# Opposition Brief — Alabama Power Co. v. Environmental Defense Fund

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1989
- **Citation:** 493 U.S. 991

## Text

No. 89-373 (3) Supreme Court, U.S.

t FItLED
| IN THE i} WwW 3 q
Supreme Court of the United Spates
October Term, 1989 een.
ALABAMA POWER COMPANY, et al,
pe
against
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, ef al,
Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

ROBERT ABRAMS
Attorney General of New York

O. PETER SHERWOOD*
Solicitor General

PETER H. SCHIFF

Deputy Solicitor General
DAviD R. WOOLEY
DouGLas H. WARD
JOAN LEARY MATTHEWS
Assistant Attorneys General
New York State Department of Law
The Capitol

Albany, New York 12224
(518) 474-4819

ROBERT E. YUHNKE

JAMES T. B. TRIPP

Attorneys for Environmental
Defense Fund

*Counsel of Record

DAVID HAWKINS

. Attorney for Natural Resources

Defense Council

JOHN P. ARNOLD
Attorney General of New Hampshire

JEFFREY L. AMESTOY
Attorney General of Vermont

CLARINE NARDI RIDDLE —
Acting Attorney General of Connecticut

JAMES M. SHANNON
Attorney General of Massachusetts

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, III
Attorney General of Minnesota

HOWARD Fox

Attorney for Sierra Club and the
National Parks and Conservation
heneieel

THE REPORTER COMPANY, INC., Walton, NY 13856—800 252-7181—1989

(3393)

i
ee Questions Presented
1. Whether the court below exceeded its jurisdiction
under § 304 of the Clean Air Act by ordering the Agency to
make a decision on whether to revise a national air quality

standard in accordance with a statutory requirement that it
do so at five year intervals.

2. Whether the court below imposed procedures
beyond those required by statute where, in advance of the
court’s ruling, the Agency voluntarily undertook notice and
comment procedures.

ii

Table of Contents
Page
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ARGUMENT

POINT I. THE DECISION OF THE SECOND CIR-
CUIT DOES NOT CREATE A CONFLICT
WITH ANY DECISIONS OF THIS COURT
OR OTHER CIRCUITS...................

A. There Is No Conflict with Vermont Yankee
Because the Court Below Did Not Impose Pro-
cedures on the Administrator...............

B. Unlike the Situation in Oljato, This Case
Involves EPA’s Failure to Perform a Non-Dis-
cretionary Duty Under the Clean Air Act ....

C. The TRAC Decision Is Inapplicable Here
Because the Clean Air Act Contains a Citizen
Suit Provision Which Specifically Assigns Dis-
trict Court Jurisdiction To Enforce EPA’s Statu-
WF SD oun ov cvaaseutdepeenbuse ts

I oe os ca oes wee eh ee ee eee eee

11

ne FMLA nella OR ONT Poems Pan

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
CASES

Environmental Defense Fund v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d
| 10

Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, No. 85-
CV-9507, S.D.N.Y. (April 19, 1988)......... 7

Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 870 F.2d
CL Ee 7

Natural Resources Defense Council v. Thomas, D.C.
oS ee 6

Oljato Chapter of the Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d
le > | 9,11, 12

Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 12

State of New York v. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. 1472
(D.D.C. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 802
F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482
ee cnc d ean hececevcwseeves 14

Telecommunications Research and Action Center v.
FCC, 720 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984)........ 9,12

Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S.
GES ESE Se 2

Union Electric Co. v. Environmenta! Protection
Agency, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) .............. 2

iv.
Page

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519
PGR GUSccubasbe Vicks vee bavconndedeee 9

FEDERAL STATUTES

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org edi, cosine Bw aewai 4
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tir. cc cava voksigeennek 6, 10, 13
s7USC 60 W............. 7 PERO NOE or 13

FEDERAL REGULATIONS
ie ES Seu eakedpeadaneest 3

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‘
M
7
5
:

Page
MISCELLANEOUS

8 A Legislative History of the Clean Air Act Amend-

2 og. err 3
36 Fed. Reg. 1502 (January 30, 1971)............. 5
38 Fed. Reg. 25679 (September 6, 1973) .......... 5
52 Fed. Reg. 24646 (July 1, 1987)................ 6
53 Fed. Reg. 14926 (April 26, 1988).............. 8

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 564, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 124,
reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
| £ Sre eon erer er reer re +

H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 10, reprinted
in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1088

H.R. Rep. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2,
reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
PE hi: -hn Shc dns daep ada paabecss 3

S. Rep. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 16, reprinted in
Congressional Research Service, A Legislative
History of the Clean Air Act Amnntmante of
ST es MOE 6 6555.5 00n caeavaeassees 4

S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970).... 2,3

No. 89-373
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1989

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY, et al,
Petitioners,
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, et al,
Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
Statement of the Case

This case arises under §§ 109 and 304 of the federal
Clean Air Act (“Act”). 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409, 7604. Seven
states and four national citizen groups (“respondents”) filed
a § 304 “citizen suit” against the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), seeking an
order requiring him to revise the secondary National Ambi-
ent Air Quality Standard (“standard” or “NAAQS”) for the

2

pollutant sulfur oxides (“SO_”) or promulgate a new stand-
ard for the pollutant sulfate (which is one of the oxides of
sulfur), or, in the alternative, require the Administrator to
conduct a rulemaking to determine whether the NAAQS
should be revised.

Respondents sought to enforce non-discretionary duties
imposed on the Administrator of the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency by § 109. Subsections 109(b)(1) and (2)
direct that NAAQS be set at the levels requisite to protect
public health with an ample margin of safety and to protect
the environment from all adverse effects of sulfur oxide
emissions.

The statutory provisions at issue were enacted in 1970
and amended in 1977. In 1970, Congress completely over-
hauled the nation’s Clean Air Act legislation, “to provide a .
much more intensive and comprehensive attack on air pol- ~
lution,” which it acknowledged as a “critical and growing ©
national problem.” S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1970) (hereinafter “1970 Senate Report”). One purpose of
the legislation was to “sharply increase federal authority
and responsibility in the continuing effort to combat air
pollution.” Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421
U.S. 60, 63-64 (1976). The 1970 amendments reflected
Congress’ dissatisfaction with progress under pre-existing
air pollution laws and were a “drastic remedy” to what was
perceived as a “serious and otherwise uncheckable prob-
lem.” Union Electric Co. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 427 U.S. 246, 249, 256 (1976).

An additional purpose of the 1970 Act was to “expedite
the establishment and implementation of air quality stand-

3

rds,” which prior law had failed to accomplish. 1970
Senate Report at 1, 10.1

Once the Administrator determines that an air pollutant
(or class of pollutants) “may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare,” the Act requires him to
place it on a list of regulated pollutants and to develop Air
Quality Criteria (“Criteria”). 42 U.S.C. § 7408(aX(1 A).
The listing of the pollutant and the development of the
Criteria are the first steps leading to establishment of
National Ambient-Air Quality Standards for that pollutant.
42 U.S.C. § 7408(aX(2). The Air Quality Criteria must
“reflect the latest scientific knowledge” and “all identifia-
ble effects on public health and welfare” from the pollutant.
Id. The national standards are required to be “based on” the
Criteria. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2).3

1Before 1970, the states had responsibility to set air quality stand-
ards “on the basis of criteria set forth by the secretary [HEW].” H.R.
Rep. No. 1146, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code
Cong. and Admin. News 5356-57. With the passage of the 1970
amendments, Congress imposed upon the Administrator the duty to set
the national standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a).

2The NAAQS are variously described as the “heart” or “cor-
nerstone” of the Act. Train v. NRDC, supra, 421 U.S. at 66: testimony of
Administrator Russell Train to the Subcommittee on Health and Envi-
ronment, March, 1975, reprinted in 8 A Legislative History of the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1977, at 7190 (1979). The standards are
expressed as a limitation on the concentration of a pollutant or pollutant
class in the ambient air. See, 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.4, 50.5. The setting of a
national standard triggers obligations upon the states to develop and
implement air pollution control plans designed to achieve the standards.
42 U.S.C. § 7410(aX(2)

3Section 109(a\(1) of the 1970 Act directed EPA to publish pro-
posed regulations prescribing national “primary” and “secondary”
ambient air quality standards for each pollutant for which Air Quality
Criteria has been issued under prior law. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a(1). At
issue in this appeal is the National Secondary Ambient Air Quality
Standard relating to the pollutant class known an sulfur oxides, for
which EPA first issued Air Quality Criteria in 1969, and revised
Criteria in 1982 and 1984.

4

The Act states that in establishing any secondary stand-
ard the EPA Administrator:

... Shall specify a level of air quality the attain-
ment and maintenance of which in the judgment of
the administrator, based on such criteria, is requisite
to protect the public welfare from any known or
anticipated adverse affects associated with the pres-
ence of such air pollution in the ambient air. ~

42 U.S.C. § 7409(bX2) (emphasis added). The Act defines
the term “welfare” to include all conceivable effects of a

pollutant on the natural and manmade environments. 42
U.S.C. § 7602(h).

The 1970 Act did not impose a schedule for revision of
the standards to account for improved knowledge of the
effects of the pollutant. It did, however, require EPA to
revise the Criteria from time to time, 42 U.S.C. § 7408(c).

The absence of a regular schedule for reviewing, and if _

appropriate, revising the standards was recognized as a
defect at the time of the 1977 Clean Air Act amendments.*
Consequently, § 109(d)(1) was added. This subsection
requires review and revision of the standards every five
years.

Not later than December 31, 1980, and at five
year intervals thereafter the Administrator shall
complete the thorough review of the criteria pub-
lished under § 7408 of this title and the national

4H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., 10, 182, 338-339,
reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 1088, 1261,
2805-6; Senate Rep. No. 127, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 16, reprinted in
Congressional Research Service, A Legislative History of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1977, Vol. 3 at 1390; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 564,
95th Cong., Ist Sess., 124 reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News at 1505.

En On a ee onties

5

ambient air quality standards promulgated under
this section and shall make such revisions in such
criteria and standards and promulgate such new
standards as may be appropriate in accordance with
section 7408 of this title and subsection (b) of this
section. The administrator may review and revise
criteria or promulgate new standards earlier or more
frequently than required under this paragraph.

42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(1) (emphasis added).

EPA established the national standards for sulfur oxides
in 1971 and has not revised them since then, except to
delete the secondary standard in 1973.5 See, opinion of the
Court of Appeals, reprinted in the Appendix, at 6a (here-
inafter referred to as “App. ___”). App. 4a, 6a, 7a. The
1971 standards expressly were not established to protect
against the acid rain and regional, haze effects of sulfur
oxides. App. 4a, 6a-7a.

To comply with the 1977 amendments to § 109, EPA
should have completed review and made a decision on
whether to revise the sulfur oxides standards in 1980 and
1985 and be preparing for a third round in 1990. Contrary
to the statements in the petition, EPA has never made any
formal decision on whether to revise the standards. EPA did
not complete first review of the sulfur oxide standards-until
1982 when it published its revised criteria documents.

>Sulfur oxides were the subject of a Criteria document issued by
the Secretary of HEW (the predecessor of the Administrator) in 1969.
At the direction of Congress in § 109(a1), EPA set National Ambient
Air Quality Standards for sulfur oxides in 1971, which were thereafter
revised in 1973. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(aX(1); 36 Fed. Reg. 1502 Ganuary
30, 1971); 38 Fed. Reg. 25679 (September 6, 1973).

The Administrator revised the air quality Criteria for sulfur oxides
in 1982 and again in 1984. He did not, however, publish any proposed
action with regard to the sulfur oxides national standards at that ti:ne.
See, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(aX(2). Thus, the national standards for sulfur
oxides have not been revised for sixteen years.

6

Those documents identified acid rain and regional haze
conditions as adverse environmental effects of sulfur oxide
emissions. Nevertheless, EPA failed to revise the standards
to address these effects.®

Since 1970, Congress has empowered district courts
(upon commencement of the civil action by any person) to
order the Administrator to “perform any act or duty under
this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administra-
tor...” 42 U.S.C. § 7604. The right to bring a citizen suit in
district court to compel EPA action under § 304 is distinct
from the right to seek judicial review of agency action. The
right of judicial review is provided in § 307 which grants to
the Court of Appeals power to review

... promulgation of any national primary or sec-
ondary air quality standard . . . or any other nation-
ally applicable regulations promulgated, or final
action taken, by the Administrator under this chap-
CE i.e

42 U.S.C. § 7607(bX1). This case seeks performance of the
Administrator’s duty to set a secondary standard to protect

against adverse effects on the environment not previously
addressed by the Administrator under the Act. Plaintiffs

®In its review of the pafticulate matter standard, EPA specifically
identified visibility impairment and acid rain as adverse effects of sulfur
dioxide and its chemical derivative, sulfate particles. 52 Fed. Reg.
24646, 24670 (July 1, 1987). The statement to the contrary in the
petition is flatly wrong. See, Alabama Power petition at 6, note 16.
EPA's refusal to set a standard for these effects-in that rulemaking was
not based on an inability to decide whether visibility was an adverse
effect of sulfur oxide emissions. Rather, it was based on the Agency’s
choice of regulatory timing in dealing with visibility effects and on an
alleged inability to devise a standard to address acid rain. An appeal of
that final EPA decision is pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit in NRDC v. Thomas, Case No. 87-1438 (oral argument
scheduled for December 14, 1989).

7

nnd \

- below did not seek review of any final agency action since
the Administrator had not taken any action with regard to
these adverse effects.

Decisions Below

On April 19, 1988 the district court (Edelstein, J.) dis-
: missed the action (on cross motions for summary judg-
ment) finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
because the Administrator had no non-discretionary duty
under § 109 to revise the national standard for sulfur oxides
| to protect the environment. Environmental Defense Fund v.
Thomas, No. 85-CV-9507 (S.D.N.Y., April 19, 1988).

Judge Edelstein ruled that § 109 imposes a non-discre-
tionary duty on the Administrator to “review” the stand-
ards at five year intervals—but no duty to revise them
“even if the EPA had found the existing standards inade-
quate,” because revision of the standards involves an exer-
cise of discretion and expert judgment. App. 38a. The court
concluded that, pursuant to § 307, any challenge to the
failure of the Administrator to set national standards must
be presented to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. App. 38a.

On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed in part and
affirmed in part. Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas,
870 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1989). The court rejected EPA’s
argument and the holding of the district court that EPA
may “stand pat, deciding neither to revise the NAAQS or to
make a public decision that revision is necessary.” App. 9a.
In reversing the district court, it held that § 109(d) imposed
a nondiscretionary duty upon the EPA Administrator to
make some decision regarding revision of the NAAQS.”
App. 9a, 18a (emphasis in original). The court further held

aerneeeeemenetrenmetll

8

that enforcement of that non-discretionary duty lies in the
district court under § 304.

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s refusal to
order EPA specifically to revise the national standard for
sulfur oxides to protect against acid rain and visibility
effects. It held that, “The substance of the Administrator’s
decision is beyond the power of the district court, . . . its
authority being limited to ordering the Administrator to
make a formal decision.” App. 9a.

Central to the court’s holding that EPA has a nondiscre-
tionary duty to make some decision are the “shall” lan-
guage and deadlines imposed upon the Administrator in
§ 109(d). App. 6a, 17a. The Second Circuit found that the
Congressional intent on this matter was “clear.” App. 17a.
To hold that this claim did not fall within the citizen suit
provision of § 304 would, the court said, “[leave] the matter
in bureaucratic limbo subject neither to review in the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit nor to challenge in the district
court.” App. 17a. Such a result, the court reasoned, could
not be countenanced:

No discernible congressional purpose is served by
creating such a bureaucratic twilight zone, in which
many of the Act’s purposes might become subject to
evasion.

App. 17a. Thus, the Second Circuit ordered the: Adminis-
trator to complete the notice and comment procedures he
voluntarily undertook nearly a year before the Court of
Appeals decision. See, 53 Fed. Reg. 14926 (April 26,
1988). The Second Circuit recognized that without such an
order there would be no assurance that the Administrator
would reach a finai decision, thereby frustrating the Con-
gressional purpose to protect public health and welfare
from air pollution.

’ daa aes

ARGUMENT

THE DECISION OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT DOES
NOT CREATE A CONFLICT WITH ANY DECISIONS
OF THIS COURT OR OTHER CIRCUITS.

Petitioners claim that the decision of the court below is in
conflict with this Court’s decision in Vermont Yankee Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519
(1978), and the decisions of the D.C. Circuit in Oljato
Chapter of the Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), and Telecommunications Research and Action
Center v. FCC, (“TRAC”), 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
These claims are meritless.

A. There Is No Conflict With Vermont Yankee Because the
Court Below Did Not Impose Procedures On the
Administrator.

Petitioners complain that the court below ordered the
Administrator to undertake rulemaking procedures in ful-
filling his obligation to take some formal action regarding
the NAAQS for SO_. Petitioners claim that this “imposi-
tion” runs afoul of this court’s decision in Vermont Yankee
which prohibits courts from imposing procedural require-
ments on an agency in excess of those imposed by statute.
435 U.S. at 547-548. Petitioners’ claim is based on a fac-
tual misstatement.

In this case, it was the Administrator, not the Second
Circuit, who determined that notice and comment
rulemaking procedures were appropriate. One week fol-
lowing the district court’s decision dismissing the plaintiff's
action (Edelstein, J.) the EPA Administrator published a
“Proposed Decision Not to Revise the National Ambient
Air Quality Standards for Sulfur Oxides (Sulfur Dioxide)”

10

in the Federal Register (53 Fed Reg 14926 [April 26,
1988]) and invited comments on the proposal from the
public.

Furthermore, § 307 of the Clean Air Act specifically
empowers EPA to adopt notice and comment procedures
for this type of decision. The rulemaking procedures of
§ 307 apply to “the promulgation or revision of any
national ambient air quality standard under section 109
...” and “such other actions as the Administrator may
determine.” 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d\(1\A) and (N). The
Administrator chose to publish his proposed decision in an
informal rulemaking proceeding either because he felt that
§ 307(d)(1 XA) required it, or because he determined that it
was appropriate to proceed in that fashion pursuant to
§ 307(dX(1(N). The Second Circuit merely ordered the
Administrator to make a final decision in the administra-
tive process which he voluntarily commenced. Therefore,
the decision of the Second Circuit decision is not inconsist-
ent with Vermont Yankee.”

Alabama Power makes the absurd claim that the Second
Circuit decision requires agencies to engage in a contin-
uous “multitude” of rulemaking proceedings as it reviews
evolving scientific information. Petition at 11, 14, 23. The
Second Circuit determination does not have this effect. It
merely enforces the § 109 requirement that EPA make a

7Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, a final decision not to revise a
NAAQS falls within the definition of a “rule” under the Administrative
Procedures Act and can only be determined by way of rulemaking
procedures. The decision not to revise the obsolete 1971 standards

“jeopardizes the rights and interests” of the members of the public.
Environmental Defense Fund v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 815 (D.C. Cir.
1983). Retention of the existing standards has “general” and “particu-
lar applicability and future effect” because it guides the behavior of
EPA and thousands of industrial air pollution sources for up to five
years. Thus, it is a rule under 5 U.S.C. §551(4). But this issue was not
before the Second Circuit. Nor is it properly before this Court, since
EPA has already chosen to publish the proposed decision as a rule.

11

formal decision on whether to revise the standards, every
five years. The Second Circuit did not usurp the Adminis-
trator’s discretion by dictating when EPA should issue such
decisions. Rather, Congress set the schedule in § 109 and
empowered district courts to enforce it in § 304. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7409, 7604.

B. Unlike the Situation in Oljato, This Case Involves EPA’s
Failure To Perform a Non-Discretionary Duty Under the
Clean Air Act.

Petitioners contend that the decision below conflicts with
the decision of the D.C. Circuit in Oljato Chapter of the
Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Specifically, petitioners argue that respondents should have
petitioned the agency for rulemaking to revise the NAAQS
for sO, , thereby resulting in the establishment of an admin-
istrative record for subsequent review by the D.C. Circuit.
Petitioners’ assertion, as the Second Circuit properly found,
ignores the fundamental difference between the Agency’s
statutory duties in Ofjato and the instant case. App. 10a,
App. 1 la.

The plaintiffs in Oljato sought review of whether EPA
should exercise discretionary powers under § 111(b) of the
Clean Air Act, which provided that EPA “may, from time
to time, revise” the performance standards at issue there. 42
U.S.C. § 7411(b); App. 10a. Pursuant to § 307 of the Clean
Air Act, such discretionary duties may only be reviewed by
the D.C. Circuit following the Agency’s action upon a
petition for rulemaking. By contrast, in the instant case,
plaintiffs sought relief under § 109(d) of the Clean Air Act
which provides that the Administrator “shall” review and
revise (at five year intervals) the criteria and standards
published under §§ 108 and 109. 42 U.S.C. 7409(d). Pur-
suant to Clean Air Act § 304, a citizen suit to compel this

12

non-discretionary duty is expressly available in the district
courts.

Thus, the outcome in Oljato was dictated by the fact that
the statute did not impose a non-discretionary duty. It was
the absence of such a duty which deprived the district court
of jurisdiction under § 304: Moreover, as the court below
found,

Since Oljato, . . . the District of Columbia Court has
distinguished between those revision provisions in
the Act that include stated deadlines and those that
do not, holding that revision provisions that do
include stated deadlines should, as a rule, be con-
strued as creating non-discretionary duties. Sierra
Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

App. 10a. Since Oljato has no application to this case, there
is no conflict between the two circuits which would warrant
review by this Court.

C. The TRAC Decision is Inapplicable Here Because the Clean
Air Act Contains a Citizen Suit Provision Which Specifi-
cally Assigns District Court Jurisdiction To Enforce EPA’s
Statutory Obligations.

Petitioners argue that the decision below conflicts with
yet another decision of the D.C. Circuit, Telecommunica-
tions Research and Action Cenier v. FCC (“TRAC”), 750
F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984), which held that “any suit seeking
relief that might affect the Circuit Court’s future jurisdic-
tion [to review agency actions] is subject to the exclusive
review of the court of appeals.” This purported conflict is
not present here because the statutory schemes in TRAC
and the instant case are markedly different.

13

In TRAC, petitioners sought review directly in the D.C.
Circuit to compel FCC action on an administrative petition
which the FCC failed to rule on after a five year delay. The
statute before the court of appeals in TRAC, however, spe-
cifically gave the court of appeals exclusive jurisdiction as
to final orders of the FCC, but did not address what court
had jurisdiction over Agency delay or failure to take action
required by law. 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1); 47 U.S.C.
§ 402(a). The D.C. Circuit held that it alone had jurisdic-
tion over “claims of unreasonable Commission delay.” 750
F.2d at 76. -

In stark contrast, the Clean Air Act provides for a bifur-
cated system of judicial review. The forum varies between
the district court and the court of appeals depending upon
whether the statute makes EPA action discretionary or non-
discretionary. Under § 304 of the Clean Air Act, Congress
expressly gave the district courts jurisdiction to issue orders
compelling the EPA Administrator to perform mandatory
duties.

The Clean Air Act gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction
to review final orders and regulations issued by EPA
Administrator. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1982). This authorizes
judicial review of virtually all final action that the Adminis-
trator has a mandatory duty to undertake. But, where the
Agency has failed to act, enforcement of EPA’s mandatory
duties in the first instance is left exclusively to the district
courts, by the plain terms of § 304(a)(2).

Consequently, the reasoning employed in TRAC—that
Congress had “manifested an intent” that the courts of
appeals should have exclusive jurisdiction over all suits to
compel agency action—is inapplicable to a statute such as
the Clean Air Act which carves out a distinct jurisdictional
function for the district court. Under the Clean Air Act,

sheen

14

Congress has clearly manifested an intent that the district
courts have jurisdiction over suits seeking to compel the
Administrator of EPA to perform a mandatory duty. App.
8a, 16a-17a.

Finally, the Environmental Protection Agency agrees
with this interpretation of § 304 and the TRAC decision. In
a brief filed in other litigation, EPA rejected a similar
argument advanced by the same parties who filed the peti-
tion in this proceeding. The District Court there agreed.

The review of the failure to perform a nondiscre-
tionary act [under the Clean Air Act] is vested in the
district court under §-304. The EPA, which argues
contrary to intervenors with respect to this issue,
argues in its surreply that intervenors ‘can only read
TRAC into this case by reading § 304 out of the
Clean Act.’

State of New York v. Thomas, 613 F. 2d 1472, 1478 (D.D.C.
1985), rev'd on other grounds, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987). The same is true
in this case, and petitioners’ once failed TRAC claim should
again be rejected.

15
CONCLUSION.

The Writ should be denied.
Dated: October 5, 1989
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT ABRAMS

Attorney General of the
State of New York

O. PETER SHERWOOD

Solicitor-General

PETER H. SCHIFF

Deputy Solicitor General

DAVID R. WOOLEY

DOUGLAS H. WARD

JOAN LEARY MATTHEWS

Assistant Attorneys General

New York State Department
of Law

The Capitol

Albany, New York 12224

(518) 474-4819

ROBERT E. YUHNKE
Environmental Defense Fund
1405 Arapahoe Avenue
Boulder, Colorado 80302
(303) 449-4901

16

JAMES T.B. TRIPP
Environmental Defense Fund
257 Park Avenue South
New York, New York 10010
(212) 505-2100

Counsel for Environmental
Defense Fund

CLARINE NARDI RIDDLE

Acting Attorney General of the
State of Connecticut

BRIAN COMERFORD

Assistant Attorney General

State of Connecticut

State Office Building

Room 147

Hartford, Connecticut 06106

(203) 566-7213

JOHN P. ARNOLD

Attorney General of the State
of New Hampshire

GEORGE DANABISBEE

CHARLES B. HOLTMAN

Assistant Attorneys General

Environmental Protegtion
Division

State of New Hampshire

State House Annex

25 Capitol Street

Concord, New Hampshire 03301

(603) 271-3679

17

JAMES M. SHANNON
Attorney General of the State

of Massachusetts
ALLAN FIERCE
Assistant Attorney General
Commonwealth of Massachusetts
One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor
Boston, Massachusetts 02108
(617) 727-2265

JEFFREY L. AMESTOY

Attorney General of the State
of Vermont

J. WALLACE MALLEY, JR.

Assistant Attorney General

State of Vermont

Office of the Attorney General

109 State Street

Montpelier, Vermont 05602

(802) 828-3171

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, III

Attorney General of the State
of Minnesota

ELDON G. KAUL

ANN SEHA ae :

Special Assistant Attorneys
General

520 Lafayette Road

Suite 200

St. Paul, Minnesota 55155

(612) 297-1075

18

DAVID HAWKINS

Natural Resources Defense
Council

1350 New York Avenue, N. W.

Suite 300 i

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 783-7800

HOWARD FOX

Attorney for Respondents ~
Sierra Club and National
Parks and Conservation
Association

Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund

1516 P Street, N. W.

Suite 300

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 667-4500

November 6, 1989

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385020_0253%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
