# Appendix — Woods v. Hudak, 110 S. Ct. 501 (1989) (No. 89-517)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1989

## Text

FILED
sep 25 was

JR.
J08 CLERK

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1989

ROBERT WOODS,

Petitioner,
vs.

JOSEPH E. HUDAK,

Respondent.

Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit

APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
VOLUME II

JOHN M. SILVESTRI, ESQ.
Attorney for Petitioner
828 Frick Building

437 Grant Street
Pittsburgh, PA 15219-6002
(412) 391-0958

APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Page

Volume I

Opinion Of The United States
Court Of Appeals For The Third
Circuit, Per Higginbotham,
Stapleton And Rosenn, JJ... . A-1

Memorandum Opinion Of The United
States District Court For The
Western District Of
Pennsylvania Dated
October 1, 1987, Per
ROGONMDOFG, Je «© « © © © © « © « Aw55

Memorandum Opinion Of The United
States District Court For The
Western District Of -
Pennsylvania Dated
October 21, 1988, Per
Rosenberg, J. « « « «© « © « « « Aw~64

Opinion Of The United States
District Court For The Western
District of Pennsylvania
Dated December 22, 1988, Per
Rosenberg, J. « « © « © e-« « « A=/9

Volume II

Memorandum Opinion Of The United
States District Court For The
Western District Of
Pennsylvania Dated
January 9, 1989, Per
Rosenberg, J. . « « « © « « « « A=188

Ex Parte Motion For A Temporary
Restraining Order ...... . A-192

Stipulation for "Consent Order"
dated September 30, 1987
(Paragraphs 1-4 & 11-17). .. . A-203

- ja -

(Appendix - Continued) Page

Order Of The District Court Dated
Doewmer by Teer « 6 « « «© ec wl tw AHWHZO08

Dismissal Of The Bankruptcy Case

Dated November 30, 1987 . .. . A-210
Motion For Contempt Of March 31, ~
1988 (Paragraphs 1-64). ... . A-212

Motion For Contempt Of April 7,
1988. . * . + ° . . * e ° . . A-241

Motion To Dismiss Contempt
Proceedings ° ° . 7 . . . . . . A-247

Order Of The District Court Dated
October 21, 1988 Denying
Motion To Dismiss Contempt
Pemeeeeamee « «© + « 0 © «© « « Am254

Order Of The District Court Dated
December 22, 1988 Adjudicating
Contempt And Imposing
Additional Conditions On The
DO Sk sos « 6 «© « « « « « Aw25§

Order Of The District Court Dated
January 9, 1989 Disposing Of
Post-Trial Motions. ..... . A-269

Judgment Of The Court Of Appeals
Dated June 28, 1989 Affirming
The District Court With
ee ee ee ee ee Se 2A

Order Of The Court Of Appeals
Dated June 30, 1989
Amending The Judgment Of
wae mee CPE fe te le ltl el ltl wl wl ew AMR|73

NOTE: The misspellings of the district
court opinions are not corrected
herein.

she did not know a lot of things about
the business or the way to handle things
that have to be done; and that she lets
Woods handle it and she accepts wnat he
does (Id. at 73, 74, 108, 109).
Throughout her testimony, she was a
little less bitter towards her daughter,
Sharon, than towards her then son-
inlaw, the plaintiff. Her acrimony,
nevertheless, showed plainly her
innermost feelings. |

The evidence of Geraldine Woods,
sometimes known as G. Woods, is striking
because of her actual testimony and of
the manner in which she spoke and acted
on the witness stand, and specifically on
one occasion when she contemptuously
addressed this court’s deputy after my
court deputy instructed her to stay in
“the witness stand, as she tried to leave,

because she was stiil a sworn witness and

A - 139

cities

had not been excused by the court. The

deputy, Miss Paula Templeton, has been a
deputy in this court for many years and
is highly respected for her honesty and
honor. On one occasion, Miss Templeton
suddenly stood up, faced me on the bench
and excitedly said, "She just called me a
bitch." I then excused the witness, Mrs.
Woods, and after swearing Miss Templeton,
requested her to testify to the this
interrupting event. |

In defense, Mrs. Woods’ counsel

questioned her on the stand and she
testified that she only called the deputy
a witch. I do believe Miss Templeton and
I do not believe Mrs. Woods because of
her general demeanor and testimony while
on the stand; but even if she called Miss
Templeton a witch, it would still be
disrespectful and contemptuous to so

address a court official while doing her

A - 140

duty. It shows the manner of person Mrs.
Woods is when she used such antics in a
courtroom. Calling Miss Templeton either
a bitch or a witch made no difference
since either term was insulting and
contemptuous of her official authority by
a witness on the stand. It was this
attitude and demeanor which, expressed in
her own words, deteriorated her
credibility to the point of almost
collapse, except for the important
statements of actually testifying
against herself and her husband, such as
when she said she did not know anything
about her husband’s business and she
admitted that she and her husband
committed various acts against their
Gaughter due to her association with
Hudak (Id. at 12-15, 100-103).

Whether her ignorance in this

connection was feigned or real is

A- 141

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indicative of the fact that her husband,
Robert Woods, instead of being just the
manager of the business, as stated, was
in fact the owner and had control over
the assets in his wife’s name, or other
veiled names. While it seemed an
admission against interest - her interest
~- it was also a revelation of her wifely
functioning for her husband to conceal
his assets. This conclusion I have made
from her testimony as a whole and from
all the other evidence in the case
whereas here and there we find specimens
or volcanic outpourings such as already
indicated in the "bitch/witch" quote.
Thus while Mrs. Woods was, strictly
speaking, the plaintiff’s witness

because he called her, her testimony was

- neither in her nor her husband’s favor.

The defendant produced, as a part

of their defense, attorney John M.

A- 142

Silvestri, who testified to a scuffle
which occurred in the corridor outside a
Common Pleas’ courtroom after a judge had
held Hudak not guilty in a Wood’s
criminal prosecution used as an attack by
Woods. Silvestri was not a defendant in
the injunction, but was named as a party
in the contempt proceeding. Two
different versions were given, one by
Silvestri that he stood two feet away
from Woods and Hudak; that Hudak was the
aggressor and came towards Woods, and
made the assertion that Hudak had sexual
relations with Woods’ wife and Woods’
secretary, Heather; and that it appeared
that Woods spit in Hudak’s face.

Hudak’s recital is that when he
came out of the courtroom into the
corridor, he addressed Silvestri, Woods’
lawyer, out of the presence of Woods to

intercede for a reconciliation, but that

A - 143

Woods came up to him and called him a
"fucking pig face," and then when Hudak
allegedly returned a slurring remark,
Woods spit in Hudak’s face. Thereupon,
Hudak struck Woods defending himself
presumably, as any man would. After
Woods grappled with Hudak, they both fell
to the floor, and the sheriff separated
them both. There was no question that
Woods spit in Hudak’s face from testimony
by both Woods and Hudak witnesses, and
that Hudak then struck Woods.

The question of credibility
exists here between an out-of-court party
defendant-retained lawyer for Woods and
the plaintiff Hudak for the court to
consider and decide. This court studied
Silvestri’s demeanor and testimony on the
stand. Silvestri was an accommodating
lawyer turned witness. Through the short

period while on the stand and while he

A-~ 144 »

|

was not under heavy questioning, he

seemed to take pleasure in testifying
against Hudak. He sometimes said he did
not remember or his attitude seemed
evasive.

The plaintiff Hudak, on the other
hand, is a simple, highly emotionally
involved individual in this case, acting
as his own attorney. He has resen through
much and on frequent occasions, as of the
time of the altercation in the Common
Pleas’ corridor, was, it seemed to me,
attempting to get a clan of bears off his
back. It appears that was how he
addressed Mr. Silvestri. What followed
afterwards came from Hudak with an effort
to get even with Woods. When Woods
became irate and spit into Hudak’s face,
the striking afterwards was probably a

very human act even from an individual

A - 145

who had just been trying to bring about
peace. |

With this detailed resume of the
charges, defenses and all of the evidence
before me as a whole, I find and make
the following Findings of Fact:

that with some repetition of what
was contained in the previous opinion
that Robert Woods, the defendant, made
connection with Joseph E. Hudak who
recently had been admitted to the Bar and
made an agreement with him by which he
advanced him not $30,000 or $50,000 as
previously though but $80,000 as was late
revealed at this second hearing, for the
purpose of setting up a legal firm under
the name of Joseph E. Hudak;

that advertising would be used to
invite divorce and bankruptcy cases; that

over a period of a year, approximately

A - 146

1,000 divorce and bankruptcy cases were
procured by the advertising;

that Woods became a part and
parcel of the firm and engaged in his own
bankruptcy business of some sort and used
a part of the law premises as his office;
that Woods had free access to the files
and records of the law firm and exercised
as well some unrevealed participation in
the management of the Hudak law firm;

that the firm hired on Michael Ss.
Geisler as a lawyer to perform legal
duties in both bankruptcy and divorce
cases;

that Geisler received a basic
weekly amount plus a 10% commission;

that Geisler also brought cases
with him into the Hudak law firm and
continued to practice law °s an
individual and handled his own separate

bankruptcy and divorce cases with or

A - 147

without the knowledge of Hudak and
processed these in his own name from the
Hudak law office;

that Woods chose Hudak without
coercion and presumably fully
knowledgeable of his reputation,
character and characteristics as his
advertising divorce and bankruptcy
associated to whom he eventually
voluntarily turned over $80,000, without
visible security; |

that Woods exhibited, initially,
total friendship with no signs of ili
feelings or bitterness towards Hudak;

that during these many months,
approximately 1,000 bankruptcy and
divorce cases were acquired;

that the Hudak association hired
Attorney Geisler and others to process

these Hudak advertisingly procured cases;

A - 148

overlook the functioning of these
attorneys before the court in relation to
their clients in an adequate, proficient
and ethical manner. This action is one
of equity for federal court functioning
and for its judicial concern, as
presenting cause for the granting of

controlled injunctive relief.

As a prerequisite to the issuance
of a preliminary injunction, the
plaintiff must demonstrate "a reasonable
probability of eventual success on the
merits, "Continental Group, Inc. vy. Amoco
Chemical Corp., 614.F.2d 351, 36-357,
C.A.3, 1980; Delaware River Port
Authority v. Transamerica Trailer
Transport, Inc., 501 F.2d 917, C.A.3,
1974; and “that it will be irreparably

injured pendente lite if relief is not

granted to prevent a change in the status

A - 60

Pictures Industries, Inc., 440 F.2d 761,
763, C.A.3, 1971. In addition, the

possibility of harm to other interested
parties resulting for the grant or denial
or preliminary relief, as well as the
public interest in general should be
taken into account. Delaware River Port
Auth., supra, at 920; Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania ex rel. Creamer v. U.S.

Dept. of Agriculture, 469 F.2d 1387, C.A.
3, 1972.

The standard for granting an
injunction involves a three-stage
inquiry. The initial question is whether
the plaintiffs have succeeded on the
merits of their claim. Beyond that, the
court must look to whether the balance of
equities favors the granting of
injunctive relief and what form the

injunctive remedy should take.

A - 61

wad sacle

Philadelphia Welfare Rights Org’n, v.
Q’Bannon, 525 F.Supp 1055, 1057 (E.D.
Pa., 1981); Prohorsky v. Prudential Ins.
Co. of America, 548 F. Supp. 1337
(N.D.Ind., 1984).

I find that irreparable harm has
already resulted to Hudak and his
clients, to the profession of lawyers,
and to the public at large; and that the
movant and plaintiff has no remedy at
law. I find that the plaintiff has a
more than reasonable probability of
eventual success on the outcome of the
case, on the basis of merit.
Accordingly, the stipulation and request
for a preliminary injunction by this
court will be granted.

The Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law as required by Rule 52

are contained herein in addition to the

A- 62

Cap

stipulation of facts filed by the parties

in this Memorandum. (1)

(1) Rule 52. Findings by the Court

"(a) Effect. In all actions tried
upon the facts without jury... the
court shall find the facts specially and
state separately the conclusions of law
thereon ... . If an opinion or
memorandum of decision is filed, it will
be sufficient if the findings and
conclusions of law appear therein."

A - 63

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSEPH E. HUDAK,

— he eee ee

Plaintiff,
vs. CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-1999
ROBERT WOODS, MICHAEL S. GEISLER )
and RICHARD O’ BRIAN )
)
Defendants. ) |

MEMORANDUM OPINION |
ROSENBERG, DISTRICT JUDGE

The defendant filed a Motion to
Dismiss this action and to dissolve an
injunction previously entered for the
following reasons: 1) that the plaintiff
failed to file briefs as the defendants
indicate were mandated by the court; 2)

that in part, the action is merely a

relitigation of a matter which was the
subject or a criminal prosecution in the

Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas;

A - 64

and 3) that this court lacks jurisdiction
over this matter because it is grounded
in the pendency of a bankruptcy petition
which has since been dismissed.

As to the first contention that
the plaintiff failed to file briefs, the
defendant evidently is not cognizant of
the fact that briefs are not a matter of
record, but are only documents usually
requested by the court to aid the court
in defining facts and in presenting
authority which the court might desire.
In this case, the court actually saw no
need for briefs because it merely
suggested that if the parties wished to
file briefs, they could do so within
certain periods of time. That did not
make it mandatory for anyone to file
briefs and therefore, this contention is

without merit.

i i i i atl ie

As for the defendants’ contention

that this is now relitigation of what
occurred in the Common Pleas Court, that —
too is made to actions in the Court of
Common Pleas which involved the

plaintiff as brought by the defendant
Woods, there was nothing in the instant
case which relitigated anything which
occurred there. So, this contention
lacks merit.

As for the third contention that
this court has no jurisdiction for the
reasons which they set forth, the movants
again show a lack of knowledge of the
processes in which this case has arrived
in this court. The bankruptcy case was
originally filed in that court,
Bankruptcy No. 87-1851, as an
involuntary action brought by counsel,
Yaier YY. Lehrer, presenting the
invcluntary bankruptcy petition. The

A - 66

second matter in this action was the
bankruptcy adversary proceeding docket at
87-00356. The adversary proceeding was
brought before this court, as the docket

entries show, on September 16, 1987 as

motion for temporary restraining order
and this court withdrew the matter form
bankruptcy court and assigned to the
United States District court this
adversary proceeding. It stated "this
withdrawal is for the purpose of
correcting and modifying the same as an
appropriate action for a preliminary
injunction, Civil Action No. 87-1999,"
and was assigned to this judge in this
court. Jurisdiction was accepted,
received, retained by the court on
September 22, 1987, and still exists in
this court.

When the defendants in their
motion to dismiss set forth the fact that

A - 67

"this court lacks jurisdiction over this
matter in as much as the court’s original
jurisdiction was grounded on the pendency
of a bankruptcy petition which has long
since been dismissed" (Def. Motion to
Dismiss, p. 2 (11), they refer to Item 24
in the bankruptcy proceeding 87-1851
dated November 30, 1987, the stipulation
for the withdrawal of the bankruptcy
petition on behalf of Woods, signed on
November 30, 1987 modified December 2,
1987 and certified that "all creditors
had been advised of this motion to
dismiss." the case was dismissed and the
case is closed.

This court was not notified of
this action. It appears, given the
complicated nature of this case, that
perhaps all creditors of the Hudak law
firm were not properly notified in this

case and general averment or

A - 68

certification to this effect is
insufficient for this court.

The matter before me now involves
the alleged contempt of a preliminary
induneten entered by this court on
September 30, 1987. This court’s powers
of contempt are not’ limited by the
dismissal of the underlying action. The
District Court’s power to punish for |

contempt is inherent and includes the

bankruptcy courts. Preferred Surfacing,

Inc. v. Gwinnett Bank & Trust Co., 400
F.Supp 280 (N.D. Ga. 1975).

Additionally, the defendant omits at
least one important fact evident to this
court upon inspection of the bankruptcy
records. The underlying bankruptcy
matter (87-1851) was not merely
dismissed; it was dismissed pursuant to
the stipulation for withdrawal of
bankruptcy petition on hehalf of G. Woods

A - 69

dated November 30, 1987. It would
certainly, in the least, be inequitable
for this court to allow any party to
attempt to defeat the provisions of a
preliminary injunction and avoid conterpt
by stipulation to a dismissal of another
matter.

“This court was not notified that
the parties stipulated to the withdrawal
of the related bankruptcy matter. It is
the belief of this court that the parties
may have consented to the withdrawal of
the underiying bankruptcy matter
illegally and may have perpetrated fraud
on this court by failure to notify this

court of its intention when all parties

~ had actual knowledge that this court had

taken jurisdiction of the adversary
matter relating to the bankruptcy.
When this court accepted this

case and acted in the issuance of a

A =- 70

temporary restraining order, it did so
also as a court of equity. With the aid
of the parties, the temporary
restraining order was eventually
converted into a preliminary injunction,
and thereafter, on October 1, 1988 into a
permanent injunction. Under these
circumstances, this court acted within
the jurisdiction granted in bankruptcy
statutes because the jurisdiction did not
supplant the statute providing that the
district curt of all civil actions
arising under the laws of the United
States, but merely supplemented that
statute; therefore, the statute
conferring upon the district court
original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the laws of the
United States provides an additional,
independent basis for federal district
court’s jurisdiction in bankruptcy

A - 71

cases. A general order revesting :

original bankruptcy jurisdiction in the
district court, as was done in this case,
vest jurisdiction in the district judges
as district judges. (emphasis added.)
UNRB Industries. Inc., 725 F.2d 1111 (Ill.
1984). In any event, even if this action
has been precipitously processed before
an uninformed member of the bankruptcy ;
court as did occur, the dismissal of the
bankruptcy case does not mandate the
dismissal of all pending adversary
proceedings. Stardust Inn, Inc. vy. ‘
Doshi, 70 B.R. 888 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Pa.
1987). Further, even if the dismissal as
averred exists as indicated in the docket
of the bankruptcy proceeding, it would
matter little because the jurisdiction
granted to the bankruptcy court is broad
and nothing in the statute governing
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court

A- 72

prohibits continuance of jurisdiction

over an adversary proceeding, which arose
in or was related to a bankruptcy case,
following dismissal of the underlying
bankruptcy case. in_re Pocklington, 21
B.R. 199 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Cal 1982). The
defendants by their motion to dismiss
attempt to sidetrack this case.

If the bankruptcy judge who
signed the dismissal order had been fully
informed and had known that the district
court had transferred and removed to that
court the adversary proceeding involving
the injunctive processes and hearings and
the work and time that the district court
had expended, it is doubtful that the
judge would have allowed withdrawal of
the bankruptcy case itself. Whether he
did or did not have knowledge, the
bankruptcy judge did not have

jurisdiction to overrule or take over

A= 73

itself any matter which a district court

judge was actively engaged in performing.
A bankruptcy court does not have such a
power and this court neither approved the
withdrawal of the bankruptcy action not
received notification of its removal, and
it would not have agreed to relinquish
its jurisdiction after the time involved
and the serious consequences that could
occur by an unthinkable action. To do
so, would be a waste of the time and
money for all involved in the injunctive
proceeding and the contempt hearings
which followed and would be an enormous
injustice to the plaintiff in this case
and to all related individuals who have
suffered immensely because they would
have been left in the same position as if
the injunctive proceeding had never been
brought, The hundreds of worried and

helpless divorce and bankruptcy cases

A- 74

would still be stranded by such an

insensitive and preposterous action.
Furthermore, it would only open the gates
to additional litigation in many ways by
many people including that of the
plaintiff himself.

Assuming, nevertheless, as a
matter of consideration, of which this
court does not approve, that the
withdrawal of the bankruptcy proceeding
on November 30, 1987, in the bankruptcy
court ended the dependent action of the
adversary matter taken over by this court
on October 1, 1987 when it issued a
permanent injunction, the defendant would
not be helped even by the bankruptcy
judges themselves. Even in the most
controversial of cases, In re
Pocklington, Supra, where a statement was
made that as a general rule dismissal of

a bankruptcy case results in the

A - 75

dismissal of all adversary proceedings
filed in that case, the Pocklington court
said that it did not follow that rule,
but instead retained jurisdiction over an
adversary proceeding without that
bankruptcy court, even though the
underlying bankruptcy case was dismissed.
That judge also noted that Section 349 of
the Bankruptcy Code clearly contemplates
continuation of jurisdiction in
appropriate circumstances. In another
case, In re Rush, 49 B.R. 158 (N.D. Ala.
1985), which held with the thinking of
the judge in Pocklington, the judge in
this case held that there was authority
that an adversary proceeding may have an
individual life after the closing of the
main bankruptcy case.

The majority of all the
bankruptcy cases hold as did the judge in
Stardust Inn. Inc., Supra, that "the

A - 76

court could retain jurisdiction over an
adversary proceeding although the main
bankruptcy case had been dismissed."
Since this court had informed and made
public as a matter of record that it
accepted jurisdiction in this adversary
proceeding, that it continues to act in
its regard and expended a large amount of
court time and research time, that it had
two hearings on it and did not reject or
deny its jurisdiction, but continues to
perform arduously the burden which it has
assumed in this injunctive proceeding as
an adversary bankruptcy matter, I cannot
permit it to be said than an uninformed
bankruptcy judge could possibly deprive
it of its jurisdiction. Accordingly,
this third basis for the dismissal of
this action before this court is

completely without merit.

A - 77

For all of the aforementioned
reasons, the motion of the defendants
will be denied.

A - 78

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSEPH E. HUDAK,

~~ ee ee ee

Plaintiff,
vs. CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-1999
ROBERT WOODS, MICHAEL S. )
GEISLER, and RICHARD )
O’ BRIAN )
Defendants. )
OPINION

ROSENBERG, DISTRICT JUDGE

This action came to me as acting
Miscellaneous judge while the members of
the District Court and Bankruptcy Court
attended a judicial conference in
Philadelphia, It came as an adversary
proceeding related to a bankruptcy case
which had been initiated on July 15, 1987
by Yaier Y. Lehrer, Esq. on behalf of
creditors, against Joseph E. Hudak, an

attorney.

A- 79

er

When I saw that possible harm was
being done not only to the plaintiff, but
to a multitude of innocent clients who
had paid money to have bankruptcy and
divorce cases filed and processed, and
with possible disrepute and harm to the
legal profession and the courts, I
accepted the matter as a district court
action with equitable concerns and powers
and accepted jurisdiction of the case for
the purpose of seeing that public justice
was done.

The instant determination which I
am called upon to adjudicate and enforce
is required because of a series of
motions, two emotion-filled and
unmethodical hearings, the first of which
produced an unproductive set of
stipulations between the parties which
enabled me to arrive at an injunctive

Order of Court, the basis for the charges

A - 80

of contempt and the foundation for this

court’s present jurisdiction and
authoritative actions.

This instant matter is presently
before me for civil contempt, after the
injunctive order dated october 1, 1987
and after a series of petitions or
motions by the plaintiff complaining of
violations of the injunctive Order, and
then after a hearing thereon for the
purpose of determining whether the
enjoined parties were recalcitrant and in
contempt of the Order of Court dated
October 1, 1987.

During the first hearing, partial
evidence was presented, but the parties
through their counsel stipulated to an
accepted injunction. Some skirmish and
delay of time was caused by one of the
attorneys for Woods, but eventually

through in-chamber conferences and

A - 61

outside agreements, the parties submitted

a proposed stipulation for approval by
this court. When eventually the matter
was presented to me, I approved the
September 30, 1987, stipulation with the
Clarifications by Order of Court dated
October 1, 1987.

The Injunctive Order appeared to
quiet the scene and to conciliate the
parties by their own peacemaking. On
March 31, 1988 and again on April 8,
1988, the plaintiff filed motions for
contempt of court for the failure of the
defendants and others to obey the
stipulated and injunctive command of
October 1, 1987. The petition was filed
to compel recalcitrant prime parties and
others to cease and desist their harmful
action against the plaintiff, Joseph E.
Hudak, his wife and children and to stop

them from interfering with his business

A - 82

and personal life, by enforcing the
performance ot the undertakings to which
they agreed in the stipulated series of
understandings incorporated into the
Injunctive Order of Court dated October
1, 1987, and to stop all harassment and
free the plaintiff and others related to
him from punishing and harmful
annoyances.

All litigation with few
exceptions can ever be said to be devoid
of some sort of emotion and antipathy
between the parties or witnesses.
However, the character of this case
requires more details than does the
ordinary action, because of the almost
dramatic theme which it portrays and
projects. Accordingly, the required
recital of details seems to make this
opinion over-long. It should, however,

present a panoramic understanding upon

A - 83

which credibility and factfinding have
been more reliably ascertained.

The plaintiff Hudak did not
originally seek damages, but only that
the defendants perform civilly in
accordance with their original
undertakings. This instant matter is now
before me not for the purpose of

\

vindicating the court’s authority. G& Cc.
Merriam Co. vy. Webster Dictionary Co.,
inca, . 639 F.2d 29 (lst Cir. 1980).

Civil contempt sanctions are remedial.
Id. The parties themselves stipulated to
the injunction, and the purpose of civil
contempt is to compel obedience to
enforce the rights of parties to the
action. In re Irving, 600 F.2d 1027 (2nd
Cir. 1979), cert. den., Dibapi v.

Irving, 444 U.S. 866 (1979). There are
two forms of civil contempt sanctions.

The first is a coercive contempt sanction

A- 84

which looks to the future and is designed
to aid the plaintiff by bringing a
defiant party into compliance with a
court order. The second is a
compensatory sanction which seeks to
compensate the plaintiff through payment
of money for damages cause by past acts
of disobedience. U.S. v. Basil Inv.
Corp., 528 F. Supp 1225 (Ed PA 1981). It
is clear that it is the first form of
civil contempt with which the plaintiff
is concerned, but this court must also
determine, not that the plaintiff be
compensated, but that others be protected
compensatorily, if only in procuring the
results contemplated by the injunctive
Order of Court.

The plaintiff in this case,
Joseph E. Hudak, newly admitted to the
Bar, was immediately drawn into an

_ association with one Robert Woods, one of —

A- 85

the defendants. While the events in the

case first showed an unsecured "loan" of
$30,000 or $50,000 to Hudak by Woods, it
later appears that the sum total was
actualiy $80,000. The purpose of the
loan was to establish an advertising
attorneys’ office for procuring divorce
and bankruptcy cases on a high-volume
scale. The advertising was successful,
not only in Allegheny County, but in
other counties of the Commonwealth, with
the filing of divorce cases in Cameron
County.

Approximately 1,000 cases were
received by the Hudak law association and
Hudak hired an attorney, one Michael S.
Geisler, a defendant in this case, and
another individual, William C. Bartley,
was named as the office manager.
Previously, Bartley had resigned from the

bar of Pennsylvania because of his

A - 86

ai lal
involvement in a felony. in the
association with Hudak in The Bigelow,
Woods had an office in the Hudak law
association and personally and actively
engaged in a mortgage business of some
kind, in the Hudak set-up. Woods also
had total access to all records of the
office and was obviously a meaningful
participant in the newly created law
office in Hudak’s name. It is not known
exactly how active Woods was from the
evidence: before me, but sufficient
evidence that he was active kept coming
in piecemeal.

The business, however did go well
because the number of cases which came in
was beyond the capacity of the members
of the organization. Hudak, himself, was
stated to be the one in control, but it
is apparent that he was a newly admitted

attorney with no experience. He knew

A - 87

very little about law and legal

procedure, especially, in divorce
procedure and bankruptcy.

By Geisler’s own testimony, it
appears that he was the one who knew more
about procedure because he had carried on
his own business before coming into the -
Hudak organization and continued with his
own business while in the Hudak
organization. However, he participated
in a share of the Hudak organizations’
proceeds. Geisler was hired on a
commission basis and was to receive a
base salary of $375.00 per week, plus a
10% commission of income from all cases
(TR of 6-14-88 Hearing, DC #44, p. 234-
235). The evidence is clear by his own
testimony that he was a personally,
money~interested associate in this law

combination.

A- 88

For approximately one year, the
relationship between Woods and Hudak was
unassailable. Where amity and close
business relationships existed, problems
began and Hudak threw Woods out of their
shared offices. As a result, Woods
became so displeased that in August,
1987, he started a systematic avalanche
upon Hudak’s activities intended to
destroy Hudak, his law business, his
clients and all who associated with him;
and Woods even began to inflict suffering
and obstructions to his own daughter and
grandchildren. At first, Woods withdrew
files of cases by the aid of Geisler and
others. Woods began a campaign of
communicating with the clients concerning
the disreputability and criminality of
Hudak, and creating dissatisfactions by
clients, creditors and business

associates, and causing sufficient

A- 89

provocations in them to make grievance
charges to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court’s Grievance Commission, as well, on
a wholesale scale.

Woods either directly or
indirectly made charges to the
Disciplinary Board in a series of
complaints. In essence, these were
created personally and by the instigation
of Woods through the actions of others to
cause a collapse of the Hudak law firm
and of the cases taken in by Hudak, Woois
and Geisler, while they were in
association. Edward Burkhardt, an
assistant disciplinary counsel at the
Disciplinary Board, was invoked by the
defendants or some of them to act as
their investigator by furnishing him with
targeted information regarding Hudak’s
personal and business activities and

spurring Burkhardt to the point where he

A - 90

became an acting personal prosecutor
against Hudak.

Hudak charged that Woods filed
four "meritless" lawsuits against him;
that Woods filed four "meritless" actions
against his then, to-be-wife, Sharon
Lavelle; that Woods filed charges, and
made telephonic communication to his
daughter, Sharon; that he made constant
telephonic harassments to Hudak |
directly; that Woods brought charges
against Hudak for drunken stuper and
terroristic threats, felonies, thefts and
rape; that in early 1988, Woods called
‘various clients of the plaintiff and
advised them to make criminal charges
against Hudak before both the Allegheny
. County District Attorney and the Attorney
General; that Woods telephoned known
creditors and gave them Hudak’s and

Sharon’s private home telephone numbers

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and urged them to telephone and write
Hudak at Sharon’s home where they
received numerous communications; that
Woods provided creditors with the
telephone number of Anthony Guida, an
attorney at Buchanan Ingersoll, who was
working on a case against Hudak and
advised creditors to make contact with
Guida regarding Hudak; that Woods and his
agents or associates telephoned creditors
| to make calls to Robert O. Lampl who was
the attorney for Hudak; that Woods
continued to contact creditors informing
them of telephone numbers for the office
and the home of Hudak to have them make
telephonic approaches; that on several
occasions, Woods spat in Hudak’s face,
once across counsel table in a |
magistrate’s office and once in the
corridor of the Common Pleas court; that

Woods procured his employee, Richard

A= 92

O’Brian to make telephone calls to Hudak

and pretend to be clients making the
telephone calls; that both Woods and
O’Brian called Hudak on the telephone and
shouted obscenities at him on
approximately 20 occasions from December,
1987 to January, 1988; that in February,
1988, Woods’ employee O'Brian, followed
Hudak in the Common Pleas’ corridor
behind him and muttered obscenities as he
followed him; that at times during this
period, Woods when he saw Hudak would
follow him and yell obscenities drawing
the attention of those surrounding Hudak;
that Woods interfered with Sharon’s
domestic life by telephoning her
grandmother who is Woods’ mother-in-law
to stop her from babysitting Sharon’s
children; that Woods threatened the
younger sister of Sharon with the >

withdrawal of funds to attend school if

A= 93

she associated with Sharon; that Woods
also disowned another sister because she
associated with Hudak; that Woods
communicated with the headmaster at the
school where Sharon’s children’s
attended and made vile, disparaging
remarks against the children’s mother,
Sharon Lavelle, in November and December,
‘1987, and that Woods caused O’Brian to
shadow Sharon and her young children.

The plaintiff charges Michael S.
Geisler with aiding Woods in filing false
and baseless disciplinary charges; that
he represented Woods in actions against
Hudak in the Pennsylvania Superior and
Supreme Courts and the United States
District Court in the Southern District
of New York by submitting documents and
evidence which were blatantly false;
that Geisler procured fees to which Hudak

was entitled for cases which Hudak had

A- 94

already paid Geisler; that Geisler

procured various clients of Hudak and
induced them to demand their fees back
from Hudak and hire Geisler and pay those
fees to Geisler; that in procuring
another association of attorneys with
himself, the disbarred William C. Bartley
and Woods, Woods commenced a new
advertising legal association and
undercut Hudak to make him unable to
function as a lawyer; that Geisler used
Burkhardt in combination with Geisler to
procure various witch-hunts against Hudak
for the purpose of discrediting him as a
lawyer; that in this combination of
Geisler and Burkhardt, Geisler fabricated
certain information which Burkhardt used
against Hudak; that he expended certain
Hudak trust funds for personal use
instead of for their original use of

paying costs for continuing the Hudak

A- 95

eT a a

cases; that Geisler misused a number of
funds paid to him by Hudak pursuant to
the injunctive order for use of payment
of costs for the cases which Hudak had
turned over to him for Hudak business,
and expended this for his own business;
that Geisler never kept a trust fund in
which to pay or account for funds given
to him as he should have done, and
especially in making monthly reports as
required by the injunctive Order; that
Woods through his attorney filed a
petition in bankruptcy -in order to avoid
responsibility in paying incurred
obligations for which Hudak had turned
over funds; that Geisler failed to
prosecute over 300 cases pursuant to the
Order of Court and for which Hudak paid
him costs; and the Geisler failed to give
Hudak progress reports of work done as
provided by the Order of Court.

A- 96

_~

The charges against Edward A.
Burkhardt are that Burkhardt, while he
was not an original defendant, associated
himself with Woods, knew what the
injunction restrained and was familiar
with all the money matters relating to
Hudak, but nevertheless, he was used by
Woods as an investigator for state
matters and to fabricate evidence against
Hudak; that he worked in concert with
Geisler in procuring fabricated evidence
against Hudak; and that while acting with
Woods, Burkhart performed various times
in violation of the injunction.

Hudak charges that William Cc.
Bartley knew about the injunctive
conditions enacted by this court, but
nevertheless, acted in concert with Woods
and Geisler, as a contact and aided them
in violations charged by Hudak.

A- 97

Yaier Y. Lehrer,.as a defendant
attorney, is charged by Hudak as a
conspirator with Woods and others rather
than just acting as counsel for Woods in
filing barratrous actions and other
matters to harass Hudak; and that he also
acted to aid Woods in foreclosing
coercively on Sharon’s home on Beechwood
Boulevard in Pittsburgh.

The plaintiff charges that John
M. Silvestri, one of the defense
attorneys, had full notice of this
court’s Order of Court in the injunctive
proceeding and was Woods’ attorney in
filing barratrous lawsuits including a
replevin; that he wrote letters for Woods
who made them available to the
Disciplinary Board, the District
Attorney’s office and his daughter,
Sharon; and that in the replevin pro-

ceedings, he threatened former a Hudak

A- 98

secretary with jail to coerce her into

testifying.

This is a brief summation of the
charges contained in the Motion for
Contempt and is not presented here for
the purpose of assuming they are factual
since only some were proven. Rather,
they are entiinnes nace ten the purpose
of showing the scenic and emotional
background which prevailed during a
period of time beginning in August, 1987
and still prevailing at the present time.
With the large number of averments by the
plaintiff in the pleadings and the wide
array of charges, to prove them all would
require a host of witnesses and exhibits.
All that this court required was to have
sufficient evidence to Convince it that
credible evidence has been presented to

make out a case of the plaintiff’s right

to a remedy. The plaintiff here

A = 99

attempted to bring in proof by his
questioning of the adverse witnesses. To
a large degree, he did succeed in
producing basic proof through these
witnesses because of their unrestrained
show of hostility towards the plaintiff.
While he fell short of producing proof of
all his averments, he did show sufficient
proof for a valid and solid base from
which the court has ample credible
evidence for making necessary findings of
fact that the stipulated injunctive order
of court of October 1, 1987 was
disregarded and violated, by whom and to
what extent, as to be in contempt of this
court.

Some charges were proven
evidentially by witnesses and to a large
extent by the defendants themselves and
their witnesses. Uncommon attraction was

drawn by the defendant Woods when he

A - 100

testified loudly and volumously in the
injunction hearing. He did not, however,
testify or deny any of the evidentiary
statements made by Hudak or the other
witnesses since he did not testify at all
at the second contempt hearing, although
he was highly observable by his unsettled
actions in the courtroom, hopping from
chair to chair at the rear of the

counsel table and to the rear of the
courtroom when any of his attorneys move
back to talk to someone. His facial
contortions were undoubtedly intended to
show his feelings and he did not
hesitate to make at the counsel table
audible vocal retorts reflecting his
thoughts or feelings. On one occurrence,
at the contempt hearing, while Woods’
wife, Geraldine Woods, was on the stand
and Hudak was questioning her, my law

clerk jumped to the bench and exclaimed

A- 101

that she heard Woods call Hudak a goof.
I immediately stopped the questioning of
the witness and excused her and had my
law clerk sworn to testify. I
questioned her and she made the statement
that she had overheard Woods direct the
name "goof" at Hudak when he was in the
front of the bar. She testified that
Woods was looking in the direction of
Hudak, and uttered only one word: "Goof"
(TR of 06-16-88 Hearing, DC #34, pp 89-
_ 93). Woods made no sworn denial. So, I
permitted his counsel to contradict or
correct the testimony of my law clerk.
Their defense was that Woods was talking
to his counsel only, and any remarks he
made at the counsel table were only for
counsel’s ears (TR of 06-16-88 Hearing,
DC #34, pp 89-93). Woods made no sworn
denial. So, I permitted his counsel to

contradict or correct the testimony of my

A - 102

ae ee

law clerk. Their defense was that Woods
was talking to his counsel only, and any
remarks he made at the counsel table were
only for counsel’s ears (TR of 06-16-88
Hearing, DC #35, pp 2-9). The
unfortunate thing was that the remark did
not go only to counsel’s ears, but it
went farther so that his remark from the
back of the counsel table went to the bar
of the court. It was heard by my alert
law clerk. I have no hesitancy in giving
her full credibility for her testimony.
Prior to this, Woods was specifically
warned that his behavior was unacceptable
(TR of 6-9-88 Hearing, DC #36, p. 74-78).
Thereupon, I held Woods in civil
contempt of court and stated that the
imposition of sanctions would be dealt
with at a later time. The case resumed
after that. This incident is recited

here only for the purpose of showing some

A - 103

of the characteristic behavior of the
defendant Woods in the courtroom while
the case was in progress.

It is interesting to note that
Wood’s attorney, Lehrer, in his
testimony, did admit that "well, I have
heard Mr. Woods say to me that Mr. Hudak
is a pigface" (Id. at 6). This court
considers this evidence, not for the
purpose of showing the truth of this
utterance, but rather to show Woods’
attitude toward Hudak. See Hunter v.
Alles Chalmers Corporation, 797 F.2d
1417 (7th Cir. 1986).

To determine credibility, this
court observed all actions occurring
during testimony and scrutinized the
demeanor of all the witnesses. This was
necessary in order to make Findings of
Fact about the things which occurred as

testified to by the witnesses. Because

A - 104

of this, I deem it appropriate to
elaborate upon the appearance and
findings which I have made from the
evidence as a whole.

This is once case which in all
the years I have presided in many
thousands of federally processed matters
that intrigued me by the very air which
pervaded the case. There were many
witnesses who were forthrightly honest
and I believed what they recited, but
some were knowingly or unknowingly
contaminated by the influence, either
Girectly or indirectly, of the defendant
Woods or his agents.

The first witness called by the
plaintiff, Anita Henry, was gospelly
honest. She was a young lady who had no
acquaintance with any of the parties or
witnesses and was employed as an inside

sales telemarketing representative for a

A - 105

management consulting company, GMW
Technologies, Suite 200, Lawyers
Building. Her testimony was simple and
to the point. She testified that she
happened to be in the closed, moving
upward elevator going to work when Woods
physically attacked Hudak without cause.
Anita Henry testified that she was
employed in an office located in the
Lawyers Building on Forbes Avenue in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. On April 7,
1987, she stepped into the elevator where
Hudak was already present. She said that
Woods also came onto the elevator and
initially she assumed they knew each
other since it seemed that Woods was
joking around with Hudak when he grabbed
Hudak’s nose. Prior to her exiting the
elevator on the second floor, she stated
that Woods started calling Hudak a
rapist. She then stepped off the

A - 106

elevator to go to her office and that
both Woods and Hudak came "barrelling"
after her (TR of 6-14~88 Hearing, DC

#39, p 22) into her office suite. She
asked both Woods and Hudak to leave when
they followed her into the suite. At
this point, Woods kept insisting that
Hudak was a rapist and that she should be
aware of this fact. At that point, she
asked the secretary to cali security and
Hudak then called "911" (Police

Emergency Number). She further testified
that Hudak was pushed into her by Woods
and she went through the door, presumably
her office door. Henry testified that
Woods repeatedly called Hudak a rapist
and that Hudak’s nose was bleeding as a
result of Woods grabbing him by the ose
(Id. at 24). The witness testified that
she had never seen either Hudak or Woods

prior to this incident and she learned of

A - 107

eect

Hudak’s name only because she was there
when the police report was made.

Her testimony reaffirmed the
volatile nature of the defendant Woods,
as this court saw and heard him in action
when he volcanically exploded in court at
the injunctive hearing on September 21,
1987, while on the witness stand. That
was an uncommon demonstration of temper
and acrimony towards the plaintiff,
Hudak. Examples of what he said in his
testimony show how deeply set was his
antagonism toward the plaintiff. In
answer to a direct question by Hudak,
Woods replied, "I told Bonnie you (Hudak)
are nuts and I’m apraid for her insanity.
And I said, if you don’t believe me, ask
anyone who’s associated with him, except
my daughter, that you are, that you are
nuts. And you are nuts even making that

statement. You’re crazier that I thought

A - 108

that this association hired

office help and set up an office with
furnishings in The Bigelow building in
downtown Pittsburgh;

that due to business differences
and inappropriate behavior on the part of
Woods, Hudak ousted Woods from the
office;

that, thereupon, Woods began a
systematic method of undermining Hudak;

that Hudak and Woods’ daughter,
Sharon Lavelle, had become personally
interested in each other and eventually
were married;

that Hudak moved into a home
owned by his wife Sharon on Beechwood
Boulevard in Pittsburgh;

that Sharon is a Registered Nurse
and regularly employed;

that Woods had previously helped

A - 149

Sharon to make the monthly mortgage

payments on her home;

that Woods has also paid tuition
for Sharon’s children at a private
school ;

that Woods enticed Geisler from
the Hudak firm and helped Geisler create
a new advertising law firm in competition
with Hudak;

that Geisler extracted a large
number of case files from Hudak’s file
room during the period when the new
Geisler firm was being set up in friendly
relationship with Woods; that Woods
systematically began to attack the Hudak
law firm to disintegrate it, and to
destroy Hudak’s ability to function
legally or personally;

that Woods systematically began
to attack his own daughter, Sharon, as a

part of his plan to undermine Hudak;

A - 150

that during the course of the

entire bombardment, Woods aided by
Geisler, O’Brien and others incessantly
notified clients of Hudak’s failure to
perform, but not of Woods own
contributions in causing Hudak’s failure
to perform;

that Woods and Geisler notified
officers of the Pennsylvania Disciplinary
Board of the mass failure of Hudak to
perform his duties towards his clients ‘
which were acquired while advertising
with Geisler’s and Woods’ aid;

that Woods and Geisler notified
creditors of Hudak’s inability to pay
them;

that Woods, Geisler and O’Brien
sought to variously disable Hudak from
performing legal business or any other

business, or from seeing clients;

A- i351

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that Woods sought to bring

disrepute to Hudak when he procured
intermediate employment; ;

that Woods instigated the
mortgagee of his daughter’s home on
Beechwood Boulevard to foreclosure
proceedings to make it more difficult for
her with her income as a registered nurse
to keep up the payments on the Beechwood
Boulevard home;

that Woods alienated the
affections of a sister of Sharon and
another of his daughters, and coerced
Sharon’s grandmother to stop babysitting
for Sharon as she had previously done;

that Woods stopped tuition
payments for and attempted to discredit
the standing of Sharon’s children at
their school by making certain
deleterious reports to the neadeaster of

the children’s school;

A - 152

+ RE SD a

WP me

that Woods had placed telephone

calls to Sharon at work to harass her and
also place numerous telephone calls to
her home, where there was a private,
unlisted telephone number; and that this
bombardment by Woods and Geisler has
stopped case processing and that, as
such, Woods and Geisler have interferred
with the lives of hundreds of innocent
and worried bankruptcy and divorce
litigants.

I find specifically that the
injunctive Order of Court dated October
1, 1987 has been intentionally and ™ :
contemptuously breached by the defendant
Woods, the defendant Geisler, and the
defendant O’Brien and also by others to a
much lesser comparative degree.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon this

court to hold them guilty of contempt of

A - 153

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court and to deal with them as contemnors

according to the requirements of law.

It is observable that on one
side, Woods’ associates contains a number
of lawyers, one of whon, acieler, has had
business connections with him before and
since his withdrawal from Hudak with a
large number of Hudak’s divorce and

bankruptcy files, and others in legal

representative capacities. On the other

side, was Hudak, his wife and children,
with even Hudak’s attorney, Lampl,
abandoning him while the trial was in
process. It is observable that no
bombardment has been instituted against
any of the defendants. The avalanche of
persecution is in one direction from the
defedant Woods towards Hudak, his wife
and their children. It has been that way
since approximately August 1987, and

continued without letup in defiance of

A - 154

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the stipulated injunctive Order of Court

of October 1, 1987.
= The contemnors cannot challenge
the injunction because it is of their own

making and they have neither respected
nor honored it. Instead, the defendants
Woods and Geisler openly led the others
into a gross defiance of its existence
and so mocked this court’s authority.
This defiance was plainly shown by Woods
in the courtroom at both hearings, on and
off the witness stand. Especially this
was displayed when he was adjudged guilty
of a specific civil contemptuous action
while this court was in the process of
hearing a sworn witness in the midst of
her testifying while on the witness
stand. Thus, they continue their
contemptuous actions and attitudes up to

present time.

A - 155

Wo Bele a Gi it tee i ile SP,

wo tanto eS

are

Cheek dist incl: Ko

The quality of the contempts of

the defendants differs. The attorneys
retained by Woods are performing
legally. It is not for me to decide
whether they are performing ethically.
That duty belongs to a special part of
the Commonwealth Judicial Branch and I
must leave it there.

I find these facts in the main
and while there are additional findings
which may be made, what I find here is
overly sufficient for me to make a
determination in this case.

From all the testimony as a
whole, it is not often that intra-
familial enmity and hostility occur to
the point where sometimes members of a
family become desirous of destroying
those with whom they have broken.
Fortunately, this does not occur very

often, but when it does, it is a sad

A - 156

iii ee Se Rn bute igd eA Cee ae

occurrence that human beings can be so

vituperative and destructive. It is not
the duty of this court here to be
concerned about cementing family
relationships. It is an element in this
case which aids the court in seeing where
credibility or lack of credibility lies
and in arriving at Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law consistent will all

_the evidence in the case as a whole, from

what has occurred in the courtroom and of
the demeanor of the parties including the
lawyers in the processing of the case.
After the contempt hearing, the
plaintiff Hudak filed on September 1,
1988 another motion for the procurement
of a citation of contempt against Robert
Woods, Michael Geisler and Richard
O’Brian.: In this motion, the plaintiff
cites the following charges: 1) that

Woods brought wrongful criminal charges

a ~ 357

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.
}

against Hudak before Judge Manning in
Common Pleas Court causing him much

embarrassment and annoyance after which

Hudak was found not guilty; 2) that Woods

instigated calls to a former client to
malign Hudak; 3) that Woods continued to
malign Hudak to Hudak’s new employer
after Hudak procured a position with
another law firm; 4) that at the behest
of Woods, O’Brian filed a lawsuit
charging Sharon Lavelle Hudak with
Slander; 5) that Woods filed another
four-count lawsuit against Hudak for
malpractice; and 6) that Woods procured
an attorney to deliver to Hudak’s wife,
Sharon, and her sister Kathy a letter
stating that "they and their issue would
be specifically disinherited."

On September 7, 1988, Hudak filed
still another motion for contempt and

charged that: 1) Michael Geisler sent a

A - 158

—— eo ee ee eee ee

letter of annoyance to cause trouble for

a member of the law firm where Hudak was
employed; 2) the law firm where Hudak was
employed receiving annoying telephone
calls from two former clients of Hudak
who stated that they received an
anonymous telephone call telling them to
place the calis to anhe complaints about
Hudak; and 3) the law firm where Hudak is
employed received telephone calls from
persons who refused to identify
themselves uttering obscenities toward
Hudak.

Another motion for contempt was
filed by Hudak on October 5, 1988. In
this motion, the plaintiff avers that the
defendants totally destroyed the public
image of the plaintiff and that this was
shown by Channel 11, a Pittsburgh
television station, on September 20, 1988

broadcasting sensationalized and

A - 159

incorrect facts castigating the plaintiff
for failure to complete hundreds of
divorce cases. The plaintiff Hudak avers
that the defendant fomented the
television stations interests; that
Geisler still has not provided Hudak with
a report of the progress of the cases he
was required to process; that Woods and
persons working for Woods are interfering
with the personal lives of Hudak, his
wife and their children and further
“caused enormous harm to the public and
continues to do so in violation of this
injunctive Court Order."

The next motion was filed on
October 13, 1988 and avers that an
incident occurred in which insults and
obsencenities were shouted across the
street at the plaintiff while he was
antering the City-County Building to

represent a client and that in this

A - 160

a

seneesu 52 meme iced stadia aia

disturbance on the heavily populated
street, Woods rushed across the street
shouting all sorts of obscenities that
Hudak is a "rapist," "scum" and
“pigface;" that Woods continued to do so
within the building itself; and that this
interfering with Hudak’s business
violates the Order of this court dated
October 1, 1987.

The most recent motion filed by
Hudak was on December 6, 1988 and he
charges that: 1) the defendants started a
mass mailing of letters to Hudak clients
causing these clients to complain about
Hudak to the Pittsburgh and Philadelphia
offices of Hyatt Legal Services which
employs Hudak; 2) about November 14,
1988, the defendants resuscitated a
telephone campaign of the creditors of
the Hudak law firm to pursue Hudak at his

place of employment; 3) that defendant

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Dette ea oe Bd

O’Brien is pursuing a baseless defamation

case against Hudak’s wife, Sharon; 4)

that Woods using Geisler as his attorney

filed two complaints in Common Pleas
court charging that Hudak violated a
lawyer’s obligation to treat client files
and papers confidentially and that he
failed to return certain documents and
business records to Woods; 5) that Hudak
alleges "barratrous motions practice"

for the purpose of harassing Hudak; 6)

that Geisler presented a motion for

sanctions against Hudak because Hudak
falsely billed Woods $150/hr.; 7) that
Geisler filed a motion that Hudak had 100
suits filed against him and that Hudak
evaded these suits by avoiding service of
process by setting up a post office box
and refusing to take the certified mail.
At this point, Hudak questions how

Geisler knew about these suits, even if

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it were true, which Hudak denies, unless

Geisler had contacted these people; and
8) Geisler has made false blatant
accusations.

These follow-up motions also
repeat some of the averments made in the
original motion for contempt. After
examining them, I am struck with the
absurdity of such matters as are raised
in these motions and conclude that no
hearings are necessary to give plaintiff
the opportunity to prove them or the
defendant the opportunity to disprove
them. The charges being made in all of
these motions are in themselves evidence
that all is not going well between those
who entered into an agreement and a
stipulated injunctive order which this
court adopted accordingly on October 1,
1987. Even as a matter of surmising, I

cannot take them as factual, but I am

A - 163

struck with the knowledge that as things
are going, they could inferentially
continue as I heard them at both hearings
of this case to demoralize Hudak and
Hudak’s wife, Sharon.

The incidents as averred in these
additional motions are not much more or
different than what had already been
averred and heard before this court
during the original injunctive hearing
and the subsequent contempt hearing.
Therefore, it is not necessary for this
court to hold any further hearings on
these subsequent motions because of the
similarity of the averments of the
incidents and circumstances.

This action is being tried by the
parties with such dynamic force as to
show a conspiracy led by Robert Woods,
and joined with Michael Geisler and

Richard O’Brian, they have been able to

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procure the aid of lawyers and others to
form a lop-sided attack against a young
inexperienced lawyer, who did not use
good common sense variously in his
dealings with the defendants, especially
with the defendant Woods. It was this
lack of experience which helped to place
him in this inextricable predicament of
being the object who will continue to be
persecuted until he is either driven from
the earth or to unknown places with his
wife and children.

Because Hudak was inexperienced
and permitted himself to be placed in the
predicament in which he finds himself, it
does not mean that he must be left there
by the courts. When he comes to the
courts, as he does in this particular
instance, he should not be turned away.
The fact that he is foolishly to blame

for certain minor matters does not mean

A - 165

ro

7. eee es oe se

that others who are to blame should not
be held accountable. That is a fact and
I so find. Hudak did not breach the
injunction Order of Court of October 1,
1987. The defendants, Woods, Geisler and
O’Brien, I find, did breach it, and
therefore, they are the culprits with
whom this court must deal. There are
other reasons why this court must act for
a just and final termination. The set of
circumstances presented to this court,

if left alone will continue unjustly
against many people. The many hundreds
of litigants, completely blameless,
continue to be left stranded if this
court does not act. Another reason is
that the reputation of the federal courts
and to a large extent, lawyers, should
not be left in a questionably creditable

state.

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»

Hundreds of anxiously waiting
divorce and bankruptcy litigants were
side-tracked from their remedies for
which they paid the Hudak law firm and
perhaps, inferentially, even to Geisler.
These clients were used a pawns by Woods
as aided by Geisler when after agreeing
to perform according to a stipulation
this case in accordance with the
conditions of the injunction contained in
the Order of Court dated October 1,

1987, they defied this court. Thus, they
continue to defy this court’s
jurisdiction, and Woods has inaugurated
and continues a campaign of harassment
without let up against the plaintiff.
Since Woods has persisted in a series of
coercements against his own daughter
resulting in harm to her and his own
grandchiliren, and since Woods was the

total cause of this very unfortunate and

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unnecessary action and its ramifications

in this court, and since Woods continues
to flaunt the Order of Court and its
jurisdiction, I find the defendant Woods
guilty as a contemnor in this action for
civil contempt. He will be required to
cooperate with all the parties and terms
required of them. He will be permitted
vahentiiet ie to remedy as much as
possible the turmoil and trouble he has
brought about and tu pay the designated
costs with certain exceptions which shall
be hereafter enumerated. I also find
Geisler guilty of contempt.

Geisler and O’Brien, too, will be
permitted the opportunity of purging and
redeeming himself, with defendant Woods,
as best as possible, by rectifying,
within a prescribed period of time, the
harm he has produced by acting as an

abettor to Woods. Upon failure to comply

A - 168

with this purging and redemption

opportunity in all its facets, the
defendants Woods, Geisler and O’Brien
will be subject to instant specified
incarceration based upon the number and
extent of their further contemptuous
actions.

I am also finding that the

defendant Woods has been and is possessed

of ample funds from the evidence in this

case. |
First, he has turned over $80,000
of funds, without visible security, to
the Hudak law firm and to Hudak for legal
or other purposes either directly by
Hudak or through Hudak. Second, he has
paid the mortgage payments on his
daughter, Sharon’s property on Beechwood
Boulevard for an undetermined period of
time. Third, he has paid the tuition for

his grandchildre, at a private school. .

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He has spoken also of other outlays or

requested outlays of funds for various
substantial business transactions.

In determining how justice might
be done for the plaintiff, and
coincidentally, the hundreds of divorce
and bankruptcy litigants who have been
mercilessly stranded by the activities of
Woods, Geisler and O’Brien, this court
has examined the evidence very carefully
and has determined that Woods and Geisler
should bear the almost exclusive burden
of rectifying this phase of the damages
which were caused with the Hudak law firm
disruption. As stated before, defendant
Woods has supplied overwhelming evidence
himself indicating that he is in control
and possession of sufficient funds to
finance the corrective process in the
payment of costs and expenses necessary

for the satisfaction of the various

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disappointed clients and that Geisler is
in control and possesses or should be in
control or possession of funds which
should be allocated to the processing of
these cases. He, as well, is obligated
to nerGeen the functions of the attorney
in these cases which he had undertaken bo
do in the injunctive proceeding and
concerning which he now stands as a
contemptor for failing to do what he
agreed and was mandated to do by the

Order of Court dated October 1, 1987.

Thus, Woods, Geisler and O’Brien are
guilty of civil contempt and may now
redeem themselves in order to avoid
punitive consequences for failure to do
so.

Civil contempt proceedings
involve three stages: 1) the issuance of
a court order (followed by failure to

comply with that court order); 2) after

A- 171

disobedience of the order, the issuance
by the court of a conditional order
finding the disobedient party in contempt
including a threatened imposition of
penalty if the disobedient party fails to
purge himself by complying with court’s
prescribed purgation conditions; and 3)
execution of the threatened penalty if
the disobedient party fails to purge
himself by meeting the conditions set
down by the court. NLRB v. Blevin Popcorn
Company, 659 F.2d 1173 (DC Cir. 1981).

In the instant case, we are in the second
stage of this procedure. The matter
before me is a civil contempt matter and
is distinguished from criminal contempt.
The purpose of criminal contempt is to
punish intentional misconduct. Civil
contempt is a sanction to force
compliance with a prior court order or to

compensate for damages that ar» a result

a - 372

of non-compliance with the order. The
elements of civil contempt are knowledge
of a court’s order and the ability to
comply with that order. Shillitani vy.
United States, 384 U.S. 364, (1966).
Consent decrees are judgments
which have the force of res judicata and
may be enforced by judicial sanctions
including a citation for contempt.
S.E.C.v, Randolph, 736 F.2d 525 (9th
Cir. 1984). At this stage of the
contempt proceeding, the court offers the
defendants an opportunity to purge
themselves of the contempt. The purpose
of this purging is not to punish the
conduct of the defendants, but rather to
give them an opportunity to comply with
the court’s order and to remedy any harm
which might have been caused by the

Defendants’ prior failure to comply with
the court order. See Oil, Chemica] and

A - 173

Atomic Workers, Supra. International

Union, AFL-CIO v, NLRB, 547 F.2d 575 (DC
1976). Lack of willfulness, good faith,

or reliance on advice of counsel or
others does not relieve an individual of
liability for civil contempt. United
States v. Snyder, 428 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.)
Cert. den. 400 U.S. 903, (1970), Fortin
vy. Commissioner of Massachusetts Dept. of
Public Welfare, 692 F.2d 790 (ast Cir
1982), TWM Manufacturing Company, Inc. v.

Dura Corporation, 722 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir.
1983).

It is necessary for this court to
determine what standard of proof is
necessary in this type of proceeding.
This proceeding for contempt is civil and
remedial in nature. The intent of the
respondents is irrelevant in determining

violation of a court order for contempt

purposes. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper

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COmpany, 336 U.S. 187 (1949). Because
the intent is irrelevant, the proper
standard for this court to apply in this
proceeding is the evidentiary standard of

clear and convincing evidence. NLRB vy.
Decaturville Sportswear Company, Inc. ,
518 F.2d 788, 790 (6th Cir.) cert. den.
423 U.S. 913 (1975). In this stage of
the contempt proceeding, it is proper for
the court to put the disobedient parties
on notice that unless they purge
themselves of their contempt by obeying
the court’s decree, they will be fined or
face other sanctions. If the conditions
of purgation are met, the contemnor can
avoid the threatened penalty. Blevin
popcorn company, Supra., at 1185.

The defendants have not raised
defenses of substantial compliance or
inability to comply as defenses in this

contempt proceeding, however, this court

A - i75

finds there has not been substantial

compliance or inability to comply on the

part of either defendant. This court

finds that Geisler, Woods and O’Brien
knew well what they were doing. They
entered into the stipulation freely and
with the advice of counsel. this court
is convinced that together they
masterminded a plan to intentionally hurt
Hudak and his clients. Counsel would
have this court believe that the
activities of these defendants were de
minimus or not specifically enjoined, and
therefore, their activities should not be
held as contemptuous. The Supreme Court
could have been writing about Woods,
Geisler and O’Brien when they made the
following statement regarding an appeal
from a contempt proceeding:

It does not lie in their mouths to

say that they have an immunity from

civil contempt because the plan or

scheme which they adopted was not

A - 176

"or le

specifically enjoined. Such a rule
would give tremendous impetous to
the program of experimentation with
disobedience of the law which we
condemned in y
Supra, at 69. The instant case is
an excellent illustration of how it
could operate to prevent
accountability for persistent
contumacy. Civil contempt is
avoided today by showing that the
specific plan adopted by
respondents was not enjoined,
Hence, & new decree is entered
enjoining that particular plan.
Thereafter, the defendants work our
a plan that was not specifically
enjoined. Immunity is once more
obtained because the new plan was
not specifically enjoined. And so,
a whole series of wrorgs is
perpetrated and a degree of
enforcement goes for naught.

McComb, Supra ., at 192.

Even though, the respondents

specifically agreed in writing to the

stipulation prepared by their counsel, if

they were unable to comply with its

terms, they could have petitioned this

court for relief. But, Woods, Geisler

and O’Brien chose not to do this. At

their own peril, they decided what course

A - 177

of operation they intended to take and
carried it out: systematically heaping
the fruits of their contempt upon the
heads of Hudak, his family and on the
unserviced clients. Again, the Supreme
Court could have been speaking of Woods,

Geisler and O’Brien when it said:

they took a calculated risk when
under the threat of contempt, they
adopted measures designed to avoid
the legal consequences (of the
Act). Respondents are not unwitting
victims of the law. Having been
caught in its toils, they were
endeavoring to extricate
themselves. They knew full well
the risk of crossing the forbidden
line. Accordingly, where as here
the aim is remedial and not
punitive, there can be no

complaint that the burden of any
uncertainty in the degree is on the
respondent’s shoulder. Id. at 193.

The three defendants, Woods,
Geisler and O’Brien, are being notified
that this court has, therefore, found
them to be contemptuous, in and out of

A - 178

the courtroom, and for the breaches and
violations of the injunctive Order of
Court dated October 1, 1987, and
accordingly, within ten (10) days from
the date of the filing of this opinion,
if they fail to heed the warning given
them, they will be dealt with as
contemnors who flout this court in its
authority. IRS v. Norton, 717 F.2d 767
(3rd Cir. 1983).

To aid them in knowing what
actions they are flouting, it is being
set forth for their full understanding
and knowledge. |

NOTICE OF BASIS FOR FULFILLMENT OF
REDEMPTION:

1) All the defendants will be
required to cease and desist from
molesting in every possible way the
plaintiff, Joseph E. Hudak:

A - 179

é
ee —

2) All the defendants will be

required to withhold the transmittal of
any statements, mouthings, gossip and
references regarding Hudak to any and all
persons except by special permission of
this court;

3) Within five days of the 10-
day period, Woods will deposit the sum of
$10,000 with the official designated by
this court as the mester, for the purpose
of providing costs and expenses for the
payment of cases requiring filing costs
and other litigation expenses and he
shall provide funds on a weekly basis to
keep the $10,000 cost fund replenished
and adequate;

4) Woods shall provide all the
funds necessary except for those which
Geisler shall be directed to provide for
furthering. all the divorce and bankruptcy

cases to their completion. The

A - 180

defendants are being given the privilege

to show their earnestness to rectify such

contemptuous activities by ceasing the
forbidden conduct and performing all the
mandatory orders of the injunction.

5) Geisler will be required
within a 10-day period to present a
complete accounting of all divorce and
bankruptcy case files which he removed
from the Hudak offices, and with each
case a summation of its status, to the
official master designated in charge of
supervision; neh

6) the defendants, Woods,
Geisler and O’Brien, will separate
themselves completely, under the
supervision of the authorized official
Master in charge, from all personal
matters and business, except as permitted
by the delegated official master

supervising this matter;

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7) Geisler will be required to |

act as counsel on all Hudak bankruptcy
and divorce cases assigned to him by the
official master appointed by the court
for the purpose of supervision, except
for those for which he shall have been
relieved, and for which other cc unsel
shall be appointed to do so and for which
the forbidden by law. They are being
first warned here so that within cost
fund secured by Woods shall be
responsible;

8) Woods will file within an
allotted time a list of his personal
holdings and those which he holds jointly
with any other person or corporation and
to what extent, and other holdings under
veil or pseudonym names;

9) Geisler will be required to
provide monthly reports on the

circumstances and financial status of

A - 182

bi Pee eS S.C * es

each case he processes to the official
Master designated in charge of
supervision;

10) Geisler shall also provide
immediate and specified funds designated
by the official master delegated in
charge by this court for supervising all
its functions which the court requires to
be done by the defendants for the purpose
of permitting them the privilege of
redeeming themselves; and

11) As for the plaintiff, Joseph
E. Hudak, he will be left to pursue the
right to a livelihood for the support of
himself and his family. This court is
taking into consideration the fact that
the plaintiff himself, who is not guilty
of any violations of the injunction, did
use misjudgment and human error in his
conduct in this case as a whole so as to

be lacking in merit of any compensatory

A - 183

aids by the court other than that of

protecting his constitutional rights as a
human being and an American citizen.
Therefore, while I cannot find that Hudak
was a guilty party in this proceeding,
since he violated neither the injunction
nor the contempt court orders, he is not
being allowed any compensation or
benefits other than those specified upon
the performance of the obligations as
required of the defendants, Woods,
Geisler and O’Brien.

As for Mrs. Sharon Lavelle Hudak,
she is not a party, but so closely
related to both sides as to make it
necessary to express a certain amount of
sympathy for her because of the
predicament in which she and her children
now exist. But, it will be remembered
that this was her choice and she must

live by it and by the aid this court can

A- 184

give so that she and her children with |
her husband can live free and clear of
all persecution from the defendants.

As for the lawyers in this case,
Hudak has named several as being
participants in the activities of both
Woods and Geisler expecting this court to
hold them as guilty defendants, This
contention of the plaintiff cannot be
supported. The attorneys, without
further naming them, are members of the
Bar of Allegheny County, of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania and of this court.
It is their function to perform their
duties to the best of their abilities,
honestly and forcefully, on behaif of
their clients. It is not the function of
this court to determine here whether the
defendants so represented their clients.
As I stated before, the judicial system

is so set up that members of the various

A- i185

tte O. \@ ow oll

wet set Naren ae 6B eS eee

|
:
:
8
:
;

bars are governed by codes of ethics and
may be disciplined, as some are
constantly being disciplined, for
violation of the codes of ethics. it is
not for this court to say that these
attorneys have violated any code, but it
is for the proper judicial tribunal to so
decide, if required, and it will be left
there.

As for the other defendants,
while they were participants with Woods
in various matters and activities, these
are inconsequential compared to those
transgressions of Woods, Geisler and
O’Brien, and properly dealing with both
Woods, Geisler and O’Brien will satisfy
the demands of justice in this case.
Therefore, no judgment is being
pronounced against then.

The Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law are incorporated in

A - 186

this Opinion in accordance with Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure 52. (1)

(1) Rule 52. Finding by the Court

"(a) Effect. In all actions tried
upon the facts without a jury ... the
court shall find the facts specially and
state separately the conclusions of law
thereon .... If an opinion or memorandum
of decision is filed, it will be
sufficient if the findings and
conclusions of law appear therein."

A - 187

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSEPH E. HUDAK, )
)
Plaintiff, )

Vv. CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-1999

ROBERT WOODS, MICHAEL S. GEISLER

)

and RICHARD O’BRIAN )
)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROSENBERG, DISTRICT JUDGE

The defendant, Robert Woods, has
filed two separate motions dated January
3, 1989. The first motion is a Motion to
Reconsider or Stay the Requirements Set
Forth in the Order of December 22, 1988
and the second is a Motion for a New
Trial, Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
and Motion to Amend Findings. The first
motion was entered by attorney Charles F.
Scarlata representing defendant Woods and

the second was entered by attorney John

A - 188

M. Silvestri who entered his appearance

as co-counsel for defendant Woods on
January 3, 1989. After thorough
examination of both motions, it is
obvious that the attack is being made
from two sides and averments are made in
each which are unsupported when one
examines the opinions filed in this
case,: the first on October 1, 1987 and
the second on December 22, 1988, the
transcript of testimony, and the record
as a whole. It is from all of this that
this court has spared neither the
plaintiff nor the defendants and has
called spades as spades whether they
applied to the defendant or to the
plaintiff. From all of the evidence as a
whole, there is an abundant foundation to
base the Findings of Fact and Conclusion
of Law that were made in the opinion

dated December 22, 1988-and in the Order

A - 189

of Court which follows it. It will be
seen that a thorough examination of all
of the witnesses was made and was
explained upon which the court had the
ability and authority to make findings
based upon credibility and that this was
the duty of this court and that this

court meticulously carried out that duty.

The complaint of these motions is
that the Order of Court denies the
defendant Woods his rights of free speech
and association. But this court’s
December 22, 1988 Order prevents the
defendants from bombardment of the
plaintiff as they were doing when stopped
by this court which is no different that
one who yells fire in a crowded church or
theatre and is not protected by the '

Constitiution. The Constitution has no

place to protect miscreants such as the

A - 190

defendants Woods, Geisler and O’Brian who
must be stopped from their actions
against the plaintiff, and forced, in the
process, to make others whom they have
harmed whole.

The conclusions in these motions
are so lacking in support upon reading of
the record as a whole, both motions

will, therefore, be denied.

A - 191

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In re )
Case No. 87-1851
INVOLUNTARY
JOSEPH E. HUDAK )
INVOLUNTARY )

EX PARTE MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
COMES NOW Joseph E. Hudak, pro
se, and makes this EX PARTE MOTION FOR A
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, in support

of which he represents as follows:

1. Michael S. Geisler was one of
the attorneys of the law firm Joseph E.
Hudak & Associates. Geisler acted as
counsel to Hudak on the involuntary
bankruptcy filed against Hudak at the
above number and discussed with Hudak all
matters related to the case and advised

Hudak on the case.

A- 192

2. Michael S. Geisler also
handled a large number of cases for the
‘Hudak law firm and had access to all

client files of the Hudak law firn.

3. Michael S. Geisler also
handled all of the accounts payable for.
the Hudak law firm.

ag 4. Contractually and ethically,
Michae) S. Geisler is bound to maintain
the confidentiality of all of the above

matters.

5. On or about Sunday August 9,
1987, Michael S. Geisler entered the
Hudak law firm offices and removed his
belongings and many of the files for
which he was responsible. On information

and belief, Geisler also removed complete

~~

A- i93

lists of all Hudak clients and

confidential details of clients files.

6. Geisler gave to Hudak no
notice that he was to defect from the
Hudak law firm; on the contrary, even on
Saturday August 8, 1987, the day before
he was to datect, Geisler met with Hudak,
discussed confidential matters with
Hudak, and caused Hudak to rely on
Geisler’s continued protection of
confidences and Geisler’s continued

services.

7. Sometime thereafter, Michaei
S. Geisler began working for the Robert
Woods, the husband of petitioner in this

case.

8. On information and belief,

Michael S. Geisler has revealed to Robert

A- 194

el

Woods all or many of the confidences of
Hudak related to this case, including
Geisler/Hudak legal analyses of the case
and facts related to the case which are
protected by the attorney-client
relationship as well as by contract.

9. On information and belief,
Michael S. Geisler has revealed to Robert
Woods client lists and-particulars of
Client files, including unlisted
telephone numbers of clients, of the

Hudak law firm.

10. On Saturday, September 12,
1987, Robert Woods himself telephoned a
client of the Hudak law firm for whose
case Michael S. Geisler had been solely
responsible. Robert Woods also
telephoned the client’s mother, sister-

in-law, and brother. Robert Woods

A - 195

revealed to all of these people
confidential matters from the client’s
file which the client herself did not
wish her relatives to know. Robert Woods
further stated to the client herself that
Joseph E. Hudak was a fraud, that Hudak
had embezzled money, and that the woman’s

case would never be filed.

11. On information and belief,
Robert Woods himself telephoned numerous
other clients of the Hudak law firm and

engaged in similar conduct.

12. On Monday, September 14,
1987, an individual identifying himself
as a "Richard O’Brien" or a "Richard
Bryant" and giving a return telephone
number of 381-1194 began . ystematically
telephoning all of the clients of the

Hudak law firm. Some of these clients

A - 196

have unlisted telephone numbers that
could have been obtained only even the
confidential files of the Hudak law firn.
Many of the clients have become
extremely upset and some have stated that
the person calling has revealed to them
knowledge of confidential matters
contained in their legal files.

13. The above individual i.
further stating that he is taking a
survey of clients of the Hudak law firn,
and, both directly and by innuendo,
suggesting impropriety and illegitimacy
in the Hudak law firm and suggesting that
the Hudak law firm clients should file
disciplinary complaints against Joseph E.

Hudak.

14. On information and belief,

this systematic harrassment and slander

A- 197

PRR OR LE PRL OTR TRA I EI ET NEST

of Hudak is a scheme controlled by

Robert Woods and Michael S. Geisler.

15. On Tuesday, September 15,
1987, the petitioner in this case,
Géraldine Woods, stated to her daughter,
the fiance of Hudak, that indeed her
husband, Robert Woods, and Michael S.
Geisler were engaged in activity designed
to result in Hudak being disbarred as an

attorney.

16. Further, on August 18, 1987,
Robert Woods committed an assault and
battery on Hudak and on August 23 1987,
attempted yet another assault and battery
on Hudak. Criminal charges have been
filed and accepted by the District

Attorney’s Office.

A - 198

17. Further still, on September

9, 1987, Robert Woods committed another
assault and battery, this time on a
deputy constable employed by Hudak to
subpoena Robert Woods and Geraldine Woods
for the September 11, 1987 hearing on
Hudak’s motion to dismiss. Criminal
charges have been filed and accepted by
the District Attorney’s Office. Robert
Woods, however, has filed a report with
the Pittsburgh Police in which he states
that the deputy constable was attempting
@ sexual assault on his wife and that he,
Woods, has seen the deputy constable
loitering about the Shadyside district of
Pittsburgh and he, Woods, believes that
the deputy constable might be the
"Shadyside rapist." Finally on this, the
deputy constable states that through a
third party Robert Woods has sent a

message that serious physical harm will

A - 199

result if the deputy constable again

attempts to subpoena G. Woods, the

petitioner in this case.

18. Robert Woods has committed
further acts of harrassment ageinst
Hudak, Hudak’s mother and brother, and
Hudak’s fiance, Wood’s daughter. These
include obscene telephone calls, threats
of lawsuits, interference with
employment, and slanderous statements

against Hudak.

19. Continuation of any of the
above described activities will cause
immediate, irreparable, and unjustified

harm.

WHEREFORE, Joseph E. Hudak,

prose,- requests that the Court issue ex

A - 200

parte a temporary restraining order 1)

to prevent Michael S. Geisler from
revealing, directly or indirectly, any
further information related to the
involuntary bankruptcy petition filed
against Hudak; 2) to prevent Michael Ss.
Geisler from revealing any further
information about Hudak’s business, his
clients, his client files, or other facts
of any kind obtained from his employment
with the Hudak law firm; 3) to prevent
Robert Woods, Michael S. Geisler, and any
persons working therefor from the above
described acts and other acts designed to
harrass, interfere with, or injure Hudak
and parties associated or related to
Hudak.

Respectfully submitted,

Joseph E. Hudak

A~- 201

OIE OME CFS Ss all pp:

VERIFICATION

_—

I, JOSEPH E. HUDAK, have read the
foregoing EXPARTE MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER.

This statements contained therein are
true anc correct to the best of my

knowledge, information and belief.

JOSEPH E. HUDAK

DATE

A - 202

MALALMEDE LCT AON LR NC pe ©

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSEPH E. HUDAK )
vs. Civil Action No: 87-1999
ROBERT WOODS, MICHAEL S.

)
GEISLER and RICHARD )
O’ BRIAN )

CONSENT ORDER

AND NOW COME Joseph E. Hudak,
Esquire, pro se, and Robert Woods,
Michael S. Geisler, and Richard O’Brian,
by their attorney, Yaier Y. Lehrer,

Esquire, and stipulate as follows:

1. On September 18, 1987, nunc
pro tunc September 16, 1987 by Order of
Judge Louis Rosenberg, in The United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania, at Case no. 87~
1851 INVOLUNTARY, Joseph E. Hudak filed

A - 203

and Ex Parte Motion for a Temporary

Restraining Order against Robert Woods,
Michael S. Geisler, and Richard O’Brian.

2. The parties have agreed and
do stipulate that the Motion for a
Temporary Restraining Order presently
being conducted before the Honorable
Louis Rosenberg, Judge of the United
States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania, shail be
withdrawn from the United states
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District
of Pennsylvania and converted to a Motion.
for a Preliminary Injunction with
continuing jurisdiction before Judge
Rosenberg in accordance with the law of

injunction and the facts of the case.

3. The parties agree that the

evidence presented before Judge Rosenberg

A - 204

: s ‘ o gs mes mg Pt NG FLEA FORE aIN HE HCE PERE NS BI FEET RETIREE AN PERRET MERIT ADH NE" SHS A RL EO IES OST LETRA CLE yt FY LANES OER MRTOTES ae mie 3

in the Motion for a Temporary

Restraining Order is evidence upon which
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
may be based in spite of the fact that
the evidence was not closed and that
there was additional testimony which the
parties could present and the Court did

<

not hear.

4. The parties have agreed and
do consent to an Order directing the

following. ..

11. Woods and O’Brian, and
agents, servants, employees or associates
thereof, shall have no further contact
whatsoever with the clients of Hudak for
the purpose of those clients’ legal
matters and shall in no way engage in the
practice of law or otherwise interfere

with the business of Hudak.

A - 205

EEA LL MEE LG LIOLN, PLY AEA BIOL EL: LESS TRI IIE GODOT BOOS SRE NEL ALY LL RE IGLOS, Byte i a Bae

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12. Hudak, and agents, servants,

employees or associates thereof, shall
have no further contact with Woods,
Woods or the wife of Woods. Hudak,
however, may contact Attorney yaier Y.
Lehrer to present bills owed Hudak by
Woods or to discuss with Lehrer matters
related to cases or problems between

Hudak and Woods.

13. Woods, and agents, servants,
employees or associates thereof, shall
have no further contact with Hudak,
except to discuss legal matters which
Hudak has handled for Woods or the wife

of Woods.

14. No bond shall be required of

any party and each party waives the

A - 206

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requirement of a bond from each other

party.

15. Nothing in the Order shall
prohibit any party from pursuing any
legal remedy for which he is entitled

under the law.

16. The prohibition against
contact between Woods and Hudak shall

take place for three years.
17. This stipulation shall
become effective as of the filing of

this stipulation from Order of Court

Consent:

Yaier Y. Lehrer 9/30/87

Joseph E. Hudak 9-30-87

A - 207

et tn eke ed Shy rwAn: oat >
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSEPH E. HUDAK, )
)
Plaintiff, )

Vv. CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-1999

ROBERT WOODS, MICHAEL S.
GEISLER, and RICHARD
O’ BRIAN,

Defendant.

ORDER

AND NOW, to-wit, this lst day of
October, 1987 in accordance with the
Stipulation for an Order of Court
accepted by the parties and previously
filed in this case, it is hereby ordered
and directed that the agreement with its
detailed acceptance of obligations and
restrictions as contained therein shall
govern the parties accordingly to its
tenor and shall be binding upon the
parties in this action pursuant thereto,
their agents, representatives and

A - 208

7 - ae PLDI R IO! WAI AGL OS ROI SD EN LEB

assignees and upon all persons in active

concert or participation with them who
receive actual notice of this order of
court by personal service or otherwise;
and shall commence until the purposes of
the Stipulation and this injunction have
been fulfilled; and it shall not be
necessary for any of the parties to file
a bond unless in the future by resort to
this court of violation of this order
when demands for bonds may be made by a
complaining party or by any other person
or persons responsible for any injury or
harm caused by a violation of the
injunctive mandate or its restrictions;
and the costs of the case shall be borne

equally by the parties of this action.

BY THE COURT:

ROSENBERG, J.

A - 209

Ci aed alee nah ae

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN RE: JOSEPH HUDAK 87-1851

STIPULATION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF BANKRUPTCY
PETITION

AND NOW, come G. Woods, Petitioning
Creditor in the above matter, by and
through her attorney, YAIER Y. LEHRER,
Esquire, and JOSEPH HUDAK, Respondent, by
and through his attorney ROBERT 0. LAMPL,
Esquire, and respectfully file the
following stipulation for withdrawal of
Bankruptcy Petition:

IT IS STIPULATED AS FOLLOWS:

1. The Bankruptcy Petition is hereby
withdrawn by the Petitioning Creditor.

2. JOSEPH HUDAK forever releases G.
WOODS, Petitioning Creditor, her agents,

A - 210

servants and/or employees from any

liability for damages under Section 303

of the Bankruptcy Code.

Robert O. Lampl, Esquire
Attorney for Joseph Hudak

Yaier Y. Lehrer, Esquire
Attorney for G. Woods

APPROVED BY THE COURT

Bankruptcy Judge

A- 211

*Reiciee. SEEGER ATE LE POP LORE EIT LAINE LIMITED BF ee PE TERIOR LOR SOT EWS Se ER RFR et . . . vOAre » PPE RSA REED REMY STE I G

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSEPH E. HUDAK,

Plaintiff

~~ er ee ee

Vv. CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-1999
ROBERT WOODS, MICHAEL S. )
GEISLER and RICHARD )
O’ BRIAN )

)
Defendants )
)

MOTION FOR CONTEMPT

The plaintiff, Joseph E. Hudak, an
attorney acting on his own behalf, files
this motion for contempt, in support of

which he represents as follows:

1. On October 1, 1987, this Court
entered an order that the stipulation for
an order of curt accepted by the parties
and previously filed in this case was

binding on the parties, their agents,

A - 212

gra ERE

oes ae RN cia a Rta ate, ae Sie ae ak ae ae ee ee aed ey ne oF YR Ce RET CEN RED Oy ce were) ye ¢ i PMO AS

representatives and assignees, and upon

all persons in active concert or
participation with the parties who
received actual notice of the order by

personal service or otherwise.

2. Since that date, defendants Robert
Woods, Michael S. Geisler and Richard
O'Brian have nearly destroyed the life,
business and career of plaintiff, and

have caused enormous harm to the public.

3. Also, in active concert or
participation with the parties or as
agents or representatives of the parties,
William C. Bartley, Edward A. Burkardt,
Yaier Y. Lehrer and John M. Silvestri
have violated the order on an incessant,
habitual and systematic basis, have

nearly destroyed the life, business and

aA © 333

career of plaintiff, and have caused

enormous harm to the public.

4. All of the persons named in
paragraph 3 above have received actual
notice of the stipulation and order by

personal service.
COUNTS AGAINST ROBERT WOODS

1. Filing and pursuing of False
Disciplinary Board Charges in Violation
of Paragraph 11 of the Stipulation and
Order of Court '

5. Robert Woods has filed and is
still pursuing against Hudak at least
four (4) false complaints to the
Pennsylvania attorneys’ disciplinary

board.

6. The first complaint alleges that

Woods or Woods’s wife delivered to Hudak

A- 214

FR x a a edulis sated mee ~

a $30,000 check under the condition that

the money was to be held in trust and
that Hudak then used the money for other
purposes. This is a blatant false
accusation but it nontheless has taken
greatly from Hudak’s time and has
severely damaged and continues to damage
Hudak’s reputation with the disciplinary

board and others.

7. The second complaint alleges that
Hudak delayed delivery of and attempted
to seal a $16,000 cashier’s check made
payable to a person from whom Woods had
purchased a mortgage. This too is a
blatantiy false accusation but has
nonetheless taken greatly from Hudak’s
time and severely damaged Hudak’s

reputation.

A=- 215

Pah 4 IES PERE

8. The third complaint involves the

Wesley Fox trust account matter which was
repeatedly discussed at the September,
1987, hearing before Judge Rosenberg in
the present case. Pursuant toc an escrow
agreement signed by Fox and Woods, ‘and
with Hudak as escrow agent, $2,1000 was
to be deposited in trust. If Fox later
paid the property taxes on certain real
estate, the money was to be paid to Fox;
at any time, however, Woods could elect
to pay the property taxes himself, in
which case the money was to be paid to
Woods. In early June, 1987, Hudak was to
join Woods and Wood’s family, who were
vacationing at Disneyworld. Hudak
removed the money as directed. Later,
after the dispute between Woods and Hudak
began, Woods worked vigorously,
attempting to induce Fox to file a

disciplinary board complaint against

A - 216

Hudak. When Woods discovered, however,

that Hudak had in fact paid Fox the
$2,100 plus interest, and when Fox
refused to file a disciplinary board
complaint against Hudak, Woods filed his
own complaint alleging that he had not
directed Hudak to remove the money. This
is another blatant lie on the part of
Woods, but the disciplinary board has
elected to prosecute Woods’s allegations

of wrongdoing as to both Fox and Woods.

9. Woods’s fourth complaint alleges
that Hudak faiied to pursue at least
three legal matters entrusted to Hudak by
Woods. One of these, Woods vy. Edgar, was
an appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior
Court which Hudak told Woods he would not
pursue because it was utterly abusive and

without merit. Another, Greenapple v.
Woods, was a Federal Court matter which

A - 217

from the very beginning Hudak refused to

handle and in which Woods defaulted and
now needs an excuse to justify the
default. The third, Craig Coal Co. v.
Romani, was a case on which Woods
explicitly fired Hudak but in which

Woods against missed a deadline and needs
an excuse. Wood’s allegations of neglect
on the part of Hudak in regard to these
cases are blatant lies but nonetheless
have taken greatly from Hudak’s time and

severely damaged Hudak’s reputation.

10. Woods has also made and continues
to make countless informal accusations
against Hudak to the disciplinary board.
These include statements that Hudak has
committed all sorts of crimes, that Hudak
has stolen money and property, that Hudak
is a rapist, that Hudak is a drug dealer,

a drug addict, an alcoholic, and mentally

A - 218

ill, that Hudak attempted to arrange the

murder of a common pleas court judge, and
that Hudak is attempting to arrange the
murders of Woods, Woods’s family,

various local lawyers, and a member of
the disciplinary board. Ludicrous as
these accusations are, Woods has induced
various persons to corroborate his false

charges.

11. The activities of Woods described
in paragraphs 5 through 10 above
constitute an interference with the
business of Hudak and thus violate
paragraph 11 of the Stipulation and

Order of Court.

12. Woods’s activities of filing
false charges and making false statements
and accusations are not legal remedies

for which Woods is entitied under the law

A- 219

and thus are not permitted by paragraph

15 of the Stipulation and Order of

Court.

II. Practicing Law in Violation of
Paragraph 11 of the Stipulation and Order
of Court.

13. Since October 1, 1987, Robert
Woods has maintained steady contact with
one Edward A. Burkardt, an assistant
disciplinary counsel at the disciplinary

board.

14. Woods has acted virtually as an
investigator for Burkardt, investigating
every of Hudak’s business and personal
life, and providing Burkardt with the

fruit of his “investigation."

15. In many instances, Woods has

supplied Burkardt with false information,

A - 220

pT

ambiguous information used to
substantiate erroneous conclusions, and

actual false, fabricated "evidence."

16. Three attorneys employed by
Woods, Michael S. Geisler, Yaier Y.
Lehrer, and John M. Silvestri, have
actively aided Woods in the activity
described in paragraphs 13 through 15
above.

17. Woods has not only acted as an
investigator for Burkardt and fabricated
evidence at the request of Burkardt, but
has also instigated and encouraged

Burkardt.
18. The activities described in

paragraphs 13 through 15 and paragraph 17

above constitute "practicing law" by

A- 221

PRED RR re
“on ihe 35 iy F3

Woods and thus violate paragraph II of

the Stipulation and Order of Court.

III. Filing of Abusive, Meritless
Lawsuits in Violation of Paragraph 11 of
the Stipulation and Order of Court

19. SInce October, 1987, Robert Woods
has filed at least four (4) abusive,
meritless lawsuits against Hudak, all
based on false swearing and perjury of
Woods. The lawsuits are designed only to
harrass and annoy Hudak and do not pursue
legal remedies for which Woods is

entitled under the law.

20. In one of the above described
lawsuits, Woods has named as additional
defendants various friends and business
associates of Hudak. Woods’s claims
against theses additional defendants are
false swearing and perjury of Woods, are

A - 222

designed only to harrass and annoy the

friends and business associates of Hudak,
and do not pursue legal remedies for

which Woods is entitled under the law.

21. In addition to the above
described barratrous lawsuits woods has
filed against Hudak, woods has filed at
least four (4) more abusive, meritless
lawsuits against Woods’s daughter, Sharon
Lavelle, who is soon to be married to

Hudak.

22. Woods’s lawsuits against Sharon
Lavelle are based on false swearing and
perjury of Woods, are designed only to
harrass and annoy, and do not pursue
legal remedies for which Woods is
entitled under the law. Moreover, the
lawsuits against Sharon Lavelle are

designed to damage the happiness and

A - 223

marriage of Sharon Lavelle to Hudak and

thus to harm Hudak.

23. Three attorneys employed by
Woods, Michael S. Geisler, Yaier Y.
Lehrer, and John M. Silvestri, have
actively aided Woods in the activity
described in paragraphs 19 through 22
above, including the false swearing,

perjury, barratry, and harrassment.

24. The activities described in
paragraphs 19 through 22 above constitute
an interference with the business of
Hudak and thus violate paragraph 11 of

the Stipulation and Order of Court.

IV. Filing of False Criminal Charges
in Violation of Paragraph 11 of the
Stipulation and Order of Court

A - 224

25. Since October, 1987, Robert Woods

has made scores of obscene, harrassing
telephone calls to his daughter, Sharon
Lavelle, Hudak fiance. Some of these
calls were to Sharon’s home and in these
Woods used the vilest obscenities and
made the vilest insults. Other calls
were made to Sharon’s place of
employment, where she works as a
registered nurse. In these calls, on
numerous occasions woods spoke to the
director of nursing and other super-
visors and stated that Sharon was a drug
dealer and drug addict, that Sharon was
stealing drugs from the hospital, and
that Sharon had killed patients at her
last place of employment by giving
patients overdoses of drugs. Then
Sharon’s hospital received a barrage of

telephone calls in which the callers

A - 225

stated that they were calling to arrange

drug "pickups" from Sharon Lavelle.

26. Finally, when Woods’s telephone
abuse became unbearable, Sharon filed
telephone harrassment charges against

Woods.

27. Although a magistrate noted the
father-daughter relationship and
ultimately held these charges in
abeyance, Woods retaliated by filing
telephone harrassment, terroristic
threat and felony theft charges against

Hudak.

28. Woods alleged that Hudak had
telephoned Woods and threatened to have
Woods, Woods’s wife, Woods’s lawyers, and
an assistant disciplinary counsel, Edward

A. Burkardt, all murdered.

A - 226

29. Woods also alleged that Hudak had
stolen form Woods over $100,000 in cash,

property and documents.

30. Among the documents Woods alleged
Hudak had stolen was a contract and
security agreement which in fact never
existed but which would be necessary for
Woods to succeed in one of the above
described barratrous civil lawsuits, a
lawsuit seeking, in bad faith, to

replevin Hudak’s office furniture and

equipment.

31. Woods alleged that in the same
(fictitious) telephone conversation in
which Hudak threatened the murders
described in paragraph 28 above, Hudak
admitted the felony thefts described in

paragraphs 29 and 30 above.

A - 227

MRI Sere C+

32. At first, the district attorney’s
office refused to accept the ludicrous,
false criminal charges Woods desired to

file against Hudak.

33. Then, at the insistence of and in
response to the manipulations of one of
Woods’s lawyers, John Silvestri, the
district attorney’s office did accept the

charges.

34. Preliminary hearings were
scheduled before a particular magistrate,
but because in the past Woods had often
bragged of influence with this
magistrate, Hudak petitioned the
director of special courts for a change

of venue.

A~ 228

35. A change a venue was granted, but
John Silvestri and Woods then vigorously
argued to the director of special courts
that the case should be assigned to a

magistrate who was not a lawyer.

36. Through a complicated turn of
events, the preliminary hearings were
assigned back to the magistrate before

whom they were originally scheduled.

37. Woods appeared and committed
blatant perjury, testifying as to the
fictitious murder threats and admissions

of felony theft.

38. Woods’s employee also appeared
and committed blatant perjury, testifying
that he had picked up a telephone
extension and heard the alleged murder

threats and admissions of felony theft.

A - 229

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39. The magistrate held the murder
threat charges in abeyance and postponed
the hearing on the felony theft charges.

40. At the present time, Woods
continues to pursue the above described

false criminal charges against Hudak.

41. The activities of woods described
in paragraphs 25 through 40 above are not
in any legitimate and are designed only
to harrass and annoy hudak. They have

taken and will continue to take enormous
amounts of time f:rom Hudak and have
severely damaged and will continue
severely to damage Hudak’s reputation and
ability to enjoy life and effectively

pursue his responsibilities.

A - 230

oh
i

42. Attorney John M. Silvestri, who
is employed by Woods, has actively aided
Woods in the activity described in
paragraphs 25 through 40 above, including
the false swearing, perjury, manipulation
of public officials, barratry, and

harrassment.

43. The activities of Woods described
in paragraphs 25 through 40 above, in
particular the filing of false criminal
charges and perjury and subornation of
perjury, are not Lees) renetiac for which
Woods is entitled under the law.

44. The activities of Woods described
in paragraphs 25 through 40 above
constitute an interference with the
business of Hudak and thus violate
paragraph 11 of the Stipulation and

Order of Court.

A= 231

=

V. Contact with Clients of Hudak for
the Purpose of Those Clients’ Legal
Matters in Violation of Paragraph 11 of
the Stipulation and Order of Court

45. During February and March, 1988,
Robert Woods or agents, associates or
employees of Robert Woods telephoned
many clients of Hudak and advised these
clients to file criminal complaints
against Hudak with the Allegheny County
District Attorney’s Office and the

Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office.

46. The activity described in
paragraph 45 above violates all of the
restrictions of paragraph 11 of the

Stipulation and Order of Court.

VI. Contact with Creditors of Hudak
for the Purpose of Interfering with the
Business of Hudak in Violation of Para-
graph 11 of the Stipulation and Order of
Court.

A - 232

47. Throughout November, 1987, Robert

Woods, or agents, associates or employees
of Robert Woods, telephoned scores of
creditors of Hudak, provided the home
telephone number of Sharon Lavelle, and
advised and encouraged these creditors to
telephone and write Hudak at the home of

Sharon Lavelle.

48. In early December, 1987, Robert
Woods, or agents, associates or employees
of Robert Woods, telephoned scores of
creditors of Hudak, provided the office
telephone number of one Anthony Guida, an
attorney at Buchanan Ingersoll who was
working on a case against Hudak, and
advised and encouraged these creditors to

telephone Anthony Guida regarding Hudak.

A - 233

/

49. Throughout December, 1987, Robert
Woods, or agents, associates or employees
of Robert Woods, telephoned scores of
creditors of Hudak, provided the
telephone number of the law offices of
Robert O. Lampl, an attorney who had
represented Hudak, and advised and
encouraged these creditors to Lampl’s

offices.

50. Throughout December, 1987,
robert Woods, or agents, associates or
employees of Robert Woods, telephoned
scores of creditors of Hudak, provided
Hudak’s new office telephone number and
Hudak’s new office address, and advised
and encouraged these creditors to
telephone and write to Hudak at Hudak’s

new offices.

A- 234

51. The activities of Woods described
in paragraphs 47 through 50 above
constitute an interference with the
business of Hudak and thus violate
paragraph 11 of the Stipulation and

Order of Court.

VII. Contact with Hudak and Harrass-
ment of Hudak in Violation of Paragraphs
11 and 13 of the Stipulation and Order of
Court.

52. On or about November 16, 1987,
Hudak appeared for a deposition on oral
examination conducted for Woods by Yaier
Y. Lehrer. At the conclusion of the
deposition, after most of Woods’ inane
accusations had been Clarified by Hudak,
Woods attempted physically to attack
Hudak and had to be restrained by
Lehrer. From across the conference
table, woods then physically spat in

Hudak’s face.

A= 235

53. Throughout December, 1987, and
January, 1987, Woods and Woods’s
employee, Richard O’Brian repeatedly
telephoned Hudak at Hudak’s offices,
purported to be clients of Hudak, and
left names and messages under fictitious

names. ~~

54. On at least 20 occasions during
December, 1987, and January, 1988, Woods
and Woods’s employee, Richard O’Brian,
telephoned Hudak and shouted obscenities

and other harrassment at Hudak.

55. On four occasions between
December, 1987, and February, 1988,
Woods’s employee, Richard O’Brian
"shadowed" Hudak, muttering obscenities
and the vilest insults at Hudak as Hudak

walked through the Pittsburgh City-County 3

A - 236

Building or Courthouse on his way to

court appearances.

56. Since October, 1987, at virtually

every appearance Hudak has made in

matters involving Woods, Woods has
“shouted obscenities and insults |
throughout the courthouse corridors and j

created public disturbance.

57. In February, 1987, as Hudak left
a courtroom after an appearance in a case
involving Woods, Woods rushed towards
Hudak, pulled back his fist as if about
to strike Hudak, then physically spat

again in Hudak’s face.

58. Since October, 1987, Woods has
threatened the 77 year old grandmother of
Sharon Lavelle, Woods’s mother-in-law,

that he will "throw her out" cf the home

A - 237

she occupies if she ever again babysits

for the children of Sharon Lavelle.
Here, Woods’s design is to violate the
happiness and interfere with the nearing
marriage of Sharon to Hudak and thus to

harm Hudak.

59. Since october, 1987, Woods has
threatened the youngest sister of Sharon’
Lavelle that he will refuse to pay her
college tuition if she has any contact
with Sharon. Here again, Woods’s design
is to viclate the happiness and
interfere with the nearing marriage of

Sharon to Hudak.

60. Since October, 1987, Woods has
harassed, threatened, and disowned the
closest-in-age sister of Sharon Lavelle
because she refuses to disassociate

herself from Sharon. Yet again, Woods’s

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—

design is to interfere with the happiness

shared by Sharon and Hudak.

61. In November and then again in
December, 1987, Woods harassed and
abused the headmaster of the grade school

of Sharon Lavelle’s youno children and
made the vilest disparaging remarks
against Sharon to the headmaster. This
was done to violate the happiness shared

by Sharon and Hudak.

62. On numerous occasions, Wood’s
employee, richard O’Brian, has "shadowed"
or followed Sharon and Sharon’s
children. This is done at the direction
of Woods to violate the happiness shared

by Sharon, her children, and Hudak.

63. The activity described in

paragraphs 52 through 62 above is

A - 239

personal harrassment which interferes so

severely with Hudak’s time and Hudak’s
ability to handle his suapentthe ities

in that it constitutes an interference
with Hudak’s business and thus violates
paragraph 11 of the Stipulation and Order

of Court.

64. The activity described in
paragraphs 52 through 57 above is
prohibited contact with Hudak and
violates paragraph 13 of the Stipulation

and Order of Court.

A - 240

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSEPH E. HUDAK,
Plaintiff

ee ee ee ee

vs. CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-1999

ROBERT WOODS, MICHAEL S. )
GEISLER and RICHARD OBRIAN, )

)
Defendants )

MOTION FOR CONTEMPT

The plaintiff, Joseph E. Hudak, an
attorney acting on his own behalf, files
this motion for contempt, in support of

which he represents as follows:

1. On October 1, 1987, this Court
entered an order which among vther
things prohibits Robert Woods from
contact with plaintiff and prohibits
Robert Woods from interference with the

business of plaintiff.

A- 241

2. On April 7, 1988, Robert Woods lay
in wait in the lobby of a building Woods
had discovered Hudak would enter and,
upon the arrival of Hudak, physically

attacked Hudak.

3. On that same day, April 7, 1988,
Robert Woods made at least five (5)
telephone calls to a company for which
Hudak was working on a project and

falsely stated that Hudak is a rapist.

4. During the last week, Woods or
agents of Woods, have resuscitated
preliminary hearings on criminal charges -

Woods has filed falsely against Hudak.

5. The activities of Woods described
in paragraphs 2 through 4 above
constitute prohibited contact with Hudak

and prohibited interference with the

a 4

A- 242

a

business of Hudak and thus violated
paragraph 11 of the Stipulation and Order

of Court.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff requests that

this Court hold Robert Woods in contempt.

Joseph E. Hudak

= A - 243

pt = 7
VERIFICATION
I, Joseph E. Hudak, plaintiff, have
written the foregoing Motion for
Contempt. The statements contained
therein are true and correct to the best
of my knowledge, information, and

belief.

This statement and verification is
made subject to law providing for
criminal penalties if I make false

statements to authorities.

Joseph E. Hudak

N A- 244

I, Joseph E. Hudak, certify that I
have served true and correct copies of
the foregoing Motion for Contempt upon
the following:

BY HAND DELIVERY

Charles Scarlata
Koppers Building
Pittsburgh, PA 15219

BY MAIL

Robert Woods
413 "The Bigelow" 413
Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Richard O’Brien
413 "The Bigelow"
Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Michael S. Geisler

500 Penn Center Boulevard
Suite 101

Pittsburgh, PA 15235

Edward A. Burkardt
1010 Manor Complex
Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Yaier Y. Lehrer
140 Gateway Towers
Pittsburgh, PA 15222

William C. Bartley

A- 245

ee

136 Longvue Drive
Pittsburgh, PA 15237

John. M. Silvestri
828 Frick Building
Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Joseph E. Hudak

4-7-87

A - 246

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSEPH E. HUDAK,

Plaintiff,

vs. CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-1999

ROBERT WOODS,
MICHAEL S. GEISLER, and
RICHARD O’BRIEN,

Defendants.

MOTION TO DISMISS

Now Comes the defendant, Robert
Woods, by and through his counsel,
CHARLES F. SCARLATA, ESQUIRE, and moves
the Court to enter an ORDER dismissing
the captioned matter. In support

thereof, it is respectfully submitted:

1. On or about September 30,
1987, this Court entered an ORDER
confirming a Consent Agreement that had

been entered into by the parties

A- 247

i

enjoining them from engaging in certain
conduct.

2. On or about March 31 and
April 5, 1988, Plaintiff filed Motions
for Contempt.

3. On or about May 11, 1988,
this Court entered and ORDER setting a
date for a Hearing on the Motions for
Contempt and requiring that the moving
party file a Brief on or before May 18,
1988. No such Brief was ever filed.

4. Thereafter, the Court held a
Hearing on the Motions for Contempt.
That Hearing concluded on or about June
16, 1988.

_ 5. At the conclusion of the
Hearing, this Court directed the Movant
to file a Brief, in support of his 7
position, within fifteen (15) days of the
filing of the Transcript in the captioned

matter. (see Transcript of Proceedings

A- 248

on June 16, 1988, at pages 44, 45, and
46). | 7

6. The final portion of the
Transcript of this Hearing was filed on
or about September 2, 1988.

7. To date, no Brief on behalf
of Movant has been filed.

8. It is respectfully suggested
that no Brief will be forthcoming because
there is no basis upon which Movant’s
claims can be supported. Fi

9. Rather than file a Brief, on
or about September 1, 1988, and September
6, 1988, the Movant filed two (2)
additional Motions for Contempt.

10. These Motions, in large
part, seek to re-litigate a matter that
was the subject of a criminal
prosecution in the Allegheny County Court

of Common Pleas and contain matters that

A - 249

could have and/or should have been raised
in any of the prior filed by the Movant.
11. In addition, it is
respectfully submitted that this Court
lacks jurisdiction over this matter
inasmuch as the Court’s original
jurisdiction was grounded on the
pendency of a Bankruptcy Petition which

has long since been dismissed.

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing
reasons, it is respectfully requested
that the Court enter an ORDER dismissing
the Movant’s Motions for Contempt for
failure to comply with the Court’s Order
or because of the lack of jurisdiction,
and further that the Court dissolve the

Injunction previously entered.

Respectfully submitted,

A - 250

CHARLES F. SCARLATA, ESQUIRE
Counsel for Defendant,
Robert Woods

A- 251

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSEPE E. HUDAK,
Plaintiff,
vs. CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-1999
ROBERT WOODS,
MICHAEL S. GEISLER and
RICHARD O’BRIEN,

Defendants.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 23rd

day of September, 1988, a true and

[Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.]

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385020_0383%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.