# Opposition Brief — American Cyanamid Co. v. O'Neil

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1990
- **Citation:** 493 U.S. 1071

## Text

No. 89-843

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1989

a

AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPAS
AND ROHM & HAAS COMP

JAMES E. O'’NEIL, IN: HIS ¢
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR

RHODE ISLAND

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIRST CIRCUIT

.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSTEION

() 1d

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Court should review the decision of
the Court below holding the Petitioners jointly and sever-
ally liable for the State’s indivisible and unapportionable
hazardous waste clean up cost pursuant to the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Lia-
bility Act (“CERCLA” or “Superfund Law”), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601 et seq.

2. Whether the Court should review the decision of
the Court below which requires that the Petitioners bear
the burden of proving their claim that their joint and
several liability for the State’s hazardous waste clean up
costs is divisible and apportionable among the liable
parties.

3. Whether the Court should review the finding of
fact by the Court below that the haphazard commingling
of various unidentified toxic wastes in undeterminable
quantities caused indivisible environmental harm at the
subject hazard waste dump site.

4. Whether the Court below by its decision to
implement the Superfund Law consistent with the deci-
sions of this Honorable Court and the law as expressed
by other circuits, violated the Ex Post Facto and Due
Process Clauses of the United States Constitution.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ......csscasccssassuasssct i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......cccssncscesscssses iii

STATEMENT OF CASE ........seeccsesncassssnsees 2

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT...........-. 8
I. Review of the alleged inequities of CERCLA would

be premature at this time. ...........005500055 8

Il. The sole Constitutional issue which the Petitioners
present for review is limited to the question of the
constitutionality of the State's efforts to recover
hazardous waste site clean up costs incurred prior
to the enactment of the Superfund Law in 1980
and, thus, is not an issue which is an important

and recurring problem. ...........000000eeeees 12

III. The decision of the Court below is consistent with the
law as expressed by other courts of appeals........ 15
CONCLUSION ........0500005056 05 0N nnn 18

APPENDICES

Appendix RA: Consent Agreement of The State of Rhode
Island and the United States with Rutgers,
The State University of New Jersey... ..RA-1

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
Cases
American Cyanamid v. King Industries, C.A. No.
Ne ee Capac eee casancscscccescs 11
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S.
EE OP TETTCL UTE ETE TEET TET TEE 17
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co.,
EE 13, 14
Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987)............. 17
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802
6 Mn a Seas aa cacasscansasaccess 8, 15
United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F.
ne 17
United States v. Medley, 25 ERC 1315 (D.S.C. 1986) .... 16
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 109 S.Ct. 3156
EE CECE A nec dccandacccsavacces 13, 15, 16, 17
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, __ U.S. __, 108 S.Ct. 146 (1987)....... 13, 14
United States v. Tyson, 25 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA)
Ee eee 17
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Company 428 US. 1
EMER EMG D ks Ss cas0ascasesecccccecese 13, 14
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981)................ 17

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES —- Continued

Page

STATUTES
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-

pensation and Liability Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et

Seer errr rr er rrrrer rrr errr Try oe passim
Ge RR. I Kio civic cecnccdsntscinciicgune 7, 8, 14
GE TAA, Be hoki c co ncanncccccacccceceuaaciesnss 8
GB ULB, © FRI a nse cc ccccnconsccncencaseusccesens 6
git i ott Go PPEETETeCOTeTIvTr eric TT or 11
GE UE, BTR 66 kn vnc caciccecncccecctucebaces 9
G2 UGA. © SED «on nn cccccccnccevcwnscvecaspaneaes 4
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act

(“SARA”), 100 Stat. 1613 (1986)..............5-008. 8
Diath CER <x vn ve acecdcndgnceevectutrenantahaks 9
CONGRESSIONAL MATERIAL
131 Cong. Rec. $11586 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1986)...... 9
131 Cong. Rec. $12021 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1986)..... 11
132 Cong. Rec. H9563 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986)........ 9
132 Cong. Rec. H9624 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986)........ 9
S. Rep. 96-848, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess...............+- 14
H.R. Rep. 99-253, 99th Cong. Ist Sess., Part 3....... 10

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A (1965) ........ 15

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433(B)({2) (1965)..... 15

No. 89-843

.
» 2

In The

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1989

,
—_

AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPANY AND ROHM &
HAAS COMPANY,

Petitioners,

JAMES E. O’NEIL, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY
GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND,

Respondent.

,*%
4

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

.
—

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

a.
-

Respondent James E. O’Neil in his capacity as Attor-
ney General for the State of Rhode Island hereby objects
to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari presented by Ameri-
can Cyanamid and Rohm & Haas Company and prays
that the Writ be denied.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The facts of the case are stated fully in the opinion of
the Court of Appeal for the First Circuit (Petitioners’
Appendix A) which is reported at 883 F.2d 176 and the
opinion of the District Court for the District of Rhode
Island (Petitioners’ Appendix B) which is reported at 682
F.Supp. 706. Nevertheless, the State feels compelled to
correct certain portions of the statement of the case as set
forth in the Petition.

The Petitioners correctly point out that a number of
settlements were reached prior to trial on this matter.
Petition at 7. The Petitioners’ description of these settle-
ments, however, tends to create a misimpression. Peti-
tioners dwell on the settlement which was reached with
the Capuano defendants whom the State believed could
have been shown to be liable for damages as transporters
of some of the hazardous materials to the Picillo Site.
That settlement required payment of Two Million
($2,000,000.00) Dollars to both the State and the Federal
Governments by the Capuanos.

Although the Capuano settlement was the largest
cash settlement, the most substantial settlement agree-
ment was dismissed by the Petitioners with a curt refer-
ence to “an agreement by jsettlors) to undertake soil
removal activities at the site”. Petition at 7. The agree-
ment to which the Petitioners are referring was part of a
settlement entered into by four defendants who, like the
Petitioners, generated hazardous waste materials which
were linked to the Picillo Site. The four settling genera-
tors agreed to accomplish, under governmental supervi-
sion, the remaining surface clean up at the site. The

government estimated the cost of this undertaking by the
settlors to be at least Three Million Five Hundred Thou-
sand ($3,500,000.00) Dollars. The four generators, General
Electric Company, Ashland Chemical Company, GAF
Corporation, and Monsanto Company, were also required
to pay an additional One Hundred Thousand
($100,000.00) Dollars to the governments as part of the
settlement. Thus, pre-trial settlements totalled Five Mil-
lion Eight Hundred Thousand ($5,800,000.00) Dollars-
Two Million Three Hundred Thousand ($2,300,00.00) Dol-
lars in cash for past costs incurred by the state and
federal governments, and Three Million Five Hundred
Thousand ($3,500,000.00) Dollars in services.

The Petitioners observe that “[sleveral of the genera-
tors who settled were not de minimis parties ... .” Id. In
fact, only one defendant in this action was determined to
have de minimis status pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §9622(g).
That party, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey,
settled for a cash payment to the state and the federal
governments of Fifty Thousand ($50,000.00) Dollars.
Respondent's Appendix (RA). Rutgers was the only
defendant to settle as a de minimis party; it contributed
only one container of hazardous material to the site and
that material had been placed in a larger container and
both containers were found intact. Thus, the amount of
hazardous substances contributed to the Site by Rutgers
and the toxic or hazardous effects of the hazardous subs-
tance contributed to the Site by Rutgers are minimal.
RA-3.

Petitioners inaccurately described themselves as de
minimis contributors to the Picillo Site. Petition at i, 9,
10-12, and 16-17. De minimis status is conferred upon

i

parties only by a determination by the President through
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency. 42 U.S.C. §9622(g). As to the Petitioners, there
could be no finding of de minimis status. A determination
as to de minimis status is made by weighing the cumula-
tive effect of a defendant's contribution to the hazardous
waste facility. Each defendant's contribution is consid-
ered in light of the other hazardous substances at the site.
It is common sense that even though materials may be
hazardous independently, combining them may cause a
substantially different environmental impact.

At the Picillo Site, there was a commingling of
numerous, unidentified toxic materials. The Petitioners
contributed experimental herbicides, insecticides, and
pesticides produced by their research laboratories It
would be technologically impossible to determine each
party’s individual share of the cumulative harm caused
by the haphazard disposal of various toxic quantities
given the synergistic effects which these materials
undergo. In addition, we must further complicate our
calculations of individual contributions by extrapolating
what effect might be caused by the extreme heat which
was generated by the huge conflagration which burned
out of control for days in one of the chemical lagoons at
the site.

Finally, the volumetric contributions which Peti-
tioners brandish are only those barrels which were “pos-
itively attributed” to them. App. 11a; 883 Fed.2d at 182.
The Court below noted that the Petitioners each gener-
ated more than Two Thousand (2,000) barrels of wastes
and each Petitioner had consigned all of its hazardous

. | | ee

material to a single transporter. “Under these circum-
stances where [Petitioners were] entrusting a substantial
amount of waste to a single transporter who ultimately
proved unreliable, we simply cannot conclude absent
evidence to the contrary, that only a handful of the 2,000
or more barrels reached the Site.” App. 13a; 883 F.2d at
182-183. Under these circumstances, the United States
was not as brazen as the Petitioners to blindly proclaim
the effect of Petitioners’ contribution to the Site to be de
minimis.

Petitioners also attempt to win the sympathy of the
Court by a partial recitation of select portions of the
findings of fact by the trial court as to Petitioners’ role in
generating the subject toxic materials. Petition at 3.

For example, they fail to include the trial court's
finding that “it is not at all clear that American Cyanamid
was as vigilant as it contends.” App. 29a; 682 F.Supp. at
723. “American Cyanamid”, the trial court found,

had an exclusive contract with the Chemical
Control Facility to handle all of its hazardous
waste, including its PCB waste. It continued to
utilize the services of this organization despite
the oe of an excessive number of drums
on the Chemical Corporation site, which in the
words of Ralph Wainwright who, as an Ameri-
can Cyanamid Company’s supervisor of indus-
trial hygiene and safety, was responsible for
dis 1 of waste, “bothered everybody.” In
addition, American Cyanamid Company made
no further inquiries concerning Chemical Con-
trol despite the fact that Mr. Wainwright was
aware of an incident in which Chemical Control
was linked to barrels of waste which had been
ey disposed of on a vacant lot in New-
ark, New Jersey. App. 49a; 682 F.Supp. at 723.

i

Additionally, Petitioner Rohm & Haas has failed to
note that in uncontradicted testimony before the trial
court, the State established that although Rohm & Haas
attempted to remove some of its barrels from the Site, it
did not remove all of its hazardous materials, allowing
some of its waste to leak into the soil and commingle with
other waste. App. 45a; 682 F.Supp. at 721.

The Respondent must also contest the Petitioners’
claim that “neither Rohm & Haas nor American Cya-
namid consigned any waste materials from their research
facilities to the Picillo property for disposal either directly
or indirectly.” Petition at 3. This precise claim was raised
by the Petitioners before the trial court. A party may
escape liability under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA” or —
“Superfund Law”), 42 U.S.C. §9601 et seq., by demonstrat-
ing that the act or omission linking the party to a hazard-
ous waste site was “caused solely” by the act or omission
of a third-party with whom the defendant does not have
“a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly.”
42 U.S.C. §9607(b) (emphasis added). The trial court spe-
cifically addressed this claim by the Petitioners and
found that the third-party defense was unavailable to
them because: :

The simple fact is that during the time the

defendants consigned their waste to licensed

disposers, some of that waste, in identifiable
containers, came to rest at the Picillo site. The
defendants’ argument that there was no evi-
dence linking the disposers to the site or that the
defendants had any relationship with whomever
actually deposited the waste there simply con-

fuses the nature of its burden under the third-
party defense. App. 60a; 682 F.Supp. at 728.

The third-party defense is an affirmative defense in
support of which the Petitioners offered no evidence.
“Absent any evidence along these lines,” the trial court
concluded “. . . . it is equally likely that either the
licensed disposers or a subcontractor of the disposers
deposited the waste at the site.” Id. There is no support in
the record for the Petitioners’ assertion of the absence of
their direct or indirect responsibility for the disposal of
their hazardous waste at the Picillo Site.

Similarly, Respondent takes exception to the Peti-
tioners’ characterization of that portion of the judgment
of the Court below that imposes liability on the Peti-
tioners for response costs for the clean up of groundwater
which may be required at the Site. Contrary to Peti-
tioners’ representation, the judgment does not make
“Petitioners liable for a blank check on the basis of no
evidence”. Petition at 22.

As the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit noted in response to Petitioners’ claim:

If after conducting the necessary tests, the gov-
ernment concludes that there was in fact no
harm to the area’s groundwater, then appellants
will have nothing to worry about. Moreover, the
district court ruled that under Section 107 of the
Act [42 U.S.C. § 9607], the State may take only
such measures as are cost-efficient. Appellants,
therefore, will have an opportunity to challenge
the State’s chosen remedial measures at the
appropriate time. App. 14a; 883 F.2d at 183.

Such a judgment can hardly be called a “blank
check”.

os

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I. Review of the alleged inequities of CERCLA
would be premature at this time.

“[T]he legislative history,” the Court observed in
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F.Supp. 802, 808
(S.D. Ohio 1983), “evinces the intent that the scope of
liability under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §9607, be determined
from traditional and evolving principles of common law
....” The Chem-Dyne court and numerous lower courts
have found that those principles support the imposition
of joint and several liability upon defendants found liable
under 42 U.S.C. §9607(a) where the harm or threat of
harm to which the government responses, is “indivis-
ible”. 572 FSupp. at 810. Chem-Dyne also held that:

if a party seeks to limit the scope of liability by a

claim that the harm is apportionable, the burden
of proof rests with those defendants. Id.

Interestingly, the Chem-Dyne decision observes that “the
volume of waste of a particular generator is not an accu-
rate predictor of the risk associated with the waste
because the toxicity or migratory potential of a partic-
ularly hazardous substance generally varies indepen-
dently with the volume of the waste.” Id. at 811.

In 1986, when it considered the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act (“SARA”), 100 Stat. 1613,
Congress had the opportunity to reexamine the liability
scheme established, and the possible inequities created,
with the enactment of CERCLA in 1980. Congressman
Eckart, one of the key sponsors of SARA, proclaimed that
SARA “maintains the strict, joint and several standards of
current law as enumerated in the leading case, United

ot De ai decal |

States v. Chem-Dyne Corporation”. 132 Cong. Rec. H9624
(daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986). Similarly, Congressman Dingell,
the primary draftsman of SARA in the House of Repre-
sentatives announced that the intent of SARA was “main-
taining the liability of the 1980 act as it has been
interpreted by the federal court.” 132 Cong. Rec. H9563
(daily ed. October 8, 1986).

Congress considered the possible inequities which
might arise from the imposition of joint and several lia-
bility. Significantly, Congress rejected efforts to institute a
mandatory apportionment scheme that would have pre-
vented joint and several liability on the basis of consider-
ations like waste volume. Senator Mitchell explained:

One proposed change to this law is a mandatory
apportionment scheme under which the burden
of proof would fall on the Government to estab-
lish the portion of the harm for which each
party is responsible, and apportion the cleanup
costs accordingly. While this may have a surface
appeal, the impacts of such a change on the
Superfund Enforcement Program would be far-
reaching. 131 Cong. Rec. S11586 (daily ed. Sept.
17, 1985).

The Senator opined that a mandatory apportionment
scheme “would delay cleanups and increase costs.” Id.

SARA explicitly provides a potentially liable party
with the right to institute a contribution action to allevi-
ate disproportionate imposition of costs by obtaining con-
tribution from other liable parties.

Section 113(f)(i) of SARA (42 U.S.C. §9613(F)(i)),
provides:

POS CE MISA aS OY

10

Any person may seek contribution from any
other person who is liable or potentially liable
under section 9607(a) of this title, during or
following any civil action under section 9606 of
this title or under section 9607(a) of this title.
Such claims shall be brought in accordance with
this section and the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure and shall be governed by Federal Law. In
resolving contribution claims, the court may
allocate response costs among liable parties
using such equitable factors as the court deter-
mines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsec-
tion shall diminish the right of any person to
bring an action for contribution in the absence
of a civil action under section 9060 of this title or
section 9607 of this title.

The legislative history clearly establishes Congres-
sional intent to allow such factors as the volume of the
waste to be considered in post-liability contribution
actions. However, volume was not to be employed in the
determination of liability. The Report of the House Judici-
ary Committee made clear that, “after all questions of
liability and remedy have been resolved, courts may con-
sider any criteria relevant to determining whether there
should be apportionment.” H.R. Rep. 99-253, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess., Part 3 at 19 (1985). Allocation criteria suggested
by the Committee for use in contribution actions included
“the amount of hazardous substances involved,” as well
as degree of toxicity, degree of involvement by the par-
ties, and other equitable factors. Id. However, the report
made explicit that such factors were to be employed in
contribution actions but not in the determination of joint
and several liability. Indeed, to avoid confusion between
the possible “apportionment” of a divisible injury (which
would make the imposition of joint and several liability

11

inappropriate) and the possible “allocation” of costs in a
contribution action, Congress carefully chose to employ
the word “allocate” rather than “apportion” in 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(f). Senator Stafford stated that:

The amendment does not diminish the liability
of any person under CERCLA nor does it sug-
gest that anything other than the standard of
liability which has been held by the courts to
apply, continue to be applied. Indeed, as origi-
nally drafted, the Senator’s amendment con-
tained the word “apportion” for which we
agreed to substitute “allocate” in order to avoid
any possible confusion on this point. 131 Cong.
Rec. $12021 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1985).

The questions presented for review do not question
the finding by the Court below that the Petitioners are
liable for the clean up of the hazardous waste site at the
Picillo Pig Farm pursuant to the Superfund Law. 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq. Rather, the Petitioners seek review
in order to challenge the extent of that liability and the
alleged inequities created by the imposition of joint and
several liability. Even if the Petitioners are victims of the
inequities alleged in their petition, the Petitioners possess
the statutory mechanism to ensure that their financial
burden will be shared by others whom the Petitioners
believe are also at fault. Such a contribution action, styled
American Cyanamid v. King Industries, C.A. No. 87-0110, in
which the Petitioners have named seventeen (17) parties
as defendants, is currently pending in the United States
District Court for the District of Rhode Island before
Senior Judge Raymond J. Pettine who served as the triai
judge in the instant action.

12

The State respectfully submits that the granting of
review by writ of certiorari at this time is premature. The
Court would be in a better position to gauge the alleged
“inequities” of the Congressionally established Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Lia-
bility System if the system were allowed to proceed
through to conclusion in the manner intended by
Congress.

II. The sole Constitutional issue which the Peti-
tioners present for review is limited to the
question of the constitutionality of the State’s
efforts to recover hazardous waste site clean up
costs incurred prior to the enactment of the
Superfund Law in 1980 and, thus, is not an
issue which is an important and recurring
problem.

The Petitioners seek to obtain review of the decision
of the Court below allowing the government to recover
its pre-enactment response costs. The Petitioners’ focus is
very narrow. The Petitioners have conceded, as they
must, the constitutionality of the imposition of liability
for response costs incurred after CERCLA’s enactment
but caused by pre-enactment conduct.

The Petitioners only seek review of the decision of
the Court below allowing recovery of response costs
incurred prior to the enactment of the Superfund Law.
CERCLA was signed into law in 1980. The State submits
that the number of cases involving an effort to recover
response costs incurred prior to 1980 is insignificant and
will be decreasing.

13

Additionally, there is no conflict in the law as
expressed by the courts of appeal which have addressed
the issue of the imposition of liability for pre-enactment
costs. United States v. Monsanto Company, 858 F.2d 160, 173
(4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 109 S.Ct. 3156
(1989); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726, 734 (8th Cir. 1986) cert. denied,
__._; U.S. __, 108 S.Ct. 146, 98 L.Ed.2d 102 (1987).

The decision of the Court below, and the opinions of
the Fourth Circuit in Monsanto and the Eight Circuit in
Northeastern Pharmaceutical relied upon the Court’s semi-
nal decision on retroactivity in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Company, 428 U.S. 1 (1976). “The retroactive
aspect of legislation,” the Court held in Turner Elkhorn,
“as well as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of
due process, and the justification for the latter may not
suffice for the former”. Id. at 16-17. Applying the reason-
ing of Turner Elkhorn in Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpora-
tion v. R.A. Gray & Company, 467 U.S. 717, 730 (1984), the
Court ruled that “that burden is met simply by showing
that the retroactive application of the legislation is itself
justified by a rational legislative purpose.”

CERCLA was intended to distribute the cost of the
clean up of hazardous waste sites. Thus, Turner Elkhorn is
particularly instructive:

It is by now well established that legislative
Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of eco-
nomic life come to the Court with a presump-
tion of constitutionality, and that the burden is
on one complaining of a due process violation to
establish that the legislature has acted in an

14

arbitrary and irrational way. 429 U.S. at 15.
(Citation omitted.)

Amplifying upon Turner Elkhorn in Pension Guaranty,
the Court stated that:

[In Turner Elkhorn, the Court held] that the
strong deference accorded legislation in the field
of national economic policy is no less applicable
when that legislation is applied retroactively.
Provided that the retroactive application of a
statute is supported by a legitimate legislative
purpose furthered by rational means, judgment
about the wisdom of such legislation remains
within the exclusive province of the legislative
and executive branches. 467 U.S. at 729.

Congressional intent to have CERCLA apply retroac-
tively is clear. As pointed out in United States v. North-
eastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Company, 810 F.2d 726,
733 (8th Cir. 1986), “[t]he language used in the key lia-
bility provision, CERCLA 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607, refers to
actions and conditions in the past tense. . . . Further the
statutory scheme itself is overwhelmingly remedial and
retroactive.” Additional support may be found in S. Rep.
96-848, 96th Congress, 2nd Sess., p. 13 [1980] (“society
should not bear the costs of protecting the public from
hazards produced in the past by a generator. . . ”).

It is eminently rational for Congress to have con-
cluded that the manufacturers who generated toxic waste
which was improperly disposed of should bear the cost
for cleaning it up.

The State, therefore, suggests that the question of the
constitutionality of the imposition of liability for pre-
enactment costs is not an important and recurring prob-
lem which is worthy of the Court’s review.

15

III. The Decision of the Court Below is Consistent
With The Law As Expressed by Other Courts
Of Appeals. «

Section 433(B)(2) of the Restatement of Torts provides:

Where the tortious conduct of two or more
actors have combined to bring about harm to
Plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to
limit his liability on the ground that the harm is
capable of apportionment among them, the bur-
den of proof as to the apportionment is upon
each such actor. Restatement (Second) of Tort
§ 433(B)(2) (1965). .

y Consistent with the Restatement, the Defendants in
Monsanto and Chem-Dyne, 572 FSupp. at 810, and the
Petitioners in the Court below were required to bear the
burden of establishing a reasonable basis for dividing
harm and apportioning liability among responsible
parties.

The parameters of that responsibility are set out in
Section 433A of the Restatement which provides:

(1) Damages for harm are to be appor-
tioned among two or more causes where

A (a) There are distinct harms, or

3 (b) There is a reasonable basis for deter-

mining the contribution of each cause to a
single harm.

(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be
apportioned among two or more causes.

Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 433A.
As the Petitioners indicate on page 2 of their Petition,

the Picillo dump site was a “classic ‘midnight dump’
site”. It was an illegal dump site at which some toxic

16

wastes were emptied from barrels into unlined lagoons
and other hazardous substances were buried in the earth
while still in their barrels which were indiscriminately
stacked upon other barrels. These barrels were crushed
and allowed to corrode causing their vile contents to ooze
out and commingle. The State only learned of the exis-
tence of the facility when an explosion ignited a fire in
one of the lagoons that burned out of control for days.
The true extent of the disposal operation did mot become
apparent until after the excavation and removal of the
barrels began. Obviously, no shipping manifests provid-
ing the State with information concerning the origin,
chemical composition or volume of material at the Site
were available.

The hazardous waste “facility” on the Picillo Pig
Farm was primitive and remarkably similar to the two
hazardous waste facilities which were considered by the
courts in United States v. Monsanto Co., and United States v.
Medley, 25 ERC 1315 (D.S.C. 1986) to present indivisible
and unapportionable damage warranting the imposition
of joint and several liability. Both the Appellants in Mon-
santo and the Petitioners in the case at bar claimed appor-
tionability of the harm but:

presented no evidence however showing a rela-
tionship between waste volume, the release of
hazardous substances, and the harm at the site.
Further, in light of the commingling of hazard-
ous substances, the district court could not have
reasonable apportioned liability without some
evidence disclosing the individual and interac-
tive qualities of the substances deposited there.
Common sense counsels that a million gallons of
certain substances could be mixed together
without significant consequences, whereas a few

17

pints of others improperly mixed could result in
disaster consequences. 858 F.2d at 172 (footnotes
omitted).

The Fourth Circuit in Monsanto also had the oppor-
tunity to pass upon a panoply of constitutional challenges
which went to the core of the Superfund Law, and found
that the Act passed Constitutional muster on each
challenge:

Nor does the imposition of strict, joint and sev-
' eral liability convert CERCLA into a bill of
attainder or an ex post facto law. United States v.
Conservation Chemical Co., 619 FSupp. 162, 214
(W.D. Mo. 1985); United States v. Tyson, 25 Env’t.
Rep.Cas. (BNA) 1897 (E.D.Pa. 1986) [available
on WESTLAW, 1986 WL 9250]. The infliction of
punishment, either legislatively or retrospec-
tively, is a sine qua non of legislation that runs
afoul of these constitutional prohibitions. See
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433
U.S. 425, 473-84, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 2805-11, 53
L.Ed.2d 867 (1977) (bill of attainder analysis);
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-30, 101 S.Ct.
960, 963-65, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (ex post facto
law analysis). CERCLA does not exact punish-
\ ment. Rather it creates a reimbursement obliga-
tion on any person judicially determined
responsible for the costs of remedying hazard-
’ ous conditions at a waste disposal facility. The
restitution of cleanup costs was not intended to
operexe, nor does it operate in fact, as a criminal
serene or a punitive deterrent. Cf. Tull v. United
tates, 481 US. 412, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 1838, 95
L.Ed.2d 365 (1987) (distinguishing civil penalties
under Clean Water Act from equitable remedy
of restitution). Moreover, as this case amply
demonstrates, Congress did not impose that
obligation automatically on a legislatively

defined class of persons. Id. 858 F.2d at 175.

iia

18

The State would suggest that the concerns raised by
the Petitioners were raised in the Court below and were
fairly and accurately ruled upon. Further, the whole of
the CERCLA system has been reviewed in detail and the
decision of the Court below is consistent with the law as
expressed by other Courts of Appeals.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, Respondent James E. O'Neil,
in his capacity as Attorney General of the State of Rhode
Island, respectfully requests that the Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

James E. O’Nen,
Attorney General for the
State of Rhode Island,

By: Gary E. Powers

Powers, Davis & Terry

1570 Westminster Street
Providence, Rhode Island 02909
(401) 861-0190

Counsel for Respondent

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APPENDIX

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

James E. O'Neil, in his
capacity as Attorney
General for the STATE
OF RHODE ISLAND

Plaintiff,
Vv.

Warren V. Picillo,

Sr., Rutgers,

the State University of
New Jersey,

Defendants.

ee eee ee

UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

Plaintiff,
v.

Rutgers, the State
University of
New Jersey,

Defendants,

ee ee ee ee ee oe ee ee

Civil Action No. 83-0787 P

CA 89-0123
Civil Action No.

CONSENT DECREE

WHEREAS, the United States of America, on behalf
of the Administrator of the United States Environmental!
Protection Agency (“Plaintiff” or “United States”) filed a

complaint against Rutgers, the State University of New

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Jersey (“Rutgers”), pursuant to Sections 106 and 107(a) of
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act of 1980 as amended by the Super-
fund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-499, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606 and 9607(a) (“CERCLA”),
and Section 7003 of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, (“RCRA”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 6973,
seeking injunctive relief regarding the cleanup of the
Picillo site in Coventry, Rhode Island (the “Site”) and
recovery of costs incurred and to be incurred in respond-
ing tc the release or threat of release of hazardous sub-
stances at or in connection with the Site;

WHEREAS, there is also pending an action entitled
O’Neil-v. Picillo, et al., designated C.A. No. 83-0787P in the
Federal District Court for the District of Rhode Island
against Rutgers and certain other companies and persons
seeking relief under Section 107(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a), and Section 311 of the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1321, relating to the disposal of waste and other
activities at the Site (the “Federal Court Action”);

WHEREAS, there is pending an action entitled Bend-
ick, et al. v. Picillo, et al., designated C.A. No. 77-3161 in
the Superior Court for the State of Rhode Island, Provi-
dence County, against Rutgers and certain other com-
panies and persons asserting claims and seeking relief
under the statutory and common law of the State of
Rhode Island relating to the disposal of waste and other
activities at the Site (the “State Court Action”);

a Me AF eee te

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WHEREAS, the United States and the State have
incurred and continue to incur response costs in respond-
ing to the release or threat of release of hazardous sub-
stances at or in connection with the Site;

WHEREAS, the United States and the Attorney Gen-
eral for the State of Rhode Island have determined that
prompt settlement of this case is practicable and in the
public interest;

WHEREAS, this settlement involves only a minor
portion of the response costs at the Site with respect to
Rutgers;

WHEREAS, the United States and the State have
determined that the amount of the hazardous substances
contributed to the Site by Rutgers and the toxic or haz-
ardous effects of the hazardous substance contributed to
the Site by Rutgers are minimal in comparison to other
hazardous substances at the Site;

WHEREAS, the United States, the State and Rutgers
agree that settlement of this case without further litiga-
tion and without the admission or adjudication of any
issue of fact or law is the most appropriate means of
resolving this action;

NOW, THEREFORE, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED as follows:

I. JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties to this action. The parties agree to be bound
by the terms of this Consent Decree and not to contest its

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validity in any subsequent proceeding to implement or
enforce its terms.

II. PARTIES BOUND

This Consent Decree shall apply to and be binding upon
the United States and the State and shall apply to and be
binding upon Rutgers, its directors, officers, employees,
agents, successors and assigns. Each signatory to this
Consent Decree represents that he or she is fully autho-
rized to enter into the terms and conditions of this Con-
sent Decree and to legally bind the Party represented by
him or her.

III. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The purpose of Rutgers entering into this Consent Decree
is to: (1) provide partial reimbursement for Plaintiffs’
Response Costs; and (2) settle any and all claims asserted
by Plaintiffs as to Rutgers in the Complaint filed in this
matter, as well as Plaintiffs’ potential claims for natural
resource damages under CERCLA, with the exception of
Plaintiffs’ claims specifically reserved in this Decree.

IV. PAYMENT

1. On or before the 30th day following entry of this
Consent Decree, Rutgers shall send a certified check to
the United States in the amount of $37,500. Payment shall
be made by a certified check payable to the “Enviornmen-
tal Protection Agency, Hazardous Substance Superfund”.

2. The check shall reference Rutgers, the Site name, and
the civil action number of this case, and shall be sent to:

RA-5

EPA Superfund
P.O. Box 371003M
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15251

3. Rutgers shall simultaneously send a copy of its check
to:

Chief, Environmental Enforcement Section
Land and Natural Resources Division
United States Department of Justice
9th and Pennsylvania Avenues, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530
Attn: DOJ No. 90-11-2-131

and
Regional Administrator
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
J.F.K. Federal Building
Government Center
Boston, MA 02203
Attn: Picillo Settlement

A copy shall also be sent to:

State of Rhode Island

Department of Environmental Management

9 Hayes Street

Second Floor

Providence, Rhode Island 02908
and

Attention: Gary Powers

State of Rhode Island

Department of Attorney General

72 Pine Street

Providence, RI 02903

4. On or before the 30th day following entry of this
Consent Decree, Rutgers shall send payment in the
amount of $12,500 to the State of Rhode Island by certi-
fied check, payable to “Treasurer, State of Rhode Island,
for Deposit in the Environmental Response Fund.” Pay-
ment shall be mailed to:

RA-6

Department of Environmental Management
9 Hayes Street, 2nd floor
Providence, Rhode Island 02908

A copy shall also be sent to:

Attention: Gary Powers

State of Rhode Island
Department of Attorney General
72 Pine Street

Providence, RI 02903

5. The payments described above are partial reimburse-
ment for Plaintiffs’ response costs and are not a penalty
or fine.

V. CIVIL PENALTIES

In addition to any other available remedies or sanctions,
should Rutgers fail or refuse to comply with any term or
condition of this Consent Decree, it shall be subject to a
civil penalty of up to $25,000 per day of such failure or
refusal pursuant to Section 122(1) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
9622(1). .

VI. CERTIFICATION OF DEFENDANTS

Rutgers certifies that to the best of its knowledge and
belief, it has provided to the United States and the State
all information currently in its possession, or in the pos-
sessiou of its officers, directors, employees, contractors,
agents or assigns, which relates in any way to the genera-
tion, treatment, transportation, storage or disposal of haz-
ardous substances at or in connection with the Site.

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VII. COVENANT NOT TO SUE

1. Subject to the reservation of rights in Section VIII of
this Consent Decree, the United States and the State
covenant not to sue or take any other civil or administra-
tive action against Rutgers for “Covered Matters.” “Cov-
ered Matters” shall include any and all civil liability
including future liability, for reimbursement of response
costs or for injunctive relief pursuant to Sections 106 or
107(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606 or 9607(a), Section
311 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.7@. § 1321, and Section
7003 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6973, with regard to the Site.
“Covered Matters” shall also include all past or future
damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural
resources, including the costs of assessing such injury,
destruction, or loss.

2. In consideration of the United States’ and the State’s
covenant not to sue in Paragraph 1 of this Section,
Rutgers agrees not to assert any claims or causes of action
against the United States, the State, or the Hazardous
Substance Superfund arising out of the Covered Matters,
or to seek any other costs, damages, or attorneys’ fees
arising out of response activities at the Site.

3. The State hereby agrees to file a motion seeking the
dismissal with prejudice of O’Neil v. Picillo and Bendick v.
Picillo as to Rutgers. The State and Rutgers further agree
that this dismissal is a final disposition of all claims
raised in those actions against Rutgers with the exception
of those claims set forth in the reservation of rights in
Section VIII, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Consent Decree.

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VIII. RESERVATION OF RIGHTS

1. Nothing in this Consent Decree is intended to be nor
shall it be construed as a release or covenant not to sue
for any claim or cause of action, administrative or judi-
cial, past or future, in law or in equity, which the United
States and/or the State may have against Rutgers for:

(a) any continuing liability as a result of failure to

make the payments required by Section IV, Para-
graphs 1 and 4, of this Consent Decree, or

(b) any matter not expressly included in Covered
Matters.

Nothing in this Consent Decree is intended to be nor
shall be construed as a release of criminal liability.

2. Nothing in this Consent Decree constitutes a cove-
nant not to sue or to take action or otherwise limit the
ability of the United States and/or the State to seek or
obtain further relief from Rutgers, and the covenant not
to sue in Section VII, Paragraph 1, of this Consent Decree
is null and void, if information not currently known or
made available to the United States and/or the State is
discovered which indicates that Rutgers contributed haz-
ardous substances to the Site in such greater amount or to
such greater toxic or other hazardous effect that the
Rutgers no longer qualifies as a de minimis party at the
Site because it contributed disproportionately to the
cumulative toxic or other hazardous effects of the hazard-
ous substances at the Site.

3. Nothing in this Consent Decree is intended as a
release or covenant not to sue for any claim or cause of
action, administrative or judicial, past or future, in law or
in ‘equity, which the United States and/or the State may

RA-9

have against any person, firm, corporation or other entity
who is not a signatory to this Consent Decree.

4. The United States, the State, and Rutgers agree that
the actions undertaken by Rutgers in accordance with
this Consent Decree do not constitute an admission of
any liability by Rutgers.

IX. CONTRIBUTION PROTECTION

Subject to the reservation of rights in Section IX of this
Consent Decree, the United States and the State agree
that by entering into and carrying out the terms of the
Consent Decree, Rutgers will have resolved its liability to
the United States and the State for Covered Matters pur-
suant to Section 122(g)(5) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2622(g)(5), and shall not be liable for claims for contri-
bution for Covered Matters.

X. PUBLIC COMMENT

This Consent Decree shall be subject to a thirty-day pub-
lic comment period. The United States or the State may
withdraw its consent to this Consent Decree if comments
received disclose facts or considerations which indicate
that this Consent Decree is inappropriate, improper, 0:
inadequate.

XI. EFFECTIVE DATE

The effective date of this Consent Decree shall be the date
of entry by this Court, following public comment pur-
suant to Section X of this Consent Decree.

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ENTERED this 2nd day of May, 1989.

/s/ Raymond J. Pettine
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

/s/ Donald Carr
DONALD A. CARR
Acting Assistant Attor-
ney General Land and
Natural Resources Divi-
sion United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C
20530

LINCOLN C. ALMOND
United States Attorney
District of Rhode Island

By:/s/ Everett Sammartino
EVERETT SAMMARTINO
Assistant United States
Attorney
224 Federal Building and
Courthouse
Kennedy Plaza
Providence, Rhode Island
02903

/s/ Carrick Brooke-Davidson
CARRICK BROOKE-DAVID-
SON, Attorney
Environmental Enforcement
Section United
States Department of Justice
P.O. Box 7611
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, D.C. 20044

RA-11

/s/

/s/

/s/

/s/

Thomas L. Adams, Jr.
THOMAS L. ADAMS, JR.
Assistant Administrator for
Enforcement

and Compliance Monitoring
United States Environmental
Protection Agency

401 M Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20460

Michael R. Deland
MICHAEL R. DELAND ©
Regional Administrator,
Region I

United States Environmental
Protection Agency

JFK Federal Building
Boston, MA 02203

Jon Fleuchaus 5/24/88

JON FLEUCHAUS
Attorney-Adviser

Office of Enforcement and
Compliance Monitoring
United States Environmental
Protection Agency

401 M Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20460

Susana Cortina de Cardenas
SUSANA CORTINA de
CARDENAS

Assistant Regional Counsel
Office of Regional Counsel
United States Environmental
Protection Agency

JFK Federal Building
Boston, MA 02203 *

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FOR THE STATE OF
RHODE ISLAND

/s/ James E. O'Neil
JAMES E. O’NEIL, in his
capacity as Attorney General
for the State of Rhode Island

By His Attorney,

JAMES E. O’NBIL
ATTORNEY GENERAL

By:/s/ Gary Powers
GARY POWERS
Special Assistant
Attorney General
72 Pine Street
Providence, RI 02903
(401) 274-4400

FOR RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

/s/ Joseph P. Whiteside
joseph P. Whiteside
Senior vice President ©
and Treasurer

/s/ Thomas Terp
Thomas T
TAFT, NIUS &
HOLLISTER
1800 First National
Bank Center
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385020_0668%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
