# Opposition Brief — Combined Insurance Co. of America v. Ainsworth

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1989
- **Citation:** 493 U.S. 958

## Text

No. 89-282 jOSEPH F- Se JR.
Cc «

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1989

COMBINED INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA,
Petitioner,
Vv.
THOMAS AINSWORTH,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

H. BARTOW Farr, III *PETER CHASE NEUMANN
JOEL I. KLEIN P.O. Box 1170

ONEK, KLEIN & FARR 136 Ridge Street

2550 M Street, N.W. Reno, Nevada 89504
Washington, D.C. 20037 (702) 786-3750

(202) 775-0184 Pese Some

WILLIAM O. BRADLEY, JR. 127 Wall Street

BRADLEY & DRENDEL, LTD. New Haven, Connecticut 06520
P.O. Box 1987 (203) 432-4846

Reno, Nevada 89505 Att 8 for R lent

(702) 329-2273
, *Counsel of Record

PRESS OF BYRON 8. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

~~

hy

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether this Court lacks jurisdiction because
petitioner has failed to meet its burden of affirma-
tively showing that the Nevada Supreme Court ruled
on its constitutional claim.

2. Whether, assuming arguendo that jurisdiction
exists, it should be exercised in a case presenting a
novel constitutional challenge when the record is si-
lent on the issue and there have been significant
changes in state law that are not before the Court.

3. Whether the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment prohibits state courts from as-
sessing punitive damages when juries are properly
instructed under established common law standards
and their verdicts are carefully reviewed on appeal.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ............ccccscccscccccsccccscccees
TR Ge AAT REED tvccevcssccevecstensecscinsestbcinnies
SEE SRUNEEIIEE . Uiibsplniectdnnlgdtnnstdaceduestiiniecedscninaminnins
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ............:. ware

I. Combined Has Failed Affirmatively To Dem-

II.

III.

IV.

onstrate That The Nevada Supreme Court
Decided Its Federal Claim. ..................00....

The Record Below Is Inadequate To Allow
For Proper Consideration Of A Major Con-
stitutional Challenge To A Fundamental Doc-
trime OF Ge TU Ta. | cise ccc sesdettnesececccne.

There Have Been Important Changes In Ne-
vada Law That Were Largely Adopted After
The Decision In This Case. ...................e0000

Combined Should Not Be Heard To Complain
Of Its Own Decision Not To Raise A Due
FUCGORS TUNE BE TUE. svcscsssssnctntniseiominicen

CURA ARITS snscsccsgcectichipnennibnieiiesababain piaaalavie

10

16

17

21
24

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES | Page
Ace Truck and Equip. Rentals, Inc. v. Kahn,

103 Nev. 503, 746 P.2d 132 (1987) ............... passim
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U. S. 813

iii iret icdabaeeatidehilcbnabetnniaeeveantecees 16
Alpark Distrid., Inc. v. Poole, 95 Nev. 605, 600 P.2d

ESERIES RR RE ey AO ee 12
Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 203 (1945) ............ 10,11,16
Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, .108

Be I ok cps a cco ncdecabweascunystosievewerce passim
Barnes v. Delta Lines, 99 Nev. 688, 669 P.2d 709

5 AeA i AT Thin icici nciieaddandiebihssumenyuntoeses 12

Batesel v. Schultz, 91 Nev. 553, 540 P.2d 100

a an 13
Bill Stremmel Motors, Inc. v. Kerns, 91 Nev. 110,

EO EINIIED invcudconssusheusnbasevososonnaborse 12
Bradshaw v. General Elec. Co., 91 Nev. 124, 531

SEE 12
Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,

I ED isiicncssccacbassensssnncsseseverees 16,17
Carson Ready Mix, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank, 97

Nev. 474, 635 P.2d 276 (1981) ........sscessee- ee, 2a
Chicago, I. & L. Ry. v. McGuire, 196 U.S. 128

aN cllnsdnculidcitdusiconmnessncesoases ssiaikedangdecne 11
Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (18 How.) 363

tis ciiincasiniaheeetunnivakantevehevccovencess 20

Desert Chrysler-Plymouth v. Chrysler Corp., 95 Nev.
640, 600 P.2d 1189 (1979), cert. denied, 445

NT ica ills lttccnateticdniwuseneeess 13
Duran v. Mueller, 79 Nev. 453, 386 P.2d 733
ETAL RE Le 12

Evkelberger v. Tolotti, 96 Nev. 525, 611 P.2d 1086
URAC Re OR A Nee 12

iv

Table of Authorities Continued

Page
Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983) ..... 9,11,15
Farmers Home Mut. Ins. v. Fiscus, 102 Nev. 371,

FD ee ED itktsthttenseiniatietientctene 00 4
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Shawcross, 84 Nev. 446,

Be ee, IE iccenecnsnnbciastnaatieintiledtiiisinans 0 12
Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974) .......... eee 11
Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 86 Nev. 408, 470 P.2d

Be I Lecnaiatescha athens thd Agnhcsamaahdasdiaidansereee 12
Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983) seesceereeees 15
Hotel Riviera, Inc. v. Short, 80 Nev. 505, 396 P.2d

ME nitdincechaneibatbicstiteniiaeitaniat das dnbeabssavess 12
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (19838) ................... 16
Lathrop v. Smith, 71 Nev. 274, 288 P.2d 212

RITE siakvibbdacdbicaicscisscadinwddaaibynadbnadababcpiasstsews 13
McGoldrich v. Compagnie Gen. Transatlantique, 309

Salm HANEY CINE Gkiccnspitidbseteebediie Meetait iat suucsdsenas 15
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) ............... 11
Miller v. Schnitzer, 78 Nev. 301, 371 P.2d 824

GENIE encieslaithadychisshinalinsaneecdacaiabaAeeanith Maan wines 7,18

_ Natchez v. Board of Optometry, 102 Nev. 247, 721

gt Bs Neem) SA eer 13
Phillips v. Lynch, 101 Nev. 311, 704 P.2d 1083

CR ONID - innivdhnrscdscsaicmneaibagnabiiesabdesdiiciiiacssan 7
Powers v. Johnson, 92 Nev. 609, 555 P.2d 1235

CRIP TED: s<csiesbdecaataaetdniaiadandaiaeiametaliideenns 12
Ross v. Giacomo, 97 Nev. 550, 635 P.2d 298

CRIES isis scsccihetincticeitittiaealiaadiaeiabeglenigilbidbilbtn saline 12
Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 82 Nev.

GED, GD Fe I itventcciintescnisecsssisccee.. 12
Smith v. Timm, 96 Nev. 197, 606 P.2d 530

DE cabecdihi:ciditemnin eases dnaciuidibannsbbietindesecsess 12

Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U.S. “270
UII chin sa scnuanichisuisdscaehd alee ibadaladdnisthasadeeenetnsinee 20

Table of ‘Authorities Continued

Page
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) .............. 11
United Fire Ins. Co. and United Diversified Corp.
v. McClelland, No. 18705, 105 Nev. Adv. Op.
No. 100 (Sept. CRE 19
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Peterson,
91 Nev. 617, 540 P.2d 1070 “1975) seal aleiabiiiene 4
Wadsworth v. Dille, 85 Nev. 86, 450 P.2d 362
CINE inicciainccnencaceeiceticnddniinast tociiceihaaiaiabtehanndens 12
Wagon Wheel Saloon & Gambling Hall, Inc. v. Mav-
rogan, 78 Nev. 126, 369 P.2d 688 (1962) ...... 12
Wilkens v. State, 96 Nev. 367, 609 P.2d 309 ‘4’
| RRS RS ean ea 18
| Statutes & Court RULES f
BT RR ene NE 10
Ala. Code § 6-11-21 (Supp. 1988) ......... 18
Alaska Stat. § 09.17.020 (1986) ..................eeseeeeeeee 18
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-701 (1989) ..........00000.... 18
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-102 (1987) ................cccees. 18
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-240b (West 1988) ...... 18
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.73 (West Supp. 1988) ......... 18
Ga. Code Ann. § 51-12-5.1 (Supp. 1988) ............... 18
Idaho Code § G-TGDE CERIO) q...cscccccscccscccscccssccvccceess 18
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3701 (Supp. 1987) ................ 18
Dine, Bie. © BED DE Cy cccsccsecesccccccccssneesscceccceses 18
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 510.263 (Supp. 1989) ................. 18
Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-221 (1987) .................20008 18
ae, Tae Be ae shee esisiibtisnsnnccenrenseni 12,22
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 42.010 (1989) .......0... 4,19
N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03.2-11 (1987) ..................... 18
N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:58C-5 (1987) .............cccccscssees 18

al iieseaiiieaeiniaiiaaniaaiaea ail

vi

Table of Authorities Continued

| Page
Ohio Rev. Code § 2815.21 (1988) ..............cccccccessees 18
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 9 (West 1986) ............. 18
S.C. Code § 15-38-185 (1988) .............ccccccsccscsssseseee 18
BN i Sie MIE chad issansachaveneavenccsaniscdammnenpeenenns 10
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 41.007 (Ver-

I I sti aia) a sae acct ctmeiinanebenmnaieaieulinnss 18
Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1 (1989) ...............ccccssseees 18
Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-38.1 (Supp. 1988) ............... 18
I I A ini seek dabich abl dllieaindiindennhnnoabton 18
OTHER AUTHORITIES
R. Stern, E. Gressman & S. Shapiro, Supreme Court

PE SUED GI: RRP ace cikccnntitencisivdseciacvnccicnss 11

\ -

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1989

ere ca cen ene

No. 89-282

COMBINED INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA,
Petitioner,
Vv.

THOMAS AINSWORTH,

Respondent.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The Supreme Court Of Nevada

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

STATEMENT

Petitioner Combined Insurance Company of Amer-
ica seeks review of a punitive damages judgment that
resulted from its oppressive conduct and bad faith
refusal to pay an insurance claim. The relevant facts
are largely set forth in the opinion of the Nevada
Supreme Court. Petitioner’s Appendix 60a (herein-
after ‘‘Pet. App.’”’). In 1969 Respondent Ainsworth
and his wife purchased insurance policies from Com-
bined, which provided coverage for ‘‘ ‘any conceivable
accident.’’’ Jd. at 61a, 66a. After having paid pre-

miums for thirteen years, in January, 1982, Mr. Ain-
sworth suffered a catastrophic accident—a stroke—
during the course of an angiogram, causing him to
lapse into a coma and leaving him permanently dis-
abled. On the advice of Mr. Ainsworth’s physician,
who believed that the stroke was caused by an ac-
cident, Mrs. Ainsworth submitted a claim for the
$9,600 in benefits available under the policies.

Without conducting an independent investigation of
any kind, without contacting Mr. Ainsworth’s physi-
cians, and without reviewing any medical records or
x-rays other than the physician’s report which accom-
panied the claim, petitioner summarily denied the
claim alleging that Mr. Ainsworth’s stroke was the
result of a disease, and not an accident.’ On the ad-
vice of a physician and Combined’s salesman, Mrs.
Ainsworth resubmitted the claim, with additional
medical evidence demonstrating that the stroke was
entirely accidental. Jd. at 62a. Petitioner sent the
claim to its retained physician, Dr. Goldfinger, but
failed to provide him with the additional material pro-
vided by the Ainsworths, and failed to provide him
with medical records from the hospital where the ac-
cident had occurred. Petitioner again denied the claim.

Mrs. Ainsworth resubmitted the claim a third time,
with additional medical evidence. Petitioner again sub-
mitted the claim to its retained physician, this time
with the additional medical information, but wrote
(without sending) a letter of denial before it even

1 The physician’s original report accompanying the Ainsworths’
claim indicated that the stroke was caused by an “‘iJatrogenic
accidental cerebral vascular accident during angiogram.’’ Ignor-
ing this language, Combined claimed to have relied on other
language in the first report stating, “‘stroke occurred from dis-
ruption of arthcromatous plaque dur'ag angiogram.”’

received its physician’s report. When it did receive
the report, petitioner sent a third letter of denial,
even though the report did not indicate that the stroke
was the result of disease, but only that it occurred
during a medical test to determine if there were a
disease.2 Mrs. Ainsworth resubmitted the claim a
fourth time, accompanied by a letter from her hus-
band’s doctor, who confirmed that the angiogram
‘* ‘revealed no pre-existing vascular disease.’”’ Id. at
63a. This time the petitioner responded with an offer
to settle the claim for 20% of what was due under
the policies, provided its insured would execute <e-
lease of all claims. Mrs. Ainsworth rejected the offer
and, for the fifth time, asked for full payment.
Petitioner responded with a repetition of its 20% of-
fer.

These repeate@resubmissions of the claim were
made at a time when the Ainsworths were financially
desperate and in great need of the benefits to which
they were entitled. Mr. Ainsworth’s stroke prevented
him from working. Having been denied the insurance
benefits from petitioner, his financial ability to obtain
critical treatment needed to reverse his severe speech
disability was compromised. As a result, he now suf-
fers permanent and irreversible speech and commu-
nication impairment. Jd. at 68a.

2 The letter that Combined sent to the Ainsworths stated that
the stroke was “directly contributed to by arteriosclerotic dis-
ease.’’ Its doctor’s subsequent report, however, stated only that
the stroke ‘‘was not purely accidental since the [angiogram] was
done to investigate the possible cause of [Mr. Ainsworth’s tran-
sient ischemic attack].” This, in fact, represented a legal, not a
medical conclusion. It was an interpretation of the insurance
contract, asserting that accidents occurring during medical pro-
cedures were not covered.

Petitioner was fully aware of its insured’s financial
difficulties. Id. at 64a-65a. It received this information
both from the Ainsworths, as well as from its’ own
salesman in Nevada, who learned of it while attempt-
ing to collect an additional insurance premium from
Mrs. Ainsworth. Despite this knowledge, petitioner
continued to deny, for many months, the needed ben-
efits. Finally, seeking to take advantage of its in-
sured’s economic distress, petitioner offered to settle
for 20% of the amount due Mr. Ainsworth. 3

On July 8, 1983, Mr. Ainsworth filed the instant
action in state district court, claiming that Combined
had failed to deal with him in good faith, a tort in
Nevada, and that it had breached its contract of in-
surance. Alleging petitioner’s aggravated conduct,
Ainsworth also sought punitive damages, as author-
ized by Nevada law.’ Despite petitioner’s objection
that there was insufficient evidence, the trial court
submitted the punitive damages issue to the jury. Pet.
App. 188a, Instr. No. 24. Petitioner failed to .object
to the content of these instructions; it failed to pro-
pose any substitute or additional instructions; and it
failed to suggest that the jury was required to receive
any instructions on standards to be applied in the
event that the jury assessed punitive damages.

3 Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §42.010(2) (1989) provides for punitive
damages in appropriate tort cases in which there is a showing
of “oppression, fraud or malice’ on the part of the defendant.
The Nevada Supreme Court previously had indicated that such
damages could apply to insurance bad faith cases under appro-
priate circumstances. Farmers Home Mut. Ins. v. Fiscus, 102
Nev. 371, 725 P.2d 234 (1986); United States Fidelity & Guar-
anty Co. v. Peterson, 91 Nev. 617, 540 P.2d 1070 (1975).

inh om ee

5

The jury returned a verdict awarding Mr. Ain-
sworth damages of $9,600 under the insurance con-
tract, $200,000 as compensatory damages for the bad
faith refusal of the petitioner to pay the benefits due,
and $5,939,500 in punitive damages.‘ In response,
petitioner moved for a new trial and sought a judg-
ment n.0.v. with respect to the punitive damage
award, arguing that there was insufficient evidence
to sustain the award. These were the only post-trial
grounds of relief petitioner offered. Petitioner failed
to request a reduction through remittitur of the
amount of damages assessed by the jury, and also
failed to question the constitutionality of the award
of punitive damages.

In a reversal of her previous ruling, the trial judge
granted judgment n.o.v. on the punitive damages
award, finding there was insufficient evidence to es-
tablish “malice in fact.”” Pet. App. 78a. Mr. Ainsworth
appealed. As the case came before the Nevada
Supreme Court, it posed only one issue: was the evi-
dence sufficient to support the jury assessment of
punitive damages? Nevertheless, in response to Mr.
Ainsworth’s brief on appeal, petitioner attempted to
raise, for the first time, a constitutional issue. It now
asserted that reinstatement of the award of punitive
damages would violate its constitutional rights under
the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment
and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.

‘As noted by the Nevada Supreme Court, this assessment
amounted to “5% of Combined’s 1985 net operating gain’’ and
“constitute[d] only .04% cf Combined’s 1985 total assets.” Pet.
App. 68a.

The irrelevance of the constitutional issue to the
appeal was recognized by the Nevada Supreme Court
when it denied petitioner’s request to delay the state
court proceedings to await this Court’s decision in
Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 108 S. Ct.
1645 (1988):

[T]he issue before this court appears to be
the propriety of the district court’s order
granting a judgment not withstanding the
verdict under the circumstances of this case,
rather than the constitutionality of punitive
damages generally.

Pet. App. 13la. Nor did petitioner demonstrate any
seriousness about its belated constitutional claims. In
a sixty-page brief, it devoted only the last two pages
to the constitutional claims, and even that focused
primarily on the Eighth-Amendment issue. It wholly
failed to raise the constitutional issues at oral argu-
ment before the Nevada Supreme Court.

The Nevada Supreme Court unanimously reversed
the trial court, finding the evidence sufficient to sus-
tain an award of punitive damages. The opinion was
based solely on Nevada law regarding punitive dam-
ages and trial court discretion. The court’s primary
determination was based upon the sufficiency of the
evidence of ‘‘oppression’”’:

Combined’s obstinate and unjustified refusal
to pay, in our opinion, constitutes oppression
as contemplated by the statute. The evidence
establishes that the Ainsworths were in des-
perate need of funds, and that Combined had
reason to know of their dire circumstances.
The record clearly supports an inference that

_ a Pe et IE A eo ols me A em NK

Combined consciously disregarded the rights
of its insured ....

Pet. App. 65a.

Reviewing the size of the punitive damages award,
the supreme court applied the standards of its recent
decision in Ace Truck and Equip. Rentals, Inc. v.
Kahn, 103 Nev. 503, 746 P.2d 132 (1987).5 The court
analyzed the jury award in light of these standards,
and concluded:

Traditionally this Court has held that the
amount of a punitive damages award was
subjective, and therefore best left to the ju-
ry’s determination. Phillips v. Lynch, 101
Nev. 311, 704 P.2d 1083 (1985); Miller v.
Schnitzer, 78 Nev. 301, 371 P.2d 824 (1962).
Recently we have attempted to define the
allowable limits of punitive damages in a
more objective fashion. Ace Truck [and
Equip. Rentals, Inc.] v. Kahn, 103 Nev. 503,
746 P.2d 182 (1987). Ace Truck described
several factors which contribute to an ap-
pellate evaluation of a punitive damages
award. We conclude, however, that none of
these factors prevent us from affirming the
award in this case.

5 Ace Truck was decided after oral argument but before de-
cision in the instant case. In it, the Nevada Supreme Court
“attempted to define the allowable limits of punitive damages
in a more objective fashion.” Pet. App. 67a. In particular, the
court set forth several criteria to be applied by trial and ap-
pellate courts in reviewing such awards. See p. 18-20 infra. The
Court apparently applied these standards in the case at bar
under its “inherent authority to issue 2 remittitur of the ver-
dict.”” Pet. App. 14a n.9.

Pet. App. 67a.

In his Reply Brief, Ainsworth had argued that the
constitutional issues were not properly before the
court, because they had not been raised in the trial
court, and were not properly preserved for review.
Pet. App. 10la. The Nevada court did not discuss the
constitutional issues in its decision other than possibly
to include them in its concluding statement: ‘Other
contentions have been considered and are deemed to
be totally without merit.” Pet. App. 69a.§

Petitioner filed a petition for rehearing, arguing
that the punitive damages were excessive under state
law, and raising unfounded and unsubstantiated al-
legations of improprieties by the then-Chief Justice of
the Nevada Supreme Court.’ The Nevada Supreme
Court denied rehearing, finding no impropriety had
occurred, and noted:

Combined’s counsel did not seriously attempt
to present on appeal a factually persuasive
or legally comprehensive argument that the
verdict was so excessive as to warrant a re-
mand or remitticur. To the contrary, counsel
essentially proceeded on an “all or nothing”’
theory that included no particulars concern-
ing the excessiveness of the punitive award.

Pet. App. 13a.

* Petitioner also had presented several claims concerning the
admissibility of certain evidence at trial and the appropriate
burden of proof in a punitive damages case.

‘Mr. Ainsworth also petitioned for rehearing on the basis of
the refusal of the court to award interest on the punitive dam-
ages. This petition was denied.

9

In short, the only merits issue ever discussed by
the Nevada Supreme Court was whether there was
sufficient evidence to support submission of the pu-
nitive damages clairn to the jury.

REASONS FOR DE®YYING THE WRIT

Petitioner seeks review of a single issue—whether
the judgment below violates the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment because the jury al-
legedly was given “unlimited discretion to award pu-
nitive damages without established standards on how
those damages are to be measured.”’ Petitioner’s Brief
at i (hereinafter ‘“‘Pet. Br.”). This issue was never
raised in the trial court and never discussed by the
Nevada Supreme Court. It should not be considered
here for several reasons.

First, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the claim
because petitioner has failed to satisfy its heavy bur-
den of showing that the court below “passed upon”
the federal law issue that it seeks to have reviewed.
See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 181
n.8 (1983). Second, even if there were jurisdiction,
the Court has repeatedly made clear that it will not
decide a constitutional challenge to punitive damages
in the absence of a ‘‘well-developed record and a rea-
soned opinion on the merits.” Bankers Life & Cas-
ualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 108 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (1988).
Third, both the Nevada Supreme Court and the state
legislature recently have responded to the Court’s in-
vitation in Bankers Life, 108 S. Ct. at 1651, to ad-
dress issues concerning the administration of punitive
damages, and have made significant changes in the
governing law. Consequently, this case essentially in-
volves a challenge to a system for assessing punitive

10

damages that no longer exists. At the same time,
further review threatens to unsettle important re-
forms before they have had a chance to become op-
erational. Finally, even if the Court were inclined to
review the issue raised by petitioner, this case is not
an appropriate one in which to do so. Mr. Ainsworth
is elderly and infirm, and has been engaged in op-
pressive litigation with petitioner for more than seven
years. The Nevada Supreme Court has already noted
petitioner’s “misuse [of] the appellate processes of
this court for the sole purpose of delaying a final
resolution of this litigation.’’ Pet. App. 43a.

I. Combined Has Failed Affirmatively To Demonstrate
That The Nevada Supreme Court Decided Its Federal
Claim. .

It is well settled that this Court’s jurisdiction to
review a judgment by a state court must “affirma-

tively appear{] upon the record brought here for re-.

view on appeal.”’ Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 203,
207 (1945) (emphasis supplied). See 28 U.S.C. § 1257.8

*In furtherance of this requirement, Rule 21.1(h) of this
Court’s rules provides:

If review of the judgment of a state court is sought,
the statement of the case shall also specify the stage
in the proceedings, both in the court of first instance
and in the appellate court, at which the federal ques-
tions sought to be reviewed were raised; the method
or manner of raising them and the way in which they
were passed upon by the court; such pertinent quo-
tation of specific portions of the record, or summary
thereof, with specific reference to the places in the
record where the matter appears (e.g., ruling on ex-
ception, portion of court’s charge and exception
thereto, assignment of errors) as will show that the

11

Thus, “‘when the highest state court fails or refuses
to pass expressly upon a federal question, the party
invoking the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction has the high
burden of showing that the federal question was in
fact properly raised, so that the state court’s failure
to deal with it was not for want of proper presen-
tation.”” R. Stern, E. Gressman & S. Shapiro, Supreme
Court Practice 150 (6th ed. 1986). As the Court has
often stated,when ‘“‘the highest state court has failed
to pass upon a federal question, it will be assumed
that the omission was due to want of proper pres-
entation in the state courts, unless the aggrieved party
in this Court can affirmatively show the contrary.”
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 582 (1969). Accord,
Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, supra, 462 U.S. at 181 n.3;
Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 50 n.11 (1974); Bazley
v. Anderson, supra, 326 U.S. at 206-07; Chicago I. &
L. Ry. v. McGuire, 196 U.S. 128, 131-33 (1905).°

Petitioner does not even acknowledge this basic re-
quirement, let alone attempt to meet the heavy bur-

federal question was timely and properly raised so as
to give this Court jurisdiction to review the judgment
on writ of certiorari.

® This settled rule is not affected by the “plain statement’’
requirement of Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), whereby
state courts were advised to make clear when they are resting
a judgment on independent state law grounds. That doctrine,
by its terms, applies only ‘‘when .. . a state court decision fairly
appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven
with the federal law.” 463 U.S. at 1040 (emphasis supplied). This
rationale has no applicability, however, when, as here, a state
court declines to discuss an issue at all; in this latter circum-
stance, there is no risk that the court will make unreviewable
federal law.

12

den that it imposes. Indeed, petitioner cannot meet
this burden when the Nevada Supreme Court chose
not to discuss the due process claim, because
petitioner’s own failure to raise the issue at trial con-
stituted a state law, procedural barrier to appellate
review.

During the trial, petitioner made no objection—con-
Stitutional or otherwise—to the content of the instruc-
tions on punitive damages. Under Rule 51,
Nev.R.Civ.P., petitioner was thereby barred from
raising, on appeal, any challenge to that jury instruc-
tion. Rule 51 expressly provides: “No party may as-
sign as error the giving or the failure to give an
instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury
retires to consider its verdict, stating directly the
matter to which he objects and the ground of his
objection.”” The Nevada Supreme Court strictly fol-
lows this rule. See, ¢.9., Carson Ready Miz, Inc. v.
First Nat'l Bank, 97 Nev. 474, 475, 685 P.2d 276
n.1 (1981).!° There is no reason to think that it did

© See also Barnes v. Delta Lines, 99 Nev. 688, 669 P.2d 709
(1983); Ross v. Giacomo, 97 Nev. 550, 556, 635 P.2d 298, 302
(1981); Eikelberger v. Tolotti, 96 Nev. 525, 611 P.2d 1086 (1980):
Smith v. Timm, 96 Nev. 197, 606 P.2d 530 (1980); Alpark Dis-
trib., Inc. v. Poole, 95 Nev. 605, 608, 600 P.2d 229, 231 (1979);
Powers v. Johnson, 92 Nev. 609, 555 P.2d 1235 (1976); Bill
Stremmel Motors, Inc. v. Kerns, 91 Nev. 110, 531 P.2d 1357
(1975); Bradshaw v. General Elec. Co., 91 Nev. 124, 581 P.2d
1358 (1975); Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 86 Nev. 408, 470 P.2d
135 (1970); Wadsworth v. Dille, 85 Nev. 86, 450 P.2d 362 (1969);
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Shaweross, 84 Nev. 446, 442 P.2d
907 (1968); Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 82 Nev.
439, 420 P.2d 855 (1966); Hotel Riviera, Inc. v. Short, 80 Nev.
505, 396 P.2d 855 (1964); Duran v. Mueller, 79 Nev. 453, 386
P.2d 733 (1963); Wagon Wheel Saloon & Gambling Hall, Inc. v.

13

otherwise in this case." At best, the Nevada Supreme
Court disposed of petitioner’s constitutional claims in
its general remark that: ‘Other contentions ... are
deemed to be totally without merit.” Pet. App. 69a.
Because the state supreme court had been made
aware of the fact that this Court had considered, but
not yet resolved, these constitutional issues, this hold-

Mavrogan, 78 Nev. 126, 369 P.2d 688 (1962); Lathrop v. Smith,
71 Nev. 274, 288 P.2d 212 (1955).

1) Petitioner asserts that the Nevada Supreme Court has “‘{a]
practice of routinely considering constitutional questions raised
for the first time on appeal.” Pet. Br. at 9 n.4. The argument
is both misleading and overstated. In the first place, petitioner
cites no case where the Nevada Supreme Court has agreed to
hear a constitutional challenge to jury instructions that was not
raised in a timely fashion in the trial court. In one of the cases
petitioner cites, Batesel v. Schultz, 91 Nev. 558, 540 P.2d 100
(1975), the dissenting judge took the position that, even though
an objection to the instructions had been made, it was not suf-
ficiently precise to preserve the issue for appeal. The remaining
cases relied on by petitioner involved objections that did not
challenge the validity of the jury instructions. See, e.g., Natchez
v. Board of Optemetry, 102 Nev. 247, 251, 721 P.2d 361, 363
(1986) (due process challenge to composition of state adminis-
trative agency); Desert Chrysler-Plymouth v. Chrysler Corp., 95 -
Nev. 640, 643, 600 P.2d 1189, 1190-91 (1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 964 (1980) (separation of powers challenge to automobile
dealership statute). Even in cases not involving jury instructions,
moreover, the Nevada Supreme Court only considers it “‘occa-
sionally appropriate” to take cognizance of a constitutional issue
not raised in the trial court. Desert Chrysler-Plymouth, supra,
95 Nev. at 643, 600 P.2d at 1191. See also Wilkins v. State, 96
Nev. 367, 609 P.2d 309 (1980) (constitutional questions will not
be reviewed in the absence of a sufficiently developed record
which demonstrates that fundamental rights are implicated and
which provides an adequate basis for review) (failure to raise
timely objection to admission of evidence held to be waiver of
Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims).

14

ing could only have represented a judgment based on
state procedural grounds.

Even on appeal, moréover, petitioner’s claim that
“the jury received no proper guidance on the question
of damages” was briefed only in a “superficial and
cursory manner’ and never raised at oral argument.
Pet. App. 14a n.9.!2 Rather, petitioner’s basic argu-
ment on appeal was the same as that at trial: the
evidence was insufficient to support any award of
punitive damages at all. There is thus no basis in the
record for suggesting that the Nevada Supreme Court
‘‘passed upon”’ petitioner’s due process claim.

Nor can petitioner argue that its belated constitu-
tional challenge to the jury instruction is simply an
alternative, legal defense of the judgment below."* The

2 Petitioner relies on the fact that the Court went on to state
that “the major focus of Combined’s argument in its briefs on
appeal was that the verdict constituted an excessive fine or a
violation of due process under the constitution.” Pet. App. l4a
n.9. On its face, this is simply a misstatement. Petitioner’s con-
stitutional claims amounted to little more than a two-page af-
terthought in a sixty-page brief. This statement cannot be
squared with the Court’s prior characterization of petitioner’s
challenge to the jury instructions as “superficial and cursory.”
Ibid. Possibly, the court meant to include in its characterization
of the “excessive fine’’ issue all of the challenges—constitutional
and non-constitutional—to the punitive damage award.

*® By its terms, Rule 51 provides that: ‘‘no party ray assign
as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless
he objects thereto.” (Emphasis supplied). While petitioner prop-
erly recognizes “(t]he Nevada Supreme Court follows the rule,
also adhered to by this Court, that it will affirm a legally correct
judgment on any legitimate ground,” Pet. Br. at 7 n.1, petiticner
fails to realize that when a basis for affirming a judgment is
raised for the first time on appeal, it will be considered “only

15

judgment below had been that the evidence did not
support a punitive damage award at all, and that,
therefore, the issue should never have gone to the
jury. The constitutional issue, however, arises only if
the issue should go to the jury; it raises a question
about the content of the instructions to be given to
the jury. To see that this is not a legal argument in
support of the judgment below one need only consider
the relief to which petitioner would have been entitled
had the Nevada Supreme Court reached the merits
of the constitutional claim and ruled affirmatively in
petitioner’s favor. The relief petitioner would have
obtained could not have been an affirmance of the
judgment below. Rather, petitioner, ct best, could
have hoped for a new trial on the amount of punitive
damages. The law of the case would have remained
that petitioner’s behavior satisfied the state law
standards for an award of punitive damages—pre-
cisely the issue upon which petitioner had won at the
trial level.

In sum, petitioner has failed to meet the heavy
burden of establishing jurisdiction in this Court by
affirmatively demonstrating that the Nevada Supreme
Court actually passed upon its due process claim. In-
deed, this Court has previously held that jurisdiction
was not present in identical circumstances. Thus, in
Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, supra, the Alabama
Supreme Court declined to “discuss” a federal claim
that had never been raised in the trial court. 462
U.S. at 181 n.3. This Court held that, even though
the federal issue was raised and briefed on appeal,

in exceptional cases.” Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 468
n.12 (1983) (quoting McGoldrich v. Cempagnie Gen. Transatlan-
tique, 309 U.S. 430, 434 (1940)).

16

the record provided no basis for jurisdiction ‘‘for it
does not affirmatively appear that that issue was de-
cided below.” Ibid. (citing Bailey v. Anderson, 326
U.S. at 206-07). On the contrary, the Court explained,
“(t]he general practice of the Alabama appellate courts
is not to consider issues raised for the first time on
appeal.’’ Jbid. For precisely the same reasons, the
same conclusion follows in this case.

Il. The Record Below Is Inadequate To Allow For
Proper Consideration Of A Major Constitutional
Challenge To A Fundamental Doctrine Of State Tort
Law.

Even if the Court had jurisdiction to review this
case, there are sound reasons to decline to do so. In
fact, in each of the past three terms the Court has
refused to decide due process challenges to punitive
damages awards even though the issue was fully
briefed and argued by the parties. Browning-Ferris
Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909,
2921 (1989); Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Cren-
shaw, supra; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S.
813, 828-29 (1986). As the Court explained in Bankers
Life, “[wJhere difficult issues of great public impor-
tance are involved, there are strong reasons to adhere
scrupulously to the customary limitations on our dis-
cretion.”’ 108 S. Ct. at 1651 (quoting Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 224 (1983)). In particular, ‘‘a constel-
lation of practical considerations, chief among which
is our own need for a properly developed record on
appeal,’’ cautions against deciding such an issue pre-
maturely. Jbid. By not rushing to judgment, in short,
the Court can ensure that the “{State] Supreme Court
will have its opportunity to decide the question of
federal law in the first instance, while any ultimate

17

review of the question that we might undertake will
gain the benefit of a well-developed record and a
reasoned opinion on the merits.” Ibid. See also
Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2921 n.23
(challenge to punitive damages would not be heard
‘in the absence of a record on the due process point
developed in the District Court and the Court of
Appeals’).

The instant case presents the Court with nothing
more than an opportunity to reprise these recent rul-
ings. There is not a word in the opinions of either
the trial court or the Nevada Supreme Court ad-
dressing petitioner’s concerns about jury discretion in
punitive damages cases. This is a glaring omission in
a case that seeks to eliminate, on federal constitu-
tional grounds, jury instructions that have been in
use for decades. A thoughtful analysis of the entire
process of determining and reviewing punitive dam-
ages awards under the challenged system is indis-
pensable to a resolution of that challenge. This
information is simply not available in the record, be-
cause petitioner did not object until after it had lost
under jury instructions that it had previously ac-
cepted. In this circumstance, there is no justification
for departing from the Court’s settled practice of de-
clining to resolve a constitutional claim on an inad-
equate record.

III. There Have Been Important Changes In Nevada
Law That Were Largely Adopted After The Deci-
sion In This Case. 7

In addition to the problems created by an inade-
quate record, the Court in Bankers Life also declined

to resolve the constitutional issues on grounds of com-
ity. Specifically, it noted its clear preference for state

18

court and legislative solutions rather than a consti-
‘tutional ruling in the area of punitive damages, which
is such an important and longstanding part of state
tort law. 108 S. Ct. at 1651 & n.3. In Nevada, this
Court’s invitation has been accepted by both the leg-
islature and the supreme court. In the past two years,
these bodies have adopted significant reforms con-
cerning the process by which such damages are
awarded by the jury, the standards by which they are
to be reviewed by the courts, and their maximum
size. For this reason alone, the instant case is par-
ticularly ill-suited for review by this Court.

The first major changes in state law occurred in
late 1987, when the Nevada Supreme Court decided
Ace Truck, supra. In that case, the court abandoned
its prior policy of according highly-deferential review
to punitive damages awards. See, e.g., Miller v.
Schnitzer, 78 Nev. 301, 371 P.2d 824 (1962). Ex-
pressing its disapproval of the notion that a “trial
judge or jury should have unbridled discretion in set-
ting the amount of punitive damages,” the court de-

'* Many other states also have amended or reformed the pro-
cedural or substantive law of punitive damages since 1986. See,
e.g., Ala. Code § 6-11-21 (Supp. 1988); Alaska Stat. § 09.17.020
(1986); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-701 (1989); Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 13-21-102 (1987), Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-240b (West 1988);
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.73 (West Supp. 1988); Ga. Code Ann. § 51-
12-5.1 (Supp. 1988); Idaho Code § 6-1604 (1980); Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 60-3701 (Supp. 1987); Minn. Stat. § 549.24 (1986); Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 510.263 (Supp. 1989); Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-221 (1987);
N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03.2-11 (1987); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:58C-5
(1987); Ohio Rev. Code § 2315.21 (1988); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit 23,
§ 9 (1986); 1987 Or. Laws 774; S.C. Code § 15-33-135 (1988); Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 41.007 (Vernon 1987); Utah Code
Ann. § 78-18-1 (1989); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-38.1 (Supp. 1988).

19

cided ‘‘to develop standards to determine the reason-
ableness of punitive damages in a given case and
thereby limit the upper amount that can be properly
and justly awarded as punitive damages.’”’ Ace Truck,
supra, 746 P.2d at 134-35. In particular, it set out
the following criteria by which courts should review
such awards: (1) the financial wealth of the defendant;
(2) the culpability and blameworthiness of the
defendant; (3) the vulnerability of, and injury suffered
by, the offended party; (4) the offensiveness of the
conduct compared to societal values of justice and
propriety; and (5) the means necessary to control the
offensive conduct. Id. at 137. See also United Fire
Ins. Co. and United Diversified Corp. v. McClelland,
No. 18705, 105 Nev. Adv. Op. 100 (Sept. 6, 1989)
(Ace Truck standards applied).

Cognizant of the decision in Ace Truck, as well as
the decision in the instant case, the Nevada legisla-
ture recently adopted additional reforms in this area.
Effective May 30, 1989, Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 42.010(2) imposes new procedural protections in all
cases involving punitive damages, including the re-
quirement that the predicate conduct of oppression,
fraud or malice be proved by ‘‘clear and convincing
evidence.”’ Pet. App. 201a.* In addition, the statute
requires bifurcation of the trial so that the amount
of punitive damages will be assessed in a separate
proceeding, at which the jury will receive -evidence,
for the first time, as to the financial condition of the

15 Although petitioner failed to request at trial that Mr. Ain-
sworth be held to this standard, it argued strongly for precisely
this burden of proof in its appellate briefs to the Nevada Supreme
Court. In fact, this contention was given priority over its Eighth
Amendment and due process claims. Pet. App. 91a.

20

defendant. Jbid. Finally, it sets a “cap” on punitive
awards (three times compensatory damages or
$300,000, whichever is higher), and provides that the
jury may not be advised of this cap in reaching its
verdict. Id. at 202a.'*

These recent changes in Nevada law ensure that
its procedures for administering punitive damages will
withstand constitutional scrutiny under the due proc-
ess clause. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri,
224 U.S. 270 (1912); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13
How.) 363 (1852). More significantly for present pur-
poses, however, these changes make the instant case
a poor candidate for review by this Court in two
significant respects. First, the system of punitive
damages that petitioner asks the Court to review is
no longer in effect in Nevada. The legislative changes
were adopted subsequent to the decision below and,
while the standards in Ace Truck were applied in
affirming the jury’s verdict in this case, those stand-
ards may not have been put to their true test because
petitioner ‘“‘did not address in a meaningful way the
specific factors set forth in Ace Truck’’ Pet. App. 14a
n.9. Indeed, the Nevada Supreme Court frankly stated
that it “‘may have been much more receptive to Com-
bined’s contentions, [regarding excessiveness] if they
had been cogently presented on appeal rather than
belatedly asserted in a petition for rehearing.” Ibid.
\

16 The statute exempts certain categories of claims, such as
bad faith denials of insurance claims, from this cap. Having done
so with particular knowledge of the instant case, the legislature
has expressed its considered view that such behavior requires a
greater measure of deterrence in Nevada than do other torts.
That view, based on an intimate knowledge of local conditions,

should not be lightly set aside on constitutional grounds, as
petitioner would suggest.

21

These recent changes make this case unworthy of
review for another reason as well. Having devoted
significant time and energy to responding to the
Court’s invitation in Bankers Life, the Nevada
Supreme Court and legisiature should not have their
efforts placed in immediate jeopardy by a premature
constitutional ruling that will inject a federal issue
into every case involving punitive damages. Instead,
these reforms should be allowed to develop so that
the state legislature and judiciary can assess their
effects and determine whether other changes are
needed. These institutions, as the Court has previ-
ously indicated, are likely to provide “less intrusive,
and possibly more appropriate, resolutions’ to the
issues presented by the petition. Bankers Life, 108
S. Ct. at 1651.

IV. Combined Should Not Be Heard To Complain Of Its
Own Decision Not To Raise A Due Process Issue
At Trial.

Petitioner, through its admitted bad faith and op-
pressive withholding of accrued benefits, did not
merely cause serious distress to Mr. Ainsworth and
his wife. As the record shows, petitioner’s conduct
aggravated the very physical maladies that its insur-
ance policy bound it to alleviate through payment of
the promised benefits. Pet. App. 68a.

Petitioner forced the disabled and financially dis-
tressed respondent to seek justice through legal ac-
tion. Petitioner was represented at trial by
experienced Nevada counsel. Counsel was given every
opportunity to present petitioner’s case to the jury,
tendering for the jury’s consideration whatever issues
might seem strategically useful. Evidently, petitioner’s
counsel did not desire jury instructions that formu-

22

lated ‘‘standards” by which to assess the amount of
any award of punitive damages. The only objection
petitioner tendered was to the giving of any instruc-
tion on punitive damages at all. No objection was
made to the form of the instruction. No attempt was
made to tender any other instruction. Nor was any
suggestion made to the trial judge by petitioner’s
counsel that an explicit statement of ‘“standards’”’
would even be of value—much less that “‘standards’”’
were essential to due process of law.

Nothing prevented petitioner’s counsel from pre-
senting this position to the trial court, had counsel
believed that an explicit statement of standards was
important. Counsel was aware of Rule 51 and the
need to raise contemporaneously any objection to jury
instructions. The failure to pose such an objection
represented a reasonable tactical decision by
petitioner. The facts reflected in the record point to-
ward the conclusion that any ‘‘standards’’ which may
have been formulated in this case (had petitioner re-
quested them) would have as likely worked against
petitioner’s position, as for it.

The Nevada Supreme Court’s review of the record
in this case, in light of the standards articulated in
Ace Truck, demonstrates this. The facts of the instant
case weighed positively for Mr. Ainsworth, and
against petitioner; they supported an assessment of
substantial punitive damages.’ In short, counsel got

17 Precisely the same reasons supported Combined’s tactical
decision not to ‘‘address in a meaningful way the specific factors
set forth in Ace Truck,” on appeal. Pet. App. 14a n.9.

23

the kind of trial they wanted."* For reasons of their
own, petitioner’s counsel chose to hold the constitu-
tional claim in reserve, until after an unfavorable ver-
dict. The opinions of the Nevada Supreme Court show
that on appeal petitioner continued to engage in an
abusive strategy of delay and obstruction. The court
not only affirmed the jury’s finding that petitioner
had acted in bad faith, as well as “‘oppressively’’ in
its dealings with Mr. Ainsworth; it also condemned,
in the strongest possible terms, numerous procedural
ploys pursued by petitioner. The Court described them
as “reckless[],”’ Pet. App. 20a n.12; “frivolous,” Jd.
at 21a; a “‘nullity,” Jd. at 17a; made “‘irresponsibly”’
Id. at 26a n.15; incapable of being “‘ ‘seriously [] con-
tended,’”’ Id. at 31a; “speculative,” Jd. at 40a;
“wholly insufficient,’ and “‘specious’’ Jd. at 4la &
n.22; and suggestive of a ‘‘misuse [of] the appellate
processes of this court for the sole purpose of delay-
ing a final resolution of this litigation.” Jd. at 43a.
By these tactics petitioner has delayed accountability
on the jury’s verdict for an additional three and one-
half years.

In conclusion, it is submitted that petitioner should
not be allowed to continue this pattern by asking this
Court to grant a new trial! on conditions different
from those which petitioner sought during its day in
court. Mr. Ainsworth is not only elderly, but seriously
ill, in part directly due to petitioner’s oppressive con-

_ 38 Combined’s counsel may also have hoped that the jury would

split the total award between compensatory and punitive dam-
ages. Counsel may have sought to keep in reserve a new con- _
stitutional challenge to the latter. The result of this tactic would
have been not only to defeat the punitive damages, but to sup-
press the compensatory damages as well.

24

duct. If this oppressive litigation is allowed to con-
tinue on issues never raised at trial, there is good
reason to suggest that much or all of what is left of
Mr. Ainsworth’s life will be consumed during the

process.
CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be de-

nied.
Respectfully submitted,

H. BARTOW Farr, III *PETER CHASE NEUMANN
JOEL I. KLEIN P.O. Box 1170
ONEK, KLEIN & FARR 136 Ridge Street
2550 M Street, N.W. Reno, Nevada 89504
Washington, D.C. 20037 (702) 786-3750
(202) 775-0184 Par wim
WILLIAM O. BRADLEY, JR. 127 Wall Street
BRADLEY & DRENDEL, LTD. New Haven, Connecticut 06520
P.O. Box 1987 (208) 482-4846
Reno, Nevada 89505 Attorneys for Respondent

(702) 329-2273 “Counsel of Remed

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385020_0167%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.