# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Rexall Drug Co. v. Tigue

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1989
- **Citation:** 493 U.S. 944

## Text

n39-2 04 |!

IN THE :
Supreme Court of the Anited States

October Term, 1988

E. R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC.,
Petitioner,
-against-

MINDY HYMOWITZ and ROBERT ABRAMS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,

Respondents.

E. R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC.,
Petitioner,
-against-
ELIZABETH TIGUE, et al.,
Respondents.

E. R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC.,
Petitioner,
-against-

JANE DOLAN and ROBERT ABRAMS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

ALLEN FE. MAULSBY DAVID A. BARRETT
CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE Counsel of Record
One Chase Manhattan Plaza DUKER & BARRETT
New York, N.Y. 10005 90 Broad Street
BARRY M. EPSTEIN New York, N.Y. 10004
MARC S. KLEIN (sap eres

SILLS CUMMIS ZUCKERMAN RADIN ROBERT L. DICKSON

TISCHMAN EPSTEIN & GROSS DAVID J. FLEMING
450 Park Avenue DICKSON, CARLSON & CAMPILLO
New York, N.Y. 10022 150 Broadway, Suite 1600

New York, N.Y. 10038
August 2, 1989

q

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether a state court violates due process by allow-
ing the award of tort damages against a defendant that con-
cededly could not have caused injury to the plaintiff or where
there is concededly no “reasonable link between liability and
the risk created by [the| defendant to a particular plaintiff.”

2. Whether a state statutc .eviving previously time-
barred tort claims—arising from use of only five arbitrarily
selected products—deprives defendants of property without
~ due process of law or violates the Equal Protection Clause.

LIST OF PARTIES

The decision below involved four separate appeals which
were consolidated for argument and decision by the New York
Court of Appeals. Three of those four appeals are the subject
of this petition. The parties involved in the three cases before
this Court are as follows:

Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.

Plaintiff Mindy Hymowitz

Intervenor Attorney General of the State of
New York

Defendants-appellants Eli Lilly & Co.; Abbott

in court of appeals Laboratories; The Upjohn Co.;
Merck & Co.; E.R. Squibb &
Sons, Inc.*

Defendants Ayerst Laboratories (a division of

American Home Products
Corp.); Winthrop Laboratories
(a division of Sterling Drug, Inc.)

* Petitioner E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary
of Squibb Corporation. The affiliates and subsidiaries (other than wholly-
owned subsidiaries) of Squibb Corporation are Squibb-Marsam, Inc.;
Squibb-Novo, Inc.; Chesapeake Biological Laboratories, Inc.; Medaphis Cor-
poration; Squibb of Bangladesh, Ltd.; Squibb Industria Quimica, S.A.; P.T.
Squibd Indonesia; Squibb Korea Limited; Squibb Pakistan Ltd; Von Heyden
Gesellschaft Mit Beschrankter Haftung; Manufactureros Quimicos Far-
maceuticos S.A.; Synbiotics Limitec; R.C.S. Realty Corporation; Sino-
American Shanghai Squibb Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; and Squibb (Nigeria)
Limited.

On July 26, 1989, Squibb Corporation, Bristol-Myers Company and
Screen Co., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bristol-Meyers, executed an agree-
ment and plan of merger which provides, among other things, that upon
consummation of the merger, Squibb Corporation will become a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Bristol-Myers.

Tigue v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.

Plaintiffs

Defendants-appellants
in court of appeals

Defendants

Elizabeth Tigue; Barbara Tigue;
and Sayre Margolies (as Ad-
ministratrix of the Estate of
Myrna Margolies)

E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.; Abbott
Laboratories; Merck, Sharpe &
Dohme (a division of Merck &
Co.); Rexall Drug Co.; The Up-
john Co.; William H. Rorer, Inc.;
Boyle & Co. Pharmaceuticals

Amfre-Grant, Inc. (a subsidiary
of Ormont Drug & Chemical
Co.); Carnrick Laboratories (a
division of G.W. Carnrick Co.);
Cole Pharmaceutical Co.;
Kremers-Urban Co.; Jerome
Schneider, M.D.

Dolan v. Eli Lilly & Co.

Plaintiff

Intervenor

Defendants-appellants
in court of appeals

Defendant

Jane Dolan

Attorney General of the State of
New York

Eli Lilly & Co.; E.R. Squibb &
Sons, Inc.; The Upjohn Co.

Winthrop-Breon Laboratories

a

iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
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ES SS OT eT See ere 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............-0..000- 3
‘A. DESand the Litigationof DES Claims 3
B. The New York “Revival” Statute ...... 7
C. The Proceedings Below and Presentation of
PE Ra wv nccescceccecass 8
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2. The Hymowitz Action ............ 9 |
3. The Dolan Action ............... 9 |
D. The Decision of the New York Court of
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Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. $§ 901, et '
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N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 214(5) (McKinney
TD ais Kk 6 ida ehh Ee Chaba eirs ovens

N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R.214-c (McKinney Supp.
GORD :o.06 cr bh ise danvvns Weis Sioa eee anaes.

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Act of July 30, 1986, ch. 682 $ 4, 1986 N.Y.
BBS NE ss RE OF ae) IE gs ca Oh

OTHER-AUTHORITIES
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B (1965) ...

Herbst, et al., Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina —
Association of Maternal Stilbestrol Therapy
with Tumor Appearance in Young Women, 284
New Eng, J. Med. B78 (IS71) 2. wweccsciccsecess

PAGE

13
18, 19

4, 6, 13, 14

24

2, 7, 21-24

17

bite

xi

McFarlane, et al., Diethylstilbestrol and Clear
Cell Vaginal Carcinoma, 81 Am. J. Med. 855
RR ern soe np er ea eee 5

Mantel, “Some Problems With Investigations
and Epidemiologic Studies Relating to
Pregnancy,” in Prevention of Physical and
Mental Congenital Defects, pp. 45-48 (Marois
oe RE a ee 5

1986 N.Y. Legislative Annual 288 .............. a4

1986 Record of Proceedings, N.Y. Senate at
5147, 5152-53 (statements of Senators Connor
Per rr ereye Terry CET E TTT 20, 21

E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., respectfully prays that a writ
of certiorari issue to review the judgments and opinion of the
New York Court of Appeals entered on April 4, 1989.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the New York Court of Appeals in four
cases (of which three are appealed here), consolidated for
argument and decision as Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., is
reported at 73 N. Y.2d 487, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 539 N.E.2d 1069
(1989), and is reprinted in the Appendix at 1a-34a.! The
opinions of the lower courts in two of the cases are reported
as Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 136 Misc.2d 482, 518 N.Y.S.2d
996 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1987) (App. 44a-54a), aff'd, 139
A.D.2d 437, 526 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1st Dep’t 1988) (App. 35a-
36a); and Tigue v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 136 Misc.2d 467,
518 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1987) (App. 55a-65a),
aff'd, 139 A.D.2d 431, 526 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1st Dep’t 1988)
(App. 37a-41a). The unreported decision of the Supreme
Court, New York County, in Dolan v. Eli Lilly & Co. is
reproduced at App. 66a-73a; its affirmance is reported at 139
A.D.2d 978, 527 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1st Dep’t 1988) (App. 42a-
43a).

JURISDICTION

The judgments of thc New York Court of Appeals effec-
tively rejecting petitioner’s federal constitutional claims were
entered on April 4, 1989. No rehearing was sought. By order
dated June 23, 1989, Justice Marshall extended Squibb’s time
to petition for certioragi to and including August 2, 1989. This
Court has certiorari jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

\

1 In this petition, all parenthetical references to a number followed by
the letter “a” (e.g., “3a,” “27a”) refer to pages of the separately bound
Appendix to the petition.

2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
INVOLVED

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution provides in pertinent part:

“No State . .. shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.”

Section 4 of chapter 682, Act of July 30, 1986, 1986
New York Laws 1567, provides in pertinent part:

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, . . .
every action for personal injury . . . or death caused by
the latent effects of exposure to diethylstilbestrol,
tungsten-carbide, asbestos, chlordane or polyvinyl-
chloride upon or within the body . . . which is barred as
of the effective date of this act or which was dismissed
prior to the effective date of this act solely because the
applicabie period of limitations has or had expired is
hereby revived and an action thereon may be com-
menced provided such action is commenced within one
year from the effective date of this act... .”

INTRODUCTION

At issue in this case is whether a state court can radically
and retroactively expand common law tort liability by eliminat-
ing the fundamental requirement of individualized assessment
of a defendant’s liability. Under the rule adopted by the court
below, a plaintiff can now take petitioner Squibb’s property
through judicial process even though the likelihood is con-
cededly “very remote” that Squibb actually injured the plain-
tiff (App. 9a).

Squibb’s responsibility is presumed upon mere proof that
it belongs to an industry of some 200-300 members, of which
one member allegedly may have injured the plaintiff. As the
court below acknowledged, this rule of “non-identification”
liability permits damage awards absent any “reasonable link
between liability and the risk created by a defendant to a
particular plaintiff” (App. 17a; emphasis added).

Ee Shi

3

Indeed, by making liability turn on the creation of risk
“to the public at large” (id.), the court below has allowed a
plaintiff to exact damages even from a defendant that con-
clusively proves its product was not the source of plaintiff’s
alleged injuries (id.). This “non-exculpation” rule allows a
finding of liability even when the evidence conclusively
demonstrates innocence.

The attraction of taxing a deep-pocket defendant to pay
for an allegedly serious injury is clear. But judicial imposition
of collective guilt, with no opportunity for individual excul-
pation, raises profound constitutional questions.

The impact of New York’s judge-made rule of non-iden-
tification, non-exculpation liability is compounded here by a
discriminatory new statute of limitations. Substantial due
process and equal protection questions are raised by the so-
called “revival” statute, which singled out petitioner’s product
as one of five substances as to which stale claims—including
claims known to the plaintiffs during the old limitations
period—were revived.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. DES and the Litigation of DES Claims.

Over the past two decades, lawsuits alleging injury from
the drug diethylstilbestrol, or DES, have been brought
throughout the country. Plaintiffs claim that they were ex-
posed to DES when their mothers allegedly took the drug to
prevent miscarriage of the pregnancies that culminated in
plaintiffs’ births. Plaintiffs’ injuries allegedly do not appear
until many years later. As a result, most plaintiffs cannot
prove which of several hundred potential defendants
produced the DES their mothers allegedly took. ;

DES duplicates the physiological effects of estrogens,
the natural female sex hormones, which are essential to fer-
tility and successful pregnancy. DES was first synthesized by
British researchers in the late 1930’s. Compared to natural
estrogens, DES is inexpensive and easy to produce. Instead

4

of requiring often painful injections, it is effective wken taken
orally. DES “was accordingly regarded as a revolutionary
breakthrough in biomedical science.” Tidler v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
851 F.2d 418, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1988). It made “estrogen therapy
available for the first time to all women.” Ryan v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 514 F Supp. 1004, 1009 (D.S.C. 1982).

The U. S. Food & Drug Administration (“FDA”) first
approved DES as safe for use in treating certain non-pregnan-
cy related conditions in 1941. See Tidler, 851 F2d at 420;
Ryan, 514 F. Supp. at 1009-10; Martin v. Abbott Laboratories,
102 Wash.2d 581, 689 P.2d 368, 374 (1984). It is still “in use

~ today with full approval of the FDA and the Surgeon General”
for treatment of those conditions, Lyons v. Premo Phar-
maceutical Labs, Inc., 170 N.J. Super. 183, 406 A.2d 185,
189-90 (1979), and others including some breast and prostate
cancers. See 36 Fed. Reg. 21538 (1971).

In 1947, the FDA approved use of DES in treating cer-
tain endocrine-produced disturbances of pregnancy, including
spontaneous abortions or miscarriages. By the early 1950’s,
the FDA had concluded that DES was “generally recognized
... as safe” for pregnancy use, Ryan, 514 F Supp. at 1011 &
n.3, as had been confirmed by independent researchers in ite
field.

DES was widely recommended by medical experts and
prescribed by doctors for preventing miscarriages. Some 200-
300 suppliers ultimately distributed products that contained
generic DES as the active ingredient. See Zafft v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Mo. 1984). It was taken by an
estimated 1.5-3 million pregnant women during the period
‘1947-1971. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cai.3d 588,
163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 607 P.2d 924, 927, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980).

In none of the extensive clinical studies leading to the
approval of DES (nor in any studies during over 20 years of
use thereafter) was there evidence of danger to the mother or
fetus. Indeed, during normal pregnancy the fetus is exposed
to estrogen levels hundreds of times greater than those in

Ris. sa di : bay ee ee ee eee SP ae

5

non-pregnant women. In 1971, however, Dr. Arthur Herbst
published an article which purported to show a statistical
association between a form of vaginal cancer in young women
and prenatal exposure to DES.” Shortly thereafter, the FDA
barred use of DES during pregnancy. See, e.g., Abel v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164, 169, cert. denied, 469
U.S. 833 (1984); Lyons, 406 A.2d at 189. Herbst’s article has
been cited literaily hundreds of times since 1971. Yet not a
single subsequent controlled epidemiologic study has verified
Herbst’s‘elaims nor causally linked DES to vaginal cancer or
other serious abnormalities.

Although the Herbst article is the essential basis for
claims that prenatal DES exposure causes cancer, Herbst’s
raw Statistical data have never been made available for scien-
tific peer review and criticism or subjected to cross-examina-
tion in court. See Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740
F.2d 556, 560, 563 (7th Cir. 1984). More recent studies ques-
tion the validity of Herbst’s purported statistical associations
and suggest that prenatal DES exposure does not cause ihe
alarming increases in cancer claimed by plaintiffs.? Most sig-
nificantly, all the reproductive ailments claimed by plaintiffs
to be caused by DES can and do occur in women who were
never exposed to the drug. See, e.g., n. 3 above; Burnside v.
Abbott Laboratories, 351 Pa.Super. 264, 505 A.2d 973, 988
(1985).

In response to the inability of DES plaintiffs t to identify
the supplier of the drug that allegedly injured them, the lower
courts have reached widely divergent and often conflicting
results. The fundamental importance of individualized

2 Herbst, et al., Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina—Association of Mater-
nal Stilbestrol Therapy with Tumor Appearance in Young Women, 284 New
Eng. J. Med. 878 (1971).

3 See, e.g., McFarlane, et al, Di¢iayistilbestrol and Clear Cell Vaginal
Carcinome, 81 Am. J. Med. 855 (1986); Mantel, “Some Problems With
Investigations and Epidemiologic Studies Relating to Pregnancy,” in Preven-
tion of Physical and Mental Congenital Defects, pp. 45-48 (Marois ed. 1985).

6

factfinding has led most courts to dismiss cases where plaintiffs
cannot identify the proper defendant.* Several states have
adopted non-identification liability, but in forms that differ
substantially from each other.> Still others have left the ques-
tion open.® All states but New York, however, permit defen-

4 See, e.g., Tidler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 851 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1986); Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984); Burnside v. Abbott Laboratories, 351 Pa. Super.
264, 50S A.2d 973 (1985); Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super.
19, 427 A.2d 1121 (1981); Morton v. Abbott Laboratories, 538 F. Supp. 593
(M.D. Fla. 1982); Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589 (D.S.C. 1981);
Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981); Gray v. United States,
445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978).

In addition, a number of courts have rejected non-identification
liability in cases involving other products. See, e.g., Shackil v. Lederle
Laboratories, A2d_ , No. A/16/17/18 (NJ. July 31, 1989); Goldman v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 33 Ohio St.3d 40, 514 N.E.2d 691 (1987); In re
Asbestos Litigation, 509 A.2d 1116 (Del. Super. 1986), aff'd, 525 A.2d 146
(Del. 1987); Blackston v. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co., 764 F.2d 1480
(11th Cir. 1985) (Georgia taw); Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. , 714
F.2d 581 (Sth Cir. 1983) (Louisiana law), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102 (1984);
Dawson v. Bristol Laboratories, 658 F. Supp. 1936 (W.D.Ky. 1987); Griffin v.
Tenneco Resins, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 964 (W.D.N.C. 1986). Cf. Senn v. Merrell-
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 305 Or. 256, 751 P.2d 215 (1988) (rejecting
“market share alternative liability”).

5 Under the teading Sindell decision in California, Sindell! v. Abbott
Laboratories, 26 Cal.3d 588, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 607 P.2d 924, cert. denied,
449 U.S. 912 (1980), a plaintiff must sue a “substantial percentage” of DES
producers, based on nationa! market share figures, and each defendant’s
share of liability is limited to its market share. Id. at 937. See Brown v.
Superior Court, 44 Cal.3d 1049, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 751 P.2d 470 (1988).
Michigan requires a plaintiff to bring “all possible defendants into court”,
thereafter subjecting them to joint and several liability. Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164, 173-74, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984)
(emphasis added). In other states, non-identification actions may proceed
against Oniy a single DES producer, and defendants’ liability can be “inflated”
above market share according to differing rules. See Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
116 Wis.2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984); Martin v.
Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash.2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984); Smith v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 173 Ill. App.3d 1, 527 N.E.2d 333 (1988). .

6 See, e.g., Gaulding v. Celotex Corp., 772 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. 1989); Bixler
v. J.C. Penney Co., 376 N.W.2d 209 (Minn. 1985); Payton v. Abbott
Laboratories, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982).

7

dants in non-identification actions to introduce evidence to
exculpate themselves. Individual DES defendants, including
Squibb, have in fact proven repeatedly that they could not
have been responsible for particular plaintiffs’ injuries.’

In DES cases that have gone to trial, plaintiffs’ specula-
tive causation claims have generally failed to impress juries
that have seen their lack of persuasive scientific evidence.
One Connecticut jury, for example, that heard four months of
testimony—including numerous medical experts presented by
skilled plaintiffs’ counsel—took just two hours to return a
special verdict finding that DES did not cause plaintiff’s in-
juries. Though individual verdicts do not preclude claims by
other plaintiffs, the fact that all plaintiffs’ scientific evidence
of causation is largely identical, combined with juries’ rejec-
tion of that evidence, indicates that defendants are not the
“wrongdoers” assumed by the court below.

B. The New York “Revival” Statute.

Two of the cases on appeal here would have been barred
by the New York statute of limitations were it not for the
passage of a special “revival” statute by the legislature. See
Act of July 30, 1986, ch. 682 § 4, 1986 N.Y. Laws 1567 (p. 2
above). That statute singled out DES, along with four other
substances,’ from a multitude of products believed to cause
latent injury. The statute revived claims based on “the latent
effects of exposure” that were otherwise barred by, or had
been dismissed because of, the statute of limitations. !°

7 See, e.g., Martin, 689 P.2d at 372 (summary judgment exculpating
Squibb); Burnside, 505 A.2d at 986.

8 Miller v. Eli Lilly & Co., et al., No. CV-80-0047107S (Conn. Super.
Ct. Feb. 13, 1985). See also, e.g., Flax v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., No. 4174
(Pa.Ct. ef Common Pleas (Philadelphia) Sept. 30, 1988) (special verdict that
DES did not cause plaintiff’s injuries after one-month trial).

9 The other substances were asbestos, polyvinyichloride (PVC),
tungsten carbide and chlordane.

10 The same legislation also changed the New York rule that the
three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, see N.Y. Civ. Prac.

ee - —

8

C. The Proceedings Below and Presentation of Federal
Questions.

The three cases that are the subject of this petition were
separately briefed in the court of appeals and then con-
solidated with a fourth action (not appealed from here) for
argument and decision. The cases had been certified for
appeal by the appellate division. The three cases here at issue
are as follows:

1. The Tigue Action.

Plaintiffs Elizabeth Tigue, Barbara Tigue and Sayre Mar-
golies filed suit in 1976, individually and as representatives of
a class that was never certified. Elizabeth Tigue alleged that
as a result of her mother’s ingestion of DES, she suffered from
adenosis, a benign tissue condition also found in non-DES
exposed women. Sayre Margolies, as administratrix of the
estate of her daughter Myrna, asserted a claim for wrongful
death, alleging that DES she took caused her daughter to
develop cancer. Plaintiffs alleged that they could not identify
the actual manufacturer of the DES allegedly ingested, and
that they therefore would rely upon some theory of “non-
identification” liability.!!

A number of defendants, including Squibb (App. 74a),
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiffs
had failed to identify them as the manufacturer of the DES in
question, and that any form of non-identification liability was
unconstitutional. Certain defendants further affirmatively
demonstrated that they did not supply the DES actually
taken. !2

L. & R. § 214(5) (McKinney Supp. 1989), began to run when a plaintiff was
last exposed to an allegedly harmful substance. See Fleishman v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 62 N.Y.2d 888, 478 N.Y.S.2d 853, 467 N.E.2d 517 (1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1192 (1985). Under the new law, the limitations period is measured
from the date of discovery of the injury. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 214-c,
(McKinney Supp. 1989), codifying 1986 N.Y. Laws, ch. 682 § 2.

11 The revival statute is not implicated in the Tigue action.

12 Defendant Upjohn showed that the form of DES that it manufac-
tured (a soft gelatinous capsule) was completely inconsistent with the physical

9

The trial court denied the motions for summary judg-
ment in a published opinion rejecting defendants’ constitu-
tional challenges (App. 55a-65a). Although the Appellate
Division and the Court of Appeals did not address the con-
stitutional claims, they were presented in defendants’ briefs to
each court (App. 81a-94a).

2. The Hymowitz Action.

Plaintiff Mindy Hymowitz alleged that her action was
authorized by the 1986 revival statute. Squibb raised a statute
of limitations defense, asserting that the revival provision
violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The
trial court granted plaintiff’s motion to strike the limitations
defense (App. 44a-54a). The constitutional claims challeng-
ing the revival statute were raised in both appellate courts and
rejected by them (App. 19a-22a, 35a-36a, 44a-54a).

3, The Dolan Action.

Plaintiff Jane Dolan alleged that she was unable to iden-
tify the manufacturer of the DES ingested by her mother and
that her action was timely by virtue of the revival statute.
Squibb and other defendants moved for summary judgment,
on the grounds that the revival statute was unconstitutional
and that plaintiff had failed to identify the manufacturer of the
DES ingested by her mother.

The trial judge denied defendants’ motions in an un-
published memorandum decision, relying on his earlier
opinions in Hymowitz and Tigue (App. 66a-73a). Constitu-
tional claims identical to those raised in the Tigue and
Hymowitz actions were raised in the appellate courts
(App. 87a-94a). The constitutional challenges to non-iden-
tification liability were not discussed by those courts; the

characteristics of the hard tablets described by Mrs. Margolies and
Mrs. Tigue. Defendant Rexall showed that it sold DES only through its own
franchised drugstores and that none of the pharmacies patronized by Mrs.
Margolies ard Mrs. Tigue was a Rexall franchisee. See App. 32a-33a.

10

challenges to the revival statute were rejected (App. 19a-22a,
42a-432a).

D. The Decision of the New York Court of Appeals.

As befits an appeal from denial of summary judgment,
the opinion of the court of appeals opens by mentioning that
plaintiffs “allege that they were injured” by DES (App. 3a).
The opinion goes on, however, to state as established fact that
“strong evidence links prenatal DES exposure to later
development of serious medical problems” (App. 4a), with no
mention of the countervailing evidence or the numerous
defendants’ verdicts in DES cases. Apparently based on these
and other allegations, the opinion describes “the insidious
nature” of plaintiffs’ injuries and asserts that “many manufac-
turers, each behind a curtain, contributed to the devastation”
(App. 11a), finally describing plaintiffs as “the innocent” and
the manufacturers as “the wrongdoers” (id.).

Faced with plaintiffs’ inability to identify the suppliers
allegedly responsible for their injuries, the court of appeals
imposed a form of non-identification liability that goes well
beyond anything adopted by other courts. The court below
simply eliminated the ancient requirement of “causation in a
single case” (App. 17a). It imposed this “non-identification”
liability on DES producers even though it admitted that there
is no “reasonable link between liability and the individual risk
created by a defendant to a particular plaintiff” (id.). Indeed,
the court below recognized that “the chance that a particular
producer caused the injury is often very remote” (App. 9a).
Instead, the court based liability upon a presumed “risk of
injury each defendant created to the public at large”
throughout the country by producing DES, with that “risk” to
be measured by each defendant’s “market share” of DES sold
for pregnancy use on an otherwise unspecified “national
market” basis (App. 16a-17a).

The court conceded that liability is not “based on...
causation in a single case” (App. 17a) and that its rule “will
likely result in a disproportion between the liability of in-
dividual manufacturers and the actual injury each manufac-

ee

11

turer caused” in New York (App. 16a). Indeed, the court
admitted that its rule “cannot be founded upon the belief that,
over the run of cases, liability will approximate causation” in
New York (App. 16a-17a).

Most strikingly, ‘he court of appeals’ logic led it to hold
that a defendant is liable for DES injuries notwithstanding
that uncontroverted evidence establishes it had no connection
with the plaintiff whatsoever (“non-exculpation” liability). In
the words of the court below, “there should be no exculpation
of a defendant who. . . appears not to have caused a particular
plaintiff’s injury” (App. 17a). The proven fact that a defen-
dant could not have manufactured the DES actually taken by
plaintiff’s mother “is merely a windfall . . . to escape liability”
(id.).

Finaily, the court held that the revival statute does not
violate due process or equal protection (App. 19a-22a).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. The Decision Below Violates the Most Fundamental
Principles of Adjudicatory Due Process by Allowing
Damage Awards Where There Is No “Reasonable Link
Between Liability” and the Plaintiff's Alleged Injury, As
Well As Where A Defendant Concededly Could Not Have
Caused the Plaintiff's Injury.'>

By denying certiorari in Sindell and its progeny, this
Court has allowed the lower courts to experiment with various

13 Although the judgments below remand these cases for further
proceedings in the state trial courts, they are “final” for purposes of this
Court’s appellate jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a); Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 482-87 (1975). The judgments below finally and
conclusively resolve ail federal questions presented here. Remand procecd-
ings cannot shed material new light upon, or otherwise alter the posture of,
the federal questions. A remand would address state issues only, such as
whether DES caused plaintiffs’ alleged injuries and whether Squibb was
negligent. Further, whatever the disposition might be on remand, there is no
doubt that identical federal issues will repeatedly arise in the 800 cases now
pending or likely to be filed in New York alone (App. 3a, 6a), in most of which
the plaintiffs concede—as they do here—that they cannot identify the

12

forms of non-identification liability. The result has been a
decade of confusion and uncertainty, with no consensus
developing.!4 Non-identification liability remains an aberra-
tion that, as shown below, raises substantial constitutional
questions. The court of appeals’ decision, in linking non-iden-
tification liability with a rule denying defendants the right to
exculpate themselves, raises even more fundamental due
process concerns. In light of New York’s quantum expansion
of non-identification liability, this Court should now set con-
stitutional limits on liability without causation.

Individualized determination of guilt is a uniquely judi-
cial duty that stands at the core of “the Anglo-American legal
heritage.” Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343
(1969) (Harlan, J., concurring). In making individualized
responsibility for a plaintiff’s injuries irrelevant and expressly
barring individual exculpation, the decision below raises sub-
stantial constitutional questions as to whether a court—in the
guise of common law decisionmaking—has the power to
engage in “social engineering” of a distinctly legislative char-
acter. See Mulcahy 376 N.W.2d at 76.

A state court’s development of its common law is, of
course, limited by constitutional constraints. See, e.g., New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1963); Brinker-
hoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 680 (1930).
This “Court must examine [the] State’s chosen standard to
determine whether it satisfies ‘the constitutional minimum of

manufacturer whose product allegedly injured them. Many more cases are
pending in other states.

Finally, the decision below renouncing bedrock concepts of causation
and personal responsibility—while imposing damage awards even on defen-
dants who concededly did not cause plaintiff any harm—threatens core
federal constitutional policies governing irrebuttable and irrational presump-
tions, adjudicative due process and arbitrary action by the states. See Cox
Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 483.

14 See pp. 5-7 & nn. 4-6 above. One result is a crazy-quilt of potential
liability that makes it impossible to insure rationally against the almost in-
evitable dangers of pharmaceutical innovation. It also unfairly penalizes

13

“fundamental fairness”.’”” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
756 n.8 (1982) (citations omitted).

é The requirement that a plaintiff prove that the named

defendant was the person who seonges the plaintiff is a
fundamental tenet of our legal system.!° See, e.g., In re “Agent
Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740, 822
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (“fundamental principle[ ] . . . that a defen-
dant should not be held responsible for harm he did not
cause”); Mulcahy, 386 N.W.2d at 76; (“fundamental
negligence requirement of proving causation”); Zafft, 676
S.W.2d at 247 (“so fundamental a concept of tort law”); Mor-
ton, 538 F. Supp. at 599-600 (“fundamental requirement of
causation”); Namm, 427 A.2d at 1125 (“fundamental princi-
ple”); Gray, 445 F. Supp. at 338 (same); Tidler v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 95 ER.D. 332, 334 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 851 F2d 418
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (“market share theory of liability . . . repre-
sents a radical departure”); Mizell, 526 F. Supp. at 596 (same);
Bateman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 1132, 1133
(Sth Cir. 1986) (characterizing market share liability as “radi-
cal expansion”); Senn, 751 P.2d at 223 (market share “alterna-
tive liability requires a profound change in fundamental tort
principles of causation”).

Under our civil justice system, a plaintiff cannot recover
for “negligence in the air”, Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.,
248 N.Y. 339, 341, 162 N.E. 99 (1928); see Mulcahy, 386
N.W.2d at 76, and thus it is necessary to prove both that the
defendant did something wrong and that it was done to the

national firms with long histories in the industry, since they are the obvious
targets of litigation, while defunct competitors will never have to pay the
alleged costs of their negligence.

15 Cf. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464,
472 (1982) (citations omitted):

“Art. III requires the party who invokes the court’s authority to ‘show
that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as
a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,’ and that
the injury ‘fairly can be traced to the challenged action.”

14

—

plaintiff before the court. Proof of either element alone is not
sufficient. Cf. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1,
13, 35 (1976) (district court invalidated Black Lung Benefits
Act provision on ground that it precluded defense that plain-
tiff’s injury “did not arise out of employment in the particular
mines for which [a defendant] was responsible”). The “law
does not guarantee relief to every deserving plaintiff.” See
Zafft, 676 S.W.2d at 246; Bateman, 781 F.2d at 1133-34 (refus-
ing to adopt market share liability although plaintiff had no
other remedy); Clift v. Nelson, 25 Wash. App. 607, 608 P.2d 647
(1980) (assault action by police officer struck from behind in
mob confrontation dismissed for failure to prove which defen-
dant hit plaintiff).

The rule adopted by the court below amounts in practical
-ffect to a selective tax or social insurance scheme. See Black-
ston, 764 F.2d at 1483 (“elimination of a causation require-
ment would render every manufacturer an insurer not only of
its own products, but also of all generically similar products
manufactured by its competitors”). It “is not merely an exten-
sion of established legal principles, but an action of wholesale
judicial legislation.” See Tidler, 851 F.2d at 422 (citation
omitted); see also Ryan, 514 F. Supp. at 1018 (describing Sin-
deil as “unprecedented legislation”). By the very nature of the
judical process, a court’s ability to make legislative type
decisions is sharply limited by its narrow focus on the parties
before it and the arguments and facts they choose to present,
the restrictions on its ability to gather information, and judges’
lack of power to levy taxes. In light of these inherent limita-
tions, this Court should consider whether due process permits
a state court to perform core legislative functions.

At bottom, this Court must consider whether the
decision below ignores the profound distinction between the
quantum of proof necessary to meet due process requirements
in the fundamentally different contexts of legislative regula-
tion and judicial factfinding. When government seeks to
protect its citizens through a prospective administrative or
legislative ban on possibly toxic substances, the action may be
upheld “even though the probability of harm to any individual

15 -

is small . . . the studies necessary to assess risk are incomplete”
and there is “a very low probability of any causal relationship.”
Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 781, 785. Where, however,
individuals invoke tort law to seek retrospective “compensa-
tion for injuries after the fact,” id. at 781, evidence that might -

_ be adequate to justify a prospective regulatory ban “would not
be sufficient to find an individual defendant liable to an
individual plaintiff.” Jd. at 782. This is because “the law
believes it unfair to require an individual to pay for another’s
tragedy unless it is shown that it is more likely than not that
he caused it.” Jd. at 781.

A. Violation of Constitutional Burden of Proof Require-
ments.

The decision below presents the important question
whether due process allows a state court to take a defendant’s
property where the plaintiff cannot prove by a fair prepon-
derance of the evidence that the defendant caused her alleged
injury. See Tidler, 95 FR.D. at 334 n.5 (noting due process
issue). ‘

This Court has repeatedly recognized that “[t]he func-
tion of a standard of proof” under the Due Process Clause “is
to ‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence
our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual
conclusions.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979);.
quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). The standard of proof “serves to allocate the risk
of error between the litigants” and reflects a societal judgment
as to “the relative importance attached to the ultimate
decision.” Addington, 441 U.S. at 423.

Of particular relevance here, the Court has recognized
that “while private parties may be interested intensely in a civii
dispute over money damages, application of a ‘fair
preponderance of the evidence’ standard indicates both
society’s ‘minimal concern with the outcome,’ and a con-
clusion that the litigants should ‘share the risk of error in
roughly equal fashion.’ [Addington,] 441 U.S., at 423.” San-
tosky, 455 U.S. at 755. “Any other standard expresses a

16

preference for one side’s interests.” Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983). This Court has never
even suggested that private property may be taken in a damage
award upon proof of anything less than a “fair preponderance
of the evidence.” When the standard of proof is changed, it
is invariably done to protect defendants, see, e.g. Addington;
Santosky (“clear and convincing evidence” required to deprive
individuals of certain personal liberties), so as not to disad-
vantage them by “express[ing] a preference for [plaintiff’s]
interests.” See Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 390.

Where private parties have a “relatively equal . . . inter-
est in the outcome... it is appropriate that each share roughly
equally in the risk of an inaccurate factual determination.”
Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 581 n.8 (1987). The decision
below, however, would judicially deprive Squibb of property
where there is no “reasonable link between liability and the
risk created” (App. 17a), and where the likelihood is admit-
tedly “very remote” that Squibb injured the plaintiff

(App. 9a).

The case thus presents the question whether, under the
Due Process Clause, a state court may decide that a particular
group of plaintiffs—“the innocent,” according to the court of
appeals (App. 11a)—is so much more deserving than a par-
ticular group of defendants—arbitrarily characterized as
“wrongdoers” (id.)—that even substantial doubt as to a re-
quired element of the tort must be resolved in plaintiffs’ favor.
This Court has suggested that “in a civil dispute over money
damages,” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755, such a judicial thumb on
the scales of justice is inappropriate because “the State’s
legitimate interest is in the fair and impartial adjudication of
all civil disputes.” Rivera, 483 U.S. at 581 n.8. Even where
“the interests of plaintiffs in such suits are significant”—as
where, for example, plaintiffs are “among the very individuals
Congress sought to protect”—they “should recover” only “[i]f
they prove that it is more likely than not” that the defendant
injured them. Herman-& MacLean, 459 U.S. at 390.

The reason is clear: “the Constitution expressly protects
against confiscation of private property.” Lindsey v. Normet,

17

405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972). If that Fourteenth Amendment right
is to have any substance, it must mean that a person challeng-
ing an owner’s right to his property must show some greater
: entitlement to the property than the owner. In other words,
property cannot be taken where, as here, the challenger’s
claim to it is “very remote” (App. 9a) and the court “concedes
the lack of a logical link” (App. 18a n.3) between the owner
and the challenger.

The New York rule is not justified by the court of
appeals’ claim that it “apportion[s] liability so as to correspond
to the overall culpability of each defendant,” measured by
each DES producer’s “market share” of an undefined “nation-
al market” (App. 16a-17a). Our legal system simply does not
function that way. As an illustration, consider a pedestrian
killed by a speeding hit-and-run driver. Assume that a police
video camera a few hundred yards away records 100 cars
speeding on the stretch of a highway during the hour in which
the victim was struck. No one would seriously contend that
the victim’s estate could sue all 100 drivers and recover 1% of
its damages from each one of them. Having failed to identify
the specific wrongdoer, the estate could recover nothing in
court. !6

B. Non-Identification Liability Creates an Irrebuttable
Presumption.

The decision below also raises the important question
whether an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption is
created by allowing non-identification liability with no oppor-

proceed even against a single manufacturer. Notably in the instant cases,
the total of all Gefendants’ market shares is less than 50% (as would be
expected in a market of some 200-300 firms). In such factual circumstances,
a finding that the “injury was caused . . . by some one of the named defendant
manufacturers,” Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 379, would be pure speculation.

a

19

presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved
fact on which it is made to depend.” Leary v. United States,
395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969). See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining
Co., 428 U.S. at 28 (presumption standards in civil law con-
text).

In the instant cases, no such “substantial assurance” is
possible. Indeed, the opposite is true. No DES producer had
a majority share of DES sales in the 1950’s and 60’s, while
Squibb’s share was about 5-10%. Thus, “a significant percent-
age,” Leary, 395 at 46, or a “not inconsiderable proportion,”
id. at 52, of DES—indeed about 90% of DES—was not sup-
plied by Squibb. Accordingly, as a matter of simple mathe-
matics, the only statement that can be made with “substantial
assurance” here is that “the presumed fact” that a plaintiff was
exposed to DES made by Squibb is not “likely . . . to flow from
the proved fact” that Squibb manufactured DES. See Leary,
395 US. at 36. .

An important constitutional question is thus posed by
whether New York’s DES rule violates the Due Process

- Clause because it “‘operates to deny a fair opportunity to

rebut it.”” Viandis, 412 U.S. at 446, quoting Heiner v. Donnan,
285 U.S. 312, 329 (1932). It “constitutes an attempt, by [judi-
cial] fiat, to enact into existence a fact which here does not,
and cannot be made to exist in actuality,” see Heiner, 285 U.S.
at 329—namely, that Squibb’s product injured every plaintiff
in some proportion related to its market share. Moreover,
because New York lacks the constitutional power to “deny{ ]
a litigant the right to prove the facts of its case,” it cannot
“escape from constitutional restrictions” by doing the same
thing “in the guise of a rule of substantative law.” Jd.

C. The Decision Below Amounts to Impermissible Judi-
cial Legislation.

Under New York’s DES rule, all producers are liable for
their “market share” of all tort damages allegedly caused by
DES, without regard to their connection to a particular
plaintiff’s injuries. This taking of defendants’ property—
without proof of individual responsibility for the plaintiff’s

ia

20

injuries—is functionally identical to the imposition of a
retroactive tax or social insurance compensation scheme upon
all DES producers. See p. 14 above. Such retroactive
comensation regimes raise serious due process questions,
evea when imposed by Congressional enactment. See, e.g.,
Turner, 428 U.S. at 16-20.

Yet here, the court of appeals has adopted a system of
virtually unlimited victim compensation, based only upon the
narrow factual record of asummary judgment motion. In light
of the inherent limitations of judicial proceedings (see p. 14
above) and the fact that all the conditions allegedly caused by
DES also occur absent DES exposure (see p. 5 above), the
rational basis for the court of appeals’ DES rule is open to
serious question. See, e.g., Turner, 428 U.S. at 17-18 (“we
would . .. hesitate to approve the retrospective imposition of
liability on any theory of deterrence or blameworthiness”)
(citations omitted), 25 (“[t]he damage resulting from a miner’s
death that is due to causes other than the operator’s conduct
can hardly be termed a ‘cost’ of the operator’s business” which
it is rational to charge to the employer); United States Dep’t of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).

The court of appeals’ claim that it was merely fulfilling
“expectations” that “the legislature consciously created . . . by
reviving hundreds of DES cases” (App. 11a) is demonstrably
inaccurate. The revival statute was part of a tort reform act
passed only after extensive debate over the course of severa!
legislative sessions. As one of its Senate sponsors said just
before final passage: “[W]e are changing a statute of limita-
tions here. We are changing a procedural measure. We are
not changing substantive right[s], certainly not retrospective-
ly.”17 Thus, the court below simply ignored the express limita-
tions imposed by the democratic branch of government and

17 Statement of Sen. Connor, 1986 Record of Proceedings, N.Y.
Senate at 5152-53; emphasis added). The revival bill’s lead Senate sponsor
explained:

“I would emphasize . . . as I have said over and over again, this
legislation . .. does not automatically have someone be paid a claim.

21

enacted its own political predilections into law. A serious
question is raised by whether appointed judges, whose func-
tion is to adjudicate individual cases, may impose such a
scheme.

II. The New York “Revival” Statute Irrationally Singles
Out Claims Against DES Manufacturers and Arbitrari-
ly Divests Their Right of Repose Under the Statute of
Limitations.

New York’s 1986 revival statute (see p. 2 above) allowed
plaintiffs to file claims—otherwise long barred by the statute
of limitations—involving five enumerated substances during
the one-year period ending July 30, 1987. The revival statute
was justified as an adjunct to a general change in the time from
which the limitations period for alleged latent toxic tort in-
juries runs in New York. Under the new law, the date of
discovery of the injury controls, rather than the date of ex-
posure (see p. 7n. 10 above). The claims that were “revived,”
however, were not limited to those that plaintiffs could not
have discovered during the old limitations period. Rather, the
statute also allowed suits by plaintiffs who knew of their claims
years before the statute had run, but had voluntarily elected
not to sue, as well as claims that were otherwise barred by
actual judgments on statute of limitations grounds.

In rejecting Squibb’s due process challenge to the revival
statute, the court of appeals relied primarily upon this Court’s
decision in Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304
(1945), which held that statutes of limitations are “proce-
dural” and that rights under them exist “only by legislative
grace.” Jd. at 314. An important constitutional question is
presented by whether the analysis and result of Chase—which
was based on the outmoded right-privilege distinction—sur-
vives this Court’s modern redefinition of constitutionally-

They . . . have to have their day in court and they have to prove their
case. By no means are people automatically going to be paid.”

Statement of Sen. Stafford, id. at 5147.

a

22

protected property rights.'8 The need for review is high-
lighted by the fact that two state supreme courts have in-
validated revival statutes similar to New York’s, see Celotex
Corp. v. St. Joseph Hospital, 259 Ga. 108, 376 S.E.2d 880
(1989); Tyson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 399 So.2d 263
(Ala. 1981), albeit on state constitutional grounds. Those
courts’ use of state constitutional provisions is further indica-
tion that the continuing usefulness of the Chase approach is
questionable.

Modern due process analysis defines constitutionally-
protected property interests “by existing rules or under-
standings that stem from an independent source such as state
law.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). The
purpose of the analysis is “to protect those claims upon which
people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be
arbitrarily undermined.” Jd. Similarly, modern just compen-
sation analysis identifies protected property by looking to
whether state regulation “has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations.” Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).

Statutes of limitations give rise to precisely the sort of
reliance interests and “investment-backed expectations” that
due process protects. As Justices Bradley and Harlan recog-
nized over a century ago:

“The immunity from suit which arises by operation of the
Statute of Limitations is as valuable a right as the right
to bring the suit itself. ... Statutes of limitation are not
only calculated for the repose and peace of society, but
to provide against the evils that arise from loss of
evidence and the failing memory of witnesses. . . . [I]t is

18 In addition, even under the outmoded Chase analysis, it is not clear
that the revival statute is merely “procedural.” A truly procedural statute of
limitations applies on a general basis to all cases in broad categories. Here,
however, by singling out DES and four other substances, while ignoring the
many other substances legislatively recognized to produce possible latent
injuries (see pp. 23-24 below), the revival statute in fact makes substantive
distinctions that cannot be rationally justified.

EP a gta LLG woe eee A cen aa

do Pacha

23

... aright, ... when vested, ... as much to be protected
as any other right that a man has.”

Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 631 (1885) (Bradley, J., dis-
senting). See also Tyson, 399 So.2d at 269 (“the great
preponderance of authority favors the view that... after a
cause of action has become barred by the statute of limita-
tions, the defendant has a vesied right . . . or property which
cannot be taken away by legislation”). New York recognizes
that statutes of limitations confer on defendants the right of
repose and the legitimate expectation to be free from stale
claims. See, e.g., Parker v. Port Authority, 113 A.D.2d 763, 493
N.Y.S.2d 355, 357 (2d Dep’t 1985) (“primary purpose of
Statutes of Limitation is to relieve defendants of the necessity
of investigating and preparing a defense,” citing Order of
Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express. gency, 321 U.S. 342,
348-49 (1944)).

In the instant case, the revival statute directly impinges
upon investment-backed expectations that arose by virtue of
the former statute of limitations. Freed from potential
liability by the expiration of the limitations period, a manufac-
turer tailors its business decisions accordingly. In DES cases,
revival prejudices defendants by the very mischief that rights
of repose are intended to prevent: “evidence has been lost,
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.” See
Railroad Telegraphers, 321 U.S. at 349. The deprivation is
particularly acute where defendants relied on actual judg-
ments of dismissal, which are effectively vacated by the revival
Statute.

A substantial question is also raised as to whether
New York’s revival of stale DES claims is irrational and ar-
bitrary, thereby denying petitioner both due process and equal
protection. The rationale for revival is to give a day in court
to plaintiffs who could not reasonably have discovered their
claims earlier. But revival of claims of which the plaintiffs
were aware during the former limitations period is inconsis-
tent with that rationale. Such inconsistency between a
statutory provision and the general justification for the law

24

raises serious constitutional questions. See, e.g., Moreno, 413
USS. at 533-34.

Moreover, although it was asserted in enacting the
revival statute that it covered “all of the currently known
categories of victims of exposure to toxic or harmful substan-
ces,” see 1986 N.Y. Legis. Ann. at 288, that claim is
demonstrably inaccurate. For example, the New York
Workers Compensation Law specifically lists at least a dozen
additional substances that may cause latent injury. See N.Y.
Work. Comp. L. § 28 (M<Kinney Supp. 1989). Similarly, New
York’s prospective change in 1986 to a discovery-based limita-
tions period applied to all substances that may cause latent
injury. See p. 7 n. 10 above.

In these circumstances, a substantial question is
presented by whether it is irrational to single out DES for
revival of claims when other substances that the legislature
believed to be potentially as or more likely to cause alleged
latent injuries are not subject to the same treatment. The
legislative history contains no rational justification for the
distinction; it appears simply to have been a matter of political
expediency. Although, as the court of appeals noted
(App. 22a), the legislature may address a problem one step at
a time, any line that is drawn must be constitutionally accept-
able. An important constitutional question exists as to
whether the revival statute meets the applicable due process
and equal protection standards.

=

musa

25

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of
certiorari to the Court of Appeals of the State of New York
should be granted.

August 2, 1989
Respectfully submitted,

ALLEN F MAULSBY DAVID A. BARRETT
CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE Counsel of Record
One Chase Manhattan Plaza DUKER & BARRETT
New York, N.Y. 10005 90 Broad Street
(212) 428-1000 New York, N.Y. 10004

(212) 809-7700

BARRY M. EPSTEIN ROBERT L. DICKSON

MARC S. KLEIN. DAVID J. FLEMING
SILL CUMMIS ZUCKERMAN DICKSON, CARLSON &
RADIN TISCHMAN CAMPILLO

EPSTEIN & GROSS 150 Broadway, Suite 1600
450 Park Avenue New York, N.Y. 10038
New York, N.Y. 10022 (212) 791-9640

(212) 349-7600

Aitorneys for Petitioner
E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385020_0098%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
