorney for Plaintiff | _ Plaintiff respectfully requests fe by jury of those issues triable toa oh in this action. Respectfully Submitted, $ KENNETH C. GRIMES ; KATHARINE VAN OST f _ 1018 Southern Securities Bldg. 329 Main Street Walkway Evansville, Indiana 47708 i Telephone: 812/242-3518 Attorney for Plaintiff | 3/26/82 4/2/82 5/3/82 5/5/82 5/6/82 207 Deft. IBEW Local 1353 fi Motion for Summary Judgment, Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Mction for Summary Judgment; c/s Deft., L & N RR Company, fi Motion for Summary Judgment, Memorandum in Support thereof and c/s. — Deft. also tenders Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Deft., Internat'] Brotherhood of Elect. Workers Local 1537 fi mo. to Strike Jury Demand; Memorandum in Support thereof and c/s. Deft., L & N RR Co., fi Joinder in mo. of deft., Internat'l Brotherhood of Elect. Workers Local 1537, to Strike Jury Demand; Memorandum in Support thereof and c/s. Mag. Endsley enters order on pre- trial held 4/5/82. In light of the pitf's counsel's Mo. to withdraw her appearance for the plitf., the Court granted the plitf. until 5/5/82 to fi a response to deft. L & N was granted until 5/11/82 to fi a reply to pitf's response to deft L & N's Mo. for Summary Judgment. By agreement of parties the Court ORDERED and DECREED that the pltf taken nothing by way of VII Pleading | Pd 6/16/82 6/25/82 7/9/82 208 Para. 3 of Complaint with respect to the deft., Local 1353, etc. and that said deft. recover its costs laid out and expended with respect to said Count of plitf's complaint. Discovery to be completed by 10/5 except for the purpose of taking depositions for the purpose of trial. Deft., Local 1353, renewed its objection to pltf's request to trial by jury with respect to VI Pleading Para. 2 alleging breach of Union's duty of fair representation, it was agreed and the Court ordered that the pltf. respond within 15 days to said deft's objection to Request for trial by jury and in the event the parties could not agree, the Union was ordered withing 30 days to fi a brief in support of its position on its objection to the Request for Trial by Jury on VI pleading Para. 2. cc: attys. and plitf. Pitt. 1 Meo. fer ext. of time tn which to respond to motion of deft L & N Railroad Co. for Summary Judgment and mo. of deft., Local 153 to Strike Jury Demand; c/s. Pitf. fi Response to Defts' Mo. to Strike Jury Demand; c/s. Hearing held on defts' motion for Summary judgment as to Counts 1,3,4 and 5 of the complaint. Arguments of 2/10/82 6/22/84 7/26/84 209 counsel are heard. Defts. enter motion to strike jury claim, Court to rule on these matters. Court enters Order and Memorandum on defts' Motion for Summary Judgment. Court GRANTS Mo for summ judg. as to appeal of decision of National Railroad Adjustment Board. Court GRANTED summ. judg as to para. one in favor of deft. Railroad; summ judge as to para. two GRANTED in favor of deft Union; summ judg as to para three GRANTED in favor of Union. With regard to deft Railroad, motion GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plitf may pursue against Railroad only - on ~his claim of retailiation in violation of Title VII, 42 USC 2000 et seq.; Summ judg. as to para. four GRANTED in favor of both defts.; summ judge as to para. five GRANTED in favor of deft. Railroad. cc:attys 0.B. Vol. 18, P. 1 Entered 2/13/84 Pitf. fi Response to Strike Demand For Jury Trial; c/s, PIitf. also fi Amended List of Witnesses and Exhibits;c/s Preceding commencement of trial, pretrial conf. is conducted in Chambers. nna qgaegaFt@GG Gt Gg 210 7 26-FY Comes now parties, pltf appearing pro se and deft by counsel, stating they are ready to proceed, trial of cause is commenced without intervention of . —— oe LUCY. Evidence on behalf of piltf is com- menced and concluded. Pitf rests. Deft orally moves for directed verdict. Court takes matter under advisement. Evidence on behalf of deft is com- menced and concluded. Deft rests. Deft orally renews motion for directed verdict. Court will rule on this matter. Court is adjourned. 211 THE COURT: Do one of you want to say something about the jury trial while you are here? MR. WOLLY; Actually, we have pending before, Your Honor, a motion to strike the jury demand on the duty of fair representation claim. I would note for the Court before addressing that, that I don't think there is any dispute that there is no entitlement to a trial by jury on the Title VII claim. We do not dispute the entitlement to a jury on the 1985 claim. I was mistaken when I referred to it as a 1981 claim earlier in this argument here. It is indeed a 1985 claim. On the duty of fair representation claim, I think we have addressed that now in our briefs, the cases that we have relied on here and to expand on it would be merely reading those cases to Your Honor, and I don't feel it is necessary. 212 THE COURT: Do you have anything further on that, Mr. White? MR. WHITE: No, I don't have, Your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Stayman, do you want to say anything on that? MR. STAYMAN: No, Your Honor. I think the briefs are adequate - more than adequate. i. —_— E TCAT MATELIN The undersigned, counselor pro se, hereby certifies that he caused to mailed, postage pre-paid, first class, personally served, on this 4h day December, 1989, tne following covies this Appendix: Forty (40) covies to Clerk, United States Supreme Court Washinoton, D.C. 20543; and Three (3) copies to Attorney Galen J. White, Jr. Boenl, Stopher, Graves & Deindoerior United Kentucky Bank Bldg. One Riverfront Plaza Louisville, Ky. 40202 Telephone 1-502-589-5980; Three (3) copies to ‘Attorney F. Wesley Bowers Bowers, Harrison, Kent & Miller Fourth Floor, Permanent Savings Bldc Evansville, Ind. 477C8 Telephone 1-822-426-1231. Ca anneth C. Grimes, ©21 East Gum Street >ro o@812~423-16CU -_ ~ | ’ a — hs Counsel 25 Pro S2 be or of se Svansville, indiana 47713 --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385020_0721%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.