# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Marker v. Rieschel > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385020_0145%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari - **Published:** January 1, 1989 - **Citation:** 493 U.S. 893 ## Text THE FOLLOWING PAGES WERE POOR HARD COPY AT THE TIME OF FILMING. IF AND WHEN A BETTER COPY CAN BE OBTAINED, A NEW FICHE WILL BE ISSUED. weniaiihine Ld / } ° AG Supreme Court, U.S. 89-284 | FILED No. 3 we PANIOL, JR. AERK IN THE { Supreme Court of the Hnited —— - OCTOBER TERM, 1989 JAMES A. MARKER, JR., AND BEVERLY J. MARKER, “Petitioners, Vv. WAYNE K. RIESCHEL, et al. Respondents. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit : James A. Marker, Jr., and Beverly J. Marker, pro se. P.O. Box A Langley AFB, Va 23665 (804) 766 2196 Beverly J. Marker 217 East 2nd St. So. Newton, Iowa 50208 (alternate address when in midwest) QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether tolling under 50 USC Appx. sec. 525 applies to an action that has already been duly filed and served under the applicable statute of limitations. The 8th Cir.Ct. says yes, the 3rd Cir.Ct. and the Sup.Ct. Penn. say no. 2. Whether 50 USC Appx. sec. 525 applies to career service persons as implied by the 8th Cir.Ct. or does not apply to a career serviceman as held by the 11th Cir.Ct. 3. Whether a stay shall be granted under 50 USC Appx. sec. 521 when the trial court's finds the ability of the plaintiff to prosecute an action is materially affected by his military service or words to that effect: "...will accept the facts ... relative to the interference of his military service in effectively prosecuting this case...". €1i> —_ Whether a dismissal without prejudice of a military plaintiff's action, for damages, after the statute of limitations has run for co-plaintiffs violates the seventh amendment or other rights of co-plaintiff when "Demand for Jury Trial” was made on complaint. _5. Whether any factors taken into ee “consideration should be any different for etlitery plaintiff under 50 USC App. sec. 501 et seq., than military defendant when a sec. 521 stay is sought, and plaintiff has prayed for an injunction to prevent irreparable injury in the interim: 6. Whether abstention is fatal defect in a case where a service man is seeking a Stay and injunctive relief under the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, when the service man is not party to any other action, and the issues raised will not be addressed in any action a co-plaintiff may be a party to. (iid 7. Whether when a defendant party is in default, can the military plaintiff ask the Court to consider the constitutionality of any act, systen, law, or relief requested as it pertains to the party in default when the request for a Stay is acted upon. { The 7th question contains within it subsidiary questions that fall well within the injunctive relief (36a-39a) asked for in the complaint filed Nov. 27, 1987, some examples follow. ] 7a. Whether Dallas County refusal to provide the services of the sheriff's and prosecutcr'’s office on a equal basis to plaintiffs violates plaintiff's rights to equal protection. _7b>. Whether Dallas County has an obligation to select those in the local justice system by a method that assures plaintiff's a fair decisional process and an impartial decisionmaker. Does lack of €iii)d Such system violate plaintiff's right's to due process or other rights. _7c. Whether Dailas County has a duty under the U.S. Constitution to respect all federally protected rights and to take positive or affirmative action to assure due process and equal protection of the laws to all that come within their jurisdiction, for example the plaintiffs. Attorneys for respondents: Robert W. Schroff, counsel for Mr. Rieschel, Suite 203, 2135 E. Sunshine, Springfield, Mo. 65804 Richard S. Magruder, counsel for Mr. Cox, Suite 300, 801 Walnut, Kansas City, Mo. 64106 Rodney E. Loomer, caunsel for Mr. and Mrs. Burtin, P.O. Box 4043, Springfield, Missouri, 65808 Party in Default: Dallas County, Mo. TABLE OF CONTEETS Page Opinions below .. 0... ccc cece erences 1 FUPMAGAGSCEGR 2.2 ik i is cee pees eee 2 Civ) Constitutional and Statutory provisions tavolvad ... 1... ees Jurisdiction of the District Court.. STATEMBRT 2c eee ee ee cence REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION i. Conflict with lower Courte....:... 2.-Conflict with: lower Courts........ 3. Conflict with this Court.. Perry ae 4. Constitutional violation ......... 5. 50 USC Appx section 521 has never been interpreted for a military plaintiff by this Court, oe ee ee ee ee ee ee 6. Inproper application of abstention 7. Major social issues and party in og th eerweerrrrn rawr a ee yee ee ee ee ere ee ee rer ee ree TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: BEACON THEATRES v. WESTOVER (1959) 359 U.S. 500, ee ee ee Cv) 25 38 40 Page Cases: Page BOONE v LIGHTNER (1943) 319 US 561,at 571-575, 87 L Bd 15867, 6S S Ct i223, Teh Gen 320 VS GOS... ccc vrs vvces 22, 32 BROWN v BOARD OF EDUCATION ) 22 S.B.2d 426,426 (3) ....... eee, 22 MASON v TEXACO IWC. (10th Cir. 1958) 862 F2d 242,245 2... ccc e ever ercenenes 21 McCAHCE v. LINDAU (Md. App. 1985) 492 A. 2G 1952, 19SS 2... cc esc cccenvnes 21 PANNELL v. CONTINENTAL CAN CO. (Sth Cir.1977) 554 Fed 216,225 (13). 20 «vid Cases: Page PATRIKES v J.C.H. SERVICE STATIONS INC. 18C Misc 917,922-924 41 NYS2nd 158,166, affd 180 Misc 927, 46 WYS2d 233, (1943 Sup.Ct. W.Y.) app den 266 App Div 924, ee PE EE. 6-0 0A Sew © Nod 2 ew ae 25, 27 PERNELL v. SOUTHALL REALITY (1974) 416 U.S. 363, 94 S.Ct. 1723,1727, ee aks On OE, 8 6 4A Gas BAS Ke Oa 8 OS 24 SELMER v OERTWIG (1943 Sup. la.» os. 6S OUD, eee eee eee 28, 27 TAHIR v GLENN L. MARTIN CO. (4th Cir. 1941) 116 F.2d 864,871.... 34 THOMPSON v REEDMAN (1961) wea FO Bary EOE 6806s ss pees 34 TUMEY v STATE OF OHIO (1927) ae ek ee, ee EE eer ee eer 47 UNITED STATES v COUNTY COURT (1887) 1g@e U.S. 306, F &.Ce °’lvi,ii7s ..... 43 WARD v VILLAGE OF MONROEVILLE, OHIO (1972) 93 S.Ct. 80, 82-846 11(2,3](4). 47 WILLIAMS v RED BANK BD. of BEd., (Srd Cir. 1981) 662 F.2d 1008,1024.. 40 ZARLINSKY v LAUDENSLAGER (1961 Sup.Ct. Pa) 402 Pa 290, Ry Bh. OG Dr ge CMe a's 0h 6 0 Ws ne wwe 18 ZITOMER v HOLDSWORTH (3rd cir. 1971) SGD FBG FORT santa bk asa ser ceecess i7 ZWICKLER v. KOOTA , VV, 32? 50 USC App sec. S20 ......... 3, 25, 31 50 USC App sec. 521 a, 3. 3, VF. TF, .... 19, 20, 26, 31, S2, 33, 34, 36, 37 SQ USC App SOC. S23 . ww crc cree cnn evens 50 USC App sec. S24 .... cee ee reeces 37 50 USC App sec. 525 TrrrrTrr teers e s 3 & iv, 16, 19, 37 SO USC: App Sec. SSH onc cece c ees nnnvveas (In 3rd Circuit Opinion Appendix 4a) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: mee. 2. GSO. FP. BRR GB sac cesusesace 3, 41 Pee. B.COe.P. Be BE sees easier 3, 34 Ped. 8. Gie. FP. Behe BD wcosessesss 3, 27 Pee. S. Gi. PF. BOA De sacccocesa 3, 42 Local Court Rule of The United States District Court For The Of Missouri: ‘Rule i. F. Attorneys (viii Western District ) Missouri Law Page Missouri Constitution Art.5 sec.i6 ..4,50 Missouri Revised Statutes: ee ee en ee ae ee 3, 41 ee ee ee ee ee ee 3, 41 (as effective when complaint filed) ROPE Was GA onc 4A 654 Senet 48 2 4, 45, S50 oh x 4 AE EE eS Ce ee Pe 3, 42 EN crs 5 a aw oe wc es ae 4, 44 x Pe kis 435 - IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM, 1989 JAMES A. MARKER, JR., et al. Petitioners, Vv. WAYNE K. RIESCHEL. et al. Respondents. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT Petitioners James and Beverly Marker respectfully petition oe a writ of certiorari to review the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and the decision of the District Court in this case. OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the court of appeais is not reported. (la-6a). The two orders and judgment of the district court are not reported. (6a-13a). However, photo- copies of the above ee of the other appended materials were filed with this court cn May 26, 1989 when additional time was requested. JURISDICTION The opinion of the court of appeals (la-6a) was entered on January 9, 1989. A petition for rehearing was denied March 8, 1989 (la). On May 30, 1989 Associate Justice Harry A. Blackmun of the Supreme Court extended the time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to July 6, 1989 and on June 26, 1989 further extended the time to August 5, 1989. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254. CORSTITUTIOWAL AWD STATUTORY PROVISIONS. INVOLVED 1. 50 USCS Appx sec. 525 (78a-79a) of main interest. Also mentioned: 50 USCS Appx sec. 521 (75a-76a). 2. 50 USCS Appx sec. 525 (78a-79a) of main interest. Also mentioned: 50 USCS Appx sections 464, 466 ‘c) (70a) 511, (7la-72a), 5S2il (75a-76a). 3. 50 USCS Appx sec. 521 of main inter- est (75a-76aa). Also: sec. 525 (78a-79a). 4. The 7Th amendment to the United States Constitution (57a) of main interest. Aiso mentioned: the lst, Sth, & 9th amendments (56a-57a) and Art.IV, sec. 2 par.1 privileges and immunities (55a-56a). 5. 50 USCS Appx sec. 501 et seq., in relevant part ‘69a-79a). Fed.R.Civ.P. Rules 15 & 19 (80a-8la). Fed.R.Civ.P. Local Rule 1.F. (39a-41la) Western Dist. of Mo. 6. Art. III, sec. 2, par. 1 167 &.a@ 317 at 320 (2) "™... this Section expressly applies to the limitation of time for bringing an action, not to a limitation of time for the continuing of process in an action already brought ...” If tolling is only for the "bringing of any action” we have had no choice except to ask this Court to clarify sec. 525 because to do less would risk the end of even Major Marker's standing. If the eighth circuit's opinion were to stand it would create a severe burden on both military plaintiffs and defendants. It would mean a military plaintiff who was concerned over the safety of his family could file his case over and over again seeking some sort of injunctive or other relief from the Courts, creating great expense for both plaintiff and defendants. Wot to mention the extra burden for the Courts themselves. Whether a service man files an action and 18 asks for a stay under sec. 521 untii he is either out of the service or whether he waits until he is out and files an action under sec. 525, the effect on witnesses and evidence is the same. The same amount of time is passed. Once a case is filed it appears that the military person should be given reasonable protection, and sec. 521 must be relied upon until — is out of service or his circumstances change to where he could prosecute his action. a There is a conflict over the issue oe —_—_—___ of whether 50 USC sec. 525 is applicable to career service persons between the 11Th Cir. and the 8Th Cir. I believe it was clear to the district and circuit courts that Major Marker is a career serviceman from the papers filed (27a par 24). When a career serviceman is aware of a case by a Federal Appeals Court, such as the following Pannell case, the 19 only prudent course of action seems to be to file his complaint within the applicable statute of limitations and 4 for a Stay under sec. 521: PANNELL v. CONTINENTAL CAN CO. (5th Cir.1977) 554 Fed 216, 225 (13) "We are of the opinion the the Soldiers’ and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. A.App. section 525 is inapplicable to a career service man like Cclonel Pannell....” For a career man to file and ask for a etay seems most appropriate when filing later may not be possible, considering PANNELL, and especially when one is look- ing for some sort of injunctive relief that will compel county officials to preform their duties because the sheriff will not respond to repeated calls for help and assistance on a variety of dates and situations, even those of a life threatening nature, because the county attorney/prosecutor has, or has had, the perpetrator as a private legal client. What we did was our only option. In 20 considering which Appeals Circuit is correct I would call your attention to 50 USC Appx sec. 464, 466(c), 511 (38a-40a). It important to us and others so situated to know which court is correct. McCANCE v. LINDAU 492 A.2d 1352 (Md.App. 1985) at 1355 disagreed with Pannell and offers a good discussion of the Act. The McCance couple had a bad experience but it does not hold a candle to the endless nightmare we have endured. If we were to detail all that happened to our family and ourselves several large volumes would be needed. We have only attempted to give a thumbnail sketch. Another very recent case, in agreement with McCANCE, that was decided since we filed our case is MASON v TEXACO (10th Cir.1988) 862 F.2d 242 at 245. 3. This unprecedented ruling by the _—_— _— Bight Circuit seriously misconstrues and/or is conflict with this Courts 21 decision in BOONE v LIGHTNER (1943) 319 US 561 at 571-575 in regards to what the Obligations are of the district court when it "...accepts the facts as set forth in Major Marker'’s letter relative to the interference of his military service in effectively prosecuting this case." (8a last para. & lla-l3a) if there is any application of BOONE v LIGHTNER to a plaintiffs action. LIGHTWER v. BOONE (1942 Sup.Ct. N.C.) 22 S.E.2d 426 at 428 (3) further reveals the trial court's reasoning in Boone. Col. Ash's letter (14a-16a) and some of the other papers in the record makes it very clear that Jim's ability to prosecute was materially affected. Jim even tried to obtain a deferment from the military to remain in Missouri, but was unsuccessful. After that he even submitted papers to leave the military service-terminate his career-just a few 22 days before he was due to be promoted, but the Air Force turned him down. I do not know what else he could have known to do legally to remain in Missouri to resolve these problems (24a para. 14). We now have copies of much of the Air Force paperwork to substantiate those efforts by my husband. Even as a Commander and officer he did not know what else he could do. ‘careeeas he could not proceed unrepresented from half a continent away, nor forget the problen. The district court (l2a) makes refer- ence to "...to the great prejudice of plaintiffs in that by that time, evidence may be lost and witnesses misplaced.” and also talks about the rights of the defendants. As already stated, there is no difference in what happens to evidence or witnesses whether a Stay is granted or the case is tolled and filed later. The same amount of time will have passed. A 23 stay does not make a judgement on defend- ant/respondents, only preserves the day for the case to be heard. However, the rignonts of co-plaintiff are destroyed when a case like this is dismissed rather than stayed, and violates the 7th amendment. . I believe the seventh amendment protects the right to a jury trial ina tort action for damages and other relief. A "Demand for Jury Trail” was very clearly made at the end of the complaint. The language was very broad and I feel certain it fell within the common law. For the Federal District Court to dismiss without prejudice was in effect to deny me any right to be heard and to violates my rights under the seventh amendment. PERNELL v. SOUTHALL REALITY (1973) 94 S.Ct. 1723,1727, CURTIS v. LOBTHER (1974) 415 U.S. 189,194-196, DAIRY QUBEH v. WOOD (1962) 82 S.Ct. 894,896,897, BEACON THEATRES v. WESTOVER (1959) 79 S.Ct. 24 948,953-955, in addition to my due pro- cess rights under the fifth, also ninth amendment rights, and Art. IV, sec.2, par.1. (55a-58a), plus my first amendment rights to a redress of grievances. Co-plaintiffs should not be penalized because a military person's military duty prevents his going to trial, when to deny them a stay would cause injury to the interests of the ai litary person: PATRIKES v J.C.H. SERVICE STATIONS IWC. 180 Misc 917,923 (1943 Sup.Ct. N.Y.) app den 266 App Div 924. Wor should any party be denied their day in court: SEMLER v OERTWIG (1943 Sup.Ct Ia.) 12 HW2d 265 at 275 (10-12). 5. The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil ae Relief Act itself treats plaintiffs and defendants in different ways. A careful examination of the Act will reveal that this is true. (69a-79a). i.e. 50 USCS Appx sec. 520 (74a-75a) provides for 25 different protection for military defendants than plaintiffs. Where a military plaintiff has been injured and is looking to the Court for injunctive and other relief there would naturally be different considerations than when the serviceman was accused of causing grief and injury to others. We would suggest the following are some of the important factere this Court may wish to address: Distance from the Court; Co-plaintiffs rights; Availability of appropriate counsel; Local impediments to obtaining unbiased counsel; Current status of section 521 (Military lawyers view); Efforts required of plaintiff to obtain military dispensation; Conditional stay. The distance from the Court's jurisdiction seems a very important consideration by itself. Absence when ones rights are being decided or the lack of opportunity to properly prepare for 26 OOO trial is in itself prejudicial: HECK v. ANDERSON (1944 Sup.Ct. Ia) 12 NWWed 849 at 851 (2,3) first para. The lowa Supreme Court indicates at 852,853 (6-8) that a stay could be granted to others, "...so far as, necessary to protect the interests of the service..." person, also FATRIKES v J.C.H. SERVICE STATIONS INC. 180 Misc 917 at 922-924, (1943 Sup.Ct. N.Y.) app den 266 App Div 924, and; SEMLER v OERTWIG (1943 Sup.Ct Ia.) 12 NWed 265 at 275 (10-12). Certainly if co-defendants are proper candidates for a stay when the interests of the service person are affected than certainly when co-plaintiffs are wife or other of the serviceman's financially dependant family members, the actin should be stayed as to all parties in the actic,. 50 USC Appx sec. 513 mentions dependents, sec. 510 (70a-73a) Acts purpose, Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 19 (80a-8la) joiner of persons needed. 27 ofl We need to be together on this action. Jim thought he had an attorney who would represent him in this case in September 1985, but as you can see from Attorney Lynch's letter (41a-47a) it was much too threatening to his practice to challenge the local system. Mr. Lynch helped us on other matters: Jim in 1965; and than me in 1986, but could not bring cimanve to do anything about what even he saw as the real problem-the problem of inequality in the Dallas County system. Jim really never had a chance to try and find another attorney in the area and my efforts to find other attorneys found the same problems Mr. Lynch had. Jim discussed this problem in more detail in his letter requesting a stay filed May 26, 1989 with this Court. Plenty of lawyers thought the system needed changing-but thought someone else should do it, mentioning conflict of interest. 28 Some thought their practice would be destroyed. ! have heard of endless people hurt by the system as it is. I think the only hope for change can come from a suit such as ours. The availability of unbiased Counsel who's first concern is for the client and the ability to freely consult with such counsel, person to person, is very important. Any restricting rules becomes even more important when one is in mtlitary service half a continent away. When Fed.R.Civ.P. local rule 1.F. restricts representation to the "Division thereof” (39a-41la), this presents real problems: obtaining representation that is unbiased, the attorney is after all a part of that same small legal community, and his livelihood depends on their good will; attorneys see a conflict of interest in representing someone in a suit that addresses problems that are 29 common to the other rural counties in this very limited area; Some of the problems | am addressing are similar to what Mr. Lynch mentioned in his letter. Local rule 1.F. seems to effectively impede any action that would challenge the local system abuses in this rural area and impedes our ability to resolve any-of our problems. Wot being lawyers “ it hard to understand the purpose of this Rule 1.F. It seems any good decent lawyer from anywhere could handle the matter. I have even wondered if this did not constitute a restraint of trade? We hope this court would look at this rule and see if it needs modification, at least where military, outsiders, etc. are concerned in this type of case. It seems that there should be pro- visions in the rules to eliminate this type of conflict of interest especially for absent military persons and their 30 family members who are domiciled in another state, and now stationed far from the Court's jurisdiction and the area where they were injured. He should have the ability to have an attorney more of his choosing without having to have an attorney from the "division thereof” rubber stamp the action. An unbiased legal system and counsel seems the very heart and soul of our judicial systen. To refuse a Stay for many of the cases where defendants are represented seems reasonable. Especially since Courts will frequently use section 520 (3) to appoint an attorney. But to use the same yard stick for the injured military plaintiff seems not to be within the meaning of 50 USC section 521 or the spirit of the Act. In CONTINENTAL ILLINOIS WAT. BANK & TRUST CO. v UNIVERSITY OF HOTRE DAME (1946 Sup.Ct. ILL) 69 WE2d 301 at 304-305 (3) the ILL. Supreme Court upholds the 31 serviceman’s right to not only be present at trial but to be able to participate in the presentation of his case, even if he has counsel. However in most cases the servicemember has been denied a stay when he has an attorney. Almost always BOONE vy LIGHTNER (1943) 319 U.S. 561, 571-575 is cited in these cases. Military lawyers have published many articles that indicate that a combination of rulings by the lower courts has served to almost totally eliminate protection that congress wanted to provide for the military under 50 USCS Appx section 521. They suggest that what ever you do, if you need a stay under 521 do not hire a lawyer! Have anyone else ask for the stay: your wife; your mother; someone in the military chain of command; anyone but a lawyer. The most recent article I have seen on this was in "The Army Lawyer" Feb. 1989. I am certain this Court did 32 not intend to nullify the Act in regards to sec. 521, nor send the current message that: if you need a stay one best not have an attorney for representation. When congress drafted the words in 50 USC Appx sec. 521: "...on application to it by such person or some person on his behalf...” I do not believe that congress meant for plaintiffs to have to file their own cases to utilize sec. 521 or to enlist the help of their mothers, wives, fellow military members, or anyone else not trained in the law to obtain a stay. We do not believe we can proceed against the other plaintiffs alone. That is one of the several reasons why a stay was requested in the first place and the request to amend our suit later was made. This issue is very important not only to us but others that come after us. We need to know if we can acquire a lawyer and what effect that has on obtaining or 33 retaining a stay under sec. 521 (75a). Not being lawyers we also asked for the right to amend the action when it was reopened as we hoped to be represented than: THOMPSON v REEDMAH (1961) 201 F.Supp 837,838 (4) states in part, "Leave to amend ‘shall be freely given when justice so requires.’ FED.R. CIV.P. rule 15. He was so desperate for help and so concerned about leaving me behind in such 34 a hostile situation he almost ended his career in the process. We can only be grateful that the Air Force did not grant Jim his request to leave the Air Force. We have needed the income to fight this legal battle. The Air Force expects their service people to go where they want them to go when they want them to go, to put the Air Force and the defense of their country first. I am concerned that many Judges may not understand what military life is like. They may have never served, or if so as legal officers, or pilots entitied to certain protections such as crew rest. Such duty may be quite different from other servicemen. Wormally one has little control over when and where you are sent. Life is uncertain because our national defense needs can change rapidly. For a plaintiff to have to consider abandoning a career which the 35 U.S. government may have spent many thousands-in some cases millions training the individual for, seems unreasonable, especially in the case of a plaintiff. I have selected parts of Jim's letter dated May 5, 1988 that you may wish to read to more fully understand what was said to the District Court on this matter (17a-25a). These parts particularly irene some of the probiems he faced in regards to his career and duty. This is the letter the Court required him to write and is referred to in the District Court orders (6a-13a). My husband did every thing he could. For military plaintiffs to have to be so concerned about civilian legal problems is not in the interest of either the serviceman or the country he serves. I can understand that career military plaintiffs present a different problem to the courts with regards to sections 521 36 and 525 than those who enlist for a short time. However, nearly all officers are on indefinite assignments. The except- ions being primarily those with short term commitments made because of Govern- ment provided schooling. Many NW.C.O. even though they have a discharge date are none the less career persons. With sec. 525 the same time passes. I do not see anything-in the Act or sec. 521 that would preclude the court from granting a stay with conditions. Section 524 (77a- 78a) provides for the stay to be SUBJECT TO SUCH TERMS AS MAY BE JUST. It seems reasonable that the court could include language that would subject the stay to re-examination if it could be shown the plaintiff had been reassigned to the jurisdiction of the court and had been there for more than 90 continuous days and had not sought to proceed with the action himself, as most plaintiffs 37 would want to do. This would seem to protect ail parties. I don't know if a stay could include any language that would allow any discovery to preserve evidence without violating the stay itself, but if that could be done it seems that it should be something the military plaintiff should be able to initiate when duty would permit, if he had an attorney to help him and if a time convenient for the defendants could also be found. I can ~ see where in many cases a military plaintiff may not be able to proceed with the action, but may be able to initiate come limited discovery and that might be desirable for all if it was possible under the stay. 6. This question addresses the application of abstention to this case. The 3rd Cir.Ct. sets out 3 criteria for applying this doctrine in: 38 DECK HOUSE v WEW JERSEY ST. BD. OF ARCHITECTS (1982) 531 F.Supp. 633 at 642 "...¢i) the state proceedings reflect strong and compelling state in- terests; (ii) the state proceedings are adequate to vindicate federal claims, and ‘(iii)» federal intervention would be substantial and disruptive....” In our case the state proceedings do not even address the problems in this case, Lynch (41a-47a). In this Federal case we are trying to get equal protection and other federal interests addressed and they are no part of the state action. The state proceedings will not address the federal claims and our other rights including those under the 14th amendment. ZWICKLER v KOOTA (1967) 88 S.Ct 391 at 395 (4) this Court held that the federal judiciary is to give due respect toa suitor's choice of a federal forum and: KUSPER v. PONTIKES (1973) 94 S.Ct. 303 at 306 (2,3) "...abstention would amount to shirking the solemm respon- sibility of the federal courts to ‘guard, enforce, and protect every 39 right granted or secured by the constitution of the United States...” We believe isianes ten eeiset and a Stay under 50 USC Appx section 501 et seq. should have beer granted and Federal jurisdiction should have been retained by the Federal District: "... Once the state proceedings are terminated, any further action in federal court would interfere with important stat: interests no more than does any other suit brought under section 1983."" WILLIAMS v RED BANK BD. OF ED. (3rd. Cir. 1981) 662 F.2d 1008,1024. and; Art. If, eeac. 2, par. i (Sa Without some sort of injunctive relief, and/or a ruling from this Court on question seven, we will suffer irreparable injury. We have already been deprived of our rights and suffered great loss over a number of years because of this unequal treatment and should not have to suffer further. 7. This question goes to the default of —_ -— Dallas County and whether this Court or 40 any court or clerk can address the default and such issues that may be part of the relief prayed for when a request for a stay is acted upon under 50 USC Appx. sec. 501 et seq. In the interest of brevity and because of the need to know if this Court will consider the constitutional questions and injunction prayed for, as it relates to Dallas County, we will keep _— commentary short. The injunction requested contains within it subsidiary questions of constitutional law (36a-39a). First, I wish to present why ! believe good service was had and why I believe we are intitled to a default judgement. The law was complied with: Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 4 (80a); Missouri laws 506.140, 506.150 (83a-84a) as applicable when the complaint was filed (33a-39a). Summons were servec twice and this Court has copies on file (Filed: May 26, 1989), 41 The prosecutor, who answered for himself, had a duty to answer for both Dallas County and the State of Missouri or find someone else to do it for him Mo. law 56.060 (84a-85a). He could have had the court appoint someone if he felt it was not proper for him to make the Selection of a substitute attorney Mo. law 56.110 (87a). The exceptions to this duty is covered by Mo. Law 56.070 (86a). When a county counselor should be appointed to handle the exceptions is covered by Mo. Law 56.631 (88a). Dallas County is not a first or second class county so there were no exceptions. It was Mr. Wayne K. Rieschel’s duty to act. Fed.R.Civ. P. Rule 55 (81a-82a) provides for a default judgement against Dallas County. Any neglect of a duty by county officials does not affect the validity of the service or judgment we are entitled to: KNOX COUNTY vy HARSHMAH 42 ’ (1890) 10 S.Ct.257 at 258. When Mr. Cox and Mr. Rieschel answered for themselves they can hardly say that they did not have any knowledge or notice thereof or that county officials were uninformed. This Court held under such circumstances the county has no right to question such actions that may result from their default and that plaintiffs do not need to go through the normal procedure of proving their case to obtain the judgment or other relief desired: UNITED STATES v COUHTY COURT (1887) 7 S.Ct 1171 at 1175. "...The averment to that effect in the petition in the action, if material and traversable, was confessed by the default .... If the defendant had denied it by a proper pleading, the fact would have been put in issue, and the plaintiff would have been bound to prove it....” However, I do believe we are obligated to present more that has been presented thus far. Missouri law 56.360 (87a-88a) allows the private practice of prosecutors in 43 places like Dallas County. Mo.Law 56.065 (85a-86a) prohibits private practice in certain first and second class counties. Private practice is allowed in Dallas County under 56.360 and as a result of this we have been deprived of the peaceful enjoyment of our home and personal property just as surely as Mrs. Freenstra was in KIRCHBERG v FEENSTRA 450 US 455 at 460,461 This Court held that to have to”... made a ‘declaration by authentic act’..."” to protect her interests did not redeem the basic inequality and "...the ‘absence of an insurmountable barrier’ will not redeem an otherwise unconstitutionally discriminatory law...” There is no overwhelming state interest in continuing with this provision, such as there was when the state was new, when travel by horse and buggy could take a day for twelve miles and there were no 44 phones. If our state of Alaska can manage with a approximately twelve district prosecutor system, Missouri, much smaller and with more and better means of communication can manage also with district prosecutors that are not allowed private practice. There are endless numbers of people ready and willing to do the job if the changes are made in Mo. law 56.010 (84a). This provision now weibe to assure that a local fellow will be prosecutor and tends to perpetuate the local problems as far as those coming into the county with different ideas, skin color, etc. To allow this unholy marriage of a private persons interests with the power of the state by allowing a private person to hire a county prosecutor has enabled the private person to influence, if not command, the degree of law enforcement protection and other services provided to 45 us. Certainly everything that has happened here, criminal acts included, appear to have been done with the full Support and permission of the Dallas co. authorities. Both private practice and the current selection to office method used in a area such as Dallas County puts those on the state pay role in the position of having their livelihood depend on their decisions. They do not need to simply perform tueir job, and dispense justice, but they must consider if they will loss their jobs if they do not bend to the prejudices and whims of both their private clients and their friends, relatives, aunts, uncles, cousins: the local electorate, who put and keep them in public office. Private practice by prosecutors allows someone who makes judge like decisions about who is to be prosecuted, when law 46 enforcement is to act, who is allowed to do as they please, to have "substantial pecuniary interests” and adjudicate disputes from an unlevel playing field. GIBSON v BERRYHILL, (1973) 93 S.Ct 1689 at 1699 (7). Even the slightest pecuniary interest of any officer, judicial or quasi judicial invalidates his decisions TUMEY v STATE OF OHIO (1927) 47 S.CT. 437 at 441. A personal, substantial pecuniary interest by a decision maker violates the 14th amendment and due process. Statutory provisions to over sie such an inequality are not sufficient under principles laid down by this Court in WARD v VILLAGE OF MONROEVILLE, OHIO (1972) 93 S.Ct. 80 at 82-84 (1) [2,3] [4] Ability to ask for a special prosecutor does not overcome the basic inequality. The incentive needs to be directed to justice and support of the U.S. 47 Constitution rather than to the above pecuniary incentive. The 14th amendment and Art VI par.2 & 3 (56a-58a) creates a further obligation on local government, below the federal level, to be certain the laws are ones that achieve those ends to the greatest possible degree at the current point in history, understanding of undesirable consequences, current techaaiaay, and still achieve an orderly society. There is also a county duty to run the schools and to train officials to better understand their constitutional duties and individual rights in an effort to combat local prejudices that clearly lead to i4th amendment (58a) violations. There is a special obligation when: groups known to have such violation of equality as their main goals and claim to want to pass(ed) laws to accomplish their objectives (48a-49a); when such groups are known to be active in the area (47a- 48 48a); when they claim to have infiltrated the system itself (50a-53a); and official action tends to lend support to such groups (49a -50a, 52a, 54a). We as a nation can do better in the Dallas Counties of America. KUSPER v PONTIKES (1973) 94 S.Ct. 303 at S07 (5). If freedom to associate is a protected right under the constitution than certainly we bioula be able to have and enjoy our Indian grandchildren and friends regardless of their skin color at our property in Dallas County and we should all be able to enjoy the property with the expectations of fair and equal treatment from Dallas County, Art. IV, sec.2, par.1 (56a), 14th amendment (58a). Without the relief asked in regards to the county in the complaint we will suffer further irreparable injury. We have already been deprived of the peaceful use of our farm, our home and 49 personal property all these years since 1984; put to great expense to only be able to protect our interests in a very limited way; required medical treatment for the resulting physical problems; denied protection from criminal acts or even investigation into the acts; and suffered a break in this spring reported to the court and attorneys for the imeriee and prosecutor, but no return communication was received on the matter, plus much, much more. The system in Missouri cities may be very good. But the playing field will not be level in places like Dallas County until another method of selecting prosecutors and local Judges is devised rather than Mo. Law 56.010 and Mo. Const. Art. 5 sec. 16. "...associate circuit judges shall be elected in the county in which they are to serve.” (adopted Aug. 3,1976) and private practice is ended 50 | (supra 43-47). States that build up sites to honor those who divided this nation: confederate monuments and museums with tax payers money rather than civil war historical sites certainly help to foster racist beliefs within their borders (54a). We find what is going on in Dallas county and Missouri to be outrageous and eksthing, yet the facts are there (47a-54a). The facts, as I see them, places those responsible as coming very close to giving aid and comfort to the enemies of democracy in violation of: Art. III, sec.3, par 1; Art. I, sec.10, par.1 (55a) and in neglecting to uphold Art.VI, par.3 (55a-56a), our whole Constitution all amendments, including the Bill of Rights and the 14th amend- ment. The oath required in Art. VI, par. 2 & 3 (56a) should also bind them to positive action in training subordinates 51 and teaching school children about equal- ity and respect for others rights, etc. It seems self evident that a judicial system as described in the statement beginning this petition, such as Dallas County has, violates the 14th amendment and the laws passed under it (56a-70a). It is wise that Judges and prosecutors are immune from being sued in their official capacity, they need as much independence as justice will allow. However, the reasons behind such immunity are compromised when prosecutors and Judges are chosen by a vote in a place like Dallas County. The local citizens can and will turn them out of office if they do not do their will to a very large degree. Their independence is only an illusion and in such places and an impartial decisionmaker and a fair decision process does not exist. The conflict of interest is too great to be 52 overcome. Where does that leave the outsider wit views, beliefs, skin color, etc? Add to that the private practice and someone like us faces an insurmountable wall of inequality. The right to vote for representation and those that pass our laws is nearly sacred in a democracy and guarenteed under our form of government, but our founding fathers made ne such provision for the selection of those chosen to interpret our laws, in fact on the federal level it is quite to the contrary. Prosecutors have to be considered with Judges because of the nature of their duty. They must make judgments about the law when they decide whether or not to prosecute. The Mo. rural system may have made good sense a century ago and was perhaps the best that could be done than, but today we as a nation can do better. Only this : 53 Court can mandate such a consideration o: this matter of such magnitude. It is in the interest of the legal system, judges. eo lawyers, prosecutors, the general public and all those of good will with a sense of justice and fair play that you do so consider this matter. Not to allow replacement with another unequal systen, but to mandate safe guards built in to give confidence to the stranger or minority that justice will truly prevail and if they believe it does not, a well known place to go to lodge compiaints that will be taken into consideration upon selection or reselection of those for office or advancement. Unless "all persons” as the amendment reads, are able to count on the whole government: State, Federal, and the Courts to treat them all equally under the law we will again soon have "A Watior Divided” part protected by the law and 54 EEE part not protected. The hostility that will grow from that will undo all the progress America has made. It will be a Nation different than we want for either cur Indian or white grandchildren or for our friends of many colors. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the writ of certiorari should be granted. Respectfully submitted, James A. Marker, Jr., and Beverly J. Marker, pro se. P.Q. Box A Langley AFB, Va 23665 (804) 766 2196 Beverly J. Marker 217 East 2nd St. So. Newton, Iowa 50203 (alternate address when in midwest) 55 — ee APPENDIX UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT Marker v Rieschel, et al. Ho. 88-1905 ORDER Filed: April 7, 1989 "A petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied March 8, 1989, and the mandate of this court issued March 17, 1989. Since that time appellants have filed a motion for stay on March 21, 1969. As the mandate has issued, this court has no further jurisdiction in this case. Appellants are notified that further filings may result in imposition of sanctions.” UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT Marker v Rieschel, et al. No. 88-1905 OPINION Filed: Jan. 9, 1989: "James and Beverly Marker appeal pro se from the district court (1) order dis- (1) The Honorable Russell G Clark, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missourl missing their complaint without prejudice. We affirm. The Markers filed this diversity suit on Wovember 27, 1987, alleging various constitutional violations arising out of a boundary-line dispute with their neighbors, Earnie and Mae Burtin. Samed as defendants in their complaint were Wayne Rieschel (the county prosecuting attorney) ,—Jerry Cox ‘(the county sheriff>, and the Burtins. Included in the complaint was a request for a stay pursuant to the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C. section 521, until the year 1995, when James Marker completes his military service, and 4 request for an injunction of a pending state court action involving the same property dispute. On February 9, 1988, the district court granted the Markers a temporary stay until May 13, 1988, and directed them to advise the court of any facts which materially affected their ability to prosecute their case. The Markers responded that James Marker’s military service interfered with his effective prosecution of the case, and requested the court to stay the cause of action until 1995. The district court dismissed the Markers’s complaint without prejudice, finding there were no facts to support a stay. In reaching this result, the court noted that the underlying property boundary dispute was pending in state court, and that the issue was not complex nor would it take an extended period of time to resolve. In addition, the court noted that the Missouri statute of limitations governing the Markers’ cause of action tolled during James Marker's military service, and that it was not in the interests of the defendants, the W o Markers, or of the court to have the case pending until 1995. This appeal followed. Title 50 U.S.C. section 521 provides that the court in which an action is pending has the discretion to stay the proceedings if the ability of the plaintiff to prosecute the action is ‘materially affected by reason of his military service.’ The stay provision is not mandatory and the court has the ultimate discretion in determining, from all the circumstances of the case, whether a stay is warranted. Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 564-65 (1943); Taber v. Miller, 389 F.2d 645, 647 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 915 (1968). The stay provision applies only to persons in military service. Growder v. Capital Greyhound Lines, 169 F.2d 674, ers south involved in those issues in the news that are of such vital concern to our nation at this point in history. 6. My duties and responsibilities have been covered to some degree by previous communications from others, however it seems desirable to touch on this subject again, bearing in mind that there are some subjects I can not cover due to their sensitivity. As Chief of Police here at HAFB and as 3lst Security Police Squadron Commander (31st SPS/CC), I wear "two hats” so to speak. I am responsible for law enforcement at HAFB, working in cooperation with the Metro Dade Police Department, FBI, and various other law enforcement agencies....close enough to 19 a Miami that, unfortunately, criminal activity bleeds over into the HAFB community. 7. My squadron also provides the security for all the resources on base, including the fighter aircraft and the equipment that supports a fighting mission, as well as security for those individuals that use the Conference Center....the Air Force sent me to two anti-terrorim schools. My men have all been mobility trained in airbase ground defense...One must remember the Air Force has no infantry...From time to time, men from my squadron are deployed to other bases worldwide, wherever they are needed. But that is about all I can say on this issue. 8&8. My work days are long. I normally spend twelve hours or more in the office daily, plus time on the weekends, holidays, down days, and evenings. 20 a A. I routinely receive telephone calls at night or communication by radio on law enforcement or security matters... (my note: here is listed 1/2 to 3/4 page of additional duties and meetings he needed to keep on top of, this list would take up several full pages here. ) 11. Since filing the complaint, I have been approached by Tactical Air Command Headquarters at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, concerning overseas assign- ments. In January 1988, they asked me if I would take an assignment to Japan. Because I still did not have anything in writing about the Stay, and because of concern for the safety of my wife, i told them I would rather not take that assign- ment. Again this month, they approached me about an assignment to Ankara, Turkey, working directly for the general in charge there. I told them if I had to go I would have to go without my wife because we were waiting to hear about a Stay in a Federal case. I was told the general might not want me without my wife there too. So far, I have not heard any more on that assignment, but could any day. Both of these assignments would have been good jobs and opportunities for advancement from what I have been told. However, I do not want to leave my wife stateside so far from home, going in and out of such a hostile situation alone, every few weeks, with no one here to return to. It is also difficult tor her to resolve anything when there, since we do not even have the benefit of law enforcement protection. 12. From what I have been told, when I leave here it will be to an overseas assignment. Hot only am I due for one, but the Air Force has tried to completely eliminate state-to-state moves because of budget constraints....if Headquarters 22 a likes your work, when they know you are due for an overseas move they will try and offer you first what they consider some of thee more choice assignments. If one does not agree to accept one of these Opportunities, than after a short while the service member will be given an assignment from Military Personal Center (MPC) in Texas in which there is iittle or no choice about where or when the assignment will be. To turn down all these earlier offers is not wise, in fact can be quite detrimental to ones future. The Air Force does not look favorably on those who turn down good opportunities. ...I know I am due to go overseas on a long tour. it would be best to be able to do it on more favorable terms.... 13. The Air Force in its efforts to save money, is trying to induce those currently overseas to... (double) their overseas assignments ...been known to 23 a change what has been voluntary to involuntary...may find myself overseas for a prolonged period of time....From what my wife has been able to research in case law it seems that one must ask for a Stay for a long enough period of time that one can reasonably hope to proceed with the case...Case law does not appear to support a second request. 14. When I was stationed in Missouri, and realized that we had some problems to solve, I did everything I knew to remain stationed there to do so. SAC wanted me to fill one of their Commander's positions, but when I tried to remain in Missouri and they found my wife could not accompany me, my first assignment was cancelled and I was sent instead to the Tactical Air Command (‘(TAC)...I wanted to be able to resolve the problems at that time, however, my military duty materially affected my ability to even 24a protect my wife or my interests. WE received no cooperation from Dallas County authorities...It was with a heavy heart that I left my wife there in Missouri, knowing that the services I provide to others in the form of law enforcement were being denféd to my wife and myself. Things certainly did not get any better after I left. 15. After the October 1985 incident it seemed the risk to my wifes safety out weighed any benefit, or property interest we had in her remaining there alone without protection. It was after this time she began going back and forth every few weeks. Our property insurance is only good if one of us is physically in the house every so many days. I did everything I could to get help from the local system, but was unsuccessful....I find it shocking when someone can use the power of the state to put another person 25 a in the position of having to go in late at night, or backpack into their own property. 17. ...She felt like she had lived like a tormented hostage in her own house, with Dallas County legal system in the employee of her tormentor and being used against her rather than to protect her. 19. ...it is an important case for not just us but for all those others that come after us who might be so wronged. 21. ...The request for a mandatory injunction is for the most part only a simple request for Dallas County to be required to provide that law enforcement protection be provided on an equal basis that I believe we have a right to expect and that we have not received from Sheriff Cox's Office or from the Prosecutor's Office. 23. Wo one in Law Enforcement who must make a decision about arrest, 26a prosecution, or investigation of a crime should be allowed to enter into or maintain any possible conflicting personal income producing relationship ....I believe that there are very important issues to be decided in this case and that all the defendants acted under "COLOR OF LAW", so it is important for both our rights and public policy that this case be preserved.... 24....1 ama regular officer and therefore a day certain for the end of my military service is not known.... 25. I must OBJECT to any... provision to dismiss this case without prejudice...because this would deny my wife a right to be heard....I believe that my wife's interests in this case and my Own interests are so interwoven that it is essential that we proceed in one action...A dismissal without prejudice would not only greatly prejudice my case, 27 a ientanieeeiiniee tie but would deny my wife's right to be heard with me... 26. I must OBJECT...Local FRCP 1... er. I must OBJECT... geographic location. 28. I must OBJECT.. default judgement tation County is in default.... 29....I1 would like you to make note of the fact that Dallas County is in default. 31. I am especially concerned that in Missouri that rural county prosecutors can have private clients....can leave a citizen with no place to turn in respect to that law enforcement agency one depends upon and which has a monopoly on the types of actions it can legally take...I believe they have a duty to provide that protection without bias in an equal manner... 32. ...injunction in our complaint ...we were simply asking that the court 28 a require Dallas County to provide its services in an equal and impartial basis to all alike and to make any reforms necessary to see that others do not suffer as we have.... 32. As you have seen we asked for a mandatory injunction in our complaint. Perhaps this is not the correct title...we were simply asking that the court require Dallas County to provide its services in an equal and impartial basis to all alike and to make reforms necessary to see that others do not c-ffer as we have... 36. It seems amazing that what has happened to us could go on in America in 1986. It is hard to believe that my wife is still having to drive thousands of miles every few weeks...Do you realize she has been making these trips and backpacking in, or going in at night, for going on three years now?...Wo serviceman 29 a —_——_— ————— a- should have such worry'’s while trying to defend his country.... 37. We have both spent our lives around the military. We work, cooperate, and live in harmony and dignity with all sorts of persons from this ‘melting pot, every race, color, and creed. Therefore our values are perhaps a little different than some others in Dallas County. We believe that everyone should be entitled to equality and dignity. Ve know that a wide variety of service people protect our liberties and way of life in America. We know that when they lay down their lives for our freedoms that all of our blood runs the same color of red. I am responsible within my squadron to see that every person is treated fairly and equally. I would hope that this case would bring the reality of justice, freedom, and equality to the backwoods of America. When one moves to such a place 30 a and stays much to yourself it may take five years before your neighbors find out that you believe in ‘freedom and justice for all.’ We lived in Dallas County for five years in peace and harmony. We believe the cause of our problems goes beyond any property concerns.... 38. ...because both the scoop and magnitude of my military duty require- ments and my geographic location do both materially affect my ability to prosecute this action...it is extremely important that I receive the Stay ... under 50 U.S.C.A. App. sections 521 et seq... 39. As I have said above it is my desire to proceed with case just as soon as possible, and will request to do so just as soon as it seems we can do sc I believe that if this case is dismissed even without prejudice that it will cause prejudice to many of my ielite and cause me great damage e.g. any rights I may 31a have to © eetentt judgement, my wife's right to be heard, my right to have her as a plaintiff with me on this case, and all other rights...In addition we would be left without the legal and law enforcement protection I believe I not only have as a birthright as a citizen of the United States of America, but have earned serving my country. I believe the intent of Congress in passing the Soldiers and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act was to relieve service personal of concern for such matters so they could devote themselves to the full service of their Country....” DISTRICT COURT CIVIL DOCKET SHEET ENTRIES reads in part: 1987 NR. "Nov. 27 2 MOTION - ... (5 summons issued and handed to Nrs. Marker)" "Dec. 22 6 RETURN OF SERVICE - Dallas County, Mo, by certified mail...” "Jan. 26 13 RETURN OF SERVICE - Dallas County, Mo, by personally serving..." 32 a { Wote: copy of this whole sheet, both summons and return service were filed with this Court May 26, 1989 in Mr. Turners office: DOCUMENTS May 1989. j UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI SOUTHERN DIVISION Marker v Rieschel, et al. No. 87-3650- CV-S-4 COMPLAINT Filed Hov 27, 1987 STATEMENT OF FACTS reads in part: " 1. The Plaintiff...spouse...domiciled in the State of Alaska. 5S. The Plaintiffs have been unable to use the military orders issued to Major Marker to move their household goods from Dallas County, nor vacate, nor rent, nor list, nor otherwise use as they would choose the Dallas County Property because of a lack of equal protection by the current Dallas County Officials, and concerns for the safety that exists for any occupant because of this lack of protection. 7. ...Defendants are residents ... of Missouri... 33 a 8. The amount in controversy ...exceeds ... ($10,000.00), exclusive of costs and interest. 16. ...Deputy Thieson, in front of witness, left a complaint form with Plaintiff, Beverly J. Marker for Plaintiff, James A. Marker, Jr., to sign when he retuned to the house. Later that same day, Deputy Thieson informed the Plaintiff, Beverly J. Marker, that the Dallas County Sheriff, Jerry Cox, had instructed him that he could not keeept the complaint because the Dallas County Prosecuting Attorney represented the Defendants, Earnie Burtin and Mae Burtin... 23. on other occasions...effective equal protection and help was either denied or ignored... 24. The Law Enforcement System Dallas County has for its rural residents and property owners consists of the Dallas 34 a County Sheriff's Office, the Dallas County Prosecutor's Office and the Dallas County Court Systen. 26. During the Summer and Fall of 1985 the adult Son and Daughter of the Plaintiffs moved from Alaska, together with their families, and with financial help of the Plaintiffs, to the referred premises...it was considered by family and friends that the property had become unsafe to occupy by one person alone or to put renters in because ot the uncon- trolled actions of the defendants...and the lack of law enforcement... e7. After the Plaintiffs adult children had been on the above referred to premises for a short period of time, they decided that without law enforcement protection...that it was unsafe for their families to remain under such lawless conditions... 31. ...The Plaintiffs believe that the ae main root of their problems is this lack of protection by the county, which they believe the county has a duty to provide....” (SUMMARY of some remaining important points: The above was followed by a request for a Stay in paragraph 33; and request to amend later in paragraph 34 explaining we were filing pro se and were not sure if the complaint was | properly worded; paragraphs 36 through 49 covered SEVEN COUNTS, as best as we could word them, and asked for a sum certain, MONEY DAMAGES, for each of the seven counts. COUNT VIII of the complaint is for injunctive relief and reads as follows: ) "MANDATORY INJUNCTION COMES WOW the Plaintiff and for Count VIII of their complaint states as follows: 50. Plaintiffs incorporates by reference in this Count Paragraphs 1 through 35 of the Statement of Facts contained herein. 51. Defendants, actions or failure to provide protection, as set forth herein are of such a continuing nature such as to deprive the Plaintiffs of an adequate 36 a remedy at law. WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs, James Allen Marker, Jr. and Beverly Jean Marker, his wife, prays as follows: 1. That this Court enters its mandatory injunction requiring The Cownty of Dallas, Missouri, to be required to provide the services of the offices of the Prosecutor and the Sheriff's Office, on which it has a monopoly, to the Plaintiffs on the same basis and with the same ease of access, as impartially, and with the same equal protection as provided any other person or tax payer within its jurisdiction; and 2. That this Court enters its mandatory injunction requiring The County of Dallas Missouri, to treat for purposes of upholding the law, or any other purpose, all persons in its jurisdiction, whether born in Missouri, stranger, military, or "outsider", or regardless of whom might 37 a be, or might have been, their legal representative, in an equal manner, and to offer equal protection without any person being able to use the powers thereof the County or State to an unfair or onesided advantage; and 3. That this Court enters its mandatory injunction requiring the County of Dallas, Missouri, to examine itself or summit itself to inspection by an outside body appointed by this Court, to remove any of those in Law Enforcement, the Justice System, or other County Officials that have not fullfilled the duties of their offices, with held Equal Protect- ion, or have used the power of their office to an unfair advantage to increase their personal gain, or that of their fellow county employees; and 4. That this Court enters its mandatory injunction requiring the County of Dallas Missouri, to make such reforms, update 38 a we such laws or practices, as is necessary to assure true and full equal protection and full civil rights to all those that come within its jurisdiction; and 5S. That this Court order the Defendants, to pay the Plaintiffs reasonable attor- ney's fees, if the services of an attor- ney are used, or to pay reasonable ex- penses for the Plaintiffs in prosecuting this injunction, and in their efforts to secure their Rights and Justice; and 6. That this Court orders the Defendants to pay costs hereof; and 7. _For such other and further relief as is just and proper in the premises." "Demand for Jury Trial” LOCAL COURT RULES OF THE USITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERH DISTRICT OF MISSOURI Effective: January 1, 1983 Rule 1. F: "“F. VISITING ATTORNEYS; PERMISSION TO APPEAR IN A PARTICULAR 39 a CASE. Any attorney not a member of this Bar but who is a member in good standing of the Bar of any court of record, may be permitted to appear and participate in a particular case, civil or criminal, under the following conditions: Where any visiting attorney undertakes to represent clients in this court, there shall be filed with the initial pleading a written statement, identifying each court of which the visiting attorney is a member of the Bar; and stating that neither said lawyer nor any member of a firm to which the attorney belongs appears on any list of attorneys disqualified to appear in that, or any other, court of record. The statement shall designate some member of the Bar of this Court having an office for transaction of law business in the District and Division thereof in which the visiting attorney seeks to appear, 40 a upon whom service of all papers may be made. The member of this Bar so designated shall consent to said designation and endorse all pleadings thereafter filed in the cause. Unless the statement, Supra, is filed with the initial pleading, or within 15 days thereafter, the Court, upon motion, may dismiss any action commenced in violation of this Rule. Upon compliance with the foregoing and introduction of the visiting attorney to the Court the sponsoring attorney may be excused from further attendance and the visiting attorney will be permitted to appear for the purpose of the particular case, without enrollment." Local FRCP Rule 1.F. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT Marker v Rieschel, et al. No. 88-1905 Filed: Feb. 28, 1989 ATTORNEY GARY W. LYNCH'S LETTER dated 4la February 23, 1989. "IT have had the occasion to represent Major and Mrs. Marker on matters at their request arising out of their ownership of their property in Dallas County, Miss- ouri, since the early part of September, 1985, and particularly with regard to the above referenced litigation. In the first petition filed by the Burtins it was claimed that they had an ownership interest in the land upon which the Marker'’s house is located. These allegations have been stricken by the Court and there are no allegations cur- rently pending by the Burtins that they have any claim on the Marker’s house. Mrs. Marker has expressed to me on numerous occasions that she is afraid to Stay at her and her husband's home with- out her husband being present. She related to me several instances when she was threatened by Mr. Burtin and the 42 a Sheriff of Dallas County, although re- quested to assist, refused to investigate or for that matter even come out to the property to lend assistance. The Burtins have been represented in their civil act- ion against Mrs. Marker by the Prosecut- ing Attorney of Dallas County, Missouri. I have had an investigator with this office visit the premises and attempt to verify Mrs. Marker's allegations. He has obtained statements from third parties confirming Mrs. Marker's statements about the failure of the Dallas county Sheriff to respond to her requests for assistance. My investigator found no instance where a witness’s statement contradicted what had been conveyed to me by either Major or Mrs. Marker. Mrs. Marker has indicated to me that as a result of the threats made against her by Mr. Burtin and the threatening actions taken by Mr. Burtin against her, coupled with the fact that the Sheriff has re- fused to respond to her requests for assistance, that she is afraid to stay on her own property without her husband. Major Marker is in the military and be- cause of his assignments cannot stay on the Dallas County property. Therefore, Mrs. Marker has hed no choice but to live away from Dallas County, except for peri- odic ei back to the property to main- tain her residence. She has related to me that on these trips to the Dallas County property she has had to enter and leave the premises surreptitiously because of her fear and her lack of confidence that the law enforcement officials of Dallas County would provide her protection. Because the state court action is strictly between the Burtins'’s and Mrs. Marker, the resolution of the pending litigation in state court would not offer Mrs. Marker any comfort or assurance that _ 44 a she could rely upon the law enforcement officials of Dallas County to provide her protection under the law. The absence of Mrs. Marker from the area and Major Marker's duty assignments in the military have contributed to the inability to conclude the above litiga- tion. In fact, the progress of this litigation has been pending for some time on scheduling the deposition of Major Marker. Given the nature of his duty assignment we have been unable to schedule it at a time when he was available. Until Mrs. Marker can be present in the area for an extended period of time to prepare properly, this case may not be capable of resolution. Although I am representing the Markers in their land controversy, I! am not ina position to represent them in any action involving the law enforcement officials of Dallas County, Missouri. _! have on 45 a humerous occasions had to request of these individuals to lend assistance to several of my clients. it would not be fair to my other clients to jeopardize that relaticaship any further than what my current representation of the Marker's has already done. In addition, because I! have had many occasions to deal with these individuals I have developed personal relationships that would make it personally very difficult to oppose them in a personal manner. I have explained this on several occasions to the Markers and urged that they seek the advice of counsel that is not personally involved. My comments should not be construed as an indication on my part as to any belief as to the propriety of the conduct of any of these individuals but rather as an explanation of my personal inability to assist the Marker's as it relates to the conduct of the law enforcement officials 46 a of Dallas County, Missouri. When Mrs. Marker mentioned to me that she felt that some of the edtions that had occurred to her in Dallas County were the result of actions taken by the Klu Klux Klan (KKK), I told her that I had seen newspaper articles and ads in re- lation to the Klan and that I had heard rumors that they were indeed active in the Dallas County area. Mrs. Marker obtained a copy of a letter to the editor of a local newspaper written by Mr. Ted Dickover who professed to be a member of the local Klan. I recall discussing this and the activities of the Klan in the Dallas County area with various members of the community when it was published. Yours truly. DOUGLAS, LYNCH, MUNTON & HAUS, P.C. BY Gary W. Lynch” (Note: a copy of the above and also the following is on on file with this Court in Mr. Turners Office, filed May 26, 1989 see last part of DOCUMENTS May 1989) 47 a UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT Marker v Rieschel, et al. No. 88-1905 Filed Feb. 28, 1989 SWORN STATEMENT of EUGENE R. WOVAK, JRNIOR, LONG LANE, DALLAS CO. MISSOURI reads in most relevant part: "I, Junior Novak, was raised in Dallas County, Missouri....how many people did I think ether belonged to the Klan OR shared their views....in my opinion it was probably about 95%...the Klan and racism is very active in the County. ..remain low key...manage to accomplish their goals... I believe that the problems Major and Mrs. Marker are having is because they hold beliefs different than most of the people that live in this area.... UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CERCUIT Marker v Rieschel, et al. Ho. 88-1905 Filed Feb. 28, 1989 article Dated 23 Feb. From Buffalo ‘(Dallas Co. ) 48 a Mo. Newspaper by Mr. Ted Dickover reads in most relevant part: "Dear Editor: ... Dallas County... Knights of the Klu Klux Klan ... We believe in white supremacy. We do not believe in Mob violence, but we do believe that laws should be enacted to prevent the cause of mob violence.... I am a Kieagle in this organization, which is the same as a recruiting officer, and males 18 years old or older who would like more information or desires to join this order may contact me at P.O. Box 529, Buffalo, Mo. 65622. For God and Country. Kleagle Ted Dickover" _ { Full copy of the above and also the following articles are on file with this Court in Mr. Turners Office, filed May 26, 1989, please see last part of DOCUMENTS May 1989 ] "MADAME CHOUTEAU" by Roy Blunt (Missouri) Secretary of State, published in the Buffalo Missouri, County Courier 20 April 1989 page 10: "...Madame 49 a Chouteau became an accomplished business— woman, Indian slave trader and property Owner." COMMENTARY, March 22, 1989 by Jim Hamilton, Editor and Publisher of the Buffalo Reflex: "...I would like to have seen Missouri’s streams as the Osage knew them. But several million people have moved into the state since we ran the Indians out....” UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT Marker v Rieschel, et al. No. 88-1905 Filed Feb. 28, 1989, dated 23 Feb. From THE NEWS-LEADER the main newspaper in Springfield, Missouri Sunday, Feb. 14, 1988. Article by Rodney Bowers of Gannett Wews Service, reads in most relevant part: "... Robert Edwards Miles, 63, reportedly the Wo. 2 man in the Aryan Nations group.... Miles, a former grand dragon of the Michigan Realm of the 50 a United Klans of America...had called for "a new order in which followers, through paramilitary and covert actions, would attain total social, total political and total theological power.' The highest officials of this new order, said Miles, should ‘include ones already holding policy-making positions within the federal, state, county or other govern- mental levels,’ including members of the armed forces and police officers.... FURTHER INFORMATION ON "MILES" mentioned in above article from: page 50 of SPEC- IAL REPORT, "The Ku Klux Klan A History of Racism and Violence” Third Edition 1988, Published by Klanwatch, a project of THE SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, 400 Washington Ave., Montgomery, Ala. 36104: "Robert Miles, 62, is the former grand dragon of the United Klans of America's Michigan chapter.... heads the Mountain Church (also called Mountain Kirk) a white supremacist church ... in Cohoctah, Mich., and publishs "From The Mountain" a newsletter read by a wide range of white 5ia supremacists. Miles conducts an exten- sive prison ministry and hosts national gatherings at his farm twice a year. During the 1970s, Miles spent six years in federal prison... According to the \ FBI, Miles was a regional commander of the Order, and he allegedly directed many of the Order crimes. Miles was acquitted along with other top leaders of seditious conspiracy charges in 19886...." ( in Federal Court in Fort Smith, Ark. ] , tFOOTNOTE: A full copv of the article: 2/14/88 pPaje SUa, and a map that was with the article is ON page Soa; additional relevant articles were filed with this Court May 26, 1989 in DOCUMENTS May 1989. 1 e.: the pictures on page S4a were taken at Higginsville, Mo on a 108 acre park where Mo. 1s Duilding a Confederate Museum and adding adjacent acreage for a cemetery; there was also an article titled "KLAN CANDIDATES ANGERING SOME.” The Klan article 16 about two white supremacists who ran for public office this spring in Northmoor, Mo. (population S06 last census ) They were reported to be: Dennis Mahon, a mational Ku Klux Klan organizer, and Joe Howard, a Klan sympathizer and former member of the National Association for the Advancement of White People. They sent out Klan literature to gain votes, upsetting some of those supporters of the opposing candidates. Northmoor is located near Kansas City. These (47a- S4a) are relevant to question 7, and show a little of what is going on in the Western Dist. of Mo. 52 a .. Seriddne se;0m Buyynjjod on = JO woTONIE: sBujquoq Aq ‘ednasd au ‘pevoge sem idweie ey, wy ‘eNIAeleAe4 ‘uoneu UBAIY Ue WO) PUB juewWUIeACO JO xOuH ‘GQ :RET jee (G4 PUB WY 8181S PelUM ey MOsYUEAO OF Buljeow o - “erepBupds j0 see UWHUBs4 1H eOpNr eu) 18 pendsucc vew 10 dnosd @ sebeye 1830P0) 174 OF ‘EBEL ‘92 “26Q Gwed juewUseACO BYU, “OUeP| ‘exe VEPAeH !e VSO Pui 1 Ajpa6eys sseqwew ySO @) sses6u0D suoen uedy ey) Bunp ‘eg61 "Nees 18 “S61 ‘OZ 260 ‘OL-Z Ane jew sisinewesdns e114 00Z ® fUBQ © POQQO! J0PIO SUL JO Grequene © :sAes juewwercd eu) - 98, Ut 8M, Burunepold “yy ‘Munod uoven uy dweo vSo ou 1e E8G6L Vous sdno:5 C861 4eQweleg Wj jUeWNDOP B sUD;s vosmg suueg sewer epee yso (8) Buim-Uubu jeoipes 0} painquye suonoy and with the The News From May |9s9 983 53 a 1 court 2b a. M> Feb 114, 1388 page G-! tnote page Sga and article page 50a tm this ¢ Soringtiel Please see foo sth Cir Ct on 26 Feb Filed wy Leader. PROPOSED SITE OF MISSOURI STATE VETERANS CEME TEN) HIGGINSVILLE, MO. JOHN ASHCROFT GOVERNOR -ARD RICE. DIRECTOR RONALDL.NORRIS PE Ont PUBLIC SAFETY DIV. = DESIGN © CONSTRUCT “2! FS R. ROBERTS. DIRECTOR “TERANS AFFAIRS ie Oe TO .) THE “IssOUR! DIVISK yo ean ...Unless it appears the defendant is not in such service the court my require...that the plaintiff file a bond... to indemnify the defendant, if in military service, against any loss or damage that he may suffer...the court my make such other and further order or enter such judgment as in its opinion my be necessary to protect the rights of the defendant... (3) In any action or proceeding in which a person in military service is a party if such party does not personally appear therein or is not represented by an authorized attorney, the court may appoint an attorney to represent him; and in such case a like bond may be required and an order made to protect the rights of such person. But no attorney 74 a appointed under this Act...to protect a person in military service shall have power to waive any right of the person for whom he is appointed or bind him by his acts. (4) If any Judgement shall be rendered ..and it appears that such person was prejudiced by reason of his military service in making his defense thereto, such judgement may...be opened by the Sours. . « 50 USCS App section 521 STAY OF PROCEEDINGS WHERE MILITARY SERVICE AFFECTS CONDUCT THEREOF At any stage thereof any action or proceeding in any court in which a person in military service is involved, either as plaintiff or defendant, during the period of such service or within sixty days thereafter may, in the discretion of the court in which it is pending, on its own motion, and shall, on application to 75 a it by such person or some person on his behalf, be stayed as provided in this Act (50 USCS Appx. sections 501 et seq.], unless, in the opinion of the court, the ability of plaintiff to prosecute the action or the defendant to conduct his defense is not materially affected by reason of his military service. (Oct. 17, 1940, ch 888, section 201, 54 Stat. 1181) 50 USCS Appx section 523 STAY OR VACATION OF EXECUTION OF JUDGEMENTS, ATTACHMENTS, ETC. In any action or proceeding commenced in any court against a person in military service, before or during the period of such service, or within sixty days thereafter, the court may, in its discretion, on its own motion, or on application to it by such person or some person on his behalf shall, unless in the opinion of the court the ability of the 76 a defendant to comply with the judgment or order entered or sought is not materially affected by reason of his military service-- (a) Stay the execution of any judgment or order entered against such person, as provided in this Act (50 USCS Appx. sections 501 et seq.]; and (b) Vacate or stay any attachment or garnishment of property, money, or debts in the hands of another, whether before or after judgment as provided in this Act (50 USCS Appx. sections 501 et seq.]. (Oct. 17, 1940, ch 888, section 203, 54 Stat. 1181.) 50 USCS Appx section 524 DURATION AND TERM OF STAYS; CODEFENDANTS NOT IB SERVICE Any stay of any action, proceeding, attachment, or execution, ordered by any court under the provisions of this Act 77 a (50 USCS Appx. sections 501 et seq.] may, except as otherwise provided, be ordered for the period of military service and three months thereafter or any part of such period, and subject to such terms as may be just... 50 USCS Appx section 525. STATUTES OF LIMITATICNS AS AFFECTED BY PERIOD OF SERVICE The period of military service shall not be included in computing any period now or hereafter to be limited by any law, regulation, or order for the bringing of any action or proceeding in any court, board, bureau, commission, department, or other agency of government by or against any person in military service or by or against his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, whether such cause of action or the right or privilege to institute such action or proceeding shall have accrued 78 a prior to or during the period of such service, nor shall any part of such period which occurs after the date of enactment of the Soldiers' and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act Amendments of 1942 (Oct. 6, 1942) be included in computing any period now or hereafter provided by any law for the redemption of real property sold or forfeited to enforce any obliga- tion, tax, or assessment. ‘Oct. 17, 1940, ch 888, section 205, 54 Stat. 1181; Oct. 6,1942, ch 581, section 5, 56 Stat. 770.) 50 U.S.C. section 535. PROTECTION OF ASSIGNOR OF LIFE INSURANCE POLICY; ENFORCEMENT OF STORAGE LIENS; PENALTIES (1) Where any life insurance policy on the life of a person in military service has been assigned prior to such person's period of military service to secure (2) Wo person shall exercise any right to foreclose or enforce any lien for 79 a FEDERAL CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURE AWD RULES Fed. R.Civ.P. Rule 4. Process (d) Summons and Complaint: Person to be Served. (6) Upon a state or municipal cerporation or other governmental organization thereof subject tc suit, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the chief executive officer thereof or by serving the summons and complaint in the manner prescribed by the law of that state for the service of summons or other like process upon any such defendant. FEDERAL CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURE AND RULES Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 15. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMEBTAL PLEADINGS "A party may amend the party's pleading... leave shall be freely given when justice so requires se hus Fed. R.Civ.P. Rule 19. JOINER OF PERSOSS HEEDED FOR JUST ADJUDICATION "(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. 80 a ..Shall be joined...if (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded... (2) the person claims an interest... disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) ...impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest (ii) leave any of the persons already parties parties subject to a substantial risk... FEDERAL CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURE AND RULES Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 55. DEFAULT (a) ENTRY. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter the party's default. (b) JUDGMENT. Judgment by default may be entered as follows: (1) BY THE CLERK. When the plaintiff's 81a claim against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain, the clerk upon request of the plaintiff and upon affidavit of the amount due shall enter judgment for that amount and costs against the defendant, if the defendant has been defaulted for failure to appear and if he is not an infant ur incompetent person. (2) BY THE COURT. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor; but no judgment by default shall be entered against an infant or incompetent person unless represented in the action by a general guardian, committee, conservator, or other such representative who has appeared therein. If the party against whom judgment by default is sought has appeared in the action 82 a MISSOURI REVISED STATUTES 506.140 WHO SHALL SERVE PROCESS Service of process except as otherwise provided shall be made by a sheriff, or his de- puty, or in case the sheriff in any cause is for any reason disqualified, then pro- cess may be issued to and served by the coroner of the county in which such pro- cess is to be served; or for good cause shown, some person, other than a sheriff Or coroner, may be specially appointed by the court for service of process in any cause, but such appoint- ment shall be valid for service of the process only for which such person was specially appoint- ed. (L.1943 p. 353 section 26) 506.150. SUMMONS AND PETITION SHALL BE SERVED TOGETHER---HOW SERVICE SHALL BE MADE The summons and petition shall be served together. Service shall be made as follows: (4) Upon a public, municipal, governmental, or quasi-public corporation 83 a or body, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the petition to the clerk of the county court in the case of a county, to the mayor or city clerk or city attorney in the case of a city, and to the chief executive officer in the case of any other public, municipal, governmental or quasi-public corporation or body.... (L.1943 p. 353 section 27) 56.010. PROSECUTING ATTORNEY -- ELECTION --QUALIFICATIONS: ...shall be elected in each county of this state a prosecuting attorney...has been a bona fide resident of the county in which he seeks election for twelve months next preceding the date of the general election at which he is a candidate for such office... 56.060 DUTIES-GENERAL-IW CHANGES OF VENUE-ON APPEAL Each Prosecuting attorney shall commence and prosecute all civil] and criminal actions in his county 84 a in which the county or state is concern- ed, defend all suits against the state or county, and prosecute forfeited recog- nizances and actions for the recovery of debts, fines, penalties and forfeitures accruing to the state or county....or shall employ some attorney at his own expense to represent the state in the courts.. 56.065 PROSECUTING ATTORNEY TO DEVOTE FULL TIME TO OFFICE ‘(CERTAIB FIRST ABD SECOND CLASS COUNTIES) " Notwithstanding the provisions of section 56.360, the prosecuting attorney of every first class county and of counties of the second class having a population of more than one hundred thousand inhabitants, and of counties of the second class having a population of more than thirty thousand containing a part of a city having a population of more than four hundred thousand, and of counties of the second 65 a class having a population of more than eighty thousand at the 1970 decennial census, but less than ninety thousand shall devcte his time full time to his office, and except for the performance of his official duties, shall not engage in the practice of law.” —- 56.070 PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S DUTIES-- EXCEPTION " The prosecuting attorney shall represent generally the county in all matters of law, investigate all claims against the county, and draw all contracts relating to the business of the county. He shall give his opinion, without fee, in matters of law in which the county is interested, and writing when demanded, to the county commission or any commissioner thereof, except in counties in which there is a county counselor....” 86 a 56.110. IF INTERESTED IN CASE, COURT TO APPOINT SUBSTITUTE " If the prosecuting attorney and assistant prosecuting attorney be interested or shall have been employed as counsel in any case where such employment is inconsistent with the duties of his office, or shall be related to the defendant in any criminal prose- cution, either by blood or by marriage, the court having criminal jurisdiction may appoint some other attorney to prose- cute os defend the cause. (R.S. 1939 section 12948) 56.360. EMPLOYMENT IB CRIMINAL CASES PROHIBITED--CIVIL PRACTICE AUTHORIZED. "It shall be unlawful for any prosecuting attorney or circuit attorney, or any assisting prosecuting attorney or any assistant circuit attorney, during the term of office for which he shall have been elected or appointed, to accept employment by any 87 a party other than the state of Missouri in any criminal case or proceeding; provided, that nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude the officers specified in this section from engaging in the civil practice of law. Any violation of the provisions of this section shall be deemed a misdemeanor." 56.631 COUNTY COUNSELOR--CERTAIW FIRST ‘CLASS COUNTIES "The county commission of any county of the first class not having a charter fcrm of government or any second class county which contains part of a city witha population of at least three hundred fifty thousand may by order of the court appoint some suitable person to the position of county counselor... 4. The county commission may require the county counselor to devote his full time to the duties of his office. ‘ 88 a Filed with the 8th Cir. Court of Appeals Marker v. Rieschel, et al. No. 88-1905: ORDER Filed: April 7, 1969 .......... la OPINION Filed: January 9, 1989 .... la-6a Dist. Ct. Marker v. Rieschel, et al. Ho. 87-3650-CV-S-4 ORDER: Filed May 20, 1968 ......... 6a-9a JUDGMENT IW A CIVIL CASE: Filed May 20, iran tesa ir aks ate ara ee es eee eee 9a-10a ORDER: Filed Feb. 9, 1988 ....... 10a-13a LETTER REFRRED TO IW ABOVE ORDER from: R. K. ASH, JR., COLONEL, USAF.... 14a-16a LETTER OF MAJOR MARKER .......... 17a-32a DEGe. Ges “ROIS Gee 6 i a ais cece 32a-33a COMPLAINT filed Wov. 27, 1987 ... 33a-39a G4 om go: EAs a en eee 36a-39a LOCAL RULES OF THE U.S. DIST. CT. for the WESTERN DIST. OF MO. Rule 1. F. . 39a-41la Filed with the 8th Cir. Court of Appeals Marker v. Rieschel, et al. No. 88-1905: ATTORNEY LYNCH’'S LETTER Filed: Feb. 28 RO + 6-8. 0g 6 020-5 a8 eh od eee ee a eS 41a-47a Sworn Statement from Eugene R. Novak, Junior, Long Lane, Dallas Co. Missouri Pilea: Feb. 26, 1960 ..cccrsscveenvvn 48a Misc. Filed with the Courts as indicated. er ere ee ee ee een ee 48a-54a Photo Copies of nearly all of the above was filed with This Supreme Court on May 26, 1989 when we requested addition time. 89 a Constitution, statutes, and regulation: CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (‘in relevant part) Art. I, sec. 10, par. 18@2....... 55a Art. III, @ec. 2, POF. © .rsessescs 55a Art. III, @@c. 3, pear. 2 ..esssnens 55a Art. IV, sec. 2, par. 1 ....... 55a-56a Art. VI, par. 2 OSD wcrc cecssvssseas 56a First Amendment Art.I ......... 56a-57a Fifth Amendment Art.V ............. 57a Seventh Amendment Art.VII ......... 57a Winth Amendment Art.IX ............ 57a Fourteenth Amendment Art.XIV....... 58a Federal Code - Title: 26 USC @@c. 1254 2... secesesees 58a-59a 28 USC ec. ISS nc crc ccssetvnnses 59a 28 UBC @ec. ABTS oes 6 cs ene s Si eee 59a 28 USC sec. 13943 .... cece eeaes 59a-6la 42 USC @ec. 19635 ....eessaedas 61a-62a 42 UEC amc. 1965 fii ws irseaes 62a-66a 42 USC mec. 1966 ...cecscscees 66a-67a 42 USC @ec. 1968 .....ssiesenss 68a-69a 50 USC App sec. 501 et seq..... 69a-79a 50 USC App sec. 464 .... cc eeseseves 70a 50 USC App sec. 466 (c)............ 70a 50 USC App sec. 510 ........... 70a-7la 50 USC App sec. 511 ........... 7la-72a SO USC App sec. S13 .....cscaes 72a-73a 50 USC App sec. 520 ....-sssses 74a-75a 50 USC App @@c. S2i ...cseseees 75a-76a 50 USC App sec. 52S ........... 76a-77a 50 USC App sec. 524 .....-...4. 77a-78a 50 USC App sec. S25 .....seeees 78a-79a 50 USC App S@C. SSS . nc scesecvesesce 79a (In 3rd Circuit Opinion Appendix 4a) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Fed.8.Civ.F. Bula @ 254-5 s eee we ee 80a Fed. R.Ci¢v. FP. Bam Be sss eee ee eee 80a Fed. 8.Giv.P. BObe@ 20 ins eva ewes 80a-8la Ped. R.Civ. FP. RGi@ De «+.sssaneee 8la-82a Local Court Rule of The U.S. Dist.Ct. The Western DistrictOf Missouri: Rule 1. F. Attorneys ......... 3S9a-4la 90a EE Ee eee Missouri Constitution Art.5 sec.16 ... 50 Missouri Revised Statutes: ES ee 83a OS A a 83a-84a (as effective when complaint filed) ee ee a 84a a ae ee a 84a-85a ea ee 85a-86a EES ee ee 86a ee Gre Ws SW 6) 5A KOK Sos ee 8 8 ek 87a ES eee 87a-88a Pe eS 66 ehh a6 5 6k ee ee eee ee ws 88a --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385020_0145%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.