# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Middle Earth Graphics, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1990
- **Citation:** 493 U.S. 1043

## Text

UNITED STATES
October Term 1989

MIDDLE EARTH GRAPHICS, INC.,
Petitioner

LS

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

SCOTT R. MERRILL
Counsel of Record

CHARITY KENYON
JAMES M. NELSON

DIEPENBROCK, WULFF, PLANT and HANNEGAN
300 Capitol Mall, Suite 1700 P.O. Box 3034
Sacramento, CA 95812-3034

(916)444-3910

Counsel for Petitioner,
MIDDLE EARTH GRAPHICS, INC.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether the First Amendment and Section 8(c) of
the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(c))
prohibit the National Labor Relations Board from using as
evidence of an unfair labor practice an anti-union
statement by an employer which contains no threats of
reprisal or force or promises of benefit and is thus
protected free speech?

2. | Whether there was substantial evidence to support
the findings of fact of the National Labor Relations Board?

TOPICAL INDEX

Constitutional Provisions Involved. ........ 2.0.6... cece wees 2
Statutory Provisions Involved. ........ 6.2.6... eee e cece eens 2
Neen ne ne cee eeesenseeons

The Board’s Finding That Petitioner’s Statement of Opposi-
tion to Unions Constituted Evidence of Animus Violated the
Freedom of Speech Provisions of Both the First Amendment

and Section 8(c) of the National Labor Relations Act.

A. Decisions of This Court ................0005 8
B. Legislative History of Section 8(c)............ 10
. Decisions of the Circuit Courts of Appeal. ....15
1. Circuits Which Permit Use of Protected
SII, 6 vou catasanccccscccces 15
ee Circuits Which Do Not Permit Use of
Protected Speech As Evidence. .............. 17
II

There Was Not Substantial Evidence to Support
the Board’s Finding That the Company Was

Motivated by Anti-Union Animus ................5:. 21

EE GHRUNSSSSKS ee Surencurececcccccccceuees .22

PU 5 Ses nsweronnnnnccccgnncesscesccccces la-65a
i

AUTHORITIES CITED

Consolidated Edision Co. v. NLRB,

ER AUREDERGRGGONe es cocccccsscecseesccees 21
Coppus Engineering Corp. v. NLRB,

ee Os Re IE GS NOUR onc ccccccccccccccscesecs 17
Darlington Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB,

Soe ©. Bh FOO CO Cota, ISGE). .. occ ccc cece ences 17
Gem International, Inc. v. NLRB,

Sal F. 2d G26 Gti Circuit, 1963)... ccc cece ce eeees 18
Hendrix Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB,

SURE Wh Ge PIII, EID, once cc ccc ccccccccneecens 16
Indiana Metal Products Corp. v. NLRB,

ee Os IES BOUID. o scenes ccc ccccncecseceess 18
Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers,

EG L shee si cescccccesscccccescess 9,11, 15
New York Times v. Sullivan,

lh ETE STOTT CT EET TTT OTT CTE TET 10, 20
NLRB v. Arkansas Grain Corp., |

et 18
NLRB v. Birdsall Co., 487 2d 288 (Sth Circuit, 1973)............. 16
NLR ¥. Brown, S00 US. 276 (1SGS). ... wee ccc cece eens 7
NLRB v. Builders Supply Co. of Houston,

steht che ey be ere re tno EEE EEE 16
NLRB v. Colonial Lincoln Mercury Sales, Inc.,

et 16
NLRB v. Colvert Dairy Products Co.,

317 F. 2d 44 (10th Circuit, 163). ........... 02.600. 16, 18, 19, 20
NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co.,

wa censeccseccengesanskeensen 9,15
NLRB v. Gissell Packing Co.,

EEE oe ee ee 8,15
NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.,

iin teas cdscncccsactesceauckeas 7
NLRB v. Howard Quarries, Inc.,

962 F. 2d 236 (6th Circuit, 1966)... 2.2... ccc cece cece cenes 17
NLRB v. McGahey,

SPs Ae GM, BOO, ccc ccc ccccccnesccssas 16
NLRB v. Putnam Tool Co.,

Ges ahi pa nan sccebacsonnsvkeeadouue 17
NLRB v. Lowell Sun Publishing Co.

ee Se Se CR HUD oo nce cc cenaccccccnccces 17

ii

AUTHORITIES CITED (cont'd.)
NLRB v. Rockwell Manufacturing Co. (DuBois Div.)
271 F. 2d 109 Grd Circuit, 1959). .... 2... eee eee eee 17,19
NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp.,
QGR US. SEB GSGRD. occ iinccceccccccces. paeawheesenesqaees 7
NLRB v. United Steel Workers (Nu Tone, Inc.),
RIT OTT TTT TT TETT TET ETE EE 21
NLRB v. Virginia Electric and Power Co.,
EN PT ee TTT eTTT TELE EEE TTT TT 21
NLRB v. Wright Line, a Division of Wright Line, Inc.,
662 F. 2d 907 (ist Circuit 1981), cert. denied
ES OPPO TTT TTT ETE EEE TEE Ee 17
Orchard Corp. of America v. NLRB,
408 F. 2d 341 (8th Circuit, 1969)... . 2... cece ee eee eee eens 17
Pennekamp v. Florida,
TT OTIS TT ITTETEPT TTT ETE L ETT 20
Pittsburgh S.S. Co. v. NLRB,
180 F.2d 731 (6th Circuit, 1950) aff’d 340 U.S. 498 (1951)...... 18
Roper Corp. v. NLRB,
712 F. 2d (7th Circuit, 1983). ..... 6.2.6... cece ee eee Won een 18
Rosenblat v. Baer,
Ra ia oS UWhiWs sede wet eKbaWekievereeians 20
Texas v. Johnson,
491 US. ___, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 105 L. Ed 2d 342 (1989).......... 10
United Auto Workers v. NLRB (Aero Corp.),
363 F. 2D 702 (D.C. Circuit, 1966). ..... 2.6.6... eee eee eee 17, 20
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
as SNS BO Ne Seca cindec cccednswcsseceeaes 21
STATUTES
Wiatiomel Later Batatiams ACE Gee. Fac cnc cccccccccccncccsccsess 2
National Labor Relations Act, Sec 8(a) (1)................. 1235
National Labor Relations Act, Sec 8(a) (3). ..............45. 2, 3,5
National Labor Relations Act, Sec. 8(c)............... 2 (seriatim)
National Labor Relations Act, Sec. 10(e). ..... 2.2.6.6... ee eee 2,3
PUBLICATIONS
Legislative History of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, 1959 Reprint 1985. ........... Appenix E
iii

ciaceeaeiiei

Petitioner Middle Earth Graphics, Inc. (hereinafter sometimes re-
ferred to as “Middle Earth” or “Petitioner”) respectfully prays that a
Writ of Certiorari be issued to review the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW
- The unpublished opinion of the court of appeals dated April
24, 1989 and the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc, dated July
6, 1989, are reprinted in the Appendix. (App., infra 1a, 2a). Thedecision
and order of the National Labor Relations Board (App. infra 3a-43a) are
reported at 283 NLRB No. 156, and 126 LRRM 1010 (1987).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
In its decision and order, the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or Board) found “clear evidence of animus which should be
considered in placing the events . . . in proper focus.” The clear evi-
dence was in fact a statement, printed and distributed by petitioner's
president on a humorous poster which purported to create a new state
out of Western Michigan. The offending statement in its entirety read:

Access to the State of Six-One-Six (Western Michi-
gan) will be severely restricted. Draw bridges will be
raised to keep out such undesirable elements as labor
organizers, dead beats, carpetbagging politicians,
and itinerant lawyers. (See Appendix F, infra)

On the basis of that statement, the Board found the requisite
anti-union animus and thereafter held that petitioner had violated
Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C.
§158(a)(1) and (3)) by terminating employees. Inso doing, thedecision
of the Board raises the following questions:

(1) Can the NLRB use, as evidence of an unfair
labor practice, a statement which contains no threat of reprisal or force
or promise of benefit, if such statement is otherwise protected free
speech?

(a) Ifthe NLRB has impermissibly used as

evidence of animus a statement which is protected free speech, are the
subsequent findings of unfair labor practices likewise tainted?

(b) Is the entire decision tainted where the
Board has used a protected statement as evidence of animus and
considered such statements when evaluating such alleged unfair
labor practice?

(2) Whether there was substantial evidence to
support the Board’s findings of fact.

TURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
US.C. 1254(1). Jurisdiction properly obtained before the court of
appeals for the Sixth Circuit pursuant to Sections 10(e) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 28 U.S.C. §10(e), since the alleged unfair labor
practices occurred in Kalamazoo, Michigan. The judgment of the
court of appeals (App. infra, 2a) was entered on April 24, 1989 and a
petition for rehearing was denied on July 6, 1989 (App. infra, 1a).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED
United States Constitution, Amendment 1:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people to peacefully as-
semble, and to petition the Government for redress of
grievances.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Section 8(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, (NLRA)
29 US.C. Section 158(c) provides:

The expressing of any views, argument or opinion, or
thedissemination thereof, whether in written, printed,
graphic, or visual form shall not constitute or be
evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the
provisions of this subchapter, if such expression
contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit.

Section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. Section 157 provides:

Employees shall have the right to self-organization,
to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other

2

ee ee

mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right
to refrain from any or all of such activities except to
the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organi-
zation as acondition of employment as authorized in
Section 158(a)(3) of this title.

Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. Section 158(a)(1)
and (3) provide:

It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer —

(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 157 of this
title;

see

(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employ-
ment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization ....

Section 10(e) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. Section 160(e) provides:

The Board shall have power to petition any court of
appeals of the United States . . . wherein the unfair
labor practice in question occurred or wherein such
person resides or transacts business, for the enforce-
ment of such order and for appropriate temporary
relief or restraining order, and shall file in the court
the record in the proceedings, as provided in section
2112 of Title 28.

see.

The findings of the Board with respect to questions of
fact if supported by substantial evidence on the rec-
ord considered as a whole shall be conclusive.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

During a period of economic slowdown, petitioner employer
transferred its employees known as “bindery workers” from
petitioner's payroll to the payroll of Manpower, Inc.,a temporary help
agency. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) found
that the petitioner's decision to transfer bindery workers to Man-
power was initially limited to those bindery workers referred to as
“mergers” and that petitioner unlawfully enlarged that decision to
include all bindery workers after petitioner learned of a union organ-
izational attempt among the bindery workers. Petitioner subse-
quently terminated several employees who refused to transfer to
Manpower.

The NLRB concluded that petitioner's decision was unlaw-
fully motivated by anti-union animus. In finding such anti-union
animus, the Board relied upon a statement contained in a poster
distributed by petitioner to promote a new printing press. The poster
indicated that petitioner’s president was opposed to unions.

The Board issued a decision and order directing petitioner to
reinstate the terminated employees and compensate them for back
wages. The court of appeals enforced the Board’s order without
opinion. A subsequent petition for rehearing en banc was denied.

Petitioner seeks review of the Board’s decision, which presents
important First Amendment and statutory questions on which the
circuits are divided, some of which are contrary to the decisions of this
Court.

Petitioner, Middle Earth Graphics, Inc., isa Michigan corpora-
tion formed in 1974 and engaged primarily in commercial and spe-
cialty printing in Kalamazoo, Michigan. Louis Hall (Hall) is the
founder, owner and president of petitioner. From 1974 until 1984,
petitioner employed an average of 10 to 12 employees. In March 1984,
Middle Earth received a purchase order from its largest customer,
Cadaco, to print, cut and supply 25,000 “sets” or “games” of playing
cards for a new game known as “Bible Trivia”, a game patterned after
the popular “Trivial Pursuit.” The game became an overnight success.
Cadaco then increased the purchase order and Middle Earth devoted
virtually its entire operation to meeting Cadaco’s production require-
ments. To meet these requirements, Hall hired 40 to 50 employees to
work primarily in the bindery area. In the fall of 1984, the Cadaco
business began to wane. Hall also experienced employee manage-
ment difficulties. In November 1984, Hall met with a representative
from Manpower, Inc.,a temporary employment agency, and accepted
a written proposal to pay Manpower a fee for transferring the bindery

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workers to Manpower for payroll purposes and assuming all payroll
obligations.

On November 7, the bindery workers were informed of the
planned transfer to Manpower’s payroll and on November 9, the first
group of employees (which included primarily “merging” employees
and a collatorassistant) were enrolled with Manpower. On November
10, several employees met at an employee’s home for the first time
with a union business agent.to discuss organizing a drive for the
Paperworkers’ Union.

On November 12, employees were informed that the deadline
for enrolling with Manpower was November 15. By November 15 all
but four bindery workers had enrolled with Manpower. The four
bindery workers asserted a right to refuse to enroll with Manpower.
Hall informed them that they would be fired unless they complied
with the direction to enroll with Manpower. One individual con-
sented; the other three were fired. Approximately one week later, an
employee who had enrolled the first day announced that he had
revoked his Manpower enrollment card. Hall fired him.

Between November 13 and November 29, 1984, the union filed
unfair labor practices with the Board, alleging violations of Sections
8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(1) and (3), and on
December 31, 1984, a complaint was issued. A settlement agreement
was reached on April 22, 1985. Additional charges were filed between
August 2 and September 26, 1985, alleging that Middle Earth had not
complied with the terms of the settlement agreement and had not
properly reinstated the alleged discriminatees. The regional director
of the Board set aside thesettlement agreement and issued an amended
consolidated complaint on October 30, 1985. The hearing was held
from January 28 to February 5, 1986.

The ALJ found that petitioner violated the Act when it dis-
charged six employees. To support these findings, the ALJ first
concluded that petitioner demonstrated “clear evidence of animus” in
the poster distributed by Middle Earth:

1. Evidence of Animus

Quite apart from any specific violations of the
Act alleged and found in this case, the Respondent
(petitioner herein) demonstrated clear evidence of
animus which should be considered in placing the
events described herein in proper focus. Among the
documents in the record is a large multi-colored bro-

5

chure which the Respondent (petitioner herein) has
printed and circulated to advertise the capability of
its new multi-color press. The document is a humor-
ous elaboration of Hall’s tongue-in-cheek proposal
for a new 51st state, to be carved out of the existing
state of Michigan and named Six-One-Six after the
telephone area code for Western Michigan. Entitled
“A New State. A New Start.”, the brochure features
Hall as its centerfold, dressed in regal attire and
holding a sword and scepter. Also portrayed on this
page are two cartoon figures, dressed as attendants
from an insane asylum, who are chasing Hall and are
making ready to apprehend him and place him ina
straightjacket. Inside the brochure is a large map of
Michigan. The eastern half is portrayed as a barren
wasteland while the western half — State Six-One-
Six — is shown asa flourishing, verdant paradise. At
the center of State Six-One-Six is its capital, Kalama-
zoo. Access to Six-One-Six from Eastern Michigan is
limited to a drawbridge over a moat. This feature is
captioned:

Access to the State of Six-One-Six will be
severely restricted. Drawbridges will be
raised to keep out such undesirable elements
as labor organizers, dead beats, carpetbag-
ging politicians, and itinerant lawyers.

When asked at the hearing if he was opposed to
unions, Hall replied: ‘Just inSix-One-Six.’ (App.infra
at 25a-26a)

The ALJ concluded that the terminations of six employees
were not for “cause” but were based on anti-union motivation. He
further found that petitioner violated the Act when Hall and two
supervisors made statements regarding the union.
The Board affirmed the decision and order of ALJ on May 19,
1987, in an opinion reported at 283 NLRB No. 156, 126 LRRM 1010.
(Appendix C, infra, at 3a)
The Court of Appeals, in a per curiam decision, enforced the
Board’s order, without comment, on April 24, 1989. A petition for
rehearing en banc was denied on July 6, 1989. (App.., infra, at 1a).

6

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

There are three elements required to prove a violation of
Section 8(a)(3): (1) knowledge of protected, concerted activity; (2) con-
duct which discriminates against and discourages union member-
ship; and (3) unlawful motivation or intent based on anti-union
animus. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 286 (1965) and NLRB v.
Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 398 (1983) (“if the
employer fires an employee for having engaged in union activities and
has no other basis for the discharge ... the employer commits an unfair
labor practice.”).

The essential element, however, is the employer motivation.
NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33 (1967) (“the finding of
a violation normally turns on whether the discriminating conduct was
motivated by an anti-union purpose.”) and NLRB v. Brown, supra, 380
US. at 287 (“we have determined that the ‘real motive’ of the employer
in an alleged § 8(a)(3) violation is decisive”).

Theultimate issue in this case, therefore, is whether petitioner's
decision to discharge its employees was unlawfully motivated by anti-
union animus. The Board found “evidence of animus” contained in
the anti-union statement in the poster. There were no threats or
coercive statements in the poster, so it is without question, protected
free speech. Section 8(c) of the Act prohibits the use of such statements
as “evidence of an unfair labor practice.” Therefore, the Board, in
finding “evidence of animus” has reached the dispositive issue in a
determination of whether the petitioner violated the Act. That is the
error.

The decision of the Board is plainly contrary to both the express
letter and spirit of Section 8(c) of the Act, which provides that such
statements, “shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor
practice under any of the provisions of this Act. . . .” (Emphasis
supplied). Although the Court has addressed the issue of freedom of
speech in the labor relations context, the Board and the courts have
nullified the free speech protections of Section 8(c) and they have
curtailed the free expressionand interchange of ideas in the workplace.
Although the Board purports to respect the First Amendment rights of
employers, decisions such as the case below have a substantial and in-
tolerable chilling effect upon such expression.

The Board explains that, while the statement in the poster is
not, in and of itself, an unfair labor practice, it is “evidence of animus.”
The Board then considered this evidence of animus in order to “place
the events” in “proper focus,” and determine whether it was more or

—s

7

less likely that the employer committed the alleged unfair labor
practice. At that point the statement became “evidence of an unfair
labor practice,” contrary to the express prohibition of by Section 8(c).

The courts of appeal are apparently divided on the scope of the
Section 8(c) prohibition. While most circuits purport to recognize the
principle of freedom of speech as it applies in the labor relations area,
they are undecided as to the evidentiary weight to be given to a
statement which is protected free speech. Under Section 8(c), the
answer is clear — no evidentiary use whatsoever may be made of a
protected statement.

Review of the Board’s and the court of appeals’ decisions is
therefore warranted and necessary to protect the free speech rights of
employers, to enforce the congressional mandate of Section 8(c) and to
achieve unanimity of results among the circuits.

DISCUSSION

I. The Board’s Finding That Petitioner’s Statement Of Opposi-
tion To Unions Constituted Evidence of Animus Violated
The Freedom Of Speech Provisions Of Both The First Amend-
ment and Section 8(c) Of The National Labor Relations Act.

The Board’s decision to use a statement which is otherwise
protected free speech as evidence of animus is in violation of funda-
mental constitutional rights and will chill free interchange of opinions
and ideas between management and labor in the workplace. An
employer certainly cannot freely express his opinions if speech critical
of unions may be used as evidence of an unfair labor practice.

A. DECISIONS OF THIS COURT

This Court has long recognized that where an employer's anti-union
statement contains no threat it is protected free speech and may not be
- used as evidence against an employer.

In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), the Court
found that Section 8(c) is the equivalent of the First Amendment:

[A]n employer's free speech right to communicate to

his employees is firmly established and cannot be

infringed by a union or the Board. Thus, § 8(c)(29

US.C. § 158(c)) merely implements the First Amend-

ment by requiring that the expression of “any views,

argument, or opinion” shall not be “evidence of an
8

unfair labor practice,” so long as such expression
contains “no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit” in violation of § 8(a)(1). 395 U.S. at 617.

Likewise, in NLRB v. United Steelworkers (Nu Tone, Inc.), 357 U.S. 357,
362 (1958), the Court noted:

Nor is the claim made that an employer may not,
under proper circumstances, engage in non-coercive
anti-union solicitation; indeed, his right to do so is
protected by the so-called “employer free speech”
provision of § 8(c) of the Act.

In NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 US. 405 (1964), the Board
found that the employer violated the Act when it announced to its
employees, shortly before a union election, a new birthday holiday
and increased overtime and vacation benefits. This Court affirmed the
Board’s conclusion as to the timing of the announcement, but refused
to place any reliance on an anti-union letter to employees:

The inference was made almost explicit in Exchange
Parts’ letter to its employees of March 4, already
quoted, which said “The Union can’t put any of those
... [benefits] in your envelope— only the Company can
do that.” (Original italics.) We place no reliance
however, on these or other words of the respondent
disassociated from its conduct. Section 8(c) of the
Act... provides that the expression or dissemination
of “any views, argument, or opinion” “shall not
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice
... if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or
force or promise of benefit.”

See also Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 62 (1966), “the
enactment of § 8(c) manifests a congressional intent to encourage free
debate on issues dividing labor and management.” The Court in Linn
then compared the labor-management free speech dilemma with
other non-labor free speech situations:

[A]s we stated in another context, cases involving
speech are to be considered “against the background
of a profound . . . commitment to the principle that

9

debate . . . should be uninhibited, robust, and wide
open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic,
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks.” New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). Such
considerations likewise weigh heavily here; the most
repulsive speech enjoys immunity provided it falls
short of a deliberate or reckless untruth. 383 U.S. at
62-63.

Most recently, in the flag-burning case, Texas v. Johnson, 491
US.__, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L. Ed 2d 342 (1989) this Court reaffirmed
its commitment to unlimited free expression of ideas regardless of
whether there is a possibility that some may take “serious offense at
the particular expression.” 109S.Ct. at 2541. The Court noted that the
precedents establish that:

A principal “function of free speech under our sys-
tem of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed
best serve its high purpose when it induces a condi-
tion of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions
as they are, or even stirs people to anger.” Id. at 2541.

* hd > *

If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the Government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea because society
finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. Id. at
2544

The Board’s decision is contrary to these principles. Thereis no
doubt that anti-union comment is offensive or disagreeable to some.
However, rather than fostering or encouraging debate, the Board
limits it. The employer is thus well-cautioned never to make any
comment or express any opinion (even if in jest) which is remotely
anti-union as there is always the possibility of a future unfair labor
practice allegation and that the statement may be used as “back-
ground evidence” to support the allegation.

B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 8(c)

This Court’s commitment to “free debate” also finds signifi-
cant support in the legislative history of Section 8(c) of the Act.

10

a

The critical inquiry into the legislative history of Section 8(c)
focuses on a single word: “evidence”. That word was the primary
source of congressional debate with respect to the entire section. It is
quite clear that here, the word “evidence” hasa particular significance.
If Congress had only wanted to ensure that an anti-union statement
would not, by itself, constitute an unfair labor practice, the word
“evidence” could have been dropped from the statute as superfluous.
Thus, the statute would have read:

“The expressing of any views, argument, or
opinion. . . shall not constitute... an unfair labor
practice. . ..”

However, Congress deliberately, and over presidential veto,
drafted the section to read:

“The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion
shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor
practice.” (Emphasis supplied.)

This Court recognized that legislative intent in Linn v. United
Plant Guard Workers, supra, 383 U.S. at 62, footnote 5:

It is more likely that Congress adopted this section
for a narrower purpose, i.e., to prevent the Board from
attributing anti-union motive toan employer on the basis
of his past statements. See H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th
Cong., Ist Sess. 45 (1947). Comparison with the
| express protection given union members to criticize
the management of their unions and the conduct of
their officers, 73 Stat. 523 (1959) 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2)
(1964 ed.), strengthens this interpretation of congres-
sional intent. (Emphasis supplied.)

An examination of the legislative history of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA) establishes that Section 8(c) was
indeed enacted, “to prevent the Board from attributing anti-union
motive to an employer on the basis of his past statements.”*

The free speech provision was enacted in reaction to decisions

' 8(c) (29 U.S.C. § 158(c)) was incorporated into the National Labor
Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.), through the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947. For convenience’ sake, citations to Section 8(c) refer to both the NLRA and

11

of the Board and courts which found violations of the Act based upon
non-coercive statements of the employer. Virtually the entire debate
with respect to Section 8(c) centered on whether or not a noncoercive

anti-union statement could be used as evidence to demonstrate
unlawful motive.

Initially there were two versions of the bill - the Senate’s (sponsored by
Senator Taft) and the House version (sponsored by Representative .
Hartley). With respect to the section which would become Section
8(c), House Report No. 245 on H.R. 3020, criticized the decisions of the
Board which found an unfair practice based in part upon previous,
non-coercive anti-union statements of the employer and stated the
purpose for the section:

The bill corrects this, providing that nothing that
anyone says shall constitute or be evidence of an
unfair labor practice unless it, by its own express
terms, threatens force or economic reprisal. . This
means that a statement may not be used against the
person making it unless it, standing alone, is unfair
within the express terms of sections 7 and 8 of the
amended act. (Legis. History, Vol. I, 324) (App. infra
at 44a).

The House Minority iat objected to the inclusion of the
term “evidence”:

But these provisions go far beyond mere protection
of an admitted constitutional right. By saying that
statements are not to be considered as evidence, they
insist that the Board and the courts close their eyes to
the plain implications of speech and disregard clear
and probative evident. In no field of the law are a
man’s statements excluded as evidence of an illegal
intention. Here, again, a deep-seated intention to
protect employers in the commission of unfair labor
practices is evidence. Here, again, the laudable pur-
pose of protecting free speech cloaks an evil design to

LMRA. Citations to the legislative history refer to Legislative History of the Labor Man-

agement Relations Act of 1947, Volumes land II, U.S.Government Printing Office, Wash-

ington, 1959 Reprint (1985). Selected portions of the Legislative History are reprinted

infra at Appendix E. :
12

nian ienea tienen

encourage unfair labor practices by employers. (Legis.
History, Vol. I, 375-376) (App. infra_at 45a)

The Senate version, which also criticized the Board’s decisions
on the issue of free speech did not contain a restrictive provision

regarding evidence:

The committee believes these decisions to be too
restrictive and, in this section, provides that if, under
all circumstances, there is neither an expressed or
implied threat of reprisal, force, or offer ofbenefit, the
Board shall not predicate any finding of unfair labor
practice upon the statement. The Board, of course,
will not be precluded from considering such statements as
evidence. (Emphasis supplied) (Legis. History, Vol. I,
429-30) (App. infra at 46a)

Ultimately, the House version was adopted by the committee:

The practice which the Board has had in the
past of using speeches and publications of employers
concerning labor organizations and collective bar-
gaining arrangements as evidence, no matter how
irrelevant or immaterial, that some later act of the
employer had an illegal purpose gave rise to the
necessity for this change in the law. The purpose is to
protect the right of free speech when what the em-
ployer says or writes is not of a threatening nature or
does not promise a prohibited favorable discrimina-
tion. (Legis. History, Vol. I, 549) (App. infra at 51a)

In the debate on Section 8(c) which followed the conference

report the discussion again centered almost exclusively on the word
“evidence”.

Mr. PEPPER . . . Under that provision (Section 8(c)),
if an employer were to say on Monday, “1 hate labor
unions, and I think they are a menace to this coun-
try”, and if he fired a man on Thursday and the
question was whether that man was fired for cause or
fired because he was agitating for a union in the
plant, would the statement made on Monday, in

which the man said, “1 = labor unions are a
1

menace to this country” be admissible in evidence as
bearing on the question of the reason for the dis-
charge?

Mr. TAFT. All these questions involve a considera-
tion of the surrounding circumstances. It would
depend upon the facts. Under the facts generally
stated by the Senator, I think that statement would
not be evidence of any threat. There would have to be
some other circumstances to tie in with the act of the
employer. If the act of discharging is illegal and an
unfair labor practice, consideration of such a state-
ment would be proper. But it would not be proper to
consider as evidence in such a case a speech which in
itself contained no threat express or implied. That is
the effect of the House language which we accepted.

Mr. PEPPER. If the Senator will permit, that is the
point I want to emphasize —

Mr. TAFT. That is the effect of the House language.

Mr. PEPPER. That under the criminal law at the
present time any statement a man may make prior to
a given act which the court may try to evaluate may
be admitted in evidence as having some relationship
to his intentions. But the conference report deliber-
ately excludes statements of that sort, unless the
Statement contains an actual threat, thereby depriv-
ing the Board of the full evidence in the case.

Mr. TAFT. So long as the Board has a statement of
that kind the employer’s mouth is practically shut. In
case he makes a speech later on and is charged with
some unfair or unlawful labor practice, and that can
be considered in evidence, it means that he cannot
afford to speak at all. Without that provision there is
not freedom of speech. I say that is one thing a man
ought to have. He ought to have freedom of speech,
and it seems to me we should put in the word
“evidence.” (Legis. History, Vol. II, 1545-46) (App.
infra at 54a-55a)

14

——— SSS. aaaE---~-~S-~—S

Senators Morse and Murray were also among the critics of the
conference report.

The House version was ultimately adopted and sent to Presi-
dent Truman, who vetoed it. In his veto message, the President made
specific mention of Section 8(c):

The bill would introduce a unique handicap,
unknown in ordinary law, upon the use of state-
ments as evidence of unfair labor practices. An anti-
union statement by an employer, for example, could
: not be considered as evidence of motive, unless it

contained an explicit threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit. (Legis. History, Vol. I, 915, 918)

(App. infra at 63a)

The veto was overridden by Congress and the House version
of Section (c) became the law. Despite this abundantly clear discussion
between both the proponents and opponents of Section 8(c) and this
Court's discussion of that section in Gissel Packing, Linn v. United Plant
Guard Workers , Exchange Parts and NLRB v. United Steelworkers, supra,
the Board and the courts have continued to do precisely what is
forbidden oy statute and by the First Amendment. They continue to
use employers’ protected statements as evidence of anti-union motive
and unfair labor practices.

In this case petitioner's statements in the poster contained no
threats, coercion or promise of benefit. The employer's speech is
protected by Section 8(c) and by the First Amendment. The Board
contends that it is not using the statement as “evidence of unfair labor
practice” but merely as “background” evidence of animus, “which
shall be considered in placing the events described herein in proper
focus.” (Decision of the Board, App. infra at 25a). This is a distinction
without a difference.

a DECISIONS OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL

The courts of appeal are divided on use of statements that constitute
protected speech.

. Their comments are contained in the appendix, infra, at S6a, 57a and 58a.
15

eeaeneenelll

used as

uruon:

1, Circuits Which Permit Use Of Protected Speech As

Evidence.

Among the earlier decisions to hold that free speech may be

evidence” is Hendrix Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB,
321 F.2d 100, 103 (Sth Cir. 1963) (Hendrix). The Hendrix Court first
acknowledged that the company had the “legal right” to oppose the

As was its legal right, NLRB v. McGahey, 233 F.2d 406,
409 (Sth Cir. 1956), the Employer made no bones
about its opposition to the Union. ... It was neither
charged nor found that the speech, as such, was a
violation of the Act. The Board, with ample justifica-
tion did regard this as an emphatic statement of anti-
union attitude. In this sense it is properly “back-
ground” against which to measure statements, con-
duct, and the like made by spokesmen, especially in
terms of the interpretation which the employees
reasonably could put on such actions. More specifi-
cally, this would bear on the question whether, from
the listeners’ point of view, these statements by sub-
ordinate management constituted forbidden coer-
cion, threats or intimidation. (Id. at 103-104).

The court then attempted to explain in a footnote how the

Board could use the protected free speech:

frees

We do not regard this as a left-handed finding that
Trippe’s statement was illegal. Cf. NLRB v. Colvert
Dairy Products Co., 10th Cir. 1963, 317 F.2d 44.

Of course the purpose of the speech, as was quite
proper, was to state management’s reasons why a
union was not needed and why it hoped the employ-
ees would vote it down. It was, therefore, anti-union.
But it was legally anti-union. (Jd. at 104, n. 6).

The Fifth Circuit again permitted the Board to use protected

peech in NLRB v. Builders Supply Co. of Houston, 410 F.2d 606, 608

(Sth Cir. 1969), as background “against which to examine these (other)
statements and conduct which were in fact found to be unlawful.” Id.
at 608. See also : NLRB v. Colonial Lincoln Mercury Sales, Inc., 485 F.2d

16

eT

455, 456 (Sth Cir. 1973) and NLRB v. Birdsall Construction Co., 487 F.2d
288, 291 (Sth Cir. 1973).

In Orchard Corp. of America v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1969),
the court concluded that while the company had the right to campaign
vigorously against the union, the employer's background of “strong
anti-union posture” could be considered as “the overall background
surrounding the parties lends substance to the Board’s finding of
violations. ...” (Id. at 342).

Similar uses of protected speech as “background” have been
permitted in the Fourth Circuit: Darlington Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB,
397 F.2d 760, 769 (4th Cir. 1968) (sanctioning the use of protected
statements to draw background of controversy and Go

Section 8(c): The bill further amends section 8 of the Wagner
Act by the addition of section 8(c). This section provides that “expres-
sion of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not consti-
tute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice * * * if such expression
contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.” This
provision for some reason does not expressly include oral expressions
of views. This omission in view of the express reference to written
statements would appear to be inadvertent.

Comment: This provision was substituted by the conference
committee for the Senate provision prohibiting the Board from finding
any noncoercive statement to be an unfair labor practice. It thus goes
far beyond the Senate provision and far beyond the mere protection of
an admitted constitutional right. By saying that statements are not to
be considered as evidence, the bill requires the Board and the courts to
close their eyes to the plain implications of speech and disregard clear
and probative evidence. In no other field of law area man’s statements
thus excluded as evidence of an illegal intention. The sweeping
character of the prohibition is such that, if enacted into law, it will
seriously circumscribe the Board in the prevention of the unfair
practices proscribed by the bill. In this connection it should be noted
that this limitation would apply not only to employer violations of the
act but also to union unfair labor practices as well.

58a

REMARKS OF SENATOR PEPPER
Congressional Record, Senate - June 6, 1947
(pp. 6673-74) (Legis. History, Vol. II, p. 1590-91)

I come to the next subsection, (c) which reads as follows:

The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion,
or the dissemination thereof, whether in written,
printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute
or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any
of the provisions of this act, if such expression con-
tains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit.

What does that mean?

First, let me state what the law isat the present time. Under the
present law, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to discharge
a worker because he attempts to organize or to join a union. The
question is always at issue in such a case before the National Labor
Relations Board as to what was the real reason for the discharge of the
employee. Was he incompetent? Did he violate the rules of the
company? Or was he discharged because he was trying to organize or
to join a union? The Board has to take all the evidence. It has to have
a trial, the way a court would, to determine what was in the mind of
the employer when he fired the worker. Why did he fire him? Under
the present law, in such a trial anything the employer wishes to
introduce, as ina civil or criminal trial, if it is relevant, can be admitted
in evidence and considered by the Board.

Suppose 10 workers are fired. Under the present law they
make a complaint to the National Labor Relations Board. The Board
has a trial to determine from the evidence what was the reason for the
discharge of those 10 workers. Was it because they were trying to
organize a union in that plant, or was it because they were the 10 most
inefficient workers in the organization? Under the present law, if
someone heard the employer say, “I hate labor unions; they are a
menace to America,” that statement could be admitted in evidence.
The Board could consider it and weigh it in connection with the act of
the employer in discharging those 10 workers. But there were some
good lawyers working on this conference report. Some very able,
competent lawyers were working on it. They provided that what a
man says or writes or prints cannot even be put in evidence unless the
statement itself is complete with a threat. In that connection, let us

59a

consider a comparable situation; namely, a case in criminal law.
Suppose a defendant is on trial for murder, and suppose he has an
alibi; suppose he says, “I am a good friend of the deceased. I did not
have anything to do with his death. I was somewhere else.” Suppose
a witness states that a week before the murder the defendant said, “1
hate that fellow. He ought to be dead.” That testimony would be
admissible in any court in the United States; but under this bill, by
analogy, it could not be admitted unless the defendant said, “1 hate
that fellow. He ought to be dead, and I am going to kill him next
Saturday night witha pistol.” Mr. President, is that fair? Is it designed
to give the worker fair protection?

That indicates the way this bill is simply riddled with such
hidden knives to strike at the heart of labor. That is why the bill is so
much more dangerous than appears on its face.

REMARKS OF SENATOR TAFT
Congressional Record, Senate - June 12, 1947
(7000, 7002) (Legis. History, Vol. II, pp. 1622, 1624)

SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSIS OF LABOR BILL AS PASSED

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, in the course of the debate on the
conference agreement on H.R. 3020 a number of arguments directed
at specific provisions of the bill were made on the floor which were not
justified by either the text of the bill or the background of statutes and
decisions against which it was written. In addition, numerous com-
pletely erroneous statements were made with respect to the effect of
certain portions of the bill. In order to make clear the legislative intent,
I placed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD last Thursday an analy-
sis of its provisions. As I stated at the close of debate on Friday, I
consider it advisable to supplement that analysis to cover some
mistaken statements made on the floor.

I therefore ask unanimous consent to have printed in the

RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks a supplementary
analysis.

> = = 2 ©

Section 8(c) Free speech: During the conference the provi-
sions in the Senate bill relating to the right of free speech were
rewritten to conform to the House bill so that this subsection now
reads as follows: “(c) The expressing of any views, argument, or
opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed,
graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair
labor practice under any of the provisions of this act, if such expression
contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.”

Several Senators have assailed this section on the ground that
the words “shall not contribute or be evidence of an unfair labor
practice” would prevent the Board from applying ordinary rules of
evidence in unfair labor practice cases. The purpose of the conferees,
as said in the statement I placed in the RECORD at the opening of the
debate, was to make it clear that the Board is not to construe utterances
containing neither threats nor promises of benefit as an unfair labor
practice standing alone oras making some act which would otherwise
be legal an unfair labor practice. The conferees had in mind a number
of Board decisions in which because of the fact that an employer has
at some time committed an unfair labor practice a speech by him,
innocuous in itself, has been held not to be privileged. The conferees

6la

did not believe that past misconduct should deprive either employers
or labor organizations of the privilege of exercising constitutional
rights. There have also been a number of decisions by the Board in
which discharges of employees, even though there was no evidence in
the surrounding circumstances of discrimination, have been deemed
unfair labor practices simply because at one time or another the
employer has expressed himself as not in favor of unionization of his
employees. The object of this section, therefore, is to make it clear that
decisions of this sort cannot be made under the conference bill.

It has been argued, however, that the prohibition against using
expressions of opinion as evidence goes much further than the rules
with respect to admissibility in a criminal or civil trial. Senators
making this argument overlook the fact that the privilege of this
subsection is limited to expression of “views, arguments, or opinion.”
It has no application to statements which are acts in themselves or
contain directions or instructions. These, of course, could be deemed
admissions and hence competent under the well-recognized excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. Numerous comparisons with criminal and
civil trials have been made. Consider a more exact comparison. A man
is on trial for selling liquor illegally. The fact that he had argued
against adoption of the Volstead Act would scarcely be permitted to
be used in evidence against him. In a murder trial in which defendant
is accused of killing a Republican Senator his political views or
opinions would not be competent testimony. Yet the Board has
permitted employers’ expressions of opinion on unionism to be used
to sustain the theory that he was guilty of violations of the National
Labor Relations Act.

62a

VETO MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT TRUMAN
Congressional Record, House - June 20, 1947
(7500, 7502) (Legis. History, Vol. I, 915, 918)

To the House of Representatives:

I return herewith without my approval, H.R. 3020, the Labor-
Management Relations Act of 1947.

Iam fully aware of the gravity which attaches to the exercise by
the President of constitutional power to withhold his approval from
an enactment of the Congress.

I share with Congress the conviction that legislation dealing
with the relations between management and labor is necessary. |
heartily condemn abuses on the part of unions and employers, and I
have no patience with stubborn insistence or private advantage to the
detriment of the public interest.

But this bill is far from a solution of those problems.

a a Coe

(5) The bill would introduce a unique handicap, unknown in
ordinary law, upon the use of statements as evidence of unfair labor
practices. An anti-union statement by an employer, for example,
could not be considered as evidence of motive, unless it contained an
explicit threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. The bill would
make it an unfair labor practice to “induce or encourage” certain types
of strikes and boycotts, and then would forbid the National Labor
Relations Board to consider as evidence “views, agreement, or opin-
ion” by which such a charge could be proved.

ADDRESS OF SENATOR TAFT
ON VETO OF LABOR RELATIONS ACT
Congressional Record, Senate - June 21, 1947
(A3232-33) Legis. History, Vol. II, 1626-27)

The President attacks the provision giving freedom of speech
to employers. The need for such a provision was the one thing
admitted even by labor union leaders. The Bill simply provides that
views, argument, or opinion shall not be evidence of aft unfair labor
practice unless they contain in themselves a threat of coercion or a
promise of benefit. Without these provisions there would be no
freedom of speech on the part of employers any more than there has
been for the last 10 years.

APPENDIX F

See enclosed
fold-out poster

Netra, quacewes

A NEW STATE
A NEW START:

|

A Vall 0 ACTION... ,

TO ALL FREE-
THINKING |
CITIZENS! |

RISE UP...

AND BREAK
TAXATION,

THE BONDS OF OPPRESSIVE
WELFARE SUBSIDIES,
AND PINKO

MAKE THE BREAK.

FROM THE TYRANNY OF DETROIT AND BIG-CITY
DOMINATION OF STATE GOVERNMENT.

SL

La

SUPPORT N EM
+ LEADERSHIP,

\\aS a OF A FREE THINKING, ENERGETIC,
FAIRLY NICE-LOOKING, HONORABLE,
TRUSTWORTHY AND SPIRITED MAN
WHO WILL LEAD US TO OUR RIGHT-
Js LN

At significant risk to his own comfortable life style, Louis Hall has offered to lead
us out of the darkness of oppression into the promising future of independence

Beneath this modest exterior beats the heart of true patriot. Like the inspiring leaders
who have preceded him in history - people like Ghengis Kahn, Pat Paulsen and Calvin
Coolidge - Louis Hall knows that the only thing that separates prosperity and chaos

is men of vision

) Letting SOT body be both a lawyer and a polite 1an rs lrke PaYtig
a shark in advance to give you swimming lessons. —

Louis Hall

Here’s a look at our nation’s 5lst state

STATE CAPTOL SOMA

MACKINAW ISLAND

Through the use of a Naval blockade, we will
seal off the island while the state government
is in session. Armed gunboats will prevent
anybody leaving until the work is done. We cut
off electricity after six weeks, and stop food
and beverage deliveries after eight weeks.

AAG ’ af =
pes , Va «te -

GAMBLING

BEAVER ISLAND: CASINO GAMBLING.

This is an appropriate spot to locate new

resorts. People will be able to feed deer and
play Blackjack at the same time. With

Mackinaw island subject to Naval blockades,
people would probably feel more secure about

going to a place that they could leave
whenever their money ran out.

OFFICIAL STATE SPORT

DUELING

A state of Sixonesix will be the first state to bring
back dueling as a legitimate and honorable means
of settling disputes. This ‘vill hold costs of main
taining a judiciary to an absolute minimum,
should hold down bad checks and overdue ac
counts, and get rid of obnoxious neighbors.

MIDLAND

MIDLAND NUCLEAR PLANT AND THE
DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY.

If Michigan doesn’t want them, we'll take them.

OFFICIAL STATE PRINTER

MIDDLE EARTH GRAPHICS

While Louis Hall may be a revolutionary, he’s not dumb. He has a new 25" by
38°" two-color press that needs to be kept working. The only consideration he

asks for is that he gets to do all of the state printing (and while Sixonesix is
getting off the ground, Middle Earth Graphics needs a lot of business to help
finance this scheme.)

SNAPPING TURTLE

This perfect symbol of the state philosophy,

the snapping turtle usually minds his own

business, has a very thick skin, is a fierce

guardian of the nest, and will chop a finger
off of anybody that disturbs it

STATE FLOWER: THIST

As a great military leader once stated, ‘‘Touch a
thistle lightly and you get pricked. But grab it
firmly and there’s no danger.’’ The leadership of
Sixonesix won’t be tentative. We’re out to insult,
abuse, and irritate anybody that gets in the way
of our quest for rugged individualism.

ize.
AN +f ( my ma ; :
ting fat“ , Blackfeet indians, the Bluefoot Tribe
ot tUl¥s af a, U

\ .

Were

Manahigi Quanani Kawawa

This comes from an ancient Viking slogan
which translates to: ‘Buddy, if you don't

start pulling your share of the load, you

cant goon any more pillaging (rips. -.

Just as the Phoenix ros? to glory from the
ashes, the state of Six .esix will rise from the
dead hulk of the state »f Michigan.

EASTERN MOAT WITH DRAWBRIDGE.

Access to the state of Sixonesix will be
severely restricted. Drawbridges will be raised
to keep out such undesirable elements as labor

7 — *
a

STATE FLAG

The distinctive ‘‘belt and suspenders’’ design of
the Sixonesix state flag is a symbol that best por-
trays the conservative philosophy of our citizens.
The padlock represents our fiscal policy towards
teachers, union bosses, lawyers, and politicians.

organizers, dead beats, carpetbagging politi
cians, and itinerant lawyers.

p*

LOUIS HALL’S VIEWS ON:

WELFARE, DEADBEATS, HUCKSTERS,
AND LILYLIVERED POLITICIANS.

(excerpts from a recent news conference where weakkneed
journalists demonstrate their left-wing reporting and failure to
appreciate the kind of qualities that made this country great. )

Q. You can’t be serious about this thing are you? It looks like the only people you have
left out from your insulting policies are nuns, the retarded, and radio announcers.
A. Yes, I guess I overlooked them.

Q. Isn’t the designation of Middle Earth Graphics as the ‘‘official state printer’’ unfair?
There certainly have to be a lot of other good printers who should be able to com-

pete for state printing. What are you going to do about them”?
A. Let them start their own state. This was my idea.

Q. Some people are saying this whole thing is just a publicity stunt and that you really
aren't trying to start a new state. Also, sixteen dollars each for the Sixonesix
bumper stickers seems like a ridiculous price and it would appear as though vou are

just trying to seli some extra printing. What have you got to say about that?
A. How rmanv bumper stickers do you want?

Q. Don’t you realize how offensive this whole thing sounds? There certainly are some
good teachers, honest politicians, capable lawyers, and conscientious union leaders.

Doesn't it require more tlian just self-made businessmen to make a state?
A. Who says?

Q. Many of us are curious about how you were able to get anybody to write and design
all of this crap. What kind of an artist or writer would stoop to putting out such of-
fensive and mindless stuff? What method did you use to get them to work on this
project?

A. Cash.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385020_0508%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.